When the law does not extinguish we do not extinguish public accountability and escape the liabilities and

ability and escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. By

including the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations
People vs Sandigan Bayan, GR No 1447706-07, Feb 16, 2005 organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that.
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and
incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? The petitioner, REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative
position in this petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent
Efren L. Alas contends otherwise, together with the respondent court.
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, two separate informations[1] for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated
from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity
as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank
(PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage
and prejudice to the government.

The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of
the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the
same is not created by a special law. It was organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC No. AS094-005593 on June 22,
1994 with a lifetime of fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the purpose
for which said entity is formed was primarily for business, xxx

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman (the governments prosecutory arm against persons charged with
graft and corruption), includes officers and employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations, likewise without any distinction.
The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its usefulness. On the contrary,
it has become even more relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and
corruption that erode the people’s faith in government. For indeed, a government-
owned or controlled corporation can conceivably create as many subsidiary
corporations under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use public funds, disclaim
EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE- Where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the
later follow the former, general word or phrase is to be construed
Pelizloy vs Province of Benguet, GR No 183137, April 10, 2013
The principal issue in this case is the scope of authority of a province to impose an
amusement tax.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
praying that the December 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court,- Branch
62, La Trinidad, Benguet in Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232 be reversed and set aside
and a new one issued in which: ( 1) respondent Province of Benguet is declared as
having no authority to levy amusement taxes on admission fees for resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, tourist spots, and other places for
recreation; (2) Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of
2005 is declared null and void; and (3) the respondent Province of Benguet is
permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial
Revenue Code of 2005.
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which is
designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of
Benguet.
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in
Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are
not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes
may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs,
and tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’
encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase
follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or
where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."17
The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National
Power Corporation v. Angas18as follows:
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court rejected PBA's
assertions and noted that:
In determining the meaning of the phrase 'other places of amusement', one must
refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and
circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional
basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of
entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.21 [Underscoring
supplied]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005,
in so far as it imposes amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is declared null and void.
Respondent Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing the
second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code
of 2005 with respect to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Coca-Cola Bottlers vs Gomez, GR No 154491, November 14, 2008
Is the hoarding of a competitors product containers punishable as unfair
competition under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293)
that would entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder? This
is the issue we grapple with in this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival
multinational softdrink giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola)
accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of
hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its
operation in Bicolandia.
BACKGROUND
guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsis yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and
saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.[2]
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory
construction giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code
generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle
of noscitur a sociis, when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be
made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
found or with which it is associated.[15]

The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding
of a person who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who
Coke empty bottles in Pepsis yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly
is entitled to protection under the Code, with or without a registered mark. Section
penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles
168.2, as previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair
must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the
competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific instances of
respondents.[1] In support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn
unfair competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the
statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he
appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that
was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi
his or her goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the
compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A.
disputed Section 168.3 being a catch all clause whose coverage the parties now
Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large quantities of
dispute.
Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was
informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the hoarding - as defined
and charged by the petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of
Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or
service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper
authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently
passing off their products or services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are
not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or misrepresentation that would
confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the respondents,
or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the
concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts
unfairness by seeking to limit the oppositions sales by depriving it of the bottles it can
use for these sales.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the
petitioners search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioners failure to
show that the acts imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense. There
could not have been any probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant
because no crime in the first place was effectively charged. This conclusion renders
unnecessary any further discussion on whether the search warrant application
properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a hoarding
in bad faith aimed to prejudice the petitioners operations, or whether the MTC duly
complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search warrant under
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly,

we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court,
Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL andVOID. Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.
Atienza vs Villarosa, GR 161081, May 10, 2005
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Ramon M. Atienza, in
his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72069. The assailed decision dismissed the petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Atienza which had
sought to enjoin the implementation of the Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and
July 1, 2002 issued by Jose T. Villarosa, Governor of the same province.
discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June
25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 of the respondent Governor, which effectively excluded
the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
from signing the purchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or
equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as
from appointing its casual and job order employees, constituted undue interference
with the latter's functions. The assailed memoranda are clearly not in keeping with
the intent of Rep. Act No. 7160 and their implementation should thus be
permanently enjoined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002
and July 1, 2002 issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND
VOID.
While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority granted to the
Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang SO ORDERED.
Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto
necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the
same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. This doctrine is
explained, thus:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the
rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is
so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus
sit, simper inest et minus.18

