Forthcoming

United Nations
Edited with a new introduction by David Travers
5 volume set CITIZENSHIP
Peacebuilding
Edited with a new introduction by Vincent Chetail
4 volume set Critical Concepts in Political Science
Democratization
Edited with a new introduction by Ronald Inglehart and
Christian Welzel
4 volume set
Information Science
Edited with a new introduction by David Nicholas and Edited by
Eti Herman
4 volume set
Richard Bel/amy and
madeleine kennedy-macfoy

Volume I
What is Citizenship? Theories of Citizenship:
Classic and Contemporary Debates

LONDON AND NEW YORK

. -.' .' .
\ ,'I I·
.I',

", ';
.
First published 2014
r
by Routledge II
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OXI4 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Rout/edge is an imprint of the Tay/or & Francis Group, an injor,!1O business
CONTENTS
Editorial material and selection © 2014 Richard Bellamy and madeleine
kennedy-macfoy; individual owners retain copyright in their own material.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.
VOLUME I WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? THEORIES
OF CITIZENSHIP: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Dala
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library DEBATES
Library of Congress Cata/oging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested Acknowledgemen ts XV
ISBN: 978-0-415-66486-8 (Set) Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters xvii
ISBN: 978-0-415-66487-5 (Volume I)

Typeset in 1O/12pt Times NR MT Introduction 1

by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

Publisher's Note
References within each chapter are as they appear in the original complete work PART 1
Classic theories 21

1 Extracts from The Politics 23

ARISTOTLE

2 Extracts from Ellcyclopedie ou DictiOllllaire RaisOlllle

Des Sciellces, Des Arts Et Des Metiers 28

3 Extracts from Oil the Duty of Mall and Citizen According

to Natural Law 32
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF

4 Extracts from Citizenship alld social class

T. H. MARSHALL

PART 2
History 65

MIX 5 The ideal of citizenship since classical times 67

Paper rrom
reaponalbla source. J. G. A. POCOCK
. ')y CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRO 4YY

VB
 -

CONTENTS

( 86 VOLUME 11 WHO IS A CITIZEN? FEMINISM,

6 Citizenship MULTICULTURALISM AND IMMIGRATION
MICHAEL WALZER I
7 Le citoyen/la citoyenne: activity, passivity and the revolutionary Acknowledgemen ts vii
conception of citizenship 93 II
WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR Introduction 1

8 Ruling class strategies and citizenship 116

MICHAEL MANN PART 4
Feminist approaches and theorisations 5

PART 3 18 Rethinking citizenship with women in focus 7

Contemporary theories and new developments 135/
MARGARET ABRAHAM, ESTHER NGAN-LING CHOW,
LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI AND EVANGELIA TASTSOGLOU
9 The myth of citizenship 137
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF 19 Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship 29
MARY G. DIETZ
10 Return of the citizen: a survey of recent work
156 20 Inclusive citizenship: realizing the potential 49
on citizenship theory
WILL KYMLICKA AND WAYNE NORMAN RUTH LISTER

11 Outline of a theory of citizenship 185 21 Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics 65
BRIAN S. TURNER CHANTAL MOUFFE

12 Women, equality, and citizenship 215 22 Citizenship and feminist theory 80

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN ANNE PHILLIPS

13 Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of 23 The square of intimate citizenship: some preliminary proposals 93
universal citizenship 228 KEN PLUMMER
IRIS MARION YOUNG 112
24 Is citizenship gendered?
14 Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on SYLVIA WALBY
the future of Europe 25 Women, citizenship and difference 129
JURGEN HABERMAS
NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS
15 Changing paradigms of citizenship and the exclusiveness
273
of the demos PARTS
JEAN L. COHEN
On the multicultural question 151
16 Citizenship and pluralism 296
DAVID MILLER 26 Pride politics and multiculturalist citizenship 153
ANNE-MARIE FORTIER
17 Citizenship and justice 318
ANDREW MASON 27 Citizens and citizenship 172
STUART HALL AND DAVID HELD

IX
viii
 CONTENTS CON,TENTS

28 The holistic ambition: social cohesion and the culturalization 37 The nature of citizenship in the United States and Great Britain:
of citizenship 185 empirical comments on theoretical themes 18
YNGVE LITHMAN PAMELA JOHNSTON CONOVER, IVOR M. CREWE AND
. I DONALD D. SEARING
29 Citizenship in culturally diverse societies: issues, contexts, concepts 200
WILL KYMLICKA AND WAYNE NORMAN 38 Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation 50
RUSSELL J. DALTON
30 On citizenship and multicultural vulnerability 243
AYELET SHACHAR 39 Citizenship in flux: the figure of the activist citizen 75
ENGIN F. ISIN
31 Citizenship, republicanism and multiculturalism in contemporary
France 267 40 The agonic freedom of citizens 97
JEREMY JENNINGS JAMES TULLY

41 The repositioning of citizenship: emergent subjects and

PART 6 spaces for politics 121
The immigration polemic 293 SASKIA SASSEN

32 Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders 295 PARTS
JOSEPH H. CARENS Changing politics for markets
33 How immigration is changing citizenship: a comparative view 314
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE 42 Citizenship, social citizenship and the defence
of welfare provision 145
34 Immigrants, nations and citizenship 338
DESMOND S. KING AND JEREMY WALDRON
DAVID MILLER
43 Markets, citizenship and the welfare state:
35 Citizenship, reproduction and the state: international marriage
some critical reflections 177
and human rights 359
N. BARRY
BRYAN S. TURNER
44 The New Right conception of citizenship and
the Citizen's Charter 206
VOLUME III HOW TO BE A CITIZEN: CIVIC RIGHTS, RICHARD BELLAMY AND JOHN GREENAWAY
DUTIES AND VIRTUES IN OLD AND NEW POLITICS
PART 9
Acknowledgements ix
Changing citizenship education 223
Introduction 1
45 Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism:
the case of God v. John Rawls? 225
PART 7 STEPHEN MACEDO
Changing citizenship practices 5
46 Civic education and social diversity 252
AMY GUTMANN
36 Citizenship: an unnatural practice? 7
. ADRIAN OLD FIELD

x xi
 r CONTENTS

47 Citizenship education: anti-political culture and political VOLUME IV WHERE TO BE A CITIZEN: CITIZENSHIP
education in Britain 273 BEYOND AND ACROSS STATES
ELIZABETH FRAZER
. Acknowledgements ix
PART 10
Introduction 1
Changing citizenship subjects 293

48 Scandinavian feminist debates on citizenship PART 12

295
HEGE SKJEIE AND BIRTE SlIM Citizenship unbound? National borders vs global citizenship 5

49 Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: 58 Borders, boundaries and citizenship 7

organized Islam in European public spheres 313 SEYLA BENHABIB
YASEMIN NUHO<'}LU SOYSAL
59 The idea of global citizenship: a sympathetic assessment 18
50 Republican citizenship and the crisis of integration in France 329 NIGEL DOWER
CECILE LABORDE
60 Fuzzy citizenship in global society 36
51 Intersectionality, citizenship and contemporary politics MATHIAS KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI
of belonging 354 61 Bounded citizenship 62
NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS DAVID MILLER

62 Postnational citizenship: reconfiguring the familiar terrain 79

PART 11 YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL
Changing citizenship spheres 369
PART 13
52 Citizenship in a time of empire: the world social forum Transnational citizenship, dual nationality and voting rights 89
as a new public space 371
JANET CONWAY 63 New rules on dual nationality for a democratizing globe:
53 Global civil society and the question of global citizenship between rejection and embrace 91
388
CHRIS ARMSTRONG DAVID A. MARTIN

64 Realignments of citizenship: reassessing rights in the age of

54 The decline of citizenship in an era of globalization 400
RICHARD FALK
plural memberships and multi-level governance 127
RAINER BAUBOCK AND VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON
55 Responsibility and global justice: a social connection model 415 65 Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political participation:
IRIS MARION YOUNG
a normative evaluation of external voting 143
56 Environmental citizenship as reasonable citizenship 444 RAINER BAUBOCK
SIMON HAILWOOD
66 Should expatriates vote? 199
57 Environmental obligations and the limits of transnational CLAUDIO L6PEZ-GUERRA
citizenship 460 67 Democracy, citizenship and the bits in between 219
ANDREW MASON SARAH FINE

xii xiii
 CONTENTS

PART 14
Global justice and citizenship 237

68 Citizenship, egalitarianism arid global justice 239

CHRIS ARM STRONG ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
69 Citizenship, non citizenship, and the transnationalization
of domestic work 258
LINDA BOSNIAK

70 The perils of global citizenship 283

BRETT BOWDEN

71 Cosmopolitan ism and global citizenship 299 We are grateful to Elizabeth Frazer, Cecile Laborde, Kate Nash, Andrew
BHIKHU PAREKH
Mason and David Owen for their helpful suggestions regarding the read-
ings included in these volumes. We would also like to thank Lior Erez for
72 Between citizenship and human rights 316 his research assistance in tracking them down. Needless to say, we remain
KATE NASH responsible for any errors or omissions that may have resulted from our
failing always to take their wise advice.

PART 15 The publishers would like to thank the following for permission to reprint
Europe 335 their material:
Cambridge University Press for permission to reprint M. Walzer, 'Citizenship',
73 Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and in T. Ball, 1. Farr, R. L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual
participation within the EU 337 Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 211-220.
RICHARD BELLAMY
W. H. Sewell, Jr for permission to reprint W. H. Sewell, Jr, 'Le citoyen/La
74 Citizenship and sovereignty in the post-Westphalian citoyenne: Activity, Passivity and the Revolutionary Conception of Citizen-
European state 358 ship', in Colin Lucas (ed.), The Political Culture of the French Revolution
ANDREW LINKLATER vo!. 2 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), pp. 105-123.

75 Mobility, migrants and solidarity: towards an emerging Sage Publications for permission to reprint M. Mann, 'Ruling Class Strate-
gies and Citizenship', Sociology, 21, 3, 1987,339-354. .
European citizenship regime 384
PATRIZIA NANZ The University of Chicago Press for permission to reprint W. Kymlicka and
W. Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship
76 Citizenship, immigration, and the European social project: Theory', Ethics, 104, 2, 1994, 352-381.
rights and obligations of individuality 408
Sage Publications for permission to reprint B. S. Turner, 'Outline of a Theory
YASEMIN NUHOCLU SOYSAL
of Citizenship', Sociology, 24, 2, 1990, 189-217.
77 Comparative citizenship: a restrictive turn in Europe? 430 The University of Chicago Press for permission to reprint I. M. Young,
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizen-
ship', Ethics, 99, 2, 1989,250-274.
Index 459 John WiIey & Sons for permission to reprint 1. Habermas, 'Citizenship and
National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', Praxis Inter-
national, 12, 1, 1992, 1-9.

xiv xv
 -""::r0"'" ""0'-'
..... 0
-O(/J
.j::.......,
s:: ::r
.- N::;:_.
::r '1:1
::e (1) '" -;..,
l=5§§S;'1:I ::::l

('D 0'"
('t)
(J;J
to-;
I--
8• (1):::.: \0(1)0"
n(1)(1)::r • '< \Oenn
(1) ::::l 'El • ::r
g.
°o_::r
Er 00 '" o· :::;:
...... (/J VI ::::l

8 8. ;:;·0 1 ::::l
NO.,=,>
'"
f"""'I'- CJ _. CD l::l ::::l
0\ ..... 0 -
l::l ..., -",

:::s'1:l ?O
,.
_. \:l
0.
::::l
...,
l::l..(1)

s· (1) N· (1) 2. >< 8 >

0. <:
:;;.
(1)
E;;
<:> '" ·w.j::..8...,_. Q... 00-
s::
'"- · 0 -.
en
(j

-. '< ::S-...,
0. 'B. '<
<:> 0
::::l z
=: £ .. (1) r;- S- •
'"
en ::::l
o
."'...... '1:1a \Do.::.. ::::l
(1) 0
.....

><
;S. o(')
OJ 0_
P ::e l::l 0
Q§l
-. f""f-
-
s·= .0
w-
g.
\O::::l
_VI _

.j::..o
w...,
....,
0'1:1 ...,
. . . s·
(6 t""
ttI
i:1
'1:1 (1) - n • ;J> N(1) ::r_ o
§
(6" ",""
gog N· 1'1:1 (1)

tit-<
'-; ttI
s::ttI
VI::::l
'" 0 ..... (1).
8 ()
::e § Q. NO p o 0 Z
>-3
o .", _. s:: O\::::l
•"'. ::r
t:j
P
<::
(1)
f""f-
::r
w' (1)
:::s •
'"
::eG ::e0 S; 00-
..... N·
-.... c;n
g -...,
c: s: 0() ::r

-6.
::l'" l::l P>
..... ... ::::l

(1)
0. l::l '1:1
- '< >6. c· 03.
:::s ::::l
0" V:l::l. N· l::lQ'Q
(1)
(1) 0 :::s C§.
_ ::::l g
0.
;:- '" <:> ...,

-
::::l OJ ::r
>6.
::::l

0"
(1).
0 ::r (1)
2-
r'":;. P> gj.
c·

- '"
_. """1 (1). ::::l
('1) I CZI !ZI 0.

l
Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters
Date Author Title Source Vo!. Ch.

335-323 Aristotle Extracts from The Politics S. Everson (ed.), The Politics, Bk III I
Chs. 4 and 5, Bk VII Ch. 7,
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988.
1682 Samuel von Pufendorf Extracts from On the Duty of Man and James Tully (ed.), chapters 1, 5, 6, 7, I 3
Citizen According to Natural Law 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 18 in On the
(j
Duty of Man and Citizen According
::t:
to Natural Law, Bk 2, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 0
1753 Extracts from Encyclopedie ou Dictionnaire "Citoyen", 1753, Tome 3, D: I 2 Z
0
Raisonne Des Sciences, Des Arts Et Des Diderot, D' Alembert, 1. Le Rond t""
Metiers (eds), Paris: chez Briasson [et all, 0
>< 0
463-67. ....
1950 T. H. Marshall Extracts from Citizenship and social class 1. Manza and M. Sauder (eds), I 4 (j

Inequality and Society, New York: >

t""
W W Norton, 2009, pp. 148-54.
>-3
1987 Joseph H. Carens Aliens and citizens: the case for open Review of Politics, 49, 251-73. II 32 >
borders C;I !

t""
1987 Mary G. Dietz Context is all: feminism and theories of Daedalus, 116:4, 1-24. II 19 ttI
citizenship
1987 Michael Ignatieff The myth of citizenship Queen's Quarterly, 99:4, 399-420. I 9
1987 Michael Mann Ruling class strategies and citizenship Sociology, 21:3, 339-54. I 8
1988 Desmond S. King and Citizenship, social citizenship and the British Journal of Political Science, III 42
Jeremy Waldron defence of welfare provision 18,415-43.
1988 William H. Sewell, Jr Le citoyenlla citoyenne: activity, passivity Colin Lucas (ed.), The Political I 7
and the revolutionary conception of Culture of the French Revolution,
citizenship vo 1. 2, Oxford: Pergamon Press,
pp. 105-23.
 Chronological table continued

Date Author Title Source Vol. Ch.

1989 Stuart Hall and David Citizens and citizenship
Held Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds), II 27
New Times: The Changing Face of
Politics in the 1990s, London:
1989 Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 173-188.
Michael Walzer Citizenship 1: Ball, 1. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), I 6 -
Political Innovation and Conceptual
Change, Cambridge: Cambridge (")
1989 University Press, pp. 211-20. ::t:
Iris Marion Young Polity and group difference: a critique of Ethics, 99:2, 250-74. I 13 :;:g
the ideal of universal citizenship 0
1990 N.Barry Markets, citizenship and the welfare state: Z
R. Plant and N. Barry, Citizenship 43 0
some critical reflections and Rights in Thatcher's Britain: t"'
S: Two Views, London: Institute of
Economic Affairs, pp. 35-77.
0
0-
....
1990 Adrian Oldfield Citizenship: an unnatural practice? (")
1990 Political Quarterly, 61, 177-87. II 36
Brian S. Turner Outline of a theory of citizenship SOciology, 24:2, 189-217. I
>
1991 11 t"'
Pamela Johnston
Conover, Ivor M. Crewe
The nature of citizenship in the United
States and Great Britain: empirical
Journal of Politics, 53, 800-32. III 37 ..,
and Donald D. Searing >
comments on theoretical themes t:Ii
1992 Jilrgen Habermas Citizenship and national identity: some t"'
Praxis International, 12:1, 1-9. I 14 t.tl
reflections on the future of Europe
1992 Chantal Mouffe Feminism, citizenship and radical 1. Butler and 1. Scott (eds), Feminists II 21
democratic politics Theorize the Political, London:
1992 Routledge, pp. 74-89.
Susan Moller akin Women, equality, and citizenship
1992 Queen's Quarterly, 99:1, 56-72. I 12
J. G. A. Pocock The ideal of citizenship since classical times
1993 Queen's Quarterly, 99:1, 33-55. I 5
Anne Phillips Citizenship and feminist theory Anne Phillips, Democracy and II 22
Difference, Canibridge: Polity Press
and Pennsylvania State University
Press, pp. 75-89.

l
1994 Will Kymlicka and Return of the citizen: a survey of recent Ethics, 104:2, 352-81. I 10
Wayne Norman work on citizenship theory
1994 Sylvia Walby Is citizenship gendered? SOciology, 28:2, 379-95. II 24
1995 Richard Bellamy and The New Right conception of citizenship Government and Opposition, 30, III 44
John Greenaway and the Citizen's Charter 469-91.
1995 Amy Gutmann Civic education and social diversity Ethics, 105,557-79. III 46
1995 Stephen Macedo Liberal civic education and religious EthicS, 105, 468-96. III 45
fundamentalism: the case of God v. John
Rawls?
1995 David Miller Citizenship and pluralism Political Studies, 43, 432-50. I 16 (")
1996 Andrew Linklater Citizenship and sovereignty in the post- European Journal of International IV 74 ::t:
Westphalian European state Relations, 2:1, 77-103. :;:g
1997 Nira Yuva1-Davis Women, citizenship and difference Feminist Review, 57, 4-27. II 25 0
1997 Changing parameters of citizenship and Theory and Society, 26:4, 509-27. III 49 Z
Yasemin Nuhoglu 0
Soysal claims-making: organized Islam in European t"'
public spheres 0
><. 0-
1999 Jean L. Cohen Changing paradigms of citizenship and the International Sociology, 14:3, I 15 ....
(")
exclusiveness of the demos 245-68.
1999 Christian Joppke How immigration is changing citizenship: a Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22:4, II 33 >
t"'
comparative view 629-52. ..,
1999 James Tully The agonic freedom of citizens Economy and Society, 28:2, 161-82. III 40 >
t:Ii
1999-2000 David A. Martin New rules on dual nationality for a Georgetown Immigration Law IV 63 t"'
democratizing globe: between rejection and Journal, 14:1, 1-34. t.tl
embrace
2000 Nigel Dower The idea of global citizenship: a Global Society, 14:4,553-67. IV 59
sympathetic assessment
2000 Richard Falk The decline of citizenship in an era of Citizenship Studies, 4:1,5-17. III 54
globalization
2000 Elizabeth Frazer Citizenship education: anti-political culture Political Studies, 48, 88-103. III 47
and political education in Britain
2000 Jeremy Jennings Citizenship, republicanism and British Journal of Political Science, II 31
multiculturalism in contemporary France 30,575-98.
 Chronological table continued

Date Author Title Source Vol. Ch.

2000 Will Kymlicka and Citizenship in culturally diverse societies: Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman II 29
Wayne Norman issues, contexts, concepts (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies,
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 1-4l.
2000 David Miller Bounded citizenship Citizenship and National Identity, IV 61
2000 Cambridge: Polity, pp. 81-96.
Ayelet Shachar On citizenship and multi cultural Political Theory, 28:1, 64-89. II 30
vulnerabili ty
2000 Hege Skjeie and Birte Scandinavian feminist debates on citizenship International Political Science III 48
Siim Review, 21:4, 345-60.
2001 Ken Plummer The square of intimate citizenship: some Citizenship Studies, 5:3, 237-53. II 23
preliminary proposals
>< 2003 Brett Bowden The perils of global citizenship
>< Citizenship Studies, 7:3, 349-62. IV 70
2003 Bhikhu Parekh Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship Review of International Studies, 29: 1, IV 71
3-17.
2003 Saskia Sassen The repositioning of citizenship: emergent CR- The New Centennial Review, 3, III 41
subjects and spaces for politics 4-26.
2004 Janet Con way Citizenship in a time of empire: the world Citizenship Studies, 8:4, 367-81. III 52
social forum. as a new public space
2004 Cecile Laborde Republican citizenship and the crisis of R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione and E. III 50
integration in France Santoro (eds), Lineages of Citizenship:
Rights, Belonging and Participation in
Eleven Nation-States, Basingstoke:
Palgrave, pp. 46-72.
2004 Yasemin NuhogIu Postnational citizenship: reconfiguring the K. Nash and A. Scott (eds), The IV 62
Soysal familiar terrain Blackwell Companion to Political
Sociology, 2nd edn, Oxford:
Blackwell,pp. 333-4l.
2005 Seyla Benhabib Borders, boundaries and citizenship Political Science & Politics, 38:4, 673-77. IV 58
2005 Anne-Marie Fortier Pride politics and multiculturalist citizenship Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28:3, 559-78. 11 26

l
2005 Simon Hailwood Environmental citizenship as reasonable Environmental Politics, 14:2, III 56 !

citizenship 195-210.
2005 Claudio L6pez-Guerra Should expatriates vote? Journal of Political Philosophy, 13:2, IV 66
216-34.
2006 Chris Armstrong Global civil society and the question of Voluntas: International Journal of III 53
global citizenship Voluntary and Nonprojit
Organisations, 17:4, 349-57.
2006 Iris Marion Young Responsibility and global justice: a social E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller and 1. Paul III 55
connection model (eds), Justice and Global Politics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 102-30.
2007 Rainer Baubock Stakeholder citizenship and transnational Fordham Law Review, 75:5, IV 65
political participation: a normative 2393-447.
evaluation of external voting
2007 Ruth Lister Inclusive citizenship: realizing the potential Citizenship Studies, 11:1, 49-6l. 11 20
2007 Nira Yuval-Davis Intersectionality, citizenship and Critical Review of Social and III 51
>< contemporary politics of belonging Political Philosophy, 10:4, 561-74.
2008 Richard Bellamy Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, Citizenship Studies, 12:6, 597-611. IV 73
rights and participation within the EU
2008 Russell 1. Dalton Citizenship norms and the expansion of Political Studies, 56:1, 76-98. III 38
political participation
2008 Christian Joppke Comparative citizenship: a restrictive turn in Law and Ethics of Human Rights, IV 77
Europe? 2:1, 128-68.
2008 David Miller Immigrants, nations and citizenship Journal of Political Philosophy, 16:4, 11 34
371-90.
2008 Bryan S. Turner Citizenship, reproduction and the state: Citizenship Studies, 12:1,45-54. II 35
international marriage and human rights
2009 Rainer Baubock and Realignments of citizenship: reassessing Citizenship Studies, 13:5, 439-50. IV 64
Virginie Guiraudon rights in the age of plural memberships and
multi-level governance
2009 Linda Bosniak Citizenship, noncitizenship, and the S. Benhabib and 1. Resnik (eds), IV 69
transnationalization of domestic work Migrations and Mobilities:
Citizenship, Borders and Gender, New
York; London: New York University
Press, pp. 127-56.
 ...... " f i V I .. ULVOTC:IKL IAbLB

0\ N 00 00 00 o
M r- ...... N \0 \0

INTRODUCTION
The theories and practices of citizenship

Richard Bellamy

These four volumes explore different theories and practices of citizenship

from ancient Greece to the present. This period has witnessed significant
changes as to who can be a citizen, the topic of Volume n, how we exercise
citizenship - the rights and duties of citizenship and the practices through
which we use them - examined in Volume Ill, and where citizenship is located
_ the nature of the political community to which a citizen belongs - the
subject of Volume IV, For example, much of the history of citizenship has
involved the struggle for the inclusion of the property less, women and ethnic
minorities, into the fold of citizens, Likewise, the range of political rights
and duties has altered over time, as have the degree and ways they need to
be performed, In most countries, military service has ceased to be a core
civic duty, while political participation has become increasingly limited to
a voluntary and periodic act of voting for a decision-maker rather than
regular and sustained direct involvement in decision-making, The type of
political community deemed to sustain a form of citizenship has also evolved,
expanding beyond the city to encompass nation states, empires, and inter-
national bodies such as the EU.
An obvious question arises given these multiple transformations of the
character of citizenship: namely, are there any defining characteristics of
citizenship that enable us to identify all these different conceptions as
variations on the same basic concept? Or are they all so different that it is
misleading to assume that any real continuity underlies the use of the same
term to refer to very different phenomena? At least one reason for thinking
N
that looking for some continuity is not entirely misplaced is historical. As
,S § John Pocock (1992) notes, in the article collected as Chapter 5 of Vo!. I, within
Z the western political tradition, at least, the writings of ancient Greek and
cd
'N Roman authors on citizenship have been 'classic' not simply in deriving from
'I::
£ a period often deemed 'classical' but in being acknowledged as setting the terms
of reference for later theories, To a greater or lesser degree, subsequent theories
have conceived themselves as adopting, adapting, adding to, abstracting from
0\ 0 o N
and abandoning key features of these classic positions, In what follows, we
0 ...... ...... ......
00
NN
8N 8N o
N
o
N
begin by looking at the classic conceptions and the underlying concept they

xxii
 INTRODUCTION
We the'n turn to the ways in which they have been subsequently
lllterpreted and reworked. As we shall note, this historical approach to
understanding citizenship combines elements of both the sociological and
normative approaches representttd by the essays in Volume 1.
The concept and conceptions of citizenship
Any attempt to isolate the core concept of citizenship risks being stipulative
and to a degree arbitrary - at best the reification of a particular conception
or set of conceptions as the 'true' account of citizenship. However, some
attempt to identify those features of citizenship that have hitherto formed
the main sites of contestation between the various conceptions seems neces-
sary for any discussion of the concept and its different interpretations
to have any coherence at all. Historically, therefore, the distinctive core of
citizenship - at least within the Western political tradition - has been the
possession of the formal status of membership of a political and legal entity
and having particular sorts of rights and obligations within it that distinguish
one from being either a subject or a casual visitor, on the one hand, or per-
forming some other non-civic social role, such as a friend, a neighbour or a
good Samaritan, on the other. Different conceptions have offered different
views as to what the criteria of membership should be; the nature of the
political and legal institution to which a citizen belongs; the content of their
rights and duties; and the character of the norms and attitudes citizens require
to exercise and fulfil these civic entitlements and obligations. However, all
agree that citizenship is a political and legal artefact that creates a condition
of civic equality among those who possess it with regard to the prerogatives
and responsibilities it bestows and requires.
This core definition may seem to be at odds with much contemporary
usage, in which citizenship encompasses a broad range of social behaviour
and ethical attitudes on the part of a diverse set of subjects - not just indi-
viduals but also groups, corporate bodies and even animals - that extends
beyond any formal status or the legal and political rights and duties granted
by states, international institutions or other bodies. On these accounts,
citizenship refers as much to neighbourliness and personal responsibility
as voting in elections or the entitlement to particular benefits. As a result, it
may seem that the term has lost its distinctiveness and become synonymous
with acting justly or well with regard to others rather than implying a specific
type of relationship brought about through certain legal and political
arrangements. Yet, these contemporary views tend to involve a critique of
existing legal and political institutions for inhibiting or failing to promote
just or good behaviour on the part of citizens - particularly in the international
sphere with regard to issues such as poverty in developing countries, human-
itarian intervention and climate change. They demand the reconfiguration
of the existing state system that forms the main context for citizenship, be
2 3
INTROD,UCTION
it to provide for trans-state rights and duties or because, in some contexts,
the traditional tasks of citizenship might be better realised through informal
arrangements. In some respects, therefore, these views challenge the very
concept of citizenship itself - not least its exclusive character as involving
membership of a particular political community. In so doing, however, these
arguments can also be regarded as engaging with the core elements of the
definition of citizenship given above.
These contemporary views of citizenship also relate to what can be regarded
as the two main conceptions of citizenship: what can be called the intrinsic
and the instrumental accounts. The intrinsic account sees citizenship as con-
stitutive of a certain form of political life in which individuals view themselves
as equal members. By contrast, the instrumental account sees citizenship and
its related institutions as mechanisms for promoting the rights and interests
of individuals in a just and equitable way. To some degree these are comple-
mentary in that justice may require the very same equal entitlements and
duties supported by the equal membership account. Nevertheless, as Andrew
Mason (2011) notes in the article collected as Chapter 17 of Vol. I, the two
views value these rights and obligations in different ways. The first is both
more and less demanding than the second. The instrumental account is
limited in some theories simply to what John Rawls termed the basic struc-
ture of society rather than the ways people interact with each other more
generally. By contrast to these, the intrinsic account proves more demanding
in that it looks to citizens to view each other as equals throughout their
social interactions. Of course, there are theories of justice that do not accept
Rawls's limitations on their scope and apply to social life more broadly. Yet,
even these theories demand less by way of social solidarity than the intrinsic
account of citizenship. For example, an intrinsic account will require not
only that no group should be discriminated against on grounds of gender,
ethnicity, religion and so forth, but also that citizens must truly value their
fellow citizens as equals and accord such differences equal recognition in
the public sphere. However, the equal membership account has also been
thought too demanding to be extended beyond the boundaries of a fairly
well defined community. Societies that are too large or too diverse may be
unable to sustain such deeply equal social relations. Social interactions may
be too infrequent, reciprocity too imperfect, the stakes of citizens in the
commonwealth too unequal and their experiences of life and world views
too different and in given respects too incompatible for it to be possible for
them to construct a political community that they all regard as a joint endeav-
our involving mutual recognition. Meanwhile, the instrumental account
demands more in its turn by rejecting attempts to circumscribe the bounda-
ries of the political community and requiring we treat all humans (and in
some accounts even a number of non-humans), as co-citizens. Though the
two conceptions overlap in many respects, therefore, the one seeks depth at
the sacrifice of breadth; the other breadth at the expense of a degree of depth.
 INTRODUCTION
This division has classical roots, and can be related to the difference be-
tween the conceptions of citizenship that came to be associated with Greece
and Imperial respectively, and which - as J. G. A. Pocock (1995) argues
- later coalesced mto what came to be termed the 'republican' and 'liberal'
accounts. Following the French revolution, the two were to some extent
brought together within the modern nation state. However, that resolution
has come under increasing strain from multicultural and class divisions within
and from The challenge for both the theory and
?f cI.tlzenshlp today. IS how far it is possible to broaden and deepen
citizenship without confrontmg a trade-off between the two. It is to the past
and present of citizenship that we now turn.
The two classic conceptions
As was. noted ?reece Imperial Rome can be regarded as offering
respectively the ongmal paradigm for the republican account based on
the intrinsic value of equal membership, and the liberal account, on the
instrumental value of equality under the law. It seems appropriate therefore
to begin by briefly outlining each of these conceptions in turn. ' , point. Apart from generals, who were elected by the assembly and could
Aristotle's Politics (335-323 BC), excerpted in Vol. I, ch. 1, provides the
canonical text of the Greek version of citizenship, with ancient Athens
the model. Aristotle regarded human beings as 'political animals' because it
is in our nature to live in political communities - indeed, he contended that
only within a po lis or city-state could human potential be fully realized.
However, he believed people played the roles appropriate to their natural
station life: with some qualifying as politai or citizens. Though neither
the qualificatIOns Anstotle deemed appropriate for membership of this select
group nor the duties he expected of them are regarded as entirely suitable
have a shadow over the history of citizenship and their
mner ratIOnale still underlies much contemporary thinking.
To be a citizen of Athens it was necessary to be a male aged 20 or over of
known genealogy as being born to an Athenian citizen family, a patri;rch
of a household, a warrior, possessing the arms and ability to fight, and
a master of the labour - notably slaves (Finley 1983). So gender,
race and class defined citizenship and many of the main later debates have
turned on how far they continue to do so. As a result, large numbers were
women, th.ough Athenian women were citizens for genea-
logICal purposes; children; Immigrants or 'metics' - including those whose
families had been settled in Athens for several generations, although they
were free, liable to taxation and had military duties; and above all
slaves. It IS reckoned that the number of citizens in Athens fluctuated between
30,000 and 50,000, while the number of slaves was of the order of 80-100 000.
Therefore, citizenship was enjoyed by a minority, though a substantial' one.
Yet, this was inevitable given the high expectation on citizens. For, their
4 5
INTROD'UCTION
capacity to perform their not inconsiderable citizenly duties rested on their
everyday needs being looked after by the majority of the population, par-
ticularly women and slaves.
Aristotle described as citizens those who 'rule and are ruled by turns'
(Aristotle 1988, 1259bl). Though the duties involved differed between
polities and even different categories of citizen within the same polity, at
some level citizenship involved 'the power to take part in the deliberative or
judicial administration' (Aristotle 1988, 1275bl). In Athens this meant at a
minimum participating in the assembly, which met at least 40 times a year
and required a quorum of 6,000 citizens for plenary sessions, and, for citizens
aged over 30, doing jury service - again, a frequent responsibility given that
juries required 201 or more members and on some occasions over 501. Though
jury service was paid, jurors were chosen by lot from among those who
presented themselves to discourage both its becoming a regular income and
jury packing, In addition, there were some 140 local territorial units of
government, or demes, with their own agorai or assembly points for public
discussion of local affairs and passing local decrees.
Meanwhile, many citizens could not avoid holding public office at some
serve multiple terms if successful, public officers were chosen by lot, served
for one or two years maximum, with key roles often rotated between office
holders. These devices aimed to increase the likelihood that all citizens had
an equal chance of exercising political power, with the short terms of office
and the checks operated by the different bodies on each other ensuring this
power was severely circumscribed. Yet, though there were no career polit-
icians, citizenship itself, if one adds military service and participation in local
affairs, was a fairly full time occupation.
Athens was unusual among Greek city-states in being so democratic. Indeed
Aristotle, who periodically resided in Athens but was not born there and so
was not an Athenian citizen, expressed a personal preference for systems that
mixed democracy with aristocratic and monarchical elements. However, even
in those systems, citizenship remained fairly onerous. Like Plato, Aristotle
esteemed the austere citizenship code of Sparta. By contrast to Athens, where
the arts, philosophy and leisure were much admired, Sparta emphasized
military service above all else. Male children were separated from their
families aged 7, subjected to a rigorous training, and thereafter attached to
a 'mess'. Given they stilI had to attend the Assembly, Spartan citizens became
even more permanent public servants than their Athenian counterparts. In
fact, it was precisely their limited opportunities to develop private interests
that Plato in particular so admired.
Aristotle acknowledged that such forms of citizenship were only possible
in small states. That was important not just so everyone could have a turn
at ruling and to keep the tasks of government sufficiently simple as to be
manageable without a professional bureaucracy or political class, but also
 INTRODUCTION
it was only in smaller settings that the requisite civic virtues were
lIkely to be fostered. Although the Athenians probably invented the idea of
taking a vote to settle disagreements, unanimity was the ideal and most issues
were settled by consensus - if need be following extended debate. Aristotle
surmised that such concord or homonoia depended on a form of civic friend-
ship among citizens that was only likely in tightly-knit communities. Citizens
know each other, share values and have common interests. Only then
wlil they be able to agree on what qualities are best for given offices and select
the right people for them, harmoniously resolve disputed rights, and adopt
collective policies unanimously. Even so, agreement rested on citizens pos-
sessing a sense of justice, being temperate by exercising self-control and
avoiding extremes, having a capacity for prudent judgement, being motivated
by patriotism, so they put the public good above private advantage, and being
courageous before especially military threats. In sum, a citizen must
not belong 'just to himself' but also to 'the polis'.
the model of citizenship was the privilege of a minority, it
proVided a considerable degree of popular control over government. True,
the Assembly and Council tended to be dominated by the high born and
wealthy, . while Aristotle's ideal of concord was often far from the reality,
at least 111 Athens. There were persistent tensions between different classes
and factions, with disagreements often bitter and personal, ending with the
physical removal of opponents through ostracism and even their execution on
trumped up charges of treason. Nonetheless, in a very real sense those people
who qualified as citizens did rule, thereby giving us the word democracy from
demokratia or people (demos) rule (kratos). Un surprisingly, Greek
cItizenship has appeared to many later thinkers as the epitome of a true
condition of political equality, in which citizens have equal political powers
so must treat each other with equal concern and respect. They have
Viewed the trend towards delegating political tasks to a professional class of
politicians and public administrators with foreboding, as presaging a loss
of political freedom and equality, and lamented the - in their opinion - short-
sighted tendency for ever more citizens to desert public service to pursue
personal concerns. By contrast, critics of this model of citizenship argue that
it was not so much an ideal as hopelessly idealized. In reality, it was doubly
oppressive. On the one hand, it rested on the oppression of slaves, women
and other non-citizens. On the other hand, it was oppressive of citizens in
demanding they sacrifice their private interests to serving the state. As we
saw, the two forms of oppression were linked: citizens could only dedicate
themselves to public life because their private lives were serviced by others.
Later liberal commentators have condemned these last features of Greek
republican citizenship as potentially despotic (Constant 1819, Berlin 1969).
They criticize not just the way non-citizens got treated as less than fully human,
but also the demand for the total identification of citizens with the state
with all dissent seen as indicative of self-interest rather than an
6 7
INTROD'UCTlON
point of view or valid concern. They castigate such regimes as both repres-
sive and corrupt - not least in diverting all talent away from the private
sphere of the economy on which the wealth of a society rests. Ironically,
making the public sphere the main avenue of personal advancement did not
prevent but promoted the abuse of power for private gain. They trace these
problems to a flawed view of liberty that falsely links freedom with civic
participation. Aristotle's defence of this linkage rested on a perfectionist
account of human flourishing, with civic involvement a means to human
self-realization, whereby individual and collective autonomy can be reconciled
by subsuming private interests under the public interest. Many liberals reject
such 'positive' conceptions of liberty as suggesting human freedom lies in
the pursuit of particular ends. Instead, they advocate a 'negative' conception
that consists of being free from interference to pursue one's personal good
in one's own way. They claim freedom of this latter sort merely requires a
just constitutional regime that limits the power of government to maximizing
freedom from mutual interference and has no intrinsic link with democracy.
Imperial Rome offers an important contrast in this respect and one that
forms part of the genealogy of the liberal view. Eligibility for Roman citizen-
ship was at first similar to the criteria for Greek citizenship - citizens had to
be native free men who were the legitimate sons of other native free men.
As Rome expanded - initially within Italy, then over the rest of Europe and
finally into Africa and Asia - two important innovations came about. First,
the populations of conquered territories were given a version of Roman
citizenship while being allowed to retain their own forms of government,
including whatever citizenship status they offered. Second, the version of
Roman citizenship given was of a legal rather than a political kind - 'civitas
sine suffragio' 01' 'citizenship without the vote'. So, the Empire allowed dual
citizenship, though it reduced Roman citizenship to a legal status. As a result,
the legal and political communities pulled apart. The scope of law went
beyond political borders and did not need to be co-extensive with a given
territorial unit. To cite the famous case of St Paul - on arrest in Palestine,
he proudly declared himself 'a Jew of Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, a citizen of
no mean city'. But not being in Tarsus, it was his additional status as a
Roman citizen that allowed him to claim rights against arbitrary punishment,
thereby escaping a whipping, and to ask for trial in Rome.
According to the Aristotelian ideal, political citizenship had depended on
being freed from the burdens of economic and social life - both in order to
participate and to ensure that public rather than private interests were the
object of concern. By contrast, legal citizenship has private interests and
their protection at its heart. Within Roman law, legal status belonged to the
owners of property and, by extension, their possessions. Since these included
slaves, a free person was one who owned himself. So conceived, as in many
respects it remains to this day, law was about how we could use ourselves
and our things and those of others, and the use they may make of us and
 INTRODUCTION
?ur the. of St Paul shows, the resulting privileges and
ImmUllItIes, lllcludlllg the nght to sue and be sued in given courts were far
from trivial. However, that the rule of law can be detached from the rule of
persons, in that those subject to it do not have to be involved in either its
making or its a?ministration, creates disadvantages as well as advantages.
The advantage IS that the legal community can, as we saw, encompass a
number of political communities and hold their rulers and officers to account
thereby limiting their discretion to act against the law. Law can be universal
in .scope. and extent, enabli?g millions of dispersed individuals to pursue their
pnvate lllterests by engaglllg and exchanging with each other across space
and, through such legal acts as bequests, through time, without any direct
The lies in these same citizens becoming the imperial
subjects of the law s empIre, who are ruled by it rather than ruling themselves.
Yet the rule of law is only ever rule through law by some person or persons.
Law ca? have many .sources and enforcers, and different laws and legal sys-
tems wIll apply to dIfferent groups of persons and have differing costs and
for each of them. If law's empire depends on an emperor, then the
danger IS that law becomes a means for imperial rule rather than rule of by and
,
Towards republicanism and liberalism
Both undeI:,:ent significant alterations over time in response
to chan.glllg social and polItIcal circumstances and new intellectual pre-
As a result, they gradually became re-configured on rather
different ontological and epistemological assumptions. Of particular import-
ance were the struggles between religious and secular political authorities
on the one hand, and, crosscutting this conflict, those between city
and monarchical rulers, including the imperial pretensions of successive Holy
on the other. struggles both shaped and were shaped
by polItIcal thlllkmg from the middle ages to the Reformation. Two related
emerging from this process were particularly significant: the
separa.tlOn of and state and the crystallization of notions of political
- be It of the people or their rulers - in the context of a polity
possesslllg the features of a state: namely, a monopoly of coercive power
over those residing within its territorial boundaries. For example, each of
them plays. a key role in Marsilius of Padua's important tract Defensor Pads
work draws on both the political and democratic and the legal
and Impenal conceptions of citizenship explored in the last section, adapting
them to the context created by the two sets of struggles mentioned above to
the legal sovereignty of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria against the
of XXII in a doctrine of popular sovereignty.
. It IS agalllst thiS background that we need to explore the significant rework-
lllgs of the two classic conceptions of citizenship brought about by Machiavelli
8 9
INTRODUCTION
and Hobbes, respectively. Both offer secular accounts of citizenship that
link popular sovereignty to the right to rule of those possessing
political authority. Yet its role within their respective account.s was dIf-
ferent. While MachiaveIIi appreciated the part laws can play 111 secunng the
rights and liberties of citizens under a monarchical regime, he
liberty was only fully secured within a republic where the people exerCised
political power in ways that allowed them to mutually check each other,
thereby obliging all citizens to act collaboratively and in the public good. By
contrast, though Hobbes grounded the right to rule in the mutual
of the people, he maintained that in the process the ruled surrendered their
sovereign power to their rulers. Moreover, he regarded the unlimited and
undivided sovereignty of an absolute ruler - preferably, though not neces-
sarily, a monarch - as offering the surest basis for law and the protection of
liberty.
MachiaveIIi's account draws on the Roman republican model of citizenship
more than the Greek model associated with Aristotle. While there are some
similarities between the two, there are also striking differences. Though classes
existed in Greek society, including among those who qualified as citizens,
the ideal of citizenship became classless with the aspiration to 'concord' a
product of putting class and other private interests to one side. Instead,. the
Roman republic was born of class discord and the struggle of the plebeians
to obtain rights against the patricians. For the theorists of the Roman model
- Cicero (44 BC), the historians of the Roman republic and, drawing on them,
MachiaveIIi (153 I) - this on-going class conflict gave politics and citizenship
a much more instrumental character than the Greek model theorized by
Aristotle. Roman citizens never possessed anything like the political influ-
ence of their Athenian counterparts. Despite the creation of Tribunes of the
People, elected by a Plebeian Council, true power rested with the Senate.
While entry to the Senate ceased to depend on rank around 400 BC, since it
was composed instead of the popularly-elected magistrates, it was dominated
by the patricians - especially among the higher magistracy, particularly the
Consuls who formed the executive. The slogan Senatus Populusque Romanus
(,The Senate and the Roman People', frequently abbreviated to SPQR) sug-
gested a partnership between the Senate and the people within the popular
assemblies. In reality, Senate and people were always in tension, with the
influence of the plebeians waxing and waning depending on their importance
as support for different factions among the patricians.
Applying these ideas to renaissance Florence, Machiavelli argued the
Roman experience showed how the selfish interests of the aristocracy and
the people could only be restrained if each could counter the other. The
republic institutionalized such mutual restraint by ensuring no person or
institution could exercise power except in combination with at least one other
person or institution, so each could check and balance the other. The need
to divide power in this way was elaborated by later republican theorists. It
 INTRODUCTION
was a key feature of the city states of renaissance Italy, especially Florence
and Venice, which inspired Machiavelli's writings on the subject, and influ-
enced the political arrangements of the Dutch republic into the eighteenth
century. Republican ideas also informed the constitutional debates of the
,I,
I English civil war of the seventeenth century, influencing writers such as
Milton and Harrington. In the work of Montesquieu and, following him,
the American Federalists, especially Madison, the check and balance of powers
became a central element of the US Constitution (Hamilton, Madison and
Jay 1787-8).
l!nderlying this was a distinctively realist view of citizenship,
WhICh could be more eastly adapted to modern democratic politics than the
Greek view. Instead of viewing the private interest and the public as
diametrically opposed, so that all elements of the first had to be removed
from politics, the public interest emerged from the clash and balancing of
interests. Consequently, citizens had self-interested reasons to par-
tIcIpate because they could only ensure that their concerns figured in any
collective decisions so long as they took part and were counted. Quentin
Skinner (1998) and Philip Pettit (1997) have argued that the neo-Roman
version of republicanism rejects the 'positive', Aristotelian view of liberty
as self-mastery for a 'negative' account of freedom as the absence of domina-
tion or mastery by another. Citizens need not identify their wilI with that
of the polity; merely seek to ensure that government and the laws address
the interests of all in an equitable manner through being obliged to 'hear the
other side'. Liberty results from a political system where none are the masters
of others because all have an equal influence over how public policies are
framed and implemented.
Once again, this republican argument can be contrasted with the liberal
notion of liberty as freedom from interference. As we noted, this position
has its origins in the Imperial view of citizenship centred on providing
the legal protection of an individual's civil liberties, especially the right to
property. Much as Machiavelli can be regarded as defending the link between
political citizenship and liberty on a new basis, Hobbes can be read as
criticizing this linkage and putting forward a new defense of the link between
legal citizenship and liberty. In framing his argument, Hobbes drew on the
contemporary natural law tradition in which individuals are conceived as
proprietors of themselves and the world, possessing rights in both for their
Although Hobbes regarded humans as capable of perceiv-
mg and pursumg laws of nature, he did not believe these precepts allowed
them to live peacefully without government. Infamously, he depicted the
state of nature as a war of all against all. He ascribed this condition to each
jury and in their own case and acting on
theIr own pnvate Judgement - Itself a product of their exercising their 'right
of nature' to do anything which they judged necessary to their preservation.
As a result, in the natural state people would live in a permanent condition
10
INTROD'UCTION
of insecurity in which neither industry nor any of the activities associated
with civilization would be possible. Hobbes contended each person ought
to be rational enough to see this state was not conducive to their ability to
safely pursue their interests and to perform those actions most conducive
to peace - a set of practical imperatives he terms the Laws of Nature. The
solution was for individuals to lay down a part of their right to all things
and to establish an absolute sovereign with sufficient power to hold all in
awe. Hobbes contended the passage from the natural to the civil state could
be regarded as the product of a mutual covenant or social contract between
the members of society, whereby they ceded their right to private judgement
concerning those matters most conducive to their preservation to a sovereign
political authority. So long as these sovereign authorities could offer effective
protection to those subject to their rule, the ruled had an obligation to obey
their commands. Nevertheless, the ruled retain a right to self-defense that
allows them to resist a sovereign that puts their lives in danger.
Hobbes sketched much of this argument in a book published in Latin in
1642 with the title De Cive, or 'On the Citizen', although it got its most
famous statement in the English version of the Leviathan published in 1651.
From the republican perspective, his argument that citizenship was secured
through subjection to an absolute Leviathan seems like a contradiction in
terms. However, Hobbes takes issue with this view. Writing in the context of
the English civil war and the religious conflicts of contemporary Europe,
Hobbes contended that sovereignty cannot be divided or limited and stilI offer
a reliable source of stability and peace. To divide or seek to limit sovereignty
is to risk institutionalizing the disagreements and conflicts that characterize
the state of nature and would undermine the effectiveness of the sovereign
authority. Moreover, the citizens of a despotic regime could enjoy as much
as, and possibly even more liberty than, those of a self-governing republic,
since they too could live under the protection of laws that guaranteed their
ability to exercise their rights in pursuit of their private interests.
Both Hobbes' view of the state of nature and his claim that sovereignty
must be absolute were disputed by others writing in this tradition. For example,
John Locke thought that human nature was more benign than Hobbes and
believed he had underestimated the degree to which state power might be
an even greater danger to an individual's liberty than other individuals.
Nevertheless, the contrast with the republican account of citizenship persists,
as can be seen in the extract from Pufendorf (1673) in Chapter 2 of Vo!. I
which provides the exemplar of this mode of theorizing. Two features are
especially important. First, rights are commodified as individual possessions,
with political society being justified by providing for their preservation. Rights
are subjective, pre-social and pre-political rather than being grounded in what
is objectively or politically determined as right or good for a society, as the
Greek and neo-Roman notions contended. Second, political legitimacy rests
on a presumed act of consent whereby sovereignty is transferred from the
11
 INTRODUCTION
people to the political institutions that govern them. The presumption of
consent rests on the supposed rationality and necessity of this transfer once
individuals begin to interact with each other on a regular basis. It is then
held to persist until such time. as the relevant institutions or persons fail to
maintain the terms of the original compact, with the continued political
participation of citizens an optional extra.
This mode of argument has proved tremendously influential in international
law, especially human rights law, and fed into contemporary cosmopolitan
conceptions of citizenship. A natural affinity also exists between this account
and the liberal defense of the constitutional state. The state and its author-
ities are deemed to be bound by the act of constitution that justifies and
legitimizes their institution, which thereby serves as a higher law to'which
they can be held to account - ultimately by the people, but in some accounts
by their authorized representatives too - be they judges or politicians. This
position also fed into views of commerce as resting on a natural system
of liberty grounded in the natural rights to ownership of oneself and one's
possessions.
Significantly all three come in for trenchant criticism from 1. 1. Rousseau
(1755, 1762), who subjects the natural law tradition to a radical republican
critique and reworking. Rousseau contends that the state of nature only takes
on a Hobbesian character once individuals interact and become mutually
dependent on each other, yet he agrees with Hobbes that to the extent that
states are in this condition in the international sphere they too are in a state
of war. However, he regards the Hobbesian social contract as systematically
disadvantaging the propertyless and exploited, who only accept it out of
fear. His solution was to propose a republican social contract in which the
natural freedom each individual enjoyed when independent from others in
the state of nature is replaced by a civil freedom that derives from each
citizen participating directly in formulating laws that accord with a general
will that stems from and applies equally to all. In other words, as with Hobbes
sovereignty is single and indivisible, but it remains popular as only then will
the laws favour the common interest rather than the partial interests of
certain particular individuals over others. The difficulty was that Rousseau
doubted that citizens would consistently will what was generally for the good
of all - that perhaps such collective goods would not exist - outside of
relatively small, undifferentiated political communities of moderate wealth.
On his reading of republicanism, therefore, the original dilemma apparently
persists whereby a society of equal citizens who rule and are ruled in turn
only seems possible in societies that are exclusive in their membership and
constrain the private lives of citizens - a vision that seems both anachro-
nistic and coercive. As Adam Smith (1776) and Benjamin Constant (1819),
two of Rousseau's prominent critics noted, allowing each citizen to pursue
their private interests so far as was compatible with a like pursuit by others
might result in social and economic inequality but it also fostered both the
12
INTRODVCTION
commerce necessary for the wealth of nations and provided greater oppor-
tunities for individuals to exercise their liberty. Yet both retained republican
worries that in a society depleted of civic virtue, the necessary, if minimalist,
state regulation risked being exploited by the rich and powerful for their own
ends, and Smith especially was concerned for the misery of the poor. There-
fore, a central issue was whether a modern commercial republic was possible.
Liberal democratic citizenship: uniting repUblican
and legal citizenship?
The opportunity to create a modern republican state confronted the two
great revolutions that inaugurated the modern democratic era - the American
revolution of 1776 and the French revolution of 1789. Both attempted to
meet this challenge by seeing their constitutional settlements as instances of
an actual contract between citizens. So, the putative authors of the American
constitution are 'We the People of the United States', while the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen declares 'the source of
all sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation'. However, these formulas preserve
a dualism between the 'public' political citizen, who acts as a collective agent
- the 'people' or the 'nation', and the private, 'legal' citizen, who is the subject
of the law and the possessor of 'natural' rights to liberty, property and the
pursuit of happiness. Civic virtue gets assigned to a single constitutional moment
and enshrined in the institutions that popular act creates, leaving selfish
citizens to pursue their personal interests under the law. Meanwhile, a tension
between the two models persisted. As Rousseau had noted, it is doubtful
that even the most well-designed institutions and laws can economize too
much on the virtues of citizens, or that citizens feel they are 'theirs', if - the
founding moment apart - they cannot actively participate in shaping them.
The liberal democratic regimes that emerged during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries struggled with this tension, mixing in their different ways
elements of both the republican or democratic and the liberal or legal forms
of citizenship. Lying midway between a city state and an Empire, the nation
state emerged as their most viable alternative - able to combine certain of
their key advantages while avoiding their disadvantages. If the polis was too
small to survive the military encroachments of Empires, the Empire was
too large to allow for meaningful political participation. The nation state
had sufficient size to sustain both a complex economic infrastructure and an
army, while being not so large to make a credible - if less participatory -
form of democracy impossible. As a result, it became subject to pressures to
create a form of citizenship that could successfully integrate popular and
legal rule by linking political participation and rights with membership of
a national democratic political community.
The sociologists T. H. Marshall (1950) and Stein Rokkan (1974) estab-
lished what has become the standard narrative of the evolution of modern
13
 INTRODUCTION
democratic citizenship. They saw citizenship as the product of the interrelated
processes of state building, the emergence of commercial and industrial
society, and the construction of a national consciousness, with all three driven
forward in various ways by class struggle and war. The net effect of these three
processes was to create a 'people', who were entitled to be treated as equals
before the law possessed equal rights to buy and sell goods, services and
labour; whose mterests were overseen by a sovereign political authority;
and who shared a national identity that shaped their allegiance to each
other and to their state. In a brilliant essay, excerpted as Chapter 4, Marshall
argued there had been three periods in the historical evolution of citizenship
as a given group fought to attain equal status as a full member of the com-
munity. The first period, from the seventeenth to mid nineteenth centuries
saw the consolidation of the civil rights needed to engage in a range of sociai
and econoI?ic activities, from the freedoms to own property and exchange
goods, to of thought and conscience. The second period, from the
end of the eIghteenth century to the start of the twentieth, coincided with
the gaining of pOlitical. rights to vote and stand for election. The third period,
from the end of the nmeteenth to the mid twentieth centuries involved the
creation of social rights that gave citizens 'the right to share 'to the full in
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the
standards prevailing in society'.
Though modelled on Britain, Marshall's account reflects not just the new
liberal democratic consensus behind a welfare state fashioned by
such Bntls? as T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse and W H. Beveridge,
but also smular 111tellectual and political movements elsewhere like the
Solidarists in France and Progressives in the United States (Bell;my 1992,
Kloppenberg 1986). Nevertheless, his argument has attracted considerable
He is said to overlook the role external pressures played in promot-
111g ng.hts (fI:1ann 1987, see Vol. ch. 8), while the three sets of rights neither
arose 111 qUIte the order or penods that he mentions, nor proved quite as
complementary as he assumed. Thus, social rights emerged in most countries
rather after political rights - often being offered by the politically
the hope of damping down demands for political rights.
c1V11 nghts can also clash, as with the right to property (Bellamy,
Castlghone and San toro 2004). However, these corrections to the details
of his argument are compatible with its underlying logic, whereby
the develoPI?ent of from a subordinate group employing
formal and 111formal pobttcal strategies to win concessions from those with
fight to be treated with equal concern and respect.
. Wntmg 111 the 1950s, when the economies of west European countries were
111 the ascendant and welfare spending expanding, it was natural for Marshall
to view social rights as the culmination of the struggle for an ever more
inclusive and egalitarian form of citizenship. Needless to say, subsequent
events have tended to challenge that optimistic conclusion. For a start, many
14
INTROD:U CTlON
aspects of the post-war welfare settlements Marshall celebrated got eroded
during the economic downturn and restructuring of the 1970s,
1990s. Various New Right politicians and theorists argued for the pnvatlza-
of numerous public services on the grounds they would be not only
cheaper and more efficiently run but also more responsive to consumer pres-
sure via a free market than they had been to the democratic pressures of
voters upon politicians and state administrators (Bellamy and Greenaway
1995, see Vol. Ill, ch. 44). They also questioned whether welfare was a right
of citizenship (King and Waldron 1988, see Vol. Ill, ch. 42). Many of the
economic and social assumptions on which this settlement rested have also
been criticized by those seeking to further expand rather than curtail citizen-
ship. Environmentalists have attacked the emphasis on increasing economic
production (Dobson 2003), feminists for the continued overlooking of
subordinate role of women (Lister 2003; 2007, see Vol. Il, ch. 20), multl-
culturalists for the failure to even mention issues of cultural, religious or
ethnic diversity (Kymlicka 2000, see Vol. Il, ch. 29; 1995), cosmopolitans for
the focus on the nation state (Benhabib 2004 and 2005, see Vol. IV, ch. 58)
and so on.
As Volume III indicates, the practices of citizenship have changed to reflect
changes in both the competences of the political community and its member-
ship. Democratic politics within the modern state has been orientated around
the ideological divide between left and right that arose at the time of the
French Revolution. Over the subsequent two centuries, competition between
parties representing the gamut of opinion along this spectrum managed to
capture the range of voter opinion on the key issues of social and political
justice. However, as both the issues and the identities of citizens have become
more diverse, so have the forms of activism that they have adopted. Debates
about the balance between centre-periphery or the environment often cut
across the left-right divide, while both the state and its demos have fragmented
due to the privatization and devolved character of previous public and state
run functions, on the one side, and the increase of local and ethnic identities,
on the other. As a result, political participation has taken on a more focused
and individualized or group-centred character, which is often centred on a
single issue. Civil and legal citizenship, exercised through consumer pressure,
demonstrations and the claiming of rights via the legal system, frequently
displaces political citizenship in the sense of participation in the formal
political process. As the articles in Part 3 note, such civic activities can be
highly effective in placing new topics on the agenda of politics and over-
coming the discrimination of hitherto marginalized groups. Yet, none of
these practices force citizens to engage with all other citizens across the whole
gamut of policy issues and to treat them all with equal concern and respect
through having to construct a programme of government that is sufficiently
attractive to be backed by a majority of the population. As Rousseau feared,
the risk is that when popular sovereignty is both fragmented and no longer
15
 INTRODUCTION
to t'he common good, a majority will no longer reflect the general
wIll ?ut rather the particular wills of those who compose it - it may even be
malllpulated. by a powerful minority. As a result the inequalities of the state
of wIll re-emerge, with the rich deploying state power to maintain
theIr ascendence over the poor.
Beyond citizenship?
In the proliferation of new forms of citizenship _ Green,
femIlllst, multlcultural - reflect the various challenges confronting nation
states at the start of the .twenty-first century. On the one hand, globalization
has the of states to provide citizens with the basic goods
of economIC well-bemg and security from a range of military, health, environ-
mental and other threats. It has also heightened inter-state mobility creating
unprece.dented levels of migration, and intensified the sense of
for the Impacts that states have on each other - particularly of the rich on
the poor. On the other hand, within states the discriminatory character of the
stand.ard criteria for have been criticized not just by feminists,
the dIsabled an? .ethmc mmontIes, but also by minority nations, indigenous
and rehgIOus and cultural minorities seeking various forms of group
nghts and self-government.
The first challenge led to calls for cosmopolitan citizenship. A doctrine
back to the world and associated particularly with the Roman
StOICS, a literally a 'citizen of the world' or kosmopolitai. The
denvatIOn of thIS term suggests that world citizenship implies a world
pohty. few cosmopolitans believe such a concentration of power
would be deSlra?le..Instead, following Kant (1795), they see cosmopolitan
norms as operatmg m .t?e con,text of a federation of free states. They advo-
cate a form of cItIzenshIp governed by international rights norms, as
have developed smce World War n. Yet, theorists differ greatly as to whether
such norms 'thin', enjoining humanitarian assistance to asylum
and aId m the event of natural disasters, the prosecution of crimes
agamst. hUI?anity, such and respecting each state's right to self-
determmatIon but no sIgnificant transfers of resources between states let
.between. individuals across the globe (Miller 2000); or are 'thick',
mvolvmg treatmg all borders as morally arbitrary, justifying a weakening
and even transcendence of national citizenship so that peoples may move
fI:eely and wealth redistributed on a global scale (Nussbaum 1996). These
reveal how even a 'thin' legal cosmopolitan citizenship confronts
the of how such laws are to be framed, implemented and their
accountable without a similarly extensive political power,
raIsmg the repubhcan worry that the empire of cosmopolitan law will be but
a cover for the imperial rule of certain persons.
16
INTRODUCTION
Some advocate a federal scheme of global democracy to meet this difficulty
(Held 1995). However, these proposals fly in the face of the second challenge.
As the European Union - the most developed supranationallegal and pol-
itical system - illustrates, creating a workable public sphere on such a scale
faces formidable problems. Linguistic and cultural diversity mean the Euro-
pean peoples have little sense of forming a demos, while.the size the
mean their votes count for less and provoke complamts that ItS decIsIOn
makers are remote and unaccountable (Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw 2006).
Indeed most of the member states confront increasing claims to devolve power
to and national minorities. Rather than seeing cosmopolitanism as
involving supra- or post-national citizenship and institutions, therefore, it
might be better to see it as a means whereby states offer reciprocal rights of
recognition to each other and their citizens, collaborate to tackle global
problems, and foster the global extension of liberal democratic
rather than making us global citizens. Indeed, in many respects thIS offers
the most appropriate characterization of European citizenship within the EU,
which has cemented democratization in Spain, Portugal, Greece and the former
Soviet bloc, and allowed the free movement of citizens between the member
states (Bellamy 2008b, Kymlicka 2008). In this way, states could remain the
context for our exercising republican and accessing legal citizenship, but allow
us to do so in ways that are compatible with the similar exercise of such
rights by others across the world (Bellamy 2008a, ch. 4).
Conclusion
This introduction has traced the almost dialectical interaction of two modes
of conceiving citizenship: a political conception based on being equally ruled
and rulers in turn, and a legal conception based on being equal under the
law. As we saw, the first conception involves a deeper sense of equality among
citizens, in which they engage in mutual respect and seek to mould institu-
tions all can identify with. However, depth comes to some degree at the
expense of breadth and diversity. The appeal of the second conception lies
in providing a framework for individuals to appeal against exclusion and
discrimination on the basis of certain basic standards of universal justice.
Yet, because the content and interpretation of this legal framework do not
remain under the equal political control of citizens in ways that encourage
them to deploy it to secure their common good, there is no guarantee that
it will be administered equitably and impartially. Indeed, as Rousseau feared,
great inequalities may develop among them. As a result, the pendulum will
swing the other way towards an attempt to redefine the political community
in ways that will allow those subject to its authority to be able once again
to participate equally in framing and implementating the law - or at least in
authorizing and holding to account those responsible for doing so on their
17
 INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The today's large scale, complex and diverse Bellamy, R. (2008b) 'Evaluating union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation
consIsts III thIS goal having become as difficult t h' . wi,thin the EU', Citizenship Studies, 12,597-611.
remams necessary to do so. 0 ac Ieve as It
Bellamy, R., Castiglione, D. and Shaw, 1. (2006) (eds) Making European Citizens:
Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Bellamy, R., Castiglione, D. and Santoro, E. (eds) (2004) Lineages of European Citi-
References zenship: Rights, Belonging and Citizenship in Eleven Nation-States, Basingstoke:
Palgrave.
Primary sources Bellamy, R. and Greenaway, 1. (1995) 'The New Right conception of citizenship and
(P35-323 BC], 1988) The Politics, S. Everson (ed.) Cambridge' Camb 'd the Citizen's Charter', Government and Opposition, 30,469-91.
Ulllverslty Press. , . n ge Benhabib, S. (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents alld Citizens, Cambridge:
Cicero BC], 1:91) .On Duties, M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (eds) C b'd . Cambridge University Press.
Cambndge Ulllverslty Press. ' n ge. Benhabib, S. (2005) 'Borders, boundaries and citizenship', Political Science & Politics
Constant, B..([l819] 1988) 'The liberty of the ancients compared with that of th 38: 4,673-77.
In Political Writings, B. Pontana (ed.) Cambridge' Cambr'd U' e Berlin, I. (1969) FOllr Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slty Press, pp. 308-28. , . 1 ge lllver- Dobson, A. (2003) Citizenship and the Environment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Madison, J. and Jay, 1. ([1787-8], 2003) The Federalist T Ball (ed) Pin1ey, M. (1983) Politics in the Ancient World, Cambridge: Cambridge University
am n ge: Cambridge University Press. ' . ., Press.
Hobbes, T. ([1651] 1991) Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.) Cambridge' Cambr'd U' . Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cos-
Press. ' . 1 ge lllverslty mopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press.
T. ([1642] 1998) On the Citizen, R. Tuck (ed.) Cambridge' C b'd U' King, D. and Waldron, 1. (1988) 'Citizenship, social citizenship and the defence of
versJty Press. ' . am n ge lll- welfare provision', British Journal of Political Science 18,415-43.
I795
I. '([C ] peace', in Political Writings, H. Reiss (ed.) Cam- Kloppenberg, 1. T. (1986) Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in
n ge. ambndge Ulllverslty Press, pp. 93-130. ' European and American Thought 1870-1920, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke, 1.. ([1690] Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed) C b'd . Kymlicka, W (1995) Multicultura/ Citizenship, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cambndge Umverslty Press. ., am n ge. Kymlicka, Wand Norman, W (2000) 'Citizenship in culturally diverse societies: issues,
Machiavelli, N. ([1531] 1970) The Discourses B Crick (ed) Harmo d th P . contexts, concepts', in W Kymlicka and W Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse
M hilT H (1950) '" ' . ., n swor : en gum Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-41.
a.rs a, " Citizens/up and Social Class Cambridge' C b'd U' .
sJty Press. , . am n ge lllver- Kymlicka, W (2008) 'Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan justice', in S. Benhabib,
S. ([16?3] 1:91) On the Duty of Man and Citizen, J. Tully (ed.) C b'd . Another Cosmopolitan ism, R. Post (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 128-44.
Cambndge Ulllverslty Press. ' am n ge. Lister, R. (2003) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Rokkan, S. (1974) 'Dimensions of state formation and nation building' i C T'II Lister, R. (2007) 'Inclusive citizenship: realising the potential', Citizenship Studies
(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Eu P . ,n .. I Y 11(1): 46-61.
ton University Press, pp. 562-600. rope, nnceton, NJ: Pnnce- Mann, M. (1987) 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship', Sociology, 21, 339-54.
1. J. ([1762] 1968) The Social Contract, M. Cranston (ed) H d . Mason, A. (2011) 'Citizenship and justice', Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 10(3):
PenguIn. ., armon sworth. 263-81.
Rousseau, 1. 1. ([.1755] 1985) A Discourse on Inequality, M. Cranston (ed) H d Miller, D. (2000) Citizenship and Natiol1alIdentity, Cambridge: Polity Press.
worth: PenguIn. ., armon s- Nussbaum, M. (1996) 'Patriotism and cosmopolitanism', in 1. Cohen (ed.), For Love
A. ([1776] 1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of of Country, Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 3-17.
R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W B. Todd (eds) Oxfo d' 0 !' d Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford: Claren-
Ulllverslty Press. ' r. XI or don Press.
Pocock, J. G. A. (1992) 'The ideal of citizenship since classical times', in R. Beiner
(ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, SUNY Press, 1995, pp. 29-52.
Secolldary sources Skinner, Q. (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walzer, M. (1989) 'Citizenship', in T. Ball, 1. Parr and R. L. Hanson, Political Innov-
Bellamy, R. (1992) Liberalism and Modern SOciety Cambridge' n I't P
Bellamy R (2008 ) C' . I' , . rO I y ress. ation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 211-19.
,. a ltlzens liP: A Very Short Introduction Oxford' 0 !' d U' .
, Press. ' . xIor lllverslty

