Fukushima Daiichi

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
"Fukushima nuclear disaster" redirects here. For the incidents at Fukushima Daini (Fukushima II), see
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant.
"2011 Japanese nuclear accidents" redirects here. For other 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents/incidents, see
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant, and
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Please consider
splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding or removing subheadings.
(September 2018)
Image on 16 March 2011 (7 years ago) of the

four damaged reactor buildings. From left to
right: Unit 4, 3, 2, and 1. Hydrogen-air
explosions occurred in Unit 1, 3, and 4, causing
structural damage. A vent in Unit 2's wall, with
water vapor/"steam" clearly visible, prevented a
similar large explosion. Drone overflights on 20
March captured clearer images.[1]
Date 11 March 2011
Ōkuma, Fukushima Prefecture,
Location
Japan
37°25′17″N 141°1′57″E /
Coordinates
37.42139°N 141.03250°E
Outcome INES Level 7 (major accident)[2][3]
1 confirmed radiation-related
Deaths
cancer death[4]
37 with physical injuries,[5]
Non-fatal
2 workers taken to hospital with
injuries
possible radiation burns[6]
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster ( 福島第一原子力発電所事故 Fukushima Dai-ichi ( pronunciation) genshiryoku
hatsudensho jiko) was an energy accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Ōkuma, Fukushima Prefecture, initiated
primarily by the tsunami following the Tōhoku earthquake on 11 March 2011.[7] Immediately after the earthquake, the active reactors
automatically shut down their sustained fission reactions. However, the tsunami disabled the emergency generators that would have
provided power to control and operate the pumps necessary to cool the reactors. The insufficient cooling led to three nuclear
meltdowns, hydrogen-air explosions, and the release of radioactive materialin Units 1, 2 and 3 from 12 to 15 March. Loss of cooling
also raised concerns over the recently loaded spent fuel pool of Reactor 4, which increased in temperature on 15 March due to the
decay heat from the freshly added spent fuel rods but did not boil down to
exposure.[8]
On 5 July 2012, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation

Commission (NAIIC) found that the causes of the accident had been foreseeable,
and that the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), had failed to
meet basic safety requirements such as risk assessment, preparing for containing
collateral damage, and developing evacuation plans. On 12 October 2012, TEPCO
admitted for the first time that it had failed to take necessary measures for fear of IAEA experts at Fukushima Daiichi
[9][10][11][12]
inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4, 2013
The Fukushima disaster was the most significant nuclear incident since the 26 April
1986 Chernobyl disaster and the second disaster to be given the Level 7 event classification of the International Nuclear Event
Scale.[13] As of September 2018, there has been one confirmed fatality linked to radiation due to the accident.[4] The United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation[14] and World Health Organization report that there will be no increase in
miscarriages, stillbirths or physical and mental disorders in babies born after the accident.[15] Controversially, however, an estimated
1,600 deaths are believed to have occurred, primarily in the elderly, who had earlier lived in nursing homes, due to the resultant poor
ad hoc evacuation conditions.[16][17]
There are no clear plans for decommissioning the plant, but the plant management estimate is 30 or 40 years.[18] A frozen soil barrier
has been constructed in an attempt to prevent further contamination of seeping groundwater,[19] but in July 2016 TEPCO revealed
that the ice wall had failed to totally stop groundwater from flowing in and mixing with highly radioactive water inside the wrecked
f groundwater with the frozen wall".[20]
reactor buildings, adding that they are "technically incapable of blocking of
In February 2017, TEPCO released images taken inside Reactor 2 by a remote-controlled camera that show there is a 2-meter (6.5 ft)
wide hole[21] in the metal grating under the pressure vessel in the reactor's primary containment vessel,[22] which could have been
caused by fuel escaping the pressure vessel, indicating a meltdown/melt-through had occurred, through this layer of containment.
Radiation levels of about 210 Sv per hour were subsequently detected inside the Unit 2 containment vessel.[23] These values are in
the context of undamagedspent fuel which has typical values of270 Sv/h, after 10 years ofcold shutdown, with no shielding.[24]
Contents
Overview
Plant description
Cooling
Backup generators
Central fuel storage areas
Zircaloy
Prior safety concerns
1967: Layout of the emergency-cooling system
1991: Backup generator of Reactor 1 flooded
2008: Tsunami study ignored
Vulnerability to earthquakes
Events
Tōhoku earthquake
Tsunami and flooding
Evacuation
Units 1, 2, and 3
Core meltdowns
Units 4, 5, and 6
Unit 4
Units 5 and 6
Contamination
Contamination in the eastern Pacific
Response
Poor communication and delays
Event rating
Aftermath
Risks from radiation
Thyroid screening program
Chernobyl comparison
Effects on evacuees
Radioactivity releases
Insurance
Compensation
Energy policy implications
Equipment, facility, and operational changes
Reactions
Japan
International
Investigations
NAIIC
Investigation Committee
See also
References
Notes
Sources
External links
Investigation
Video, drawings, and images
Artwork
Other
Overview
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant comprised six separate boiling water reactors originally designed by General Electric
(GE) and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). At the time of the Tōhoku earthquake on 11 March 2011,
Reactors 4, 5, and 6 were shut down in preparation for re-fueling.[25] However, their spent fuel pools still required cooling.[26][27]
Immediately after the earthquake, the electricity-producing Reactors 1, 2, and 3 automatically shut down their sustained fission
reactions by inserting control rods in a legally-mandated safety procedure referred to as SCRAM, which ceases the reactors' normal
running conditions. As the reactors were unable to generate power to run their own coolant pumps, emer
gency diesel generators came
online, as designed, to power electronics and coolant systems. These operated nominally until the tsunami destroyed the generators
for Reactors 1–5. The two generators cooling Reactor 6 were undamaged and were sufficient to be pressed into service to cool the
, averting the overheating issues that Reactor 4suffered.[26]
neighboring Reactor 5 along with their own reactor
The largest tsunami wave was 13 meters (43 ft) high and hit 50 minutes after the initial earthquake, overwhelming the plant's seawall,
which was 10 m (33 ft) high.[7] The moment of impact was recorded by a camera.[28] Water quickly flooded the low-lying rooms in
which the emergency generators were housed.[29] The flooded diesel generators failed soon afterwards, resulting in a loss of power to
the critical coolant water pumps. These pumps needed to continuously circulate coolant water through a Generation II reactor for
several days to keep the fuel rods from melting, as the fuel rods continued to generate decay heat after the SCRAM event. The fuel
rods would become hot enough to melt during the fuel decay time period if an adequate heat sink was not available. After the
secondary emergency pumps (run by back-up electrical batteries) ran out, one day after the tsunami, 12 March,[30] the water pumps
stopped and the reactors began to overheat.
Meanwhile, as workers struggled to supply power to the reactors' coolant systems and restore power to their control rooms, a number
of hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred, the first in Unit 1, on 12 March and the last in Unit 4, on 15 March.[30][31][32] It is
estimated that the hot zirconium fuel cladding-water reactionin Reactors 1–3 produced 800 to 1000 kilograms of hydrogen gas each.
The pressurized gas was vented out of the reactor pressure vessel where it mixed with the ambient air, and eventually reached
explosive concentration limits in Units 1 and 3. Due to piping connections between Units 3 and 4, or alternatively from the same
reaction occurring in the spent fuel pool in Unit 4 itself,[33] Unit 4 also filled with hydrogen, resulting in an explosion. In each case,
the hydrogen-air explosions occurred at the top of each unit, that was in their upper secondary containment buildings.[34][35] Drone
overflights on 20 March and afterwards captured clear images of the effects of each explosion on the outside structures, while the
view inside was largely obscured by shadows anddebris.[1]
Coinciding with the well understood implicationsof a loss of coolant accident, the insufficient cooling eventually led tomeltdowns in
Reactors 1, 2, and 3. The full extent of the movement of the resulting corium is unknown but it is now considered to be at least
through the bottom of each reactor pressure vessel(RPV), residing somewhere between there and the water-table below each reactor.
In a similar manner to what was observed at reactor 4 inChernobyl.
As of September 2018, there has been one confirmed fatality linked to short term overexposure to radiation reported due to the
Fukushima accident,[4] while approximately 18,500 people died due to the earthquake and tsunami. The maximum cancer mortality
and morbidity estimate according to the linear no-threshold theory is 1,500 and 1,800 but with most estimates considerably lower, in
the range of a few hundred.[36] In addition, the rates of psychological distress among evacuated people rose fivefold compared to the
[37]
Japanese average due to the experience of the disaster and evacuation.
In 2013, the World Health Organization (WHO) indicated that the residents of the area who were evacuated were exposed to low
amounts of radiation and that radiation-induced health impacts are likely to be low.[38][39] In particular, the 2013 WHO report
predicts that for evacuated infant girls, their 0.75% pre-accident lifetime risk of developing thyroid cancer is calculated to be
increased to 1.25% by being exposed to radioiodine, with the increase being slightly less for males. The risks from a number of
additional radiation-induced cancers are also expected to be elevated due to exposure caused by the other low boiling point fission
products that were released by the safety failures. The single greatest increase is for thyroid cancer, but in total, an overall 1% higher
lifetime risk of developing cancers of all types, is predicted for infant females, with the risk slightly lower for males, making both
some of the most radiation-sensitive groups.[39] Along with those within the womb, which the WHO predicted, depending on their
[40]
gender, to have the same elevations in risk as the infant groups.
A screening program a year later in 2012 found that more than a third (36%) of children in Fukushima Prefecture have abnormal
growths in their thyroid glands.[41] As of August 2013, there have been more than 40 children newly diagnosed with thyroid cancer
and other cancers in Fukushima prefecture as a whole. In 2015, the number of thyroid cancers or detections of developing thyroid
cancers numbered 137.[42] However, whether these incidences of cancer are elevated above the rate in un-contaminated areas and
therefore were due to exposure to nuclear radiation is unknown at this stage. Data from the Chernobyl accident showed that an
unmistakable rise in thyroid cancer rates following the disaster in 1986 only began after a cancer incubation period of 3–5 years;[43]
determined.[44]
however, whether this data can be directly compared to the Fukushima nuclear disaster is yet to be
A survey by the newspaper Mainichi Shimbun computed that of some 300,000 people who evacuated the area, approximately 1,600
deaths related to the evacuation conditions, such as living in temporary housing and hospital closures, had occurred as of August
2013, a number comparable to the 1,599 deaths directly caused by the earthquake and tsunami in the Fukushima Prefecture in 2011.
The exact causes of the majority of these evacuation related deaths were not specified, as according to the municipalities, that would
hinder application for condolence moneycompensation[16][17] by the relatives of the deceased.
On 5 July 2012, the Japanese National Diet-appointed Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC)
submitted its inquiry report to the Japanese Diet.[45] The Commission found the nuclear disaster was "manmade", that the direct
causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to 11 March 2011. The report also found that the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami. TEPCO, the regulatory bodiesNISA
( and NSC) and the government
body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as
assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation
plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release. Meanwhile, the government-appointed Investigation Committee on the
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company submitted its final report to the Japanese
government on 23 July 2012.[46] A separate study by Stanford researchers found that Japanese plants operated by the largest utility
[7]
companies were particularly unprotected against potential tsunami.
TEPCO admitted for the first time on 12 October 2012 that it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of
inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants.[9][10][11][12] There are no clear plans for decommissioning the plant, but the
plant management estimate is thirty or forty years.[18]
A frozen soil barrier was constructed in an attempt to prevent further contamination of seeping groundwater by melted-down nuclear
fuel,[19] but in July 2016 TEPCO revealed that the ice wall had failed to stop groundwater from flowing in and mixing with highly
radioactive water inside the wrecked reactor buildings, adding that they are "technically incapable of blocking off groundwater with
the frozen wall".[47][20]
In 2018, some tours to visit Fukushima disastered area have been started.[48]
Plant description
Main article: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Map of Japan's electricity distribution
site close-up network, showing incompatible systems
between regions. Fukushima is in the 50
hertz Tohoku region.
Simplified cross-section sketch of a typical

BWR Mark I containment as used in units 1
to 5
Key:
RPV: reactor pressure vessel
DW: dry well enclosing reactor pressure
vessel.
WW: wet well - torus-shaped all around the
base enclosing steam suppression pool.
Excess steam from the dry well enters the
wet well water pool via downcomer pipes.
SFP: spent fuel pool area
SCSW: secondary concrete shield wall
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant consisted of six GE light water boiling water reactors (BWRs) with a combined power
of 4.7 gigawatts, making it one of the world's 25 largest nuclear power stations. It was the first GE-designed nuclear plant to be
constructed and run entirely by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Reactor 1 was a 439 MWe type (BWR-3) reactor
constructed in July 1967, and commenced operation on 26 March 1971.[49] It was designed to withstand an earthquake with a peak
ground acceleration of 0.18 g (1.4 m/s2, 4.6 ft/s2) and a response spectrum based on the 1952 Kern County earthquake.[50] Reactors 2
and 3 were both 784 MWe type BWR-4s. Reactor 2 commenced operation in July 1974, and Reactor 3 in March 1976. The
earthquake design basis for all units ranged from 0.42 g (4.12 m/s2, 13.5 ft/s2) to 0.46 g (4.52 m/s2, 14.8 ft/s2).[51][52] After the 1978
Miyagi earthquake, when the ground acceleration reached 0.125 g (1.22 m/s2, 4.0 ft/s2) for 30 seconds, no damage to the critical parts
of the reactor was found.[50] Units 1–5 have a Mark-1 type (light bulb torus) containment structure; unit 6 has Mark 2-type
(over/under) containment structure.[50] In September 2010, Reactor 3 was partially fueled bymixed-oxides (MOX).[53]
[54]
At the time of the accident, the units and central storage facility contained the following numbers of fuel assemblies:
Location Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Central storage

Reactor fuel assemblies 400 548 548 0 548 764 N/A
Spent fuel assemblies[55] 292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375[56]
Fuel type UO2 UO2 UO2/MOX UO2 UO2 UO2 UO2
New fuel assemblies[57] 100 28 52 204 48 64 N/A
There was no MOX fuel in any of the cooling ponds at the time of the incident. The only MOX fuel was currently loaded in the Unit
3 reactor.[58]
Cooling
See also: Decay heat § Power reactors in shutdown, and Nuclear reactor
safety system
Nuclear reactors generate electricity by using the heat of thefission reaction to produce steam,
which is used to drive turbines in order to generate electricity. When the reactor stops
operating, the radioactive decay of unstable isotopes in the fuel continues to generate heat
(decay heat) for a time, and so require continued cooling.[59][60] Initially this decay heat
amounts to approximately 6.5% of the amount produced by fission,[59] decreasing over
several days before reachingshutdown levels.[61] Afterwards, spent fuel rods typically require
several years in a spent fuel pool before they can be safely transferred to dry cask storage
vessels.[62] The decay heat in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool had the capacity to boil about 70
.[63]
metric tons (69 long tons; 77 short tons) of water per day
In the reactor core, high-pressure systems cycle water between the reactor pressure vessel and
heat exchangers. These systems transfer heat to a secondary heat exchanger via the essential
service water system, using water pumped out to sea or an onsite cooling tower.[64] Units 2
and 3 were equipped with steam turbine-driven emergency core cooling systems that could be Diagram of the cooling
directly operated by steam produced by decay heat, and which could inject water directly into systems of a BWR
the reactor.[65] Some electrical power was needed to operate valves and monitoring systems.
Unit 1 was equipped with a different, entirely passive cooling system, the Isolation Condenser (IC). It consisted of a series of pipes
run from the reactor core to the inside of a large tank of water. When the valves are opened, steam flows upward to the IC where the
cool water in the tank condenses the steam back to water, and it runs under gravity back to the reactor core. For unknown reasons,
Unit 1's IC was operated only intermittently during the emergency. However, during a 25 March 2014 presentation to the TVA, Dr
Takeyuki Inagaki explained that the IC was being operated intermittently to maintain reactor vessel level and to prevent the core from
cooling too quickly which can increase reactor power. Unfortunately, as the tsunami engulfed the station, the IC valves were closed
and could not be reopened automatically due to the loss of electrical power, but could have been opened manually.[66] On 16 April
2011, TEPCO declared that cooling systems for Units 1–4 were beyond repair.[67]
Backup generators
When a reactor is not producing electricity, its cooling pumps can be powered by other reactor units, the grid, diesel generators, or
batteries.[68][69]
Two emergency diesel generators were available of r each of Units 1–5 and three for Unit 6.[70]
In the late 1990s, three additional backup generators for Units 2 and 4 were placed in new buildings located higher on the hillside, to
comply with new regulatory requirements. All six units were given access to these generators, but the switching stations that sent
power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still in the poorly protected turbine
buildings. The switching station for Unit 6 was protected inside the only GE Mark II reactor building and continued to function.[71]
All three of the generators added in the late 1990s were operational after the tsunami. If the switching stations had been moved to
inside the reactor buildings or to other flood-proof locations, power would have been provided by these generators to the reactors'
cooling systems.[71]
The reactor's emergency diesel generators and DC batteries, crucial components in powering cooling systems after a power loss, were
located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings, in accordance with GE's specifications. Mid-level GE engineers expressed
concerns, relayed to Tepco, that this left them vulnerable to flooding.[72]
Fukushima I was not designed for such a large tsunami,[73][74] nor had the reactors been modified when concerns were raised in
Japan and by the IAEA.[75]
Fukushima II was also struck by the tsunami. However, it had incorporated design changes that improved its resistance to flooding,
reducing flood damage. Generators and related electrical distribution equipment were located in the watertight reactor building, so
that power from the electricity grid was being used by midnight.[76] Seawater pumps for cooling were protected from flooding, and
[77]
although 3 of 4 initially failed, they were restored to operation.

Used fuel assemblies taken from reactors are initially stored for at least 18 months in the pools adjacent to their reactors. They can
[5] Fukushima I's storage area contains 6375 fuel assemblies. After further cooling,
then be transferred to the central fuel storage pond.
[78]
fuel can be transferred to dry cask storage, which has shown no signs of abnormalities.
Zircaloy
Many of the internal components and fuel assembly cladding are made from zircaloy because it is relatively transparent to neutrons.
At normal operating temperatures of approximately 300 °C (572 °F), zircaloy is inert. However, above 1,200 degrees Celsius
(2,190 °F), zirconium metal can react exothermically with water to form free hydrogen gas.[79] The reaction between zirconium and
the coolant produces more heat, accelerating the reaction.[80] In addition, zircaloy can react with uranium dioxide to form zirconium
dioxide and uranium metal. This exothermic reaction together with the reaction of boron carbide with stainless steel can release
additional heat energy, thus contributing to the overheating of a reactor.[81]
Prior safety concerns
1967: Layout of the emergency-cooling system

On 27 February 2012, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered TEPCO to report its reasoning for changing the piping
layout for the emergency cooling system.
The original plans separated the piping systems for two reactors in the isolation condenser from each other. However, the application
for approval of the construction plan showed the two piping systems connected outside the reactor. The changes were not noted, in
violation of regulations.[82]
After the tsunami, the isolation condenser should have taken over the function of the
cooling pumps, by condensing the steam from the pressure vessel into water to be
used for cooling the reactor. However, the condenser did not function properly and
TEPCO could not confirm whether a valve was opened.
1991: Backup generator of Reactor 1 flooded

On 30 October 1991, one of two backup generators of Reactor 1 failed, after
flooding in the reactor's basement. Seawater used for cooling leaked into the turbine
The Fukushima reactor control room
building from a corroded pipe at 20 cubic meters per hour, as reported by former
in 1999
employees in December 2011. An engineer was quoted as saying that he informed
his superiors of the possibility that a tsunami could damage the generators. TEPCO
installed doors to prevent water from leaking into the generator rooms.
The Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission stated that it would revise its safety guidelines and would require the installation of
additional power sources. On 29 December 2011, TEPCO admitted all these facts: its report mentioned that the room was flooded
through a door and some holes for cables, but the power supply was not cut off by the flooding, and the reactor was stopped for one
ged, but its drive mechanism had remained unaffected.[83]
day. One of the two power sources was completely submer
2008: Tsunami study ignored

In 2007, TEPCO set up a department to supervise its nuclear facilities. Until June 2011, its chairman was Masao Yoshida, the
Fukushima Daiichi chief. A 2008 in-house study identified an immediate need to better protect the facility from flooding by seawater.
This study mentioned the possibility of tsunami-waves up to 10.2 meters (33 ft). Headquarters officials insisted that such a risk was
.[84]
unrealistic and did not take the prediction seriously
A Mr. Okamura of the Active Fault and Earthquake Research Center (replaced in 2014 by Research Institute of Earthquake and
Volcano Geology (IEVG), Geological Survey of Japan (GSJ), AIST) urged TEPCO and NISA to review their assumption of possible
tsunami heights based on a ninth century earthquake, but it was not seriously considered at that time.[85] The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission warned of a risk of losing emergency power in 1991 (NUREG-1150) and NISA referred to the report in
2004. No action to mitigate the risk was taken.[86]
Vulnerability to earthquakes
Japan, like the rest of the Pacific Rim, is in an active seismic zone, prone to earthquakes. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) had expressed concern about the ability of Japan's nuclear plants to withstand earthquakes. At a 2008 meeting of the G8's
Nuclear Safety and Security Group in Tokyo, an IAEA expert warned that a strong earthquake witha magnitude above 7.0 could pose
[87] The region had experienced three earthquakes of magnitude greater than 8,
a "serious problem" for Japan's nuclear power stations.
including the 869 Sanriku earthquake, the 1896 Sanriku earthquake, and the 1933 Sanriku earthquake.
Events
Further information: Timeline of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and
tsunami
Tōhoku earthquake
The 9.0 MW Tōhoku earthquake occurred at 14:46 on Friday, 11 March 2011, with the epicenter near Honshu, the largest island of
Japan.[88] It produced maximum groundg-forces of 0.56, 0.52, 0.56 (5.50, 5.07 and 5.48 m/s2, 18.0, 16.6 and 18.0 ft/s2) at units 2, 3,
and 5 respectively. This exceeded the earthquake tolerances of 0.45, 0.45, and 0.46 g (4.38, 4.41 and 4.52 m/s2, 14.4, 14.5 and
14.8 ft/s2). The shock values were within the design tolerances at units 1, 4, and 6.
[52]
When the earthquake struck, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating, but units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for a scheduled
inspection.[51][89] Reactors 1, 2, and 3 immediately shut down automatically;[90][91] this meant the plant stopped generating
electricity and could no longer use its own power.[92] One of the two connections to off-site power for units 1–3 also failed,[92] so 13
on-site emergency diesel generators began providing power.[93]
Tsunami and flooding