The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the
CHEREA vs Commission on Human Rights, GR No 155336, November 25, 2004
Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and
reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department
of Budget and Management?
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision1 dated 29
November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the
Resolutions2 dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of
the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear
that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts
an end to what is implied.21
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to
allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is
only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit,
the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,24 we explained:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate
and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge
of their functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a
unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,28 we echoed the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation's coffers, the
Secretary of the DBM, as the President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks
inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted
upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire
government in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11
September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29
March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is
REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated
04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and
Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the
Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sterling vs Laguna Lake, GR No 171427, March 30, 2011
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Sterling Selections Corporation (petitioner) is assailing the
Decision1 dated May 30, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated January 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79889.
Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its
products are manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria
and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New
Manila, Quezon City.3
The word include means "to take in or comprise as a part of a whole."53
Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily conveys the very idea
of non-exclusivity of the enumeration.54 The principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by
way of example only.55 The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does
not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.56 Said legal maxim
should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is
not otherwise manifest.57
In another case, the Court said:
[T]he word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in
including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are
activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an
agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is [–] apart from
such assistance – something else already in[,] and covered or may be covered
by, the said agreement.58
As the regulation stands, therefore, all cottage industries including, but not
limited to, those enumerated therein are exempted from securing prior
clearance from the LLDA. Hence, the CA erred in ruling that only the three
activities enumerated therein are exempted.
Next, the Court must determine if petitioner is in fact a cottage industry
entitled to claim the exemption under LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997.
That jewelry-making is one of the activities considered as a cottage industry is
undeniable. The laws bear this out. However, based on these same laws, the
nature of the activity is only one of several factors to be considered in
determining whether the same is a cottage industry.
In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset
requirements, it is crystal clear that the same is a defining element in
determining if an enterprise is a cottage industry.
It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on
technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect
but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not
overwhelming or preponderant.69 Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy
decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned
and not by the courts.70
The Court recognizes the right of petitioner to engage in business and to profit from
its industry. However, the exercise of the right must conform to the laws and
regulations laid down by the competent authorities.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 30, 2005 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79889 are AFFIRMED.
Fortich vs Corona, GR 131457, August 19, 1999
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and
intervenors' separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November
17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court En banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for
reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court
sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999,
wherein we noted without action the intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With
Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc" filed on December 3, 1998, on
the following considerations, to wit:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sittingen
banc.4
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand,
and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" whilematters,
which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided"
must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters",
applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the
other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear. 5
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required
three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains
to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is
still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the
division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the
voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is
not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of
this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once
and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already
been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are
seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as
qualified beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new
as in fact they have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for
reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land
inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to
a just share of the fruits of the land.10 Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution itself
states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform.11 Absent any definitive finding of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested
with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case.
Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For
Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED
with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
COA Cebu vs Province of Cebu, GR 141386, November 29, 2001
May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed
by local chief executives in Connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, be
charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit
concerned?
The instant petition for review, which raises a pure question of law, seeks to annul
and set aside the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in a
petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24422.
General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA to the respondent
province amounted to a breach or violation, and therefore, the petition for
declaratory relief should have been denied by the trial court.
We are not convinced. As held in Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v.
Municipality of Sipocot,12 my breach of the statute subject of the controversy will not
affect the case; the action for declaratory relief will prosper because the applicability
of the statute in question to future transactions still remains to be resolved. Absent a
definite ruling in the instant case for declaratory relief, doubts as to the disposition of
the SEF will persist. Hence, the trial court did not err in giving due course to the
petition for declaratory relief filed by the province of Cebu.

The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom of Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED with
teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that MODIFICATION. The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers
would accommodate students in the public schools. appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes, are declared chargeable
against the Special Education Fund of the province. However, the expenses
With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the
incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship grants should not
pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not
be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against the General Funds of
among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It
the province of Cebu.
should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code
substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of
salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of "establishment and SO ORDERED.
maintenance of extension classes" and "operation and maintenance of public
schools," the "granting of government scholarship to poor but deserving Davide, Jr., C. J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
students" was omitted in Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio,
Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing JJ., concur.
omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where
the legislature has omitted it.10

In the same vein, however noble the intention of the province in extending said
scholarship to deserving students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary
implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is neither necessary nor
indispensable to the operation and maintenance of public schools. Instead, such
scholarship grants may be charged to the General Funds of the province.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6311 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
declaratory relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation. The Solicitor