18 19
,I

Part 1

CLASSIC THEORIES
 1
EXTRACTS FROM THE POLITICS

Aristotle

Source: S. Everson (ed.), The Politics, Bk 1II Chs. 4 and 5, Bk VII Ch. 7, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ([335-323 BC] 1988).

4 • There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the excellence of

a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But before entering on this
discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the excellence
of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now,
sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot,
and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and
while the precise definition of each individual's excellence applies exclusively
to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them
all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation.
Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the commu-
nity is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution;
the excellence of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution
of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it
is evident that there is not one single excellence of the good citizen which is
perfect excellence. But we say that the good man is he who has one single
excellence which is perfect excellence. Hence it is evident that the good citizen
need not of necessity possess the excellence which makes a good man.
The same question may also be approached by another road, from a con-
sideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed
of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well,
and must therefore have excellence, still, inasmuch as all the citizens cannot
be alike, the excellence of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide.
All must have the excellence of the good citizen - thus, and thus only, can
the state be perfect; but they will not have the excellence of a good man,
unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good.
Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living
being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and
body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of

23
-------------------- IS CITIZENSHIP?
EXTRACTS FROM THE POLITICS

husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these as well
as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders
as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and therefore the excel-
of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under
lence of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the
the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had the command of a
excellence t?e leader of chorus is the same as that of the performer who
regiment and of a company. It has been well said that he who has never
stands by hIS SIde. I have saId enough to show why the two kinds of excellence
cannot be absolutely the same. . learned to obey cannot be a good commander. The excellence of the two is
not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should
But will there then be no case in which the excellence of the good citizen
know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman - these
and the excellence of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the
are the excellences of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of
good ruler is a good and wise man, but the citizen need not be wise. And
a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the excellence of a good man
persons say that eve.n the educa.tion of the ruler should be of a special
will include both; for the excellence of the good man who is free and also
kmd, for are not the chtldren of kmgs instructed in riding and military
exercises? As Euripides says: a subject, e.g. his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds,
the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temper-
ance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a
No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires. I
coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman
would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her con-
As though there were a special education needed for a ruler. If the excellence
versation than the good man; and indeed their part in the management
of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we assume further
of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of
the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the excellence of the good
the other to preserve. Practical wisdom is the only excellence peculiar to the
CItIzen and the excellence of the good man cannot be absolutely the same
ruler: it would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler
although in some cases they may; for the excellence of a ruler differs
and subject. The excellence of the subject is certainly not wisdom, bu.t onl.y
that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made Jason
true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, whtle hIS
say that 'he. when was not a tyrant', meaning that he could not
master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.
endure to Itve m a pnvate statIOn. But, on the other hand, it may be argued
From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question,
tha.t are for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and
whether the excellence of the good man is the same as that of the good
he IS saId to be a CItIzen of excellence who is able to do both well. Now if we
citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.
suppose the excellence of a good man to be that which rules and the excel-
lence of the citizen to and obeying, it cannot said that they
5 • There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a true
are equally worthy of praIse. Smce, then, it is sometimes thought that the
citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they
ruler. the ruled must learn different things and not the same, but that
who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this
CItIzen must know and share in them both, the inference is obvious. There
excellence; for this man is a citizen. And if none of the lower class are
IS, mdeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices _ the
citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not
master ne.ed not know how to perform these, but may employ others in
resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. May we not reply, that as far
the executIOn of them: the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean
this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than m
the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in character and
excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It
are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicrafts-
must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are
men, who, as their name signifies, live by the labour of their hands _ under
necessary to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizens
the is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some
equally with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not
nat.IOns, the workmg. classes had no share in the government _ a privilege
being grown up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. In ancient times,
WhICh they only acqUIred under extreme democracy. Certainly the good man
and among some nations, the artisan class lVere slaves or foreigners, and
.the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of
therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not
except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practise them
admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of
there WIll cease to be a distinction between master and slave. '
the excellence of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, nor to every free
But there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and
man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services. The
equals by birth - a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying,
necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals,

24
25
__ IL.JClp4i3nlr I
or who are the servants of the community. These
reflections carned a httle further will explain their position; and indeed what
has .been said already is of itself, when understood, explanation enough.
Smce there are many forms of government there must be many varieties
I
I of citizens, and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some
I governments the mechanic and the labourer will be citizens but not in
.1 others, as, for. example, i? so-called aristocracies, if there are ;ny, in which
,
I I honours are gIven accordmg to excellence and merit; for no man can practise
who is life of a mechanic or labourer. In oligarchies the
qualIficatIOn for office IS hIgh, and therefore no labourer can ever be a citizen'
but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes
was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from business
fo: ten But in many states the law goes to the length of admitting
alIens;. :or 111 some a is a citizen though his mother only
be a cItizen; and a sImIlar pnnclple IS applied to illegitimate children among
many. Nevertheless they make such people citizens because of the dearth of
legitimate (for they introduce this sort of legislation owing to lack
of populatIOn); so when the number of citizens increases, first the children of
a. I?ale or a female are excluded; then those whose mothers only are
cItizens; and at last the nght of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers
and mothers are both citizens.
Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens' and he is a
citizen !n the sense w?o shares in the honours of the s;ate. Compare
Homer s words lIke some dIshonoured stranger';2 he who is excluded from
the honours of the state is no better than an alien. But when this exclusion
is concealed, then its object is to deceive their fellow inhabitants.
As to the question whether the excellence of the good man is the same as
that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in
some states the good man and the good citizen are the same and in others
different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man,
the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunc-
tion wIth others, the conduct of public affairs.
6 • Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether
there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are,
and how many, and what are the differences between them.
A con.stitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially
of the hIghest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state
and the constitution is in fact the government. ' I Fragment from the lost play, Aeo/us.
7 • Having spoken .of the number of citizens, we will proceed to speak of
what should be theIr character. This is a subject which can be easily under-
stood by anyone who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Greece
and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. Those
26
EXIRACtS FROM 1HE POL111CS
live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intel-
ligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but .have
no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas
the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit,
and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the
Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in
character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free,
and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one
state, would be able to rule the world. There are also similar differences in
the different tribes of Greece; for some of them are of a one-sided nature,
and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a happy com-
bination of both qualities. And clearly those whom the legislator will most
easily lead to excellence may be expected to be both intelligent and coura-
geous. Some say that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom
they know, fierce towards those whom they do not know. Now, passion is
the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love; not-
ably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances
than against who. are unknown t.o us, when we. t?ink w,e are
despised by them; for whICh reason Archllochus, compla111111g of hIS fnends,
very naturally addresses his spirit in these words, 'For surely thou art plagued
on account of friends.'
The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based
upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. Nor is it right
to say that the guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do not
know, for we ought not to be out of temper with anyone; and a lofty spirit
is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers. And this,
as I was saying before, is a feeling which men show most strongly towards
their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands: as indeed
is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be deprived of a
benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the saying, 'Cruel is the strife of
brethren', and again, 'They who love in excess also hate in excess'.
Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens
of our state, and also the size and nature of their territory. I say 'nearly', for
we ought not to require the same accuracy in theory as in the facts given by
perception.
Notes
2 Iliad, IX 648.
27
 CITOYEN

fuero regionem; solemnitates perpetuas observabo; receptis consuetudinibus

2 parebo, & quaseumque adhuc popu/us prudenter statuer;t, amp/ectar; & si quis
leges receptas sustulerit, nisi comprobaverit, non permittam; tuebor denique,
solus & cum reliquis omnibus, atque patria saera co/am. DU Cognitores, Agrauli,
EXTRACTS FROM Enyalius, Mars, Jupiter, Floreo, augesco duci. Plut., In Peric 3• Voila un pru-
ENCYCLOPEDIE OU DICTIONNAIRE denter, qui abandonnant a chaque particulier le jugement des lois nouvelIes,
etait capable de causer bien des troubles. Du reste, ce serment est tres beau
RAISONNE DES SCIENCES, DES & tres sage.
On devenait cependant eitoyen d' Athenes par l'adoption d'un citoyen, &
ARTS ET DES METIERS par le consentement du peuple: mais cette faveur n'6tait pas commune. Si
I'on n'etait pas cense citoyen avant vingt ans, on etait cense ne l'etre plus
lorsque le grand age empechait de vaquer aux fonctions publiques. Il en etait
Source: "Citoyen", 1753, Tome 3, D: Diderot, D'Alembert, 1. Le Rond (eds), Paris: Briasson de meme des exiles & des bannis, a moins que ce ne rut par l'ostracisme.
[et all. 463-67.
Ceux qui avaient subi ce jugement, n'etaient qu'eloignes.
Pour constituer un veritable citoyen romain, iI falIait trois choses; avoir
son domicile dans Rome, etre membre d'une des trente-cinq tribus, & pouvoir
parvenir aux dignites de la Republique. Ceux qui n'avaient que par conces-
sion & non par naissance quelques-uns des droits du citoyen, n'etaient, a
m. (Hist ..ane., mod., Droit publ.). C'est celui qui est membre proprement parler, que des honoraires. V. CITE, JURISPRUDENCE.
dune societe hbre de plusleurs familIes, qui partage les droits de cette societe Lorsqu'on dit qu'il se trouva plus de quatre millions de citoyens romains
& ses franchises!. Voy. SOCIETE, CITE, VILLE FRANCHE, FRANCmSES: dans le denombrement qu'Auguste en fit faire, il y a apparence qu'on y
reside dans .une pareilIe societe pour quelque affaire, & qui doit comprend & ceux qui residaient actuellement dans Rome, & ceux qui rep an-
s en elOlgner, son affalre terminee, n'est point eitoyen de cette societe' c'en dus dans l'Empire, n'etaient que des honoraires.
est. seulement un sujet momentane. Celui qui y fait son sejour habituel ' mais II y avait une grande difference entre un citoyen & un domicilie. Selon la
qUl a & fran;hises, n'en est pas non plus un loi de ineolis, la seule naissance faisait des citoyens, & donnait tous les priv-
CelUl qUi en. a ete depoUllIe, a cesse de l'etre. On n'accorde ce titre aux ileges de la bourgeoisie. Ces privileges ne s'acqueraient point par le temps
fem?Ies, aux enfants, aux serviteurs, que comme a des membres de la du sejour. Il n'y avait sous les consuls que la faveur de l'Etat, & sous les
fal111lIe d'un proprement dit; mais ils ne sont pas vraiment eitoyens. empereurs que leur volonte qui put suppleer en ce cas au defaut d'origine.
On peut dlstmguer deux sortes de citoyens, les originaires & les naturalises C'etait le premier privilege d'un citoyen romain, de ne pouvoir etre juge
9
,sont ceux ui sont Les naturalises, ce sont ceu; que par le peuple. La loi Portia defendait de mettre a mort un citoyen. Dans
a societe. a accorde la partiCipatIOn a ses droits & a ses franchises, les provinces memes, iI n'etait point soumis au pouvoir arbitraire d'un pro-
quolqu tls ne sOlent pas nes dans son sein. consul ou d'un propreteur. Le eMs sum arretait sur-le-champ ces tyrans
. ont tres a accorder la qualite de citoyens de leur subalternes. A Rome, dit M. de Montesquieu, dans son livre de I'Esprit des
vtlle a. des etr.angers; 1Is ont mls en cela beaucoup plus de dignite que les lois, !iv. XI, ehapitre xjx, ainsi qu'a Lacedemone, la liberte pour les eitoyens
Ro.mams: l,e titre de citoyen ne s'est jamais avili parmi eux; mais i1s n'ont & la servitude pour les esclaves, etaient extremes. Cependant malgre les
retire. de la qu'on en avait conyue, l'avantage le plus privileges, la puissance, & la grandeur de ces citoyens, qui faisaient dire a
de s de tous ceux qui l'ambitionnaient. II n'y Ciceron (Or. pro M. Fonteio) an qui amplissimus Gal/ice cum infimo cive 1'0-
avalt guere a de que ceux qui etaient nes de parents eitoy- mano comparandus est?4 iI me semble que le gouvernement de cette republique
Quand homme e:a!t a l'age de vingt ans, onl'enregistrait etait si compose, qu'on prendrait a Rome une idee moins precise du citoyen,
SUI le ypalllla'tEtov ; I Etat le comptait au nombre de ses mem- que dans le canton de Zurich. Pour s'en convaincre, il ne s'agit que de peser
bres. On lui faisait prononcer dans cette ceremonie d'adoption le serment avec attention ce que nous alIons dire dans le reste de cet article.
a .la face. du ciel. Arma non dehonestabo; nee adstantem, 'quisqUis ille Hobbes ne met aucune difference entre le sujet & le eitoyen; ce qui est vrai,
fuen.t, soelum relmquam; pugnabo quoque pro focis & aris, solus & cum mullis; en prenant le terme de sujet dans son acception stricte, & celui de citoyen
patnam nec turbabo, nec prodam; navigabo contra quam cum que destinatus dans son acception la plus etendue; & en considerant que celui-ci est par

28 29
 JP? CJTO,YEN

rapport aux lois seu\es, ce que I'autre est par rapport it un souverain. Ils sont
fermes, des fermiers, &c. il faut, pour ainsi dire, distinguer en lui le souverain
egalement mais l'un par un etre moral, & l'autre par une per-
& le sujet de la souverainete. Il est dans ces occasions juge & partie; C'est
s?nne physIque. Le nom de citoyen ne convient ni it ceux qui vivent subjugues, un inconvenient sans doute; mais il est de tout gouvernement en general,
m it ceux qui vivent isoles; d'oll il s'ensuit que ceux qui vivent absolument
& ii ne prouve pour ou contre, que par sa rarete ou par sa frequence, &
dans l'etat de nature, comme les souverains, & ceux qui ont parfaitement
non par lui-meme. Il est certain que les sujets seront d'autant
renonce it cet etat comme les escIaves, ne peuvent point etre regardes comme
moins exposes aux injustices, que l'etre souveram physIque ou moral sera
citoyens; a moins qu'on ne pretende qu'il n'y a point de societe raisonnable
plus rarement juge & partie, dans les occasions 011 il sera attaque comme
011 il ait un etre moral, immuable, & au-dessus de la personne physique
particulier. . .
soUVeraI?e. Puffendorff,. egard a cette exception, a divise son ouvrage
Dans les temps de troubles, le citoyen s'attachera au partI qUl est pour le
des devOlrs en deux partIes, 1 une des devoirs de I'homme, I'autre des devoirs
du citoyen. systeme etabli; dans les dissolutions de systemes, il suivra le parti cite,
s'il est unanime; & s'il y a division dans la cite, il embrassera celUl qUl sera
Comme.les lois des societes libres de familIes ne sont pas les memespartout,
pour I'egalite des membres & la , .
& comme 11 y a dans la plupart de ces societes un ordre hierarchique constitue
Plus les citoyens approcheront de I egahte de pretentIOns & de fortune,
par les dignites, le citoyen peut encore etre considere & relativement aux lois
plus l'Etat sera tranquille: cet avantage para!t etre de la democratie pure,
de sa societe, & relativement au rang qu'il occupe dans l'ordre hierarchique.
excIusivement a tout autre gouvernement; mais dans la democratie meme
Dans le second cas, il y aura quelque difference entre le citoyen magistrat &
la plus parfaite, l'entiere egalite entre les membres est une chose
le citoyen bourgeois; & dans le premier, entre le citoyen d' Amsterdam & celui
de Bale. & c'est peut-etre la le principe de dissolution de ce gouvernement, a moms
qu'on n'y remedie par toutes les injustices de l'ostracisme. Il en est d'u.n
Aristote, en admettant les distinctions de societes civiles & d'ordre de
gouvernement en general, ainsi que de la vie animale; ,chaque pas VIe
citoyens. dans ne reconnait cependant de vrais citoyens que
est un pas vel's la mort. Le meilleur gouvernement n est pas qUI est
ceux qUl ont part a la JudIcature, & qui peuvent se promettre de passer de
immortel, mais celui qui dure le plus longtemps & le plus tranqUlllement.
de aux premiers grades de la magistrature; ce qui ne
conVIent qu aux democratIes pures. Il faut convenir qu'iJ n'y a guere que celui
qui jouit de ces prerogatives, qui soit vraiment homme public; & qu'on n'a Notes
aucun caractere distinctif du sujet & du citoyen, sin on que ce dernier doit Le point de depart de cet article est Pufendorf, Droit de la nature et des gens, VII,
etre homme public, & que le role du premier ne peut jamais etre que celui 11,20.
de particulier, de qUidam. 2 « Le registre des citoyens ». ., .
Puffendorf, en restreignant le nom de citoyen a ceux qui par une reunion 3 Ce passage n'est pas tire des Vies paralletes de Piutarque, mals de i
de Juiius Pollux (voir la version iatine dans l'edition procuree J. H. Lederlm
premiere de familIes ont fonde l'Etat, & a leurs successeurs de pere en fils
et T. Hemsterduis, Amsterdam, 1706, 2 vol., t. ll, p. 925-926 - hvre VIII, § 105);
.une distinction frivole qui repand peu de jour dans son ouvrage, &, « Je ne deshonorerai pas mes armes, et je n'abandonnerai pas mon camarade a
qUI peut Jeter beaucoup de trouble dans une societe civile, en distinguant les mes cotes, quel qu'il soit; je combattrai aussi pour nos et ?OS autels, o.u
citoyens originaires des naturalises, par une idee de noblesse mal entendue. avec beaucoup; je ne mettrai pas .le des.ordre la patne; m ne la J,e
Les citoyens en qualite de citoyens, c'est-it-dire dans leurs societes sont tous naviguerai a toutes les regions ou Je sera I envoye; solenmtes perpe-
tueIles; je me soumettrai aux coutumes et J embrasseral toutes que
egalement nobles; la noblesse se tirant non des ancetres, mais du droit com-
jusqu'ici le peuple aura sagemenf ordonpees; et si quelq.u'un 10ls rer;ue.s
mun aux premieres dignites de la magistrature. ou ne les reconnait pas,je ne le permettral pas; finalementJe
moral etant par rapport au citoyen ce que la personne seul et avec tous les autres, les rites de nos ancetres. Je prends a temom les dleux,
physIque despotIque est par rapport au sujet, & l'esclave le plus parfait ne Agraulus, Enyalius, Mars, Jupiter, Prosperite, Multiplication, ».
son, etre it son it plus forte raison le citoyen 4 «Peut-on comparer, je ne dis pas aux premiers personnages de notre cIte, mats au
dernier des citoyens romains, l'homme le plus considerable de la Gaule? »
a-tot! des drOlts qu tl se reserve, & dont lIne se depart jamais. Il y a des occa-
sio?s 011 il, trouve sur .Ia meme ligne, je ne dis pas avec ses concitoyens,
maIS avec I etre moral qUl leur commande a tous. Cet etre a deux caracteres
I'un particulier, & l'autre public: celui-ci ne doit point trouver de resistance:
l'autre peut en eprouver de la part des particuliers, & succomber meme
la contestation. Puisque cet etre moral a des domaines, des engagements, des

30 31
 3
r ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN

of such weakness, the fact that we now enjoy innumerable good things, the
fact that we have cultivated our minds and bodies for our own and others'
benefit - all this is the result of help from others. In this sense the natural
state is opposed to life improved by human industry.
EXTRACTS FROM 5. From the third point of view, we consider the natural state of man in
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN terms of the relationship which men are understood to have with each other
on the basis of the simple common kinship which results from similarity of
ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW nature and is antecedent to any agreement or human action by which par-
ticular obligations of one to another have arisen. In this sense men are
said to live in a natural state with each other when they have no common
Samuel van Pufendarf master, when no one is subject to another and when they have no experience
either of benefit or of injury from each other. In this sense the natural state
is opposed to the civil state.
Source: lames Tully (ed.), chapters 1,5 6 7 9 11 12 13 14 15 and 18' a I D .f'
6. The character of the natural state, furthermore, may be considered either
.. . ' , " , , " In n t,le uty oJ
Man and CII/zen Accordmg to Natural Law, Bk 2, Cambridge University Press ([1682], 1991). as it is represented by fiction or as it is in reality. It would be a fiction if we
supposed that in the beginning there existed a multitude of men without any
dependence on each other, as in the myth of the brothers of Cadmus, I or if
we imagined that the whole human race was so widely scattered that every
man governed himself separately, and the only bond between them was like-
On men's natural state ness of nature. But the natural state which actually exists shows each man
joined with a number of other men in a particular association, though hav-
1. We must inquire the duties which fall to man to perform as a ing nothing in common with all the rest except the quality of being human
of the states m which we find him existing in social life. By and having no duty to them on any other ground. This is the condition
state [status] m general, we mean a condition in which men are understood
[status] that now exists between different states [civitas] and between citizens
:01'
to be set the of performing a certain class of actions. Each state
also has Its own dlstmctIve laws [jura]. of different countries [respublica] , and which formerly obtained between
heads of separate families.
Men:s state is either natural. or adventitious. Natural state may be considered, 7. Indeed it is obvious that the whole human race was never at one and the
the lIght of reason alone, m three ways: in relation to God the Creator or same time in the natural state. The children of our first parents, from whom
m the re.lation of each individual man to himself; or in relation to other the Holy Scriptures teach that all mortal men take their origin, were subject
3. the first point of view, the natural state of man is the to the same paternal authority [patria potestas]. Nevertheless, the natural
cOndItIon. m WhICh was placed by his Creator with the intention that he state emerged among certain men later. For the earliest men sought to fill
be an ammal .excellIng It follows from this state that man the empty world and to find more ample living space for themselves and
recogmze and worshIp hIS Creator, admire His works, and lead his their cattle, and so left the paternal home scattering in different directions;
m a manner utterly different from that of the animals. Hence this state and individual males established their own families. Their descendants dis-
IS m complete contrast with the life and condition of the animals.
persed in the same way, and the special bond of kinship, and the affection
4. sec.ond point of view, we may consider the natural state of man, that goes with it, gradually withered away leaving only that common element
by an ImagmatIve effort, as the condition man would have been in if he had that results from similarity of nature. The human race then multiplied
been to himself alone, without any support from other men, given the remarkably; men recognized the disadvantages of life apart; and gradually,
condItIon of nature as we now perceive it. It would have been, it those who lived close to each other drew together, at first in small states
seems, more mIserable than that of any beast, if we reflect on the great weak- [civitates], then in larger states as the smaller coalesced, freely or by force.
?f man as he comes into this world, when he would straight away Among these states the natural state [status] still certainly exists; their only
dIe wIthout help from others, and on the primitive life he would lead if he bond is their common humanity.
had no other resources than he owes to his own strength and intel!,
o 't
. ne may put 1 more strongly: the fact that we have been able to grow out
Igence. 8. The principal law of those who live in the natural state is to be subject
only to God and answerable to none but Him. In that respect this state has