The earthquake triggered a 13-to-15-meter (43 to 49 ft)-high tsunami
that arrived approximately 50 minutes later. The waves overtopped
the plant's 5.7-meter (19 ft) seawall,[94][95][96] flooding the
basements of the power plant's turbine buildings and disabling the
emergency diesel generators[70][97][98] at approximately
15:41.[92][99] TEPCO then notified authorities of a "first-level
emergency".[90] The switching stations that provided power from the The height of the tsunami that struck the station
approximately 50 minutes after the earthquake.
three backup generators located higher on the hillside failed when the
A: Power station buildings
building that housed them flooded.[71] Power for the plant's control B: Peak height of tsunami
systems switched to batteries designed to provide power for about C: Ground level of site
eight hours.[100] Further batteries and mobile generators were D: Average sea level
dispatched to the site, but were delayed by poor road conditions; the E: Seawall to block waves
first arrived at 21:00 11 March,[93][101] almost six hours after the
tsunami struck.
Unsuccessful attempts were made to connect portable generating equipment to power water pumps. The failure was attributed to
flooding at the connection point in the Turbine Hall basement and the absence of suitable cables.[97] TEPCO switched its efforts to
installing new lines from the grid.[102] One generator at unit 6 resumed operation on 17 March, while external power returned to
units 5 and 6 only on 20 March.[103]
Evacuation
The government initially set in place a four-stage evacuation process: a prohibited access area out to 3 km (1.9 mi), an on-alert area
3–20 km (1.9–12.4 mi) and an evacuation prepared area 20–30 km (12–19 mi). On day one, an estimated 170,000 people[104] were
evacuated from the prohibited access and on-alert areas. Prime Minister Kan instructed people within the on-alert area to leave and
urged those in the prepared area to stay indoors.[105][106] The latter groups were urged to evacuate on 25 March.[107] The 20 km
(12 mi) exclusion zone was guarded by roadblocks to ensure that fewer people would be fected
af by the radiation.[108]
The earthquake and tsunami damaged or destroyed more than one million buildings leading to a total of 470,000 people needing
[109]
evacuation. Of the 470,000, the nuclear accident was responsible for 154,000 being evacuated.
Units 1, 2, and 3
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2013)
See also: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Unit 1 Reactor), Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Unit 2
Reactor), and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Unit 3 Reactor)
In Reactors 1, 2, and 3, overheating caused a reaction between the water and the zircaloy, creating hydrogen gas.[110][111][112] On 12
March, an explosion in Unit 1 was caused by the ignition of the hydrogen, destroying the upper part of the building. On 14 March, a
similar explosion occurred in the Reactor 3 building, blowing off the roof and injuring eleven people. On the 15th, there was an
explosion in the Reactor 4 building due to a shared vent pipe with Reactor 3.
Core meltdowns
The amount of damage sustained by the reactor cores during the accident, and the location of molten nuclear fuel ("corium") within
the containment buildings, is unknown; TEPCO has revised its estimates several times.[113] On 16 March 2011, TEPCO estimated
that 70% of the fuel in Unit 1 had melted and 33% in Unit 2, and that Unit 3's core might also be damaged.[114] As of 2015 it can be
assumed that most fuel melted through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), commonly known as the "reactor core") and is resting on
the bottom of the primary containment vessel (PCV), having been stopped by the PCV concrete.[115][116][117][118] In July 2017 a
remotely controlled robot filmed for the first time apparently melted fuel, just below the pressure vessel of Unit[119]
3.
TEPCO released further estimates of the state and location of the fuel in a November 2011 report.[120] The report concluded that the
Unit 1 RPV was damaged during the disaster and that "significant amounts" of molten fuel had fallen into the bottom of the PCV
. The
erosion of the concrete of the PCV by the molten fuel after the core meltdown was estimated to stop at approx. 0.7 meters (2 ft 4 in)
in depth, while the thickness of the containment is 7.6 meters (25 ft) thick. Gas sampling carried out before the report detected no
signs of an ongoing reaction of the fuel with the concrete of the PCV and all the fuel in Unit 1 was estimated to be "well cooled
down, including the fuel dropped on the bottom of the reactor". Fuel in Units 2 and 3 had melted, however less than in Unit 1, and
fuel was presumed to be still in the RPV, with no significant amounts of fuel fallen to the bottom of the PCV. The report further
suggested that "there is a range in the evaluation results" from "all fuel in the RPV (none fuel fallen to the PCV)" in Unit 2 and Unit
3, to "most fuel in the RPV (some fuel in PCV)". For Unit 2 and Unit 3 it was estimated that the "fuel is cooled sufficiently".
According to the report, the greater damage in Unit 1 (when compared to the other two units) was due to the longer time that no
cooling water was injected in Unit 1. This resulted in much more decay heat accumulating, as for about 1 day there was no water
[120]
injection for Unit 1, while Unit 2 and Unit 3 had only a quarter of a day without water injection.
In November 2013, Mari Yamaguchi reported for Associated Press that there are computer simulations which suggest that "the
melted fuel in Unit 1, whose core damage was the most extensive, has breached the bottom of the primary containment vessel and
even partially eaten into its concrete foundation, coming within about 30 centimeters (1 ft) of leaking into the ground" – a Kyoto
University nuclear engineer said with regards to these estimates: "We just can't be sure until we actually see the inside of the
reactors."[113]
According to a December 2013 report, TEPCO estimated for Unit 1 that "the decay heat must have decreased enough, the molten fuel
[115]
can be assumed to remain in PCV (primary container vessel)".
In August 2014, TEPCO released a new revised estimate that Reactor 3 had a complete melt through in the initial phase of the
accident. According to this new estimate within the first three days of the accident the entire core content of Reactor 3 had melted
through the RPV and fallen to the bottom of the PCV.[117][118][121] These estimates were based on a simulation, which indicated that
Reactor 3's melted core penetrated through 1.2 meters (3 ft 11 in) of the PCV's concrete base, and came close to 26–68 centimeters
(10–27 in) of the PCV's steel wall.[116]
In February 2015, TEPCO started the muon scanning process for Units 1, 2, and 3.[122][123] With this scanning setup it will be
possible to determine the approximate amount and location of the remaining nuclear fuel within the RPV, but not the amount and
resting place of the corium in the PCV. In March 2015 TEPCO released the result of the muon scan for Unit 1 which showed that no
fuel was visible in the RPV, which would suggest that most if not all of the molten fuel had dropped onto the bottom of the PCV –
[124][125]
this will change the plan for the removal of the fuel from Unit 1.
In February 2017, six years after the disaster, radiation levels inside the Unit 2 containment building were crudely estimated to be
about 650 Sv/h.[126] The estimation was revised later to 80 Sv/h.[127] These readings were the highest recorded since the disaster
occurred in 2011 and the first recorded in that area of the reactor since the meltdowns. Images showed a hole in metal grating beneath
[128]
the reactor pressure vessel, suggesting that melted nuclear fuel had escaped the vessel in that area.
In January 2018, a remote-controlled camera confirmed that nuclear fuel debris was at the bottom of the Unit 2 PCV, showing fuel
had escaped the RPV. The handle from the top of a nuclear fuel assembly was also observed, confirming that a considerable amount
of the nuclear fuel had melted.[129][130]
Units 4, 5, and 6
Main article: Fukushima Daiichi units 4, 5 and 6
Unit 4
Reactor 4 was not operating when the earthquake struck. All fuel rods from Unit 4
had been transferred to the spent fuel pool on an upper floor of the reactor building
prior to the tsunami. On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop
area of Unit 4, creating two large holes in a wall of the outer building. It was
reported that water in the spent fuel pool might be boiling. Radiation inside the Unit
4 control room prevented workers from staying there for long periods. Visual
inspection of the spent fuel pool on 30 April revealed no significant damage to the
rods. A radiochemical examination of the pond water confirmed that little of the fuel
had been damaged.[131]
In October 2012, the former Japanese Ambassador to Switzerland and Senegal,

Mitsuhei Murata, said that the ground under Fukushima Unit 4 was sinking, and the
structure may collapse.[132][133]
In November 2013, TEPCO began moving the 1533 fuel rods in the Unit 4 cooling
[134]
pool to the central pool. This process was completed on 22 December 2014.
Units 5 and 6
Reactors 5 and 6 were also not operating when the earthquake struck. Unlike
Reactor 4, their fuel rods remained in the reactor. The reactors had been closely Aerial view of the station in 1975,
monitored, as cooling processes were not functioning well.[135] Both Unit 5 and showing separation between units 5
Unit 6 shared a working generator and switchgear during the emergency and and 6, and 1–4. Unit 6, not
[136][71] completed until 1979, is seen under
achieved a successful cold shutdown nine days later on 20 March.
construction.

On 21 March, temperatures in the fuel pond had risen slightly, to 61 °C (142 °F) and
water was sprayed over the pool.[5] Power was restored to cooling systems on 24
[137]
March and by 28 March, temperatures were reported down to 35 °C (95 °F).
Contamination
Main article: Radiation effects from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster
Unit 4 after the hydrogen explosion.
Sub article: Comparison of Fukushima and Chernobyl The bright yellow object is the lid of
nuclear accidents with detailed tables inside the Reactor Containment Vessel.
This section is in a list format that may be better

presented using prose. You can help by converting
this section to prose, if appropriate. Editing help is
available. (November 2017)
Radioactive material was released from the containment vessels for several reasons: deliberate venting to reduce gas pressure,
deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea, and uncontrolled events. Concerns about the possibility of a large scale release led
to a 20-kilometer (12 mi) exclusion zone around the power plant and recommendations that people within the surrounding 20–30 km
(12–19 mi) zone stay indoors. Later, the UK, France, and some other countries told their nationals to consider leaving Tokyo, in
[138]
response to fears of spreading contamination.[138] In 2015, the tap water
contamination was still higher in Tokyo compared to other cities in Japan.[139] Trace
amounts of radioactivity, including iodine-131, caesium-134, and caesium-137, were
widely observed.[140][141][142]
Between 21 March and mid-July, around 27 PBq of caesium-137 (about 8.4 kg or

19 lb) entered the ocean, with about 82 percent having flowed into the sea before 8
April.[143] However, the Fukushima coast has some of the world's strongest currents
and these transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, thus Map of contaminated areas around
causing great dispersion of the radioactive elements. The results of measurements of the plant (22 March – 3 April 2011)
both the seawater and the coastal sediments led to the supposition that the
consequences of the accident, in terms of radioactivity, would be minor for marine
life as of autumn 2011 (weak concentration of radioactivity in the water and limited
accumulation in sediments). On the other hand, significant pollution of sea water
along the coast near the nuclear plant might persist, due to the continuing arrival of
radioactive material transported towards the sea by surface water running over
contaminated soil. Organisms that filter water and fish at the top of the food chain
are, over time, the most sensitive to caesium pollution. It is thus justified to maintain Fukushima dose rate comparison to
surveillance of marine life that is fished in the coastal waters off Fukushima. Despite other incidents and standards, with
graph of recorded radiation levels
caesium isotopic concentrations in the waters off of Japan being 10 to 1000 times
and specific accident events from 11
above the normal concentrations prior to the accident, radiation risks are below what to 30 March
[144]
is generally considered harmful to marine animals and human consumers.
A monitoring system operated by the Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) tracked the spread
of radioactivity on a global scale. Radioactive isotopes were picked up by over 40
monitoring stations.[145]
On 12 March, radioactive releases first reached a CTBTO monitoring station in

Takasaki, Japan, around 200 km (120 mi) away
. The radioactive isotopes appeared in
eastern Russia on 14 March and the west coast of the United States two days later.
By day 15, traces of radioactivity were detectable all across the northern hemisphere. Radiation measurements from
Within one month, radioactive particles were noted by CTBTO stations in the Fukushima Prefecture, March 2011
southern hemisphere.[146][147]
Estimates of radioactivity released ranged from 10–40%[148][149][150][151] of that of

Chernobyl. The significantly contaminated area was 10[148]-12%[149] of that of
Chernobyl.[148][152][153]
In March 2011, Japanese officials announced that "radioactive iodine-131 exceeding

safety limits for infants had been detected at 18 water-purification plants in Tokyo
and five other prefectures".[154] On 21 March, the first restrictions were placed on
the distribution and consumption of contaminated items.[155] As of July 2011, the
Seawater-contamination along coast
Japanese government was unable to control the spread of radioactive material into with Caesium-137, from 21 March
the nation's food supply. Radioactive material was detected in food produced in until 5 May 2011 (Source:GRS)
2011, including spinach, tea leaves, milk, fish, and beef, up to 320 kilometres from
the plant. 2012 crops did not show signs of radioactivity contamination. Cabbage,
rice[156] and beef showed insignificant levels of radioactivity. A Fukushima-produced rice market in Tokyo was accepted by
consumers as safe.[156]
On 24 August 2011, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan published the
results of the recalculation of the total amount of radioactive materials released into
the air during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The
total amounts released between 11 March and 5 April were revised downwards to
130 PBq (petabecquerels, 3.5 megacuries) for iodine-131 and 11 PBq for caesium-
137, which is about 11% of Chernobyl emissions. Earlier estimations were 150 PBq
and 12 PBq.[157][158]
In 2011, scientists working for the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Kyoto University
and other institutes, recalculated the amount of radioactive material released into the Radiation hotspot in Kashiwa,
ocean: between late March through April they found a total of 15 PBq for the February 2012
combined amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137, more than triple the 4.72 PBq
estimated by TEPCO. The company had calculated only the direct releases into the
[159]
sea. The new calculations incorporated the portion of airborne radioactive substances that entered the ocean as rain.
In the first half of September 2011, TEPCO estimated the radioactivity release at some 200 MBq (megabecquerels, 5.4 millicuries)
per hour. This was approximately one four-millionth that of March.[160] Traces of iodine-131 were detected in several Japanese
prefectures in November[161] and December 2011.[162]
According to the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, between 21 March and mid-July around 27 PBq of
caesium-137 entered the ocean, about 82 percent before 8 April. This emission represents the most important individual oceanic
emissions of artificial radioactivity ever observed. The Fukushima coast has one of the world's strongest currents (Kuroshio Current).
It transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, dispersing the radioactivity. As of late 2011 measurements of both
the seawater and the coastal sediments suggested that the consequences for marine life would be minor. Significant pollution along
the coast near the plant might persist, because of the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported to the sea by surface water
crossing contaminated soil. The possible presence of other radioactive substances, such as strontium-90 or plutonium, has not been
sufficiently studied. Recent measurements show persistent contamination of some marine species (mostly fish) caught along the
Fukushima coast.[163] Migratory pelagic species are highly effective and rapid transporters of radioactivity throughout the ocean.
Elevated levels of caesium-134 appeared in migratory species of [164]
f the coast of California that were not seen pre-Fukushima.
As of March 2012, no cases of radiation-related ailments had been reported. Experts cautioned that data was insufficient to allow
conclusions on health impacts. Michiaki Kai, professor of radiation protection at Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences,
-related deaths) likely won't increase."[165]
stated, "If the current radiation dose estimates are correct, (cancer
In May 2012, TEPCO released their estimate of cumulative radioactivity releases. An estimated 538.1 PBq of iodine-131, caesium-
134 and caesium-137 was released. 520 PBq was released into the atmosphere between 12–31 March 2011 and 18.1 PBq into the
ocean from 26 March – 30 September 2011. A total of 511 PBq of iodine-131 was released into both the atmosphere and the ocean,
13.5 PBq of caesium-134 and 13.6 PBq of caesium-137.[166] TEPCO reported that at least 900 PBq had been released "into the
atmosphere in March last year [2011] alone".[167][168]
In 2012 researchers from the Institute of Problems in the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, Russian Academy of Sciences, and
the Hydrometeorological Center of Russia concluded that "on March 15, 2011, ~400 PBq iodine, ~100 PBq caesium, and ~400 PBq
[169]
inert gases entered the atmosphere" on that day alone.
In August 2012, researchers found that 10,000 nearby residents had been exposed to less than 1 millisievert of radiation, significantly
less than Chernobyl residents.[170]
As of October 2012, radioactivity was still leaking into the ocean. Fishing in the waters around the site was still prohibited, and the
levels of radioactive 134Cs and 137Cs in the fish caught were not lower than immediately after the disaster
.[171]
On 26 October 2012, TEPCO admitted that it could not stop radioactive material entering the ocean, although emission rates had
stabilized. Undetected leaks could not be ruled out, because the reactor basements remained flooded. The company was building a
2,400-foot-long steel and concrete wall between the site and the ocean, reaching 100 feet (30 m) below ground, but it would not be
finished before mid-2014. Around August 2012 two greenling were caught close to shore. They contained more than 25,000
becquerels (0.67 millicuries) of caesium-137 per kilogram (11,000 Bq/lb; 0.31 μCi/lb), the highest measured since the disaster and
250 times the government's safety limit.[172][173]
On 22 July 2013, it was revealed by TEPCO that the plant continued to leak radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean, something long
suspected by local fishermen and independent investigators.[174] TEPCO had previously denied that this was happening. Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe ordered the government to step in.[175]
On 20 August, in a further incident, it was announced that 300 metric tons (300 long tons; 330 short tons) of heavily contaminated
water had leaked from a storage tank,[176] approximately the same amount of water as one eighth (1/8) of that found in an Olympic-
size swimming pool.[177] The 300 metric tons (300 long tons; 330 short tons) of water was radioactive enough to be hazardous to
nearby staff, and the leak was assessed as Level 3on the International Nuclear Event Scale.[178]
On 26 August, the government took charge of emergency measures to prevent further radioactive water leaks, reflecting their lack of
confidence in TEPCO.[179]
As of 2013, about 400 metric tons (390 long tons; 440 short tons) of water per day of cooling water was being pumped into the
reactors. Another 400 metric tons (390 long tons; 440 short tons) of groundwater was seeping into the structure. Some 800 metric
tons (790 long tons; 880 short tons) of water per day was removed for treatment, half of which was reused for cooling and half
diverted to storage tanks.[180] Ultimately the contaminated water, after treatment to remove radionuclides other than tritium, may
have to be dumped into the Pacific.[18] TEPCO intend to create an underground ice wall to reduce the rate contaminated groundwater
reaches the sea.[181]
In February 2014, NHK reported that TEPCO was reviewing its radioactivity data, after finding much higher levels of radioactivity
than was reported earlier. TEPCO now says that levels of 5 MBq (0.12 millicuries) of strontium per liter (23 MBq/imp gal;
19 MBq/U.S. gal; 610 μCi/imp gal; 510 μCi/U.S. gal) were detected in groundwater collected in July 2013 and not the 900 kBq (0.02
[182][183][184]
millicuries) (4.1 MBq/imp gal; 3.4 MBq/U.S. gal; 110 μCi/imp gal; 92 μCi/U.S. gal) that were initially reported.
On 10 September 2015, floodwaters driven by Typhoon Etau prompted mass evacuations in Japan and overwhelmed the drainage
pumps at the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant. A TEPCO spokesperson said that hundreds of metric tons of radioactive water had
entered the ocean as a result.[185] Plastic bags filled with contaminated soil and grass were also swept away by the flood waters.
[186]
Contamination in the eastern Pacific

In March 2014, numerous news sources, including NBC,[187] began predicting that the radioactive underwater plume traveling
through the Pacific Ocean would reach the western seaboard of the continental United States. The common story was that the amount
of radioactivity would be harmless and temporary once it arrived. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration measured
caesium-134 at points in the Pacific Ocean and models were cited in predictions by several government agencies to announce that the
radiation would not be a health hazard for North American residents. Groups, including Beyond Nuclear and the Tillamook Estuaries
Partnership, challenged these predictions on the basis of continued isotope releases after 2011, leading to a demand for more recent
and comprehensive measurements as the radioactivity made its way east. These measurements were taken by a cooperative group of
organizations under the guidance of a marine chemist with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and it was revealed that total
radiation levels, of which only a fraction bore the fingerprint of Fukushima, were not high enough to pose any direct risk to human
life and in fact were far less than Environmental Protection Agencyguidelines or several other sources of radiation exposure deemed
safe.[188] Integrated Fukushima Ocean Radionuclide Monitoring project (InFORM) also failed to show any significant amount of
radiation[189] and as a result authors received death threats from supporters of a Fukushima-induced "wave of cancer deaths across
North America" theory.[190]
Response
See also: Investigations into the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
Government agencies and TEPCO were unprepared for the "cascading nuclear disaster".[191] The tsunami that "began the nuclear
disaster could and should have been anticipated and that ambiguity about the roles of public and private institutions in such a crisis
was a factor in the poor response at Fukushima".[191] In March 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that the government
shared the blame for the Fukushima disaster, saying that officials had been blinded by a false belief in the country's "technological
."[192]
infallibility", and were taken in by a "safety myth". Noda said "Everybody must share the pain of responsibility
According to Naoto Kan, Japan's prime minister during the tsunami, the country was unprepared for the disaster, and nuclear power
plants should not have been built so close to the ocean.[193] Kan acknowledged flaws in authorities' handling of the crisis, including
poor communication and coordination between nuclear regulators, utility of
ficials, and the government. He said the disaster "laid bare
a host of an even bigger man-made vulnerabilities in Japan's nuclear industry and regulation, from inadequate safety guidelines to
[193]
crisis management, all of which he said need to be overhauled."
Physicist and environmentalist Amory Lovins said that Japan's "rigid bureaucratic structures, reluctance to send bad news upwards,
need to save face, weak development of policy alternatives, eagerness to preserve nuclear power's public acceptance, and politically
fragile government, along with TEPCO's very hierarchical management culture, also contributed to the way the accident unfolded.
Moreover, the information Japanese people receive about nuclear energy and its alternatives has long been tightly controlled by both
TEPCO and the government."[194]
Poor communication and delays

The Japanese government did not keep records of key meetings during the crisis.[195] Data from the SPEEDI network were emailed
to the prefectural government, but not shared with others. Emails from NISA to Fukushima, covering 12 March 11:54 PM to 16
March 9 AM and holding vital information for evacuation and health advisories, went unread and were deleted. The data was not
used because the disaster countermeasure office regarded the data as "useless because the predicted amount of released radiation is
unrealistic."[196] On 14 March 2011 TEPCO officials were instructed not to use the phrase "core meltdown" at press
conferences.[197]
On the evening of 15 March, Prime Minister Kan called Seiki Soramoto, who used to design nuclear plants for Toshiba, to ask for his
help in managing the escalating crisis. Soramoto formed an impromptu advisory group, which included his former professor at the
University of Tokyo, Toshiso Kosako, a top Japanese expert on radiation measurement. Mr. Kosako, who studied the Soviet response
to the Chernobyl crisis, said he was stunned at how little the leaders in the prime minister’s office knew about the resources available
to them. He quickly advised the chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, to use SPEEDI, which used measurements of radioactive
releases, as well as weather and topographical data, to predict where radioactive materials could travel after being released into the
atmosphere.[198]
The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company's interim
report stated that Japan's response was flawed by "poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at
the facility". The report blamed Japan's central government as well as TEPCO, "depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of
making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the
disaster".[199] The report said poor planning worsened the disaster response, noting that authorities had "grossly underestimated
tsunami risks" that followed the magnitude 9.0 earthquake. The 12.1-meter (40 ft) high tsunami that struck the plant was double the
height of the highest wave predicted by officials. The erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system would function after the
tsunami worsened the disaster. "Plant workers had no clear instructions on how to respond to such a disaster, causing
[199]
miscommunication, especially when the disaster destroyed backup generators."
In February 2012, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation described how Japan's response was hindered by a loss of trust between
the major actors: Prime Minister Kan, TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters and the plant manager. The report said that these conflicts
"produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information".[200][201] According to the report, Kan delayed the cooling of the
reactors by questioning the choice of seawater instead of fresh water
, accusing him of micromanaging response efforts and appointing
a small, closed, decision-making staff. The report stated that the Japanese government was slow to accept assistance from U.S.
nuclear experts.[202]
A 2012 report in The Economist said: "The operating company was poorly regulated and did not know what was going on. The
operators made mistakes. The representatives of the safety inspectorate fled. Some of the equipment failed. The establishment
repeatedly played down the risks and suppressed information about the movement of the radioactive plume, so some people were
[203]
evacuated from more lightly to more heavily contaminated places."
From 17 to 19 March 2011, US military aircraft measured radiation within a 45 km (28 mi) radius of the site. The data recorded 125
microsieverts per hour of radiation as far as 25 km (15.5 mi) northwest of the plant. The US provided detailed maps to the Japanese
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on 18 March and to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT) two days later, but officials did not act on the information.[204]
The data were not forwarded to the prime minister's office or the Nuclear Safety Commission(NSC), nor were they used to direct the
evacuation. Because a substantial portion of radioactive materials reached ground to the northwest, residents evacuated in this
direction were unnecessarily exposed to radiation. According to NSC chief Tetsuya Yamamoto, "It was very regrettable that we didn't
share and utilize the information." Itaru Watanabe, from the Science and Technology Policy Bureau, blamed the US for not releasing
the data.[205]
Data on the dispersal of radioactive materials were provided to the U.S. forces by the Japanese Ministry for Science a few days after
11 March; however, the data was not shared publicly until the Americans published their map on 23 March, at which point Japan
published fallout maps compiled from ground measurements and SPEEDI the same day.[206] According to Watanabe's testimony
before the Diet, the US military was given access to the data "to seek support from them" on how to deal with the nuclear disaster.
Although SPEEDI's effectiveness was limited by not knowing the amounts released in the disaster, and thus was considered
"unreliable", it was still able to forecast dispersal routes and could have been used to help local governments designate more
appropriate evacuation routes.[207]
On 19 June 2012, science minister Hirofumi Hirano stated that his "job was only to measure radiation levels on land" and that the
ef [206]
government would study whether disclosure could have helped in the evacuation forts.
On 28 June 2012, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency officials apologized to mayor Yuko Endo of Kawauchi Village for NISA
having failed to release the American-produced radiation maps in the first days after the meltdowns. All residents of this village were
evacuated after the government designated it a no-entry zone. According to a Japanese government panel, authorities had shown no
respect for the lives and dignity of village people. One NISA official apologized for the failure and added that the panel had stressed
the importance of disclosure; however, the mayor said that the information would have prevented the evacuation into highly polluted
[208]
areas, and that apologies a year too late had no meaning.
In June 2016, it was revealed that TEPCO officials had been instructed on 14 March 2011 not to describe the reactor damage using
the word "meltdown". Officials at that time were aware that 25–55% of the fuel had been damaged, and the threshold for which the
term "meltdown" became appropriate (5%) had been greatly exceeded. TEPCO President Naomi Hirose told the media: "I would say
it was a cover-up... It’s extremely regrettable.”[209]
Event rating
Main article: Accident rating of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
The incident was rated 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).[210] This
scale runs from 0, indicating an abnormal situation with no safety consequences, to
7, indicating an accident causing widespread contamination with serious health and
environmental effects. Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level
7 event on record, while theThree Mile Island accidentwas rated as level 5.
Comparison of radiation levels for
A 2012 analysis of the intermediate and long-lived radioactivity released found
different nuclear events
about 10–20% of that released from the Chernobyl disaster.[211][212] Approximately
15 PBq of caesium-137 was released,[213] compared with approximately 85 PBq of
caesium-137 at Chernobyl,[214] indicating the release of 26.5 kilograms (58 lb) of caesium-137.
Unlike Chernobyl, all Japanese reactors were in concrete containment vessels, which limited the release of strontium-90, americium-
241, and plutonium, which were among theradioisotopes released by the earlier incident.[211][214]
Some 500 PBq of iodine-131 were released,[213] compared to approximately 1,760 PBq at Chernobyl.[214] Iodine-131 has a half life
xenon-131, a stable isotope.[215]
of 8.02 days, decaying into a stable nuclide. After ten half lives (80.2 days), 99.9% has decayed to
Aftermath
Main article: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster casualties
No deaths followed short-term radiation exposure,[216] though there were a number of deaths in the evacuation of the nearby
population,[217] while 15,884 died (as of 10 February 2014[218]) due to the earthquake and tsunami.
Risks from radiation

Very few cancers would be expected as a result of accumulated radiation exposures,[219][220][221] even though people in the area
worst affected by Japan's Fukushima nuclear accident have a slightly higher risk of developing certain cancers such as leukemia,
solid cancers, thyroid cancer, and breast cancer.[222][223]
Estimated effective doses from the accident outside Japan are considered to be below (or far below) the dose levels regarded as very
.[224][189]
small by the international radiological protection community
In 2013, the World Health Organization reported that area residents who were evacuated were exposed to so little radiation that
radiation-induced health effects were likely to be below detectable levels.[225][226] The health risks were calculated by applying
conservative assumptions, including the conservative linear no-threshold model of radiation exposure, a model that assumes even the
smallest amount of radiation exposure will cause a negative health effect.[227][228] The report indicated that for those infants in the
most affected areas, lifetime cancer risk would increase by about 1%.[226][229] It predicted that populations in the most contaminated
areas faced a 70% higher relative risk of developing thyroid cancer for females exposed as infants, and a 7% higher relative risk of
leukemia in males exposed as infants and a 6% higher relative risk of breast cancer in females exposed as infants.[39] One-third of
involved emergency workers would have increased cancer risks.[39][230] Cancer risks for fetuses were similar to those in 1 year old
infants.[40] The estimated cancer risk to children and adults was lower than infants.
[231]
These percentages represent estimated relative increases over the baseline rates and are not absolute risks for
developing such cancers. Due to the low baseline rates of thyroid cancer, even a large relative increase represents a
small absolute increase in risks. For example, the baseline lifetime risk of thyroid cancer for females is just three-
quarters of one percent and the additional lifetime risk estimated in this assessment for a female infant exposed in the
most affected location is one-half of one percent.
— World Health Organization. "Health Risk Assessment from the nuclear accident after the
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on a preliminary dose estimation"
(PDF) . Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-10-22.
The World Nuclear Associationreports that the radiation exposure to those living in proximity to Fukushima is expected to be below
10 mSv, over the course of a lifetime. In comparison, the dosage of background radiation received over a lifetime there is 170
mSv.[232][233]
According to a linear no-threshold model (LNT model), the accident would most likely cause 130 cancer deaths.[234][235] However,
radiation epidemiologist Roy Shore countered that estimating health effects from the LNT model "is not wise because of the
uncertainties."[236] Darshak Sanghavi noted that to obtain reliable evidence of the effect of low-level radiation would require an
impractically large number of patients, Luckey reported that the body's own repair mechanisms can cope with small doses of
radiation[237] and Aurengo stated that “The LNT model cannot be used to estimate the ef
fect of very low doses…”[238]
In April 2014, studies confirmed the presence of radioactive tuna off the coasts of the Pacific U.S.[239] Researchers carried out tests
on 26 albacore tuna caught prior to the 2011 power plant disaster and those caught after. However, the amount of radioactivity is less
than that found naturally in a single banana.[240][241] Caesium-137 and caesium-134 have been noted in Japanese whiting in Tokyo
Bay as of 2016. "Concentration of radiocesium in the Japanese whiting was one or two orders of magnitude higher than that in the sea
[242]
water, and an order of magnitude lower than that in the sediment." They were still within food safety limits.
In June 2016 Tilman Ruff, co-president of the political advocacy group, the "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War" argues that 174,000 people have been unable to return to their homes and ecological diversity has decreased and malformations
have been found in trees, birds, and mammals.[243] Although physiological abnormalities have been reported within the vicinity of
the accident zone,[244] the scientific community has largely rejected any such findings of genetic or mutagenic damage caused by
ef [245]
radiation, instead showing it can be attributed either to experimental error or other toxic fects.
Five years after the event, the Department of Agriculture from the University of Tokyo (which holds many experimental agricultural
research fields around the affected area) has noted that "the fallout was found at the surface of anything exposed to air at the time of
the accident. The main radioactive nuclides are now caesium-137 and caesium-134", but these radioactive compounds have not
dispersed much from the point where they landed at the time of the explosion, "which was very difficult to estimate from our
[246]
understanding of the chemical behavior of cesium".
In February 2018, Japan renewed the export of fish caught off Fukushima's nearshore zone. According to prefecture officials, no
seafood had been found with radiation levels exceeding Japan safety standards since April 2015. Thailand is the first country to
receive a shipment of fresh fish from Japan's Fukushima prefecture.[247] A group campaigning to help prevent global warming has
demanded the Food and Drug Administration disclose the name of the importer of fish from Fukushima and of the Japanese
restaurants in Bangkok serving. Srisuwan Janya, chairman of the Stop Global Warming Association, said the FDA must protect the
rights of consumers by ordering restaurants serving Fukushima fish to make that information available to their customers, so they
could decide whether to eat it or not.[248]
In July 2018, a robotic probe has found that radiation levels remain too high for humans to work inside one of the reactor
buildings.[249]
Thyroid screening program

The World Health Organization stated that a 2013 thyroid ultrasound screening program was, due to the screening effect, likely to
lead to an increase in recorded thyroid cases due to early detection of non-symptomatic disease cases.[250] The overwhelming
majority of thyroid growths are benign growths that will never cause symptoms, illness, or death, even if nothing is ever done about
the growth. Autopsy studies on people who died from other causes show that more than one third of adults technically have a thyroid
growth/cancer.[251] As a precedent, in 1999 in South Korea, the introduction of advanced ultrasound thyroid examinations resulted in
an explosion in the rate of benign thyroid cancers being detected and needless surgeries occurring.[252] Despite this, the death rate
from thyroid cancer has remained the same.[252]
According to the Tenth Report of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey released in February 2013, more than 40%
of children screened around Fukushima prefecture were diagnosed with thyroid nodules or cysts. Ultrasonographic detectable thyroid
nodules and cysts are extremely common and can be found at a frequency of up to 67% in various studies.[253] 186 (0.5%) of these
had nodules larger than 5.1 mm (0.20 in) and/or cysts larger than 20.1 mm (0.79 in) and underwent further investigation, while none
had thyroid cancer. A Russia Today report into the matter was highly misleading.[254] Fukushima Medical University give the
number of children diagnosed with thyroid cancer, as of December 2013, as 33 and concluded "it is unlikely that these cancers were
1".[255]
caused by the exposure from I-131 from the nuclear power plant accident in March 201
In October 2015, 137 children from the Fukushima Prefecture were described as either being diagnosed with or showing signs of
developing thyroid cancer. The study's lead author Toshihide Tsuda from Okayama University stated that the increased detection
could not be accounted for by attributing it to thescreening effect. He described the screening results to be "20 times to 50 times what
would be normally expected."[42] By the end of 2015, the number had increased to 166 children.
[256]
However, despite his paper being widely reported by the media,[252] an undermining error, according to teams of other
epidemiologists who point out Tsuda's remarks are fatally wrong, is that Tsuda did an apples and oranges comparison by comparing
the Fukushima surveys, which uses advanced ultrasound devices that detect otherwise unnoticeable thyroid growths, with data from
traditional non-advanced clinical examinations, to arrive at his "20 to 50 times what would be expected" conclusion. In the critical
words of epidemiologist Richard Wakeford, “It is inappropriate to compare the data from the Fukushima screening program with
cancer registry data from the rest of Japan where there is, in general, no such large-scale screening,”. Wakeford's criticism was one of
seven other author's letters that were published criticizing Tsuda's paper.[252] According to Takamura, another epidemiologist, who
examined the results of small scale advanced ultrasound tests on Japanese children not near Fukushima, "The prevalence of thyroid
cancer [using the same detection technology] does not dif [252]
fer meaningfully from that in Fukushima Prefecture,”.
In 2016 Ohira et al. conducted a study cross-comparing thyroid cancer patients from Fukushima prefecture evacuees with rates of
Thyroid cancer in from those outside of the evacuation zone. Ohira et al. found that "The duration between accident and thyroid
examination was not associated with thyroid cancer prevalence. There were no significant associations between individual external
doses and prevalence of thyroid cancer. External radiation dose was not associated with thyroid cancer prevalence among Fukushima
[257]
children within the first 4 years after the nuclear accident.."
A 2018 publication by Yamashita et al. has also concluded that attribution of Thyroid cancers can also be attributed to the screening
effect. They noted that the mean age of the patients at the time of the accident was 10–15 years, while no cases were found in
children from the ages of 0-5 who would have been most susceptible. Yamashita et al. thus conclude that "In any case, the individual
prognosis cannot be accurately determined at the time of FNAC at present. It is therefore urgent to search not only for intraoperative
[258]
and postoperative prognostic factors but also for predictive prognostic factors at the FNAC/preoperative stage."
Thyroid cancer is one of the most survivable cancers, with an approximate 94% survival rate after first diagnosis. That rate increases
.[259]
to a nearly 100% survival rate if caught early
Chernobyl comparison
Main article: Comparison of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents
Radiation deaths at Chernobyl were also statistically undetectable. Only 0.1% of the 110,645 Ukraninian cleanup workers, included
in a 20-year study out of over 500,000 former Soviet clean up workers, had as of 2012 developed leukemia, although not all cases
resulted from the accident.[260][261]
Data from Chernobyl showed that there was a steady then sharp increase in thyroid cancer rates following the disaster in 1986, but
[43][44]
whether this data can be directly compared to Fukushima is yet to be determined.
Chernobyl thyroid cancer incidence rates did not begin to increase above the prior baseline value of about 0.7 cases per 100,000
people per year until 1989 to 1991, 3–5 years after the incident in both adolescent and child age groups.[43][44] The rate reached its
highest point so far, of about 11 cases per 100,000 in the decade of the 2000s, approximately 14 years after the accident.[43] From
1989 to 2005, an excess of 4,000 children and adolescent cases of thyroid cancer were observed. Nine of these had died as of 2005, a
99% survival rate.[262]
Effects on evacuees
In the former Soviet Union, many patients with negligible radioactive exposure after the Chernobyl disaster displayed extreme
anxiety about radiation exposure. They developed many psychosomatic problems, including radiophobia along with an increase in
amashita noted:[263]
fatalistic alcoholism. As Japanese health and radiation specialist Shunichi Y
We know from Chernobyl that the psychological consequences are enormous. Life expectancy of the evacuees
dropped from 65 to 58 years – not because of cancer, but because of depression, alcoholism, and suicide. Relocation
is not easy, the stress is very big. We must not only track those problems, but also treat them. Otherwise people will
feel they are just guinea pigs in our research.[263]
A 2017 study examined the economic and health effects of those relocated in the wake of the disaster in comparison to the danger
posed by remaining near the reactor. It concluded that there was no "economic or scientific grounds" to justify the decision to relocate
the 160,000 nearby residents.[264][265]
A survey by the Iitate local government obtained responses from approximately 1,743 evacuees within the evacuation zone. The
survey showed that many residents are experiencing growing frustration, instability, and an inability to return to their earlier lives.
Sixty percent of respondents stated that their health and the health of their families had deteriorated after evacuating, while 39.9%
.[266]
reported feeling more irritated compared to before the disaster
Summarizing all responses to questions related to evacuees' current family status, one-third of all surveyed
families live apart from their children, while 50.1% live away from other family members (including elderly
parents) with whom they lived before the disaster. The survey also showed that 34.7% of the evacuees have
suffered salary cuts of 50% or more since the outbreak of the nuclear disaster. A total of 36.8% reported a lack of
[266]
sleep, while 17.9% reported smoking or drinking more than before they evacuated.
Stress often manifests in physical ailments, including behavioral changes such as poor dietary choices, lack of exercise, and sleep
deprivation. Survivors, including some who lost homes, villages, and family members, were found likely to face mental health and
[267]
physical challenges. Much of the stress came from lack of information and from relocation.
A survey computed that of some 300,000 evacuees, approximately 1,600 deaths related to the evacuation conditions, such as living in
temporary housing and hospital closures that had occurred as of August 2013, a number comparable to the 1,599 deaths directly
caused by the earthquake and tsunami in the Prefecture. The exact causes of these evacuation related deaths were not specified,
[16][268]
because according to the municipalities, that would hinder relatives applying for compensation.
Radioactivity releases
In June 2011, TEPCO stated the amount of contaminated water in the complex had increased due to substantial rainfall.[269] On 13
February 2014, TEPCO reported 37 kBq (1.0 microcurie) of caesium-134 and 93 kBq (2.5 microcuries) of caesium-137 were
detected per liter of groundwater sampled from a monitoring well.[270] Dust particles gathered 4 km from the reactors in 2017
[271] After decades of exponential decline in ocean caesium
included microscopic nodules of melted core samples encased in caesium.
from weapons testing fallout, radioactive isotopes of caesium in the Sea of Japan increased after Fukushima from 1.5 mBq/L to about
f the western coast of Japan have declined.[272]
2.5 mBq/L and are still rising as of 2018, while those just of
Insurance
According to reinsurer Munich Re, the private insurance industry will not be significantly affected by the disaster.[273] Swiss Re
similarly stated, "Coverage for nuclear facilities in Japan excludes earthquake shock, fire following earthquake and tsunami, for both
physical damage and liability. Swiss Re believes that the incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant is unlikely to result in a
."[274]
significant direct loss for the property & casualty insurance industry
Compensation
[275]
The amount of compensation to be paid by TEPCO is expected to reach 7 trillion yen.
Costs to Japanese taxpayers are likely to exceed 12 trillion yen ($100 billion).[276] In December 2016 the government estimated
decontamination, compensation, decommissioning, and radioactive waste storage costs at 21.5 trillion yen ($187 billion), nearly
double the 2013 estimate.[277]
In March 2017, a Japanese court ruled that negligence by the Japanese government had led to the Fukushima disaster by failing to use
its regulatory powers to force TEPCO to take preventive measures. The Maebashi district court near Tokyo awarded ¥39 million
[278]
(US$345,000) to 137 people who were forced to flee their homes following the accident.
Energy policy implications
By March 2012, one year after the disaster, all but two of Japan's nuclear reactors
had been shut down; some had been damaged by the quake and tsunami. Authority
to restart the others after scheduled maintenance throughout the year was given to
local governments, who in all cases decided against. According to The Japan Times,
the disaster changed the national debate over energy policy almost overnight. "By
shattering the government's long-pitched safety myth about nuclear power, the crisis
dramatically raised public awareness about energy use and sparked strong anti-
The number of nuclear power plant
nuclear sentiment". An energy white paper, approved by the Japanese Cabinet in constructions started each year
October 2011, says "public confidence in safety of nuclear power was greatly worldwide, from 1954 to 2013.
damaged" by the disaster and called for a reduction in the nation's reliance on Following an increase in new
nuclear power. It also omitted a section on nuclear power expansion that was in the constructions from 2007 to 2010,
there was a decline after the
previous year's policy review.[279]
Fukushima nuclear disaster.
Michael Banach, the currentVatican representative to the IAEA, told a conference in
Vienna in September 2011 that the disaster created new concerns about the safety of
nuclear plants globally. Auxiliary Bishop of Osaka Michael Goro Matsuura said this
incident should cause Japan and other countries to abandon nuclear projects. He
called on the worldwide Christian community to support this anti-nuclear campaign.
Statements from Bishops' conferences in Korea and the Philippines called on their
governments to abandon atomic power. Author Kenzaburō Ōe, who received a
Nobel prize in literature, urged Japan to abandon its reactors.[280]
The nuclear plant closest to the epicenter of the earthquake, the Onagawa Nuclear
Power Plant, successfully withstood the cataclysm. According to Reuters it may Electricity generation by source in
serve as a "trump card" for the nuclear lobby, providing evidence that it is possible Japan (month-level data). Nuclear
for a correctly designed and operated nuclear facility to withstand such a energy's contribution declined
cataclysm.[281] steadily throughout 2011 due to
shutdowns and has been mainly
The loss of 30% of the country's generating capacity led to much greater reliance on replaced with thermal power stations
such as fossil gas and coal power
liquified natural gas and coal.[282] Unusual conservation measures were undertaken.
plants.
In the immediate aftermath, nine prefectures served by TEPCO experienced power
rationing.[283] The government asked major companies to reduce power
consumption by 15%, and some shifted their weekends to weekdays to smooth
power demand.[284] Converting to a nuclear-free gas and oil energy economy would
cost tens of billions of dollars in annual fees. One estimate is that even including the
disaster, more lives would have been lost if Japan had used coal or gas plants instead
of nuclear.[234]
Many political activists have begun calling for a phase-out of nuclear power in
Japan, including Amory Lovins, who claimed, "Japan is poor in fuels, but is the
richest of all major industrial countries in renewable energy that can meet the entire
long-term energy needs of an energy-efficient Japan, at lower cost and risk than Komekurayama Solar Power Plant
owned and operated byTEPCO in
current plans. Japanese industry can do it faster than anyone — if Japanese
Kofu, Yamanashi Prefecture
policymakers acknowledge and allow it".[194] Benjamin K. Sovacool asserted that
Japan could have exploited instead its renewable energy base. Japan has a total of
"324 GW of achievable potential in the form of onshore and offshore wind turbines (222 GW), geothermal power plants (70 GW),
gy (4.8 GW) and agricultural residue (1.1 GW)."[285]
additional hydroelectric capacity (26.5 GW), solar ener
In contrast, others have said that the zero mortality rate from the Fukushima incident
confirms their opinion that nuclear fission is the only viable option available to
replace fossil fuels. Journalist George Monbiot wrote "Why Fukushima made me
stop worrying and love nuclear power." In it he said, "As a result of the disaster at
Fukushima, I am no longer nuclear-neutral. I now support the technology."[286][287]
He continued, "A crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a
monster earthquake and a vast tsunami. The electricity supply failed, knocking out
the cooling system. The reactors began to explode and melt down. The disaster
exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-cutting. Yet, as far as we know,
no one has yet received a lethal dose of radiation."[288][289] Responses to Monbiot
Part of the Seto Hill Windfarm in
noted his "false calculation that [nuclear powered electricity] is needed, that it can Japan, one of several windfarms that
work economically, and that it can solve its horrific waste, decommissioning and continued generating without
proliferation-security pitfalls ... [along with human] safety, health and indeed human interruption after the 2011
psychology issues."[290] earthquake and tsunamiand the
Fukushima nuclear disaster
In September 2011, Mycle Schneider said that the disaster can be understood as a
unique chance "to get it right" on energy policy. "Germany – with its nuclear phase-
out decision based on a renewable energy program – and Japan – having suffered a
painful shock but possessing unique technical capacities and societal discipline – can
be at the forefront of an authentic paradigm shift toward a truly sustainable, low-
carbon and nuclear-free energy policy."[291]
On the other hand, climate and energy scientists James Hansen, Ken Caldeira, Kerry
Emanuel, and Tom Wigley released an open letter calling on world leaders to
support development of safer nuclear power systems, stating "There is no credible
path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear
power." [292] In December 2014, an open letter from 75 climate and ener
gy scientists
Price of PV modules (yen/Wp) in
on the website of pro-nuclear advocate Barry Brook asserted "nuclear power has Japan
lowest impact on wildlife and ecosystems — which is what we need given the dire
state of the world’s biodiversity."[293] Brook's advocacy for nuclear power has been
challenged by opponents of nuclear industries, including environmentalistJim Green
of Friends of the Earth.[294] Brook has described the Australian Greens political
party (SA Branch) and Australian Youth Climate Coalition as "sad" and
"increasingly irrelevant" after they expressed their opposition to nuclear industrial
development.[295]
As of September 2011, Japan planned to build a pilot offshore floating wind farm,
with six 2 MW turbines, off the Fukushima coast.[296] The first became operational
in November 2013.[297] After the evaluation phase is complete in 2016, "Japan plans
Anti-nuclear power plant rally on 19
to build as many as 80 floating wind turbines off Fukushima by 2020."[296] In 2012, September 2011 at theMeiji Shrine
Prime Minister Kan said the disaster made it clear to him that "Japan needs to complex in Tokyo
dramatically reduce its dependence on nuclear power, which supplied 30% of its
electricity before the crisis, and has turned him into a believer of renewable energy".
Sales of solar panels in Japan rose 30.7% to 1,296 MW in 2011, helped by a government scheme to promote renewable energy.
Canadian Solar received financing for its plans to build a factory in Japan with capacity of 150 MW, scheduled to begin production in
2014.[298]
As of September 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that "Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged that the vast majority of
Japanese support the zero option on nuclear power",[299] and Prime Minister Noda and the Japanese government announced plans to
make the country nuclear-free by the 2030s. They announced the end to construction of nuclear power plants and a 40-year limit on
existing nuclear plants. Nuclear plant restarts must meet safety standards of the new independent regulatory authority. The plan
requires investing $500 billion over 20 years.[300]
On 16 December 2012, Japan held its general election. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a clear victory, with Shinzō Abe as
the new Prime Minister. Abe supported nuclear power, saying that leaving the plants closed was costing the country 4 trillion yen per
year in higher costs.[301] The comment came after Junichiro Koizumi, who chose Abe to succeed him as premier, made a recent
statement to urge the government to take a stance against using nuclear power.[302] A survey on local mayors by the Yomiuri
Shimbun newspaper in January 2013 found that most of them from cities hosting nuclear plants would agree to restarting the reactors,
provided the government could guarantee their safety.[303] More than 30,000 people marched on 2 June 2013, in Tokyo against
.[304]
restarting nuclear power plants. Marchers had gathered more than 8 million petition signatures opposing nuclear power
In October 2013, it was reported that TEPCO and eight other Japanese power companies were paying approximately 3.6 trillion yen
(37 billion dollars) more in combined imported fossil fuel costs compared to 2010, before the accident, to make up for the missing
power.[305]
From 2016 to 2018 the nation fired up at least eight new coal power plants, plans for an additional 36 coal stations over the next
decade are the biggest planned coal power expansion in any developed nation. The new national energy plan that would have coal
provide 26% of Japan's electricity in 2030, presents the abandoning of a previous goal of reducing coal's share to 10%. The coal
revival is seen as having alarming implications for air pollution and Japan's ability to meet its pledges to cut greenhouse gases by
80% by 2050.[306]
Equipment, facility, and operational changes

A number of nuclear reactor safety system lessons emerged from the incident. The most obvious was that in tsunami-prone areas, a
power station's sea wall must be adequately tall and robust.[7] At the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, closer to the epicenter of 11
March earthquake and tsunami,[307] the sea wall was 14 meters (46 ft) tall and successfully withstood the tsunami, preventing serious
damage and radioactivity releases.[308][309]
Nuclear power station operators around the world began to install Passive Autocatalytic hydrogen Recombiners ("PARs"), which do
not require electricity to operate.[310][311][312] PARs work much like the catalytic converter on the exhaust of a car to turn potentially
explosive gases such as hydrogen into water. Had such devices been positioned at the top of Fukushima I's reactor buildings, where
hydrogen gas collected, the explosions would not have occurred and the releases of radioactive isotopes would arguably have been
much less.[29]
Unpowered filtering systems on containment building vent lines, known as Filtered Containment Venting Systems (FCVS), can
safely catch radioactive materials and thereby allow reactor core de-pressurization, with steam and hydrogen venting with minimal
radioactivity emissions.[29][313] Filtration using an external water tank system is the most common established system in European
countries, with the water tank positioned outside the containment building.[314] In October 2013, the owners of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
[315][316]
nuclear power station began installing wet filters and other safety systems, with completion anticipated in 2014.
For generation II reactors located in flood or tsunami prone areas, a 3+ day supply of back-up batteries has become an informal
industry standard.[317][318] Another change is to harden the location of back-up diesel generator rooms with water-tight, blast-
resistant doors and heat sinks, similar to those used by nuclear submarines.[29] The oldest operating nuclear power station in the
world, Beznau, which has been operating since 1969, has a 'Notstand' hardened building designed to support all of its systems
independently for 72 hours in the event of an earthquake or severe flooding. This system was built prior to Fukushima
Daiichi.[319][320]
Upon a station blackout, similar to the one that occurred after Fukushima's back-up battery supply was exhausted,[321] many
constructed Generation III reactors adopt the principle of passive nuclear safety. They take advantage of convection (hot water tends
to rise) and gravity (water tends to fall) to ensure an adequate supply of cooling water to handle the decay heat, without the use of
pumps.[322][323]
As the crisis unfolded, the Japanese government sent a request for robots developed by the U.S. military. The robots went into the
plants and took pictures to help assess the situation, but they couldn't perform the full range of tasks usually carried out by human
workers.[324] The Fukushima disaster illustrated that robots lacked sufficient dexterity and robustness to perform critical tasks. In
response to this shortcoming, a series of competitions were hosted by DARPA to accelerate the development of humanoid robots that
could supplement relief efforts.[325][326] Eventually a wide variety of specially designed robots were employed (leading to a robotics
boom in the region),[327] but as of early 2016 three of them had promptly become non-functional due to the intensity of the
.[328]
radioactivity; one was destroyed within a day
Reactions
Japan
Main article: Japanese reaction to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
Japanese authorities later admitted to lax standards and poor oversight.[331] They
took fire for their handling of the emergency and engaged in a pattern of withholding
and denying damaging information.[331][332][333][334] Authorities allegedly wanted
to "limit the size of costly and disruptive evacuations in land-scarce Japan and to
avoid public questioning of the politically powerful nuclear industry". Public anger
emerged over an "official campaign to play down the scope of the accident and the
potential health risks".[333][334][335]
In many cases, the Japanese government's reaction was judged to be less than
adequate by many in Japan, especially those who were living in the region.
Decontamination equipment was slow to be made available and then slow to be
utilized. As late as June 2011, even rainfall continued to cause fear and uncertainty
in eastern Japan because of its possibility of washing radioactivity from the sky back
to earth. Japan towns, villages, and cities in
and around the Daiichi nuclear plant
To assuage fears, the government enacted an order to decontaminate over a hundred exclusion zone. The 20 and 30 km
(12 and 19 mi) areas had evacuation
areas with a level contamination greater than or equivalent to one millisievert of
and shelter in place orders, and
radiation. This is a much lower threshold than is necessary for protecting health. The
additional administrative districts that
government also sought to address the lack of education on the effects of radiation had an evacuation order are
[336]
and the extent to which the average person was exposed. highlighted. However, the above
map's factual accuracy is called into
Previously a proponent of building more reactors, Kan took an increasingly anti- question as only the southern portion
nuclear stance following the disaster. In May 2011, he ordered the aging Hamaoka of Kawamata district had evacuation
Nuclear Power Plant closed over earthquake and tsunami concerns, and said he orders. More accurate maps are
would freeze building plans. In July 2011, Kan said, "Japan should reduce and available.[329][330]
eventually eliminate its dependence on nuclear energy".[337] In October 2013, he
said that if the worst-case scenario had been realized, 50 million people within a
[338]
250-kilometer (160 mi) radius would have had to evacuate.
On 22 August 2011, a government spokesman mentioned the possibility that some areas around the plant "could stay for some
decades a forbidden zone". According to Yomiuri Shimbun the Japanese government was planning to buy some properties from
civilians to store waste and materials that had become radioactive after the accidents.[339][340] Chiaki Takahashi, Japan's foreign
minister, criticized foreign media reports as excessive. He added that he could "understand the concerns of foreign countries over
recent developments at the nuclear plant, including theradioactive contaminationof seawater".[341]
Due to frustration with TEPCO and the Japanese government "providing differing, confusing, and at times contradictory, information
on critical health issues"[342] a citizen's group called "Safecast" recorded detailed radiation level data in Japan.[343][344] The Japanese
government "does not consider nongovernment readings to be authentic". The group uses off-the-shelf Geiger counter equipment. A
simple Geiger counter is a contamination meter and not a dose rate meter. The response differs too much between different
radioisotopes to permit a simple GM tube for dose rate measurements when more than one radioisotope is present. A thin metal
shield is needed around a GM tube to provide energy compensation to enable it to be used for dose rate measurements. For gamma
emitters either an ionization chamber, a gamma spectrometer or an energy compensated GM tube are required. Members of the Air
Monitoring station facility at the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Berkeley, California have tested many
environmental samples in Northern California.[345]
In 2014 Japan enacted the State Secrecy Law. The Fukushima incident falls under this law and, as a "state secret", independent
.[346][347]
investigations and reports are forbidden by law
International
Main article: International reactions to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
The international reaction to the disaster was diverse and widespread. Many inter-
governmental agencies immediately offered help, often on an ad hoc basis.
Responders included IAEA,World Meteorological Organization and the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization.[348]
In May 2011, UK chief inspector of nuclear installations Mike Weightman traveled