32 33

the. of liberty. By natural liberty every man is understood to
be m hIS own rIght and power and not subject to anyone's authority without
a preceding human act. This is also the reason why every man is held to be
to every other, where there is no relationship of subjection.
men. light of reason implanted in them to govern
theIr actions by Its IllummatlOn, It follows that someone living in natural liberty
does not o? else to rule his actions, but has the authority to
do anyt?mg IS c.onslstent with sound reason by his own jUdgement
at And owing to the inclination which a man shares
all hvmg he must infallibly and by all means strive to preserve
hIS body and hfe and to repel all that threatens to destroy them, and take
necessary to that end; and since in the natural state no one has a
supeI:lOr to whom he has subjected his will and judgement, decides
for hImself whether the measures are apt to conduce to self-preservation or
not. For no matter how attentively he listens to the advice of others it is still
up to him whether he will take it or not. It is, however, essentiai that he
conduct his government of himself, if it is to go well, by the dictates of right
reason and natural law.
9. state of nature attractive in promising liberty
and from all But m fact before men submit to living in
It IS With a multitude of disadvantages, whether we imagine
mdlvlduals eXlstmg m that state or consider the condition of separate heads
of For you picture to yourself a person (even an adult) left
thiS worl? Without any of the aids and conveniences by which human
has reheved and enriched our lives, you will see a naked dumb
amma.l, seeking to satisfy his hunger with roots and grasses
hiS thirst With whatever water he can find, to shelter himself from the
mclemencies of the weather in caves, at the mercy of wild beasts, fearful of
every encounter. Those who were members of scattered families may
have mO.re developed way of life but in no way com-
With CivIl .lIfe; and. th.ls not so much because of poverty, which the
famIly deSires are seems capable of relieving, as because it
can do lIttle to ensure securIty. To put the matter in a few words in the state
of nature each is protected only by his own strength; in the by the
all
nastmess,
be. IS the 0:
strength of all. T?ere no .one may be sure of the fruit of his industry; here
the passions, there there is war, fear, poverty,
barbanty: Ignorance, savagery; here is the reign of rea"
son, here there IS peace, secunty, wealth, society, taste, knowledge,
benevolence.
10. In the state, if one ?oes not do for another what is due by agree-
ment, or does him or If a dispute arises in other ways, there is no
one who can by authonty compel the offender to perform his part of the
agree.ment or make restitution, as is possible in states, where one may implore
the aid of a common judge. But as nature does not allow one to plunge into
34
ON THE D[jTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
war on the slightest provocation, even when one is fully convinced of the
justice of his cause, an attempt must first be made to settle the. matter by
gentler means, namely, by friendly discussion between the partIes. a.nd an
absolute (not conditional) mutual promise or by appeal to the declSlon of
arbitrators.
Such arbitrators must be fair to both sides and not show prejudice or
favour in giving their verdict; they must look only at the merits of the case.
For the same reason a man is not appointed as arbitrator in a case in which
he has greater expectation of benefit or glory from the victory of one of the
parties than from the other, and so has an interest in one party winning
the case no matter how. So there must be no agreement or promise between the
arbitrator and the parties, to oblige him to pronounce in favour of one rather
than the other.
If the arbitrator cannot ascertain the state of the facts either from the
common admissions of the parties or on the basis of reliable documents or
of arguments and evidence that admit no doubt, the facts will have to be
ascertained from statements by witnesses. Natural law, and in many cases
the sanctity of an oath, constrain witnesses to tell the truth; but it would be
safest not to accept as witnesses those who have such feelings about either
of the parties that their conscience must struggle so to speak with friendship,
hatred, vindictiveness or some other strong emotional impulse, or even with
some more intimate bond; not everybody has sufficient firmness to overcome
these feelings. Sometimes litigation may be avoided by the mediation of
mutual friends, which is rightly considered to be among the most sacred
duties. But in the natural state, the individual is responsible for execution of
the judgement, when one party will not voluntarily render what is due.
11. Nature herself has willed that there should be a kind of kinship among
men, by force of which it is wrong to harm another man and indeed right
for everyone to work for the benefit of others. However, kinship usually has
a rather weak force among those who live in natural liberty with each other.
Consequently, we have to regard any man who is not our fellow-citizen, or
with whom we live in a state of nature, not indeed as our enemy, but as a
friend we cannot wholly rely on. The reason is that men not only can do each
other very great harm, but do very often wish to do so for various reasons.
Some are driven to injure others by their wickedness of character, or by lust
for power and superfluous wealth. Others, though men of moderation, take
up arms to preserve themselves and not to be forestalled by others. Many
find themselves in conflict because they are competing for the same object,
others through rivalry of talents. Hence in the natural state there is a lively
and all but perpetual play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to subvert the
strength of others, and desire to get ahead of them or to augment one's own
strength by their ruin. Therefore as a good man should be content with his
own and not trouble others or covet their goods, so a cautious man who
loves his own security will believe all men his friends but liable at any time
35
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
to become enemies; he keep peace with all, knowing that it may soon
be for war. ThIS IS the reason why that country is considered happy
WhICh even In peace contemplates war.
On the impulsive cause of constituting the state
I. There seems to be hardly any amenity or advantage that cannot be secured
by the duties and conditions [status] we have so far discussed. Nevertheless
we must now investigate why men have not been content with those first
small associations [societas], but have constituted large associations which
go ?y the of .states [civitas]. For this is the basis from which we must
denve the JustIficatIOn of the duties which go with men's civil state [st t
Cl.VI'/']
IS • . a us
2: is not enough to say here that man is drawn to civil society [societas
by hersel:' so that he cannot and will not live without it. For
man IS ObvIOusly an alllmal that loves himself and his own advantage in the
It is un?oubtedly therefore necessary that in freely aspiring
to cI.vlI socIety he .has hIS eye on some advantage coming to himself from it.
man was likely to be the most miserable of animals without associa-
tton [societas] with his fellows; yet his natural desires and needs could have
?een abundantly met by the earliest societies and by duties based on human-
Ity We cannot therefore infer directly from man's sociality
that hIS nature te?ds precisely to civil society.
3. ThIS wIll become clearer If we consider: (1) the human condition which
results from the constitution of states; (2) the requirements for a man to be
truly said to be a political animal, i.e., a good citizen; and finally, (3) the
features of human nature which are repugnant to the character of
CIVil socIety.
4: (1) In becoming citizen, a man loses his natural liberty and subjects
?Imself to an authonty whose powers include the right of life and death. At
ItS command he must do much he would otherwise avoid; and he must not
d? that he would otherwise powerfully desire to do. Again, in most of
hIS must take into account the good of society, which often seems
to conflIct wIth good of individuals. Yet he has a congenital tendency to
want to be to no one, to act at his own discretion, and to set his
course for hIS own advantage in everything.
5. (2) By a truly political animal, i.e., a good citizen, we mean one who
promptly obeys the orders of those in power; one who strives with all his
strengt.h for the good, and gladly puts his own private good second
- one, In who believes to. be good for him unless it is also good
for the state, one, finally, who IS well dIsposed to his fellow-citizens. But there
are few whose are spontaneously attuned to this end. Most people
are barely restramed by fear of punishment. Many remain bad citizens
. throughout their lives and not political animals.
36
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
6. (3) No animal is fiercer than man, none more savage and prone to more
vices disruptive of the peace of society. For besides the desires for food and
sex to which the beasts also are subject, man is driven by many vices unknown
to them, such as, an insatiable craving for more than he needs, ambition (the
most terrible of evils), too-lively remembrance of wrongs, and a burning
desire for revenge which constantly grows in force over time; the infinite
variety of his inclinations and appetites, and stubbornness in pressing his
own causes. And man has such a furious pleasure in savaging his own kind
that the greatest part of the evils to which the human condition is subject
derives from man himself.
7. Therefore the true and principal cause why heads of households abandoned
their natural liberty and had recourse to the constitution of states was to
build protection around themselves against the evils that threaten man from
man. For just as, after God, man may do more good for his fellow-man than
anything else, so he may do most harm. And they judge rightly of the evil
of men, and the remedy of that evil, who formulated the saying: 'Without
courts of law, men would devour each other.'
But after men had been brought into order by means of states, and so
could be safe from injuries from each other, the natural consequence followed
of a richer enjoyment of the benefits which tend to come to man from his
fellows; for example, the advantage that they are steeped from their earliest
years in more suitable habits of behaviour and discover and develop the
various skills by which human life has been improved and enriched.
8. The cause of the constitution of states will become still clearer if we reflect
that no other means would have been adequate to restrain the evil in man.
Admittedly, natural law teaches that men should refrain from all infliction
of injuries. But respect for that law cannot guarantee a life in natural liberty
with fair security. There may indeed be men of such good character that they
would not want to wrong others even with a guarantee of impunity; others
too who would somehow repress their desires through fear of consequent
evil. However, there are also a great many men to whom laws mean nothing
in the face of an expectation of profit, and who have confidence in their own
strength or cunning to repel or elude their victims' vengeance. Everyone who
loves his own security seeks to take precautions against such men, and the
most appropriate way of taking precautions is by means of states. It is not
enough that some persons should have given each other a pledge of mutual
assistance; unless there is something which unites their judgements and firmly
binds their wills to keep their pledge, it is vain for them to expect sure help
from each other.
9. Finally, though natural law gives adequate warning that those who wrong
others will not go unpunished, yet neither the fear of God nor the sting of
conscience are found to have sufficient force to restrain the evil that is in
men. For there are many who, by fault of their upbringing and manner of
life, are inattentive to the force of reason. They pay attention only to the
37
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
present with' little care for the future; and are only moved by what is before
their eyes.
J?ivine tends to proceed at a slow pace; and this gives oppor-
tUl11ty to the wicked among mankind to ascribe the sufferings of the impious
to other. causes, as they often s,ee them abundantly provided with
those thmgs by which the vulgar measure happiness. There is also the fact
that the stings of conscience which precede a crime do not seem to be as
strong as those which fo!low it, when what has been done no longer can be
undone. Truly the effectIve remedy for suppressing evil desires, the remedy
perfectly fitted to the nature of man, is found in states.
On the internal structure of states
I. We have next to inquire into the means by which states have been instituted
and ar.e .their bonds of cohesion. In the first place it is clear
that the mdlvldual finds m other men a more useful and effective defence
against the evils that human depravity threatens to inflict on him than in
weapons or dumb animals; and since a man's power is of lim-
Ited extent, It was necessary for him to combine with other men to achieve
that end.
2. It equally t.hat a combination of two or three cannot provide
that of secunty agamst other men. For it is easy for enough persons to
to overco.me these few as would give them full assurance of victory;
and their expectatIon of success and impunity would also give the conspira-
tors the to make the attempt. It is therefore necessary to this end,
there be a Ul110n of an overwhelming number of men so that the acces-
sIOn of a few to the enemy would not tip the scales towards victory for the
latter.
3. Among these many individuals who come together for this purpose, there
has to be a consensus on adopting means likely to achieve it. If they do
not among themselves, but are distracted in their opinions and tend
to ends, they will achieve nothing, no matter how many they are.
there .may be a temporary agreement under the impUlse of a
but they wIll soon go their separate ways, men's minds and inclina-
tIons bemg as changeable as they are. Though they may promise on the basis
of agreement that each will bring his individual strength to the common
yet even this method will not provide a guarantee that the group
Will last. those who have once consented to peace and mutual help
for the common good must be prohibited from dissenting thereafter whenever
their own private good seems to be in conflict with the public
4. ,!here are two principal faults in human nature which prevent a number
of mdependent [sui juris] men who are not subordinate to one another from
cooperati?n in a common end. One is the diversity of
.mc!tnatlOns and Judgements m deciding what is most conducive to that end.
38
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
This is often found in combination with obtuseness in selecting from several
options the one which is most advantageous, and a stubbornness in
ing tooth and nail whatever option one has taken up. The other fault IS
indolence and disinclination to do what is useful, when there is no compul-
sion to f;rce them to stop procrastinating and to do their duty willy nilly.
The first fault is countered by a perpetual union of the wills of all; the
second by constituting some power [potestas], which shall be directly before
their eyes, capable of inflicting suffering on those who oppose the common
interest.
5. The only means by which the wills of many may be united is that each
submit his will to the will of one man or one assembly, in such a way that
from that time on whatever that man or that assembly wills in what concerns
the common security be taken as the will of all and everyone.
6. Similarly, such a power as all men may fear can only be constituted among
a number of men if each and everyone [omnes & singuli] obliges himself to
use his force as he shall determine to whom all have resigned the direction
of their forces.
Only when they have achieved a union of wills and forces is a multitude
of men brought to life as a corporate body stronger than any other body,
namely a state [civitas].
7. Two agreements and one decree are required for a state to form in regular
fashion.
First of all when those many men who are understood to be placed in
natural libert; assemble to form a state, they agree one with indi-
vidually that they wish to enter into a single and perpetual Ul110n and to
administer the means of their safety and security by common counsel and
leadership; in a word, that they wish to become fellow-citizens. Each a.nd
everyone must consent to this agreement; anyone who dissents remams
outside the future state.
8. After this agreement there must be a decree on the form
to be introduced. Until this is determined, no measures of public safety wIll
be able to be effectively instituted.
9. After the decree on the form of government, a second agreement is needed,
when the man or men are appointed on whom the government of the infant
state is conferred. By this agreement he or they bind himself or themselves to
provide for the common security and safety, and the rest
to obedience to him or them. By this agreement, too, all submit their Will to
his or their will and at the same time devolve on him or them the use and
application of their strength to the common defence. And only when .this
agreement is duly put into effect does a complete and regular state come mto
being. .
10. A state so constituted is conceived as one person [persona], and IS
separated and distinguished from all particular men by a unique name: and
it has its own special rights and property, which no one man, no multitude
39
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
of men, nor 'even all men together, may appropriate apart from him who
holds the sovereign power or to whom the government of the state has been
committed. Hence a state is defined as a composite moral person whose will
blended an? combined from the agreement of many is taken as'the will of
all so that It may employ the forces and capacities of every individual for
the common peace and security. '
11. The will of the state as the principle of public actions expresses itself either
through one man or through one assembly, according as supremacy has been
conferred on the one or the other. When the government of the state is in
the hands of one man, the state is understood to will whatever he has decided
(assuming that he is sane) in anything within the purpose of a state.
12. when the government of a state has been conferred on an 'assembly
conslstlllg of several men each of whom retains his own natural will it is
normal to take as the will of the state what the majority of those who 'com-
pose the assembly have agreed to, unless an express arrangement has been
made as to what of the assembly is required to give its consent
to the WIll ?f whole body. When two conflicting opinions have
equal weIght, no actIOn WIll be taken, but the matter will remain as it was.
When there are several opinions, that one will prevail which gets
more ,votes than any that so many agree in it as can represent
the wIll of the whole body III other cases according to public law.
13. In a state so constituted, the bearer of government is called a monarch
a senate or a free people according to whether it is one man, or an assembl;
?f a few, or an of The rest are called subjects or citizens, tak-
lllg the latter word III Its WIder sense. in a narrower sense the
word 'citizens' is often applied only to certain persons by whose unio; and
consent the state was originally formed, or their successors, i.e., the heads
of households.
Further, citizens are either native or naturalized. The former are those who
either were party to the birth of the state at the beginning, or are descended
from them, and are usually called indigenous. The latter are those who come
from abroad into a state when it is already formed, to settle there.
. Those who are Ii.ving in a. state only for a time, though they are subject to
Its government dunng that tIme, yet are not held to be citizens but are called
foreigners or residents. '
1.4. Th.is of the. origin of states does not imply that civil authority
[lmpe:lUm ClVl/e] IS not nghtly said to be of God. For God wills that all men
practIse natural law, but with the multiplication of mankind such a horrid
life was likely to ensue would scarcely have been a place
left f?r natural law. It IS the lIlstltutIOn of states which most favours the
practIce of natural law. And therefore (since he who commands the end is
held also to necessary means to that end), God too, is under-
stood .to have gIven prIor command to the human race, mediated through
the dIctates of reason, that when it had multiplied, states should be
40
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
constituted, which are so to speak brought to life by sovereign power. In the
Holy Scriptures too He expressly gives His approval to their order and assures
the sanctity of that order by special laws and so demonstrates His particular
concern for it.
On the functions of the sovereign power2
1. The functions of the sovereign power [summi imperii] and the means by
which its force operates in states may be clearly inferred from the nature and
purpose of states.
2. In a state all have subjected their own will to the will of those in power
in matters affecting the state's security, so that they are willing to do whatever
the rulers wish. For this to be possible, those in power must signify to the
citizens their will in such matters. They do this not only by instructions
addressed to individuals on particular matters, but also by general rules, so
that there may always be certainty as to what is to be done and what is not
to be done. This is also the normal means by which it is determined what
each must regard as his own and what as another's; what is to be taken as
lawful in that state, what as unlawful; what as good, what as bad; what
remains of each man's natural liberty, or how each must reconcile the enjoy-
ment of his own rights with the tranquillity of the state; and what each
man of his own right may require of another and in what manner. Clear
definition of all these matters makes a vital contribution to the dignity and
tranquillity of the state.
3. The over-riding purpose of states is that, by mutual cooperation and
assistance, men may be safe from the losses and injuries which they may and
often do inflict on each other. To obtain this from those with whom we are
united in one society, it is not enough that we make agreement with each
other not to inflict injuries on each other, nor even that the bare will of a
superior be made known to the citizens; fear of punishment is needed, and
the capacity to inflict it immediately. To achieve its purpose, the penalty must
be nicely judged, so that it clearly costs more to break the law than to observe
it; the severity of the penalty must outweigh the pleasure or profit won or
expected from wrongdoing. For men cannot help choosing the lesser of two
evils. Though it is true that there are many men who are not deterred from
wrongdoing by threat of punishment, still this must be taken to be exceptional
- and the human condition does not allow us to rule out all exceptions.
4. Controversies often arise about the correct application of laws to particu-
lar facts, and many points arise that need to be carefully weighed whenever
it is alleged that some particular act was illegal. Hence to maintain peace
among citizens, it is a function of the sovereign power to take cognizance
of the citizens' disputes and make decisions, to investigate actions of indi-
viduals denounced as illegal, and to pronounce and execute the penalty in
conformity with the laws.
41
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
5. To ensure safety against outsiders of those who have united in one state
it is a function of the sovereign power to assemble, unite and arm or
natively to hire as many men as may seem necessary for the defence
account of uncertain number and strength of the enemy, and
agam, when expedIent, to make peace. Alliances have uses in times of
war and in times of peace, both to pool better the resources of different states
and by a of forces t.o repel or bring to terms a stronger enemy. It is
therefore wlthm the authol'lty of the sovereign to enter into alliances of both
kinds and oblige his subjects to observe them, and at the same time to direct
to the state all the benefits flowing from them.
6. The business of a large state, whether in war or in peace, cannot be carried
out by one man ,,:,ithout ministers and magistrates. The sovereign will there-
need to men who will on his behalf investigate disputes between
CItIZens, gather IIltelltgence of the intentions of neighbouring states command
the soldiers, collect and distribute the state's resources, and, in a look
to the state's interest [utilitas] in every quarter. The sovereign may and should
compel all ?f these officials to do their duty and require them to report to him.
7. The busmess of the state in war or peace cannot be carried on without
It is the right of the sovereign power, therefore, to compel the
cItIzens to these expenses: This may be done in a variety of ways. For
example, the cItIzens set aSIde for this purpose some part of the goods
or produ.ce of the regIOn they inhabit; or individual citizens may contribute
from theu' own property and also provide services when needed' or customs
duties may be imposed on imports and exports (the former i; more of a
burden to citizens, the latter to foreigners); or a modest portion of the price
of consumer goods may be deducted.
8. Finally, each man governs his actions by his own opinion but most men
usually jud?e matters as they have been accustomed, and they see them
Very few can discern what is true and good by their own
lIl.telltgence. It I.S therefore for the state that it universally resound
WIth such al:e consIstent with the right purpose and usage of states,
and that the cItIzens mmds be steeped in them from childhood. It is a func-
tion of sovereignty, therefore, to appoint public teachers of such doctrines.
9. These functions of sovereignty are naturally so interwoven with each other
that each and everyone of them should be exclusively under the control of
one man. For if anyone of them is actually missing, the government will be
defective and unfitted to achieve the end of a state. But if they are divided
so t.hat some are exclusively under the control of one man, the rest of anothe;'
an Irregular form of government must result, liable to disintegration.
On the characteristics of civil authority3
1. Every authority [imperium] by which a state [civitas] in its entirety is ruled,
.whatever the form of government, has the characteristic of supremacy
42
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
[summum]. That is, its exercise is not dependent on a superior; it acts by its
own will and judgement; its actions may not be nullified by anyone on the
ground of superiority.
2. Hence it is that authority in this sense is unaccountable [anhupeunthunos],
i.e. not obliged to account to any man on condition that if it should not
render him a satisfactory account it would be liable for that reason to human
penalty or punishment from him as from a superior.
3. Conformably with this, the sovereign authority [summum imperium] is
superior to human and civil laws as such, and thus not directly bound. by
them. For these laws depend in their origins and duration on the sovereIgn
authority. Hence it cannot be that it is bound by them itself, for if it were,
the very same power would be superior to itself. Yet, when the sovereign has
enjoined certain things on the citizens by law, whose scope extends to him
too, it would be appropriate for him to conform of his own free will; this
would also tend to strengthen the authority of the law.
4. Sovereign authority, finally, has also its own particular sanctity. It is there-
fore morally wrong for the citizens to resist its legitimate commands. But
beyond this even its severity must be patiently borne by citizens in exactly
the same way as good children must bear the ill temper of their parents. And
even when it has threatened them with the most atrocious injuries, individuals
will protect themselves by flight or endure any injury or damage rather than
draw their swords against one who remains the father of their country, how-
ever harsh he may be.
5. In monarchies and aristocracies particularly, sovereign authority occurs
in absolute form [absolutum imperium]; elsewhere it occurs in limited form.
Absolute authority is said to be held by a monarch who can wield it
according to his own judgement, not by following the rule of fixed, standing
statutes, but as the actual condition of affairs seems to require, and who uses
his own judgement in protecting the security of his country as its circum-
stances require.
6. But because the judgement of a single man is liable to error and his will
may tend towards evil, especially where he has so much liberty, some peoples
have thought it prudent to restrain the exercise of authority within fixed
limits. This was done at the conferring of the kingship by binding the king
to fixed laws concerning the administration of parts of his authority; and
for circumstances of supreme crisis if such should arise (and this cannot be
defined in advance), they determined that such matters should be handled
only with the prior knowledge and consent of the people or of its deputies
met in assembly, so that the king would have less opportunity to stray from
his kingdom's security.
7. Finally, some differences occur between kingdoms in the manner of hold-
ing the kingship, which, one may observe, is not uniform in all kingdoms.
For some kings are said to hold their kingdom as a patrimony; they may
therefore at their pleasure divide, alienate or transfer it to whom they will .
43
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
This is particularly the case with kings who have acquired their kingdom by
force of arms, and have made their own people for themselves. But those
the have freely invited to be king, though they have the high-
rIght to exerCIse power, yet they may not divide, alienate or transfer the
kmgdom at their pleasure. They are obliged to follow the fundamental law
or accepted of the people in handing on the kingdom to their suc-
cessors, for thIS reason some have likened them in a certain respect to
usufructuanes.
On the duty of sovereigns
I. A clear account of the precepts that govern the office of the sovereign
may be drawn from the nature and end of states and from consideration of
the functions of sovereignty.
The prime requirement is that those in power take pains to learn all that
IS relevant to a full knowledge of their office; no one can perform with credit
what he has ?ot learned. Hence the prince must forgo pursuits that
have no bearIng on hIS office. Pleasures, amusements and idle pastimes must
be c.u.t .so as th.ey with this purpose. He should admit to
famIlIarIty hImself JUdICIOUS men skilled in practical affairs; he should
ban from hIS court flatterers and triflers and those who have learned nothing
but useless nonsense.
To know how to make a correct application of the general principles of
prudent the must have the most profound knowledge possible
of condItIons of hIS position the character of the people subject
to He also partICularly cultIvate the virtues whose practice is most
In such administration and adapt his manners to the
dIgmty of hIS great emInence.
3. This is the general rule for sovereigns: the safety of the people is the
supreme law: FO.r authorit,Y has been given them to achieve the end for which
states were InstItuted. PrInces must believe that nothing is good for th
.
prIvate Iy wh'IC h'IS not good for the state. em
4. The internal peace of the state requires that the wills of the citizens be
governed and ?irected as the safety of the state requires. It is therefore a
duty of sovereIgns not .only to lay down laws appropriate to that purpose,
but also to lend authonty to public discipline, so that the citizens conform
to t?e of the not so much through fear of punishment as by
It to this end to ensure that the pure and sincere
ChnstIan doctnne flounshes in the state, and that the public schools teach
dogmas consistent with the purpose of states.
5. It contributes to peace to have the laws written out plain and
clear m the matters that anse most often between citizens. However, the civil
should regulate only as much as is necessary for the good of state and
cItIzens. For men more often deliberate about what they should or should
44
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
not do on the basis of natural reason than by knowledge of the law. Hence
when there are more laws than they can easily keep in memory, and things
are forbidden by law which reason does not by itself forbid, it is inevitable
that men should fall foul of the laws even without any wrong intention.
those in power may cause the citizens unnecessary inconvenience, and thIS
is contrary to the purpose of s t a t e s . · .
6. It is pointless to make laws if sovereigns allow them to be broken WIth
impunity. They therefore have a duty to see that the laws are put into effect
and to ensure that each man may obtain his right without lengthy delays,
legal evasions and harassment. They must also impose penalties proportionate
to the offence in each case and to the intention and malice of the offender.
They must not grant pardons without good cause; it is unfair. and
exasperating to the citizens not to give similar treatment, other thIngs beIng
equal, to similar offences.
7. Just as penalties should not be imposed except in the public interest, so
the public interest should govern the extent of the penalties. In this way the
citizens' sufferings will not outweigh the state's gain. Besides, if penalties are
to achieve their purpose, they should obviously be designed to ensure that
the suffering they inflict outweighs any profit or pleasure that may result
from the illegal act.
8. Men have united in states to obtain security against wrongs by others. It
is therefore a duty of sovereigns to be severe in preventing men from wrong-
ing each other precisely because continual living together offers more frequent
opportunity to do harm. Distinctions of rank and dignity ought not to have
sufficient influence to allow the more powerful to trample at will on the
humbler class. It is also contrary to the purpose of government that citizens
should avenge with private violence what they think are wrongs done to them.
9. One prince is unable to deal directly with all the business of a large
state. He must inevitably, therefore, call in ministers to share his responsibilities.
Nevertheless, as they all derive their power from the sovereign, the respon-
sibility for both their good and their bad actions rests ultimately with him.
Again, whether business is handled well or ill depends on the quality of the
ministers. For both these reasons, sovereigns have an obligation to employ
honest and competent men for the state's offices, and to inquire from time
to time into their actions, and to reward or punish them according to their
handling of affairs. Thus the rest of the people will understand that public
affairs are to be treated with no less sincerity and diligence than their own
private affairs. Similarly, wicked men are attracted to commit crimes by the
hope of avoiding punishment, and their hope is liveliest when judges are
open to corruption. Consequently, it is the duty of sovereigns to impose
severe punishment on such judges; they encourage crime which destroys the
citizens' security. Finally, although the handling of business should be left
to ministers, sovereigns should never refuse to lend a patient ear to the com-
plaints and petitions of the citizens.
45
 ON 1EE DUlY 01' M"AN "AND C111ZEN

10. The only ground on which citizens must bear taxes and other burdens is
occurs and the country's condition can easily bear it. the Same ,end .one
so far as these are necessary to meet the state's expenses in times of war and
must obtain accurate intelligence of the plans and projects of one s neIgh-
peace. It is therefore the duty of sovereigns in this matter not to extract more
bours, and use prudence in contracting friendships and alliances.
than the or interests of the country require; and to keep
the burdens as light as poss}ble, so that the citizens suffer as little as possible.
Then mus.t .ensure that taxes are assessed fairly and proportionately, On civil laws in particular
and that ImmumtIes are not granted to some part of the citizens to defraud and
1. It remains to discern the specific functions of sovereign power and their
exploit the rest. .What is collected must be spent on the state's requirements,
noteworthy features. Most important here are the civil laws, are.
n?t squandered m extravagance, largesse, unnecessary ostentation or frivolity.
decrees of the sovereign civil authority [summi imperantis civilis], WhICh enJom
Fmally, one must ensure that expenditures correspond with revenues' when
upon the citizens what they do not do in .
revenues fall short, the solution must be found in economy and retrendhment
of unnecessary expenses. 2. There are two particular senses m WhICh the word CIvIl IS applied to law.
with respect to authority and with respect to origin. In the former sense,
1.1. are n?t obliged to maintain their subjects, though, excep- all laws are called civil which are the bases for the giving of justice in the
tIOnally, chanty reqUIres them to take particular care of those who cannot
civil courts, whatever their origin. In the latter sense, those laws are called
themselves because of some undeserved misfortune. Nevertheless,
which proceed from the will of the sovereign and deal with matters WhICh
sovereIgns must not merely collect from the citizens' property the funds
are undefined by natural and divine law but deeply affect the private interests
for the .preservation of the state. For the strength of the state con-
of individual citizens.
SIStS also m the vIrtue and wealth of the citizens, and therefore the sovereign
3. Though nothing should be regulated by the authority of the civil laws
must take whatever measures he can to ensure the growth of the citizens'
unless it has a bearing on the public interest, it is of the highest importance
peI:sonal prosperity. A step in this direction is to develop in the citizens the
for the dignity and peace of civil life that citizens should properly observe
attItude that they should draw a rich harvest from the land and its waters'
the natural law; and therefore it is a duty of sovereigns to lend it the force
that they should apply their industry to their country's natural resources
and effectiveness of civil law. For there is so much wickedness in the greater
purchasing from others the labour which they can well perform themselves'
part of mankind that neither the obvious benefits of natural law nor fear of
and to achieve this, sovereigns must encourage technical skills. It is
divine power is adequate to check it. The sovereign, therefore, may ensure
important to promote trade and encourage navigation in the coastal
preservation of the moral integrity of civil life by lending to natural laws the
dIstncts. Idleness has to be banished; and the citizens recalled to habits of
force of the civil laws.
economy by which prohibit excessive expenditures, especially 4. The force of the civil laws consists in the addition of a penal sanction
those by th.e cItIzens is transferred abroad. Here the example to precepts to do or not to do, or in defining the penalty in the courts that
set by sovereIgns IS more effectIve than any law.
awaits one who has done what he ought not or not done what he ought.
1.2: The internal health and stability of states results from the union of the
Violations of natural law which have no penal sanctions attached are beyond
CItIzens: and the more perfect it is, the more effectively the force of govern-
the reach of human justice, though the divine tribunal still stands ready to
ment WIll pervade the body of the state. It is therefore the sovereign's
.
task factIOns do not arise; to prevent citizens from forming 5. Since civil life is too fragile to allow each man to exact what he believes
assocIatIOns by pnvate agreements; to ensure that neither all nor some have
to be his due by violent self-help, civil laws come to the aid of natural law
a greater dependence on any other person whether within or without the
in providing actions for the obligations of natural law. Such. actions
state, under guise, sacred or profane, than on their own prince, and
a man to exact his due in civil courts with the help of a magIstrate. What IS
that they believe they have more protection for themselves from him than
from anyone else. not backed by this force of the civil laws cannot be wrested from one who
refuses to give it, but depends wholly on the delicacy of the delinquent's
13 .. Finally, the relation of states to each other is a somewhat precarious peace.
conscience.
IS therefor.e a .duty of take measures to develop military It is normal that civil laws provide actions chiefly for obligations arising
vIrtue skIll WIth m the cItIzens, and to make ready in good time
from explicit contracts between parties. They have usually refused
all that. IS needed repellmg force: fortified places, weapons, soldiers and
for other obligations based on some indefinite duty ?f law. The
- the smews of actIOn - money. But one should not take the initiative in tion here is that good men should have scope to exerCIse theIr vIrtue, and to wm
aggression even with a just cause for war, unless a perfectly safe opportunity
public commendation for being seen to have acted well without compulsion.

46
47
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Often too matters have seemed too trivial to justify troubling the judge
with them.
? Many of the precepts of natural law are indefinite, and their application
IS left to each ?iscretion. In its concern for the dignity and peace
of the the CIVIl law normally prescribes time, manner, place and
persons for actIons of this kind, defines other relevant circumstances
and sometimes provides rewards to induce men to obey. The civil law has
also the function of clarifying whatever is obscure in natural law' citizens
to accept this clarification, though their private may be
qUIte dIfferent.
7. a state are left by natural law to the judgement
and dIscretIOn of the mdlvldual, but they need to be managed in auniform
way the interest of peace and dignity. Hence civil laws normally
a fixed form for actIOns and transactions of that kind, for example
wIlls,. and ma.ny others. For the same reason civil laws have usually
put lImIts on the exercIse of rights admissible by nature.
8. Citizen.s .ought to obey civil laws, so far as they are not openly repug-
to. dIVme. not as. If by fear of punishment alone, but by an internal
oblIgatIon whIch IS establIshed by natural law itself, since its precepts include
the behest to obey legitimate rulers.
9. Finally, citizens must obey particular commands of rulers no less than the
laws. But here a question arises: does what the sovereign orders
the cItIzen .to do be.come the citiz.en's own action? Or does the sovereign rather
aS,slgn to hIm executIOn of an act which is to be regarded as the
sovereIgn s own? For m latter case the citizen, acting under compulsion
the ruler, can do, wIthout wrong on his part, acts whose commission
the ruler in wrongdoing. But a citizen is never justified in doing
anythmg contrary to natural and divine law in his own name. Hence it is
that, if a citizen bears arms on the orders of the sovereign even in an unjust
wal; he does not do wrong. But if on the sovereign's orders he condemns the
innocent, bears false witness or brings mischievous accusation against some-
one, he do wrong. For a citizen bears arms in the public
name; but It IS m hIs own name that he acts as judge, witness and accuser.
On the right of life and death
1. !he civil authority has a twofold right over the citizens' lives:
a dIrect rIght Il1 the suppression of crime, and an indirect right in the defence
of the state.
2. Force on the part of an external enemy has often to be met by force' or
we need to use violence claiming our right. In either case the
authorIty may compel the cItIzens to perform this kind of service where it
is not a question of deliberately sending them to death but only of' exposing
. them to the danger of death. The sovereign authority has the duty to give
48
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
them training and preparation to conduct themselves with vigour an? skill
in such dangers. No citizen through fear of this danger may render hImself
unfit for military service. Once inducted, he will in no circumstances desert
his post through fear but will fight rather to the last he believes
it to be the will of his commander that he should save hIs hfe rather than
hold his position, or that the position is less important to the state than the
lives of the citizens involved.
3. Executing its right directly the sovereign power may take away citizens'
lives for atrocious crimes and as a punishment (though punishment also falls
upon a man's other possessions). At this point a few general explanatory
remarks on the nature of punishment are necessary.
4. A punishment is an evil one suffers, inflicted in return for an evil one has
done; in other words, some painful evil imposed by authority as a means of
coercion in view of a past offence.
For although punishment often takes the form of action, yet these
actions are designed to be laborious and painful to the doer and so to
inflict on him a kind of suffering.
2 Punishment is to be inflicted on men against their will. Otherwise it
would not achieve its goal, which is to deter men from wrongdoing by
its harshness. Nothing a man gladly accepts has this effect.
3 Evils inflicted in war or in self-defence in fighting are not punishments,
because they are not by authority.
4 Nor is what one suffers when wronged a punishment, because it is not
inflicted in view of a past offence.
5. It is characteristic of natural liberty that a man in that state has no sup-
erior except God and is therefore liable only to divine punishment. By contrast,
with the introduction of government among men, the security of societies
requires that rulers too have the capacity to suppress the wickedness of
subjects upon the commission of an offence, so that most men may hve
securely with one another. .
6. Although there is nothing obviously inequitable in an evildoer sufferIng
evil still when human beings inflict punishments they have to consider not
onl; what evil was done, but also what good may come from its punishment.
For example one should never inflict punishments to gratify the victim's
delight in the pain and punishment of his attacker. For this delight is clearly
inhumane and repugnant to sociality.
7. The real aim of punishment by human beings is the prevention of attacks
and injuries. This aim is achieved if the criminal changes for the better, or
others by his example no longer wish henceforth to do wrong; or if the
criminal is restrained so that he can do no more harm. This can be expressed
as follows: the purpose of punishment is either the good of the criminal, or
the interest of the person for whom it would have been better if the crime
49
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
had not committed and who has thus been injured by the crime or
everyone's mterest without distinction. '
8. The purpose then of punishment is the good of the offender his
character IS reformed by the pain of the punishment itself which als 't'-
. h h' d . , 0 ex m
gUlS. es IS to do wrong. Even in states, most commonly, this kind of
pumshment IS left to heads of households to exercise on members of th '.
Given its purpose it may not go to the length of inflicting
smce a dead man cannot be reformed.
9. Second, punishment also seeks the interest of the victim, which is that he
should not suffer the thing again either from the same man or from
others. The former ?bJect is attained either by getting rid of the offender
altogether, or by takmg away his capacity to do harm while sparirig h' I'ft
'f If' IS I e,
or I. as a resu t.o pUlllshment?e learns not to offend. The latter object is
by pUbl.lC and pumshment designed to strike terror into others.
10. pumshment aIms at the good of all, in that it is concerned with
preventmg has harmed one man from subsequently harming
or wIth deternng others from similar acts by fear of his e I ness of the motive, which may be assessed from various signs: for example,
' b'
Th IS . . d' xamp e.
0 IS attame m the same way as the former.
I I. If we on the purposes of punishment and the condition of the
human race, It becomes clear that not all offences are fit to be punished b
human justice. The following are exempt from human punishment: y aggravating circumstances; or if his temperament fitted him to resist tempta-
acts, delicious thoughts of sin, greed, desire and
mtentIOn wIthout actIOn, even if subsequent confession reveals them
to dot?e!'s .. For no is done to anyone by such an internal impulse;
an It IS In no one s Interest that anyone be punished for it.
12. 2
It would also be excessively rigorous to subject petty lapses to human
pen.aIties. In the condition of nature in which we live no one can
aVOId such lapses however scrupulous he may be.
13. 3
human laws turn a blind eye to many acts, for the peace of
CIvil socIety or for other reasons: for example, if some action would be
mo!,e splendid was not seen to be a factor in its under-
or w.hen It IS not worth troubling the judges over a minor incident;
?f If case IS too obscure for a clear verdict; or if an abuse is too deeply
m.graIned to be removed without turning the country upside down.
14. 4
FInally, we must also exempt from human punishment those faults
of character which arise from man's common corruption. They Occur
so t?at you would have no one left to rule, if you chose
VISIt t?em severe penalties, so long as they have not erupted
s.enous for example, ambition, avarice, inhumanity,
mgIatltude, hYPOCrISY, envy, arrogance, anger, animosity, and so on.
15. However, even the case of offences deserving punishment, it is not
. always necessary to Impose penalties. In fact, it happens from time to time
50
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
that an offender may rightly be granted a pardon for his crime. This should
not however be done without very good reasons, among which are the
following: if the purposes of punishment in a given case seem not to
appropriate; or if a pardon would produce than a penalty; or If
the purposes of punishment can be more readIly achIeved some other way.
Likewise if the transgressor adduces services to his country on his part or
on the part of his kin which deserve special reward; or if he is recommended
by any other outstanding attribute, as some rare skill; or if there is hope that
he wilI purge his fault by distinguished achievements; especially where some
ignorance is involved, even if not altogether inculpable; or if the particular
reason for the law is inapplicable to the act in question. Often, too, pardon
must be granted because there are so many offenders that punishing them
all would exhaust the state.
16. The gravity of offences is determined as follows: from the object on which
the offence was committed, its dignity and value; similarly, from its effect,
whether it causes much or little damage to the country; and from the wicked-
if the offender might easily have resisted the causes impelling him to do
wrong; or if in addition to the usual deterrents, there was some particular
reason that should have restrained him from wrongdoing; or when there are
tions to do wrong. Other usual considerations are whether a man took the
lead or was seduced by the example of others, or whether he offended
repeatedly and after several wasted warnings.
17. The precise kind and amount of punishmen t to be inflicted in individual
cases are for the supreme civil authority to determine, whose only object here
must be the good of the country. Hence it may and does happen that two
unequal crimes may incur the same penalty. For the equality which judges
are instructed to observe in the matter of defendants is to be understood of
defendants who have committed crimes of the same kind, insofar as the
offence which is condemned in one should not be condoned in the other
without very good reason. And although men should, so far as possible,
be rather gentle towards their fellow-men, nevertheless from time to time
the safety of the state and the security of the citizens require that penalties
be made more severe: for example, if strong medicine is needed against
a growth in crime, or where some offence is particularly dangerous to the
state. What must always be kept in view in estimating penalties is that they
should be adequate to curb the passion by which men are driven to the crime
for which the penalty provides. One should not exact heavier penalties
than are set by law, unless particularly atrocious circumstances aggravate the
offence.
18. However, the same penalty does not affect all men equally and so does
not have the same effect in curbing the desire to do wrong. Hence in the
general assessment of penalties and in their application to individuals you
51
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
take .acCount. of the person of the actual offender and of the qualities
m hIm whIch may mcrease or diminish his reaction to the penalty, for exam-
ple, age, sex, status, wealth, strength, and so on.
19. Just as (in human justice) no one can be punished for another man's
crime, so if a has been committed by a corporation, anyone who did
not consent to It WIll not be guilty of it. Hence if a man did not consent he
can only be made to forfeit what he received in the name of and for 'the
benefit of the corporation, though the innocent too usually do suffer loss as
a of the punishment of a corporation. The offences of public bodies
expIre when none of those by whose consent and co-operation the crime was
committed remain alive.
20. Yet it often happens that one man's offence causes another's loss or the
disappointment of some expected good. For example, if parents' wealth is
for an offe?ce, innocent children are also reduced to poverty.
And If a defendant SkIPS baIl, the bondsman is compelled to pay a fine, not
for an offence, but because it was precisely in case such a thing happened
that he undertook the obligation.
On reputation
I. in general is the value of persons in common life [vita com-
mums] by WhICh they may be measured against others or compared with
them and either preferred or put after them.
2. Reputation is either simple or intensive. Both are viewed with reference
on the one hand to men living in natural liberty and on the other hand to
men in the civil state.
3: reputa,tion those who live in natural liberty consists prima-
nly m man s makmg himself and being taken to be such a man as may
be dealt WIth as a good man and who is fit to live with others by the prescript
of natural law.
4. Reputation of this kind is held to be intact, so long as one does not know-
ingly, willingly with evil intent violate the law of nature with respect to
others by a malIcIOUS or outrageous act. Hence everyone is taken to be a
good man, until the contrary is proved.
5. Reputation of this kind is diminished by malicious commission of outra-
geous crimes contrary to the law of nature, the effect of which is that one
needs to show more caution in dealing with such a man. However, this stain
may be purged by making voluntary reparation for the loss caused and by
giving evidence of sincere repentance.
6. Similarly, reputation is utterly destroyed by a manner and way of life which
aims at harm to others and at profiting by open
wrongdomg. Men of thIS nature (so long as they show no signs of repent-
ance) be treated as public enemies by all who are in any way affected
by theIr WIckedness. They may however repair their reputation by abjuring
52
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
their vicious manner of life and entering on an honourable course, after
making restitution for loss or obtaining forgiveness.
7. Simple reputation among those who live in states is not to have been
declared by the law and custom of the state a vicious member of the same,
and to be regarded as a person of some standing.
8. Want of simple reputation may be a result merely of status or it may be
a result of crime.
Want of simple reputation as a result of status applies to two cases: when
the status in question has naturally in itself nothing disgraceful or else
when it is associated with vice or at least with a perception of vice. The former
occurs in some states, where there are slaves with no standing. The latter is
the case with pimps and prostitutes and such like: they do indeed enjoy
public protection so long as they are publicly tolerated, but they should be
excluded from the company of honest men. The same is the case with those
whose occupations, though not vicious in nature, are sordid or mean.
9. Total loss of simple reputation may also be the result of crime, when a
man is marked with infamy by the civil laws; he may also be executed, in
which case his memory is damned; or exiled from the state; or permitted to
remain in the state as an infamous and unsavoury character.
10. It is clear that simple reputation or natural honesty cannot be taken from
a man by the arbitrary decision of sovereigns, since it cannot be thought to
be in the state's interest in any way that this power should be conferred upon
them. Likewise, it does not seem possible to incur true infamy so long as one
is executing the state's law in the simple capacity of a minister.
11. Intensive reputation is that by which some persons, though otherwise
equal to others in terms of simple reputation, are given preference over them,
insofar as there are qualities in one more than in the other which move men's
minds to honour them. And indeed honour properly so called is the indica-
tion of our judgement of another's superiority.
12. This intensive reputation may be considered in respect either to those
who live in natural liberty or to citizens of the same state. We must also
examine the grounds of such reputation both where they simply make it
appropriate to expect honour from others, and where they give rise to a right
strictly so called to require honour from others as one's due.
13. The grounds of intensive reputation in general are considered to be every-
thing that has a notable degree of perfection and superiority, or is judged to
give evidence of such, provided their effect is congruous with the purpose of
natural law or of states: for instance, intelligence and a capacity to master
various skills and disciplines, a keen judgement in managing affairs, a firm
temper unshaken by external events and superior to temptation and fear,
eloquence, physical beauty and dexterity, the good things of fortune and,
above all, outstanding achievements.
14. All these qualities, however, yield only an imperfect right or aptitude
to receive honour and respect from others. Hence to refuse such honour to
53
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
others even when they have deserved it is not wrong but only disreputable
a.s a mark inhumanity and what one might call 'incivility'. But a perfect
nght to receIve honour or the outward signs of honour from another arises
either from the authority which one has over him, or from an agreement one
has made with him, or else from a law made or sanctioned by their common
master.
1.5. Between and between independent peoples the factors specially
cIted for pre-emInence an? are: antiquity of kingdom and dynasty;
extent and wealth of subject terntones and power; the nature of the author-
ity by which one holds power in the kingdom and the splendour of the title.
But th.ese factors !n themselves do not create a perfect right to precedence
as agaInst .other kIng.s or peoples, unless it has been acquired by' agreement
or conceSSIOn on theIr part.
16. Among citizens it is the prerogative of the sovereign to assign degrees of
dignity, but in this matter he is right to have regard for each man's excellence
and his to services his country. Whatever degree of dignity
the has assIgned to a CItizen, he must protect it against the man's
fellow-cItizens; and he should acknowledge it equally himself.
On the power of sovereign authority over property
within the state
1. When property has come to citizens from sovereigns, the right by which
they h?ld on the discretion of the sovereign. By contrast, property
of WhICh obtained full ownership by their own industry or in
any other way IS subject to three principal rights which, by the nature of
states and as necessary to their purpose, belong to sovereigns.
2. The first right is that sovereigns may make laws obliging the citizens to
accommodate their use of their property to the interest of the state' or defin-
ing the extent and nature of possessions, and the method of
property to others, and other matters of this kind.
3. The second right is that the sovereign may collect a fraction of the citizens'
property as tribute or tax. For since their lives and fortunes are to be defended
by the state, it. is that they contribute to meeting the expenses
to thIS It IS totally unscrupulous to attempt to enjoy the pro-
tectIOn and convemence the state affords while refusing to contribute either
service or property to its preservation. And yet prudent rulers would be wise
to take into consideration the resentment felt by ordinary people and to
make an effort to give as little offence as possible in collecting taxes: observ-
ing fairness above all and imposing taxes that are moderate and flexible rather
than massive and uniform.
4. The third right is eminent domain, which means that in a national emer-
seize. and apply to public use the property of any
subject whIch the cnSlS particularly requires, even if the property seized far
54
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
exceeds the amount which had been fixed as his normal obligatory contribu-
tion to his country's expenses. For this reason, however, as much of the excess
as possible should be refunded to him from the public treasury or by a levy
on the rest of the citizens. .
5. Besides these three rights, there is in many states a distinct
which usually goes under the name of the country's or the kIngdom s patn-
mony. This is again divided in various places into the patrimony of the prince
and that of the country, or into the privy purse and the treasury. The former
is intended for the maintenance of the king and his family, the latter for the
public purposes of the kingdom. The king has a usufruct of the former and
may dispose of the proceeds from it as he pleases. In the case of the. latter,
however, he is in the position of an administrator, and should apply thIS fund
to the uses for which it is intended. He can alienate neither without the
consent of the people.
6 There is even less of a case for a king who does not hold his kingdom as
a' patrimony to alienate the whole kingdom or any part of without the
consent of the people; and in this latter case, without the parttcular consent
of the part to be alienated. Conversely, no member territory of a state may
break away from it without the state's consent, unless reduced by force of
external enemies to such a condition that it can not survive in any other way.
On the duties of citizens
I. A citizen's duty is either general or special. General duties arise from t.he
common obligation to be subject to the civil authority. Special duties an se
from the particular tasks and functions which the sovereign may impose
upon individuals.
2. A citizen's general duties are towards either the governors of the state, or
the state as a whole, or his fellow-citizens.
3. The citizen owes respect, loyalty and obedience to the governors of his
state. This entails that he be content with the actual state of things and not
give his mind to revolution, and that he not form too close ties with any
other ruler nor show him admiration and respect. In thought and speech he
should honour and approve his governors and their actions.
4. The duty of a good citizen to the state as a whole is that its safety and
security be his dearest wish; that his life, wealth and fortune be freely offered
to preserve it; that he devote all the vigour of his intelligence and industry to
extend its glory and increase its prosperity. .
5. A citizen's duty towards his fellow-citizens is to live with them In
and friendship; to be courteous and obliging; not to cause trouble by beIng
stubborn and difficult; not to covet or steal other people's property.
6. Special duties are concerned either with the whole state indifferently or
with only a part of it. In all cases the general precept holds: no one should
accept or undertake any public duty for which he believes himself unfit.
55
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN

7. Those who assist the governors of the state with counsel must keep an . k . g secrets', inflexible
and the true from the fabricated; utterly ?iscreet III
eye on all parts of the country; whatever seems good for it they should
for their country's good against all possIble hould
skilfully and faithfully propose, without fear or favour; the country's welfare
must be their aim in all their counsels, not their own wealth or power; they 14. Those who have charge of collecting and state
should not encourage by flattery evil inclinations on the part of princes; refrain from all unnecessary and public funds;
fi their own gain or from spIte or annoy , d I
they must avoid illegal factions and associations; they should not keep
or a those who have a claim on the treasury without e .ay.
to themselves what should be published, nor broadcast what should be
kept confidential; they should be impervious to corruption by foreigners; Jtizen's special duty lasts as long as he remains the
. s rise to the duty, when he leaves, the duty too expIres.
in,
and they should give priority to public business over private business or gIve ..
pleasures. I t 1 g as a man remains a cItizen. .
8. The publicly appointed ministers of religion should show dignity and
scrupulousness in the performance of their duties; they must declare true
right of citizenship; or if he is overcome by an enemy force and com-
dogmas on the worship of the Deity; they should make themselves con-
pelled to submit to the victor's sway.
spicuous examples of what they teach the people; and they should not cheapen
the worth of their office or weaken the influence of their teaching by their
own moral failings. Notes
9. Those who have been given the responsibility of instructing citizens in the Phoenix and Cilix, eponymous ancestors 0 f, respec t'Ive1y, the Phoenicians and the
various branches of learning should teach nothing false or harmful. Their
manner in teaching what is true should bring their students to assent to the 2 Cilicians. . ,.IS trans1ate d as 'we!"
[De partibus sllmmi imperii). 'Impenum po or 'authority'
truth not so much because they have heard it often as because they have depending on context.
3 [imperium civile).
understood the solid grounds for it; they should avoid all dogmas which tend
to disturb civil society; they should hold that all human knowledge which is
not useful for human and civil life is worthless.
10. There must be easy access to those who are charged with the administra-
tion of justice; they must protect the common people from oppression by
the powerful; they must give justice equally to the poor and humble and
to the powerful and influential; they must not drag out legal cases more than
necessary; they must abjure bribes; they must show diligence in hearing
cases and put aside any prejudices that would mar the integrity of their judge-
ments; and they should not fear any man in doing what is right.
11. Those who are entrusted with the armed forces should take care to train
the soldier in due time and inure him to the rigours of military life; to keep
military discipline in good order; not rashly expose their soldiers to be
massacred by the enemy; and promptly supply pay and provisions, so far as
they can, embezzling nothing. They must also ensure that the troops always
support their country and never conspire with them against it.
12. For their part soldiers should be content with their pay; refrain from
pillage and harassment of the population; perform their tasks in protection
of their country gladly and with vigour; not rashly court danger nor avoid
it through cowardice; show courage against the enemy, not against their
comrades; and choose rather to die with honour than to save their lives by
running away.
13. Those who are sent abroad on state business need to be cautious and
. circumspect; shrewd in distinguishing good information from the worthless

56
57
 CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS

speaking here of the fusion of political and civil institutions and rights; But
4 a man's social rights, too, were part of the same amalgam, and derived from
the status which alSo determined the kind of justice he could get and where
he could get it, and the way in which he could take part in the administration
EXTRACTS FROM of the affairs of the community of which he was a member. But this status
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS was not one of citizenship in our modern sense. In feudal society status was
the hallmark of class and the measure of inequality. There was no uniform
collection of rights and duties with which all men-noble and common, free
T. H. Marshal! and serf-were endowed by virtue of their membership of the society. There
was, in this sense, no principle of the equality of citizens to set against the
principle of the inequality of classes. In the medieval towns, on the other
Source: 1. Manza and M. Sauder (eds), Inequality and Society New York' W W No t 2009 hand, examples of genuine and equal citizenship can be found. But its specific
pp. 148-54. Originally published 1950. , . . . r on, , rights and duties were strictly local, whereas the citizenship whose history
I wish to trace is, by definition, national.