to Japan as the lead of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert
mission. The main finding of this mission, as reported to the IAEA ministerial
conference that month, was that risks associated with tsunamis in several sites in Evacuation flight departs Misawa
Japan had been underestimated.[349]
In September 2011, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said the Japanese
nuclear disaster "caused deep public anxiety throughout the world and damaged
confidence in nuclear power".[350][351] Following the disaster, it was reported in The
Economist that the IAEA halved its estimate of additional nuclear generating
capacity to be built by 2035.[352]
In the aftermath, Germany accelerated plans to close its nuclear power reactors and
decided to phase the rest out by 2022.[353] Italy held a national referendum, in which
U.S. Navy humanitarian flight
94 percent voted against the government's plan to build new nuclear power undergoes radioactive
plants.[354] In France, President Hollande announced the intention of the decontamination
government to reduce nuclear usage by one third. So far, however, the government
has only earmarked one power station for closure – the aging plant at Fessenheim on
the German border – which prompted some to question the government's commitment to Hollande's promise. Industry Minister
Arnaud Montebourg is on record as saying that Fessenheim will be the only nuclear power station to close.
On a visit to China in December 2014 he reassured his audience that nuclear energy was a "sector of the future" and would continue
[355]
to contribute "at least 50%" of France's electricity output.
Another member of Hollande's Socialist Party, the MP Christian Bataille, says the plan to curb nuclear was hatched as a way of
[356]
securing the backing of his Green coalition partners in parliament.
Nuclear power plans were not abandoned in Malaysia, the Philippines, Kuwait, and Bahrain, or radically changed, as in Taiwan.
China suspended its nuclear development program briefly, but restarted it shortly afterwards. The initial plan had been to increase the
nuclear contribution from 2 to 4 percent of electricity by 2020, with an escalating program after that. Renewable energy supplies 17
percent of China’s electricity, 16% of which is hydroelectricity. China plans to triple its nuclear energy output to 2020, and triple it
again between 2020 and 2030.[357]
New nuclear projects were proceeding in some countries. KPMG reports 653 new nuclear facilities planned or proposed for
completion by 2030.[358] By 2050, China hopes to have 400–500 gigawatts of nuclear capacity – 100 times more than it has
now.[359] The Conservative Government of the United Kingdom is planning a major nuclear expansion despite widespread public
objection. So is Russia. India are also pressing ahead with a large nuclear program, as is South Korea.[360] Indian Vice President M
Hamid Ansari said in 2012 that "nuclear energy is the only option" for expanding India's energy supplies,[361] and Prime Minister
[362]
Modi announced in 2014 that India intended to build 10 more nuclear reactors in a collaboration with Russia.
Investigations
Three investigations into the Fukushima disaster showed the man-made nature of the catastrophe and its roots in regulatory capture
associated with a "network of corruption, collusion, and nepotism."[363][364] Regulatory capture refers to the "situation where
regulators charged with promoting the public interest defer to the wishes and advance the agenda of the industry or sector they
ostensibly regulate." Those with a vested interest in specific policy or regulatory outcomes lobby regulators and influence their
choices and actions. Regulatory capture explains why some of the risks of operating nuclear power reactors in Japan were
.[364]
systematically downplayed and mismanaged so as to compromise operational safety
Many reports say that the government shares blame with the regulatory agency for not heeding warnings and for not ensuring the
independence of the oversight function.[365] The New York Times said that the Japanese nuclear regulatory system sided with and
promoted the nuclear industry because of amakudari ('descent from heaven') in which senior regulators accepted high paying jobs at
companies they once oversaw. To protect their potential future position in the industry, regulators sought to avoid taking positions
that upset or embarrass the companies. TEPCO's position as the largest electrical utility in Japan made it the most desirable position
for retiring regulators. Typically the "most senior officials went to work at TEPCO, while those of lower ranks ended up at smaller
utilities."[366]
In August 2011, several top energy officials were fired by the Japanese government; affected positions included the Vice-minister for
Economy, Trade and Industry; the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy.[367]
In 2016 three former TEPCO executives, chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and two vice presidents, were indicted for negligence
resulting in death and injury.[217][368] In June 2017 the first hearing took place, in which the three pleaded not guilty to professional
negligence resulting in death and injury.[369]
NAIIC
Main article: National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) was the first independent investigation
commission by the National Diet in the 66-year history of Japan's constitutional government.
Fukushima "cannot be regarded as a natural disaster," the NAIIC panel's chairman, Tokyo University professor emeritus Kiyoshi
Kurokawa, wrote in the inquiry report. "It was a profoundly man-made disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and
prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response."[370] "Governments, regulatory authorities
and Tokyo Electric Power [TEPCO] lacked a sense of responsibility to protect people's lives and society," the Commission said.
"They effectively betrayed the nation's right to besafe from nuclear accidents.[371]
The Commission recognized that the affected residents were still struggling and facing grave concerns, including the "health effects
of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast
areas of the environment".
Investigation Committee
Main article: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo
Electric Power Company
The purpose of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (ICANPS) was to identify the
disaster's causes and propose policies designed to minimize the damage and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.[372] The 10
member, government-appointed panel included scholars, journalists, lawyers, and engineers.[373][374] It was supported by public
prosecutors and government experts.[375] and released its final, 448-page[376] investigation report on 23 July 2012.[46][377]
The panel's report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis-command disarray caused by the
government and TEPCO, and possible excess meddling on the part of the Prime Minister's office in the crisis' early stage.[378] The
.[373]
panel concluded that a culture of complacency about nuclear safety and poor crisis management led to the nuclear disaster
See also
Comparison of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents
Environmental issues in Japan
Fukushima disaster cleanup
Japanese nuclear incidents
Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission
List of civilian nuclear accidents
Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
Nuclear power in Japan
Nuclear power phase-out
Radiation effects from the Fukushima Daiichinuclear disaster
Timeline of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
References
Notes
1. "High-resolution photos of Fukushima Daiichi"(http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/daiichi-photos.htm)(Press
release). Air Photo Service Co. Ltd., Japan. 24 March 2011 . Retrieved 14 January 2014.
2. Negishi, Mayumi (12 April 2011)."Japan raises nuclear crisis severity to highest level"(https://www.reuters.com/articl
e/2011/04/12/japan-severity-idUSTKE00635720110412) . Reuters.
3. "Fukushima accident upgraded to severity level 7"(http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/nuclear/fukushima-acci
dent-upgraded-to-severity-level-7/). IEEE Spectrum. 12 April 2011.
4. "Fukushima nuclear disaster: Japan confirms first worker death from radiation" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-as
ia-45423575). BBC. 5 September 2018. Retrieved 5 September 2018.
5. "IAEA Update on Japan Earthquake"(http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html). Archived (http
s://www.webcitation.org/5x8gJ8rN2?url=http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html)from the
original on 12 March 2011. Retrieved 16 March 2011. “As reported earlier, a 400 millisieverts (mSv)per hour
radiation dose observed at Fukushima Daiichi occurred between 1s 3 and 4. This is a high dose-level value, but it is
a local value at a single location and at a certain point in time. The IAEA continues to confirm the evolution and value
of this dose rate. It should be noted that because of this detected value, non-indispensable staff was evacuated from
the plant, in line with the Emergency Response Plan, and that the population around the plant is already evacuated. ”
6. "Radiation-exposed workers to be treated at Chiba hospital"(http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UPDATE2%3A+Radiation
-exposed+workers+to+be+treated+at+Chiba+hospital.-a0252558693) . Kyodo News. 17 April 2011. Retrieved 12
February 2016.
7. Phillip Lipscy, Kenji Kushida, and Trevor Incerti. 2013. "The Fukushima Disaster and Japan’s Nuclear Plant
Vulnerability in Comparative Perspective(http://www.stanford.edu/~plipscy/LipscyKushidaIncertiEST2013.pdf)."
Environmental Science and Technology 47 (May), 6082–6088.
8. Accident Progression (https://web.archive.org/web/20170226171624/http://www .jsmillerdesign.com/FukushimaPaper
s/Fukuchima_AREVA.pdf)
9. Fackler, Martin (12 October 2012)."Japan Power Company Admits Failings on Plant Precautions"(https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20141006070548/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/tepco-admits-failure-in-acknowledging-ri
sks-at-nuclear-plant.html?_r=0). The New York Times. Archived from the original (https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/
13/world/asia/tepco-admits-failure-in-acknowledging-risks-at-nuclear -plant.html?_r=0) on 6 October 2014. Retrieved
13 October 2012.
10. Sheldrick, Aaron (12 October 2012)."Fukushima operator must learn from mistakes, new adviser says"(http://in.reut
ers.com/article/2012/10/13/japan-nuclear-adviser-fukushima-idINDEE89C03220121013?feedT ype=RSS&feedName
=worldNews). Reuters. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140309030940/http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/10/
13/japan-nuclear-adviser-fukushima-idINDEE89C03220121013?feedT ype=RSS&feedName=worldNews)from the
original on 9 March 2014. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
11. Yamaguchi, Mari (12 October 2012)."Japan utility agrees nuclear crisis was avoidable"(https://web.archive.org/web/
20131005004918/http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/2012/10/12/japan-utility-admits-nuke-crisis-avoidable-says
-feared-consequences-new-safety-measures/NK3yENYHgVPQZ76POvbBLL/story .html). Boston.com. Associated
Press. Archived from the original (http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/2012/10/12/japan-utility-admits-nuke-crisis
-avoidable-says-feared-consequences-new-safety-measures/NK3yENYHgVPQZ76POvbBLL/story .html) on 5
October 2013. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
12. "Japanese nuclear plant operator admits playing down risk"(http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/12/world/asia/japan-tepc
o-report/index.html?hpt=ias_c2). CNN Wire Staff. CNN. 12 October 2012.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201
40309032320/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/12/world/asia/japan-tepco-report/index.html?hpt=ias_c2) from the
original on 9 March 2014. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
13. "Analysis: A month on, Japan nuclear crisis still scarring"(http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/132391/20110409/japan-nucl
ear-crisis-radiation.htm)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120815080111/http://www .ibtimes.co.in/articles/132
391/20110409/japan-nuclear-crisis-radiation.htm)15 August 2012 at theWayback Machine. International Business
Times (Australia). 9 April 2011, retrieved 12 April 2011
14. UNIS/OUS/237 2 April 2014 Increase in Cancer Unlikely following Fukushima Exposure – says UN Report Low Risk
of Thyroid Cancer Among Children Most Exposed(http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2014/unisous237.
html)
15. Fukushima disaster predicted to raise cancer rates slightly , 5 March 2013, Ned Stafford (http://www.rsc.org/chemistry
world/2013/03/fukushima-nuclear-disaster-cancer-risk-increase)
16. Smith, Alexander (10 September 2013)."Fukushima evacuation has killed more than earthquake and tsunami,
survey says" (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/10/20420833-fukushima-evacuation-has-killed-more-th
an-earthquake-and-tsunami-survey-says?lite). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131027031039/http://worldn
ews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/10/20420833-fukushima-evacuation-has-killed-more-than-earthquake-and-tsuna
mi-survey-says?lite) from the original on 27 October 2013. Retrieved 11 September 2013.
17. "Stress-induced deaths in Fukushima top those from 2011 natural disasters" (https://web.archive.org/web/20130927
033901/http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130909p2a00m0na009000c.html) . Archived from the
original (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130909p2a00m0na009000c.html) on 27 September
2013.
18. Justin Mccurry (10 March 2014)."Fukushima operator may have to dump contaminated water into Pacific" (https://w
ww.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/10/fukushima-operator-dump-contaminated-water-pacific). The
Guardian. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140318045100/http://www .theguardian.com/environment/2014/m
ar/10/fukushima-operator-dump-contaminated-water-pacific) from the original on 18 March 2014. Retrieved 10
March 2014.
19. Peter Fairley (20 October 2015)."Startup Time for Fukushima's Frozen Wall. Here's Why it Should Work"(http://spec
trum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/nuclear/startup-time-for -fukushimas-frozen-wall-heres-why-it-should-work) . IEEE.
Retrieved 13 November 2015.
20. Otake, Tomoko (20 July 2016)."In first, Tepco admits ice wall can't stop Fukushima No. 1 groundwater"(http://www.j
apantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/20/national/first-tepco-admits-ice-wall-cant-stop-fukushima-no-1-groundwater/) . The
Japan Times Online. ISSN 0447-5763 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0447-5763). Retrieved 12 February 2017.
21. http://www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/2018/04/tepco-footage-shows-fuel-debris-in-no.2-reactor .html
22. "Highest radiation reading since 3/11 detected at Fukushima No. 1 reactor" (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/
02/03/national/fukushima-radiation-level-highest-since-march-11/) . The Japan Times Online. 3 February 2017.
ISSN 0447-5763 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0447-5763). Retrieved 12 February 2017.
23. Beser, Ari (22 February 2017)."After Alarmingly High Radiation Levels Detected, What Are the Facts in
Fukushima?" (http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2017/02/22/after -alarmingly-high-radiation-levels-detected-what-
are-the-facts-in-fukushima/). National Geographic Society (blogs). National Geographic Society. Retrieved 9 April
2017.
24. Su, S. (August 2006). TAD Source Term and Dose Rate Evaluation(http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0907/ML09077
0282.pdf) (PDF). Bechtel Saic. 000-30R-GGDE-00100-000-00A . Retrieved 20 May 2012.
25. Black, Richard (15 March 2011)."Reactor breach worsens prospects"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environ
ment-12745186). BBC Online. Retrieved 23 March 2011.
26. IAEA press release Japanese Earthquake Update (19 March 2011, 4:30 UTC) 19 March 2011. Archive.org (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20110607091828/http://www .iaea.org/press/?p=1463)
27. https://web.archive.org/web/20170226171624/http://www .jsmillerdesign.com/FukushimaPapers/Fukuchima_AREV A.pdf
Accident Progression.
28. W. Maschek; A. Rineiski; M. Flad; V. Kriventsev; F. Gabrielli; K. Morita. "Recriticality, a Key Phenomenon to
Investigate in Core Disruptive Accident Scenarios of Current and Future Fast Reactor Designs" (https://web.archive.
org/web/20180615083415/https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2012/2012-03-19-03-23-TM-
NPTD/12_TM-Safety-Dresden_Germany_Maschek-Rineiski.pdf)(PDF). IAEA & Institute for Nuclear and Energy
Technologies (IKET). Archived fromthe original (http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2012/20
12-03-19-03-23-TM-NPTD/12_TM-Safety-Dresden_Germany_Maschek-Rineiski.pdf) (PDF) on 15 June 2018.
Retrieved 31 August 2018. Note: See picture in the upper left corner of page 2.
29. 24 Hours at Fukushima A blow-by-blow account of the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl By Eliza Strickland
Posted 31 Oct 2011 (http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima/0)Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20131114193832/http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima/0) 14 November 2013 at
the Wayback Machine.
30. "OECD Timeline for the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131029191
924/http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/2011/NEWS-04.html). Archived from the original (http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/
2011/NEWS-04.html) on 29 October 2013.
31. "Fukushima nuclear accident update log, updates of 15 March 2011"(http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fuk
ushima150311.html). IAEA. 15 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xoqS3dVJ?url=http://www.iaea.o
rg/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima150311.html)from the original on 9 April 2011. Retrieved 8 May 2011.
32. Hydrogen explosions Fukushima nuclear plant: what happened?(http://www.hyer.eu/news/regional-news/hydrogen-i
n-nuclear-accidents-what-is-the-role-of-the-gas-in-fukushima)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013120223555
2/http://www.hyer.eu/news/regional-news/hydrogen-in-nuclear-accidents-what-is-the-role- of-the-gas-in-fukushima)2
December 2013 at theWayback Machine.
33. "MELCOR Model of the Spent Fuel Pool of Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 4"(https://web.archive.org/web/2013030511190
7/http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Pub33574.pdf)(PDF). Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Archived from the
original (http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Pub33574.pdf)(PDF) on 5 March 2013.
34. page 6 (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41694.pdf)
35. "Archived copy" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131202225020/http://eetd-seminars.lbl.gov/sites/eetd-seminars.lbl.g
ov/files/Fukushima1_Technical_Perspective_LBL_EEDT_04052011-1.pdf)(PDF). Archived from the original (http://ee
td-seminars.lbl.gov/sites/eetd-seminars.lbl.gov/files/Fukushima1_T echnical_Perspective_LBL_EEDT_04052011-1.p
df) (PDF) on 2 December 2013. Retrieved 11 April 2013. What happened at Fukushima a Technical Perspective.
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionPage 11, 26, 29.
36. Sadiq Aliyu, Abubakar;et al. (2015). "An overview of current knowledge concerning the health and environmental
consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) accident". Environment International. 85:
213–228. doi:10.1016/j.envint.2015.09.020(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2015.09.020).
37. Hasegawa; et al. (2015). "From Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Fukushima 2. Health effects of radiation and other health
problems in the aftermath of nuclear accidents, with an emphasis on Fukushima". The Lancet. 386 (9992): 479–488.
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(15)61106-0(https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736%2815%2961106-0) .
38. WHO report, page 92. (http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78218/1/9789241505130_eng.pdf)
39. Walsh, Bryan. (1 March 2013)WHO Report Says That Fukushima Nuclear Accident Posed Minimal Risk to Health
|TIME.com (http://science.time.com/2013/03/01/meltdown-despite-the-fear-the-health-risks-from-the-fukushima-accid
ent-are-minimal/#ixzz2MnbjhPmv). Science.time.com. Retrieved on 2013-09-06.Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20131104041934/http://science.time.com/2013/03/01/meltdown-despite-the-fear-the-health-risks-from-the-fukushi
ma-accident-are-minimal/#ixzz2MnbjhPmv)4 November 2013 at theWayback Machine.
40. WHO 2013, pp. 70, 79–80.
41. Ryall, Julian (19 July 2012)."Nearly 36pc of Fukushima children diagnosed with thyroid growths"(https://www.telegr
aph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9410702/Nearly-36pc-of-Fukushima-children-diagnosed-with-thyroid-growths.
html). The Daily Telegraph.
42. "Experts link higher incidence of children's cancer to Fukushima radiation" (http://www.sciencealert.com/experts-link-
higher-incidence-of-children-s-cancer-to-fukushima-radiation). ScienceAlert. Retrieved 15 January 2016.
43. "Radioactivity and thyroid cancer*Christopher Reiners Clinic and Polyclinic of Nuclear Medicine University of
Würzburg. See Figure 1. Thyroid cancer Incidence in children and adolescents from Belarus after the Chernobyl
accident" (http://www.hormones.gr/521/article/article.html). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131015035623/
http://www.hormones.gr/521/article/article.html) from the original on 15 October 2013.
44. "Disturbing thyroid cancer rise in Fukushima minors"(http://rt.com/news/fukushima-children-thyroid-cancer -783/).
RT. 21 August 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140327163742/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-children-t
hyroid-cancer-783/) from the original on 27 March 2014.
45. National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. "国会事故調 | 東京電力
福島原子力発電所事故調査委員会のホームページ" (https://web.archive.org/web/20130119181123/http://naiic.go.jp/e
n/). National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. Archived from the
original (http://naiic.go.jp/en/) on 19 January 2013. Retrieved 9 July 2012.
46. "Update: Government panel blasts lack of 'safety culture' in nuclear accident"(https://web.archive.org/web/20140413
220232/http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207230081). The Asahi Shimbun. 23 July 2012.
Archived from the original (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207230081)on 13 April 2014.
Retrieved 29 July 2012.
47. [1] (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/20/national/first-tepco-admits-ice-wall-cant-stop-fukushima-no-1-grou
ndwater/#.WJ_YHW995aQ)
48. http://fukushima.tohoku-tour.com/
49. "Fukushima Daiichi Information Screen"(https://www.webcitation.org/6I3e6BS19?url=http://www.icjt.org/npp/podrobn
osti.php?drzava=14&lokacija=818). Icjt.org. Archived from the original (http://www.icjt.org/npp/podrobnosti.php?drzav
a=14&lokacija=818) on 12 July 2013. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
50. Brady, A. Gerald (1980). Ellingwood, Bruce, ed.An Investigation of the Miyagi-ken-oki, Japan, earthquake of
June 12, 1978 (https://books.google.com/books?id=qEuWntnoZzYC&pg=P A123). United States Department of
Commerce, National Bureau of Standards. NBS special publication.592. p. 123.
51. "The record of the earthquake intensity observed at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini
Nuclear Power Station (Interim Report)"(http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11040103-e.html).
TEPCO (Press release). 1 April 2011.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140506165214/http://www .tepco.co.j
p/en/press/corp-com/release/11040103-e.html)from the original on 6 May 2014.
52. "Fukushima faced 14-metre tsunami"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Fukushima_faced_14-metre_tsunami_
2303113.html). World Nuclear News. 24 March 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110616013044/http://
www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Fukushima_faced_14-metre_tsunami_2303113.html)from the original on 16 June
2011. Retrieved 24 March 2011.
53. "Fukushima to Restart Using MOX Fuel for First T ime" (http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear_power_industry_news/b/nuc
lear_power_news/archive/2010/09/17/fukushima-to-restart-using-mox-fuel-for -first-time-091704.aspx). Nuclear
Street. 17 September 2010. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140429061914/http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear
_power_industry_news/b/nuclear_power_news/archive/2010/09/17/fukushima-to-restart-using-mox-fuel-for -first-time-
091704.aspx) from the original on 29 April 2014. Retrieved 12 March 2011.
54. Martin, Alex, "Lowdown on nuclear crisis and potential scenarios(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110320
b1.html)", Japan Times, 20 March 2011, p. 3.
55. "Fukushima: Background on Fuel Ponds"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131016010133/http://www .world-nuclear.or
g/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Appendices/Fukushima--Fuel-Ponds-Background/) . Archived from the
original (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Appendices/Fukushima--Fuel-Ponds-
Background/) (PDF) on 16 October 2013. Retrieved 23 November 2013.
56. "No. 1 fuel pool power to be restored: T epco" (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/20/national/no-1-fuel-pool-p
ower-to-be-restored-tepco/). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140107062532/http://www .japantimes.co.jp/ne
ws/2013/03/20/national/no-1-fuel-pool-power -to-be-restored-tepco/)from the original on 7 January 2014. Retrieved
20 March 2013.
57. "NISA – The 2011 off the Pacific coast of T ohoku Pacific Earthquake and the seismic damage to the NPPs, pg 35"(h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20110501090748/http://www .nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf)(PDF).
Archived from the original (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf) (PDF) on 1 May 2011.
Retrieved 24 April 2011.
58. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(August 2015). "The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Technical Volume 1/5
– Description and Context of the Accident"(http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalV olumes/P17
10/Pub1710-TV1-Web.pdf) (PDF). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Retrieved 5 August 2017.
59. Grier, Peter (16 March 2011)."Meltdown 101: Why is Fukushima crisis still out of control?"(http://www.csmonitor.co
m/USA/2011/0316/Meltdown-101-Why-is-Fukushima-crisis-still-out-of-control) . Christian Science Monitor. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20140506163911/http://www .csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0316/Meltdown-101-Why-is-Fuk
ushima-crisis-still-out-of-control)from the original on 6 May 2014. Retrieved 27 March 2011.
60. Helman, Christopher (15 March 2011)."Explainer: What caused the incident at Fukushima-Daiichi"(https://blogs.forb
es.com/christopherhelman/2011/03/15/explainer -what-caused-the-incident-at-fukushima-daiichi/) . Forbes. Archived
(https://www.webcitation.org/5xDPUSqFr?url=http://blogs.forbes.com/christopherhelman/2011/03/15/explainer -what-
caused-the-incident-at-fukushima-daiichi/)from the original on 16 March 2011. Retrieved 7 April 2011.
61. "DOE fundamentals handbook – Decay heat, Nuclear physics and reactor theory" (https://web.archive.org/web/2011
0316042315/http://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/standard/hdbk1019/h1019v2.pdf)(PDF). Archived
from the original (http://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/standard/hdbk1019/h1019v2.pdf)(PDF) on 16
March 2011. Retrieved 16 May 2009., Vol. 2, module 4, p. 61.
62. "What if it happened here?"(http://www.somdnews.com/stories/03232011/rectop133917_32384.shtml).
Somdnews.com. Retrieved 7 April 2011.
63. "More on spent fuel pools at Fukushima"(http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/4008511524/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fu
kushima). Allthingsnuclear.org. 21 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xoqiB6Z5?url=http://allthings
nuclear.org/post/4008511524/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fukushima)from the original on 9 April 2011. Retrieved 7
April 2011.
64. Pre-construction safety report – Sub-chapter 9.2 – W ater Systems. (http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/liblocal/doc
s/PCSR/Chapter%20%209%20-%20Auxiliary%20Systems/Sub-Chapter%209.2%20-%20W ater%20Systems.pdf)
AREVA NP / EDF, published 2009-06-29, Retrieved 23 March 2011.
65. "Why has it become impossible for Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station to cool reactor core?" (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20110427091626/http://www .shimbun.denki.or.jp/en/news/20110318_01.html). Shimbun.denki.or.jp.
Archived from the original (http://www.shimbun.denki.or.jp/en/news/20110318_01.html)on 27 April 2011. Retrieved 7
April 2011.
66. https://www.nfb.ca/film/meltdown_doc
67. Higgins, Andrew, "disorder intensified Japan's crisis(https://www.washingtonpost.com/todays_paper/A%20Section/2
011-04-20/A/6/18.0.2348772357_epaper .htmlEarly)", The Washington Post, 19 April 2011, Retrieved 21 April 2011.
68. Mike Soraghan (24 March 2011)."Japan disaster raises questions about backup power at US nuclear plants" (http
s://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/24/24greenwire-japan-disaster-raises-questions-about-backup-p-16451.html) .
The New York Times. Greenwire. Retrieved 7 April 2011.
69. "Regulatory effectiveness of the station blackout rule"(http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/03/23/document_pm_01.
pdf) (PDF). Retrieved 7 April 2011.
70. "The 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Pacific Earthquake and the seismic damage to the NPPs"(https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20110522211409/http://www .nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf)(PDF). Archived from the
original (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf) (PDF) on 22 May 2011. Retrieved 13 July 2011.
71. Shirouzu, Norihiko (1 July 2011)."Wall Street Journal: Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster" (https://www.wsj.com/a
rticles/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822) . Online.wsj.com. Archived (https://www.webcitation.or
g/5zqgYOzG0?url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.html) from the
original on 1 July 2011. Retrieved 13 July 2011.
72. Yoshida, Reiji, "GE plan followed with inflexibility(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110713x1.html) ", Japan
Times, 14 July 2011, p. 1. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/609dIIlCg?url=http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bi
n/nn20110713x1.html) 13 July 2011 at WebCite
73. Arita, Eriko, "Disaster analysis you may not hear elsewhere(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20110320x2.htm
l) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110829130706/http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20110320x2.html)
29 August 2011 at theWayback Machine.", Japan Times, 20 March 2011, p. 12.
74. Agence France-Presse/Jiji Press, "Tsunami that knocked out nuke plant cooling systems topped 14 meters",Japan
Times, 23 March 2011, p. 2.
75. "IAEA warned Japan over nuclear quake risk: W ikiLeaks" (http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-03-iaea-japan-nuclea
r-quake-wikileaks.html). physorg.com. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120117052026/http://www .physorg.c
om/news/2011-03-iaea-japan-nuclear-quake-wikileaks.html) from the original on 17 January 2012. Retrieved 26
March 2011.
76. "Plant Status of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (as of 0AM 12 March )", TEPCO, end of day 11 April (http://
www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031204-e.html). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201402151014
38/http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031204-e.html)15 February 2014 at theWayback Machine.
77. Fukushima No. 1 plant designed on 'trial-and-error' basis(http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201104060126.html),
Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xuVdOI8a?url=http://www.asahi.com/english/T
KY201104060126.html)13 April 2011 at WebCite
78. "Spraying continues at Fukushima Daiichi"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Spraying_continues_at_Fukushi
ma_Daiichi_1803111.html). 18 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xHdOLAvT?url=http://www.world
-nuclear-news.org/RS_Spraying_continues_at_Fukushima_Daiichi_1803111.html)from the original on 18 March
79. "The Japanese Nuclear Emergency – Sydney e Tchnical Presentation" (https://web.archive.org/web/2011093014315
2/http://www.engineersaustralia.org.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=624CEC6F-F845-73AA-003E
-B1433462956D&siteName=ieaust). Engineers Australia. 6 June 2011. Archived fromthe original (http://www.engine
ersaustralia.org.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=624CEC6F-F845-73AA-003E-B1433462956D&si
teName=ieaust) on 30 September 2011. Retrieved 22 August 2011.
80. B. Cox, Journal of Nuclear Materials, Pellet Clad Interaction (PCI) Failures of Zirconium Alloy Fuel Cladding – A
Review, 1990, volume 172, pages 249–292/
81. St. John Foreman, Mark Russell (2015). "An introduction to serious nuclear accident chemistry". Cogent Chemistry.
1. doi:10.1080/23312009.2015.1049111(https://doi.org/10.1080/23312009.2015.1049111) .
82. The Mainichi Shimbun (28 28 February 2012)TEPCO ordered to report on change in piping layout at Fukushima
plant (http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120228p2g00m0dm010000c.html) Archived (https://archive.is/201205
30224710/http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120228p2g00m0dm010000c.html) 30 May 2012 at Archive.is
83. NHK-world (29 December 2011)Fukushima plant's backup generator failed in 1991(http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/engli
sh/20111229_09.html).
JAIF (30 December 2011)Earthquake report 304:Fukushima plant's backup generator failed in 1991 (http://www.jaif.
or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1325217663P.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2012010320
5544/http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1325217663P .pdf) 3 January 2012 at the
Wayback Machine..
The Mainichi Daily News (30 December 2011)TEPCO neglected anti-flood measures at Fukushima plant despite
knowing risk (http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/news/20111230p2a00m0na008000c.html) .
84. "TEPCO did not act on tsunami risk projected for nuclear plant |"(http://jagadees.wordpress.com/2012/02/13/tepco-d
id-not-act-on-tsunami-risk-projected-for-nuclear-plant/). Jagadees.wordpress.com. 13 February 2012.Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20140412165406/http://jagadees.wordpress.com/2012/02/13/tepco-did-not-act-on-tsunami-r
isk-projected-for-nuclear-plant/) from the original on 12 April 2014. Retrieved 30 December 2013.
85. "AFERC urged to review assumption on T sunami in 2009" (http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/123-LI467Z07SXKY01.
html). Yomiuri News Paper. 11 March 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140216104627/http://www .bloo
mberg.co.jp/news/123-LI467Z07SXKY01.html)from the original on 16 February 2014. Retrieved 14 September
2013.
86. "Fukushima Nuclear Accident – U.S. NRC warned a risk on emergency power 20 years ago" (http://www.bloomberg.
co.jp/news/123-LI467Z07SXKY01.html). Bloomberg L.P. 16 March 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2014
0216104627/http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/123-LI467Z07SXKY01.html)from the original on 16 February 2014.
Retrieved 14 September 2013.
87. "IAEA warned Japan over nuclear quake risk: W ikiLeaks" (http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-03-iaea-japan-nuclea
r-quake-wikileaks.html). physorg.com. Daily Telegraph. 17 March 2011.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120
117052026/http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-03-iaea-japan-nuclear-quake-wikileaks.html) from the original on 17
January 2012.
88. "Magnitude 9.0 – near the East coast of Honshu, Japan"(https://www.webcitation.org/5x7WfsrXn?url=http://earthqua
ke.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/) . Earthquake.usgs.gov. Archived from the original (https://
earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/)on 12 March 2011. Retrieved 17 March 2011.
89. "Plant Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (as of 0AM March 12th )" (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/
corp-com/release/11031203-e.html). TEPCO (Press release). 12 March 2011.Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/
5yZvLHSV7?url=http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031203-e.html)from the original on 10 May
90. "Occurrence of a specific incident stipulated in Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on "Special measures concerning
nuclear emergency preparedness (Fukushima Daiichi) " " (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/1103110
2-e.html). TEPCO (Press release). 11 March 2011.Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xfbVW2y1?url=http://ww
w.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031102-e.html) from the original on 3 April 2011. Retrieved 13 March
2011.
91. Associated Press, "How the first 24 hours shaped Fukushima nuclear crisis(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn
20110707f1.html)", Japan Times, 7 July 2011, p. 3. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5zzhPR0B4?url=http://sea
rch.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110707f1.html)7 July 2011 at WebCite
92. "TEPCO press release 3"(http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031103-e.html). Tepco (Press
release). 11 March 2011.Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5yCGtlpb7?url=http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp
-com/release/11031103-e.html)from the original on 25 April 2011.
93. TEPCO tardy on N-plant emergency: National: Daily o Ymiuri Online (The Daily Yomiuri) (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/
national/T110411004567.htm). Yomiuri.co.jp (12 April 2011). Retrieved 30 April 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitat
ion.org/5xuNpW7E9?url=http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110411004567.htm)13 April 2011 at WebCite
94. Eric Talmadge (1 July 2011)."AP: First 24 hours shaped Japan nuke crisis"(http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireSt
ory?id=13982317#.T9WqgFLT7NA). Google.com. Retrieved 13 July 2011.
95. Japan Meteorological Agency|Tsunami Warnings/Advisories, Tsunami Information (http://www.jma.go.jp/en/tsunami/o
bservation_04_20110313180559.html). Jma.go.jp. Retrieved 30 April 2011.Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5y
2aL5KwV?url=http://www.jma.go.jp/en/tsunami/observation_04_20110313180559.html)18 April 2011 at WebCite
96. Bloomberg, "Tepco revises tsunami's height to 15 meters(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-10/tepco-says-
damaged-fukushima-nuclear-plant-was-hit-by-a-15-meter-tsunami.html) ", 10 April 2011, Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20131229181700/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-10/tepco-says-damaged-fukushima-nuclear-p
lant-was-hit-by-a-15-meter-tsunami.html)29 December 2013 at theWayback Machine.
97. David Sanger and Matthew Wald, Radioactive releases in Japan could last months, experts say . (https://www.nytime
s.com/2011/03/14/world/asia/japan-fukushima-nuclear-reactor .html) The New York Times 13 March 2011 Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20120925004946/http://www .nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/asia/japan-fukushima-nucl
ear-reactor.html) 25 September 2012 at theWayback Machine.
98. "Massive earthquake hits Japan"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Massive_earthquake_hits_Japan_110311
1.html). World Nuclear News. 11 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xrvetgTI?url=http://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/RS_Massive_earthquake_hits_Japan_1103111.html)from the original on 11 April 2011. Retrieved
13 March 2011.;
99. Bloomberg L.P., "Time not on workers' side as crisis raced on(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110505n1.
html)", Japan Times, 5 May 2011, p. 3. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5yT0I94u7?url=http://search.japantime
s.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110505n1.html)6 May 2011 at WebCite
100. Inajima, Tsuyoshi; Okada, Yuji (11 March 2011). "Japan Orders Evacuation From Near Nuclear Plant After Quake"
(https://web.archive.org/web/20120202204525/http://www .businessweek.com/news/2011-03-11/japan-orders-evacua
tion-from-near-nuclear-plant-after-quake.html). Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Archived from the original (http://www.bus
inessweek.com/news/2011-03-11/japan-orders-evacuation-from-near -nuclear-plant-after-quake.html) on 2 February
101. "Japan Earthquake Update (2210 CET)"(https://web.archive.org/web/20110314044731/http://www .iaea.org/press/?p
=1133). International Atomic Energy Agency(Press release). 11 March 2011. Archived fromthe original (http://www.i
aea.org/press/?p=1133)on 14 March 2011. Retrieved 12 March 2011.
102. Magnier, Mark; et al. (16 March 2011)."New power line could restore cooling systems at Fukushima Daiichi plant" (h
ttp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-japan-quake-daiichi-20110317,0,5721172.story) . Los Angeles
Times. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xFVAiNPj?url=http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-j
apan-quake-daiichi-20110317,0,5721172.story)from the original on 17 March 2011. Retrieved 19 March 2011.
103. "Stabilisation at Fukushima Daiichi"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Stabilisation_at_Fukushima_Daiichi_20
03111.html). World-nuclear-news.org. 20 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xrvabkIV?url=http://w
ww.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Stabilisation_at_Fukushima_Daiichi_2003111.html)from the original on 11 April
2011. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
104. AP, "IAEA: 170,000 Evacuated near Japan nuclear plant," 12 March 2011. https://news.yahoo.com/iaea-170-000-
evacuated-near-japan-nuclear-plant-20110312-133929-901.htmlaccessed 23 February 2016.
105. Richard Black (15 March 2011)."Japan quake: Radiation rises at Fukushima nuclear plant"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/n
ews/world-12740843). BBC Online. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xC7my9A8?url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/ne
ws/world-12740843) from the original on 15 March 2011. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
106. "Japan's PM urges people to clear 20-km zone around Fukushima NPP (Update-1)" (http://en.rian.ru/world/2011031
5/163008635.html). RIA Novosti. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130511212232/http://en.rian.ru/world/2011
0315/163008635.html)from the original on 11 May 2013. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
107. Makinen, Julie (25 March 2011)."Japan steps up nuclear plant precautions; Kan apologizes"(http://www.latimes.co
m/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-japan-nuclear -plant-20110326,0,5763742.story). Los Angeles Times.
108. Herman, Steve (12 April 2011)."VOA Correspondent Reaches Crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant" (http://ww
w.voanews.com/content/voa-correspondent-reaches-crippled-fukushima-1-nuke-plant-119776799/137977.html) .
VOA. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130601033400/http://www .voanews.com/content/voa-correspondent-r
eaches-crippled-fukushima-1-nuke-plant-119776799/137977.html)from the original on 1 June 2013. Retrieved 5
March 2014.
109. "Reconstruction Agency"(http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/GEJE/index.html). www.reconstruction.go.jp.
Retrieved 2 June 2016.
110. Takahashi, Hideki, and Shinya Kokubun, W " orkers grappled with darkness at start of Fukushima nuclear crisis (http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/02/national/workers-grappled-darkness-start-fukushima-nuclear-crisis/) ", Japan
Times, 3 September 2014, p. 3
111. Takahashi, Hideki, Shinya Kokubun, and Y ukiko Maeda, "Response stymied by loss of electricity(http://www.japanti
mes.co.jp/news/2014/09/02/national/response-stymied-loss-electricity/#.V AcE5o0cR9A)", Japan Times, 3 September
2014, p. 3
112. Takahashi, Hideki, and Hisashi Ota, F" ukushima workers tried to save reactor 1 through venting(http://www.japantim
es.co.jp/news/2014/09/02/national/workers-tried-save-reactor-1-venting/#.V AcFeI0cR9A)", Japan Times, 3
September 2014, p. 3
113. Uncertainties abound in Fukushima decommissioning.(http://phys.org/news/2013-11-uncertainties-abound-fukushim
a-decommissioning.html)Phys.org. 19 November 2013.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140314004915/htt
p://phys.org/news/2013-11-uncertainties-abound-fukushima-decommissioning.html) 14 March 2014 at theWayback
Machine.
114. Fukushima Timeline (http://www.scientificamerican.com/media/multimedia/0312-fukushima-timeline/)
scientificamerican.comArchived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140306144112/http://www .scientificamerican.com/m
edia/multimedia/0312-fukushima-timeline/)6 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
115. Most of fuel NOT remaining in reactor1 core / eTpco "but molten fuel is stopped in the concrete base"(http://fukushi
ma-diary.com/2013/12/most-of-fuel-not-remaining-in-reactor1-core-tepco-but-molten-fuel-is-stopped-in-the-concrete-
base/) Fukushima-Diary.com Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140325031908/http://fukushima-diary .com/201
3/12/most-of-fuel-not-remaining-in-reactor1-core-tepco-but-molten-fuel-is-stopped-in-the-concrete-base/) 25 March
2014 at the Wayback Machine.
116. "Reactor 3 fuel is assumed to have melted concrete base up to 26cm to the wall of primary vessel" (http://fukushima-
diary.com/2014/08/reactor-3-fuel-is-assumed-to-have-melted-concrete-base-up-to-26cm-to-the-wall-of-primary-vesse
l/). Fukushima Diary. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
117. "TEPCO Admits Unit 3 Had Total Melt Through" (http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=13608). SimplyInfo. Retrieved 12
June 2015.
118. "Fukushima Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Failure Preceded Explosion" (http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=13619).
SimplyInfo. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
119. "Fukushima robot finds potential fuel debris hanging like icicles in reactor 3"
(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/
07/21/national/fukushima-robot-finds-potential-fuel-debris-hanging-like-icicles-reactor -3/). The Japan Times.
Bloomberg. 21 July 2017. Retrieved 23 July 2017.
120. The Evaluation Status of Reactor Core Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1 to(http://ww 3
w.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_04-e.pdf)30 November 2011 Tokyo Electric Power
Company
121. Report on the Investigation and Study of Unconfirmed/Unclear Matters in the Fukushima Nuclear Accident –
Progress Report No.2 – 6 August 2014 T okyo Electric Power Company, Inc. (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-co
m/release/betu14_e/images/140806e0101.pdf)
122. TEPCO to start "scanning" inside of Reactor 1 in early February by using muon (http://fukushima-diary.com/2015/01/
tepco-start-scanning-inside-reactor-1-early-february-using-muon/)– Fukushima Diary
123. Muon Scans Begin At Fukushima Daiichi(http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=14380)– SimplyInfo
124. Muon Scan Finds No Fuel In Fukushima Unit 1 Reactor e Vssel (http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=14602)–
SimplyInfo
125. IRID saw no fuel or water remaining in reactor core of Reactor 1(http://fukushima-diary.com/2015/03/irid-saw-no-fuel
-or-water-remaining-in-reactor-core-of-reactor-1/)– Fukushima Diary
126. "High radiation readings at Fukushima's No. 2 reactor complicate robot-based probe" (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0170215025105/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/10/national/high-radiation-readings-at-fukushima-no-2-re
actor/#.WMTiA4WcGZ8). The Japan Times. 10 February 2017. Archived fromthe original (http://www.japantimes.co.
jp/news/2017/02/10/national/high-radiation-readings-at-fukushima-no-2-reactor/)
on 15 February 2017. Retrieved 11
February 2017.
127. 東電２号機格納容器の放射線量を大幅訂正(https://web.archive.org/web/20170727224247/http://www3.nhk.or .jp/ne
ws/html/20170728/k10011077611000.html)(in Japanese). NHK. 28 July 2017. Archived fromthe original (http://www
3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20170728/k10011077611000.html) on 27 July 2017. Retrieved 28 July 2017.
128. Justin McCurry (3 February 2017)."Fukushima nuclear reactor radiation at highest level since 2011 meltdown" (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20170311101048/https://www .theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/03/fukushima-daiichi-
radiation-levels-highest-since-2011-meltdown) . The Guardian. Archived from the original (https://www.theguardian.co
m/environment/2017/feb/03/fukushima-daiichi-radiation-levels-highest-since-2011-meltdown) on 11 March 2017.
Retrieved 3 February 2017.
129. "Tepco surveys interior of unit 2 containmentvessel" (http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Tepco-surveys-interior-
of-unit-2-containment-vessel-1901186.html). World Nuclear News. 19 January 2018. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
130. Kawahara, Chikako (20 January 2018)."Melted nuclear fuel seen inside No. 2 reactor at Fukushima plant"(http://ww
w.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201801200017.html). The Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
131. "Most fuel in Fukushima 4 pool undamaged"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Most_fuel_in_Fukushima_4_po
ol_undamaged-1404117.html). world nuclear news. 14 April 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xxgcVep
h?url=http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Most_fuel_in_Fukushima_4_pool_undamaged-1404117.html) from the
original on 15 April 2011. Retrieved 27 January 2012.
132. "Japan Diplomat: Ground underneath Fukushima Unit 4 is sinking — More than 30 inches in some areas — Now in
danger of collapse" (http://enenews.com/former-prime-ministers-secretary-ground-fukushima-unit-4-sinking-30-inche
s-areas-danger-collapse-video). ENENews. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140326155008/http://enenews.
com/former-prime-ministers-secretary-ground-fukushima-unit-4-sinking-30-inches-areas-danger -collapse-video) from
the original on 26 March 2014. Retrieved 24 October 2012. “Due to its ground has been sinking, reactor 4 is now
endangered in collapse. … According to secretary of former Prime Minister Kan, the ground level of the building has
been sinking 80 cm … unevenly. Because the ground itself has the problem, whether the building can resist a quake
bigger than M6 still remains a question.”
133. "Gundersen: Japan ambassador confirms Fukushima Unit 4 is sinking unevenly — Building "may begin to be tilting ""
(http://enenews.com/gundersen-fukushima-unit-4-sinking-confirms-japan-ambassador -building-begin-be-tilting-audi
o). ENENews. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140311135500/http://enenews.com/gundersen-fukushima-un
it-4-sinking-confirms-japan-ambassador-building-begin-be-tilting-audio)from the original on 11 March 2014.
Retrieved 24 October 2012. “So I have been able to confirm that there is unequal sinking at Unit 4, not just the fact
the site sunk by 36 inches immediately after the accident, but also that Unit 4 continues to sink something on the
order of 0.8 meters, or around 30 inches.”
134. "Fuel Removal From Unit 4 Reactor Building Completed at Fukushima Daiichi" (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp
-com/release/2014/1246703_5892.html). TEPCO. 22 December 2014. Retrieved 24 December 2014.
135. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/15/japan.nuclear .reactors/?hpt=T1
136. https://web.archive.org/web/20110523050825/http://www .nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110322-1-1.pdfNISA
news release
137. "Seismic Damage Information (the 61st Release)"(https://www.webcitation.org/5xs2iKmoX?url=http://www.nisa.meti.
go.jp/english/files/en20110330-1-1.pdf)(PDF). Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. 29 March 2011. Archived from
the original (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110330-1-1.pdf) (PDF) on 11 April 2011. Retrieved 12 April
2011.
138. Cresswell, Adam (16 March 2011). "Stealthy , silent destroyer of DNA".The Australian
139. "Fukushima Radiation Found In Tap Water Around Japan" (http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=14751).
140. Fukushima radioactive fallout nears Chernobyl levels – 24 March 2011(https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2028
5-fukushima-radioactive-fallout-nears-chernobyl-levels.html) . New Scientist. Retrieved 30 April 2011.Archived (http
s://www.webcitation.org/5xRjHTuh3?url=http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20285-fukushima-radioactive-fallout-n
ears-chernobyl-levels.html)25 March 2011 at WebCite
141. Report: Emissions from Japan plant approach Chernobyl levels(http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadlin
e/post/2011/03/report-radioactive-emissions-from-japan-plant-approach-chernobyl-levels/1) , USA Today, 24 March
2011 Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130818115231/http://content.usatoday .com/communities/ondeadline/p
ost/2011/03/report-radioactive-emissions-from-japan-plant-approach-chernobyl-levels/1) 18 August 2013 at the
Wayback Machine.
142. Doughton, Sandi. (5 April 2011)Local News|Universities come through in monitoring for radiation|Seattle imes T
Newspaper (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014693490_nukemonitors06m.html) .
Seattletimes.nwsource.com. Retrieved 30 April 2011.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110921031656/http://
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014693490_nukemonitors06m.html) 21 September 2011 at the
Wayback Machine.
143. IRSN (26 October 2011)."Synthèse actualisée des connaissances relatives à l'impact sur le milieu marin des rejets
radioactifs du site nucléaire accidenté de Fukushima Dai-ichi"(http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Do
cuments/IRSN-NI-Impact_accident_Fukushima_sur_milieu_marin_26102011.pdf) (PDF). Retrieved 3 January 2012.
144. Buesseler, Ken O.; Jayne, Steven R.; Fisher, Nicholas S.; Rypina, Irina I.; Baumann, Hannes; Baumann, Zofia;
Breier, Crystaline F.; Douglass, Elizabeth M.;George, Jennifer; MacDonald, Alison M.; Miyamoto, Hiroomi;
Nishikawa, Jun; Pike, Steven M.; Yoshida, Sashiko (2012). "Fukushima-derived radionuclides in the ocean and biota
off Japan" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3341070). Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. 109 (16): 5984–8. doi:10.1073/pnas.1120794109(https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1120794109).
PMC 3341070 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3341070) . PMID 22474387 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.ni
h.gov/pubmed/22474387).
145. "CTBTO to Share Data with IAEA and WHO"(http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2011/ctbto-to-share-
data-with-iaea-and-who/). CTBTO Press Release 18 March 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201312241
10321/http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2011/ctbto-to-share-data-with-iaea-and-who/)from the
original on 24 December 2013. Retrieved 17 May 2012.
146. "Fukushima-Related Measurements by the CTBT O" (http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2011/fukushima-rel
ated-measurements-by-the-ctbto/fukushima-related-measurements-by-the-ctbto-page-1/) . CTBTO Press Release 13
April 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5yTNGskVw?url=http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/201
1/fukushima-related-measurements-by-the-ctbto/fukushima-related-measurements-by-the-ctbto-page-1/) from the
original on 6 May 2011. Retrieved 17 May 2012.
147. "CTBTO Trakcs Fukushima's Radioactive Release"(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9b7PwKraaek). Animation
CTBTO YouTube Channel. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120523032332/https://www .youtube.com/watc
h?v=9b7PwKraaek&list=UUt-lelHFVnp7c08xEtCw87A&index=1&feature=plcp) from the original on 23 May 2012.
Retrieved 17 May 2012.
148. Frank N. von Hippel (September/October 2011 vol. 67 no. 5)."The radiological and psychological consequences of
the Fukushima Daiichi accident"(http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/5/27.full). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
pp. 27–36. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/643mZ4JGx?url=http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/5/27.full)from
the original on 20 December 2011.Check date values in: |date= (help)
149. No-Man's Land Attests to Japan's Nuclear Nightmare . (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mans-land-atte
sts-japans-nuclear-nightmare-15239892#.Tvn--1ZhuuJ)ABC News, 27. December 2011.Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20111228012212/http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mans-land-attests-japans-nuclear-night
mare-15239892#.Tvn--1ZhuuJ)28 December 2011 at theWayback Machine.
150. "Reactor accident Fukushima – New international study"(https://web.archive.org/web/20140106212906/http://www .n
ilu.no/Nyhetsarkiv/tabid/74/language/en-GB/NewsId/157/Reactor -accident-Fukushima--New-international-study .asp
x). Norwegian Institute for Air Research. 21 October 2011. Archived fromthe original (http://www.nilu.no/Nyhetsarkiv/
tabid/74/language/en-GB/NewsId/157/Reactor -accident-Fukushima--New-international-study .aspx) on 6 January
2014. Retrieved 20 January 2012.
151. David Guttenfelder (27 December 2011)."No-man's land attests to Japan's nuclear nightmare"(https://www.thestar.c
om/news/article/1107411). theStar.com. Toronto. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120110055251/http://ww
w.thestar.com/news/article/1107411)from the original on 10 January 2012. Retrieved 20 January 2012.
152. Kyodo News, "Radioactivity Dispersal Distance From Fukushima 1/10th Of Chernobyl's", 13 March 2012, (wire
service report), "The data showed, for example, more than 1.48 million becquerels (40 micro curies) of radioactive
caesium per square meter was detected in soil at a location some 250 kilometers away from the Chernobyl plant. In
the case of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the distance was much smaller at about 33 km, the ficialsof said."
153. Hongo, Jun, "Fukushima soil fallout far short of Chernobyl(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120314x1.html)",
Japan Times, 15 March 2012, p. 1.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120316193101/http://www .japantimes.c
o.jp/text/nn20120314x1.html)16 March 2012 at theWayback Machine.
154. Michael Winter (24 March 2011)."Report: Emissions from Japan plant approach Chernobyl levels"(http://content.us
atoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/03/report-radioactive-emissions-from-japan-plant-approach-chernoby
l-levels/1). USA Today. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130818115231/http://content.usatoday .com/commu
nities/ondeadline/post/2011/03/report-radioactive-emissions-from-japan-plant-approach-chernobyl-levels/1) from the
original on 18 August 2013.
155. Hamada, Nobuyuki. "Safety regulations of food and water implemented in the first year following the Fukushima
nuclear accident" (http://jrr.oxfordjournals.org/content/53/5/641.short). Oxford Journals. Retrieved 30 November
2013.
156. "福島産の新米、東京で販売開始全袋検査に合格" (http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG0102S_R00C12A9C
R8000/). 共同 Nikkei Kyodo news. 1 September 2012. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131203094456/htt
p://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG0102S_R00C12A9CR8000/) from the original on 3 December 2013.
Retrieved 18 April 2013.
157. JAIF (5 September 2011)NSC Recalculates Total Amount of Radioactive Materials Released (http://www.jaif.or.jp/en
glish/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1315203996P .pdf) Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/643r4IfLX?url=http://
www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1315203996P .pdf) 20 December 2011 atWebCite
158. INES (the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) Rating on the Events in Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear
Power Station by the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake(https://www.webcitation.org/5xsyUr2Wx?url
=http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110412-4.pdf). NISA/METI, 12 April 2011, archived fromOriginal (http://
www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110412-4.pdf).
159. JAIF (9 September 2011)Radioactive release into sea estimated triple(http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pd
f/ENGNEWS01_1315542569P.pdf) Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/63r4rrpz2?url=http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/
news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1315542569P .pdf) 11 December 2011 atWebCite
160. JAIF 20 September 2011Earthquake-report 211: A new plan set to reduce radiation emissions(http://www.jaif.or.jp/e
nglish/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1316578041P .pdf)
nglish/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1316578041P .pdf)
161. Possibility of recriticality again(http://fukushima-diary.com/2011/12/breaking-news-possibility-recriticality-again/),
Fukushima Diary Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131224113244/http://fukushima-diary .com/2011/12/breaki
ng-news-possibility-recriticality-again/)24 December 2013 at theWayback Machine.
162. Increasing leakage of Iodine-131(http://fukushima-diary.com/2011/12/breaking-news-fukushima-increasing-leakage-i
odine-131/), Fukushima Diary Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131224091048/http://fukushima-diary .com/20
11/12/breaking-news-fukushima-increasing-leakage-iodine-131/)24 December 2013 at theWayback Machine.
163. IRSN (26 October 2011)."Synthèse actualisée des connaissances relatives à l'impact sur le milieu marin des rejets
radioactifs du site nucléaire accidenté de Fukushima Dai-ichi"(http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Do
cuments/IRSN-NI-Impact_accident_Fukushima_sur_milieu_marin_26102011.pdf) (PDF). Retrieved 3 January 2012
164. Daniel J. Madigan; Zofia Baumann; Nicholas S. Fisher (29 May 2012)."Pacific bluefin tuna transport Fukushima-
derived radionuclides from Japan to California"(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3386103).
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America . 109 (24): 9483–9486.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1204859109(https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1204859109). PMC 3386103 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3386103) . PMID 22645346 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22645346)
165. Aoki, Mizuho, "Tohoku fears nuke crisis evacuees gone for good (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120307x1.ht
ml)", Japan Times, 8 March 2012, p. 1. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120307172156/http://www .japantim
es.co.jp/text/nn20120307x1.html)7 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine.
166. TEPCO Press Release."The Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air and the Ocean
Caused by Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident Due to theohoku-Chihou-TT aiheiyou-Oki Earthquake
(As of May 2012)" (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1204659_1870.html). TEPCO. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20140215101525/http://www .tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1204659_187
0.html) from the original on 15 February 2014. Retrieved 24 May 2012.
167. Kevin Krolicki (24 May 2012)."Fukushima radiation higher than first estimated"(http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/
24/nuclear-japan-radiation-fukushima-idINDEE84N0CR20120524). Reuters. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0131015040840/http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/24/nuclear -japan-radiation-fukushima-idINDEE84N0CR201205
24) from the original on 15 October 2013. Retrieved 24 May 2012.
168. "TEPCO puts radiation release early in Fukushima crisis at 900 PBq"(https://web.archive.org/web/20120524191342/
http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2012/05/159960.html) . Kyodo News. 24 May 2012. Archived fromthe original (htt
p://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2012/05/159960.html)on 24 May 2012. Retrieved 24 May 2012.
169. Estimation of radionuclide emission during 15 March 2011 accident at the fukushima-1 npp (japan)", R.. V
Arutyunyan, L. A. Bolshov, D. A. Pripachkin, V. N. Semyonov, O. S. Sorokovikova, A. L. Fokin, K. G. Rubinstein, R.
Yu. Ignatov, M. M. Smirnova, Atomnaya Énergiya, V ol. 112, No. 3, pp. 159–163, March 2012, as reported in Atomic
Energy, July 2012, Volume 112, Issue 3, pp 188-193s
170. Boytchev, Hristio, "First study reports very low internal radioactivity after Fukushima disaster (https://www.washingto
npost.com/national/health-science/first-study-reports-very-low-internal-radioactivity-after-fukushima-disaster/2012/0
8/14/aadd1dc2-e628-11e1-8741-940e3f6dbf48_story .html)", Washington Post, 15 August 2012
171. Ken O. Buesseler (26 October 2012)."Fishing for Answers off Fukushima"(http://www.sciencemag.org/content/338/
6106/480.summary?sid=a63a9534-893c-403a-a5b3-9a96f74eed93) . Science. 338 (6106): 480–482.
doi:10.1126/science.1228250(https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1228250). PMID 23112321 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/23112321). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130817100136/http://www .sciencemag.org/conten
t/338/6106/480.summary?sid=a63a9534-893c-403a-a5b3-9a96f74eed93) from the original on 17 August 2013.
172. Tabuchi, Hiroko (25 October 2012)."Fish Off Japan's Coast Said to Contain Elevated Levels of Cesium"(https://ww
w.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/fish-off-fukushima-japan-show-elevated-levels-of-cesium.html?_r=0) . New
York Times Asia Pacific. Retrieved 28 October 2012.
173. (in Dutch) Nu.nl (26 October 2012)Tepco sluit niet uit dat centrale Fukushima nog lekt (http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/2
943442/tepco-sluit-niet-centrale-fukushima-nog-lekt.html)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140108032351/ht
tp://www.nu.nl/buitenland/2943442/tepco-sluit-niet-centrale-fukushima-nog-lekt.html)8 January 2014 at theWayback
Machine.
174. Fukushima Plant Admits Radioactive Water Leaked To Sea (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/fukushima-ra
dioactive-water-leaks-into-sea_n_3634352.html) . Huffingtonpost.com. Retrieved on 6 September 2013. Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20140417215437/http://www .huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/fukushima-radioactive-water-l
eaks-into-sea_n_3634352.html)17 April 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
175. Adelman, Jacob. (7 August 2013)Abe Pledges Government Help to Stem Fukushima W ater Leaks (https://www.bloo
mberg.com/news/2013-08-07/fukushima-leaks-priority-not-nuclear-restarts-activists-say .html). Bloomberg. Retrieved
on 2013-09-06. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131202234133/http://www .bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-0
7/fukushima-leaks-priority-not-nuclear-restarts-activists-say .html) 2 December 2013 at theWayback Machine.
176. "Wrecked Fukushima storage tank leaking highly radioactive water"(https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/us-j
apan-fukushima-leak-idUSBRE97J02920130820) . Reuters. 20 August 2013.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0140429172138/https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/us-japan-fukushima-leak-idUSBRE97J02920130820)
from the original on 29 April 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2013.
177. SI Units: Volume (https://www.nist.gov/pml/wmd/metric/volume.cfm)
178. "Japan nuclear agency upgrades Fukushima alert level"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23776345). BBC.
21 August 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140429172136/http://www .bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-237
76345) from the original on 29 April 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2013.
179. Takashi Hirokawa; Jacob Adelman; Peter Langan; Yuji Okada (26 August 2013)."Fukushima Leaks Prompt
Government to 'Emergency Measures' (1)"(http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-26/fukushima-filter-shutdo
wn-adds-to-tepco-water-management-woes). Businessweek. Bloomberg. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201
30930015231/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-26/fukushima-filter-shutdown-adds-to-tepco-water-mana