The development of citizenship to the end of
the nineteenth century
I shall be ru.n?ing Y'ue to. type as a sociologist if I begin by saying that I
to clttzenshlp lllto three parts. But the analysis is, in this case,
dictated by hlst07,_even more clearly than by logic. I shall call these th
or The civil element is composed
the lights necessary for llldlvldual freedom-liberty of the person freed m
of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude
contracts, and right .to justice. The last is of a different order from the
It IS the nght to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of
e.quahty others and .by due process of law. This shows us that the institu-
most directly associated civil rights are the courts of justice. By the
pohttcal element I mean the to participate in the exercise of political
power, as a member of a body lllvested with political authority or as an elector
of the of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament
and of local By the element I mean the whole range
from the ught to.a of e.conomlc welfare and security to the right to
share t? the full III the social hentage and to live the life of a civilised bein
accordmg to the prevailing in the society. The institutions
closely conn.ected with It are the educational system and the social services.
. In early times these three strands were wound into a single thread. The
were blended because the institutions were amalgamated. As Maitland
said: The further back we trace our history the more impossible it is for
to draw of between the various functions of the
the same lllstttutlOn IS a legislative assembly, a governmental council and
a court of law.... Everywhere, as we pass from the ancient to the modern
we see what the fashionable philosophy calls differentiation.' Maitland
The early impact of citizenship on social class
... My aim has been to trace in outline the development of citizenship in
England to the end of the nineteenth century. For this purpose I have divided
citizenship into three elements, civil, political and social. I have tried to show
that civil rights came first, and were established in something like their
modern form before the first Reform Act was passed in 1832. Political rights
came next, and their extension was one of the main features of the nineteenth
century, although the principle of universal political citizenship was not
recognised until 1918. Social rights, on the other hand, sank to vanishing
point in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Their revival began
with the development of public elementary education, but it was not until
the twentieth century that they attained to equal partnership with the other
two elements in citizenship.
Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a com-
munity. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and
duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle
that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which
citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship
against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration
can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge
towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which
the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the
status is bestowed. Social class, on the other hand, is a system of inequality.
And it too, like citizenship, can be based on a set of ideals, beliefs and
values. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the impact of citizenship on
social class should take the form of a conflict between opposing principles.

58 59
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
If I am right 'in my contention that citizenship has been a developing institu-
in at least the latter of the seventeenth century, then it
not 0:
IS clear that growth with capitlllism, which is a system,
but of mequality. Here is something that needs explaining.
IS It that these. two opposing principles could grow and flourish side by
sIde m the same sOlI? What made it possible for them to be reconciled with
one a?d to for a time at least, allies instead of antagonists?
The questIOn IS a pertment one, for it is clear that, in the twentieth century
citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war. ' rights, and social rights in the mid-nineteenth century were in the doldrums.
... in its early forms, was a principle of equality, and that
dunng thIS penod It was a developing institution. Starting at the point where
men were free in t?eory, capable of enjoying rights, it grew by enrich-
the body .of n?hts they were capable of enjoying. But these rights
dId not conflIct wIth the mequalities of capitalist society; they were, on the
contrary, the maintenance of that particular form of inequality.
The explanatlO.n. m the fact. the core of citizenship at this stage was
composed of CIVti nghts. And CIVti nghts were indispensable to a competitive
market economy. They to each man, as part of his individual status,
the engage as an unit in the economic struggle and
made It possIble to deny to hIm social protectioiioll-tl}e ground that he was
equipped with the means to protect himself. Maine's that 'the
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract' expresses a profound truth which has been elaborated
with varying terminology, by many sociologists, but it requires qualification:
and con.tract are present in all but the most primitive socie-
bes. Mame hImself admItted this when, later in the same book, he wrote that
the feudal communities, as contrasted with their archaic predecessors,
were bou?d together by mere sentiment nor recruited by a fiction.
The tIe whIch ulllted them was Contract.' But the contractual element in
feudalism coexisted with a class system based on status and as contract
hardened into custom, it helped to perpetuate class status. retained
the form of undertakings, but not the reality of a free agreement.
Modern contract dId not grow out of feudal contract; it marks a new develop-
ment to whose progress feudalism was an obstacle that had to be swept aside.
For modern contract is essentially an agreement between men who are free
and equal in status, though not necessarily in power. Status was not eliminated
from the social system. Differential status, associated with class, function and
was replac.ed by the single uniform status of citizenship, which pro-
vIded the foundatIOn of equality on which the structure of inequality could
be built.
... This status was clearly an aid, and not a menace, to capitalism and the
free-market economy, because it was dominated by civil rights which confer
. the legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to but do
60
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
not guarantee the possession of any of them. A property right is not aright
to possess property, but a right to acquire it, if you can, and to protect it,
if you can get it. But, if you use these arguments to explain to a pauper that
his property rights are the same as those of a millionaire, he will probably
accuse you of quibbling. Similarly, the right to freedom of speech has little
real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say that is worth
saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it. But
blatant inequalities are not due to defects in civil rights, but to lack of SOCIal
The Poor Law was an aid, not a menace, to capitalism, because it relieved
industry of all social responsibility outside the contract of employment, while
sharpening the edge of competition in the labour market. Elementary school-
ing was also an aid, because it increased the value of the worker without
educating him above his station.
... Thus although citizenship, even by the end of the nineteenth century,
had done little to reduce social inequality, it had helped to guide progress
into the path which led directly to the egalitarian policies of the twentieth
century.
It also had an integrating effect, or, at least, was an
in a integrating process.... Citizenship requires ... a direct"sens.t: of com-
munity membership based on lI-oyalty to a civilisation ,which is a common
possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by
a common law. Its growth is stimulated both by the struggle to win those
rights and by their enjoyment when won. We see this clearly in the eighteenth
century, which saw the birth, not only of modern civil rights, but also of
(lnodern national consciousness. The familiar instruments of modern demo-
cracy were fashioned by upper classes and then handed down, step by
step,_to the lower: political journalism for the intelligentsia was followed
by<uewspapers' for all who could read, public meetings, propaganda campaigns
and associations for the furtherance of public causes. Repressive measures
and taxes were quite unable to stop the flood. And with it came a patriotic
nationalism, expressing the unity underlying these controversial outbursts....
This growing national consciousness, this awakening public opinion, and
these first stirrings of a sense of community membership and common her-
itage did not have any material effect on class structure and social inequality
for the simple and obvious reason that, even at the end of the nineteenth
century, the mass of the working people did not wield effective political
power. By that time the franchise was fairly wide, but those who had recently
received the vote had not yet learned how to 1,Iseit. The political rights of
citizenship, unlike the civil rights, were full o(potential dal1$er to the capit-
alist system, although those who were cautiously extendirig them down the
social scale probably did not realise quite how great the danger was. They
could hardly be expected to foresee what vast changes could be brought about
61
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
by the peaceful use of political power, without a violent and bloody revolu-
tion. The planned society and the welfare state had not yet risen over the
horizon or come within the view of the practical politician. The foundations
of the market economy and the contractual system seemed strong enough
to stand against any probable assault. In fact, there were some grounds for
expecting that the working classes, as they became educated, would accept
the basic principles of the system and be content to rely for their protection
and progress on the civil rights of citizenship, which contained no obvious
menace to competitive capitalism. Such a view was encouraged by the fact
that one of the main achievements of political power in the later nineteenth
century was the recognition of the right of collective bargaining. This meant
that social progress was being sought by strengthening civil rights, not by
creating social rights; through the use of contract in the open market, not
through a minimum wage and social security.
But this interpretation underrates the significance of this extension of civil
rights in the economic sphere. For civil rights were in origin intensely indi-
vidual, and that is why they harmonised with the individualistic phase of
capitalism. By the device of incorporation groups were enabled to act legally
as individuals. This important development did not go unchallenged, and
limited liability was widely denounced as an infringement of individual
responsibility. But the position of trade unions was even more anomalous,
because they did not seek or obtain incorporation. They can, therefore, ex-
ercise vital civil rights collectively on behalf of their members without formal
collective responsibility, while the individual responsibility of the workers in
relation to contract is largely unenforceable. These civil rights became, for
the workers, an instrument for raising their social and economic status, that
is to say, for establishing the claim that they, as citizens, were entitled to
certain social rights. But the normal method of establishing social rights is
by the exercise of political poweI; for social rights imply an absolute right
to a certain standard of civilisation which is conditional only on the discharge
of the general duties of citizenship. Their content does not depend on the
economic value of the individual claimant. There is therefore a significant
difference between a genuine collective bargain through which economic
forces in a free market seek to achieve equilibrium and the use of collective
civil rights to assert basic claims to the elements of social justice. Thus the
acceptance of collective bargaining was not simply a natural extension of
civil rights; it represented the transfer of an important process from the polit-
ical to the civil sphere of citizenship. But 'transfer' is, perhaps, a misleading
term, for at the time when this happened the workers either did not possess,
or had not yet learned to use, the political right of the franchise. Since
then they have obtained and made full use of that right. Trade unionism has,
therefore, created a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel with
and supplementary to the system of political citizenship.
62
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
Social rights in the twentieth century
The period of which I have hitherto been was one which. the
rowth of citizenship, substantial and impressIve though It was, had httle
effect on social inequality. Civil rights gave legal powers. whose use
drastically curtailed by class prejudice and lack of economIC
Political rights gave potential power whose exercise expenence,
organisation and a change of ideas as to the proper government.
All these took time to develop. Social rights were at a mmlmum and
not woven into the fabric of citizenship. The common of
and voluntary effort was to abate the nuisance of poverty dIsturbmg
the pattern of inequality of which poverty was the most obVIOusly unpleas-
ant consequence. . tl
A new period opened at the end of the nineteenth convemen y
marked by Booth's survey of Life and Labour of the People m
the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor. It saw the first bIg. ad:ance I? s?clal
rights, and this involved significant changes in the egahtanan
ex ressed in citizenship. But there were other forces at work as well. A nse of
incomes unevenly distributed over the social classes altere.d
nomic distance which separated these classes from one another,
the gap between skilled and unskilled labour and between sk.tlled labour
and non-manual workers, while the steady increase in small savmgs blUI:red
the class distinction capitalist and the propertyless proletanan
Secondly, a system of:dl!ect taxatiollh ever steeply ci
the whole scale of disposable incOiil'es. ThIrdly, mass productIOn fOl the home
market and a growing interest on the part of industry in needs
of the common people enabled the less well-to-do to enJoy a
isation which differed less markedly in quality from that nch .than It
had ever done before. All this profoundly altered the settmg m whIch the
progress of citizenship took place. Social from the
of sentiment and patriotism into that of matenal enjoyment. The compon
ents of a civilised and cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few,
brought progressively within reach of the many, who were there y
to stretch out their hands towards those that still grasp. The
diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for Its abohtlon, at least
with regard to the essentials of social welfare. . . .
These aspirations have in part been met by SOCIal n.ghts m
the status of citizenship and thus creating a ulllversal nght t? real mcome
which is not proportionate to the market of t?e claImant.
abatement is still the aim of social rights, but It has acqUired a new
It is no longer merely an attempt to abate the obvious nuisance. of
in the lowest ranks of society. It has assumed the guise of actIOn
the whole pattern of social inequality. It !s no content to raIse t e
floor-level in the basement of the social edIfice, leavmg the superstructure as
63
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?

it was. It has begun to remodel the whole building, and it might even end by
converting a skyscraper into a bungalow. It is therefore important to consider
whether any such ultimate aim is implicit in the nature of this development,
or whether, as I put it at the outset, there are natural limits to the contem-
porary drive towards greater social and economic equality.... Part 2
I said earlier that in the twentieth century citizenship and the capitalist class
system have been at war. Perhaps the phrase is rather too strong, but it is
quite clear that the former has imposed modifications on the latter. But we HISTORY
should not be justified in assuming that although status is a principle that
conflicts with contract, the stratified status system which is crel?ping into
citizenship is an alien element in the economic world outside. SOcial rights
in their modern form imply an invasion of contract by status, the subordina-
tion of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by
the declaration of rights....

64
 5
THE IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
SINCE CLASSICAL TIMES

J. G A. Pocock

Source: Queen's Quarterly, 99:1 (1992),33-55.

Citizens of Athens were able to represent themselves directly

in their public forum. Addressing their fellow citizens in an
assembly of equals, they collectively consented to "rule and be
ruled." But what of ge11der and matter, labour and property
- the world surrounding democracy? John Pocock, addressing
the Queen's symposium on the Citizen and the State, exam-
ines the history of the public and private citizen.

When we speak of the "ideal" of "citizenship" since "classical" times, the last
term refers to times that are "classical" in a double sense. In the first place,
these times are "classical" in the sense that they are supposed to have for us
the kind of authority that comes of having expressed an "ideal" in durable
and canonical form - though in practice the authority is always conveyed
in more ways than by its simple preservation in that form. In the second
place, by "classical" times, we always refer to the ancient civilizations of the
Mediterranean, in particular to Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC
and to Rome from the third century BC to the first AD. It is Athenians and
Romans who are supposed to have articulated the "ideal of citizenship" for
us, and their having done so is part of what makes them "classical." There
is not merely a "classical" ideal of citizenship articulating what citizenship
is; "citizenship" is itself a "classical ideal," one of the fundamental values
that we claim is inherent in our "civilization" and its "tradition." I am putting
these words in quotation marks not because I wish to discredit them, but
because I wish to focus attention upon them; when this is done, however,
they will turn out to be contestable and problematic.

67
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP

The "citizen" - the Greek po lites or Latin civis - is defined as a member capacity of its own for the intelligent pursuit of good. It is better to, rule
of the polis or Roman res publica, a form of human association animals than things, slaves than animals, women than slaves, one's fellow
umque to these ancient Mediterranean peoples and by them trans- citizens than the women, slaves, animals, and things contained in one's house-
mItted to "Europe" and "the West." This claim to uniqueness can be criticized hold, But what makes the citizen the highest order of being is his capacity
and relegated to the of myth; even when this happens, however, the to rule and it follows that rule over one's equal is possible only where one's
myth has a ,of unique as a determinant of "western" identity equal ;'ules over one, Therefore the citizen rules and is ruled; join
- n,o ?ther clvIlIzatl?n has a myth like this, Unlike the great co-ordinated each other in making decisions where each decider respects the authOrIty of
socIetIes that arose In the river-valleys of Mesopotamia Egypt o· Ch' the others, and all join in obeying the decisions (now known as "laws") they
th /. 11' , ,I Ina,
, e po IS a socIety, rather exploitatively than intimately related to have made.
Its productIve and perhaps originally not much more than
a of raiders, It could therefore focus its attention less This account of human equality excludes the greater part of the human
on ItS presumed place In a cosmic order of growth and recurrence "'I1d m . species from access to it. Equality, it says, is something of which only a very
th h " d ' 'd ' , ... Ole on
e erolc In IVI ualIsm of the relations obtaining between its human _ few are capable, and we in our time know, at least, that equality has pre-
b h ., f h ' u mem
, el'S; t e ongIns o. umamsm are to that extent in barbarism. Perhaps this requisites and is not always easy to achieve, For Aristotle the prerequisites
IS why the myths of the polis do not describe its separation from are not ours; the citizen must be a male of known genealogy, a patriarch, a
the great cosmIC orders of Egypt or Mesopotamia, but its substitution of its warrior, and the master of the labour of others (normally slaves), and these
OW? for those of archaic tribal society of blood feuds and kinship prerequisites in fact outlasted the ideal of citizenship, as he expressed it, and
oblIgatIOns, Solon and Klelsthenes, the legislators of Athens, substitute for an persisted in western culture for more than two millennia. Today we all attack
of clansmen speaking as clan members on clan concerns an assembly them, but we haven't quite got rid of them yet, and this raises the uncomfort-
of whose may speak on any matter concerning the po lis (in able question of whether they are accidental or in some way essential to the
LatIn, on res publtca, a term which is transferred to denote the assembly ideal of citizenship itself. Is it possible to eliminate race, class, and gender
and socIety themselves), In the Eumenides, the last play in Aeschylus's as prerequisites to the condition of ruling and being ruled, to participate as
Orestela, another fundamental expression of foundation myth, Orestes comes equals in the taking of public decisions, and leave the classical description
on the, as a tribesman and leaves it as a free citizen cap- of that condition in other respects unmodified? Feminist theorists have had
able wIth hIS equals of JudgIng and resolving his own guilt It I'S h a great deal to say on this question, and I should like to defer to them - and
. h h . , ' ,owever,
uncertaIn w et et the has been altogether wiped out or remains leave it to them to speak about it. At an early point in the exposition of the
concealed at foundatIOns of the city - there are Roman myths that express problem, one can see that they face a choice between citizenship as a condi-
the, same ambIvalence - and the story is structured in such a way that women tion to which women should have access, and subverting or deconstructing
easIly symbolize the primitive culture of blood, guilt, and kinship which the the ideal itself as a device constructed in order to exclude them. To some
males, are trying to surpass, But the men, as heroes, continue to extent this is a rhetorical or tactical choice, and therefore philosophically
act ,the pnmltIve values (and to blame the women for it), vulgar, but there are real conceptual difficulties behind it.
ThIS IS a point that must be made strongly, and made all the time, but it Aristotle's formulation depends upon a rigorous separation of public from
?oes n?t the fact that, stated as an ideal, the community of citizens private, of polis from O;/WS, of persons and actions from things, To qualify
IS one In WhIch speech takes the place of blood, and acts of decision take as a citizen, the individual must be the patriarch of a household or oikos, in
the .of vengeance: The. "classical" account of citizenship as an which the labour of slaves and women satisfied his needs and left him free
Ideal IS to be found In Anstotle's Politics, a text written late enough to engage in political relationships with his equals, But to engage in those
In polls hIstory - after the advent of the Platonic academy and the M aced . relationships, the citizen must leave his household altogether behind, main-
. I'f « oman
empIre - to qua 1 y as one of the meditations of the Owl of Minerva. In this tained by the labour of his slaves and women, but playing no further part
we are told the citizen is one who both rules and is ruled, in his concerns, The citizens would never dream of discussing their household
mtellIgent and purposlVe beings we desire to direct that which can be affairs with one another, and only if things had gone very wrong indeed would
dIrected towaI:d some purpose; to do so is not just an operational good it be necessary for them to take decisions in the assembly designed to ensure
but expreSSIOn of that is best in us, namely the capacity to patriarchal control of the households, In the para-feminist satires of Aristo-
opeI atIOnal goods. Therefore It IS good to rule, But ruling becomes bett ' phanes they have to do this, but they haven't the faintest idea how to set
·
, prop or t IOn as that wh'ICh IS
' ruled is itself better, namely endowed with some er In
about it·, there is no available discourse, because the situation is unthinkable,

68 69
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
What they discuss and decide in the assembly is the affairs of the po lis and
not the oilms: affairs of war and commerce between the city and other cities
affairs of pre-eminence and emulation, authority and virtue between
citizen.s To Arist?tle and many others, politics the activity
of rulIng and beIllg ruled) IS a good in itself, not the prerequisite of the
public good but the public good or res publica correctly defined. What mat-
ters is the freedom to take part in public decisions, not the content of the
decisions taken. This non-operational or non-instrumental definition of
politics has ?f definition of freedom ever since and explains
role of It. is not just a means to being free; it
IS the of !ree. Itself. Anstotle based his definition of citizenship on
a very ngorous dlstmctlOn between ends and means, which makes it an ideal
in the strict sense that it entailed an escape from the o;/ws the material
infrastructure in which one was forever managing the of action
into the po/is, the ideal superstructure in which one took actions which
were not to ends but ends in themselves. Slaves would never escape
from the matenal because they were destined to remain instruments, things
managed.by others; w?men would never escape from the oikos because they
were destmed to remam managers of the slaves and other things. Here is the
central of emancipation: does one concentrate on making the escape
or on denymg that the escape needs to be made? Either way, one must reckon
with those who affirm that it needs to be made by others, but that they have
never needed to make it. The citizen and the freedman find it difficult to
become equals.
If one wants to make citizenship available to those to whom it has been
on grounds.that they too much involved in the world of things
- m matenal, productIve, domestIc, or reproductive relationships - one has
to choose .them from these relationships and denying
that these relatIOnshIps are negative components in the definition of citizen-
ship. If one chooses the latter course, one is in search of a new definition
of .citizenship, d.i[,feri?g from the Greek definition articulated by
Anstotle, a III which public and private are not rigorously separated
and the barrIers between them have become permeable or have disappeared
altogether. In the latter case, one will have to decide whether the concept of
the )u.blic" has survived at all, whether it has merely become contingent
and or has actually been denied any distinctive meaning. And if
that IS what has happened, the concept of citizenship may have disappeared
as well. That is the predicament with which the "classical ideal of citizenship"
con!ronts those who set to criticize or modify it, and they have not always
aVOIded the traps the predicament puts before them. In the next part of this
papel; I some alternative definitions of citizenship have
become hlstoncally avaIlable, but before I do so, I want to emphasize that
the. classical and is a definition of the human person as a cognitive,
active, moral, social, mtellectual, and political being. To Aristotle, it did not
70
IDEAL OF cITIZENSHIP
seem that the human - being cognitive, active and purposive - could be fully
human unles!i he ruled himself. It appeared that he could not do this unless
he ruled things and others in the household, and joined with his equals
to rule and be ruled in the city. While making it quite clear that this fully
developed humanity was accessible only to a very few adult males,
made it no less clear that this was the only full development of humalllty
there was (subject only to the Platonic suggestion that the life of pure thought
might be higher still than the life of pure action). He therefore declared that
the human was kala phusin zoon politikon, a creature formed by nature to
live a political life, and this, one of the great western definitions of what it
is to be human, is a formulation we are still strongly disposed to accept. We
do instinctively, or by some inherited programming, believe that the indi-
vidual denied decision in shaping her or his life is being denied treatment as
a human, and that citizenship - meaning membership in some public and
political frame of action - is necessary if we are to be granted decision and
empowered to be human. Aristotle arrived at this point - and took us there
with him - by supposing a scheme of values in which political action was a
good in itself and not merely instrumental to goods beyond .it. In taking
part in such action the citizen attained value as a human bemg; he knew
himself to be who and what he was; no other mode of action could permit
him to be that and know that he was. Therefore his personality depended on
his emancipation from the world of things and his entry into the world of
politics, and when this emancipation was denied to others, they must.
whether to seek it for themselves or to deny its status as a prereqUIsIte of
humanity. If they took the latter course, they must produce an alternative
definition of humanity or face the consequences of having none. Kata phusin
zoon politikon set the stakes of discourse very high indeed.
I want to turn now to a second great western definition of the political uni-
verse. This one is not aimed at definition of the citizen, and therefore, in
Aristotle's sense it is not political at all. But it so profoundly affects our
understanding of the citizen that it has to be considered part of the concept's
history. This is the formula, ascribed to the Roman jurist Gaius, according
to which the universe as defined by jurisprudence is divisible into "persons,
actions, and things" (res). (Gaius lived about five centuries after the time
of Aristotle, and the formula was probably well-known when he made use of
it.) Here we move from the ideal to the real, even though many of the res
defined by the jurist are far more ideal than material, and we move from the
citizen as a political being to the citizen as a legal being, existing in a world
of persons, actions, and things regulated by law. The intrusive concept here
is that of "things." Aristotle's citizens were persons acting on one another,
so that their active life was a life immediately and heroically moral. It would
not be true to say that they were unconcerned with things, since the po lis
possessed and administered such things as walls, lands, trade, and so forth,
71
 CITIZENSHIP?
and there w€re practical decisions to be taken about them, But the citizens
did not upon each other through the medium of things, and did not in
the first mstance define one another as the possessors and administrators of
things, We saw that had been left behind in the oikos, and that, though
one possess them m order to leave them behind, the polis was a kind
of ongomg potlatch in which citizens emancipated themselves from their
in order to meet face to face in a political life that was an end
m Itself. ,But for the Roman jurist it was altogether different; persons acted
thmgs, of their actions were directed at taking or main-
tammg It was these actions, and through the things or
possessIOns which were the subjects of the actions, that they encountered
one another entered into relationships which might require regulation,
!he w?rld of thmgs, ,or res: claimed the status of "reality"; it was the medium
m WhlC,h human b,emgs 1,IVed and through which they formed, regulated,
and articulated their relatIOns with each other, The person was defined and
represented through his actions upon things; in the course of time the term
" t " , immunities outside the officer's jurisdiction, The ideal of citizenship has come
proper y came to mean, first, the defining characteristic of a human or
ot?er being" second, the relation which a person had with a thing, and
third: the thmg as the possession of some person, From being kata
ph,usm zoon polrtTlwn, the human individual came to be by nature a pro-
pnetor or possessor of things; it is in jurisprudence, long before the rise and
of the market, that we should locate the origins of possessive
mdlvlduahsm,
, The ,individual a citizen - and the word "citizen" diverged
from It,S Ans,tot,ehan significance - through the possession of
and the, practice of Junsprudence, His actions were in the first instance
directed at ,thmgs and at other through the medium of things; in
second mstance, they were actIOns he took, or others took in respect of
at law - appropriation, conveyance, acts of litiga-
tIOn, Justification, His relation to things was regulated by law,
and hiS actIOns were performed in respect either of things or of the law
regulating actions, A "citizen" came to mean someone free to' act by law, free
to ask expect the law's protection, a citizen of such and such a legal
of, such and such a legal standing in that community, A famous
narrative case IS that of St. Paul announcing himself a Roman citizen, Paul
not only asserts as a citizen he is immune from arbitrary punishment,
h,e, goes on remmd the officer threatening the punishment that he is a
cItizen by birth and the officer only by purchase and therefore of lower
and Citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with
It nghts certam perhapsyossessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps
- available m many kmds and degrees, available or unavailable
of for many kinds of reason, There is still much about
It that IS Ideal, but It has become part of the domain of contingent realit
, a category of status in the world of persons, actions, and things, One
72
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
say in the world of St. Paul that citizenship is a right to and
say far more than by saying the same in the world accordmg to Aristotle, ,
We now ask: in what sense does "citizen" remain a political term after It
has' become a legal or juristic concept? An Aristotelian citizen, ruling a,nd
being ruled, took part in the making or determining of the laws
he was governed, There had been a time when civis Romanus had Similarly
denoted one who participated in the self-governing assemblies of republican
Rome, But Paul - who is not a Roman, has never seen Rome, and will find
no assembly of the citizens if he ever gets there - means something quite
different. By claiming to be a Roman citizen, he means that of the various
patterns of legally defined rights and ava,ilable to subjects of a
complex empire made up of many commumtIes, he enJoys access to the most
uniform and highly privileged there is, Had he been only a citizen of Tarsus,
the officer might have ordered him to be flogged, especially as they were not
in Tarsus at the time, But he is a Roman citizen and can claim rights and
to denote a legal status, which is not quite the same thing as a political
status and which will, in due course, modify the meaning of the term "pol-
itical" itself, Over many centuries, the legalis homo will come to denote one
who can sue and be sued in certain courts, and it will have to be decided
whether this is or is not the same as the zoon politikon, ruling and being ruled
in an Aristotelian polis,
The status of "citizen" now denotes membership in a community of shared
or common law, which mayor may not be identical with a territorial com-
munity, In Paul's case it is not; the status of "Roman citizen" is one of
several extended by Roman imperial authority to privileged groups through-
out the empire (who enjoy it, wherever they may be, while living and moving
- empires can be highly mobile societies - alongside others who enjoy only
local and municipal privileges in communities more localized and territorial
in terms of the laws that define them), In much later centuries, these muni-
cipal communities become known by the medieval French term bour!!" and
one's right of membership in them, one's right of appeal to the pnvIlege
and protection of municipal law, comes to be known as one's bourgeoisie, In
virtue of one of those rhetorical devices that extend meaning from the part
to the whole the universal community of legal privilege to which St. Paul
laid claim, his right of membership within it, came to be described as
his bourgeoisie Romaine, the municipal authority of that city having
imperial. But "bourgeois" and "bourgeoisie" came to denote membership m
a municipal - rather than an imperial or political - community, While the
bourgeois might sue and be sued, it was not clear that he ruled and was ruled,
even when his bourg might claim to be free and sovereign, In consequence,
although many cities and civitates had been reduced to the municipal status
of bourgs within empires and states, and the words "bourgeois" and "citizen"
were used interchangeably as a result, there was always room for doubt
73
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
they the same meanings - whether the bourgeois really
enjoyed, should enJoy, or wanted to enjoy the absolute liberty to rule and
be ruled asserted by the ideal of citizenship in its classical or Aristotelian
sense.
.was the notion of that profoundly altered the meaning of the
As Paul Gams both knew, law denoted something imperial,
and multiform; there were many kinds of law, some of which
applied everywhere and some of which did not. As soon, therefore as one
employed the te.rm "citizen" to denote the member of a community'defined
by law, there mIght be as many definitions of "citizen" as there were kinds
of law. There was a community of Roman citizens like Paul, who might claim
the same status wherever they went in the empire; there were numerous
communities of those whose citizenship was only municipal and did not
apply municipa.l authority could not be appealed to; there was half
populatIOn accordll1g to gender and about half according to the distinc-
tion between slave and free who were not citizens at all and could not take
the initiative in claiming the protection of the law even if it was offered them
And there was the notion - a new "classical ideal" - of a universal
munity to which all humans belonged as subject to the law of nature. But
whether one was a "citizen" of the community defined by the law of nature
v.:as a th.at resources even of metaphor. Certainly one
dId not rule 111 It, [f by rule was meant determining what the law of the
sh?uld be; there was no assembly of all mankind, and the very
notIOn a umversal law meant that one could be a citizen only municipally,
determll1l11g what the local, particular, and municipal application of the
law of nature sh.ould be. There had by this time appeared the figure, or ideal
type, of the who, as the word was used as a classical ideal
claimed that the. cognition of natural law was an intellectual activity, and
that by. a separatIOn between contemplation and action, theory and practice
the philosopher had acquired in his ideal world the absolute freedom of
determination once sought by the citizen in his polis. There are those who
history ofyolitical thought has no meaning outside the history of
thIS c!aIm by the but my commission in this lecture is to pursue
the hIstory of the concept of the citizen.
The advent of jurisprudence moved the concept of the "citizen" from the
zoon politikon toward the legalis homo, and from the eivis or polites toward
the bourgeois or burger. It further brought about some equation of the
with the '.'subject," for in defining him as the member of a community
of law, It emphaSIzed that he was, in more senses than one, the subject of
those laws that defined his community and of the rulers and magistrates
empowered to enforce them .. It would do little violence to our use of language
to suppose St. Pau.I claImed ?e a Roman "subject" since by doing so
,he and pnv[lege as well as offering allegiance and
obedIence. Th[s IS why the last action he performs as eivis Romanus is to
74
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
exercise his right of appealing to Caesar, after which the local magistrates
are obliged to' send him to Rome to be judged by Caesar, and we don't know
exactly what Caesar did with him when he got there; Caesar's jurisdiction
certainly extended to judgment of life or death. All this would be in the
minds of Lord Palmerston and his parliamentary hearers when he proclaimed
that any British subject might say with Paul "civis Romanus sum." In terms
of protection and allegiance, right and authority, "subject" and "citizen"
might be interchangeable terms, and when my passport declares me to be a
United Kingdom "citizen" as well as a British "subject," I know that it is
offering me rights and protections within the United Kingdom which may
be denied to other "British subjects," and I am not altogether reassured, even
though I am being privileged, by the implied separation between "subject"
and "citizen" which once meant the same thing.
What is the 'difference between a classical "citizen" and an imperial or
modern "subject?" The former ruled and was ruled, which meant among
other things that he was a participant in determining the laws by which he
was to be bound. The latter could appeal to Caesar; that is, he could go into
court and invoke a law that granted him rights, immunities, privileges, and
even authority, and that could not ordinarily be denied him once he had
established his right to invoke it. But he might have no hand whatever in
making that law or in determining what it was to be. It can be replied that
this is too formal a way of putting it; the law functions in such a way
that it is determined in the process of adjudication, and litigants, witnesses,
compurgators, pleaders, and so forth play a variety of parts in the process of
determining it. The legalis homo is not necessarily a subject in the rigorously
passive sense. But the growth of jurisprudence decentres and may margin-
alize the assembly of citizens by the enormous diversity of answers it brings
to the questions of where and by whom law is made, and how far it is made
- how far determined and how far discovered. It may be found in the order of
nature, the revealed will of God, the pleasure of the prince, the judgment
of the magistrate, the decree of the assembly, or the customs and usages
formed in the processes of social living themselves; and in this majestic
hierarchy of lawgivers, the assembly of citizens, meeting face to face in the
utter freedom to determine what and who they shall be, can only be one and
may sink into entire insignificance. Legalis homo is perpetually in search of
the authority that may underlie determinations of the law; the need to close
off this search within the human world may induce him to locate sovereignty
whenever it seems to have come to rest, in prince or people, and there are
circumstances in which sovereignty may be lodged in the assembly of the
citizens, so that the individual as citizen comes again to be what he was in
the classical ideal, a co-author of the law to which he is subject. But there
are so many other possible locations of sovereignty, and so many ways of
determining and discovering law other than by the sovereign's decree, that
even when the subject is a member of the sovereign, he is unlikely to forget
75

Charles I's, dictum that Ha. subject and a sovereign are clean different things"
may ask he IS the same person when ruling that he was when
beIng ruled. IS the question repeatedly asked by Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
the last great phIlosopher of early modem politics, and it reminds us that even
from the world of Paul and from the world of Jean-Jacques
- the road back to the slmplIclhes of the po lis may be too long to be
Yet the meanIng of "the ideal of citizenship since classical times"
that need to explore this road back, even if we cannot travel
It, and It IS Important to understand why we have this need.
It is no less important to represent the substitution of the Gaian
th A . I' . tormu a
101' e nstote Ian as a hIghly successful, and in many ways beneficial, revolt
of the real - and even the material - against the ideal and against:'th I . I
'd If" h' . e c asslca
I ea 0 cItizens Ip. The Greek citizen, stepping from the oikos into the polis,
out of the world of things into a world of purely personal inter-
actl.ons, a world of deeds and words, speech and war. The Roman citizen
subject law and prince, was constantly reminded by the Gaian
t?at he lIved In a wo:ld of things, as weH as of persons and actions. And
for thlllgS is res, the world of things has ever since asserted
ItS cl.alm. to be the world." The formula insistently returned his attention
to hIS ?lkos, to the thlllgs and persons he possessed and in whom the law
gave hIm property - the adjudication of which made him a citizen in the
lega.l sense of the term. Possession, rather than the emancipation from pos-
sessIOn, became t?e centre of his citizenship, and the problem of
freedom became lllcreaslllgl.y a problem of property: that of seeing how
women could become propnetors and slaves cease to be property Th'
th t b h' h " . IS was
es y w IC Itself - not merely the ideal of personal freedom
- a matenal lllfrastructure. The rhetoric of materialism is as old as
the rhet.onc of law a?d property, and history embarked on the long journey
belllg the narratIve of actions performed by persons to being, at the same
tIme, the archaeology of changes in the infrastructure of thI'ngs th
d· . f b h . , e pre-
con ItIon 0 .ot actIon and. personality. Property, from the same point,
ItS long care.er I? the metaphysics of social, historical, and
polItIcal reahty, the essential Illlk through which personality be ca
th gh · . . me rea
/?U the world of things and law became the regulation
o an realIty. The citizen, redefined as a legal rather than a
polItIcal beI?g, found ?imself connected to a world of things which he pos-
sessed and nghts t.o thlllgS which the law would also treat as his possessions.
He could define hImself as a citizen (or bourcreois) of a communit f I
d fi' h' . h ' 6 Y 0 aws
e. lllng IS ng ts to thmgs, and could go so far as to believe in the global
Ulllverse as such a community, in which the laws of nature defined h' t I
. h d d h' . IS na ura
ng ts an I?a as It. were, a citizen of nature. The enormous importance
of llldlVldualIsm was .that it made possession and right the
constItuent Imks between personahty and reality, in which framework action
76
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
became increasingly actio legis the forms of action, action according to law.
The universe of natural jurisprudence was a universe of due process..
The Gaian universe had only one defect, which was that though It was
capable of idealized, it could never be ideal. That is, it could never
satisfy the hunger of individuals in the Hellenic tradition to be free of
world of things, free to interact with other persons as free as themselves. m
a community of pure action and personal freedom, in a political commulllty
good in itself and an end in itself. The citize? claimed freedom throug?
action, the philosopher through contemplatIon, and havmg once artI-
culated as an ideal, it simply cannot be eradicated from the Ideals of a
I
Greek-derived civilization. The Gaian formula has persistently opposed the
real to the ideal; that is, it has insisted that we live in a world of things, that
our actions are for the most part performed upon things, and come to be
interactions with other persons only through the dense medium, the material
texture, of things upon which our actions constitute "reality." How that
"reality" is an order objectively existing is another question; the pomt here
is that it constantly mediates, deflects, and conditions the
seek to assert in thought and action. There is such an intolerable dIversIty
of things on which we act, and of interactions between the things and the
actions we perform upon them, that we can exist as persons, and encounter
other persons with whom to interact, only by submitting to the
deflections, fragmentations, specializations, and redefinitions of personahty
which action in the world of things imposes upon us. In the Gaian universe
we are all foxes, never lions or hedgehogs. But since we also live in a Homeric
and a Platonic universe, we desire to be all three of these symbolic creatures
at the same time.
Consequently, we can simplify the history of the concept of citizenship in
western political thought by representing it as an unfinished dialogue between
the Aristotelian and the Gaian formulae, between the ideal and the real,
between persons interacting with persons and persons interacting thr?ugh
things. Both formulae have left us a divided legacy. Aristotle and the anCIents
have left us believing that it is only in the interaction with others to shape
our lives in political decisions that we are free, human, and ends in
I But, at the same time, they remind us that in the relation of ruhng and
being ruled we are simultaneously ends in ourselves and means to the ends
of others; it is a relationship of using and being used, and there is a ques-
tion whether any ethos of community, friendship, or love quite overcomes
that, even among citizens - let alone between those who are and
those like slaves or women in the ancient world, who are not. Gams, the
and, as we shaH see, the modems tell us that we know and
better and communicate better with one another, once we accept the dIsciplIne
of things as well as persons, of admitting that we live by with
a world of things that we possess, transfer, and produce, and In we
recognize others as having rights of property and labour that make us mto
77
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP

persons. In this formula we live at a slight distance from others and even
with things and recognizing others as acquiring moral being through the
from ourselves, separated by the medium of things on which we act and so
same interactions. The individual became a person through acquiring rights
make ourselves into persons; we act only indirectly on one another and see
and. recognizing their acquisition by others, and this process occurred in a
selves as created in what is termed "reality," but thus we escape the intoler-
material world, one in which things were the objects of actions and persons
able strain of interacting directly with persons whom we must consider as
the subjects of their own actions. In this way, the person appropriated the
they consider us, both ends in selves and means to the self-creation of
material world, or world of "nature," and carried his interactions with it into
But t.he of reality leaves undispelled the danger of a dictatorship
a legal and political world, constituted by his recognition of the rights of
of thmgs; m ceasmg to regard others as merely things to be used to our own
others and the magistrate's recognition of his obligation to administer the
ends, may we not become things to our selves, acknowledging that we are
law that regulated the relations between possessive individuals. If government
never fully persons and that our selves remain contingent upon dear old
were a matter of law, and law a matter of property, then the relations between
reality? To this the jurists, and those political philosophers we have come to
persons, actions, and things had been organized as political, real, and
term "liberals," have proposed the solution of regarding the person as the
material.
bearer of what are called "rights." These are modes of interaction between the
I am emphasising the material component in all this because I am aiming
person and the world of things, and with other persons through the medium
to organize the history of the ideal of citizenship around the Gaian introduc-
of things; persons recognize one another as human, and so recognize themselves
tion of the concept of "things." Materialism as a tool of social thought
as human, through recognising one another's rights in a universe of shared
is much older than Marxism - as old as the Gaian formula, which is older
la,,:, - Paul: t?e Roman and even Caesar may be thought of as than Gaius himself, and it is part of the destructive arrogance of Marxism
domg m the btbhcal story. Very Impressive efforts have been made, by means
that it has laid claim to a monopoly upon materialism. In the liberal or
both revolutionary and constitutional, to convert that legal universe into
proto-liberal process I have been describing, the person defined as
a political universe, thus enlarging the rights-bearer or legalis homo into a
proprietor before he claimed to be a citizen, and thus set up a world of relations
citizen in some both Aristotelian and Gaian, political and legal, ancient
with things and persons which he did not leave behind in an Aristotelian
and modern. ThiS IS where we encounter the liberal or modern ideal of citizen-
oikos when he entered politics and became a citizen, but, on the contrary,
ship,. in maintaining which we believe ourselves to be engaged; it remains
carried with him into politics as the pre-condition of his citizenship. This move
pOSSible to ask how successful it is being in making us persons, or selves.
raised many problems: how far could politics be described as the mainten-
ance of a pre-political and natural set of relationships? Was not the person
The Gaian formula became the formula for a liberal politics and a liberal
claiming that he existed by nature before he became a citizen, and so had a
ideal. of during the early modern and modern historical periods
natural and (so to speak) private existence and personality to which his
the way.. world of persons, actions, and things was citizenship was merely contingent? Was there a natural history of property
m. pnmItI.ve with no settled laws to give it and society existing prior to the civil history of politics? All such questions
In thiS conditIon, ll1dlvldual was supposed to develop relations emphasized that politics had become secondary to, and defined by, the social
With thmgs through the actIOns he performed upon them, which relations
history of property, and that the individual existed, became a person, and
the things pertain in. a peculiar sense to his personality, while making
endeavoured to remain one in that history - the history of persons, actions,
him a person by hiS relations with the things. The term "property"
and things - far more than in the world of ruling and being ruled, which
to be used m a double sense, meaning that the things came to be both
the Aristotelian formula defined as a world in which citizens met to decide
objects possessed by. the and .attributes of the proprietor's personality. (as Plato once put it) "no trivial question, but how a man should live." One
From a very early tIme It was pOSSible to ask whether this was a sufficient tremendous strength that the Gaian, juristic, and liberal ideal of citizenship
account of personality; was it possible to describe the individual as a moral
possesses is that it enables us to define an indefinite series of interactions
being simply by describing the sum of his possessive relationships? But once
between persons and things, which may be restated as rights, used to define
came to .recognize these relationships as enjoyed by the indi- new persons as citizens, and carried over into the world of liberal politics;
Vidual, It became pOSSible to recognize them as his "property" and him as a
we break down the patriarchal narrowness which separated the oikos from
"person" constituted by them, and so to define them as his "rights." By
the polis, and empower all manner of social beings to claim rights legal
describing all this as going on in the so-called "state of nature" - in a world of
citizenship, irrespective of gender, class, race, and perhaps even humal1lty. In
perso.ns, actions, and things not yet organized as politics - it was possible to
so doing, however, we necessarily make citizenship a legal fiction, brought
descnbe the person as a product of "reality," as creating himself by interacting
about by the invention of persons and the decision to attribute rights and