gement-woes) from the original on 30 September 2013. Retrieved 27 August 2013.
180. "Japan seeks outside help for contaminated water"(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Japan_seeks_outside_h
elp_for_contaminated_water-2609134.html). World Nuclear News. 26 September 2013.Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20140402111159/http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Japan_seeks_outside_help_for_contaminated_
water-2609134.html) from the original on 2 April 2014. Retrieved 1 October 2013.
181. "How TEPCO plans to build an ice wall at Fukushima"(https://web.archive.org/web/20140224111246/http://www .nei
magazine.com/features/featurehow-tepco-plans-to-build-a-frozen-wall-at-fukushima-4179856/) . Nuclear Engineering
International. 18 February 2014. Archived fromthe original (http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurehow-tepco-
plans-to-build-a-frozen-wall-at-fukushima-4179856/)on 24 February 2014. Retrieved 19 February 2014.
182. Varma, Subodh (10 February 2014)."Fukushima radiation data is wildly wrong, management apologizes"(https://we
b.archive.org/web/20140211124813/http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Fukushima-radiation-data-
is-wildly-wrong-management-apologizes/articleshow/30163944.cms) . TNN. Archived from the original (http://timesofi
ndia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Fukushima-radiation-data-is-wildly-wrong-management-apologizes/articlesh
ow/30163944.cms) on 11 February 2014. Retrieved 11 March 2016.
183. "TEPCO to review erroneous radiation data"(https://archive.is/20140209232503/http://www3.nhk.or .jp/nhkworld/engl
ish/news/20140209_80.html). NHK World. NHK. 9 February 2014. Archived fromthe original (http://www3.nhk.or.jp/n
hkworld/english/news/20140209_80.html)on 9 February 2014. Retrieved 9 February 2014. “Tokyo Electric Power
Company, or TEPCO, says it has detected arecord high 5 million becquerels (0.13 millicuries)per liter of radioactive
strontium in groundwater collected last July from one of the wells close to the ocean. ... Based on the result, levels of
radioactive substances that emit beta particles are estimated to be 10 million becquerels (0.26 milli curies) per liter,
which is more than 10 times the initial reading. ”
184. "TEPCO to Review Erroneous Radiation Data"(http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20140206-OYT1T01326.htm).
Yomiuri Online. Yomiuri Shimbun. 9 February 2014. Retrieved 9 February 2014. “On February 6, TEPCO announced
that 5 million Bq/Liter of radioactive strontium was detected from the groundwater sample taken on June 5 last year
from one of the observation wells on the embankment of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The density is 160,000
times that of the legal limit for release into the ocean, and it is about 1,000 times that of the highest density in the
groundwater that had been measured so far (5,100 Bq/L). TEPCO didn't disclose the result of measurement of
strontium alone, as the company believed there was a possibility that the result of measurement was wrong. As to
this particular sample, TEPCO had announced on July last year that the sample had contained 900,000 Bq/L of all-
beta including strontium. On February 6, TEPCO explained that they had "underestimated all of the results of high-
density all-beta, which exceeded the upper limit of measurement." This particular sample may contain about 10
million Bq/L of all-beta, according to TEPCO. The company recently switched to a different method of analysis that
uses diluted samples when the density of radioactive materials is high. ”
185. Fernquest, John. "Japan floods: After typhoon, rivers overflow , nuclear water" (http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/
learning-from-news/688236/japan-floods-after -typhoon-rivers-overflow-nuclear-water). Retrieved 10 September
2015.
186. "Flooding swept away radiation cleanup bags in Fukushima"(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/12/national/f
looding-swept-away-radiation-cleanup-bags-in-fukushima/) . The Japan Times Online. 12 September 2015.
ISSN 0447-5763 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0447-5763). Retrieved 13 September 2015.
187. Fukushima's radioactive ocean plume due to reach US waters in 2014 – NBC News (http://www.nbcnews.com/scien
ce/environment/fukushimas-radioactive-ocean-plume-due-reach-us-waters-2014-f8C11050755) Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20140326074916/http://www .nbcnews.com/science/environment/fukushimas-radioactive-ocean-pl
ume-due-reach-us-waters-2014-f8C11050755)26 March 2014 at theWayback Machine.
188. Sherwood, Courtney (11 November 2014)."Fukushima radiation nears California coast, judged harmless"(http://new
s.sciencemag.org/asiapacific/2014/11/fukushima-radiation-nears-california-coast-judged-harmless) . Science.
189. "British Columbia | Home"(http://fukushimainform.ca/category/peer-reviewed/location/british-columbia/).
fukushimainform.ca. Retrieved 2 November 2015.
190. "Canadian researcher targeted by hate campaign over Fukushima findings" (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/new
s/british-columbia/canadian-researcher-targeted-by-hate-campaign-over-fukushima-findings/article27060613/). The
Globe and Mail. Retrieved 2 November 2015.
191. Yoichi Funabashi; Kay Kitazawa (1 March 2012). "Fukushima in review: A complex disaster , a disastrous response"
(http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/02/29/0096340212440359.full.pdf+html) . Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists.
192. Hiroko Tabuchi (3 March 2012)."Japanese Prime Minister Says Government Shares Blame for Nuclear Disaster" (htt
ps://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/world/asia/japans-premier-says-government-shares-blame-for-fukushima-disaste
r.html). The New York Times.
193. "AP Interview: Japan woefully unprepared for nuclear disaster , ex-prime minister says"(http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/
TopStories/20120217/japan-unprepared-for-nuclear-disaster-ex-pm-says-120217/). ctv.ca. 17 February 2012.
194. Amory Lovins (2011). "Soft Energy Paths for the 21st Century"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131224094312/http://
www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2011-09_GaikoSoftEnergyPaths). Archived from the original (http://www.rmi.
org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2011-09_GaikoSoftEnergyPaths)on 24 December 2013.
195. "Japan did not keep records of nuclear disaster meetings"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16754891). BBC
Online. 27 January 2012. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140220102644/http://www .bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-16754891) from the original on 20 February 2014.
196. "Fukushima Pref. deleted 5 days of radiation dispersion data just after meltdowns" (https://web.archive.org/web/2012
0325172734/http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120322p2a00m0na012000c.html) . The Mainichi Shimbun. 22
March 2012. Archived fromthe original (http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120322p2a00m0na012000c.html)
on 25 March 2012.
197. "Tepco concealed core meltdowns during Fukushima accident" (http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newstepco-conc
ealed-core-meltdowns-during-fukushima-accident-4931915) . Nuclear Engineering International. 24 June 2016 .
198. "Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril"(http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20110808/ZNYT03/1080
83022/-1/NEWS04?p=1&tc=pg). Herald-Tribune. 8 August 2011. Retrieved 8 August 2011.
199. "Report: Japan, utility at fault for response to nuclear disaster"(http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/12/j
apans-march-11-earthquake-and-tsunami-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear -power-plant-meltdown.html). LA Times. 26
December 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140123215710/http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_no
w/2011/12/japans-march-11-earthquake-and-tsunami-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear -power-plant-meltdown.html) from
the original on 23 January 2014.
200. Martin Fackler (27 February 2012)."Japan Weighed Evacuating Tokyo in Nuclear Crisis"(https://web.archive.org/we
b/20120626120608/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/world/asia/japan-considered-tokyo-evacuation-during-the-nu
clear-crisis-report-says.html). The New York Times. Archived from the original (https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/
world/asia/japan-considered-tokyo-evacuation-during-the-nuclear -crisis-report-says.html)on 26 June 2012.
201. Yoshida, Reiji (17 March 2012)."Kan hero, or irate meddler?"(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120317a3.html).
Japan Times. p. 2. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20121101132508/http://www .japantimes.co.jp/text/nn2012
0317a3.html) from the original on 1 November 2012.
202. Hongo, Jun (29 February 2012)."Panel lays bare Fukushima recipe for disaster"(https://web.archive.org/web/20120
229063911/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120228x1.html). Japan Times. p. 1. Archived from the original (htt
p://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120228x1.html) on 29 February 2012.
203. "Blow-ups happen: Nuclear plants can be kept safe only by constantly worrying about their dangers" (http://www.eco
nomist.com/node/21549095). The Economist. 10 March 2012. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201404121944
25/http://www.economist.com/node/21549095) from the original on 12 April 2014.
204. Kyodo News (20 June 2012)."Japan sat on U.S. radiation maps showing immediate fallout from nuke crisis" (https://
web.archive.org/web/20121101132531/http://www .japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120619a1.html). Japan Times. p. 1.
Archived from the original (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120619a1.html) on 1 November 2012.
205. "Japan failed to use U.S. radiation data gathered after nuke crisis"(https://archive.is/20120716140052/http://mainich
i.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120619p2g00m0dm004000c.html) . The Mainichi Shimbun. 18 June 2012.
Archived from the original (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120619p2g00m0dm004000c.html)
on 16 July 2012.
206. Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. (JAIF) (19 June 2012)."Earthquake report 447"(http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/new
s_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1340094210P .pdf) (PDF)
207. The Japan Times (17 January 2012)U.S. forces given SPEEDI data early(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/0
1/18/national/u-s-forces-given-speedi-data-early/#.VxWY1EeWkgU)
208. JIAF (29 June 2012)Earthequake-report 455: NISA "sorry" for withholding US radiation maps (http://www.jaif.or.jp/en
glish/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1340954689P .pdf)
209. "Japanese utility admits to 'coverup' during Fukushima nuclear meltdown |oronto T Star" (https://www.thestar.com/bu
siness/2016/06/21/japanese-utility-admits-to-coverup-during-fukushima-nuclear -meltdown.html). thestar.com.
Retrieved 1 July 2016.
210. "NISA News Release April 12, 2011"(https://www.webcitation.org/69MikbzsO?url=http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/
files/en20110412-4.pdf)(PDF). Archived from the original (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110412-4.pdf)
(PDF) on 23 July 2012. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
211. Directly comparing Fukushima to Chernobyl: Nature News Blog(http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/directly_com
paring_fukushima_t.html). Blogs.nature.com (31 January 2013). Retrieved on 2013-02-13.Archived (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20131028093349/http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/09/directly_comparing_fukushima_t.html) 28
October 2013 at the Wayback Machine.
212. Austria (12 April 2011)."IAEA Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log – Updates of 12April 2011" (http://www.iae
a.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima120411.html) . Iaea.org. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xxahjDaK?url
=http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima120411.html)from the original on 15 April 2011. Retrieved 24
April 2011.
213. Press Release |The Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air and the Ocean Caused by
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident Due to the ohoku-Chihou-T
T aiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (As of May
2012) (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1204659_1870.html). TEPCO. Retrieved on 13
February 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140215101525/http://www .tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/re
lease/2012/1204659_1870.html)15 February 2014 at theWayback Machine.
214. Chapter II The release, dispersion and deposition of radionuclides – Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and
Health Impact (https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/c02.html). Oecd-nea.org. Retrieved on 13 February 2013.
Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5y5ol8HsS?url=http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/c02.html)20 April 2011
at WebCite
215. Isotopic ratio of radioactive iodine (129I/131I) released from Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident (http://www.terrapub.c
o.jp/journals/GJ/pdf/4604/46040327.pdf)
216. Johnson, George (21 September 2015)."When Radiation Isn't the Real Risk"(https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/
science/when-radiation-isnt-the-real-risk.html). The New York Times. Retrieved 30 November 2015.
217. "Fukushima disaster: Ex-Tepco executives charged with negligence"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-356840
98). BBC News. 29 February 2016. Retrieved 13 March 2016.
218. Japan Earthquake – Tsunami Fast Facts (https://web.archive.org/web/20131031070028/http://www .cnn.com/2013/0
7/17/world/asia/japan-earthquake---tsunami-fast-facts/) , CNN, 20 February 2014, archived fromthe original (http://w
ww.cnn.com/2013/07/17/world/asia/japan-earthquake---tsunami-fast-facts/)on 31 October 2013, retrieved 6 April
2014
219. Brumfiel, Geoffrey (23 May 2012)."World Health Organization weighs in on Fukushima"(http://blogs.nature.com/ne
ws/2012/05/world-health-organization-weighs-in-on-fukushima.html) . Nature. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0131006104951/http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/05/world-health-organization-weighs-in-on-fukushima.html) from
the original on 6 October 2013. Retrieved 20 March 2013.
220. Brumfiel, Geoff (Jan 2013). "Fukushima: Fallout of fear".Nature. 493 (7432): 290–293. doi:10.1038/493290a (https://
doi.org/10.1038/493290a). PMID 23325191 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23325191).
221. Brumfiel, Geoff (May 2012). "PRINT – FUKUSHIMA".Nature. 485 (7399): 423–424. doi:10.1038/485423a (https://do
i.org/10.1038/485423a). PMID 22622542 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22622542).
222. Nebehay, Stephanie (28 February 2013)."Higher cancer risk after Fukushima nuclear disaster: WHO"(https://www.r
euters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-japan-nuclear -cancer-idUSBRE91R0D420130228). Reuters. Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20131015040134/https://www .reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-japan-nuclear -cancer-idUSBRE91
R0D420130228) from the original on 15 October 2013.
223. Rojavin, Y; Seamon, MJ; Tripathi, RS; Papadimos, TJ; Galwankar, S; Kman, N; Cipolla, J; Grossman, MD;
Marchigiani, R; Stawicki, SP (Apr 2011). "Civilian nuclear incidents: An overview of historical, medical, and scientific
aspects". J Emerg Trauma Shock. 4 (2): 260–72. doi:10.4103/0974-2700.82219(https://doi.org/10.4103/0974-2700.
82219).
224. WHO 2013, p. 42.
225. WHO 2013, p. 92.
226. "Global report on Fukushima nuclear accident details health risks"(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/20
13/fukushima_report_20130228/en/). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140412215045/http://www .who.int/me
diacentre/news/releases/2013/fukushima_report_20130228/en/)from the original on 12 April 2014. Retrieved 28
April 2014.
227. Frequently asked questions on the Fukushima health risk assessment(http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_me
et/faqs_fukushima_risk_assessment/en/), questions 3 & 4 Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140213180033/h
ttp://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/faqs_fukushima_risk_assessment/en/)13 February 2014 at the
Wayback Machine.
228. WHO 2013, p. 83.
229. "WHO: Slight cancer risk after Japan nuke accident"(http://bigstory.ap.org/article/who-small-cancer-risk-after-fukushi
ma-accident). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130303021915/http://bigstory .ap.org/article/who-small-cancer
-risk-after-fukushima-accident) from the original on 3 March 2013.
230. "WHO report: cancer risk from Fukushima is low"(http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newswho-report-cancer-risk-fr
om-fukushima-is-low). Nuclear Engineering International. 1 March 2013.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013
1014044905/http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newswho-report-cancer-risk-from-fukushima-is-low)from the
original on 14 October 2013. Retrieved 6 March 2013.
231. WHO 2013, p. 13.
232. "Fukushima Accident" (http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-acci
dent.aspx). World Nuclear Assocation. Retrieved 9 September 2018.
233. Goldberg, Jeanne (September–October 2018). "From the Spectral to the Spectrum". Skeptical Inquirer. 42 (5).
234. Dennis Normile (27 July 2012)."Is Nuclear Power Good for You?" (https://www.webcitation.org/6EPZQYUB0?url=htt
p://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/07/is-nuclear -power-good-for-you.html). Science. 337 (6093): 395–
396. doi:10.1126/science.337.6093.395-b(https://doi.org/10.1126/science.337.6093.395-b) . Archived from the
original (http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/07/is-nuclear -power-good-for-you.html) on 13 February
2013.
235. John E. Ten Hoeve; Mark Z. Jacobson (2012). "Worldwide health effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident"
(http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/TenHoeveEES12.pdf) (PDF). Energy & Environmental Science. 5 (9):
8743. doi:10.1039/c2ee22019a (https://doi.org/10.1039/c2ee22019a). Retrieved 18 July 2012.
236. Normile, D. (2011). "Fukushima Revives the Low-Dose Debate".Science. 332 (6032): 908–910.
doi:10.1126/science.332.6032.908(https://doi.org/10.1126/science.332.6032.908) . PMID 21596968 (https://www.nc
bi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21596968).
237. Luckey, T. J. (27 September 2006)."Radiation Hormesis: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly"(https://www.ncbi.nlm.ni
h.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2477686). Dose Response. 4 (3): 189–190. doi:10.2203/dose-response.06-102.Luckey(http
s://doi.org/10.2203/dose-response.06-102.Luckey) . PMC 2477686 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2
477686) . PMID 18648595 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18648595).
238. Aurengo, A.; et al. (2005). "Dose-Effect Relationships and Estimation of the Carcinogenic Effects of Low Doses of
Ionizing Radiation". Academies of Sciences and Medicine, Paris. 2: 135. doi:10.1504/IJLR.2006.009510(https://doi.
org/10.1504/IJLR.2006.009510).
239. "Radioactive Tuna Fish From Fukushima Reactor Spotted Off U.S. Shores"(http://foxweekly.com/2014/04/30/now/ra
dioactive-tuna-fish-from-fukushima-reactor-spotted-off-u-s-shores.html). Fox Weekly. 30 April 2014. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20140502130113/http://foxweekly .com/2014/04/30/now/radioactive-tuna-fish-from-fukushima-re
actor-spotted-off-u-s-shores.html)from the original on 2 May 2014.
240. Sebens, Shelby (29 April 2014)."Study finds Fukushima radioactivity in tuna off Oregon, W ashington" (https://news.y
ahoo.com/study-finds-fukushima-radioactivity-tuna-off-oregon-washington-222450201.html) . Yahoo. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20140503034950/http://news.yahoo.com/study-finds-fukushima-radioactivity-tuna-off-oregon
-washington-222450201.html)from the original on 3 May 2014.
241. Worstall, Tim (16 November 2013)."Fukushima Radiation In Pacific Tuna Is Equal To One Twentieth Of A Banana"
(https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/11/16/fukushima-radiation-in-pacific-tuna-is-equal-to-one-twentieth-of
-a-banana/). Forbes. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140502204840/http://www .forbes.com/sites/timworstal
l/2013/11/16/fukushima-radiation-in-pacific-tuna-is-equal-to-one-twentieth-of-a-banana/) from the original on 2 May
2014.
242. Teishima, Hirohiko et. al (2017). "Concentration of radiocesium in Japanese whiting Sillago japonica living inokyo
T
Bay after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident"(http://doi.org/10.14928/amstec.23.1_1). Journal of
Advanced Marine Science and Technology Society (in Japanese with English abstract).23 (1): 1–9.
doi:10.14928/amstec.23.1_1(https://doi.org/10.14928/amstec.23.1_1). Retrieved 6 July 2017.
243. Tilman Ruff. Fukushima: The Misery Piles up(https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/fukushima-the-misery-piles-up) ,
Pursuit magazine, University of Melbourne, 2016.
244. Hiyama; et al. (2012). "The biological impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident on the pale grass blue butterfly" (htt
ps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3414864/). Scientific Reports. 2: 570 – via NCBI.
245. Sutou; et al. (2015). "Commentary 2: abnormalities of butterflies captured around Fukushima areas might not be
caused by non-genetic but toxic effects".Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Global Implications, Long-T erm Health
Effects and Ecological Consequences. New York: Nova Sciences Publishers Inc. pp. 225–230.
246. Nakanishi, Tomoko M. (2017). "What Has Become Obvious from an Agricultural Perspective in These 5 ears Y after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident"(http://doi.org/10.2116/bunsekikagaku.66.217) . Bunseki
Kagaku (in Japanese with English abstract).66 (4): 217–222. doi:10.2116/bunsekikagaku.66.217(https://doi.org/10.
2116/bunsekikagaku.66.217). Retrieved 12 May 2017.
247. "Thailand receives Fukushima's first fish export since 2011 nuclear disaster" (http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asi
a/thailand-receives-fukushimas-first-fish-export-since-2011-nuclear-disaster). The Straits Times. Retrieved 14 March
2018.
248. "Activists oppose imports of fish from Fukushima"(https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/1423391/activists-op
pose-imports-of-fish-from-fukushima). Bangkok Post. Retrieved 14 March 2018.
249. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20180702_35/ (https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20180702_35/).
Missing or empty |title= (help)
250. WHO 2013, p. 87-88.
251. Welch, H. Gilbert; Woloshin, Steve; Schwartz, Lisa A. (2011). Overdiagnosed: Making People Sick in the Pursuit of
Health. Beacon Press. pp. 61–34.ISBN 978-0-8070-2200-9.
252. Screening effect? Examining thyroid cancersfound in Fukushima children. Jonathan Kellogg PhD, 2016(https://fuku
shimainform.ca/2016/03/06/screening-effect-examining-thyroid-cancers-found-in-fukushima-children/)
253. Guth, S; Theune, U; Aberle, J; Galach, A; Bamberger , CM (2009). "Very high prevalence of thyroid nodules detected
by high frequency (13 MHz) ultrasound examination".Eur. J. Clin. Invest. 39: 699–706. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2362.2009.02162.x (https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2362.2009.02162.x) . PMID 19601965 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.g
ov/pubmed/19601965).
254. "Fukushima kids have skyrocketing number of thyroid abnormalities – report" (http://rt.com/news/fukushima-children-
thyroids-abnormalities-cancer-444/). Russia Times. 18 February 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201404
15201917/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-children-thyroids-abnormalities-cancer -444/) from the original on 15 April
2014.
255. "Archived copy" (https://web.archive.org/web/20150209225613/http://www .fmu.ac.jp/radiationhealth/workshop20140
2/presentation/Co-Chairs_Summary_E.pdf)(PDF). Archived from the original (http://www.fmu.ac.jp/radiationhealth/wo
rkshop201402/presentation/Co-Chairs_Summary_E.pdf)(PDF) on 9 February 2015. Retrieved 1 December 2014.
256. "Experts divided on causes of high thyroid cancer rates among Fukushima children – The Mainichi" (http://mainichi.j
p/english/articles/20160307/p2a/00m/0na/022000c) . Retrieved 6 July 2016.
257. Ohira, Tetsuya et. al. (August 2016)."Comparison of childhood thyroid cancer prevalence among 3 areas based on
external radiation dose after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC5008539). Medicine. 95 (35): e4472 PubMed. PMC 5008539 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5008539) .
258. Yamashita, Shunichi; et al. (1 January 2018). "Lessons from Fukushima: Latest Findings of Thyroid Cancer After the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident".Thyroid. 28 (1): 11–22 PubMed.
259. cancer.org Thyroid Cancer (http://www.cancer.org/cancer/thyroidcancer/detailedguide/thyroid-cancer-survival-rates)
By the American Cancer Society. In turn citing: AJCC Cancer Staging Manual (7th ed).Archived (https://web.archive.
org/web/20131018080511/http://www.cancer.org/cancer/thyroidcancer/detailedguide/thyroid-cancer-survival-rates)
18 October 2013 at theWayback Machine.
260. Brumfiel, Geoff (10 September 2012)."Fukushima's doses tallied"(http://www.nature.com/news/fukushima-s-doses-t
allied-1.10686). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140214080426/http://www .nature.com/news/fukushima-s-d
oses-tallied-1.10686) from the original on 14 February 2014. Retrieved 23 May 2013.
261. Zablotska, Lydia (8 November 2012)."Chernobyl Cleanup Workers Had Significantly Increased Risk of Leukemia" (h
ttp://www.ucsf.edu/news/2012/11/13087/chernobyl-cleanup-workers-had-significantly-increased-risk-leukemia) .
UCSF. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140104212647/http://www .ucsf.edu/news/2012/11/13087/chernobyl-
cleanup-workers-had-significantly-increased-risk-leukemia)from the original on 4 January 2014.
262. "Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident. 20 Y ears Later a UN Report Provides Definitive Answers and W ays to
Repair Lives" (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/index.html). Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20071003015317/http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/index.html)from the
original on 3 October 2007.
263. Studying the Fukushima Aftermath: 'People Are Suf fering from Radiophobia' – Spiegel Online(http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/studying-the-fukushima-aftermath-people-are-suf fering-from-radiophobia-a-780810.html).
Spiegel.de (19 August 2011). Retrieved on 2013-09-06.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140116075017/htt
p://www.spiegel.de/international/world/studying-the-fukushima-aftermath-people-are-suffering-from-radiophobia-a-78
0810.html) 16 January 2014 at theWayback Machine.
264. Homes should not be abandoned after a big nuclear accident, study suggests (https://www.sciencedaily.com/release
s/2017/11/171120085453.htm)
265. Thomas, P.J (November 2017). "J-value assessment of relocation measures following the nuclear power plant
accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi"(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S09575820173007
82). Process Safety and Environmental Protection. doi:10.1016/j.psep.2017.03.012(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.20
17.03.012).
266. "Evacuees of Fukushima village report split families, growing frustration" (https://web.archive.org/web/201309222046
12/http://www.europe-solidaire.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a24296.pdf)(PDF). Mainichi Daily News. 30 January
2012. Archived from the original (http://www.europe-solidaire.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a24296.pdf)(PDF) on 22
September 2013.
267. Katherine Harmon (2 March 2012)."Japan's Post-Fukushima Earthquake Health Woes Go Beyond Radiation
Effects" (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=japans-post-fukushima-earthquake-health-woes-beyond-r
adiation&page=3). Nature. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131013113835/http://www .scientificamerican.co
m/article.cfm?id=japans-post-fukushima-earthquake-health-woes-beyond-radiation&page=3) from the original on 13
October 2013.
268. "Stress-induced deaths in Fukushima top those from 2011 natural disasters" (https://web.archive.org/web/20130927
033901/http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130909p2a00m0na009000c.html) . Archived from the
original (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130909p2a00m0na009000c.html) on 27 September
2013.
269. "Rain raises fear of more contamination at Fukushima"(http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/03/japan.nucle
ar.water/index.html?iref=allsearch). CNN. 4 June 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131224120859/htt
p://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/03/japan.nuclear.water/index.html?iref=allsearch)from the original on 24
December 2013.
270. "about the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant"(http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu-news/2014/1234259_5
878.html). 3 February 2014. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140222134739/http://www .tepco.co.jp/nu-new
s/2014/1234259_5878.html)from the original on 22 February 2014.
271. Gebl, Katy (14 February 2018)."How did Fukushima disaster affect air pollution?"(http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/
how-did-fukushima-disaster-affect-air-pollution) (Interview). Stanford Center for International Security and
Cooperation. Retrieved 27 February 2018.
272. Takata, H.; Kusakabe, M.; Inatomi, N.; Ikenoue, T. (2018). "Appearances of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant-
derived Cs-137 in coastal waters around Japan: Results from marine monitoring off nuclear power plants and
facilities". Environmental Science and Technology. 52 (5): 2629–2637. doi:10.1021/acs.est.7b03956(https://doi.org/1
0.1021/acs.est.7b03956). PMID 29336565 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29336565).
273. "estimates claims burden from earthquake in Japan at around €1.5bn"(https://www.webcitation.org/5ygfJyBZB?url=h
ttp://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2011/2011_03_22_press_release.aspx) . Munich Re. 22
March 2011. Archived fromthe original (http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2011/2011_03
_22_press_release.aspx)on 15 May 2011. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
274. Swiss Re provides estimate of its claims costs from Japan earthquake and tsunami (http://media.swissre.com/docum
ents/pr_20110321_japan_en.pdf), Swiss Re, news release, 21 March 2011
275. "UPDATE 1-Fukushima operator's mountinglegal woes to fuel nuclear opposition"(https://www.reuters.com/article/ja
pan-nuclear-tepco-legal-idUSL3N10S2GJ20150817). Reuters. 17 August 2015. Retrieved 2 February 2016.
276. Robin Harding (6 March 2016)."Japan taxpayers foot $100bn bill for Fukushima disaster"(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
0/97c88560-e05b-11e5-8d9b-e88a2a889797.html) . Financial Times. Retrieved 20 March 2016.
277. Justin McCurry (30 January 2017)."Possible nuclear fuel find raises hopes of Fukushima plant breakthrough" (http
s://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/31/possible-nuclear-fuel-find-fukushima-plant). The Guardian.
278. McCurry, Justin (17 March 2017)."Japanese government liable for negligence in Fukushima disaster"(https://www.t
heguardian.com/world/2017/mar/17/japanese-government-liable-negligence-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear -disaster). The
Guardian. London, United Kingdom.ISSN 0261-3077 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0261-3077). Retrieved 17
March 2017.
279. Tsuyoshi Inajima; Yuji Okada (28 October 2011)."Nuclear Promotion Dropped in Japan Energy Policy After
Fukushima" (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28/nuclear-promotion-dropped-in-japan-energy-policy-after -f
ukushima.html). Bloomberg. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131228131910/http://www .bloomberg.com/new
s/2011-10-28/nuclear-promotion-dropped-in-japan-energy-policy-after-fukushima.html) from the original on 28
December 2013.
280. Mari Yamaguchi (September 2011)."Kenzaburo Oe, Nobel Winner Urges Japan To Abandon Nuclear Power"(http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/06/kenzaburo-oe-nobel-winner-japan-nuclear_n_950085.html). Huffington Post.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131220074854/http://www .huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/06/kenzaburo-oe-no
bel-winner-japan-nuclear_n_950085.html)from the original on 20 December 2013.
281. Japanese nuclear plant survived tsunami, offers clues (https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-japan-nuclear-t
sunami-idUSTRE79J0B420111020). Reuters. Retrieved on 6 September 2013.Archived (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20111025214745/https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-japan-nuclear-tsunami-idUSTRE79J0B42011102
0) 25 October 2011 at theWayback Machine.
282. "Fukushima Starts Long Road To Recovery" (https://www.npr.org/2012/03/10/148351019/fukushima-starts-long-road
-to-recovery). NPR. 10 March 2012.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131219020955/http://www .npr.org/201
2/03/10/148351019/fukushima-starts-long-road-to-recovery)from the original on 19 December 2013. Retrieved 16
April 2012.
283. "Neon city goes dim as power shortage threatens traffic lights and telephones inokyo"
T (http://www.news.com.au/wo
rld/neon-city-goes-dim-as-power-shortage-threatens-traffic-lights-and-telephones-in-tokyo/story-e6frfkyi-1226021645
448). news.com.au. 15 March 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xCf0ORlt?url=http://www.news.com.au/
world/neon-city-goes-dim-as-power-shortage-threatens-traffic-lights-and-telephones-in-tokyo/story-e6frfkyi-12260216
45448) from the original on 15 March 2011.
284. Yuri Kageyama, dealing with power shortage(http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=54&articlei
d=20110522_46_e3_tokyoj653192Automakers) . Associated Press, 22 May 2011
285. Benjamin K. Sovacool (2011).Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power: A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic
Energy, World Scientific, p. 287.
286. George Monbiot. "Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power"(https://www.theguardian.com/c
ommentisfree/2011/mar/21/pro-nuclear-japan-fukushima). the Guardian. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
287. "Why This Matters" (http://www.monbiot.com/2011/04/13/why-this-matters/). Retrieved 12 June 2015.
288. "The Moral Case for Nuclear Power"(http://www.monbiot.com/2011/08/08/the-moral-case-for-nuclear-power/).
289. "How the Greens Were Misled" (http://www.monbiot.com/2011/11/22/how-the-greens-were-misled/). Retrieved 12
June 2015.
290. Jeremy Leggett. the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/renewables-nuclear-
fukushima-japan-environment(https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/renewables-nuclear-fukush
ima-japan-environment). Retrieved 21 December 2017. Missing or empty |title= (help)
291. Mycle Schneider (9 September 2011)."Fukushima crisis: Can Japan be at the forefront of an authentic paradigm
shift?" (https://web.archive.org/web/20130106021131/http://www .thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-crisi
s-can-japan-be-the-forefront-of-authentic-paradigm-shift) . Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Archived from the original
(http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-crisis-can-japan-be-the-forefront-of-authentic-paradigm-sh
ift) on 6 January 2013.
292. Dr. Ken Caldeira, Senior Scientist, Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution, Dr. Kerry Emanuel,
Atmospheric Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of e Tchnology, Dr. James Hansen, Climate Scientist, Columbia
University Earth Institute, Dr. Tom Wigley, Climate Scientist, University of Adelaide and the National Center for
Atmospheric Research."There is no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for
nuclear power" (http://cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientists-letter/). cnn.com.
293. Barry W. Brook – Professor of EnvironmentalSustainability at University of Tasmania, Corey Bradshaw Professor
and Director of Ecological Modelling at University of Adelaide."It's time for environmentalists to give nuclear a fair
go" (https://theconversation.com/its-time-for-environmentalists-to-give-nuclear-a-fair-go-35488#).
theconversation.com.
294. Green, Jim (12 March 2012)."Nuclear power isn't a green bullet"(https://newmatilda.com/2012/03/12/nuclear -power-
isnt-green-bullet). NewMatilda.com. Retrieved 9 February 2015.
295. Brook, Barry (8 February 2015)."South Australia announces Royal Commission into Nuclear Energy"(http://bravene
wclimate.com/2015/02/08/south-australia-announces-royal-commission-into-nuclear -energy/). Brave New Climate.
296. "Japan Plans Floating Wind Power Plant" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120521071742/http://www .breakbulk.com/
wind-renewables/japan-plans-floating-wind-power -plant). Breakbulk. 16 September 2011. Archived fromthe original
(http://www.breakbulk.com/wind-renewables/japan-plans-floating-wind-power-plant) on 21 May 2012. Retrieved 12
October 2011.
297. Elaine Kurtenbach. "Japan starts up offshore wind farm near Fukushima (http://www.smh.com.au/world/japan-starts-
up-offshore-wind-farm-near-fukushima-20131112-2xct0.html)" The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 2013.
Accessed: 11 November 2013.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131230222924/http://www .smh.com.au/worl
d/japan-starts-up-offshore-wind-farm-near-fukushima-20131112-2xct0.html)30 December 2013 at theWayback
Machine.
298. Joshua S Hill (11 December 2013)."Canadian Solar Signs Loan Agreement For Japan Development"(http://cleante
chnica.com/2013/12/11/canadian-solar-signs-loan-agreement-japan-development/). CleanTechnica. Retrieved 30
December 2013.
299. Carol J. Williams (14 September 2012)."In wake of Fukushima disaster, Japan to end nuclear power by 2030s"(htt
p://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/09/in-wake-of-fukushima-disaster -japan-to-end-nuclear-power-by-2030
s.html). LA Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140123124938/http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_no
w/2012/09/in-wake-of-fukushima-disaster-japan-to-end-nuclear-power-by-2030s.html) from the original on 23
January 2014.
300. Gerhardt, Tina (22 July 2012). "After Fukushima, Nuclear Power on Collision Course W ith Japanese Public" (http://w
ww.alternet.org/story/156431/after_fukushima,_nuclear_power_on_collision_course_with_japanese_public) . Alternet.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131014062123/http://www .alternet.org/story/156431/after_fukushima,_nucle
ar_power_on_collision_course_with_japanese_public)from the original on 14 October 2013. Retrieved 8 August
2013.
301. "Abe dismisses Koizumi's call for zero nuclear power plants"(https://web.archive.org/web/20140413220411/http://aj
w.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310250045). Asahi Shimbun. 25 October 2013. Archived fromthe
original (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310250045)on 13 April 2014. Retrieved 30
December 2013.
302. "Supporters of zero nuclear power "irresponsible": Abe"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131029204935/http://www .ho
useofjapan.com/local/supporters-of-zero-nuclear -power-irresponsible-abe). Archived from the original (http://www.ho
useofjapan.com/local/supporters-of-zero-nuclear -power-irresponsible-abe) on 29 October 2013.
303. "Most Japan cities hosting nuclear plants OK restart: survey"(https://archive.is/20130215133558/http://www .bangkok
post.com/news/world/329475/most-japan-cities-hosting-nuclear -plants-ok-restart-survey). Bangkok Post. Archived
from the original (http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/world/329475/most-japan-cities-hosting-nuclear-plants-ok-resta
rt-survey) on 15 February 2013. Retrieved 30 December 2013.
304. United Press International (2 June 2013)."60,000 protest Japan's plan to restart nuclear power plants"(http://www.u
piasia.com/Top-News/2013/06/02/60000-protest-Japans-plan-to-restart-nuclear-power-plants/UPI-3496137019781
8/). UPI Asia. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029191631/http://www .upiasia.com/Top-News/2013/06/0
2/60000-protest-Japans-plan-to-restart-nuclear -power-plants/UPI-34961370197818/)from the original on 29 October
2013.
305. "Japan's Fuel Costs May Rise to 7.5 Trillion Yen, Meti Estimates" (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-09/j
apan-s-fuel-costs-may-rise-to-7-dot-5-trillion-yen-meti-estimates)
. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013100917
3004/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-09/japan-s-fuel-costs-may-rise-to-7-dot-5-trillion-yen-meti-estimat
es) from the original on 9 October 2013.
306. http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6388/476
307. Maeda, Risa (20 October 2011)."Japanese nuclear plant survived tsunami, offers clues"(https://www.reuters.com/ar
ticle/2011/10/20/us-japan-nuclear-tsunami-idUSTRE79J0B420111020). Reuters. Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20111025214745/https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-japan-nuclear-tsunami-idUSTRE79J0B4201110
20) from the original on 25 October 2011. Retrieved 27 October 2013.
308. IAEA Expert Team Concludes Mission to Onagawa NPP (http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2012/prn20
1220.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029190224/http://www .iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2
012/prn201220.html) 29 October 2013 at theWayback Machine.
309. Japanese nuclear plant 'remarkably undamaged' in earthquake – UN atomic agency . (https://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=42664&Cr=iaea&Cr1#.UV5n_crpyJM) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029185251/ht
tp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42664&Cr=iaea&Cr1#.UV5n_crpyJM)29 October 2013 at the
Wayback Machine.
310. Hydrogen fix for Japanese reactors(http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Hydrogen_solution_for_Japanese_react
ors_1910121.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140214023734/http://www .world-nuclear-news.org/RS_
Hydrogen_solution_for_Japanese_reactors_1910121.html)14 February 2014 at theWayback Machine.
311. Hydrogen recombiners at all 20 NPC plants to avoid Fukushima. Sanjay Jog |Mumbai 7 April 2011 Last Updated at
00:29 IST (http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/hydrogen-recombiners-at-all-20-npc-plants-to-a
void-fukushima-111040700049_1.html)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201737/http://www .business
-standard.com/article/economy-policy/hydrogen-recombiners-at-all-20-npc-plants-to-avoid-fukushima-111040700049
_1.html) 29 October 2013 at theWayback Machine.
312. CFD analysis of passive autocatalytic recombiner interaction with atmosphere. Archive Kerntechnik – Issue 2011/02.
(http://www.nuclear-engineering-journal.com/web/o_archiv.asp?o_id=200804221619-119&ausgabe_id=211548193-2
78&artikel_id=2115481931-4949&task=03&j=2011&h=02&nav_id=0)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013102
9190149/http://www.nuclear-engineering-journal.com/web/o_archiv.asp?o_id=200804221619-119&ausgabe_id=211
548193-278&artikel_id=2115481931-4949&task=03&j=2011&h=02&nav_id=0) 29 October 2013 at theWayback
Machine.
313. Daly, Matthew (10 March 2013)."Nuclear chief: U.S. plants safer after Japan crisis. March 10, 2013"(https://www.us
atoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/10/us-plants-safer/1976689/). USA Today.
314. "Vents and Filtering Strategies Come to Forefront in Fukushima Response Nuclear Energy Insight. Fall 2012"(http://
www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Vents-and-Filtering-Strategies-Come-to-Forefront-i) .
315. "TEPCO implements new safety measures in bid to restart Niigata reactors" (https://web.archive.org/web/201404132
20421/http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201310030043). Archived from the original (http://ajw.a
sahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201310030043)on 13 April 2014.
316. "Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant shown to reporters"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131029184139/http://www .houseofjap
an.com/local/kashiwazaki-kariwa-plant-shown-to-reporters) . Archived from the original (http://www.houseofjapan.co
m/local/kashiwazaki-kariwa-plant-shown-to-reporters)on 29 October 2013.
317. Nuclear power plant operator in China orders backup batteries for installation at plants 7 September 2012 (http://ww
w.power-eng.com/articles/2012/09/nuclear-power-plant-operator-in-china-orders-backup-batteries-for-plants.html)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029183645/http://www .power-eng.com/articles/2012/09/nuclear-power-p
lant-operator-in-china-orders-backup-batteries-for-plants.html)29 October 2013 at theWayback Machine.
318. China’s Guangdong Nuclear Power Corp Announces Orders for BYD Battery Back-up for Nuclear Plants(http://www.
businesswire.com/news/home/20120906006958/en/China%E2%80%99s-Guangdong-Nuclear-Power-Corp-Announc
es-Orders) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131029225615/http://www .businesswire.com/news/home/20120
906006958/en/China%E2%80%99s-Guangdong-Nuclear-Power-Corp-Announces-Orders) 29 October 2013 at the
Wayback Machine.
319. Epstein, Woody (7 May 2012)."Not losing to the rain" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131014195130/http://woody .co
m/2012/05/07/not-losing-to-the-rain/). Quantitative Risk Assessment. woody.com. Archived from the original (http://w
oody.com/news/not-losing-to-the-rain/)on 14 October 2013. Retrieved 26 February 2016. “The Notstand building, a
bunkered facility which could support all of the plant systems for at least 72 hours given a severe flood or earthquake
which could take out the normal power and cooling facilities. I asked Martin Richner , the head of risk assessment,
why Beznau spent so much money on the Notstand building when there was no regulation or government directive
to do so. Martin answered me, "Woody, we live here."”
320. "A PRA Practioner Looks at the Fukushima Daiichi Accident"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131214225420/http://w
oody.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Fukushima-Daiichi-Accident-v8b.pdf)(PDF). Archived from the original (h
ttp://woody.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Fukushima-Daiichi-Accident-v8b.pdf.)on 14 December 2013.
321. "2012 20th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering and the ASME 2012 Power Conference" (http://proceed
ings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=1764452) . Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201
31215021119/http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=1764452) from the
original on 15 December 2013.
322. "Gen III reactor design 04/06/2011 By Brian Wheeler Associate Editor"(http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2011/04/
gen-iii-reactor-design.html). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131214225031/http://www .power-eng.com/articl
es/2011/04/gen-iii-reactor-design.html) from the original on 14 December 2013.
323. "Nuclear Science and Techniques 24 (2013) 040601 Study on the long-term passive cooling extension of AP1000
reactor" (http://www.j.sinap.ac.cn/nst/EN/article/downloadArticleFile.do?attachType=PDF&id=47.). Archived (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20131214225149/http://www .j.sinap.ac.cn/nst/EN/article/downloadArticleFile.do?attachT ype=PD
F&id=47) from the original on 14 December 2013.
324. "Disaster response robots", Open Minds blog, featuring BBC Documentary (https://openminds.swissre.com/stories/5
78/) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140222142144/https://openminds.swissre.com/stories/578/) 22
February 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
325. Seiji Iwata; Ryuichi Kanari (26 May 2011)."Japanese robots long gone before Fukushima accident"(https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20140903061944/http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201105260215) . Asahi
Shimbun. Archived from the original (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201105260215)on 3
September 2014. Retrieved 27 August 2014.
326. "DARPA Robotics Challenge" (https://web.archive.org/web/20160428005028/http://www .darparoboticschallenge.or
g/). DRC. DARPA. Archived from the original (http://www.theroboticschallenge.org/)on 28 April 2016. Retrieved 27
April 2016.
327. Gross, Rachel (10 March 2016)."The Slatest Your News Companion March 10 2016 1:35 PM Decontamination Bots
Are Dying on Our Behalf in Fukushima"(http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/03/10/these_fukushima_decon
tamination_bots_are_dying_trying.html). Slate.
328. McIntyre, Niamh (5 March 2017). "Experts baffled as robots sent to clean up Fukushima nuclear site keep dying: The
latest probe was destroyed in less than a day"(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3485187/Fukushimas-
ground-zero-No-place-man-robot.html). Independent.
329. "Areas to which evacuation orders have been issued"(http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pd
f/20130807_01.pdf) (PDF). 7 August 2013.
330. "Designating and Rearranging the Areas of Evacuation (pg 7)"(http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roa
dmap/pdf/20120723_01.pdf)(PDF).
331. Dahl, Fredrik (15 August 2011)."U.N. atom body wants wider nuclear safety checks"(https://www.reuters.com/articl
e/2011/08/15/nuclear-iaea-safety-idUSLDE77E0F720110815). Reuters. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2014
0506163915/https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/nuclear-iaea-safety-idUSLDE77E0F720110815)from the
original on 6 May 2014.
332. Brasor, Philip, "Public wary of official optimism (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fd20120311pb.html)", Japan Times,
11 March 2012, p. 11.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130103082540/http://www .japantimes.co.jp/text/fd20
120311pb.html) 3 January 2013 at theWayback Machine.
333. Norimitsu Onishi (8 August 2011)."Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril"(https://web.archive.org/we
b/20110821120439/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html). The New York Times. Archived
from the original (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html) on 21 August 2011.
334. Charles Digges (10 August 2011)."Japan ignored its own radiation forecasts in days following disaster , imperiling
thousands" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120318044157/http://www .bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rad_forcasts
_ignored). Bellona. Archived from the original (http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rad_forcasts_ignored) on
18 March 2012.
335. "Analysis: A month on, Japan nuclear crisis still scarring,"(http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/132391/20110409/japan-nucl
ear-crisis-radiation.htm)Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5y2agYEQZ?url=http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/132391/
20110409/japan-nuclear-crisis-radiation.htm)18 April 2011 at WebCite International Business Times (Australia). 9
April 2011, retrieved 12 April 2011; excerpt, According toJames Acton, Associate of the Nuclear Policy Program at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Fukushima is not the worst nuclear accident ever but it is the
most complicated and the most dramatic ... This was a crisis that played out in real time on TV . Chernobyl did not."
336. Hasegawa, Koichi (2012). "Facing Nuclear Risks: Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster". International
Journal of Japanese Sociology. 21 (1): 84–91. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6781.2012.01164.x(https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475
-6781.2012.01164.x).
337. Hiroko Tabuchi (13 July 2011)."Japan Premier Wants Shift Away From Nuclear Power"(https://www.nytimes.com/20
11/07/14/world/asia/14japan.html). The New York Times.
338. Naoto Kan (28 October 2013). "Encountering the Fukushima Daiichi Accident"(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/naoto-
kan/japan-nuclear-energy_b_4171073.html). The Huffington Post. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201401251
44355/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/naoto-kan/japan-nuclear-energy_b_4171073.html)from the original on 25
January 2014. Retrieved 9 November 2013.
339. (dutch)Nu.nl (22 August 2011)Area around Fukushima maybe a forbidden zone for decades to come(http://www.nu.
nl/buitenland/2595112/gebied-fukushima-mogelijk-decennia-verboden.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0131023044023/http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/2595112/gebied-fukushima-mogelijk-decennia-verboden.html)23
October 2013 at the Wayback Machine.
340. The Guardian (22 August 2011)residents may never return to radiation-hit homes(https://www.theguardian.com/worl
d/2011/aug/22/japan-nuclear-disaster-radiation-levels)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110823190201/htt
p://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/22/japan-nuclear-disaster-radiation-levels)23 August 2011 at theWayback
Machine.
341. Earthquake Report – JAIF, No. 45: 20:00, 7 April. (https://www.webcitation.org/5xp08Ife5?url=http://www.jaif.or.jp/eng
lish/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1302175783P .pdf) JAIF / NHK, 7 April 2011, archived fromoriginal (http://www.
jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1302175783P.pdf) on 9 April 2011, Retrieved 9 April 2011.
342. Al-Jazeera English: Citizen group tracks down Japan's radiation(10 August 2011) (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
asia-pacific/2011/08/2011810142915166342.html)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110831170137/http://en
glish.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2011/08/2011810142915166342.html) 31 August 2011 at theWayback
Machine.
343. Safecast Organization Official Blog (http://blog.safecast.org/)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2014041520315
5/http://blog.safecast.org/)15 April 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
344. Franken, Pieter (17 January 2014)."Volunteers Crowdsource Radiation Monitoring to Map Potential Risk on Every
Street in Japan" (http://www.democracynow.org/2014/1/17/volunteers_crowdsource_radiation_monitoring_ to_map).
Democracy Now! (Interview). Interviewed byAmy Goodman. Tokyo, Japan. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20
140425012728/http://www.democracynow.org/2014/1/17/volunteers_crowdsource_radiatio n_monitoring_to_map)
from the original on 25 April 2014. Retrieved 17 January 2014.
345. UC Berkeley Nuclear Engineering Air Monitoring Station |The Nuclear Engineering Department at UC Berkely web
site (http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/UCBAirSampling)Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5xbqFUtSn?url=http://ww
w.nuc.berkeley.edu/UCBAirSampling)1 April 2011 at WebCite
346. Joanna Chiu (14 April 2014)."Journalists in Japan face threats 3 years after Fukushima"(https://cpj.org/blog/2014/0
4/journalists-in-japan-face-threats-3-years-after -fu.php). Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved 4 March 2017.
347. "Japan. Don't mess with "state secrets" " (https://rsf.org/en/japan). Reporters Without Borders. 2016. Retrieved 5
March 2017.
348. "USS Ronald Reagan Exposed to Radiation"(http://navyhandbook.org/190/uss-ronald-reagan-exposed-to-
radiation/). Navy Handbook. 14 March 2011.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131110011914/http://navyhan
dbook.org/190/uss-ronald-reagan-exposed-to-radiation/)from the original on 10 November 2013. Retrieved 18
March 2011.
349. Grimes, Robin (16 June 2014)."The UK Response to Fukushima and Anglo-Japanese Relations"(http://www.scienc
ediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/uk-response-fukushima-and-anglo-japanese-relations). Science & Diplomacy. 3
(2).
350. "IAEA sees slow nuclear growth post Japan"(http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/09/23/IA
EA-sees-slow-nuclear-growth-post-Japan/UPI-87041316777856/). UPI. 23 September 2011. Archived (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20140309080212/http://www .upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/09/23/IAEA-sees-slow
-nuclear-growth-post-Japan/UPI-87041316777856/) from the original on 9 March 2014.
351. Nucléaire: une trentaine de réacteurs dans le monde risquent d'être fermés (http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secte
urs/energie-environnement/actu/0201298382424-nucleaire-une-trentaine-de-reacteurs-dans-le-monde-risquent-d-etr
e-fermes.htm) Les Échos, published 12 April 2011, accessed 15 April 2011
352. "Gauging the pressure"(http://www.economist.com/node/18621367?story_id=18621367). The Economist. 28 April
2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120831040950/http://www .economist.com/node/18621367?story_id=
18621367) from the original on 31 August 2012.
353. Poch, Rafael (31 May 2011)."Merkel se despide de lo nuclear y anuncia una revolución en renovables" (http://www.l
avanguardia.com/medio-ambiente/20110531/54162870889/merkel-se-despide-de-lo-nuclear -y-anuncia-una-revoluci
on-en-renovables.html)(in Spanish). lavanguardia.com. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
354. "Italy nuclear: Berlusconi accepts referendum blow"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13741105). BBC
News. 14 June 2011. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5zOE5XqnJ?url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europ
e-13741105) from the original on 12 June 2011. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
355. "France struggles to cut down on nuclear power"(https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25674581). BBC News.
356. Rob Broomby (11 January 2014)."France struggles to cut down on nuclear power"(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ma
gazine-25674581). BBC News Magazine. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140207131502/http://www .bbc.c
o.uk/news/magazine-25674581)from the original on 7 February 2014. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
357. "China Nuclear Power – Chinese Nuclear Energy"(http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/country-profiles/countries-a-f/ch
ina--nuclear-power/). Retrieved 12 June 2015.
358. http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/nuclear-power-role-in-shaping-
energy-policies-v3.pdf
359. Shannon Tiezzi; The Diplomat. "Why China Will Go All-In on Nuclear Power"(http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/why-ch
ina-will-go-all-in-on-nuclear-power/). The Diplomat. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
360. "Nuclear Power in South Korea"(http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/South-Korea/) .
361. "Nuclear energy only option before country: Ansari"(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/latest-news/nuclear -energ
y-only-option-before-country-ansari/). The Indian Express. 20 October 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
362. "Modi: India to build 10 more nuclear reactors with Russia"(http://www.ibtimes.co.in/tv/modi-india-to-build-10-more-n
uclear-reactors-with-russia-28373). International Business Times. 12 December 2014.
363. Richard Tanter (October–December 2013).After Fukushima: A Survey of Corruption in the Global Nuclear Power
Industry (http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/0258-9184-37.4.475?journalCode=aspr). Asian Perspective.
Vol. 37, No. 4.
364. Jeff Kingston (10 September 2012)."Japan's Nuclear Village" (http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822#sthas
h.KdeLLyJk.dpuf). Japan Focus. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140329180414/http://www .japanfocus.org/
-Jeff-Kingston/3822) from the original on 29 March 2014.
365. Kaufmann, Daniel; Veronika Penciakova (17March 2011). "Japan's triple disaster: Governance and the earthquake,
tsunami and nuclear crises"(https://web.archive.org/web/20120503222247/http://www .brookings.edu/opinions/2011/
0316_japan_disaster_kaufmann.aspx). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (http://www.brookings.edu/op
inions/2011/0316_japan_disaster_kaufmann.aspx)on 3 May 2012.
366. Culture of complicity tied to stricken nuclear plant(https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html?
pagewanted=2&_r=4&src=me), NYTimes, 27 April 2011
367. "Japan to fire 3 top nuclear officials – CNN"(https://web.archive.org/web/20110819212845/http://articles.cnn.com/20
11-08-04/world/japan.nuclear.crisis_1_fukushima-daiichi-industrial-safety-agency-nuclear-industry?_s=PM%3AWOR
LD). Articles.cnn.com. 4 August 2011. Archived fromthe original (http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-04/world/japan.nucl
ear.crisis_1_fukushima-daiichi-industrial-safety-agency-nuclear-industry?_s=PM:WORLD)on 19 August 2011.
Retrieved 11 August 2011.
368. "3 former TEPCO executives face criminal trial over Fukushima crisis"(https://web.archive.org/web/2016031401262
6/http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201507310053). The Asahi Shimbun. 31 July 2015.
Archived from the original (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201507310053)on 14 March 2016.
Retrieved 13 March 2016.
369. McCurry, Justin (30 June 2017)."Fukushima nuclear disaster: former T epco executives go on trial" (https://www.theg
uardian.com/environment/2017/jun/30/fukushima-nuclear -crisis-tepco-criminal-trial-japan). The Guardian. Retrieved
5 July 2017.
370. "Fukushima nuclear accident 'man-made', not natural disaster"(http://www.smh.com.au/world/fukushima-nuclear-acc
ident--manmade-not-natural--disaster-20120705-21jrl.html). Bloomberg L.P. The Sydney Morning Herald.Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20131103145937/http://www .smh.com.au/world/fukushima-nuclear-accident--manmade
-not-natural--disaster-20120705-21jrl.html) from the original on 3 November 2013. Retrieved 9 July 2012.
371. "Japan says Fukushima disaster was 'man-made ' " (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/201275549
6885199.html). Al Jazeera and agencies. AL Jazeera English. 5 July 2012.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20
140130075242/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/2012755496885199.html)from the original on
30 January 2014. Retrieved 9 July 2012.
372. "Official website of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations ofokyo T
Electric Power Company"(https://www.webcitation.org/60axydhPx?url=http://icanps.go.jp/eng/). Archived from the
original (http://icanps.go.jp/eng/)on 31 July 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2012. “This committee was established with the
aim of conducting an investigation to determine the causes of the accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and
Daini Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, and those of the damages generated by the
accident, and thereby making policy proposals designed to prevent the expansion of the damages and the
recurrence of similar accidents in the future.”
373. "Japan nuclear plants 'still not safe'" (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/20127236623434937.htm
l). Al Jazeera Online. 23 July 2012.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140416085813/http://www .aljazeera.co
m/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/20127236623434937.html)from the original on 16 April 2014. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
374. "Japan, TEPCO ignored atomic accident risks due to 'myth of nuclear safety': Report" (http://www.newstrackindia.co
m/newsdetails/2012/07/23/330-Japan-TEPCO-ignored-atomic-accident-risks-due-to-myth-of-nuclear -safety-Report.h
tml). Asian News International(ANI). News Track India. 23 July 2012.Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201312
25212854/http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/07/23/330-Japan-TEPCO-ignored-atomic-accident-risks
-due-to-myth-of-nuclear-safety-Report.html) from the original on 25 December 2013. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
375. Mitsuru Obe; Eleanor Warnock (23 July 2012). "Japan Panel Says Plant Operator Falls Short on Nuclear Safety"(htt
ps://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444025204577544732979462706). The Wall Street Journal. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20130927120309/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904440252045775447
32979462706.html) from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 30 July 2012.
376. Tsuyoshi Inajima; Yuji Okada (23 July 2012)."Fukushima Investigators Say More Study Needed on What W ent
Wrong" (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-23/fukushima-investigators-say-more-study-needed-on-what-
went-wrong). Bloomsberg Businessweek. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130928230639/http://www .busine
ssweek.com/news/2012-07-23/fukushima-investigators-say-more-study-needed-on-what-went-wrong) from the
original on 28 September 2013. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
377. Hancocks, Paula (23 July 2012)."New report criticizes TEPCO over Fukushima nuclear crisis"(http://edition.cnn.co
m/2012/07/23/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report/index.html) . CNN. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20131226
040201/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/23/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report/index.html) from the original on 26
December 2013. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
378. Kazuaki Nagata (24 July 2012)."Government, Tepco again hit for nuke crisis"(https://web.archive.org/web/2012110
1132641/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120724a1.html). The Japan Times. Archived from the original (http://w
ww.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120724a1.html) on 1 November 2012. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
Sources
Cited
WHO (2013). Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami (PDF). ISBN 978 92 4 150513 0. Retrieved 7 September 2016.
Other
Caldicott, Helen [ed.]: Crisis Without End: The Medical and Ecological Consequences of the Fukushima Nuclear
Catastrophe. [From the "Symposium at the New York Academy of Medicine, March 11–12, 2013"]. The New Press,
2014. ISBN 978-1-59558-970-5 (eBook)
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster.
Investigation
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Report website in English
Investigation Committee on the accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station ofokyo
T Electric Power
Company
The Radioactive Waters of Fukushima
Lessons Learned From Fukushima Dai-ichi – Report & Movie
Video, drawings, and images
Webcam Fukushima nuclear power plant I, Unit 1 through Unit 4
Inside the slow and dangerous clean up of the Fukushima nuclear crisis
TerraFly Timeline Aerial Imagery of Fukushima Nuclear Reactor after 2011 sunami
T and Earthquake
In graphics: Fukushima nuclear alert, as provided by the BBC, 9 July 2012
Analysis by IRSN of the Fukushima Daiichi accident
Kumamoto, Murata & Nakate: "Fukushima Evacuees Face New Hardship Sixears Y On", provided by the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of Japan, 9 March 2017
Artwork
Ah humanity!- a film essay by Lucien Castaign-T aylor, Ernst Karel and Véréna Paravel
"Statue of child clad in protective suit met with criticism in disaster
-hit Fukushima". The Japan Times Online. 13
August 2018.
Other
Fukushima Revitalization Station (Fukushima Prefectural Government) in English
TEPCO News Releases, Tokyo Electric Power Company
"Reassessment of Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Outline of Nuclear Safety Reform Plan(Interim Report)"
by
TEPCO Nuclear Reform Special Task Force.14 December 2012
v
t
e
2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami
Aftermath
Japan Trench
Pacific Plate
North American Plate
Geology Okhotsk Plate
Honshu Island
Oshika Peninsula
Pacific Ocean
Affected Areas
areas severely Hokkaido
damaged Hokkaido Oshima Subprefecture
Hakodate
Tōhoku
Region Iwate Prefecture
Kamaishi
Miyako
Ōfunato
Ōtsuchi
Rikuzentakata
Yamada
Miyagi Prefecture
East-Matsushima (Naruse)
Ishinomaki
Kesennuma
Kurihara
Natori
Onagawa
Sendai
South-Sanriku (Shizugawa)
Yamamoto
Fukushima Prefecture
Iwaki
Ōkuma
Sōma
South-Sōma (Haranomachi)
Tomioka
Ibaraki Prefecture
Hitachinaka
Itako
Kashima
North-Ibaraki (Isohara)
Kantō Ōarai
Region
Chiba Prefecture
Asahi
Chōshi
Ichihara
Urayasu
Ichihara refinery
Fujinuma Dam
Sendai Airport
Taro sea wall
Ōarai-Kashima Line
Affected Tōhoku Shinkansen
infrastructure Joban Line
Rail Shinchi Station
lines Tomioka Station
Senseki Line
Nobiru Station
Kesennuma Line
Nuclear Fukushima
Accidents Daiichi Fukushima Daiichi plant
and Incidents nuclear Unit 1
disaster Accident
reactors Unit 2
Unit 3
Units 4-6
Sequence
of events Timeline
reactions
International
Japanese
Radiation effects
Casualties
Cleanup
Fukushima 50
Topics Investigation
National Diet
Government
Comparison
Accident Rating
Project Sunshine for Japan