78
79
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
personality to them. At this point we hear the voice of the classical citizen
- now as likely to be female as male - proclaiming unequivocaIly that
she or he IS a person, self-proclaimed as such by joining with her or his equals
to rule and be ruled and' decide to be individuals, and at this point we
have encountered the limitations of a world in which we must consent to be
in. that ,,:,e may be free. The classical ideal - which may now
be Jomed m allIance WIth the classical liberal - has identified and begun its
quarrel with the post-modern.
This has come about since about 1700, when the juristic ideal of citizen-
ship seemed to completeness; the nature of property
- of the person s mteractIOn WIth the world of things - began to change and
to be s.een changing. It had been known as "real property," the possession
of an tenure in land: and this in turn was based on a process of
appropnatIOn very assocIated with arable cultivation. Humans appro-
pnated the earth, and m so doing became persons and citizens because
they ploughed it and exchanged its fruits; the only alternative claim made
by such the .English Diggers, was that they had been created in a s;iritual
commumon WIth the land because they were the incarnate children of God
so. dominant. was the of the plough that hunter-gatherer
tIes --: the InUlt and IndIans of North America or the tangata whenua and
abongm.es of the. . Pacific - were very easily considered "savages"
a?d demed legal cItIzenshIp or even human personality, simply because they
dId not plough and were therefore thought not to appropriate. Just as these
encounters were taking place, however (we can find them in Locke) it had
be recognize.d that the power of the state and the per;onality
of the mdIvIdual were basmg themselves on what was, most interestingly
termed "personal," as distinct from "real," property: that is on
with that were and exchangeable and - as res had always had
the to be - or created in the interaction between persons:
property m commodItIes, cash, credit, and capital. It was Locke who observed
that government becaI?e necessary only when media of exchange
made It possIble for persons to 111teract with others at a distance; Gibbon
observed that the savage was confined to a pre-personal existence by his lack
of money and letters as well as his lack of the plough. The linguisticaIly
"personal" property was that it involved the person
through hIS actIOns m the world of things far more efficaciously and power-
fuIly than merely "real" had ever done; he now acted upon things
that were the:nselves dynamIc and made his actions and his personality far
more dynamIc than ever before. And yet so many of the things on and
through which he acted were fictions - were the media of action rather than
th.ings acted :- that !t a question whether the person-
alIty and the cItIzenshIp WIth WhICh they provided him were not themselves
. fictitious and consequently not "real." Could a person be a citizen if he was
unreal even to himself?
80
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
These were the historical circumstances in which the modern to post-
modern ideal' of citizenship took shape: the ideal of the citizen as a social
involved in an indefinite series of social actions - actions by persons
upon things which set up relationships now exceeding the limits set by
possession and appropriation. These citizens are able to make claims
others and upon the civic process itself - claims that may all, at least 111
principle, be reducible to the language of rights. Citizenship therefore becomes
a practice of rights, of pursuing one's own rights and assuming the
of others within the legal, political, social, and even cultural commUl1ltIes
that have been formed for purposes of this kind. There are problems here
of membership (bourgeoisie), allegiance, and even sovereignty, and these come
to exist in two ways. In the first place, an adjudicative community may
demand final authority and closed identity if it is to function properly - the
buck has to stop somewhere - and may require the citizen to acknowledge that
he or she is a subject, whose aIlegiance is finally given to some community
as sovereign authority. In the second place, among the citizen's objectives
is the freedom, autonomy, authority and power to define herself or himself
as a person, which in this context means as a citizen of a community, and
there is a bipolar danger to be confronted at this point. A community or a
sovereign that demands the whole of one's allegiance may be foreclosing
one's freedom of choice to be this or that kind of person; that was the early
modern and modern danger. A plurality of communities or sovereignties that
take turns in demanding one's allegiance, while conceding that each and every
allocation of allegiance is partial, contingent, and provisional, is denying one
the freedom to make a final commitment which determines one's identity,
and that is plainly the post-modern danger. I recaIl reading, a couple of
months ago, an article in the Economist forecasting that Canada might
become the first post-modern democracy, and wondering whether this was
an encouraging prospect. It is one thing to decide that being a Canadian - or,
like me a New Zealander - offers one an open range of identities, and that
consists in retaining one's mobility in choosing between them. It is
quite another when the sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers of this world
get together to inform one that there is no choice of an identity, no commit-
ment of an allegiance, no determination of one's citizenship or personality
that they regard as other than provisional (or may not require one at any
moment to unmake). Under post-modern conditions we do confront these
alliances of un makers, deconstructors, and decenterers, and our citizenship
may have to be our means of telling them where they get off. The predica-
ment may be the result of our having immersed ourselves in the world of
persons, actions, and things, when the production of things has become
exponential and uncontrollable and is constantly redefining the actions and
the persons taking them. And if the things being produced are in fact not
material objects, but fictions and images, we have entered that post-modern
and post-structuralist world in which the languages, constantly producing
81
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
the.msel:es, more real than the persons speaking them. We may have to
resist thiS, and say that we have decided and declared who we are, that our
words forth and cannot be recalled, unspoken, or deconstructed.
To say thiS IS act or rather an act affirming citizenship.
But affirm citizenship. Without a sufficient consensus as to the republic
of which we are to be can be a very dangerous thing to do. To find
the Red or their on my doorstep, affirming that I am
hencefOl:th a cItIzen of their republic, is to find myself not liberated but
appropnated.
I using the of revolution - at a moment when revolutionary
actIOn everywhere directed at the demolition of revolutionary regimes _
because we are lookmg back over a two-century period at the outset of h' h
the ideal of citizenship became a revolutionary ideal. About 1700 as: IC _
above, in the Gaian universe began to look like
m a constantly changmg, expanding, and diversifying process of commercial
and instantly arose a criticism that emphasized the danger that
cItIzen not be able to maintain his freedom in this process, because
his personahty would become distracted and fragmented. This criticism
engaged, consciously and specifically, in a restatement of the classical Greco-
Roman .ideal; it wanted the citizen to retain the possession of arms instead
of makmg them over to the state, and it wanted him to maintain the anti-
que vi:tue (meaning the active consciousness of the self as citizen) of the
and. To this the reply was made, in an age of
hlston.cal that the classical ideal was archaic _ that
It Imphed a heroic warn or society, a patriarchal household, a subjection of
and a slav.e economy, that its ideal of personality was inhuman and
because It all the enrichments of personality brought to
the mdlvldual b'y. a of universal love and an economy of universal
CitIzen, ll1volved by the growth of commerce in an explosivel
groWlI1g UnIverse of persons, actions, and things, could affirm his
by rights he or she had never before possessed and by
appomtmg and govern him or her in ways never
before It IS from that we date the centrality of the notion
that the definmg charactenstIC of the citizen is his or her capacity to be
and that there is no reason why she should not have a repre-
sentatIve (and be one) as well as him. Faced with all this and much more
besides, however, the critics of commercial model11ity continued pertinaciousl
to ask how whether the citizen could maintain unity of personality
constantly makll1g over the essential attributes of his citizenship to be man-
aged on his be?alf by someone else. they responded to the great discovery
of representative democracy by askl11g how, if my citizenship was my person-
ality, I could possibly appoint someone else to be me for me? It was all very
, well to say that I could always recall my representative and appoint another;
82
IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP
the question remained unanswered how much of myself I had in
making myself over to these characters, and certainly there are moments
in the course' of an American presidential campaign when one wonders
what personality has to do with it. Are these things? Are these actions? Are
these persons?
The debate continued through the eighteenth century, and one could say
that it continues still. Because of this duality of values - the capacity of the
classical ideal to persist under the modern conditions so deeply opposed to
it - the great revolution in France was at one and the same time a declara-
tion of the Rights of Man, an attempt to devise a Gaian formula to give
legal personality to the human race, and an affirmation of active
and its classical virtue, in which Parisians took arms and went out to spIll
the blood of the impure, affirming themselves to be the free masters of their
destinies and determinants of their selves. They took to the streets as
Muscovites were doing while I was writing this lecture (with the difference
that Parisians showed a certain carefree innocence about what spilling the
blood of the impure could lead to, whereas Muscovites know so much about
it that they are understandably reluctant to begin again). Several significantly
titled recent studies - Carol Blum's Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue, Simon
Schama's Citizens - have investigated once more the connections between
virtue and terror, the circumstances in which the ideal of citizenship becomes
an instrument of collective homicide, and though this is not the whole of the
truth about the French or any other revolution, there has been quite enough
of it to merit investigation. The answer given by these and other authors
seems to be that once my citizenship becomes the affirmation of the purity
and integrity of my self, any adversary I may have becomes the adversary
of citizenship, purity, and integrity themselves, whom I must destroy if I am
to remain myself. And I find it easy to attribute a malignant lack of purity to
whole categories of human beings - hence the grisly succession of puritanical
holocausts perpetrated from Robespierre to Pol Pot. To this diagnosis, Edmund
Burke, at the beginning of the revolutionary story, added the observation
that it was what happened when the energies of the human mind escaped
from the restraints of property. However unsatisfying we may find Burke's
description of "property," he was making a Gaian point. If persons forgot
that they were living in a world of things - which imposed a material discip-
line that was the foundation of moral personality - then persons encountered
persons face to face. The only instruments, the only obstacles, that my self-
affirming action encountered consisted of other persons, whom I must use
or destroy as the imperatives of virtue commanded. This kind of action was
the only kind available when, as Burke put it, nothing ruled except the mind
of desperate men. Burke, in this respect a conservative materialist, was utter-
ing one of the great Gaian attacks upon the classical ideal; it was better to
live in a world of things than to be governed by the ideal of personal action.
83
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? IDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP

But we think of materialism as a dialectical and revolutionary force; I am information explosion, we have - since we are still under the .iJ?peratives
contending that it does not have to be that, but it certainly has been. On the f the Classical ideal - to find means of affirming that we are cltlzens: that
long road from Robespierre to Pol Pot, the citizen acting in a political com- o. . . Wl·th 0 th er persons. to
f affirming that we are persons and assoclatmg
munity merged into the acting in a historical process, but voice and action in the making of our worlds. the
claiming to exert there the same capacity to join with others in making their tion of the sovereign community of citizens to the mternatlOnal
world and themselves that we found in the classical ideal. This historization f post-industrial market forces has been a good or a bad first step m the
of citizenship has been the history of the ideal of revolution, and most of of a post-modern politics remains to be seen.
us find good reason to hope that its history is coming to an end; as we all
know, it went disastrously and genocidally wrong, and since Burke himself
it has been a valuable half-truth to say that it went wrong from the begin-
ning. It failed on both the Aristotelian and the Gaian counts; it was very
bad at understanding the relations between ruling and being ruled'that con-
stitute politics and citizenship, and there was much that was amiss with its
understanding of the relations between persons, actions, and things that
constitute both jurisprudence and history. Since the Roman lawyers them-
selves, the relation between persons and things had typically been the relation
of possession or of property. Marx and his predecessors endeavoured to
substitute the relation of production, and set the capacity to labour at the
centre of the human paradigm, where Aristotle had set the capacity to rule.
The worker, making and being made, took the place of the citizen ruling
and being ruled. The person, by his actions, produced things and produced
himself, thus creating his world instead of merely appropriating it. This
was clearly a noble ideal, however appallingly it became corrupted by errors
not unlike those Burke denounced in the Revolutionaries (and however much
we may wish to say that it mistook the nature of the productive process as
badly as that of the political). While it lasted, it offered the human creature
a vision of being the author of human history, and of forming communities
of worker citizens engaged in the production of history, but it does not seem
to have lasted longer than the industrial technology that associated human
labour with the operation of machines. While the politics of socialist revolu-
tion were destroying themselves through a series of appalling misconceptions
about the relations between persons, high-technology capitalism _ with its
usual devilish cunning - was destroying their basic premise by the single step
of substituting information for labour. The myth of the proletariat, and the
reality of social-democratic politics with a role for organized labour in them,
began a rapid disappearance, and we found ourselves in a post-industrial
and post-modern world in which more and more of us were consumers of
information and fewer and fewer of us producers or possessors of anything,
including our own identities. When a world of persons, actions, and things
becomes a world of persons, actions, and linguistic or electronic constructs
that have no authors, it clearly becomes much easier for the things _ grown
much more powerful because they are no longer real - to multiply and take
charge, controlling, and determining persons and actions that no longer
, control, determine, or even produce them. Under these conditions of the

84 85
 CITIZENSHIP

women of all ages. "Young men will go to the front; married men. will
6 arms and transport foodstuffs; women will make tents, clothes, WIll serve m
the hospitals; children will tear into lint; old men will get. themselves
carried to public places, there to stir up the courage of the warnors, hatred
CITIZENSHIP of kings, and unity in the republic" (Brinton 1934: 128). The mood is best
captured by the Marseillaise, "Aux armes, citoyens!"
The inspiration for all this was classical, that is, it derived from the read-
Michael Walzer ing of Aristotle, Plutarch, Tacitus, and so on. But the ideology is clearl? a
neoclassical, early-modern production. Machiavelli, Harrington, MontesqUIeu,
and Mably are key theorists, but it is Rousseau (and, a little later, Kant)
Source: T. Ball, 1. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conce'Pfllal Cl
Cam bfI'd ge: Cam b'd
fl ge
U' . Press, 1989, pp. 211-20.
mvefSlty . lange, who gives citizenship its modern philosophical grounding, connecting it to
the theory of consent. The citizen, in The Social Contract, is the free and
autonomous individual, who makes, or shares in the making of, the laws he
obeys: "obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty" (Social
Contract, bk.I, chap.8; 1950). Only the political community provides a suit-
able arena for this ethical self-creation. Only the activist citizen, who "flies
A citizen is, most simply, a member of a political community, entitled to what- to the public assemblies," can be both free and moral (righteous, upright, or
ever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities are attached just, rather than naturally good). .,.
to The word comes to us from the Latin civis; the Greek equiv- For Rousseau, the republic would be successful only If each CItIzen
alent IS po/rtes, member of the pollis, from which comes our "political." But the greater proportion of his happiness in public rather t?an in
we have more Latin than a vocabulary. What may be activity (Social Contract, bk.III, chap.l5). For then the purSUIt of happmess
the I?eology of cItizenshIp IS essentially an early-modern (neoclassical) would strengthen the structures of virtue. In the expanding bourgeois world
mterpretah?n of Greek and Roman republicanism, and the current legal of the eighteenth century, however, private activity - especially in the
understandmg of the concept has its sources in the later Rome of the empire and the family - was a more likely source of happiness. Wealth and affectIon,
and in early-modern reflections on Roman law.
rather than power and glory, seemed to most men and women the more
We can best engage the ideology in medias res, not, for the moment in its realistic, perhaps also the more desirable, goals. And some of them, l.east,
origins or early intellectual history, and not in its later decline and' inter- could actually accumulate wealth and win affection - not, however, as CItizens
but at the height of its vigor, during the French Revolution. in Rousseau's sense but as entrepreneurs, lovers, and parents, monsieurs rather
In ItS Jacobll1 phase, the revolution is best understood as an effort to estab- than citoyens, members of civil society rather than of the political community.
lish the identity of every Frenchman - against the But then civil society was a threat to the republic, for it drew its members
IdentI!Ies rehgIOn, estate, family, and region. The replacement away from politics; now they flew homewards rather than to the
of the stIll trtle A!0nsieur with the fully universal citoyen (and also, It followed that citizenship and virtue required either the repression of CIvIl
though symbolizes that effort. Citizenship was to society or the reduction of its scope and appeal. This project is already
replace rehgIOus faIth and famIlIal loyalty as the central motive of virtuous implicit in Rousseau's theory; Jacobin politics makes it explicit.
Inde.ed, virtue, and public spirit were closely connected "Revolutionaries must be Romans," declared the Jacobin tribune Saint-Just
Ideas, suggestmg a ngor?us commitment to political (and military) activity
on 0: the commun!ty -
was
not yet nation. Activity (meetings, speeches,
was an emphatically positive conception of
(1957: 197). They must be citizens in the style of the classical republics. But
this would require what Marx, writing about the Jacobin Terror of 1793, called
the "sacrifice" of bourgeois values - industry, competition, private interest,
the cItIzen s role. A dIstmctIOn between active and inactive citizens drawn and self-enjoyment. Indeed, the revolutionary state can impose the sacrifice;
on economic rather than political lines, was introduced in the constitution it can "abolish" the exuberance and corruption of civil society, but "only in
of 1791 but suppressed a year later (Brinton 1934: 42-3). In Jacobin ideol- the way it abolishes private property by ... confiscation ... or only in the
ogy, citizenship was a universal office; everyone was to serve the community. way it abolishes life by the guillotine" (Marx 1963: 16). There is no that
.the levee (1793), which goes well beyond all subsequent con- leads back to Greek or Roman citizenship except the road of coerCIOn and
scnptIon laws; It Itterally conscripts everybody, setting tasks for men and terror, because modern civil society does not breed citizens but rather, in

86 87
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CITIZENSHIP

Marx's philosophical jargon, "self-alienated natural and spiritual individuality" democratic citizens as men who rule and are ruled in turn, he was referring
and Engels 1956: .164) - men and women who need occasionally to not to the legislative function, making laws and then obeying them, but rather
Ima?me as cItIzens but whose everyday actions are governed by to the executive function, holding office and then submitting to other
the Im.perattves o.f the market. !acobinism enacts an inauthentic autonomy, holders. Once again, the character and scale of the community were crucIal.
and It sustam the enactment without continuous violence. In the city-state, citizens were likely to know (or at least know ot) one
ThIS faIlure to esta?hsh political life as the "real life" of ordinary men and and so they were ready to trust one another in office, even allowmg
women comes early m modern history, and it is not necessarily defi 't' ticular choices to be made by lottery (in Athens only generals and pubbc
Bt' d . . m lYe.
u It oes mVlte us to look back, to look behind neoclassical republI'c . physicians were elected) - a strong expression indeed of moral unity.
. d '. amsm,
as It were, an to study Its anCIent and more authentic models un t When the scale of political organization changes, unity and trust collapse
" h';> Th . YY rta was
citizens lp. e answer to this question is much disputed among contem- and a different understanding of citizenship is required. The requirement is
porary scholars of Greece and Rome, though it is increasingly clear th t most visible, perhaps, in modern bourgeois society, but it is apparent.
need to be skeptical of idealized accounts of public spiritedness and' p weI in the Roman empire; it is in the first instance the product of
·· . . h . 0 I Ica
par tIClpatIOn m t e ancIent republics. There too citizenship stood in inclusiveness. Rome expanded by granting citizenship to the peoples It con-
t' .h '1 I" some
ensIOn WIt lamI y, re IgIOn, and private economic interest. There too citizens quered - at first only to some and by degrees; in 212, by an. edict of Caracalla,
were often and apathetic. But the city-state was a far less to all subjects of the empire except the very lowest (chIefly rural) classes.
complex and dIfferentIated society than our own. And for many of 't I This extension did not alter the formal definition of citizenship, still expressed
't' h" If I S ma e
Cl Izens, t e , the community, was indeed the focal point in terms of office-holding, but it did alter the political and legal realities.
of everyday lIfe. In Its publIc squares, its courts and assemblies, they might When St. Paul claimed to be a Roman citizen, he was imagining himself not
well find the greater part of their happiness. as an active and involved member of the political community, certainly
minimal range of social differentiation is crucial here. Citizenship in not as a potential magistrate, but rather as the passive recipient of specific
Athens, ex.ample, was doubly endogamous, and so the body of rights and entitlements (Acts 23: 27). A citizen was more significantly some-
CltIze?S was an extended family, an urban tribe. Socrates could one protected by the law than someone who made and executed the law. On
plausIbly descnbe. the CIty and its laws as the parents of the citizens. "We this understanding, citizenship was relatively easy to extend to a large and
have brought you mt? the world," he has the Laws say, "and reared you and heterogeneous population whose members had no knowledge of one
educated you, and glYen you and all your fellow-citizens a share in all the and shared neither history nor culture. Henceforth the body of Roman
at our disposal" (Crito, 51c; 1954). The standard religion was a zens included people ethnically different from the original Romans, wIth
relIgIOn (a.s understood), providing local gods and a myth of different religions, different conceptions of political life, who lived elsew.here,
ongms..The of was unknown; religious rituals were performed and so on. Citizenship for such people was an important but occasIOnal
by pubhc pnests temples. Though Athens was an imperial center identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life.
and possessed a sIgmficant population of resident aliens and foreign slaves So it remained throughout the feudal period, when even the legal status
sense of .place and the attachment to homeland were strong among had only a bookish existence, replaced in actual social relationships by
clttzens. PreCIsely because . of the presence of aliens and slaves, class dI'VISIOns
.. private-law identities as serf, villein, vassal, lord, and so on. But the
the free and nattve-born, though visible enough, were never overrid- states of the late medieval and early-modern period, seeking to impose theIr
mg and took no form; in the assembly every citizen was the equal of authority on heterogeneous populations, returned to the (imperial) R?man
other. All thIS made for the moral unity of the city and lifted citizen- experience. Jean Bodin, the sixteenth-century jurist, an early of
ShIP pr?bably primacy among self-conceptions. sovereign power, was reflecting on this experience he defined.
AncIent was of this primacy, not occasionally as "one who enjoys the common liberty and protectIOn of authonty (Bodm
but every day, m pohttcal dISCUSSIOn, participation in theJ'uries and coun '1 1945: 158). "Enjoy" might mean "rejoices in," but I suspect that it is an
. I '1' . Cl s,
umversa mI Itary common worship. Perhaps most important entirely passive relationship that Bodin intended to describe. In his view,
of all was ?f clttzens through the chief magistracies. Aristotle citizen is not himself an authority; rather he is someone to whose protectIOn
understood m terms of eligibility for office (much as we mi ht the authorities are committed. Their commitment, insofar as it is serious,
understand It m terms of the vote): "The citizen in the strict sense is rules out the arbitrary use of political power; hence it makes for the kind of
defined .,' . [as] a man who shares in the administration of justice and in liberty sometimes called "negative" - the liberty of private life and individual
, the holdmg of office" (Politics, 1275a; 1948). When he went on to describe choice.

88 89
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Early-modern liberalism is an effort to explore and expand the Bodinian
liberty," wrote Montesquieu, "consists in security
or ... m the opmlOn that we enjoy security" (Spirit of the Laws, bk.xn,
cha?2; 1949). To share in the "common liberty" is to be protected against
vanous of danger - sometimes by other people, sometimes by
the the?lSelves. It IS to be made secure in one's physical life
(Hobbes) or m famIly and home (Bodin and Montesquieu) or in conscience
and p!'operty (Locke). But this search for protection assumes the primacy of
what IS protected, namely, the private or familial world. It is there that men
and find the part of their happiness; they "enjoy" protection
?ut m s0m.ethmg They are not political people; they have other
mterests, m salvatlOn or busmess or love or art and literature. For them th
political community is only a necessary framework, a set of external
ments, not a common life.
. as still dominates contemporary law. Citizens are
from ahens by the added protection to which they are entitled
also by the added obligation of military service), not by their
t? office. democratic states, of course, the vote is part of the
s tItle, but has. largely dropped out of the general understand-
mg. Thus Webster s InternatIOnal Dictionary: "A citizen as such is entitled to
the protection of life, liberty, and property at home and abroad but is not
with the suffrage or other political rights." ' requires, at least intermittently, the activist politics of citizens. And, secondly,
a full-scale revolt against the early-modern
of thIS CItIzenshIp - a reassertion of republican values against
the claIms of empll'e and the monarchic or liberal state. But this is an ideo-
logical reassertion and a failed revolt because the Jacobin intellectuals never
took measure of their own society. France was no city-state. Vast in scale
anCIent stan.dards),.heterogeneous and divided, the country did not pro-
appr?pnate socIal for an activist citizenship. And yet, republican
surVIved the Jacobm as it survived the fall of the ancient
cItIes; It has had a long after-ltfe, and even today it suggests an alternative
practical or utopian, to the largely apolitical existence of
cItIzens.
D.ualistic constructions are never adequate to the realities of social life.
I.t WIll be summarize this particular dualism of repub-
and Impenal or CItIzenship before trying to see what lies beyond
.. We have, then, two dIfferent understandings of what it means to be a
cItIzen. The first describes citizenship as an office, a responsibility, a burden
assumed;. the second describes citizenship as a status, an entitlement,
a nght set of nghts The first makes citizenship the core
of .our hfe, the .makes It ItS outer frame. The first assumes a closely
kmt body CItIzens, Its members committed to one another; the second
a dIverse and lo?sely connected body, its members (mostly) com-
mItted elsewhere. Accordmg to the first, the citizen is the primary political
90
CITIZENSHIP
actor, law-making and administration his everyday business. According to
the second, law-making and administration are someone else's business; the
citizen's business is private.
The first understanding of citizenship, Marx argued, is appropriate to
"the ancient, realistic, and democratic republic based on real slavery" while the
second is appropriate to "the modern spiritualist ... representative state which
is based on emancipated slavery, on bourgeois society" (Marx and Engels
1956: 164). But that distinction, like the fundamental dualism itself, is too
rigid. By "realistic," Marx means that citizenship among the ancients was a
concrete and actual experience; by "spiritualist," he means that citizenship
under modern conditions is an ideology and an illusion. In fact, however,
ancient realism was at least partly ideological, for there were many citizens
who were inactive or ineffective in action (and many more non-citizens upon
whom political silence was imposed). And modern spiritualism is at least
partly real, for ordinary citizens are sometimes mobilized in parties and
movements that change the shape of the larger society.
To understand citizenship in the United States today, and in Western
democracies more generally, we must focus on this partial reality. It has its
origin in two simple facts of political life: firstly, the security provided by the
authorities cannot just be enjoyed; it must itself be secured, and sometimes
against the authorities themselves. The passive enjoyment of citizenship
whenever an activist politics is possible, the definition of "common liberty"
is certain to be contested. Democratic politics since the French Revolution is
essentially this contest, sometimes fought to a settlement, but always renewed.
The contestants are not Jacobin (or Greek or Roman) citizens, but they
are also not the mere recipients or consumers of political protection - if
they were that they would get much less protection than they do.
"Common liberty" is an idea subject to expansion. The expansion is of
two sorts. The number and range of people in the "commonality" grows by
invasion and incorporation. Slaves, workers, new immigrants, Jews, Blacks,
women - all of them move into the circle of the protected, even if the pro-
tection they actually get is still unequal or inadequate. And, at the same time,
the number and range of "liberties" or entitlements also grows, and citizen-
ship comes gradually to entail not only the protection of life and family but
also the provision, in one or another degree, of education, health care, old
age pensions, and so on. Both these expansions are contested; both involve
organization and struggle, and so citizenship as political participation or
"ruling" and citizenship as the receipt of benefits go hand in hand. At least,
they go hand in hand until a full range of benefits is finally provided for
a full range of citizens. Then there may be nothing left to organize and
struggle for, no contest worth contesting. But that time seems a long way
off. Meanwhile citizenship is simultaneously active and passive, requiring the
exercise of ancient virtues if only for the enjoyment of modern rights.
91
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?

But the number of citizens actually involved in political organizations,

actually holding political office, is fairly small, and the willingness of ordinary
men and women to devote time and energy to politics is fairly minimal. 7
Democratic citizenship in its contemporary form does not seem to encourage
high levels of involvement or devotion. Hence the periodic reappearance of LE CITOYEN/LA CITOYENNE
ancient citizenship in ideological dress, the expression of a hand-wringing
sense that something vital has been lost. Indeed, the primacy of politics has Activity, passivity and revo!utionary
been lost and with it the exhilarating sense of civic or urban camaraderie bred
in the Greek and Roman cities (never really shared by their rural members). conception of cItIzenshIp
But "lost" is a strange verb here, for this sort of thing has never been "found"
in a fully modern setting - except perhaps in those parties and movements
that championed the expansion of democratic citizenship. The labor move- William H. Se well, Jr
ment, the civil movement, the feminist movement, have all generated
in their time a csetlse oLsolidarity and an everyday militancy among large
Source: Colin Lucas (ed,), The Political Culture of the French RevoII/IlOn,
' I
VO, 2, Oxford'' Pergamon
numbers of men and women. But these are not, probably cannot be, stable Press, 1988, pp, 105-23.
achievements; they don't outlast the movement's success, even its partial
success. Citizenship is unlikely to be the primary identity or the consuming
passion of men and women living in complex and highly differentiated
societies, where politics competes for time and attention with class, ethnicity, Cette personne p ubll'que .. , prenoit autrefois le nom deI' Cite, .
religion, and family, and where these latter four do not draw people together et prend main tenant celui de Repllblique ou de po IfIqU,{
but rather separate and divide them. Separation and division make for the le uel est appelle par ses membres Etat quand 11 est ,
primacy of the private realm. Sduverain quand il est actif, Puissance en le compara?t a ses
bl bl A I''''gard des associes ils prel1l1ent collectIvement
sem
I
a de
es.peuple" et s'appellent en partIcu , I'ler C't comme
I oyens .
it l'autorite souverail1e, et Stljers comme soumls aux
References loix de I'Etat. 1
Aristotle. 1948. The Politics, translated by Ernest Barker. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bodin, Jean. 1945 [1566]. Methodfor the Easy Comprehension of History, translated
by Beatrice Reynolds. New York: Columbia University Press.
Brinton, Crane. 1934. A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799. New York: Harper and
Brothers. . .. ssa e from Rousseau's Du contrat social specified the core
Marx, Karl. 1963. Early Writings, translated by T. B. Bottomore. London: in
C. A. Watts.
h t "J' et " which imphe d su IOn .
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1956 [1844]. The Holy Family, translated by to t e erm su , 'h "'t n" implied an active participatIOn
R. Dixon. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
partidPftion .in
Montesquieu. 1949 [1748]. The Spirit of the LaJl!s, translated by Thomas Nugent. B th term was not always used so preCIse y as III
New York: Hafner.
laws. ut e . l' d "ces termes se confondent souvent
Plato. 1954. Crito, translated by Hugh Tredennick. In The Last Days of Socrates. tion. As Rousseau hImself comp , 1 d much more
Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 53-70. et se prennen t l'un pour l'autre"2
. CItoyen was common
l' y ause
city
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1950 [1762]. The Social Contract and Discourses, translated broadly, to indicate any of : of the term was
by G. D. H. Cole. New York: E P. Duttol1. The distinction between a an 'tt on Legislation of the
Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Leon de. 1957. Discollrs et rapports, edited by Albert Soboul.
Paris: Editions Sociales. of 1793.

L'idee genera le que reveille le mot citoyen est celle de membre de

la cite, de la societe civile, de la natIon.

92 93
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Dans un sens rigoureux il signifie seulement ceux qui sont admis
a exercer les droits politiques, a voter dans les assemblees du peuple,
ceux qui peuvent elire et etre elus aux emplois publics; en un mot, les
membres du souverain.
Ainsi les enfants, les insenses, les mineurs, les femmes, les con-
damnes a peine afflictive ou infamante, jusqu'a leur rehabilitation
ne seraient pas des citoyens. ' adjective "passif" openly contradicts the "sens rigoureux" of
Mais dans I'usage on applique cette expression a tous ceux qui
sont du corps social, c'est-a-dire qui ne sont ni etrangers, ni morts
civilement; soit qu'ils aient ou non des droits politiques; enfin a tous
ceux qui jouissent de la plenitude des droits civils, dont la personne
et sont gouvernes en tout par les lois generales du pays.
Volla les cItoyens dans le langage le plus ordinaire.
Les publicistes et meme les legislateurs confondent sou vent ces
deux significations tres differentes; et de la I'obscurite, l'incoherence
apparente de certaines propositions. 3
The centrality of the term citoyen in the discourse of the French Revolu-
arose from Lanj.uinais called its "sens rigoureux"-that is to say,
Its core RousseaUIan meamng. Indeed, one could characterize the aim of the
revolutionaries, from Sieyes and Mirabeau to Robespierre and Saint-Just as
the transformation of "sujets" into "citoyens." Rather than passive
of the French were to become active participants in the
lIfe of. the natIOn. The law was no longer to result from the arbitrary
wIll of the klllg, but, as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
put it, to be "l'expression de la volonte generale. Tous les citoyens ont droit
de concourir personnellement, ou par leurs representants a sa formation."
From the very beginning of the Revolution, and even more prominently after
the overthrow of the monarchy and the foundation of the republic, "citoyen"
became a central symbol of the Revolution. 4
As contemporary literary theorists have made us acutely aware all of
language is characterized by multiple meanings. But this common faie of all
words is probably compounded for terms possessing extraordinary symbolic
power. Because "citoyen" was a term to conjure with, there was no way it could
be "sens The potency of the term, the powerful
aSSOCIatIons that called up, meant that the orators, publicists, and
polItIcIans of the RevolutIOn could not resist using it in an extended sense
whenever such use would benefit their cause. The inevitable consequence was
that the term "citoyen" was packed with multiple, ambiguous and contradic-
tory t;neanings, and that it became a focus of passionate political struggles.
In thIS paper I propose to explore some of the contradictions that beset
this the by examining two of its usages:
the deSIgnatIOn of certalll lllhabItants of France as "citoyens passifs" in the
94
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
Constitution.of 1791, and the adoption of "citoyen" and "citoyenne" as
universal terms of address in 1792.
Le citoyen passif
The term "citoyen passif" is a curious usage. It is in fact an oxymoron, since the
The term "citoyen passif" was, as far as I know, first used by the Abbe SIeyes
in his Reconnaissance et exposition raisonm?e des Droits de I'Homme et du
Citoyen, composed at the request of the Comite de
to the committee on July 20 and 21, and published at Its request ImmedIately
thereafter. 5 This text consists of a draft declaration in thirty-two articles,
preceded by sixteen pages of "exposition raisonnee," which set forth the
principles-derived from a social contract theory that is a melange of Locke
and Rousseau-on which the declaration was based.
In his exposition raisonnee, Sieyes distinguished two sorts of rights:
... les droits naturels et civils sont ceux pour le maintien desquels
la societe est formee; et les droits politiques, ceux par lesquels la
societe se forme. 11 vaut mieux, pour la clarte du langage, appeUer
les premiers, droits passifs, et les seconds, droits actifs.6
From this distinction of active and passive rights flowed a distinction between
active and passive citizens.
Tous les habitants d'un pays doivent y jouir des droits de citoyen
passif, tous ont droit a la protection de leur personne, de leur pro-
priete, de leur liberte, etc; mais tous n'ont pas droit a prendre une
part active dans la formation des pouvoirs publics; tous ne sont
pas citoyens actifs. Les femmes, du moins dans l'etat actuel, les
enfans, les etrangers, ceux, encore, qui ne contribueroient en rien a
fournir l'etablissement public, ne doivent point influencer activement
sur la chose publique. Tous peuventjouir des avantages de la societe,
mais ceux-Ia seuls qui contribuent a l'etablissement public, sont
comme les vrais actionnaires de la grande entreprise social. Eux
seuls sont les veri tables citoyens actifs, les veritables membres de
l'association. 7
The distinction between active and passive citizens did not appear in Sieyes'
draft of a declaration, but it is implied in his article XXVI:
La loi ne peut etre que I'expression de la volonte generale. Chez un
grand peuple, elle doit etre l'ouvrage d'un corps de representans
95
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
choisis pour un temps court, mediatement ou immediatement par
tous les citoyens qui ont it la chose publique, interet avec capacite.
Ces deux qualites ont besoin d'etre positivement et clairement
determinees par la constitution. 8
In other words, the exact criteria for the distinction between "citoyens actifs"
and "citoyens passifs" must be set by the Constituent Assembly.
should be? Sieyes lists four criteria in his exposition
rmsonnee: to be actIfs, cItizens must be male, adult, French nationals and
must make some contr.ibution to public expenses-that is, be taxpayers. He
elaborates an overlappIng but slightly different list in Qu' est-ce que le T;ers
etat?
Dans tous les pays la loi a fixe des caracteres certains, sans lesquels
on ne peut etre ni electeur ni eligible. Ainsi, par exemple, la loi doit
determiner un age au-dessous duquel on sera inhabile it representer
ses concitoyens. Ainsi les femmes sont partout, bien ou mal, eloignees
de ces sortes de procurations. Il est constant qu'un vagabond un
mendiant, ne peuvent etre charges de la con fiance politique' des
peuples. Un domestique et tout ce qui est dans la dependance d'un
maitre, un etranger non-naturalise seroient-ils admis it figurer parmi
les representants de la nation?9
If we from the two texts, the characteristics barring
?ne fro.m active cItizenshIp would be non-French nationality, female sex,
InSUfficIent age, employment as a domestic servant, lack of gainful employ-
ment, or lack of financial contribution to the state. The problem with
foreigners. is not so mUCh. that they are actually passive as that their loyalties
to the natIOn are uncertaIn. Therefore their properties and persons are to be
protected by the law, but they cannot be trusted to participate in its forma-
tion. But the remaining categories of passive citizens were regarded as in
some sense genuinely passive. Women and children were, of course coven-
tionally judged to be passive by nature. Their weakness and natural
to adult males made them dependents of the male head of the household
who alone could be said to possess an active and independent will.
servants were comparable, except that they were passive not by nature but
by contract. As Sieyes notes, they are "dependants d'un maitre'" as is the
case with and children, their wills are not their own. Domestics,
women, and were t? be passive in the public sphere because they
were already paSSIve In the pnvate domestic sphere. But the remaining cases-
beggars, vagabonds, and those who made no financial contribution to the
state-clearly were passive in a different sense; they were not to be made
active citizens even if they were French adult male heads of families. Their
passivity in the public sphere was also derived from an imputed passivity in
96
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
the private sphere, but this passivity was neither natural nor familial: it was
economic.
Beggars and vagabonds are, essentially, those without regular employment.
Neither plays an active role in the production of wealth. Beggars receive their
means of subsistence as passive supplicants, dependent on the productive
activity of other categories of the population. Vagabonds are, of course, a
less clearly definable category, but are also assumed to consume more than
they produce-living by a combination of begging, crime, and fitful stints
of desultory work. The passivity of those who do not pay taxes is not only
economic in character. Sieyes likens taxpayers to "actionnaires de la grande
enterprise sociale." Although the analogy is taken from the realm of economic
activity ("actionnaires" are stockholders in a joint-stock company), it draws
attention not to the role of taxpayers and nontaxpayers in production, but
to their participation or nonparticipation in supporting the activities of the
state. Only those should have a right to make laws who pay to support
the state that guarantees the laws. But at the same time, both Sieyes and his
readers are aware that payment of taxes is also a rough measure of income,
so that the category of those who do not pay taxes is composed of those
who produce so little that they are a net drain on society. Like beggars and
vagabonds, non taxpayers are the very poor, whose relation to the economy
is passive rather than active.
Active citizens, Sieyes seems to be arguing, are those adult males who make
an active contribution to the private and public maintenance of society and
who are not disqualified by foreign nationality or voluntary servitude. On
the face of it, this would imply a very broad, although certainly not universal,
suffrage. But there are also significant indications that Sieyes is thinking of
a rather more restricted body of active citizens. In the article of his draft
declaration that deals with suffrage qualifications, he states that the legislature
should be chosen "par tous les citoyens qui ont it la chose publique, interet
avec capacite." This departs somewhat from the text of the exposition raison-
nee. To have "interet it la chose publique" implies that one be a taxpayer,
that is, have a financial interest in the state, but it could also imply having a
significant financial or proprietary stake in society. If so, it might imply
a level of wealth considerably above that of the poorest taxpayers. To have
"capacite it la chose publique" implies at a minimum having an active and
independent will (ruling out women, children, and domestic servants), but it
could imply considerably more-the intellectual capacity, education, and
leisure necessary to ponder properly the public good.
Here Sieyes' intentions are not entirely clear. Although he believed passion-
ately in equality of "droits passifs"-that is, in equality before the law-he
was not a strong advocate of equal political rights and was actively hostile
to any attempt to legislate economic equality. In his exposition raisonnee, he
stresses the distinction between an equality of natural rights and a natural
inequality of means.
97
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
II existe, il est vrai, de gran des inegalites de moyens parmi les
hom.mes..La natur: fait des forts et des foibles; elle departit aux uns
une mtelllgence qu elle refuse aux autres. 11 suit qu'il y aura entr'eux
inegalite de travail, inegalite de produit, inegalite de consommation
ou de jouissance; mais il ne suit pas qu'il puisse y avoir inegalite de
droits. 1O
This distinction also finds its way into his draft declaration, where article
XVI states:
Si les hommes ne sont pas egaux en moyens, c'est-a-dire en richesses
en esprit, en force, etc. il ne suit pas qu'ils ne soient pas tous
en droits. Devant la loi, tout homme en vaut un autre elle les protege
tous sans distinctions. I I '
Inequality of means is in the nature of things, but equality of rights must
be guaranteed .
. absolu.te equality of rights, however, extends only to the "droits pas-
slfs -:-prot:ctIon of the. pe.rson, property, and liberty. These are natural rights,
the nghts pour le mamtIen desquels la societe est formee." But actl've
" I . h or
po1ItICa ts to the "citoyens actifs." Natural inequalities in
moyens, give rIse to mequa!ities in labor, product, consumption-and,
of course, 111 property-have no mfluence on the distribution of the "d 't
. "B 1h h' rOI s
paSSlfS. ut, a t oug Sleyes does not explicitly make the connection the
certainly reflected in the distribution of "droits actifs." The
women, the generally-are destined to be "citoyens
passlfs, whereas the forts -mtellIgent, hardworking, prosperous adult
males-are destined to be "citoyens actifs." But where, precisely should th
line between "forts" and "foibles" be drawn? Which inhabitants of 'France h e
· .
th e necessary corn bmatlOn ave
of "inten:lt" and "capacite"? Is every French adult
male taxpayer, no matter how poor and ignorant, qualified to exercise the
rights of the "citoyen actif"?
It s?ould be noted that Sieyes has a very low opinion of the intelligence
of the P?or.. It undoubtedly his distrust of the poor that
him to specify 111 hiS draft declaration that equality extended only
to n?hts and not to means, and that the choice of representatives should be
restncted to those who combined "interet" and "capacite." But the full
'd'd' force
ofh IS IS .am for the poor emerges most clearly in certain of his unpublished
notes, datl11g from 1770s and 1780s, which have recently been collected
by Roberto Zappen. In one of these Sieyes remarks
... Vne grande est necessairement composee de deux peuples,
pI:oducteurs et les humains de la production, les gens
I11tellIgents et les ouvners qui n'ont que la force passive; les citoyens
98
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
eduques et les auxiliaires a qui on ne laisse ni le temps ni les moyens
de recevoi.r l'education ... 12
Here it is the intelligent and educated who are producers, while the ignorant
are a distinct people of passive auxiliaries, mere "instruments humains de la
production" utilized by the active producers like any other tool. text not
only indicates the depth of his contempt, but suggests that lme between
the active and the passive excludes from the adult male populatIOn not merely
a fringe element of lazy or disabled persons, but a large proportion-perhaps
all-of those ignorant but laborious peasants and workers who made up the
mass of the population in eighteenth-century France.
Were the "citoyens actifs" in fact to be composed only of an educated,
prosperous, propertied elite? More than this one obscure text points to
a conclusion. In Qu'est-ce que le Tiers hat? Sieyes sketches out a portrait of
what he calls the "classes disponibles," this time not to act as an electorate,
but to serve as representatives.
... j'appelle avec tout le monde classes disponibles celles 011 une sorte
d'aisance permet aux hommes de recevoir une education liberale, de
cultiver leur raison, enfin de s'interesser aux affaires publiques. Ces
classes-la n'ont pas d'autre interet que celui du reste du peuple. Voyez
si elles ne contiennent pas assez de citoyens instruits, honnetes, dignes
,
a tous egards d'etre de bons representans de 1a natIOn
. . 13
To be entrusted with making laws, a citizen must not just be a taxpayer, or
even just perform what Sieyes would regard as an active part in production
(that is, be the owner or manager of he should
be sufficiently prosperous to have obtamed a hberal educatIOn and to have
interested himself in public affairs. A full citizen, this suggests, one capable
of actually participating personally in the formation of the law, must be a
person of considerable means.
What, then, did Sieyes intend by his distinction between "citoyens actifs"
and "citoyens passifs?" Were the "citoyens actifs" to include all adult male
citizens who were not a positive burden on the public and who paid even the
smallest measure of taxes? Or were they to include only those who performed
some sort of directing role in the process of production? Or were they to be
made up only of the well-educated and well-to-do? Or was there to be some
sort of sliding scale of citizenship, with more demanding criteria for repre-
sentatives than for voters? Sieyes' text is in fact so ambiguous, open-ended,
and occasionally contradictory that his intentions are unclear. The uncer-
tainties are multiple. He denies that the natural (and therefore legitimate)
inequality of means justifies any inequality in rights. But he states elsewhere
in the same text that only passive rights are guaranteed to all, whereas only a
portion of all citizens may exercise active rights. He then goes on to distinguish
99
 between active and passive citizens in w ' .
based at least in part on superior Imply that active rights are
he fails to mention active and h a mg even more confused,
the text of the declaration but ts and passive citizens in
"interSt" and "capacite" ha . °l.uce.s m place two new terms-
. h ve Imp IcatIOns neIther defin d d'
m t e exposition raisonnee. Notions of 1" .. e nor Iscussed
tal in Sieyes' conceptions of societ Bu ac are fundamen-
constitutional distinction between t on a proposed
Yet one thing is clear in spite of remains unclear.
"citoyens actifs" would be citizens' R e ter,mmolog lCal ambiguities: only
n more generally. The definitions of active citizens in the Constitution of 1791
comes very close to saying so wheIn h ousseauks sense. Indeed, Sieyes himself
e remar s that
ceux-la seuls qui contribuent it l'et bI' .
les vrais actionnaires de la r a sont comme
les veritables citoyens actifs sboclale. Eux seuls sont
, es mem res de l'association.14
If only the "citoyens actifs" are" ,. b
what are "citoyens passifs?" In R venta !es membres de l'association," then
"citoyens actifs" are the would be clear:
ens" at all, but rather "sujets." court. cItoyens passIfs are not "citoy-
However, using the term "sujet" rather th ".
been highly problematic for Sieyes, for both . 11 cItoye n passif:'. would have
To begin with "suJ'et" would t h l
II1 e ectua and polItIcal reasons.
, no ave been "I t . " in the debates of the National Assembly. The "citoyens passifs" were "citoyens"
"citoyen," it had associations reachin f: e m,o Juste. No less than
definition A "suJ'et" c .t . I g ar beyond Its narrow Rousseauian
. el am y was a pers" . .
the term implied a submission to th on soumIS aux 10IS de l'Etat," but
to the laws. "sujet" did not person .of the as well as
but rather the highly variegated relati submIssIOn to the laws,
of the king that characterized the co 0 e state, the law, and the person
part of the reason Sieyes chose the of the old regime. Surely
that it implied a uniform relation to cItoyen" avoided "sujet" is
si on to the law. Thus, from Sieyes' oint conditIon of equal submis-
protection of the law but did not h View, persons who had the full
designated "citoyens passifs" than " a:e "e suffrage were more accurately
Bt't' I sUJe ts.
u 1 IS a so true that designating such erso "'"
a political disaster. Such a designation p ns as sUJets. would have been
were to be subjected to a sovereign over It clear that they
longer a monarch but a collectI' . om t ey exercIsed no control-no
, ve sovereIgn comp d f'"
A revolution made on behalf of c· '1 I' ose 0 cItoyens actifs."
that a majority of the nation's could not openly announce
of its adult male inhabitants were in :0 at minority
body of citoyens-in other words f . ecome sUJets of a restricted
contrast, created a (literally) The term by
oxymoronic adjective "passif" 't q ty, even when modified by the
. ' I was much more serviceable than "sujet."
100
This was because it tended to obscure the political subjection of the
majority-probably not only from Sieyes' intended audience, but from Sieyes
himself.
I believe that this extended analysis of the distinction between "citoyens
actifs" and "citoyens passifs" in the writings of Sieyes is worth pondering
for two reasons: first, because for all its ambiguities, the distinction was
written into the Constitution of 1791; and, second, because I believe that
Sieyes' reasoning-even his confusions and uncertainties-were symptomatic
of a wide range of opinion in the National Assembly and in political society
bear this out, since they reproduce very closely Sieyes' criteria. "Citoyens
actifs" were males twenty-five or over who were not domestic servants, had
been domiciled for a specified length of time in their commune (thus exclud-
ing vagabonds and plenty of perfectly solid migrants as well), had taken the
civic oath, had paid a "contribution directe" equal to the value of at least
three days of labor, and were neither bankrupts nor under accusation in the
courts. Only "citoyens actifs" had the right to sit in primary assemblies, which
chose electors who in turn elected representatives to the National Legislative
Assembly.ls The Constitution uses the term "citoyen actif," but avoids using
the uncomfortable "citoyen passif." In spite of this silence, it was clear to all
that those members of the French nation who did not qualify as "citoyens
actifs" could only be "citoyens passifs," and the term was used abundantly
only in the sense that their rights and their property were given equal protec-
tion of the laws. In Rousseau's terms they were not citoyens at all, but sujets;
they were "soumis aux lois de l'Etat" but did not participate "a l'autorite
souveraine. "
The Constitution of 1791 not only distinguished between active and pas-
sive citizens, but also introduced distinctions among the active citizens. All
active citizens had the right to vote for the electors who chose the repre-
sentatives in the National Legislative Assembly, but further qualifications were
imposed on electors. To serve as an elector, a man had not only to be an
active citizen, but also to be the proprietor or the usufructory of a sizeable
property. The constitution, in short, erected a graduated scale of citizenship,
with the extent of political rights dependent on personal wealth.
The distinction between active and passive citizens was one of the most
politically explosive features of the Constitution of 1791. The distinction
became an object of Sans-Culotte rage in 1792. But this distinction, and the
graduated scale of citizenship with which it was associated, was already
controversial during the debates on the constitution. The initial scheme of
the National Assembly had envisaged not three but four stages of citizenship:
passive citizens, who had protection of the laws but no political rights; active
citizens, who could vote for electors; those active citizens who were capable of
serving as electors; and those who were also eligible to serve in the legislature.
101