Movements Safecast (organization)
Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants
Fukushima Daini plant

Tōkai plant
Others Reactors/Facilities Onagawa plant
Higashidori plant
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
Foreshocks, Miyagi, Japan (7.1, 7 April 2011)

Aftershocks Fukushima, Japan (6.6, 11 April 2011)
Miyagi, Japan (7.3, 7 December 2012)
Naoto Kan
Yukio Edano
Katsuhiko Ishibashi
Kiyoo Mogi
People Masao Yoshida
Miki Endo
Takashi Shimokawara
Hideaki Akaiwa
Katsunobu Sakurai
Humanitarian response
Efforts Operation Pacific Assist

Operation Tomodachi
Reconstruction Agency
All Together
Relief and
Recovery Artistes 311 Love Beyond Borders
Download to Donate: Tsunami Relief
Fundraisers Fight and Smile
Songs for Japan
Pray for Japan
Side by Side
Reunion
Media Documentaries
Pray for Japan
Surviving Japan
Surviving the Tsunami - My Atomic Aunt
The Tsunami and the Cherry Blossom
Documentary of AKB48 Show Must Go On
Himizu
Movies Homeland
Land of Hope
Reunion
Drama Amachan
Side by Side
Songs Songs for Japan
Anata ga Irukara
Books Strong in the Rain
Impact on video game industry

No.18 Kyotoku-maru
Tsunami fish
Japan Trench Fast Drilling Project
Other Ryou-Un Maru
869 Sanriku earthquake
2011 local elections
Miracle pine
Shinkansen Relay
See also: Japanese earthquakes

Seismicity of the Sanriku coast
List of historical tsunamis
Nuclear power in Japan, section Seismicity
Nuclear and radioactive incidents
v
t
e
Nuclear power in Japan
Energy in Japan
Nuclear power
Reactors (Active) LWR Hokkaido Tomari
Tohoku Onagawa
Higashidōri
Fukushima Daiichi
TEPCO Fukushima Daini
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Chubu Hamaoka
Hokuriku Shika
Kansai Ōi
Mihama
Takahama
Chugoku Shimane
Shikoku Ikata
Kyushu Sendai
Genkai
JAPC Tōkai
Tsuruga
Fugen
ATR
Closed
Monju
prototype fast (breeder) reactor
Canceled Maki
Namie-Odaka
Under
construction Ōma
Jōyō
Other
research fast reactor
Japanese Atomic Energy Commission(JAEC)

Regulatory
Nuclear Regulation Authority(NRA)
bodies
formerly Japan's NSC and NISA
Hitachi
Toshiba
Companies Mitsubishi FBR Systems
Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
Organisations JCO
Research Japan Atomic Energy Agency(JAEA)
institutions Dōnen (abolished)
Japan Electric Association(JEA)

membership organization
Other
Rokkasho
reprocessing

Accidents Tokaimura nuclear accident
Mihama nuclear accidents
Japanese nuclear incidents
Anti-nuclear
movement Ashes to Honey
Japanese Communist Party
Genpatsu-shinsai
Mizuho Fukushima
Katsumi Furitsu
Nobuto Hosaka
Tetsunari Iida
Kiyoshiro Imawano
Project Sunshine for Japan
Sanshiro Kume
Kenzaburō Ōe
Rokkasho Rhapsody
Ryuichi Sakamoto
Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants
Jinzaburo Takagi
Category
Commons
v
t
e
Asia pollution topics
North, East and Northeast Asia
Asian Dust
2010 China drought and dust storms
Green Wall of China
Pollution in China
South and Southeast Asia

ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution
Southeast Asian haze
1997 SEA haze
1997 Indonesian forest fires
Air 2005 Malaysian haze
pollution
2006 SEA haze
2009 SEA haze
2013 SEA haze
2015 SEA haze
2016 Malaysian haze
2016 SEA haze
Asian brown cloud
Operation Haze
Air pollution in India
Shamal
Pollutant Standards Index
Water
pollution China water crisis
Water pollution in China
Water pollution in India
Water pollution in Japan
Water pollution in the Philippines
Air pollution in China

Hong Kong
Related Macau
pages
Air pollution in India
Air pollution in Malaysia
Pollution of the Pasig River (Philippines)
BNF: cb16500489j (data)

Authority
control LCCN: sh2011003738
NDL: 01228618
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster&oldid=860331843

"
This page was last edited on 19 September 2018, at 22:59(UTC).
Text is available under theCreative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License ; additional terms may apply. By using this
site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of theWikimedia
Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.

Fukushima Daiichi

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Fukushima Daiichi

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

Image on 16 March 2011 (7 years ago) of the

On 5 July 2012, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation

Simplified cross-section sketch of a typical

Location Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Central storage

Fuel type UO2 UO2 UO2/MOX UO2 UO2 UO2 UO2

New fuel assemblies[57] 100 28 52 204 48 64 N/A

Central fuel storage areas

Prior safety concerns

1967: Layout of the emergency-cooling system

1991: Backup generator of Reactor 1 flooded

2008: Tsunami study ignored

Tsunami and flooding

In October 2012, the former Japanese Ambassador to Switzerland and Senegal,

Central fuel storage areas

This section is in a list format that may be better

Between 21 March and mid-July, around 27 PBq of caesium-137 (about 8.4 kg or

A monitoring system operated by the Preparatory Commission for the

On 12 March, radioactive releases first reached a CTBTO monitoring station in

Estimates of radioactivity released ranged from 10–40%[148][149][150][151] of that of

In March 2011, Japanese officials announced that "radioactive iodine-131 exceeding

Contamination in the eastern Pacific

Poor communication and delays

Risks from radiation

Thyroid screening program

Equipment, facility, and operational changes

In May 2011, UK chief inspector of nuclear installations Mike Weightman traveled

Japan had been underestimated.[349]

Project Sunshine for Japan

Fukushima Daini plant

Foreshocks, Miyagi, Japan (7.1, 7 April 2011)

Efforts Operation Pacific Assist

Impact on video game industry

See also: Japanese earthquakes

Japanese Atomic Energy Commission(JAEC)

Japan Electric Association(JEA)

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

South and Southeast Asia

Air pollution in China

BNF: cb16500489j (data)

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster&oldid=860331843

This page was last edited on 19 September 2018, at 22:59(UTC).

Você também pode gostar