A place this hierarchy was to be determined by the amount of
taxes paId: the eqUIvalent of three days' labor to qualify as an active citizen
the of days' la?or to qualify as an elector, and a "marc
to qualIfy as a ThIS system was subjected to withering attacks from
the left of NatIOnal Assembly, especially from Robespierre. In the
the ?f the marc d'argentwas suppressed so that any active
could m prmcIple serve as a legislator. But this was accompanied b
a raISm? of the property qualifications for electors. Although it
the the opted for the graduated citizenship proposed by the
constItutIOnal commIttee rather than for the universal manhood citizenship
advocated by Robespierre.
. attack on the distinction between active and passiv.e citizens
IS nevertheless Important, because it exposed with characteristic lucidit th
. d" f h . , ' y, e
. IctIOns 0 t e commIttee s scheme. The committee's proposal was, he
ma1l1tamed, contrary to the first, third, and sixth articles of the DeclaraaOI1
des DroUs de 1'H.0m.:ne et du Citoyen. The law could not be the expression
the general wIll le plus grand nombre de ceux pour qui elle est
faIte ne peuvent concounr, en aucune maniere it sa formation." Men
· . h "I
I 111 were
not ts orsque les uns jouissant exclusivement de la faculte de
pOUVOlr etre elu membres du corps legislatif, ... les autres de celle de les
nommer seulement; autres restent prives en meme terns de tous ces droits."
Men were not admIssIble to all public employments with no distinctions oth
than their virtues and talents "lorsque l'impuissance d'acquitter la
'b' ., I ' con
tn utIOn eXIgee es de tous les emplois publics, quels que soient leurs
vertus et leurs tal ens. " Fmally,
es.t-elle souveraine, quand le plus grand nombre des
llldlVl.dus qUI la est depouille des droits politiques qui
constItuent la souveramete? Non; et cependant vous venez de voir
que ces memes decrets [those restricting citizenship rights] les ravis-
sent it la plus grande partie des Franc;ais. Que seroit donc votre
declaration des droits, si ces decrets pouvoient subsister? Une vaine
formule. Que seroit la nation? Esclave; car la liberte consiste it oMir
aux loix qu'on s'est donnees, et la servitude it etre contraint de se
soumettre it une volonte etrangere. Que seroit votre constitution?
Une veritable aristocratie! La plus insupportable de toutes' celle
Riches. 16 ' Le citoyenlla citoyenne
In. fact, passive citizens would not to be citizens at all, but subjects of an
of wealth. meme, que je puisse etre fier quelquefois
d pauvrete, et ne cherchez point it m'humilier, par l'orgueilleuse
pretentIOn de vous reserver la qualite de souverain, pour ne me laisser q
. "17 Th " ue
ce11e de. e maJonty of the Assembly was in fact stripping the
, poorer mhabltants of France of their citizenship rights.
102
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
Robespierre's recognition of the linguistic means by which this spoliation
was being achieved was particularly acute. The majority of the Assembly, he
intimated was quite aware of what it was doing, but covered its designs with
a subtle of language. The terms "citoyen actif" and "citoyen passif,"
were invented to mask the Assembly's spoliation of the poor. But to the
discerning and virtuous observer, the language in fact revealed the Assembly's
designs.
Les partisans du systeme que j'attaque ont eux-memes senti cette
verite, puisque, n'osant contester la qualite de citoyen it ceux qu'ils
condamnoient it l'exheredation politique, ils se sont bornes it eluder
le principe de legalite qu'elle suppose necessairement, par la distinc-
tion de citoyens actifs et de citoyens pass ifs. Comptant sur la facilite
avec laquelle on gouverne les hommes par les mots, ils ont essaye
de nous donner le change en publiant, par cette expression nouvelle,
la violation la plus manifeste des droits de l'homme.
Mais qui peut etre assez stupide pour ne pas appercevoir que
ce mot ne peut ni changer les principes, ni resoudre la difficulte;
puisque declarer que tels citoyens ne seront point actifs, ou dire qu'ils
n'exerceront plus les droits politiques attaches au titre de citoyen,
c'est exactement la meme chose dans l'idiome de ces subtils polit-
iques ... je ne cesserai de reclamer contre cette locution insidieuse
et barbare qui souillera it-Ia-fois notre code et notre langue, si nous
ne nous hatons de l'effacer de l'une et de l'autre ... 18
Robespierre lost the argument in the Constituent Assembly, but the events
of the summer of 1792 in fact obliterated this "insidious and barbarous
locution" from French political language. In the weeks preceding the revolu-
tion of August 10, many of the Parisian sections-which were of course
primary electoral assemblies composed by definition only of active citizens-
invited passive citizens to join their deliberations, thereby defying the
Constitution's definitions. Soon the insurrection of August 10-largely the
handiwork of these enlarged sections-overturned the Constitution of 1791
and thereby nullified the concept of "citoyen passif" once and for all.
One striking linguistic feature of the summer and autumn of 1792 was the
19
rise of the terms "citoyen" and "citoyenne" as universal forms of address.
This usage arose out of the fevered political conjuncture of the time. The
term "citoyen" called forth precisely the sort of obsessive patriotism that
swept over Paris and parts of the provinces as the new revolutionary French
state fought for its existence against the Austrian and Prussian armies and
against its real and imagined domestic enemies. As distrust of the King
103
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
and the "aristocratic conspiracy" mounted, and as the republican movement
swelled, the egalitarian designation "citoyen" and "citoyenne" began to replace
designations "monsieur" and "madame." By the time the
msurrect.IOn of August 10 had overthrown the monarchy and the National
had declared the establishment of a republic, "citoyen" and
cItoyenne had become quasi-official terms of address.2o
On September 23, 1792, two days after the declaration of the French
Republic, Charlier rose in the Convention to demand that "citoyen" become
the official designation of all Frenchmen.
Citoyens, lorsque la Revolution est completement faite dans les
choses, il faut aussi la faire dans les mots. Le titre de citoyendoit
seul se trouver dans tous les actes emanes de vous. Le mot Monsieur
et Sieur, derive de monseigneul', ne doit plus etre une qualification
en usage. J'en demande la suppression dans toutes les actes de l'etat
civil ... "21
The Convention, which had been discussing another matter at the time
?f Charlier's intervention, ruled him out of order and continued with the
mterrupted debate. As far as I know, the term "citoyen" never received
the imprimatur of the Convention as the only allowable form of address 22
Nevertheless, its use became essentially universal in republican speech
in official documents.
Old regime society had recognized a hierarchy of forms of address-
ranging downwards from "sire," "altesse," "excellence," and "monseigneur"
to "monsieur" and "madame," to the plainer "le sieur" and "la dame" and
finally to simple proper with no distinguishing appelations (or, legal
documents, the bald desIgnatIOn 'le nomme"). Initially, revolutionary language
tended toward the general use of "Monsieur" and "Madame."23 But to the
taking shape in 1792, these terms were tainted by their
and associations. "Monsieur" and "Madame" not only
the eXIstence of social distinctions but also smacked of fawning and
artIficIal courtly manners. "Monsieur," when used in public discourse thus
to carry private vanities into public life. "Citoyen," by im-
VIrtue and,?evotion to the public good. To use Althusser's terminology,
It mterpellated Frenchmen as active participants in the sovereign will. The
term "citoyen" reminded them, as it designated them, that they were active
and equal members of the and that as members of the sovereign
they always to place pubhc duty above private satisfactions. The use
of "cItoyen" as a replacement for "Monsieur" was of course an extension of
the term i.ts "sens rigoureux," since it was used not only to designate
role as members of the sovereign, but also in their private
roles m ClVll socIety. Indeed, this was one of its major attractions. Unlike
"Monsieur," which threatened to contaminate public life with private vanities,
104
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
"citoyen" was calculated to infuse even private life with salutory public
virtues. .
But the use of "citoyen" as a universal term of address also had its con-
tradictions and ambiguities. The term "citoyen" clearly had been adopted
with French men in mind. Yet precisely because the designation was to be
universal to substitute for quotidian usages of "Monsieur" and "Madame"
and to to all inhabitants of France, it had to have both a masculine
form-le citoyen-and a feminine form-la citoyenne. The term "citoyen"
triumphed because it interpellated males as active members of the sovereign
who were to think about the public good even in private life. By contrast,
the term "citoyenne" was only an afterthought-a kind of unintentional
consequence of the adoption of "citoyen." Like "citoyen passif," it was an
oxymoron: citoyen implied activity and membership in the sovereign, but the
feminine ending implied passivity and exclusion from the public sphere. And
like "citoyen pass if," it indicated a vulnerable point in the revolutionary
project of its creators. The danger of the locution "citoyenne" was, of course,
that day after day, in all the routines of social life, it unintentionally inter-
pellated women as active members of the sovereign, as rightful coparticipants
in the political life of the nation. It is therefore hardly surprising that some
women answered the call.
By the spring of 1793, women were frequently admitted to the popular
societies that were constituted by the Sans-Culottes. In July of 1793 the
"Societe de I'Harmonie Sociale des Sans-Culottes des deux sexes" stated
explicitly that "les citoyennes seront admises sans distinction it partager les
travaux patriotiques de la Societe."24 But the most spectacular case was the
"Societe (or club) des citoyennes republicaines revolutionnaires," a popular
society made up exclusively of women, whose career has been ably chronicled
in several recent works. 2s The Citoyennes republicaines revolutionnaires took
the universalist implication of the term "citoyenne" literally. Perhaps the
most remarkable thing about them as a woman's club is that they did not
particularly concern themselves with "women's issues," but discussed and
acted on the issues that dominated (male) politics in the same way as men's
political clubs did. Nor did they shy away from physical danger. They played
a significant role in the insurrection of May 31 to June 2, which purged the
Girondins from the Convention-among other things, standing guard at
the doors of the Convention and refusing entry to Girondin deputies. 26
This commitment to militant political action was explicitly written into their
reglement, whose first article stated that the Society's purpose was to join in
the armed defense of "la Patrie.'>27
But even for these extraordinarily active and politicized women, the
duties of the "citoyenne" were potentially contradictory. This can be seen
with particular clarity in an address delivered at a meeting of the Societe des
citoyennes republicaines revolutionnaires by a member of a delegation. of
"citoyennes" from the Section des Droits de l'homme, which was presentmg
105
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
to the Society standard to be carried in public demonstrations ceremonies
and insurrections. In her address, the orator insisted that activity
the proper duty of the "citoyenne".
Vous avez rompu un des anneaux de la chaine des prejuges, il n'existe
plus pour vous celui qui, releguant les femmes dans la sphere etroite de
leurs menages, faisoit de la moitie des individus des etres passifs et isoles.
Vous voulez tenir votre place dans I'ordre social, la neutralite vous
offense, vous humilie. C'est en vain que I'on pretendoit vous distraire
des grands interets de la Patrie, ils ont remue vos ames, et desormais
vous concourerez it l'utilite commune.
... Et pourquoi les femmes de la facuIte de sentir' et
d'exprimer leurs pen sees, verroientelles prononcer leur exclusion
affaires publiques? ...
Que ce guidon dirige vos pas partout Oll I'egoisme et I'insouciance
enleve des Citoyens it la Patrie, portez dans vos deputations cet
embleme expressif de I'Egalite; que I'oeil de ses ennemis en soit
souvent frappe. Sous son ombre bienfaisante, venez toutes vous
ranger dans les ceremonies publiques; qu'au premier signal du
danger, cet etentard revolutionnaire se mele aux drapeaux tricolores
qu'il mene it la victoire des republicaines devouees, qui
la foiblesse de leur sexe devant les perils eminens de la Patrie ... 28
Republican "citoyennes" must not be passive or neutral; they must send
deputations, participate in ceremonies, and join insurrectionary movements
when the nation is in peril. "Citoyennes," in all these respects, apparently
should be indistinguishable from "citoyens."
Yet even this call to vigilant activism casts women as the weaker sex.
More this militant orator, elsewhere in her speech, seems to
charactenze the dIfferences between the sexes in a way that normally valor-
ized women's exclusion from political affairs.
... La declaration des droits est commune it I'un et it I'autre des
sexes et la consiste dans les devoirs; il en est des publics, il
en est de. pnves. Les hommes sont particulierement appelles it remplir
les premIers, la nature elle-meme indiqua la preference; elle a reparti
chez eux une constitution robuste, la force des organes, tous les moyens
capables de soutenir des travaux penibles: qu'aux armees, qu'au
senat, que dans les assemblees publiques, ils occupent preferablement
les places, la raison, les convenances le veulent, il faut y ceder.
Le.s au contraire ont pour premieres obligations, des
devOlrs pnves, les douces fonctions d'epouses et de meres leur sont
confiees, mille objets de details qu'elles entrainent consument une
forte partie de leurs temps, leurs loisirs sont moins frequens ... 29
106
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
Men and women differ by nature. Men are stronger and women bear children;
as a consequence, men are "particulierement appelles" to fulfill "devoirs
publics" and women to fulfill "devoirs prives." All of this is a quite conven-
tional reading of the commands of nature-except that this female orator
makes no claim that men possess superior intellectual capacities or an exclu-
sive claim to political rights.
How is this relegation of women to the "douces fonctions d'epouses et de
meres" to be reconciled with women's active participation in the public sphere?
The orator goes on as follows:
. .. neanmoins il est possible de concilier, ce qu'exige imperieusement
la nature, ce que commande l'amour du bien public. Apres avoir
vaque a des occupations indispensables, i1 est encore des instans, et
les femmes citoyennes qui les consacrent dans les Societes fratemeIles,
a la surveillance, it I'instruction ont la douce satisfaction de se voir
doublement utiles. 30
This is, of course, not entirely satisfactory. It implies that women who are also
wives and mothers will have precious little chance for political activity-the
"mille objets de details" of their naturally decreed "douces fonctions" will
leave them only "des instans" and it is only these rare moments that can be
consecrated "a la surveillance, it l'instruction." Hence, only those rare women
who remained unmarried-like Claire Lacombe and Pauline Leon, the most
prominent leaders of the Societe des citoyennes republicaines revolutionnaires-
could hope to devote themselves to public affairs with a zeal comparable
to that of men. But avoiding marriage and motherhood could hardly be the
proper answer, since the functions of wives and mothers are "exigences im-
perieuses" of nature. It follows that "citoyennes" could be at best part-time
patriots, active in political life only on those occasions when their "premiers
obligations" as wives and mothers allowed them sufficient leisure. The
sacrifice of private duites and interests to the public good that was implied
by the term "citoyen" was impossible to the "citoyenne"-unless she violated
the commands of nature and remained unmarried.
The orator from the Section des Droits de I'homme was thus in the uncom-
fOl'table position of at once accepting the conventional gender definitions
that justified women's exclusion from politics and urging women to continue
their seemingly "manly" activism-in other words, of attempting to hold
together the passivity and the activity that were simultaneously called forth
when women were interpellated by the oxymoron "citoyennes." The orator
struggled to avoid this contradiction-for example by characterizing the
Society's members as "epouses des Sans-Culottes" (thereby denying the im-
plication that serious political activism would be limited to unmarried women)
and by advancing the dubious claim (in view of her stated assumptions) that
the Society's militant activism could be pursued purely in wives' and mothers'
107
 ----- -,-, -- -------0-
moments of l,eisure. She also developed an alternative characterization of
the and its work in terms more consonant with existing gender-role
defimtIOns-as. a sch?ol ,;here mothers could gain the political knowledge
to raise their chtldren as good republicans. " ... La Liberte trouve
ICI une ecole nouvelle; meres, epouses, enfans y viennent s'instruire, s'exciter
mutuellement it la pratique des vertus sociales. "31 But none of these devices
could fre:, her its fundamental trap: as long as "citoyennes"
accepted what nature Impenously requires" of females-as this was under-
stood .in the late eighteenth century-their claims to membership in the
sovereign were bound to remain precarious.
Just how precarious was demonstrated in October of 1793 when th
.
C onventIOn d ' e
move to suppress the Societe des citoyennes republicaines revo-
lutionnaires. The pretext for the dissolution of the Society was a disturbance
touched off when the citoyennes republicaines revolutionnaires attempted
to force market women to wear the bonnet rouge. But the Convention went
beyond the particular issue to consider the general question of whether
be all.owed to exercise political rights and to form
pohttcal IS, whether the "sens rigoureux" of "citoyen" had
any appltcatIOn to women. Amar, reporting for the Committee of General
Security, answered unhesitatingly in the negative. It is symptomatic of Amar's
and th; that nowhere in his long disquisition about
women s role pohbcs he utter the term "citoyenne"; women are always
referred to as femmes. HIs arguments are based on conventional notions
about the differences between the sexes-notions similar to those put forth
by the from S.ection des Droits de l'homme, although his version
of conventIOnal notIOns IS far more misogynist and the conclusions he draws
from them are radically different.
An: ar women .lack "la force morale et physique" required to
exercise poltttcal nghts-that IS to "faire prendre des resolutions relatives it
l'interet de l'Etat." "Gouverner, c'est regir la chose publique par des lois dont
la confection exige des connaissances etendues, une application et un devoue-
ment sans bornes, une impassibilite severe et l'abnegation de soi-meme ... "
W?men, he went on, are not "susceptible de ces soins et des qualites qu'ils
Not capable of governing, neither should they form political
aSSOCiatIOns.
Le but des associations populaires est celui-ci: devoiler les mano-
euvres de la chose publique, surveiller et les citoyens
et les fonctionnaires publics, meme le corps
leglslattf; eXlter le zele des uns et des autres par I'exemple des vertus
republicaines; s'eclairer par des discussions publiques et approfondies
sur le defaut ou la reformation des lois politiques. Les femmes
it utiles et penibles fonctions? Non, parce
qu elles seralent obhgees d y sacrifier des soins plus importants
108
auxquels le nature les appelle. Les fonctions privees auxquelles sont
destinees les femmes par la nature meme tiennent it l'ordre general
de la societe; cet ordre social resulte de la difference qu'il y a entre
l'homme et la femme. Chaque sexe est appele it un genre d'occupation
qui lui est propre; son action est circonscrite dans ce cercle qu'il ne
peut franchir, car la nature, qui a pose ces limites it l'homme, com-
mande imperieusement, et ne aucune 10i. 33
Here we have the familiar imperious commands of nature that assign women
to the home and family-but with the difference that the limits commanded
by nature are now absolute.
Amar also gives a much starker and more elaborate account of the differ-
ence between the sexes than that set forth by the female orator from the
Section des Droits de l'homme.
L'homme est fort, robuste, ne avec une grande energie, de l'audace
et du courage; il brave les perils, l'intemperie des saisons par sa
constitution; il resiste it tous les elements, il est propre aux arts, aux
travaux penibles; et comme il est presque exclusivement destine it
l'agriculture, au commerce, it la navigation, aux voyages, it la guerre,
it tout ce qui exige de la force, de l'intelligence, de la capacite, de
meme il para!t seul propre aux meditations profondes et serieuses
qui exigent une grand contention d'esprit et de longues etudes qu'il
n'est pas donne aux femmes de suivre. 34
For Amar, men are not only stronger, but more courageous, more intelligent,
and more capable of profound and serious meditation than women. Hence,
the domestic sphere is not only the "first duty" but the sole duty of women.
Quel est le caractere propre it la femme? Les moeurs et la nature
meme lui ont assigne ses fonctions: commencer I'education des hom-
mes, preparer l'esprit et le coeur des enfants aux vertus publiques,
les diriger de bonne heure vers le bien, elever leur ame et les instru-
ire dans le culte politique de la liberte: telles sont Ieurs fonctions,
apres les soins du menage; la femme est naturellement destinee it
faire aimer la vertu. Quand elles auront rempli tous ces devoirs, elles
auront bien merite de la patrie. 35
Amar admits that in order for women to raise their children with a love of
liberty, they must be allowed to instruct themselves about politics; for this
reason
... elles peuvent assister aux deliberations des Societes populaires;
mais, faites pour adoucir les moeurs de l'homme, doivent-elles prendre
109
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -----WHXT-IS CITIZENSHIP?
CONCRPT OF 9ITlZENSHIP

une part active a des discussions dont la chaleur est incompatible participation. Far more important, in Amar's eyes, is the ef!ect of
avec la douceur et la moderation qui font le charme de leur sexe? such participation on the domestic sphere. Although the which the
Nous devons dire que cette question tient essentiellement Societe des citoyennes repuhlicaines revolutionnaires had III the
moeurs, et les point de republique ... Voulez-vous que, of Paris were regrettable, Amar's primary complaint agamst the SocIety was
dans la repubhque on les voit venir au barreau a la trib that its activities threatened "l'ordre general de la societe."
bI' l' . , une,
aux assem ees po ItIques comme leshommes, abandonnant et la To see what Amar meant by this threat to the general social order, we must
retenue, source de toutes les vertus de ce sexe et le soin de le consider the role of gender in the Jacobins' overall conception. of
fumilk? ,m
and society.39 Gender is hardly a trivial concern for the Jacobill S. In
Elles ont autre moyen de rendre des services a la patrie; speech, Amar claims that sexual difference constitutes social order; that SOCIal
elles peuvent eclalrer lems epoux, leur communiquer des re'fie . order "resulte de la difference qu'il y a entre I'homme et la femme." Although
, . f' d XIOns
rUlt u d'une vie sedentaire, employer a fortifier Amar obviously regards males as superior to females, he sees social order
en eux. I amour de la patne par tout ce que l'amour prive leur donne and the stability of the republic as resulting not solely from the knowledge,
?'emplre; eclaire par des discussions famiIieres et pais- the good judgment, and the strength of men, but from a prope!, balance
Ibl.es au de son menage, rapportera dans la societe les idees between masculine and feminine virtues. There were reasons for thIS balance
utIles que IUl aura donnees une femme honnete. to seem precarious in the Year n. The "Republique une et indivisible"
, ... que sont disposees, par leur organisation, sumed and demanded of the "citoyen" a particularly intense and mascuhne
a une exaltatIOn qUI seraIt funeste dans les affaires publl'que t form of virtue-what Amar characterizes as "une impassibilite severe et
I . ' A d I' s, e
lllterets Etat seraient bient6t sacrifies a tout ce que la l'abnegation de soi-meme." The "citoyen" was to sacrifice all private
,des paSSIOns peut produire d'egarement et de desordre. tions for public well-being; to be ready to risk his life in. the ?r III
LlVrees a la des elles enculqueraient a lems popular insurrections; to be unbendingly stern with himself, hIS fellow CItIzens,
enfants, non 1 amour de la patne, mals des haines et les preventions.36 and his governors; to suppress all sympathetic feelings for those who revealed
themselves to be enemies of the republic-that is, systematically to value
The. conclusion . dwas clear . to Amar: "Nous croyons donc qu'une 11"emme ne stern justice over tender mercy. This "virilization" of the citoyen was to
d 01t pas sortIr e sa famllle pour s'immiscer dans les affaires du g ._
t"·37 "'1 ' . ovelne characterize the republic at all times, but it was particularly-and necessar-
men '. I n pas que femmes exercent les droits politiques. "38 ily-exaggerated in an era of revolution. Only this form
lhetonc ?f Amar speech IS superheated-indeed, downright hys- of citizenship could ward off the dangers that beset the repubhc dunng the
tellcaI. UnquestIOnably, hIS (and the Jacobins') hostility to the S "t' A Year n.
. , hI' . oCle e ues
repu revolutionnaires arose in part out of the threat that Yet the unrelenting sternness required of the "citoyen" was potentially
ItS own manhood. The spectacle of women successfully dangerous and exhausting. It had to be balanced by the feminine virtues-
exerclsmg t e pu 1C vIrtues that the Jacobins regarded as innately ma I'
. r' Iy d b scu me
ou t on both the Jacobins' gender identities and their polit-
mercy, gentleness, affection, intimacy, sweetness, charm, and love. In the
of Amar, the real danger represented by the Societe des citoyennes repuhllc-
Ical But. however hysterical this text, it nevertheless contains a aines revolutionnaires was that it would turn "citoyennes" into heartless and
certam loglc-a logIC to which we must attend if we are to understand th virilized caricatures of "citoyens," who would abandon the sweet feminine
Jacobins' denial of citizens' rights to women. e
virtues of domestic life. Should this happen, "citoyens" would be deprived
Amar's oPPo.sition to the of women in politics was partly of the domestic tranquility, intimacy, and affection that are a condition of
based on a belIef that such partIcIpatIon produced disorder in the bl' their ability to act virtuously in the public sphere. Women's part in a repub-
'k f h' pu IC
rea Im. L I e most. 0 IS contemporaries, he assumed that women are by lic is to soften and educate the hearts of males, both of sons as they are
nature emotIonal than men. This quality of women's "organisation" is growing up and of husbands when they are heads of households. "La femme,"
so long as women remain within the domestic sphere, which they according to Amar, "est naturellement destinee a faire aimer la vertu"; wOI?en
WIth love and tenderness. But when they enter the public sphere, their are "faite pom adoucir les moems de l'homme" and to "preparer l'espnt et
emotIOns carry them away and produce "egarement" and "desordr "H le coem des enfants aux vertus publiques." If women should abandon the
fi . th d f h bl' e. ence,
. 01 0 t e repu IC, women must be denied the right to participate feminine virtues of the home, men's morals would be hardened to the p.oint
m But fact that of women introduces disorder into of destructiveness and children's hearts would no longer be capable of vIrtu-
the pubhc sphele IS not Amar s weIghtIest argument against women's political ous feeling. If women take an active part in "des discussions dont la chaleur

110 111
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
est incompatible avec la douceur et la moderation qui font le charme de leur
sexe," the results will be catastrophic. Exposed to the heat of public debate
women's more emotional nature will be moved to "exaltation" "egarement ,:
an d "d'esordre, " rath er t han the'' douceur," "moderation," and " "paix" that
result from confinement to the "calme d'une vie sedentaire" in the natural
sphere of the home. Women who were active in political affairs would be
and enlightening their husbands in "discussions fam-
et ; they their children "non l'amour de la patrie,
malS et les preventIOns." Thus, the continued participation of
women In poittlcs threatened not merely occasional disorders such as those
that had recently taken place in the Parisian markets, but a destruction of
the balance of society and consequently of the republic as well.
. IS when he said that the question of women's par-
tIcIpatIon In poithcs hent essentiellement aux moeurs, et sans les moeurs point
de in Am.ar's vision, was the guardian and reposi-
tory of moeurs. PublIc vIrtue, WhIch the Jacobins coded as masculine was
the essence of the republic, but public virtue was impossible to sustain
out private "moeurs," which the Jacobins coded as feminine. In the Jacobins'
eyes, women's participation in politics threatened to denature women which
",:ould destroy private "moeurs," which in turn would undermine' public
vIrtue. societies of women therefore was necessary to the
preservatIOn of the repubhc. Consequently, after brief debate, the Convention
"Les et les Societes populaires de femmes, sous quelque
que ce sont defendues."4o After 9 Brumaire Year lI, "citoy-
ennes of the most radIcally democratic republic the world had ever known
deprived ?f the .last of their active political rights-the right to associate
to The oxymoronic term "citoyenne" had been deprived
of ItS sens ngoureux and reduced to a de facto synonym for "sujet."
Conclusion
The history of contradictory usages of the term "citoyen" in the French
Revolution. is also a of the revolutionaries' hesitations in establishing
a democratIc state and socIety. From the beginning, the revolutionaries wished
to establish a state in which subjects of the king would be transformed into
true citizens-with the liberty to devote themselves to the public good and
the power to enact public laws. It was the centrality of this goal that made the
term "citoyen" such a powerful symbol in revolutionary discourse. But
symbolic P?wer breeds symbolic contradiction. In the political struggles of
the revolutIOn, the usage of "citoyen" was stretched to fit varying political
ends-:-stretched so far it to be employed in self-contradictory
These. citoyen passif" and "la citoy-
enne -:-are partIcularly InterestI?g because they became points of political
contentIOn, both over the meamng of words and over the direction of the
112
CONCEPT OF 'CITIZENSHIP
Revolution. Linguistic quarrels about the meaning of "citoyen" reveal
the limits of the revolutionary visions, first of the patriot party of 1789 and
then of the Jacobins of the Year lI.
The notion of "le citoyen passif" epitomizes the limited democratic vision
of the Revolution's first generation of leaders. Stirred by a Rousseuian
passion for the public good and the wish to establish a just and rational
constitution, Sieyes and his collaborators were only reluctant democrats.
They envisaged a political order in which public service would be performed
by an enlightened and public-spirited elite on behalf of the It was
the intervention of the masses that brought them to power 111 the summer
of 1789 but they distrusted the masses nonetheless. The constitution they
wrote the summer of 1789 and the summer of 1791 embodied pre-
cisely this contradiction between elitism and popular power-and nowhere
more blatantly than in its consignment of most of the population to the
ranks of "citoyens passifs." At one level, the employment of the oxymoron
"citoyen passif" was an attempt to cover the real status of "sujet" with the
term "citoyen." At another level, the term was an attempt to wish away
the potentially menacing activism of the rural and urban poor by designat-
ing them hopefully as passive. But the effect of the Constituent Assembly's
oxymoron was to enfiame rather than to "passify". The term's blatant self-
contradiction made it seem an "insidious and barbarous locution" and the
distinction between active and passive citizens provided a choice target for
radically democratic republican activists in 1792.
With the republican victory in August 1792, "le citoyen" became a figure
of mythic proportions. All were now to be citizens and all citizens were to
be eternally vigilant. One means of signifying the emergence of a universally
active citizenship was to impose the terminology of citizenship in the inter-
actions of daily life, replacing "Monsieur" by "citoyen" and "Madame" by
"citoyenne" as obligatory forms of address. But, as we have seen, this new
democratic usage of "le citoyen/la citoyenne" had its own contradictions,
contradictions that revealed the limits of the Jacobin concept of democracy.
Interpellated as "citoyennes," a minority of women began to act as if they
too were expected to conform to the model of the republican "citoyen." But
in Jacobin ideology, the stern and vigilant model of the citoyen was in fact
predicated on a soft, loving, totally domestic model of the "citoyenne"-on
a "citoyenne" that preserved nothing of the meaning of the term except the
feminine ending. The Jacobin vision of radical democracy was tied to a
conception of gender difference that relegated women more insistently than
ever to a narrow domestic sphere. The Ninth Brumaire of the Jacobins removed
the ambiguous linguistic promise of democratic participation that had been
inadvertently encoded in "la citoyenne" from the republican tradition for
a century and a half. In matters of citizenship, the constraints of patriarchy
turned out to be far more durable than those of class, both during the
Revolution itself and in the post-revolutionary republican tradition.
113
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CONCEPT OF ,CITIZENSHIP

Notes 26 Levy, Applewhite, and Johnson, Women in Revolutionary Paris, p. 145.

27 Ibid., p. 161. .
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Du contrat social," in Oeuvres completes (Bibliotheque 28 Discollrs prononce cl la societe des citoyennes republicaines revollltionnaires par les
de la Pleiade: Paris, 1964), 3:361-2.
2 Ibid., p. 362. eitoyenlles de la section des Droits de I'Homme (Paris, n.d.: Bib!. Nat. Lb40 2411),
pp. 3-6.
3 Archives parlementaires de 1787 cl 1799, (1st ser., Paris, 1903),63:562. 29 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
4 The career of the term citoyen during the revolution is well chronicled in 30 Ibid., p. 5. The locution "Ies femmes citoyennes" is intriguing. In principle, "Ies
Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la langue jranfaise des origines cl nos jours, Vo!. 9, femmes" is redundant, since "Ies citoyennes" necessarily implies women. But because
La Rel'olulion et I'Empire. Part 2, Les evenements, les institutions et la langue (Paris, "Ies femmes" means "wives" as well as "women," "Ies femmes citoyennes" may be
1967), pp. 682-9.
read either as "citizen women" or as "citizen wives." This double entendre (whether
5 Published as Pretiminaire de la constitution: Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnee intentionally or inadvertently we cannot say) captures the orator's intended mix
des. Droits tHol1l1ne du Citoyen. Par M. I' Abbe Sieyes (Versailles, July 1789). of private wifely and motherly duties supplemented by public duties.
ThIS work IS mcluded III Emmanuel-Joseph Sieye, Ecrits politiques, ed. Roberto 31 Ibid., p. 3. It is true that this Societe, like most societes populaires of the era,
Zapperi, (Paris, 1985), pp. 189-206. .
6 Sieyes, Pretiminaire, p. 13. ; engaged in much correspondence and political discussion that could be
7 Ibid., pp. 13-14. terized as political education. But one suspects that the orator chose to hIghlIght
8 Ibid., pp. 20-21. that aspect of its activities because it fit with the "natural" function of women as
the educators of their children.
9 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers etat?, ed. by Roberto Zapperi 32 Archives parlementaires, 78:50.
(Geneve, 1970), p. 139.
10 Sieyes, Pretiminaire, pp. 3-4. 33 Ibid., p. 50.
II Ibid., p. 19. 34 Ibid., p. 50.
12 Si eyes, Ecrits politiques, p. 75. 35 Ibid., p. 50.
13 Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers etat?, pp. 143-4. 36 Ibid., p. 50-51.
14 Sieyes, Preliminaires, p. 14. 37 Ibid., p. 50.
38 Ibid., p. 51.
15 Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789, ed. Jacques Godechot (Paris, 1970),
pp. 40-41. 39 A theoretical argument for the type of interpretive strategy here may
found in Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of HistorIcal AnalYSIS,
16 Maximilien Robespier:e, Oetmes, vo!. 7, Discours (2e Partie) Janvier-Septembre American Historical Review 91 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1053-75. Indeed, much of my
1791, ed. Marc BoulOlseau, Georges Lefebvre, and Albert Soboul (Paris, 1952), substantive interpretation of Amar's speech grows out of conversations with
pp. 161-2.
17 Ibid.,p. 165. Joan Scott.
18 Ibid., pp. 162-3. 40 Archives parlementaires, 78:49.
19 Brunot cites a letter of May 24, 1792, by Petion, the mayor of Paris to the
inhabitants of the city, as containing the first official usage of the term "citoyens"
the generality of the population. Histoire de la langue jranfaise, 9(ii):
20 Ibid., pp. 682-4.
21 Archives parlementaires, 52: 102.
22 Here I am relying on Brunot, Histoire de la langue jranfaise, vo!. 9, part 2.
23 For example, until the session of September 24, 1792, the proces verbal of the
Parisian Jacobin club used M. and MM. before the names of speakers whose
contributions were being noted. At the beginning of that session, Chabot demanded
that the proces I'erbal henceforth "ne serve plus que de la date I'an I de la
RepubJique." He then went on to argue that the proces verbal should avoid not
only "Monsieur," but even "le citoyen tel," and "n'employer al'avenir que le nom
seu1 de la personne." This practice-based on the concern that even "le citoyen"
would become a term of distinction-was adopted by the club and conformed to
thenceforth in the proces verbal (F. A. Aulard, La Societe des Jacobins: Receuil
de documents pour l'histoire du Club des Jacobins de Paris, (Paris, 1982),4:328-9.
24 Paule-Marie Duhet, Lesftmmes et la Revolution. 1789-1794 (Paris, 1971), p. 130.
25 Marie Cerati, Le Club des citoyelllles republicaines revolutionnairimes (Paris,
1966); Duhet, Les Femmes, pp. 127-60; and Darline Gay Levy, Harriet Branson
Applewhite, Mary Durham Johnson, Women in Revolutionary Paris, 1789-1795
(Urbana, II1., 1979), pp. 144-220.

114 115

8 authority or as an elector of the members of such a body.' The third stage,
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
AND CITIZENSHIP 1
Michael Mann
Source: Sociology, 21:3 (1987), 339-54.
Abstract
Mars.hall's theory is criticized for being Anglo-
. and eyo!utlOnISt. Comparative historical analysis of
not one but at least five viable
s.trategJes for t?e 1I1stItutlOnalization of class conflict, here called
authoritarian monarchist, Fascist and authori-
tanan In explaining their origin and development
should be placed upon the strategies and cohesion
of classes an.d anciens regimes rather than upon those of
the and proletarian classes (as has been the
case 111 .much prevIOus theory). In explaining their durability
emphaSIS should be placed upon geo-political events, especially
the two world rather than on their internal efficiency.
If thIrd stage of citizenship is a reasonably accurate
Europe, this is primarily due to
the mIhtary VIctOrIeS of the powers.
Marshall's theory
important and true ideas are rare. Such ideas which are then developed
mto a coherent theory are even scarcer. T. H. Marshall is one of the very
to have had at least one such idea, and to develop it. That is why it is
Important to to improve upon his theory of citizenship.
has rendered class struggle innocuous;
IS. also m contmuous tension, even war, with the class inequal-
ItIes that. capItalIsm He identified three stages of the struggle for,
and of, CItIzenshIp: civil, political and social. Civil citizenship
emerged m. the 18th century. It comprised 'rights necessary for individual
freedom -lIberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right
to ?,:"n to valid contracts, and the right to justice.'
PolItIcal cItIzenshIp emerged m the 19th century: 'the right to participate in
116
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
the exercise of political as a member of a body invested with political
social citizenship, developed through the 20th century: 'the whole range from
the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being
according to the standards prevailing in the society.' It is what we mean now
by the Welfare State and social democracy.
Through these stages the major classes of modern capitalism, bourgeoisie
and proletariat, institutionalized their struggles with the ancien regime and
with each other. Citizenship and capitalism were still at war, Marshall de-
clared, but it was institutionalized, rule-governed warfare. Such was the model
developed in his famous 1949 lecture, Citizenship and Social Class (1963 edi-
tion). It has continued to seem true and important. Major sociologists like
Reinhard Bendix, Ralf Dahrendorf, Ronald Dore, A. H. Halsey, S. M. Lipset,
David Lockwood and Peter Townsend have acknowledged his influence (e.g.
Halsey, 1984; Lipset, 1973; Lockwood, 1974). It remains strong today (see,
for example, the recent admiring work by Turner, 1986). This is for a good
reason: Marshall's view of citizenship is essentially true - at least as a
description of what has actually happened in Britain.
There is one rather remarkable feature of Citizenship and Social Class. It
is entirely about Great Britain. There is not a single mention of any other
country.2 Did Marshall regard Britain as typical of the capitalist West as a
whole? He does not explicitly say so. Yet the most general level of the argu-
ment explores the tension between economic inequalities and demands for
popular participation, both generated everywhere by the rise of capitalism.
This certainly implies a general evolutionary approach, and indeed he does
intermittently use the term 'evolution'. In his book Social Policy (1975 edi-
tion), evidence from other countries is only introduced to illustrate variations
on a common, British theme. Finally, others have used his model in explicitly
evolutionary theories of the development of modern class relations (e.g.
Dahrendorf, 1959:61-4). Flora and Heidenheimer (1981:20-21) have observed
that general theories of the modern welfare state have been dominated by
British experience, chronicled especially by Marshall and Richard Titmuss.
Six counter-theses
I wish to deviate from this Anglophile and evolutionary model in six ways.
(1) The British strategy of citizenship described by Mat'shall has been only
one among five pursued by advanced industrial countries. I call these the
liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, Fascist, and authoritarian socialist
strategies.
(2) All five strategies proved themselves reasonably adept at handling
modern class struggle. They all converted the head-on collision of massive,
antagonistic social classes into conflicts that were less class-defined, more
117
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
limited and sometimes more orderly, sometimes more erratic. Thus
tales are There has been no single best way of institu-
tIOnalIzmg class m society, but at least five potentially
durable forms of mshtutIOnabzed conflict and mixes of citizen rights.
(3) !n explaining how such different strategies arise, I will stress the role
of rulIng classes. By 'ruling class' I mean a combination of the dominant
economic class and the and military rulers. I do not mean to imply
that gI:OUPS wer:e unchangmg or even united - indeed the degree of their
cohesIOn wIll figure Importantly in my narrative. But I do imply the pair of
general explanatory precepts expressed in (4) and (5) below.
(4) Influence on social varies according to power. As a ruling
possesses power, Its strategies matter most. In fact, many'anciens
regimes could survive the onslaught of emergent classes with a few conces-
sions here and there. Neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat has been as
has been argued by the dominant schools of sociology, liberal,
reformIst Marshall) and Marxist. Indeed, ruling class strategies tended
to determme. the of the social movements generated by bourgeoisie
and proletanat, especially whether they were liberal, reformist or revolu-
tionary. argument has also been made by Lipset (1985: Chapter 6).
(5) matters. "'!e generally exaggerate the transformative powers
of the Industnal RevolutIOn. That Revolution was preceded by centuries of
structural change commercialization of agriculture, the globalization
of trade, the consolIdation of the modem state, the mechanization of war the
secularization of ideology. If anciens regimes had learned to cope with these
changes, they could master the problems of an industrial society with tradi-
up-dated. If not, they were usually already vulnerable and
mternally divided before the actual bourgeois or proletarian onslaught.
Others have also stressed the survival of tradition through the Industrial
Revolution - classically Moore (1969) and Rokkan (1970) more recently
Mayer (1981) and Corrigan and Sayer (1985). '
. (6) The du.rability of regime strategies has been due less to their superior
1I1ternal effiCiency than to geo-politics - and specifically to victory in world
wars. The geo-political and military influences on society have been consider-
able. neglected sociological theory. However, they have recently been
recelvmg the attentIOn they deserve (e.g. Giddens, 1985; Hall, 1985; Mann,
1980, 1986a and b; Shaw, 1987; Skocpol, 1979).
Let us approach the historical record with these six theses in mind. What
were the traditional regime strategies used to cope with the initial rise of the
bourgeoisie?
Absolute and constitutional regimes 3
We divide the regimes of pre-industrial Europe into approximations to
two Ideal-types, absolute monarchies and constitutional regimes.
118
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
By 1800 the principal absolutists were Russia, Prussia and Austria. Their
monarch's formal despotic powers were largely unlimited. Citizenship was
unknown. The rule of law supposedly operated, but personal liberties, and
freedom of the press and association could be suspended arbitrarily. Indeed,
any conception of universal rights was restrained by the proliferation of
particularistic statuses, possessed by corporate groups - estates of the realm,
corporations of burghers, lawyers, merchants and artisan guilds. Yet the real,
infrastructural powers of the monarchs were far from absolute. They
the co-operation of the regionally and locally powerful. RepressIOn was
cumbersome and costly, and far more effective if used together with 'divide-
and-rule' negotiations with corporate groups. The monarch's crucial
was tactical freedom: the capacity to act arbitrarily both in conduct1l1g
negotiation and in using force. It is important to realize that these three
characteristics - arbitrary divide-and-rule, selective tactical repression, and
corporate negotiations - survived intact into the 20th century.
Britain and the United States were the main constitutional regimes. There
civil citizenship was well-developed. Individual life and property were legally
guaranteed, and freedom of the press .and .were.
recognized - they were 'licensed' under dlscermble rules. PolItical citizenship
also existed, though it was confined to the propertied classes who
represented' the rest. Social citizenship was as absent here as in absolutist
regimes. All this was well understood by Marshall.
Not all regimes were either predominantly absolutist or constitutional.
Some formerly absolutist regimes had experienced revolution or serious
disorder, and were now bitterly contested between constitutionalists and
reactionaries: France after 1789, Spain and several Italian states. In others
absolutism and constitutionalism merged through less violent, more orderly
conflict: principally the Scandinavian countries.
Capitalist industrialization changed much, but we can nonetheless see the
initial imprint of these four types of regime: absolutist, constitutional, con-
tested and merged. Let us follow this in more detail, concentrating in turn
on the US, Britain and Germany.
From constitutionalism to liberalism - the US and Britain
In Britain and the US the rise of liberalism strengthened civil and political
citizenship. The rule of law over life, property, freedom of speech, assembly
and press was extended, as was the political franchise. But any social citizen-
ship remained equivocal. The regime provided basic subsistence to the poor
out of charity anp a desire to avoid sedition. But provision came from local
worthies and private insurance; and legislation encouraged rather than
enforced. Subsistence was not a right of all, but the result of a mixture of
market forces, the duty to work and save, and private and public
The state was not interventionist or 'corporatist': interest group conflict was
119
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
predominantly' left to the economic and political marketplaces, its limits
defined by law. However, collectivities could legitimately exploit their market
powers, and the regime devised rules of the ensuing game. Under liberalism
individuals and interest groups, but not classes, could be accommodated
within the regime. Repression, now fully institutionalized, was reserved only
for those who went outside the rules of the game.
Such was one basic strategy of dealing with the rise of the bourgeoisie. But
could it cope with the working class? The two main cases, the United States
and Britain, coped differently.
In the US labour was eventually absorbed into the liberal regime. A broad
coalition, from landowners and merchants down to small farmers and
artisans, had made the Revolution. White, adult males could not be easily
excluded from civil and political citizenship. By the early l840s all of them
in all states, possessed the vote - 50 years earlier than anywhere else, 50
before the emergence of a powerful labour movement. Thus the political
demands of labour could be gradually expressed as an interest group within
an existing federal political constitution and competitive party system. As
Katznelson (1981) has shown, workers' political life became organized more
by locality, ethnicity and patronage than by work, unions or class. In the
sphere of work there was severe and violent conflict, between unions and
employers aided by government and the law courts. But here too the ruling
class eventually came to accept the legitimacy of unions in essentially liberal
terms; while the Wagner Act allowed unions to negotiate freely, Taft-HartIey
compelled them to act only as the balloted representatives of their individual
members.
The US gives us the truest picture of what would have happened to class
conflict without the politics of citizenship. If class struggle had only concerned
the Marxist agenda, of relations of production, labour processes, and direct
conflict between capitalists and workers, then liberal regimes would have
dominated industrial society. As the (white) working class was civilly and
politically inside the regime, it had little need for the great ideologies of the
proletariat excluded from citizenship - socialism and anarchism. American
trade unions became like other collective interest groups exploiting their market
power. If workers did not possess effective market powers, they would be
outside this liberal and tempted by socialism and anarchism. But they
could be repressed - with the consent of labour organizations accepting the
rules of the game. Consequently, neither class nor socialism has ever appeared
as a fundamental organizing principle of power in the United States. Those
groups who in other countries constituted the core of the labour and socialist
movement - male artisans, heavy industrial, mining and transport workers
- became predominantly interest groups inside the liberal regime while the
unskilled, those in other sectors, females and ethnic minoritie; were left
outside.
120
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
Liberalism was thus the first viable regime strategy of an advanced industrial
society. It still dominates the United States, and is also found in Switzerland.
In these countries social citizenship is still marginal. Economic subsistence
and participation is provided overwhelmingly out of the economic buoyancy
of their national capitalisms, from which the large majority can insure them-
selves against adversity. Below that, there are welfare provisions against actual
starvation, though they vary between states and cantons, are often denied to
immigrant workers, and are sometimes provided only if the poor show their
'worth'. It is closer to the 18th century Poor Law than to what Marshall
meant by social citizenship. Its social struggles remained defined by liber-
alism. If civil and political citizenship could be attained early, before the class
struggles of industrialism, then social citizenship need not follow. The most
powerful capitalist state has not followed Marshall's road. It shows no signs
of doing so.
But Britain strayed from liberalism towards reformism, as Marshall depicted.
Britain's initial struggle for liberal political citizenship was more of a class
struggle, waged predominantly by the rising bourgeoisie and independent
artisans. However, the British constitution has not excluded classes or status
groups as systematically as have most constitutions of continental Europe.
The franchise before 1832 was extraordinarily uneven; then, until 1867, it
passed through the middle of the artisan group; between 1867 and 1884
it grew to include 65% of the adult male population. In 1918 all adult males
and many females were included, and in 1929 all females. Hence at any
particular point in time emerging dissidents - petty bourgeois radicals, artisan
and skilled factory worker socialists, feminists - have been partially inside,
partially outside the state. Thus liberalism and socialism have both remained
attractive ideologies. Indeed, perhaps only the splits in the Liberal Party
consequent on the First World War may have ensured that a joint liberal!
reformist ideology would be carried principally by an independent Labour
Party, rather than through Lib-Lab politics. Britain has enshrined the rule
of both interest groups and classes, jointly. The labour movement is part
sectional interest group, part class movement, irremediably reformist, virtu-
ally unsullied by Marxist or anarchist revolutionary tendencies.
Britain is thus a mixed liberal!reformist case. The state remains liberal,
unwilling to intervene actively in interest-group bargaining - it has incorpor-
ated the lower classes into the rules of the game, not into the institutions
of 'corporatism'. Yet social citizenship has advanced somewhat beyond the
American level. The state guarantees subsistence through the welfare state,
but this meshes into, rather than replaces, private market and insurance
schemes. Thus its major social struggles are fought out in terms of an ideo-
logical debate, and a real political pendulum, between liberalism and social
democracy. In reaction to the Thatcher government's liberal strategy, the
reformist strategy is now becoming more popular again.
121
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Contested and merged regimes - France, Spain, Italy,
Scandinavia
In France, Spain and Italy, reactionaries (usually monarchist and clerical)
and secular liberals struggled over politiyal citizenship for most of the
19th and 20th centuries, with many violent change of regime. Citizenship
remained bitterly disputed, though there was undoubtedly some secular
progress in the Marshallian direction. As radical bourgeoisie, peasantry and
labour were erratically but persistently denied political citizenship, these
developed competing excluded ideologies. Sometimes they rejected the state,
as in anarchism and syndicalism; sometimes they embraced it, as in Marxist
socialism. The fierce competition between anarcho-syndicalism, revolutionary
socialism and reformist socialism was not solved until after World War II,
for reasons I mention later.
In several other countries the absolutist/constitutional struggle proceeded
to more peaceful victory for a broad alliance between bourgeoisie, labour
and small farmers. Over the first four decades of this century they achieved
civil and political citizenship, and proceeded furthest along the road to social
citizenship. The absolutist inheritance, never violently repudiated (unlike in
France), provided a more corporatist tinge to regime negotiations which still
endures. The Scandinavian countries are the paradigm cases of this route,
less affected by the dislocations of war than any other. This second road, a
corporatist style of reformism, corresponds closely to Marshall's vision (more
so than the British case does). Its social struggles are avowedly class ones,
but they are managed by joint negotiations, and constrained more by prag-
matic that ideological limits. Continuing reform, it is agreed, will be limited
primarily by the growth record of each national economy.
But to investigate properly the absolutist legacy suggests a methodology
of examining the 'purer' and longer-lasting cases of absolutism, in Russia,
Austria, Japan and especially in Prussia/Germany.
From absolutism to authoritarian monarchy - Germany,
Austria, Russia, Japan
The absolutist regimes entered the 19th century with two conflicting predis-
positions. First, monarch, nobility and Church were unwilling to grant
universal citizen rights to either bourgeoisie or proletariat, since that would
threaten the particularistic, private and arbitrary nature of their power.
Second, despite their despotic appearance, they were pessimistic about their
infrastructural capacity to overcome determined resistance with systematic
repression. When it became obvious that neither the bourgeoisie nor the
proletariat would go away, the regimes not only cast around for other solu-
tions to maintain their power - they also realized that to incorporate these
.rising groups would 'modernize' the regime and increase its Great Power
122
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
status. The most successful regime in Europe was Wilhelmine Germany, on
which I will therefore concentrate. 4 •
German absolutists were willing to concede on civil citizenship. Often thiS
did not seem like 'concession' at all. Ancien regime members were major
property-holders, gradually using their property more capitalistically. They
were not opposed to the spread of universal contract law and guarantees
of property rights - including the liberal conception of freedom of
Recent Marxists have observed that classical liberalism, combining capitalIsm
with democracy, has not often appeared subsequently: much civil can exist
with little political citizenship (e.g. Jessop, 1978). Blackbourne and Eley
(1984) have demonstrated this case with respect to 19th century Germany:
liberal legal rights (civil citizenship) were achieved through a consensus
between the Prussian regime and the bourgeoisie over what was needed to
modernize society.
Absolutist regimes also favoured a minimal social citizenship. Their ideo-
logy and particularistic practices were already paternalist. Particular
like artisans or miners often had their basic wages, hours and workmg
practices guaranteed by the state. When state infra structural powers expanded,
after about 1860, so could a minimal social citizenship. As is generally
ognized today, Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm, and not liberals or
were the founders of the Welfare State, though it is true that they did not
take it very far (Flora & Albers, 1981).
The sticking-point was over political citizenship. Real parliaments could
not be conceded' democrats could not be allowed absolute freedoms of the
press, speech or Gradually, however, the astute
institutionalized a workable political strategy. The regime conceded a parlia-
mentary shell but weighted the franchise, rigged ballots, and only allowed
elected representatives limited powers alongside an executive branch respon-
sible to the monarch alone. Thus the bourgeoisie, even the proletariat, could
be brought within the state but could not control it. By this sham political
citizenship they were 'negatively incorporated', to use Roth's (1963) terI?'
The tactics were divide-and-rule: negotiate with the more moderate sectIOns
of excluded groups, then repress the rest; play off incorporated interest
and classes against each other; and preserve a vital element of arbitrary
regime discretion. In the hands of a Bismarck the discretion used
quite cynically: Catholics, regionalists, National Liberals, claSSical lIberals,
even the working class, would be taken up, discarded, and accord-
ing to current tactical exigencies (see the brilliant biography of ?y
Taylor, 1961). Divide-and-rule was corporatist and arbitrary - both
inherited from absolutism. Groups and classes were integrated as orgalllza-
tions into the state, rather than into rule-governed marketplaces. The state
could alter the rules by dissolving parliament, restricting civil liberties, and
selecting new targets for repression. By these means authoritarian
emasculated the German bourgeoisie, dividing it among Conservative, NatIOnal
123
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Liberal, Catholic and regionalist factions, all vying for influence within the
By 1914 the German bourgeoisie was finished as an independent
political force (as Max .weber so often lamented). Only a small radical rump
was prepared to ally wIth the excluded socialists against the regime.
The proletariat was treated more severely. Though the regime became
s.omewhat in.ternally divided,. and though different Liinder also varied (with
lIberals argumg that conceSSIOns to labour unions would detach them from
socialism), in the. end authoritarians proved to be the heart of the regime.
from a .bnef penod (1890-94) under the Chancellorship of Caprivi,
a lIberal PrussIan general, the politics of conciliation never carried the court
- and the Kaiser dismissed Caprivi rather than make concessions to labour.
The regime was essentially united and so could respond with a clear strat-
egy. The German working class could elect representatives to the Reichstag,
but these were excluded from office or influence on the regime. Unions were
permitted, but - even after the anti-Socialist Laws were repealed in 1889 _
their legal rights were unclear. The state could exploit legal uncertainties or
invoke martial law to repress strikes, meetings, marches, organizations and
publications. It did so arbitrarily, according to its traditions.
Faced with a strategy largely of civil and political exclusion, labour re-
sponde? predictably. It followed the Marxist Social Democrats, ostensibly
revolutIOnary but geared up in practice to fight the elections. Most activist
workers joined the socialist unions, committed to SPD rhetoric, but able to
make reformist gains in some industries and localities. But to be a reformist
brought because of regime intransigence. By 1914 Karl Legien,
the crypto-reformIst leader of the socialist unions, had carefully built up a
measure of autonomy from the SPD. But he was forced to confess that reform
was impossible without a fundamental change in the state. The working class
was largely outside political citizenship. It responded with a flawed revolu-
- rhetoric, practical caution, and a leadership,
conscIOUS of the IsolatIOn of the movement, concentrating on electoral politics.
How frightened was the regime of the socialist threat? In the 1912 election
the SPD achieved its greatest success, capturing a third of the votes and
becoming the largest single party in the Reichstag. The regime was
aback but quickly recovered. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg used the
Red Scare agains.t his major enemy at the time, which was the Right, not
the He explOIted the :ears of the propertied classes to finally push through
an mcome tax, long deSll"ed by the regime, long resisted by the agrarian
5
landlords. Authoritarian monarchy was still successfully dividing-and-ruling
and modernizing at the onset of the first World War.
Each of the authoritarian monarchies provided its variation on this German
theme. I discuss them briefly in order of their success, beginning with Japan,
the most successful.
, !he had less freedom of action. Instead a tightly-
klllt MeI]I elIte, moderlllzmg but drawn from the traditional dominant
124
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
classes, used the monarchy as its legitimating principle. The Meiji Revolution
represented an unusually self-conscious regime strategy of conservative
modernization. After a careful search around Western constitutions, the
German constitution was adopted and modified according to localneed. 6 It
is worth adding that forms of organization from liberal-reformist countries
were also borrowed where they could fit into an authoritarian mould - not-
ably French army and British navy organization. 7 Authoritarian monarchy
became rather more corporate, less dependent on the personal qualities of
the monarch, than in Europe - an apparent strengthening of the strategy.
Less successful was Russia, whose regime generally favoured more repres-
sion and exclusion, yet vacillated before modern liberal and authoritarian
influences from the West. Two periods of regime conciliation (1906-7 and
1912-14) enabled the emergence of bourgeois parties of compromise and labour
unions run by reformists. But each time the subsequent return to repression
cut the ground from under liberals and reformists. They could promise their
followers little. Many became embittered and moved leftward. Socialist revolu-
tionaries took over the labour and peasant movements and even some of
the bourgeois factions (see e.g. on the workers' movement, Bonnell, 1983,
and Swain, 1983). Divisions and vacillation at court prevented successful
emulation of the German model. The ancien regime still possessed the loyalty
of the nobility and propertied classes in general, but its modernization pro-
gramme began to disintegrate from within (as Haimson, 1964 and 1965,
classically argued). The regime lacked a corporate core of either liberal or
conservative modernizers. Stolypin, the architect of the agrarian reforms
designed to recruit rich and middling peasant support, was the potential
conservative saviour of the regime, yet his influence at court was always
precarious. The divided regime became buffeted by the personal irresoluteness
of Nicholas and the reactionary folly of Alexandra. When monarchy begins
to depend on the personal qualities of its monarchs, it is an endangered
species. Russia represented the opposite pole to Japan within the spectrum
of authoritarian monarchy - no corporate regime strategy, much depending
on the monarch himself. On the other hand, economic and military modern-
ization was proving remarkably successful in pre-war Russia. Could the regime
find a comparably coherent political strategy? In 1914 the answer was not
yet clear. Though regime weaknesses had begun to create what later proved
to be its revolutionary grave-diggers, their influence was still negligible in
1914. The least successful case was Austria (become the Dual Monarchy of
Austria-Hungary in 1867), uniquely beset by nationality conflicts as well as
class struggle across its variegated lands. 8
The monarchy attempted divide-and-rule on both fronts at once, but was
faced by defections among ancien regime groups (Hungarian and Czech
nobilities) as well as the hostility of bourgeois liberal nationalism. As the
monarchy faltered, some peculiar alliances developed. After 1867 the most
loyal and dominant groups in the two halves of the Dual Monarchy were
125
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
the German nobility and bourgeoisie and the Hungarian nobility. But the
monarchy found their support unwelcome because it alienated all the other
nationalities these two exploited. After 1899 the Marxist SPD rejected
nationalism as a bourgeois creed, thereby becoming to its surprise the major
de facto of the monarchy. The monarchy belatedly
converted to parhamentary lllstItutions similar to Germany's (universal suf-
to parliaments whose rights were subordinate to the monarchy's), and
tned to reach out to exploited nationalities and even classes.
But noble and bourgeois nationalists, not the proletariat, made the parlia-
ments unworkable, they were dissolved. This authoritarian monarchy
could not even retam the loyalty of the whole ancien regime, let alone
incorporate the bourgeoisie. By.1914 the regime consisted of the monarchy,
the army, and the largely tactical support of various national and class
groupings. Its corporate solidarity was probably the weakest of the four cases.
The four cases reveal considerable variation in regime strategy and success.
The crucial criteria of success were to maintain the corporate coherence
of the ancien regime, and to modernize by incorporating sections of the bour-
It.is outside the scope of this article to attempt to explain why some
regimes did much better than others at these tasks. However, regimes seem
not to have prospered or faltered because of the strength in general class
and terms of and proletariat. In these terms the rising
classes m Germany were IllltIalIy the most threatening, those of Japan the
least threatening, with Austria and Russia somewhere in between. This is not
the same ordering as for regime success. The bulk of the explanation of suc-
cess would seem to lie among the traditional regimes and classes not among
the rising classes. '
At its most coherent, authoritarian monarchy provided a distinctive mix-
ture of citizen rights - a fair degree of civil citizenship, minimal social
citizenship, limited political citizenship, the whole varying by class and tac-
ticalIy undercut by an arbitrary monarchy and court-centred elite. Its social
part part incorporated interest-group
]osthng, erratIcalIy vIOlent yet mstItutlOnalized nonetheless. Was this the third
viable strategy for advanced industrial societies? Could it have survived the
working class pressure indefinitely? But for the fortunes of war would it still
survive today in three of the four greatest industrial powers the world a
united Germany, a Tsarist Russia, and an Imperial Japan? We cannot be
because these regimes colIapsed in war. But let us consider four supports for
this counter-factual possibility.
. F!rst,. in own time Wilhelmine Germany was not idiosyncratic. Its emerg-
mg lllstItutlOns were better-organized versions of the European mainstream.
As Gold stein (1983) has shown, the combination of selective repression
was .the late 19th century norm, not welI-developed
hberahsm, st111 less reformlsm. For this reason German institutions were
much copied, especialIy by Austria and Japan.
126
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
Second, by the time of their entry into the decisive war, 1914 (or
in the case of Japan), the authoritarian monarchies were already becommg
great industrial powers. Germany had overtaken and F.rance a?d.
matched only by the United States. Japan and RUSSia were mdustnahzmg
rapidly and successfully; and Russian economic resources, then as now,
made up in quantity what they lacked in quality (quantitative indices of the
economic strength of the Great Powers can be found in Bairoch, 1982).
Authoritarian monarchy was surviving into advanced industrial societies in
Germany and Japan, still had a reasonable chance in Russia, and was obvi-
ously failing only in Austria, where nations, not classes, provided the main
threat.
Third, we must beware a too-homogeneous view of industrial society and
its class struggles. The main reason the working class was not so threatening
was its limited size. National censuses conducted between 1907 and 1911
show Britain to be exceptional. Only 9% of its working population was still
in agriculture, compared to 32% in the US, 37% in Germany, and more
55% in Russia. Among the major powers only in Britain were more workmg
in manufacturing than in agriculture (Bairoch, 1968: Table A2 has assembled
the census data). Outside Britain, labour needed the support of peasants and
small farmers to achieve either reform of revolution. It achieved this partially
in the 'contested' cases of France, Italy and Spain, and more sustainedly in
the "mixed" cases of Scandinavia. But in Germany, Japan and Austria it
failed dismalIy. Socialism was trapped in its urban-industrial enclaves, out-
voted by the bourgeois-agrarian classes, and repressed by peasant soldiers
and aristocratic officers. Authoritarian monarchy could continue to divide
and rule and selectively repress provided it could manipulate divisions between
agrarian and bourgeois classes, and motivate them both with fear of the
proletariat. Few 20th century socialists have broken this strategy - Lenin
being the obvious exception.
Fourth, the numerical weakness of labour has continued, though in changed
form. The rise of the 'new middle class' and of the 'service class', the re-
emergence of labour market dualism, and the increasing size and variety of
service industries soon introduced new differentiations among the employed
population, just as agriculture declined. Successful labour movements in
the post-war period, like those of Scandinavia, have managed to repeat
their earlier populist strategy (Esping-Anderson, 1985). They have recruited
white-collar workers and new economic sectors into the Social Democratic
movement, just as they earlier recruited bourgeois radicals and smaII farmers.
But could labour movements which had already failed to attract the bour-
geoisie or farmers, as in Germany or Japan, now do better among
groups? It is surely more plausible to conceive of divide-and-rule, selective
repression strategies, wielded by arbitrary authoritarian monarchies, surviv-
ing successfully today in Germany and Japan, and possibly also in Russia
and constituent parts of Austria-Hungary.
127
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
I t?at the third strategy, authoritarian monarchy, could probably
have survlVed mto advanced, post-industrial society, providing a distinctive
arbitrary combination of partial civil, political and
SOCial cItizenship. This was not envisaged by Marshall, or indeed by any
modern sociologist.
Fascism and authoritarian socialism
World War I resulted in two further strategies, fascism and authoritarian
socialism. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are their exemplars. Both
used more USi!lg the infra structural capacities of the 20th century
and vIOlent legitimating ideologies. In practice, as in all
repressIOn to be combined with negotiation. Both regimes
with ,":hom they would not negotiate: for both, anyone
provldmg pnnclpled opposItIon; for the Nazis labour leaders, socialists, Jews
and o!her non-Aryan groups; for the Soviets, major property-owners. But
other mterest groups - never acknowledged as antagonistic classes - could
establish cliques within and clients without, and bargain and
Jostle m tIme-honoured abs?lu.tist style. social struggles were not openly
at a.ll. But wlthm the regime they would continue, flaring into
mtermlttent bfe with purges, riots and even armed factional struggle.
Neither regime provided civil rights; neither provided real political citizen-
they provided the institutions of sham corporatism and
SOCialIsm). Yet they moved furthest toward social citizenship. Fascism's move
hesitant: full employment. and public works programmes were not greatly
m advance of others of the tIme (and were partially an outcome of a more
!mportant policy goal, rearmament). But had the regime survived the war
ItS encroachments on capitalism would surely have extended the
role in guaranteeing subsistence. The Soviet regime has gone much further
prou.d of its programme of social citizenship. The state formally provides
subsistence of all (though the reality, with private peasant plots and black
markets, is less clear-cut).
Of course, German Fascism was deeply unstable. But this was due to the
restless mi.litarism of its leaders in geo-politics, not to its class strategy.
thiS was remarkably successful in a short space of time. The prole-
tanat was suppressed more completely than any of the regimes discussed
so far would have believed possible. Its leaders were killed or exiled' its
disbanded. or staffed by the regime's para-military fo;ces;
Its masses sIlenced, seemmgly with the approval of other social classes. The
was emasculated even more effectively than the Wilhelmine
regime had The liberals were killed or silenced, the rest kept quiet
or loudly support. Ruthlessness was no longer hidden by scruple.
FaSCism mlgh! h.ave offered a fourth, chilling resolution to class strug-
gle m advanced societIes. Its main test would have been the next one: could
128
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
it take on capital too? It was already beginning to do this by subordinating
economic profit to militarism. This proved its downfall- but not at the hands
of domestic social classes, who fought loyally for the Nazi regime down to
its last days.
The stability of the fifth solution, authoritarian socialism, cannot be in
doubt. The Bolsheviks and their ruling successors soon cowed the bourgeoisie,
and gradually domesticated the labour movement. The trade unions were
converted into a-political welfare state organizations (sometimes headed by
ex-KGB men). It took almost fifty years for the institutionalization to be
complete. But once in place, it appears no less stable than other enduring
types of regime.
The impact of war and geo-politics
I have described five viable regime strategies and mixtures of citizenship:
liberalism, reformism, authoritarian monarchy, Fascism and authoritarian
socialism. Yet industrial society today has lost some of this variety. Authori-
tarian monarchy and Fascism no longer exist. Why? Is it because of their
inherent defects or instability? I have already suggested not.
There is an alternative explanation. To paraphrase a famous epitaph on
the Roman Empire - these regimes did not die of natural causes, they were
assassinated. Of course, Fascism and authoritarian socialism were also born
out of assassination. But for the fortunes of World War I, authoritarian
monarchy might be alive today, while Fascism and authoritarian socialism
might never have been born. But for the fortunes of World War 11 Fascism
might dominate the world today. True, it is difficult to see American liber-
alism being overthrown by the German, Austrian and Japanese alliances. But
Europe and Russia might well have had viable futures under very different
regimes.
Of course, proof of this argument would require disposing of the reverse
causality: regime type might have determined the role of war. This could
have happened in two stages. Certain regimes - obviously the more authori-
tarian ones - may have been more militaristic and provoked the world
wars; yet they may have been less effective at them. The first
has validity. The Nazis and Japanese did aggress m World War 11; and, m
a more confused, stumbling way, the authoritarian monarchies did start
World War I. But is the second stage of the argument valid? Were liberalism,
reformism and authoritarian socialism better suited to mass mobilization
warfare? The ideologies of the victors suggest the answer 'yes'. I have only
time here to give fragmentary evidence, but my answer is 'no'.
In both wars the German army fought better than its enemies, who con-
tinuously needed numerical superiority to survive. German civilians also
loyally supported their regimes to the end. Both points hold also for the
Japanese in the second war. The Eastern Front in the first war offers further
129
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
shocks to the liberal/reformist perspective. Authoritarian monarchy Russia
outfought the. by now semi-authoritarian monarchy of Austria-Hungary,
whose troops .m turn outfought the by now largely liberal regime of Italy.
Indeed, whe.n m 1917 the Hungarian armies against Russia collapsed,
they were stIffened by Prussian officers and NCOs and then began to get the
upper hand (Stone, 1975). The Central and Axis powers were correct in their
view that the fortunes of war turned less upon citizenship than on efficient
military. organization. Unfortunately for them, military efficiency became
over-weIghted by numbers. Numbers resulted principally from the alliance
system - how may powerful states were on each side? Authoritarian mon-
arc?y and were. by superior geo-political alliances" not by
theIr domestIc socIO-polItlCal structure. . of 'reference societies', more advanced societies to which modernizers could
After 1945 this result was deliberately rammed home by the victors care-
ful not to repeat the mistakes of the peace treaties of 1918 (see Maier, '1981).
Eastern Europe was made safe for authoritarian socialism by the Red Army.
Western Europe and Japan were more subtly made safe for liberal/reformist
regimes (though regime does not fit happily into this categorization,
because of of many traditions). In Western Europe
the authorItanan RIght was elImmated by force, the revolutionary Left
had the ground cut from under it by reforms and economic growth offered to
governments and industrial relations systems of the Centre and Centre-Left.
By 19.50 was ?ver. A cross between Marshallian citizenship and
Amencan lIberalIsm dommated the West, less through its internal evolution
than through the fortunes of war. It still dominates today.
Marshall's general argument was that industrial society institutionalized
class struggle through mass citizenship. This seems true. All regimes have
rights. But they have done so in very different degrees
and combmatIOns. It IS a more complex and less optimistic overall picture
he But for of geo-politics and war - including the
of hIS own - It might have been a very different and
mfimtely more depressmg pIcture in Europe.
.are prone to that 'evolution' is usually geo-politically
assIsted. Dommant powers may Impose their strategies on lesser powers;
or the lesser may freely choose the dominator's strategy because it is an
obviously successful modernization strategy. This means that what 'evolves'
depends on changing geo-political configurations.
Let me quote Ito Hirobumi, the principal author of the Meiji constitution
of 1889:
:We were just then in an age of transition. The opinions prevailing
m the country were extremely heterogeneous, and often diametrically
opposed to each ... there was a large and powerful body of
the younger generatIOn educated at the time when the Manchester
theory was in vogue, and who in consequence were ultra-radical in
130
RULING CLASS STRATEGIES
their ideas of freedom. Members of the bureaucracy were prone
to lend willing ears to the German doctrinaires of the reactionary
period, while, on the other hand, the educated politicians among the
people having not yet tasted the bitter significance of administrative
responsibility, were liable to be more influenced by the dazzling words
and lucid theories of Montesquieu, Rousseau and similar French
writers.'
I have taken this quotation from Bendix (1978:485) who uses it in support
of a general evolutionist model of how Western ideals of popular repres-
entation supplanted monarchy everywhere. He rightly notes the importance
point with approval. But the quotation reveals that at the end of the 19th
century there were at least three - Britain, France and Germany - and this
reflected a real balance of power among several great powers. No single power
could impose its will on others (outside its colonial or regional sphere of
influence). Modernizers could choose from among several regime strategies.
That is far less the case today. The Soviet and Anglo-American strategies were
imposed - in the East by force, in the West by assisting certain political fac-
tions and subverting others. The two strategies have worked in their different
ways for 40 years, and are now backed by the economic, ideological, military
and political resources of two hegemonic superpowers. Eastern Europe is
still held down by force. In the Western European periphery, deviant regimes
in Portugal, Spain and Greece have succumbed to the Anglo-American vision
of modernization desired increasingly by their domestic elites. In the Third
World there is more variety of choice, because most countries are more
insulated from both Western and Eastern blocs, but the choices tend to be
around the two models provided by the superpowers.
Geo-politics has also provided a second recent change: the emergence of
nuclear weapons. Warfare at the highest level would now destroy society.
Therefore, the war-assisted pattern of change dominant in the first half of
the century cannot be repeated. The emergence of the superpowers and
of nuclear weapons both indicate that the future of citizenship will be dif-
ferent from its past. Our assessment of its prospects must combine domestic
with geo-political analysis.
Notes
An earlier version of this article was given as the 1986 T. H. Marshall Memorial
Lecture at the University of Southampton. My thanks go to the University's
Department of Sociology for its invitation and hospitality and to John Hall and
David Lockwood for their helpful criticisms of that version.
2 I write 'Great Britain' rather than 'The United Kingdom' because there is also
no reference to Northern Ireland, which, of course, would not fit well into his
theory.
131
 •• rnn IO:S Cl IIZENSHIP? RULING CLASS STRATEGIES

3 The historical generalizations contained in h .

empirical and bibliographic sup ort' M t e rest of thIS essay are given more HALL, 1 1985. Powers and Liberties. Oxford: Blackwell.
and po:er, For the distinction between HALSEY, A. H. 1984 .. 'T.H. Marshall: Past and Present, 1893-1981', Sociology,. 18.
4 The hterature on Wllhelmme German i JESSOP, B. 1978. 'Capitalism and democracy: the best possible political shell?' in
from works cited later good co . Y s enormous and often controversial. Apart G. Littlejohn et al POIl'er and the State. London: Croom Helm.
and by various are provided by Calleo, KAISER, D. E. 1983. 'Germany and the origins of the First World War', Journal of
5 KaIser, 1983: 458-62, makes this ar umen an,. . . Modern History, 55.
writers like Berghahn 1972 that th g . t'II agamst the more tradItional view of
to counter its threat. ' , e regIme eared the Left and militarized society KANN, R. E. 1964. The Multinational Empire. New York: Octagon Books. 2 vols.
KATZNELSON, I. 1981. City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the
6 Bendix, 1978: 476-90, gives a succinct ... United States. New York: Pantheon Books.
7 I am grateful to Professor Michio M of Mel]1 strategy.
8 H!storical sociologists have tended to or t.hls observ.ation .. LrPSET, S. M. 1973. 'Tom Marshall- Man of Wisdom', British Journal of Sociology,
ahsm. For a narrative that enables us t g. Austna, except m relatIOn to nation- 24.
between regime, classes and nations, most of the complex relations LIPSET, S. M. 1985. Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology. New
Brunswick: Transaction Books.
LocKwOOD, D. 1974. 'For T.H. Marshall', Sociology, 8.
References MAIER, C. S. 1981. 'The two postwar eras and the conditions for stability in 20th
century Western Europe', American Historical Review, 86.
BAIROCH, P. 1968. The Working p, l t' d'
de Bruxelles. opu a 1011 all Its Structure. Brussels: Universite Libre MANN, M. 1980. State and Society, 1130-1815: an analysis of English state finances,
in Zeitlin, M. (ed.) Political Power and Social Theory. Vol I. Connecticut: lAI.
BAIROCH, P. 1982. 'International industrialization levels f
of European Economic History, 11. rom 1750 to 1980', Journal Press.
MANN, M. 1984. 'The autonomous power of the state' in Archives Europeennes de
BENDIX, R. 1978. Killgs or People p, d
sity of California Press. . OIl'er all the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: Univer- Sociologie, 25.
MANN, M. 1986a. The Sources of Social POlller, Vol I: A History of Power from the
BEpRGHAHN, y. 1973. Germany and the Approach of War ill 1914 London' St M t' Beginning to 1760 A.D. New York & London: Cambridge UP.
ress. . ' . ar ms
M ANN, M. 1986b. 'War and Social Theory: into Battle with Classes, Nations and
BLACKBOURNE, D. & ELEY G 1984 Th " .
Oxford UP. '. e PeCUliarIfles of German History. Oxford: States', in Shaw, M. & Creighton, C. (eds.) The Sociology of War and Peace.
London: MacMillan.
BONNELL, Y. E. 1983. Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Po . . . . MANN, M. 1989. The Sources of Social POIl'er, Vol II: A History of POlller in Industrial
St. Petersburg and Moscow 1900 1914 B k I IUICS and OrgalllzatlOns ill
CALLEO, D. 1978. The Proble . er ey: University of California Press. Societies. New York & London: Cambridge UP.
MARSHALL, T. H. 1963. 'Citizenship and Social Class' in his Sociology at the Cross-
1870 to the Present. Cambridge Germany and the World Ordel;
roads. London: Heinemann.
CORRIGAN, P. & SAYER, D. 1985 The Great A I' . .
Revolution. Oxford: Blackweli. re 1. EnglIsh State Formation as Cultural MARSHALL, T. H. 1975. Social Policy. London: Hutchinson, 4th revised edition.
MAYER, A 1 1981. The Persistence of the Old Regime. London: Croom Helm.
DAHRENDORF, R. 1959. Class and Class C ifI' . MOORE, B. 1969. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Harmondsworth:
Routledge and Kegan Paul. on ICt 111 an Industrial Society. London:
Penguin.
ESPING-ANDERSON, G. 1985. Politics a ains
to Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton t Markets: The Social Democratic Road ROKKAN, S. 1970. Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study
of the Processes of Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
FLORA, P. & ALBER, 1 1981. 'Modernizatio D " ROTH, G. 1963. The Social Democrats in Imperial Gemany. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster
of Welfare States in Western Europe,n;n and. the Development
The Development of Welfare States in Euro e & A !.
(eds.)
Press.
SHAW M. 1987. The Dialectics of Total War. London: Pluto Press.
Transaction Books. 'P and America. New BrunswIck, NJ:
SHEEHAN, 1 1 1976. Imperial Germany. New York: Franklin Watts.
FLORA, P. & HEIDENHEIMER, A. 1 1981 'In d . ,. .
Welfare States, op. cit. . tro uctlOn 111 theIr The Development of SKOCPOL, T. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
STONE, N. 1975. The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
GIDDENS A 1985. The Natioll State and Violence 0 II . . SWAIN, G. 1983. RlISsian Social Democracy and the Legal Labour Movement, 1906-1914.
GOLD STEIN, R. J. 1983. Political R . . ' x ord. PolIty Press.
Croom Helm. epresslOn 111 19th Century Europe. Beckenham: London: Macmillan.
TAYLOR, A. J. P. 1961. Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman. London: Arrow Books.
HAIMSON, L. H. 1964 and 1965 'The r bl .
1905-1917' Parts I and 2 SI' . R p.o em of SOCIal stability in urban Russia TURNER, B. S. 1986. Citizenship and Capitalism: the Debate over Reformism. London:
, , laVlC eVlew, 23 and 24. ' Alien & Unwin.

132 133
 Part 3

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES
AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
 9
THE MYTH OF CITIZENSHIP*

Michael Ignatieff

Source: Queen's Quarterly, 99:4 (1987), 399-420.

Michael Ignatieff develops and uses an ideal type of citizenship

to examine the practice of citizenship in the modern world. He
argues that the neo-conservative revolution in political thinking
has been an attack on citizenship as a coercive bargain.

In its noble meaning, the word myth refers to some ancient story which, in
allegorical form, tells us a truth about the universe and how we are in it.
Since ancient times, for example, the myth of Oedipus has told human beings
disturbing truths about the hidden nature of our desires for our mothers and
fathers. In this sense of the word, myth is a bearer of truth in disguised form.
But the word myth is also shadowed by a more ironical meaning. In modern
times we use the word as a synonym for everything that is fanciful, dubious,
inflated, and untrue. In this sense we think of myths as an inheritance from
the past that deserves a dip in the acid bath of our scepticism.
Citizenship is a myth in both the noble and the ironical sense. On the one
hand, the Western political imagination remains haunted by the ideal of
citizenship enunciated in Aristotle's Politics. What is haunting, specifically,
is the ideal of a public realm in which through participation the citizen
transcends the limits of his private interest and becomes, in his deliberation
with others, what Aristotle said man I truly was - a political animal. The
myth of citizenship holds that political life is the means by which men realize
the human good. On the other hand, to the modern western political tradi-
tion, inaugurated by Hobbes and Locke, citizenship has seemed a fanciful
conception of man and his political nature. Man in such a conception is a
bundle of passions and interests which he satisfies chiefly in market relations
and private sociability: the political or public realm is a necessary evil - the
institutional arrangements necessary to protect and enhance private freedom.

137
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
THE MYTH OF' CITIZENSHIP

It is, two' images: as noble myth, citizenship as What is the point of such an exercise? Briefly this, These essential tensions
fancIful lIe and two polItIcal paradIgms - the republican and the liberal between conceptions of men as civic actors or as economic ones
- that I want to examine here,
again and again within our tradition, We are living through such a per,lO,d
, I am not concerned here to trace the history of citizenship since ancient today, In the past twenty years there has been a sustained attack on the CI;IC
tImes, Thanks to the work of some great historians - John Pocock Q t'
Sk' t ' , uen m contract of post-war liberal democratic society, I refer to the neo-conservatIve
mner, 0 name Just two - the way-stations of this history have become ever revolution in political thinking, a revolution in thought which, among other
clearer m the past, 20 years: Aristotle's Politics, the constitution of Athens' things, has helped bring Mr, Reagan and Mrs, Thatcher to power, and has
the republIcs; the early Italian city states of the thirteenth century; rearranged most of our mental furniture about the proper balance between
Calvm s the Common:-vealth ideology of the English civil war; and state and market. I want to argue that this revolution has been above all an
the republIcal11sm of the Enlightenment, culminating in the Declaration attack on citizenship as a coercive bargain: citizenship is seen as a commit-
of ,and the Declaration of the Rights of Man; finally, the ment to others which does not give "value for money"; in place of civic
republIcan despotism of the Committee of Public Safety, In each of th
t h " b ' , ese relations between strangers, it is proposed to substitute market relations
momen s, w at It lS to e a cltIzen is at the centre of political discussion because these enable a person not only to chose the extent and degree of his
My own work as a historian concerned the period in late commitment to others but also to put a price on this commitment relative
and Scotland when a republican discourse on virtue and to other expenditures of time and money,
CItlzenshlp encountered the nascent discourse of political economy' '
,, ,economlC When seen as a critique of citizenship, the neo-conservative revolution can
CItizen, I have argued that one of the intentions govern- be understood in larger terms than as a class-interested or selfish assault on
mg Ada,m SmIth s of was a root and branch critique of the the post-war welfare state, Its roots go deeper: its challenge cannot be met
economlC an,d assuI?ptIons underlying the Rousseauian ideal of unless we see it as an expression of the deep-seated contradictions between
the self-sufficlent, CIty state republic,2 What this work brought home
citizenship and economic life as we live it in a market society, It is this
t,o me was, tenSIOn between the republican discourse on citizenship and contradiction, both analytically and historically, that I want to explore,
lIberal polItlcal theory of market man, The one defends a political th th'
, d fi ' , , eo el Let me begin by putting together an ideal type of the citizen as it, comes
economlc e I11tIOn of man, one an active - participatory _ concep- to us first of all from Aristotle, A citizen, said Aristotle, is one who IS fit to
tIOn of freedom, the other a paSSIve - acquisitive - definition of freedom' both 'govern and' obey, fit both to make the laws and to observe them, Citizen-
the ,speaks of a, the other of society as a market-based ship thus implies both an active and a passive mode: participation
aSSOCiation of competitIve 1I1dlvlduals, This tension between man the 't'
d ' d' 'd Cllzen office holding and election in the governance of the state; and obedlence to
an keconomlc mat: IVl e,s our spirits and loyalties to this day: we live as the laws made by other citizens, Civic virtue, the cultural disposition apposite
mar et men, we wlsh we lIved as citizens,
to citizenship was thus two-fold: a willingness to step forward and
I do not want to recapitulate my own work here or to use the work of th the burdens of public office; and secondly, a willingness to subordmate
to retrace the history of citizenship in detail. Instead I want to do whO t el'S
h't' 'th f a no private interest to the requirement of public obedience, What Aristotle called
IS onan WI any sense 0 professional prudence should attempt: I want to the "right temper" of a citizen was thus a disposition to put public goo,d
develop Max Weber would ha:e called an ideal type of citizenship and ahead of private interest. Crucial to this vision is a conception of the pubhc
to use t,hat ldeal type t? some hght on the practice of citizenship today, being a higher, truer arena than the private, Aristotle did not deny that
!he pomt of the exerClse IS to work both ways at once: to criticize the real- were many worthy private avocations, especially contemplation, but he
lty of contemporary citizenship from the standpoint of myth and to critici
insist specifically that the realm of the eoconomia - the household realm 111
the myth from the standpoint of reality, From this exercise I hope we ;e
e?d up un d el'S tan d'mg ar i ' WI l which the material necessities of daily life were reproduced - was a lesser
ltt e more precisely what kind of citizenship is pos- realm than the public, For it was in the public that man exercised his highest
m a modern world, or to put it another way, what elements of the capacities as a social animal. ,,
myth we should hold on to and what elements were either dub'o Who then was fit to be a citizen? Since Aristotle assumed that pohtlcal
th "I ' , I us
m e ongma slmply mapplicable in modern conditions, When I speak discussion was an exercise in rational choice of the public good, he also
modern conditions, I mean the tiny portion of the globe in which advanced assumed that the only persons fit for such an exercise were those capable of
lIberal democracy exists, in which human beings have the valuable and ft rational choice, And the only ones capable of rational choice were those who
taken for privilege of being free to determine what kind of were free, Dependent creatures could not be citizens: slaves, those who worked
they would like to be,
for wages, women and children who were both subject to the authority of

138 139
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
the domestic oeconomia were excluded from citizenship. Adult male property
owners were the only persons vested with civic personality.
. its therefore, citizenship was an exclusionary category,
JustIfymg the coerCIve rule of the included over the excluded. As Michael
Walzer has pointed out, the rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members
strangers, is. the most common form of tyranny in human
hlsto.ry. Among a rough equality of fortunes was always
consl.dered necessary, smce mequality of property among citizens would give
the nch the means to suborn the interests of the less wealthy and corrupt
the. But was such rough equality to be maintained? By sumptuary
legIslatIOn agamst luxury? By confiscatory taxation? At what point, would
such enforced equality abolish the freedom the polis was intended to defend?
Throughout its life, civic discourse struggles with the contradiction between
economic processes ceaselessly generating inequality, and political processes
requiring equality among citizens.
its the. of .citizenship implied the following crucial
cham of assocIatIOns: polItIcal chOIce requires independence of mind' inde-
pendence ?f mind material and social independence;
mheres only m those capable of material, social and intellectual
By a paradox which underlay refusal of citizenship rights
to workmg people and women from ancient Athens to the dawn of the
twentieth century, property-holding, far from being a proof of interest was
taken to be the material precondition for disinterestedness. The civic
?oly of adult male property-holders was justified on the grounds that their
acted of the rights of those under their tutelage
and m theIr .. CItIzenshIp m the republican tradition thus is undergirded
throughout ItS ancIent and modern history by patriarchialism. As such a
civic paradigm was bound to come into eventual conflict with a rights-based
paradigm of political community. There is a clear contradiction between
the restrictive property-based citizenship implied in the classical republican
model the universa! adult citizenship that follows necessarily from any
of human belllgs .as equal rights-based creatures. Yet in the thought
foundmg of lIberal tradition like Locke, rights-based concep-
.of polItIcal IIlclUsl.on ceded place to property-based conceptions of
mcluslOn, and the exclUSIve definition of citizenship prevailed until clamour
from out of doors - popular campaigns, first for working men's suffrage,
then for - the contradiction within liberal theory
between ulllversal nghts and restncted citizenship impossible to sustain.
our and .rig?t1y so, republican citizenship is disgraced by its
patnarchalIst underplllnmgs, yet these underpinnings were something more
the of privilege. They proceeded from a particular
VIew of the IIltellectual, socIal and economic preconditions for disinterested
i.e., good jUdgment in politics. Property owners had leisure and education:
they were free from a narrow inscription within the division of labour _ the;
140
THE MYTH OF CITIZENSHIP
did not have their noses to any particular grindstone - and could thus raise
their eyes up to the higher questions of political art. Moreover, since the
property that classical citizenship implied was property in land, rather than
in moveable goods or stock, property holding automatically vested its owner
with an interest in the territory of the nation state. By virtue of landed
property, therefore, a citizen was automatically a patriot.
There are two additional features of the myth of citizenship which need
to be pointed out: to use modern and therefore anachronistic parlance, its
anti-bureaucratic and its anti-imperial features. The civic paradigm assumed
a constant rotation of office and looked askance at the consolidation of any
form of permanent administrative cadre set apart from the citizenry. The
civic paradigm also stood against the creation of a standing army of paid
professionals. Such an army of paid hirelings would prove a weapon in the
hands of any tribune of the people bent on suppressing republican liberty.
Moreover, once a citizen devolved his obligation to defend the republic onto
a paid professional, his own patriotic virtue would wither away. The civic
model opposed the creation of a separate army and a separate bureaucratic
cadre on the grounds that specialization bred interests at variance with the
general interest of citizens. In the folklore of Roman republicanism the civic
hero was Cincinnatus, the farmer who left his plough to lead the republic
out of danger and then returned to the humble soil as soon as the job was
done. The civic myth opposed not only the creation of a permanent political
class, but the social division of labour which sets the state above and against
civil society. In its ideal, self-rule means just that: citizens, known to each
other, rule over each other in turn. Yet, from its very inception, such a myth
of self-rule was a fiction at variance with the facts. Aristotle himself remarks
that there are few democracies in which true rotation of office occurs: "moved
by the profits of office and the handling of public property men want to
hold office continuously" (Poetics, Book 3). Into the discourse on citizenship
there had to be inserted a discourse on corruption, on how a self-governing
citizens could be led astray by the profits of office and the lure of power into
setting themselves up as permanent office holders, and on some occasions,
despots. The civic myth is thus a myth of the fall in politics: how virtuous
self-rule is corrupted and transformed into despotism by human cupidity.
Citizenship implied a tragic and often nostalgic sense of lost human pos-
sibility. Civic life was a ceaseless struggle to preserve the human good - the
polis - from the forces within human nature bent on its deformation into
tyranny.
This tradition of principled opposition to a demarcation between ruler
and ruled, leader and led helps to explain why the civic tradition was
anti-ritualistic, i.e., hostile to the pomp of power, to the self-inflating rituals
used by leaders to raise themselves above the common herd. The civic model
came to admit the necessity of executive power within republics but it took
pains to insist that leader should always remain only a primus inter pares.
141
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
THE MYTH OF 'CITIZENSHIP

fusion with Protestantism in the Genevan city state and

far from being the .lesser realm of rude mechanics, slaves and the
10 the AIT,lencan colonies heightened this suspicion of ritual display in
oeconomia - the private realm of providing food and shelter, neceSSItIes
the exercise of power, a ntual associated with corrupt monarchies and
luxuries for people - was the essential realm of life; even more so, a socIety
bloated churches. Washington and Jefferson were republican ideals beca
was just to the degree that its poorest members had an adequ.ate standard
they adopted the plain, simple and unadorned style becoming a republi::
leader. of living. By such a standard, they argued, modern commercIal, or we
would say capitalist society had nothing to reproach itself in any companson
One essential 'path to civic ruin, as far as the civic paradigm was concerned
with the virtuous but materially backward republics of the past. It was the
the temp.tatlOn to Civic discourse was always anti-imperial.
modern division of labour which made such a standard of living
discourse optImum size. of polity should be small: the city state,
not only the subdivision of tasks within industry dramatIc
relatIons .c?uld rema10 face to face relations. Imperial expan-
improvements in the productivity of labour, but the SOCIal dIVIsIOn ?f
SIOn conditIOns and required bureaucratic administration and
between the state and civil society. The very aspects of modermty whIch
executive
. .. despotIsm.
h' Moreover, citizens could not consistently rule'b alob ar_
classic republicans regarded as a dangerous departure form the ideal of an
lans: cItIzens lp properly applied only to adult male property holders who
unspecialized civic democracy: a strong executive, ?acked up by a .bureaucracy
shared the and values of the state - it could not be extended to
and a standing army, Smith praised as essentIal to the achIevement of
those who dId not share the premises of the polis. Hence, barbarians could
society's essential goal: an adequate standard of living for .the A
only be ruled by force rather than consent, and the use of force abroad was not
democracy of property-owning citizens, who shared office 10 rotatIOn mI.ght
with the maintenance of democracy at home. In very different
be free, Smith conceded, but it was bound to be unequal and poor. A socIety
CIrcumstances the late republican discourse of Cicero, to the
which allowed government and the holding of public office to a
CIVIC dIscourse of the early eIghteenth-century British Commonwealth
man specialized function, which, in other words, encouraged the dema.rcatlOn
the incompatibility of citizenship and imperialism was always stressed. ,
between state and civil society, was bound to be both more productIve and
me here and s.ummarize the paradigm of citizenship as I have
more capable of satisfying the needs of its people. .
descnbed It so far: an antI-bureaucratic or anti-imperial ideal of self-rule
For Smith and Hume, the state is essentially an instrumental
by adult male owners, equal among themselves, sustained by an
crucial to the adjudication and containment of self-interest in the prIvate
of In Rousseau's Social Contract this vision of polity
and market sphere. The public sphere is not the arena in which citizens real-
receIves ItS fullest eighteenth-century expression. It is at J'ust such a mom t
as po
r' I t heory enters the en,
age that citizenship is then exposed as
ize their natures by transcending their self-interest. Indeed, it makes no sense
to speak of human beings as having an essential nature or purpose
a fancIful out of touch with the realities of market society.
which can be attributed to their various activities. Human be111gs are creatures
In . there was a vital debate about the material
of the passions, desires and interests that they have: the task is to
conditions of politIcal dlSI?terestedness or virtue in the British polity. The
find the political form that enables them to satisfy these and 111te.r-
debate centred on the of whether holders of mercantile or moveable
ests at the least cost in liberty and regulation. Democracy IS not a value 10
p.roperty could be true, dIs111.terested citizens. The rural squirearchy of early
itself in such a theory, although liberty is. The liberty which is the sine qua
England, 10 whom this neo-republican ideology of citizen-
non of market society is passive liberty: the right to enjoy and
ShIP was vested, looked askance at the emergence of a new
property, to be safe from arbitrary arrest, to be. free. to express s
type of economIC man, the stock-jobber, financier, international merchant
and to worship as, or if, one pleases. The actIve lIberty the. CIVIC
and nab.ob, all of the new men created by Britain's expansion as an imperial
paradigm - the freedom to make the laws one lives by, to partIcIpate 111 the
C?uld such men be loyal citizens if their interests were
making and ordering of the polity - was as second-
1OternatlOnal, If theIr property were not tied to the land? Given that m t
ary. Hume said that if he had to choose between hV1l1g 10 a
of their fortunes were built in alliance with the state as empire builder co
the rule of law - one which allowed him freedom to advance hIS affaIrs 111
they be to be disinterested in deliberation over public affairs?
private - and a democracy which gave him rights of
d.e?ates, for us by John Pocock, show an ancient ideal of
not guarantee the security of his property or the freedom of hIS h.fe,
cItIzenshiP. strugglIng to to terms with a new type of economic man .
he would chose to live in a despotism. This is to make the analytIcal P010t
. In the dIscou.rse economy - which challenged the civic para-
that market society requires the rule of law to guarantee contract,
dIgm, the classICal CIVIC condescension towards the economic and priv t
· d .h . ae but it does not require democracy. Economic man may be a CItIzen but he
was su b to WIt enng scorn. As Adam Smith and David Hume insisted
, need not be. Indeed, the possibility emerges that as long as a state leaves a

142
143
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
individual in the possession of his property and his legal rights, that
mdlVldual need have no business in politics whatever.
The relation between private freedom and democracy may be contingent
and people in society live the contingency of that relationship.
to say, they of participation in the elective process as a
vestigial duty, rather like gomg to church. It really has nothing to do with
them, and as long as they are left alone, they are happy to leave politics to
A?athy or disinterest .of this sort is one of the great privileges of the
tmy fractIOn of the world whICh calls itself democratic. In most of the world
people are not free to pick or chose their relation to the political. In
like late 1970s, citizenship was abolished altogether; in
others lIke Mao s Chma under the Red Guards citizenship was enforced to
the exclusion of all private rights.
Hume could envisage - and the Committee of Public Safety of the French
Revolution certainly validated his prediction - a radical deformation of
the civic tradition in which the communitarian bias of the civic discourse
its subordination of the private realm to public duty would legitimize reai
tyranny. Majoritarian tyranny in all its modern forms - from Jacobin demo-
through - has always exploited the public
associated with the word citizen: in such regimes, the "good
cItizen IS one who ?enounces and informs on his neighbours, the one
who sets aSide bourgeoIs moral scruple and submits his will to what the
deem to be the public good. Germans who stood by while their
Jewish neighbours were deported were "good citizens". Aristotle had not
envisaged a situation in which a good citizen was not also a good man.
read these eighteenth-century debates now as matters of archival
cunoslty or we can try to formulate them in modern form. This classical
discourse on however dated, however disgraced its premises may
now seem: the power to enable us to pose still valid questions of
modern cItizenship: what are the conditions of political disinterestedness?
what ties. ?ur material inte.rests to the interests of our country? do
the harned conditIOns of modern life - our inscription in a narrow division
of la.bour our restricted leisure - disable our political judgment? If, as
nghtly thmk, we cannot let our politics become the sport of a monied
anstocracy, who would fit the criterion of ancient civic-mindedness how will
we, ordinary harried citizens that we are, approximate to these virtues?
Or is the ancient paradigm asking too much of us? .
If we put our faith in a majoritarian democracy based on universal citizen-
in preference to an aristocratic democracy based on a minority franchise,
It IS because we have ceased to believe in the natural disinterestedness
of and. because we believe that in the exercise of mass suffrage,
the prejudices and mterests of minorities cancel out each other in the will
of a majority. The trouble is, of course, that majorities make mistakes: demo-
crlwies safeguard themselves against these mistakes by the requirement of
144
THE MYTH OF CITIZENSHIP
regular elections and by the entrenchment of rights of minorities which
protect individuals from the zealous tyranny of majority rule. In other words,
entrenched rights and democratic constitutions are held to compensate for
the potential lack of disinterested virtue in electoral majorities.
In the republican civic paradigm, the virtue of citizens is held to be the
ultimate guarantee of good government. In the liberal politics that sought
to make its peace with economic man and with the realities of market
society, good constitutions, checks and balances are held to matter more
virtue. The idea that virtuous institutions are an instance of history's cunnmg
in redeeming unvirtuous men is an essential part of the thinking that went
into the framing of the American Constitution. This Constitution is the most
successful fusion of republican and liberal traditions and attempts to make
peace between them. Many traditional republican features are in evidence:
the suspicion of standing armies, the entrenchment of the right to bear
arms; yet the ascription of sovereignty to "we the people" is qualified both
by entrenchment in a written constitution of rights "we the people" are not
allowed to abuse; and by the creation of checks and balances between
executive, legislative and judicial branches.
The question of whether civic virtue in the citizens or a firm structure of
countervailing powers is the more effective guarantee of democratic freedoms
is recurrently put to the test. For example, one is entitled to wonder whethel;
if the conduct of two recent American Presidents - Nixon and Reagan -
had been put to the test of a plebiscite, they would not have been vindicated
or forgiven by the American people. Were their behaviour in Watergate or
Irangate to have been put to a plebiscite, it would have been judged a matter
of personal honesty or the lack of it, matters a judging public might leave
to easy forgiveness or general indifference. Fortunately, their conduct involved
infringements of the powers of Congress, and for this reason their censure
could be achieved by institutional rather than popular means.
The great nineteenth-century commentator on these eighteenth-century
debates was of course the young Marx. Much of his early writing in 1843
and 1844, particularly on the Jewish Question, can be read as his reckoning
with the civic discourse on citizenship and the discourse of political economy.
For him political economy's anatomy of real life in civil society - economic
man in competition with other in a war of interests - had shown up the
mythic quality of the civic ideal. Modern man was divided between his identity
as bourgeois and as citoyen; the former was his real identity, the latter a false,
mythic identity. In the market, he lived as an unequal competitor; in the polis
he was supposed to be a rights-bearing equal. His identity as a citizen was
entirely legal and therefore imaginary (and thus ineffective) as a motive.
While subjecting the myth of citizenship to devastating scrutiny Marx
remained the tradition's greatest nineteenth-century exponent. He held true
to an Aristotelian ideal of man, freed from material necessity, and therefore
equipped with the leisure and judgement to realize his own nature - his
145
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
sl!ecies being - with others. Socialist man was supposed to recon-
cIle the contradictIOn between bourgeois and citoyen. Socialist production
would create the equal and universal conditions of affluence and leisure
which would allow men to realize the Aristotelian ideal and overcome the
split between private and public. Aristotle saw this as the true mark of
the citizen. In this sense, Marxism is the culmination of the civic ideal and
is the to render the ideal of citizenship applicable
In modern economiC conditIOns.
If this is the case, why in almost all communist societies which hold them-
of Marxist has socialist citizenship proved incompatible
With democracy or With private rights? Isaiah Berlin's famous answer
"Two Concepts of Liberty" is that of the two available conceptibns of
lIberty - "freedom from" versus "freedom to" - Marxism showed a disas-
trous :or the over the former. What Marx disdainfully called
bourgeOIs CIVil nghts - freedom from" - were held to be subservient to
the higher task of creating socialist man,jreeing him to realize his inner nature
as a communal being. If this is the case, the fault lies not only in Marxism
but in the original civic ideal which - unless balanced by the cautious
of checks and balances and natural rights as
In .the - favours civic community at the expense of
pnvate nght. IS a myth, therefore, it has proven a dangerous
one not balanced by a strong dose of private rights.
If Marxtan socialIsm IS one terminus ad quem of the civic ideal which
shows up some of its and some of its danger, it is not the only one.
What about the fate of strIctly bourgeois republicanism, the attempt to marry
ancient concepts of citizenships to a market economy?
We have already seen that the patriarchal elements of the ancient discourse
the libe.ral ideal of equal human rights: accordingly, the polit-
Ical of the mneteenth century can be interpreted as the attempt by
and women to .force this contradiction into the open and
resolve It In of an new doctrine, in which citizenship was
to be a nght of all adult individuals irrespective of their property. That
ach.leved, however, the empty formality of citizenship in an unequal market
society more and more evident. If that eminent nineteenth-century
Anatole France could admit that bourgeois equality amounted to
nothing more equal right of rich and poor to sleep under a bridge,
then the contradictIOn between formal and real equality in his society was
apparent. even to the bourgeoisie. Marx's indictment of bourgeois citizenship
- that It confers. formal legal e.quality upon citizens without conferring
the SOCIal and economic equality necessary for the exercise of the
- IS correct; and, once again, much of the history of citizenship
smce the nmeteenth century can be understood as the attempt to reduce
the contradiction between real inequality and formal equality in the civic
cohtract of modern society. This is a struggle, it must be said again, led from
146
THE MYTH OF' CITIZENSHIP
below - from the. working class and feminist organizations - and from
above - by liberal philanthropic circles who were repelled, for reasons of
Christian principle, by the contradiction between the formal and the real. It
was in struggling against this contradiction that an essentially individualistic
market society generated what A. V. Dicey called the collectivist solution.
Despite the libertarian and anti-etatist principles of much nineteenth-century
statecraft, bourgeois society created the modern interventionist state essentially
to reduce an intolerable moral contradiction between the promise of citizen-
ship and the reality of a market economy.
Out of this struggle emerged the modern welfare state. Following
T. H. Marshall and others, I would interpret the history of the welfare
state as a struggle to undergird formal legal rights with entitlements to social
and economic security so that citizenship could become a real as opposed
to a purely formal experience. Given the inertial tendency of market proc-
esses to generate unequal outcomes, the state is called upon by its own
populace to extend entitlements to keep the contradiction between real
inequality and formal inequality growing too large.
As such, modern politics made a crucial marriage between the liberal and
civic ideals, thus hoping to have the best of both worlds. From liberalism came
the idea that the state exists to enable individuals to be "free from"; from
the civic tradition came the ideal of "free to". By using common resources
to create common entitlements, the formal freedom promised by liberalism
was to undergirded by the real freedom. Thus we have a polity formally
neutral on what constitutes the good life, yet committed to providing the
collective necessities requisite for the attainment of that good life, however
individuals conceive of it.
To view the history in this way is to insist that the size and weight of the
modern state bureaucracy is not some ghastly collectivist mistake foisted
upon us by bureaucrats bent on the expansion of their prerogatives or by
liberal politicians bent on making other people pay for their expensive experi-
ments in social betterment. That is how the history of the welfare state is
seen by its contemporary right-wing critics, but that, I would argue, is not
how it was. What happened, surely, was an attempt to use state power to
make sure that the market economy's natural tendencies would not be allowed
to vitiate the ideal of a community of equal citizens. That attempt was sus-
tained by important social forces: the trade unions and the liberal professions
together with those elements of the business class who understood that a
just civic bargain was the essential precondition of economic efficiency.
Keynesianism sought to marry equity and efficiency by using public expendi-
ture to reduce the severity of the natural business cycle.
The names of William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes are not
usually associated with the history of citizenship but they have a crucial
place in defining the terms of the civic bargain that prevailed from 1945 to
the 1970s. In this new conception of citizenship, the citizen could count, as
147

WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
a matter of right, to be protected against illness, old age and unemployment
out of a common fund to which he has himself contributed. Welfare benefits
were universal; the new civic. bargain was not between "haves" and "have
on the basis of need. Taxation was explicitly conceived as the
mstrument for building civic solidarity among strangers. Civic solidarity was
built upon the presumption that the more a citizen received from the state
the more easily he would connect his private interest to the public.
The Keynesian ascendancy, from 1945 to 1973, masked the long-term con-
tradiction between the market and citizenship. As soon as western economies
entered storm of troubles in the I 970s, this contradiction began to
reassert What at first. seemed a crisis of inflation, of adjusting every-
where to hIgher raw matenal costs and of restraining excess demand soon
revealed itself as a crisis of transition from an industrial to a post-industrial
economy. Keynesianism and welfarism depended upon a heavily centralized
and often nationalized industrial economy built around huge extractive and
manufacturing industries - steel, coal, petrochemicals, automobiles - which
benefited from state-capitalist partnership. Now these foundations were crum-
bling: the social welfare costs of adjusting to permanently high levels of
employment eroded private profitability and put all of the apparatus of the
post-war welfare state under permanent strain; the whole apparatus of em-
ployment security put into place in the Keynesian partnership between unions,
management and the began to prove an obstacle to the restructuring
of the labour market m the late 1970s. The political constituencies tied to
the nationalized industries and public sector employment - the unions, local
communities and their political elites - spent most of the decade resisting
economic restructuring: denationalization, the watchword of politics in the
early 1980s is an attempt to break the power of these obstructive collectivities
and to force through modernization on lines that follow a purely economic
rather than civic or public logic. Security had been the watchword of the
pact: security in employment, housing, illness, and
old age. Now mobIlIty IS the watchword of a post-industrial economy rather
than security: jobs emerge and disappear, move from one process to another,
from .one to another - skill not seniority which counts. The logic of
post-mdustnal growth seems to work against both nationalization and tradi-
welfarist of employment security. The emerging pattern
IS toward smaller umts of production adapted to rapid fluctuations in level
and patterns of demand. These units may be owned by multinationals but
their management and recruitment are left to local employers. Nationaliza-
tions work in industries with a stable demand tied to the delivery of some
essential and essentially stable public utility. They will not work with small
companies in a life and death relation to the international market.
Alongside economic crisis, there was the experience of learning from the
welfare state's successes and failures. First of all, extending citizenship rights
to welfare did not increase social solidarity: it did not engender a stronger
148
-------------- ---
THE MYTH OF CITIZENSHIP
general commitment to the public interest. Instead, once the state was defined
as the provider of last resort, the new civic culture unleashed expectations
which both exposed a vast amount of unmet demand for social services and
created new and unlimited demands once these initial demands were met.
For example, instead of taking pride in public hospitals as a common civic
asset, most people only noted how inadequate many public hospitals were
in comparison to private provision. Small but significant numbers of depend-
ents exploited the welfare system and this attracted disproportionate outrage
because exploitation of the welfare system was seen as a violation of the
tacit civic contract. It was seen as bad citizenship - a more serious matter
than mere fraud. Likewise, the rising real rates of criminality since 1945
seemed to contradict the expectation that if everyone were given a real stake
in society through the welfare system, they would behave towards others as
mature citizens. This simply did not happen. Right-wing critics of the welfare
society could point to both crime and welfare fraud as instances to show
that the supposed civic bargain was nothing more than a rip-off.
The impact of the welfare state on social solidarity is paradoxical. When,
for example, social workers take over the caring functions formerly discharged
by family members, there is both a gain and a loss: the dependent individuals
may be better cared for in some instances family members, particularly women,
will be freer to enter the labour market; but a sense of family obligation
may be weakened and community solidarity may suffer. The welfare state
did increase collective solidarity in certain ways: in societies with a public
health service, we all accept an obligation to contribute to each other's health
care costs - indeed this is very much the core of the social democratic civic
ideal. At the same time the welfare state allowed the emergence of new styles
of dependency and new lines of moral exculpation. "It's the state's job,
not mine" becomes everybody's first line of excuse when confronted with
vandalism, neglect of civic property or, more seriously, abuse of children
next door. In public housing especially, the maxim, "everybody's property is
nobody's property" goes some way to explaining the all too frequent down-
ward spiral of neglect.
If the idea of citizenship is in crisis today, it is precisely because experience
has not validated the post-war civic ideal that public goods would extend
civic solidarity. It becomes less surprising (when the history is read in this
way) to understand why of the two elements that went into the making of
the post-war consensus - the liberal insistence on freedom and the civic
insistence on public goods - it should be the liberal which is now be
seeking to detach itself from its civic integument. The two were always in
potential conflict and have been so since the dawn of the market era: any
emphasis on freedom as the primary goal of a market society must be in
eventual contradiction with a view which envisages society as a polity of
risk-sharing citizens. As long as the market is functioning adequately, these
contradictions can be contained. When economic crisis forces restructuring,
149
 --- ILCl"lto:lnlot" I
costs. and of public provision begin to seem too high and
cItIzenship Itself comes to be seen as a coercive bargain.
focal point of this of citizenship is of course taxation. People
begm to ask why they are paYIng more for declining levels of public service'
or they ask they are paYing publicly for a service they would prefer
contract for pnvately. Where competing private services exist in education
health "care, with wealth begin to clamour for the right
to opt out of publIc proVISIOn: to send their children to private schools to
have operati?ns private hospitals. The logic of a politics which aims
reducIng taxatIOn In order to give private individuals more disposable
mco.me to spend .as please on a range of private rather than public
servlc.es becomes IrreSIStIble. Yet it is clear that citizenship, not to mention
, to become accountable and responsive to consumer demand. The enormous
Citizens?ip reposes in not too strict an accounting of what the bargain is
worth. ChIldless couples pay through their taxes for the education of other
children; young working people help to pay for the retirement
and SIckness costs of the aged; those who work help support those out of
work; those who take good care of their children often end up paying
by.those who do not take good care of theirs. This
Impel so.nal CIVIC altrUIsm IS undergirded by the insurance principle:
we pay Into a common fund In order to draw on it ourselves and as long as
we get public services when we need them, we do not mind paying
for free nders.
..Universality of benefits provides the essential legitimacy of the civic pact:
IS pact, "haves" and "have nots", but among equal partners
In a CIVIC enteI!'nse, each of whom can count on the baby bonus, and
and the old age pension as a matter of right. But
the CIVIC bargaIn IS bound to come under strain if the growth machine
of modern slows down and thus reduces the disposable income
for the CIVIC and if the quality of goods delivered begins to
declIne. We all then begm to hve through that characteristic double conscious-
ness of .the urban class: not wanting to opt out of public education
or. health but feeh?g that the longer we stay in for the sake of civic
the more our pnvate interests suffer. Ultimately any of us will take
out a crumbling inner-city school rather than persevere with
CIVIC mmdedness Simply for the sake of principle.
If I have spoken of modern citizenship in terms of passive entitlements
to this is. .the active elements of citizenship - running for
votmg, polItical organizing - were under-emphasized in the
BevendgI.an welfare state. A welfare state generated an enormous bureaucracy
only accountable to elected officials. Instead of confirming a citizen's
m a common enterprise, the experience of any form of public
was all too often a lesson in bureaucratic arbitrariness or ineptitude.
CItIzenshIp was thus a bureaucratic rather than a democratic reality; and as
150
rHE MYIH OF CIIIZENSffIP
such was weakly implanted in the political culture, vulnerable to the first
plausible attack from the right on social democratic red tape. It was never
obvious in fact how exactly to make the welfare bureaucracy more account-
able without reproducing more committees and review bodies. of the
important ironies about citizenship is that no one wants to be a CitIZen all
the time. Socialism, as Oscar Wilde said, is all right, but it takes too many
evenings. Participatory democracy - the slogan of citizenship in the 1960s
- foundered on its inability to propose any solution to the problem of
democratic control over the state bureaucracy other than more meetings.
This laid the welfare state open to the argument that its problem is the state's
monopoly over the services it delivers. Remove this monopoly, ch.arge market
prices for welfare and social services of all kinds and the state wIll then have
moral prestige of markets derives chiefly from the failure of the civic bargain
behind welfare to live up to its democratic promise. Markets have to respond
to customer demand; bureaucracies seemingly do not. It is a symptom of
the crisis of citizenship in the 1980s that most political rhetoric, whether
of left or right, addresses the electorate not as citizens but as taxpayers or
as consumers. It is as if the market were determining the very language of
political community.
The reassertion of the market model can be understood as the outcome
of a class struggle between labour and capital over the percentage of economic
surplus that should go to wages, public expenditure and or
Certainly a class analysis will take us part of the way: reassertmg the nghts
of capital, increasing the profitability of companies and breaking t?e hold .of
public sector unions were undoubtedly central to the conservatIve partIes
which came to power in so many Western democracies in the 1980s. But as
usual, class analyses will take one only so far. Equally important is
might be called an epistemological factor: markets have proved better predIC-
tors of the future than government planning. The inability of government
to anticipate let alone plan for post-industrial conversion brought back to
the fore the market model's oldest claim to plausibility: as a signalling
device of emergent trends. Market signals are more accurate and more re-
sponsive predictors than government-backed planning based on social science
indicators.
Yet there was a further specifically political attraction in the market model
besides its predictive plausibility. One of the crucial functions
solution - denationalization, privatization - has been to take dlstnbutlOnal
conflicts out of the political arena. When a company is privatized, its deci-
sions about plant location, investment and levels of employment, are supposed
to be guided by market rather than political considerations. Ridding com-
panies of "political interference" means, in effect, the of
unions and electoral considerations on company behavIOur. If service m a
newly privatized company remains bad, the government is off the hook, while
151
 the heat is on the company. The .market solution is thus an attempt to take
of the political arena. This is fully intended, of course.
IS a key term of neo-conservative argument. It implies
that m areas - the economy to the private sphere of family life
- a host o.f were. bemg Plade subject to legislative interference in ways
were mlmlcal to hb.erty or efficiency or both. Given the intensity of
umon-management conflIct over the share between capital and labour in the
public sect?r during the 1970s, the political attractions of privatization
appear obvIOUS: the government simply ceases to be the court of last resort
such battles: Likewise in the field of welfare. Neo-conservatives argue that
the pubhc debate how much income should be spent on welfare
IS mtermmable and endless, It would be more efficient and less constrictive
of the choices of individuals if they were left free to contract privately for
such health care services and educational services as they chose. Democratic
of these services, they argue, is bound to infringe the rights of
mmontles who want to spend either more or less than the democratically
agreed mean.
It should be clear that the market solution is an attack on citizenship and
democracy. The consequence may be a diminution of that area of collective
life - the economy - which ought to be subject to the collective will of
citizens.
It is here in its definition of politics that neo-conservatism becomes inco-
herent. Neo-conservatives limit the state's powers and, therefore the domain
of collective political discussion to the provision of external 'defence and
internal law and order. Every other feature of the welfare state tends to be
regarded as a regrettable pragmatic concession of principle to the debauched
tastes electorate: benefits may not be justifiable in principle
but abohtlOn of welfare IS Impossible in practice, both for political reasons
and for fear of the law and order consequences. But this stance in effect
the revealed preferences of the electorate for effective social security
protectIOn. Yet these settled preferences are not to be taken as a sign of an
by state handouts but rather as evidence of the degree
to whlc? m mass-society private welfare is intimately linked
to publIc proVISIOn and cannot be otherwise. The modern welfare state is not
sustained by a culture of altruism but by public awareness of the acute
of public and private utilities. Because they fail to grasp this
mterdependence, neo-conservative governments are increasingly confronted
by the contradiction between their rhetoric and their performance between
telling their. supporters they will get government off the backs of the people
and the plam fact that g?vernment expenditure is either stable or rising as
a percentage of gross natIOnal product. Indeed, in Britain, the privatization
of public assets, far from reducing the level of state expenditure within the
economy, has simply enabled the state to maintain or increase welfare
services while slightly lowering general taxation.
152
There is also an interesting tension 'between conservative enthusiasm for
the market and their distaste for the culture of the market place: its pander-
ing to the taste of the lowest common denominator, the vulgarity,
and sexuality that seem to be what sells in a market culture. Out of thIS
tension is born a contradictory cultural policy: the privatization of public
broadcasting networks or the relaxation of broadcasting licensing require-
ments in order to improve the efficiency of the media market, coupled with
the moral browbeating of broadcasters on the issue of violence in the media
and strongly moralistic stances on the content of both the criminal law and
the school curriculum. Conservatives are unhappy with a culture that appears
to relativize value or that appears to stand for nothing beyond the general
permission to be free. But to say this is a tension in their thought is merely
to say that their thought stands astride an enduring tension between the
market and the polity on both the economic and cultural plane. Those who
want a culture to stand for something beyond generalized permissiveness
know in the end that that "something" cannot be left to the market or to
private morality. It must receive legitimation by the polity, by citizens col-
lectively deciding this is what we stand for.
What this amounts to is that the necessity for citizenship is inextinguish-
able. One can be agnostic on the question of whether man is or is not, by
nature, a political being; whether citizenship is or is not a human need. But
it seems indubitable that, in the western tradition, he has sought to reconcile
two competing political ways: maximum freedom in the private sphere
coupled with collective deliberation over the content of justice and the shape
of moral value. If men are citizens, it is because they cannot avoid the con-
stantly renewed and ever changing dimensions of this choice. The pendulum
of choice may swing and we are, indeed, in a strong market phase. It is strictly
impossible, however, for this phase to endure forever because the choices that
have been made are too fraught with contradiction to remain unchallenged.
What, then, are we to expect when the pendulum begins to shift away from
the liberal market phase towards a renewal of the civic phase? We cannot
expect a restoration of the status ante quo, a return to the post-war welfare
state consensus. In the post-industrial economy, it is hard to envisage govern-
ment once again in the commanding heights of industry, simply because the
acceleration of economic change makes it imprudent for government to
manage areas where risks are more safely left to private managers. Govern-
ment will stay out of the economy, in other words, for reasons of political
prudence: in order to reduce the political costs of failure and misjudgment.
In the sphere of what is now the welfare state, one can easily envisage that
citizens on rising real incomes will want to spend more of their disposable
income on private welfare services - health care, education, pensions - and
that state resources will be increasingly concentrated on ensuring adequate
provision for those in need. That implies a new contract of citizenship no longer
based on universality of coverage and contribution, but one more explicitly
153
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? THE MYTH OF 'CITIZENSHIP

based on obligations between those who "have" and those who "have not". important to us chiefly to the degree that become by
There is the risk that those in need will be stigmatized by dependency and hich we exert our influence in the internatIonal commul1lty of natIOns. We
maintained at the lowest levels consistent with social decency. They are treated :re the first human beings ever to see the planet Earth from .outer space, the
this way now and it is to be feared their condition will deteriorate once the first to grasp the fragility of its environment and the tota.l lllterdependence
welfare state ceases to be a collective social asset and becomes instead what of our fates. Our conception of citizenship will have to adjust to that kno.w-
it once was in the Poor Law era, a set of social provisions exclusively for led e' it will have to become a myth, an ideal, adequate to the way we hve
those in need. A new social contract is only saleable politically if the middle g The paradox of a global economy is that the nation state becomes 111?re
class receive sufficient reductions in tax to offset their foregone benefits and important as our instrument for defending our interests a.nd SOIVlllg
if administration to those in need is seen to be a credit, an honour to the our problems in the international sphere: to balk.al1lze.spheres
whole community, a sign of its civic spirit. The crucial point here is that or to concede self-determination to provlllclallllterests puts us III a dilemma.
the demand for equality of opportunity, for common starting conditions, is We want a strong local government to be responsive to our local needs
something more than a passing political fad or contingent political allegiance and we want a strong federal government to speak for us in the global sphere.
of the social democratic and socialist tradition. As we have seen, the belief
that a polis cannot either be a community or a democracy unless there is
rough equality of opportunity among its citizens is constitutive of our old-
Notes
est and most distinguished political inheritance. As such, the demand for * This article is a substantially revised version of a lecture given at
equality simply will not go away, because it is co-equal with the even more on 22 September 1987. The lecture was given in the annu?l "Corry" senes w was
tablished to commemorate the former Queen's PrinCipal. This Lectures Ip was
basic demand of human beings that they live in a community. To paraphrase
in 1974 to be jointly administered by the of .and
John Kenneth Galbraith, no one, to my knowledge, has ever proposed the f Political Studies Queen's University. The lectureship bnngs dlstmgUls . gk
squirrel wheel as an adequate model of human society. address the on "some aspect of the relation of law and en
Yet is also clear that the very notion of community is changing and up in general or philosophical terms or on some lively current Canadian Issue .
becoming ever more global in its reach. There is a new politics about in the 1 "Man" in the context of this article, refers to man and woman. ."
world since 1945 which takes the universal human subject as its subject and 2 The N:eds of Strangers, see Chapter 4, "The Market and the Republic.
the doctrine of universal human rights as its chief demand. In such a politics,
dramatically instanced in organizations like Amnesty International, the
Works cited
responsibilities of the citizen are held to cede before the obligation to be
a human being. When a man is being tortured in another jurisdiction, I can Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. and Intra. Ernest Barker. ?xford Univ. Press, 1958.
no longer regard our difference of citizenship as grounds to leave it to some- Ignatieff, Michael. The Needs of Strangers. New York: Vlkmg, 1984.
one else to protest. Likewise in the politics of environmental protection, the
field of political intervention is now global, since the threats to that habitat
are now global. Pollution from one country's steel and automobile industries
becomes acid rain in another country. When the rain forests in Brazil are
felled, the lungs of the whole world come under threat. Weapons made in
one nation's laboratory can end human life on the planet. If we are becom-
ing citizens of the world, it is because the threats to our lives and livelihoods
no longer stop at the frontier of the nation state. It is perhaps here that the
ancient myth of citizenship serves us least well in its explicit distinction
between citizens and barbarians, between those who rule and those who are
ruled. As Canadians know, citizens of others countries are now wading ashore
claiming our protection against oppression in countries we have never heard
of. We may try to use our citizenship laws to deny them right of entry, but
there is simply no escape from the impingement of their problems upon us
because these problems have become ours too. In more practical terms, this
m'eans I think that our national citizenship and our national government are

154 155

10
RETURN OF THE CITIZEN
A survey of recent work on citizenship theory
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman
Source: Ethics, 104:2 (1994), 352-81.
I. Introduction
has an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among
In 1978, it could be confidently stated that "the concept
o cItizens Ip as out of fashion among political thinkers" (van
Gunsteren 1978, p. 9), FIfteen years citizenship has become the "buzz
word" among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum (Heater 1990
p. 293; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. x). ' As we shall see in the next section, most writers believe that an adequate
There are a number of .for this renewed interest in citizenship in
the 1990s. At the level of theory, It IS a natural evolution in political discourse
because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice
community membership--:the central concepts of political philosophy
111 .1 and .1980s, respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to ideas
of entItlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular
commul1lty on the Thus it may help clarify what is really at stake in
the debate between lIberals and communitarians.
.. Interest in citizenship has also been sparked by a number of recent pol-
Ittcal events and trends throughout the world-increasing voter apathy and
dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nation-
ahst ,movements 111 Europe, the stresses created by an increasingly
and multtraclal popUlation in Western Europe, the backlash
the welfare state in Thatcher's England, the failure of environmental
poliCIes that rely on voluntary citizen cooperation, and so forth.
These events have made clear that the health and stability of a modern
democracy not. only on the justice of its 'basic structure' but also
?n qualIttes and attItudes of its citizens: I for example, their sense of
Identtty and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional,
156
RETURN OF "fHE CITIZEN
ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with
others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the
political process in order to promote the public good and hold political
authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise
personal responsibility in their economic demands and in personal choices
which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess
2
these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable. As
Habermas notes, "the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth
as much as a population makes of them" (Habermas 1992, p. 7).
It is not surprising, then, that there should be increasing calls for 'a theory
of citizenship' that focuses on the identity and conduct of individual citizens,
including their responsibilities, loyalties, and roles. There are, however, at
least two general hazards in this quest. First, the scope of a 'theory of citizen-
ship' is potentially limitless-almost every problem in political philosophy
involves relations among citizens or between citizens and the state. In this
survey we try to avoid this danger by concentrating on two general issues
that citizenship theorists claim have been neglected due to the overemphasis
in recent political philosophy on structures and institutions-namely, civic
virtues and citizenship identity.3
The second danger for a theory of citizenship arises because there are
two different concepts which are sometimes confiated in these discussions:
citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, as full membership in a particular political
community; and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and quality
of one's citizenship is a function of one's participation in that community,
theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues.
Few of them, however, are proposing that we should revise our account of
citizenship-as-Iegal-status in a way that would, say, strip apathetic people
of their citizenship. Instead, these authors are generally concerned with the
requirements of being a 'good citizen'. But we should expect a theory of
the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what
it is to be a citizen, just as a theory of the good person is distinct from the
metaphysical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person. While most
theorists respect this distinction in developing their own theories, we shall
discuss in Section IV a fairly widespread tendency to ignore it when criticiz-
ing others' theories of citizenship-for example, by contrasting their own
'thick' conception of citizenship-as-activity with an opponent's 'thin' concep-
tion of citizenship-as-status.
IT. The postwar orthodoxy
Before describing the new work on citizenship, it is necessary to outline
quickly the view of citizenship that is implicit in much postwar political
theory and that is defined almost entirely in terms of the possession of rights,
157
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
RETURN OF T'HE CITIZEN

The
. h most
" influential exposition of this postwar conceptI'on of Cl't'Izens h'Ip-
as-ng IS T. H. Marshall.s. "Citizenship and Social Class," written in 1949. 4
to Marshall, CItIzenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that
everyone ?S treated as a full apd equal member of society. And the way to
ensure thIS of is through according people an increasing
number of cItIzenshIp nghts.
Marshall divides citizenship rights into three categories whl'ch h
h' k h Id ' . e sees as
ta en. 0 In England In successive centuries: civil rights, which
alOse In the eIght:enth century; politIcal rights, which arose in the nineteenth
century; and socIal rights-for example to public education health
l' ' ,care,
oym.ent Insurance, and old-age pension-which have become estab-
lished m. thIS 1965, pp. 78 ff.).5 And with the expansion
of the of he notes, there was also an expansion of the
;IVtl and political rights that had been restricted to white
IOP:I y-ownmg rotestant men were gradually extended to wome th
workIng class, Jews and Catholics, blacks, and other previously
groups.
For the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-
democratIc welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights
to all, the welfare .state ensures that every member of society feels like a
full. member of socIety, able t? participate in and enjoy the common life of
any of these nghts are withheld or violated, people will be
margmalized and unable to participate.
This .is often ."passive" or "private" citizenship, because of its
emphaSIS on paSSIve entItlements and the absence of any obligatio n t
ticipate in public life. It is still widely supported 6 and with good rea ptahr-
b fit f ' .. h' ' son.
en.e s 0 pnvate Ip are not to be sneezed at: they place certain
basIc human goods (secunty, prosperity, and freedom) within the grasp of
nearly all, and that is nothing less than a fantastic human achievement"
(Macedo 1990, p. 39).
. this postwar conception of citizenship has come
attack In the past decade. For the purposes of this article
we can IdentIfy two sets of criticisms. The first set focuses on the need t '
(or passive acceptance of citizenship rights with
actIve exerCIse of cItIzenshIp responsibilities and virtues includin
self l' l' 1'1' I .. . , g economIC
. - e I.ance, po 1 Ica partIcIpatIOn, and even civility. These issues are discussed
In SectIOn Ill.
. !he set focuses on the need to revise the current definition of
cItIzenshIp to accommodate the increasing social and cultural plural'
of mode . l' C .. h Ism
SOCIe Ies. an CItIzens ip provide a common experience, identity,
a?d a!leglance for the members of society? Is it enough simply to include
an equal basis, or are special measures some-
tImes reqUIred? ThiS Issue IS dIscussed in Section IV.
ID. The responsibilities and virtues of citizenship
A. The New Right critique of social citizellship alld
the welfare state
The first, and most politically powerful, critique of the postwar orthodoxy
came from the New Right's attack on the idea of "social rights." These rights
had always been resisted by the right, on the grounds that they were (a)
inconsistent with the demands of (negative) freedom or (desert-based) justice,
(b) economically inefficient, and (c) steps down 'the road to serfdom'. But
in the public's eye, these arguments were seen as either implausible or, at any
rate, as justifiably outweighed by considerations of social justice or by a
citizenship-based de fen se of the welfare state such as Marshall's.
One of the revolutions in conservative thinking during the Thatcher/
Reagan years was the willingness to engage the left in battle over the domain
of social citizenship itself. Whereas Mat'shall had argued that social rights
enable the disadvflntaged to enter the mainstream of society and effectively
exercise their civil and political rights, the New Right argues that the welfare
state has promoted passivity among the poor, without actually improving
their life chances, and created a culture of dependency. Far from being the
solution, the welfare state has itself perpetuated the problem by reducing
citizens to passive dependents who are under bureaucratic tutelage. Accord-
ing to Norman Barry, there is no evidence that welfare programs have in fact
promoted more active citizenship (Barry 1990, pp. 43-53).
The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship under-
estimated the extent to which fulfilling certain obligations is a precondition
e for being accepted as a full member of society. In particular, by failing to
meet the obligation to support themselves, the long-term unemployed are
a source of shame for society as well as themselves (Mead 1986, p. 240V
Failure to fulfill common obligations is as much of an obstacle to full mem-
bership as the lack of equal rights. In these circumstances, "to obligate the
dependent as others are obligated is essential to equality, not opposed to it.
An effective welfare [policy] must include recipients in the common obliga-
tions of citizens rather than exclude them" (Mead 1986, pp. 12-13).
. According to the New Right, to ensure the social and cultural integration
of the poor, we must go "beyond entitlement," and focus instead on their
responsibility to earn a living. Since the welfare state discourages people from
becoming self-reliant, the safety net should be cut back and any remaining
welfare benefits should have obligations tied to them. This is the idea behind
one of the principal reforms of the welfare system in the 1980s: "workfare"
programs, which require welfare recipients to work for their benefits, to
reinforce the idea that citizens should be self-supporting.
This New Right vision of citizenship has not gone unchallenged. For
example, the claim that the rise of an unemployed welfare-underclass is due

158 159
 :as. UiX:!iE11 •
to the availability of welfare ignores th .
turing, and sits uncomfortably with the of global economic
welfare states (in Scandinavia ) h ct tha.t .many of the most extensive
lowest unemployment rates. ,e.g. ave tradItIOnally enjoyed among the
Moreover, critics charge it is difficult t fi . imposing obligations as a matter of public policy. They believe that the
Right reforms of the 1980" h 0 nd any eVIdence that the New
save promoted res 'bl " .
reforms aimed to extend the sc f k·' ponSI e cItizenshIp. These
ope 0 mar ets In p I ' r
trade, deregulation tax cuts the we k ' f eop e s Ives-through freer
. ' , a enIng 0 trade un' d h .
Ing of unemployment benefits' .' IOns, an t e tIghten-
· " . -In palt In order to tea h I h .
of InItiatIve, self-reliance and self f:t!. ( c peop e t e VIrtues
, -su llCIency Mulga 1991
Instead, however many market d I' n , p. 43).
, eregu atlOns arguabl d .
era of unprecedented greed and economi . . . .Y ma e pOSSIble an
the savings and loan and J'unk b d c as evidenced by
on scandals In Am' (M 1 .
p. 39). Also, cutting welfare benefits f f . enca u gan 1991,
on their feet, has expanded the gettIng back
exacerbated, and the workin d ass. Class InequalIties have been
"disenfranchised" unable to ant .unemployed have been effectively
. .' ICIpa e 111 the n
RIght (FIerlbeck 1991 p 579' H . d ew economy of the New
,. ,00veI an Plant 1988 h 12) 8
For many, therefore the New Ri ht . ' cap. .
a.s an alternative of citizen;hi IS most plausibly seen not
cIple of citizenship. As Plant puts it ut as an assault .on the very prin-
a political and social status mod 'c nstead. of acceptIng citizenship as
the role of the market and have t have sought to reassert
status independen t of economic e 9that citizenship confers a
p. 303; King 1987, pp. 196-98). Ing ant 91, p. 52; cf. Heater 1990,
B. Rethillkillg social citizellShip
Given these difficulties with the New Ri ht "
most people on the left continue to def! gd ?f welfare entitlements,
requires social rights. For the left M 11' e pnncIple that full citizenship
full members and participants in' th aI'S a s th.at people can be
basic needs are met "is as str e lIfe of SOCIety only if their
ong now as It ever " (I . unequal power over decisions regarding sex, reproduction, consumption,
p. 72). However, many on the left acce '" . was gnatIeff 1989,
welfare state are unpopular in t b pt that the eXIsting institutions of the
d ' par ecause they seem t ..
an dependence and to "facilitat '. 0 promote paSSIVIty
particular 'clientalization' of the e : pn,vatIst from citizenship and a
i
cf. King 1987, pp. 45-46). c IZens role (Habermas 1992, pp. 10-11;
How then should the state foster self-reli
The left has responded ambivale tl t . ance and personal responsibility?
. .
h and, the pnncIple n y 0 Issues such as 'w 'kf ' 0
of personal res on . " . 01 are. n the one
been at the heart of socialism and SOCIal obligation has always
all, implicit in Marx's famous slog::n"Fro ' p. 39). A to work is, after
to each according to his needs" S ' m each accordIng to his talents,
. . ome people on the left, therefore, express
160
UI (lIb GXIIGiJI ...
qualified acceptance of workfare, if it "gives both responsibility and the
power to use it" (Mulgan 1991, p. 46).
On the other haild, most people on the left remain uncomfortable with
dependent are kept out of the mainstream of society because of a lack of
opportunities, such as jobs, education, and training, not because of any
desire to avoid work. Imposing obligations, therefore, is futile if genuine op-
portunities are absent, and unnecessary if those opportunities are present,
since the vast majority of people on welfare would prefer not to be (King
1987, pp. 186-91; Fullinwider 1988, pp. 270-78). Rather than impose an
obligation to work, the left would try to achieve full employment through,
for example, worker-training programs. So while the left accepts the general
principle that citizenship involves both rights and responsibilities, it feels that
rights to participate must, in a sense, precede the responsibilities-that is, it
is only appropriate to demand fulfillment of the responsibilities after the
rights to participate are secured.
A similar rejection of the New Right's view of citizenship can be found
in recent feminist discussions of citizenship. Many feminists accept the im-
portance of balancing rights and responsibilities-indeed, Carol Gilligan's
findings suggest that women, in their everyday moral reasoning, prefer the
language of responsibility to the language of rights (Gilligan 1982, p. 19).
But feminists have grave doubts about the New Right rhetoric of economic
self-sufficiency. Gender-neutral talk about "self-reliance" is often a code
for the view that men should financially support the family, while women
should look after the household and care for the elderly, the sick, and the
young. This reinforces, rather than eliminates, the barriers to women's full
participation in society.9
When the New Right talks about self-reliance, the boundaries of the "self"
include the family-it is families that should be self-reliant. Hence, greater
"self-reliance" is consistent with, and may even require, greater dependency
within the family. Yet women's dependence on men within the family can be
every bit as harmful as welfare dependency, since it allows men to exercise
leisure, and so on (King 1987, p. 47; Okin 1989, pp. 128-29).
Since perceptions of responsibility tend to fall unequally on women, many
feminists share the left's view that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede
responsibilities. Indeed, feminists wish to expand the list of social rights, in
order to tackle structural barriers to women's full participation as citizens that
the welfare state currently ignores, or even exacerbates, such as the unequal
distribution of domestic responsibilities (Phillips 1991a, 1991b; Okin 1992).
Given the difficulty of combining family and public responsibilities, equal
citizenship for women is impossible until workplaces and career expectations
are rearranged to allow more room for family responsibilities and until men
accept their share of domestic responsibilities (Okin 1989, pp. 175-77).
161
 -----w-n-KrLS -Cl T I ZEN S HIP?
if ,rights must precede 'b' " ,
the old view of passive III tIes, It seems we are back to
need for change, The most po e e t, as, much as the ri?ht, accepts the
cratize the welfare state-for e!m IS to decentralize and demo-
power and making th p , Y giVIng local welfare agencies more
200-207), Hence the ,rierson pp,
by supplementing welfare rights with d recipients
administration of welfare program emoclatlc participatory nghts in the
This is the central theme of the ' balance of rights and responsibilities, Where do we learn these virtues? The
ship, 10 Whether it will work to porary left view of social citizen-
overcome welfare depend 'd'f:'t::
say, Service providers have often resi t d ,ency IS I ucult to
ability (Rustin 1991, p, 231; Pierson SI ttempts to Increase their account-
be some tension between the oal ' ' 206-7), MoreoveI; there may
the local community and in;reas?f IncreasIng accountability to
P, 30) A d" Ing accountabilIty to clients (plant 1990
, s we ISCUSS In the next sect' th I f '
the ability of democratic participati e e t may have excessive faith in
on 0 so lve the problems of citizenship,
C The lIeed for civic virtues
Many classical liberals believed that a liberal d
even in the absence of an especiall vir could be made secure,
and balances, Institutional and pr:Ced by creating checks
of powers, a bicameral legislature and el:lces such as the separation
wou1d-be oppressors, Even if e ' le era Ism would all serve to block
ac h '
without regard for the common p;lson pursued her own self-interest,
check another set of private 1I one set private interests would
procedural-institutional mechanisms b has become clear that
and that some level of civic virtue a, -Interest are not enough,
1991, pp, 217, 244; Macedo 1990 and P1u3b8lic-spmtedness is required (Gals ton
Consl'd er the many ways that public
' pp, -39),
01' " , assume that political participation itself will teach people responsibility and
lifestyle decisions: the state will b bf ICy on responSIble personal
citizens do not act responsibly e to provl?e adequate health care if
a healthy diet, exercise, and the consum to own health, in terms of
will be unable to meet the needs of of liquor and tobacco; the state
if citizens do not agree to share this I t,he elderly, ,0: the disabled
for their relatives; the state cannot ,by ,s?me care
unwilling to reduce reuse and ,t e environment If CItIzens are
lr
to the economy b: o;n, h?mes;, of the
Immoderate amounts or demand ' un, elmIned If CItizens borrow
a fairer society will flounder if attempts to create
and generally lacking in what Rawls call oI1Ically Int,olel:ant of difference
pp, 114-16 335) W'th , s a sense of Justice (Rawls 1971
ability of liberal' and self-restraint in these areas,
(Galston 1991, p, 220; Macedo progressively diminishes"
162
RETURN OF T,HE CITIZEN
In short, we need "a fuller, richer and yet more subtle understanding and
practice of citizenship," because "what the state needs from the citizenry
cannot be secured by coercion, but only cooperation and self-restraint in the
exercise of private power" (Cairns and Williams 1985, p, 43), Yet there is
growing fear that the civility and public-spiritedness of citizens of liberal
democracies may be in serious decline (Walzer 1992, p. 90),12
An adequate conception of citizenship, therefore, seems to require a
New Right relies heavily on the market as a school of virtue. But there are
other answers to this question,
1. The left and participatory democracy
As we just noted, one of the left's responses to the problem of citizen pas-
sivity is to "empower" citizens by democratizing the welfare state and, more
generally, by dispersing state power through local democratic institutions,
regional assemblies, and judicable rights, However, emphasizing participation
does not yet explain how to ensure that citizens participate responsibly-that
is, in a public-spirited, rather than self-interested or prejudiced, way,
Indeed, as Mulgan notes, "by concentrating too narrowly on the need to
devolve power and on the virtues of freedom, issues of responsibility have
been pushed to the margins" (Mulgan 1991, pp. 40-41), Empowered citizens
may use their power irresponsibly by pushing for benefits and entitlements
they cannot ultimately afford, or by voting themselves tax breaks and slash-
ing assistance to the needy, or by "seeking scapegoats in the indolence of
the poor, the strangeness of ethnic minorities, or the insolence and irrespons-
ibility of modern women" (Fierlbeck 1991, p. 592).
Following Rousseau and J. S. Mill, many modern participatory democrats
toleration. As Oldfield notes, they place their faith in the activity of par-
ticipation "as the means whereby individuals may become accustomed to
perform the duties of citizenship. Political participation enlarges the minds
of individuals, familiarizes them with interests which lie beyond the imme-
diacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to
acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should
pay attention" (Oldfield 1990b, p, 184).
Many people on the left have tried in this way to bypass the issue of re-
sponsible citizenship "by dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself," which
in turn has led to the "advocacy of collective decision-making as a resolution
to all the problems of citizenship" (Held 1991, p, 23; cf, Pierson 1991, p, 202),13
Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems overly
optimistic (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184; Mead 1986, p. 247; Andrews 1991, p, 216),
Hence there is increasing recognition that citizenship responsibilities should
be incorporated more explicitly into left-wing theory (Hoover and Plant 1988,
163
 I IZENSHIP?
pp. 289-91; V<;>gel and Moran 1991 xv'
that the left has not yet found a lan' e' Mouffe I But i.t seems clear
able with, or a set of concrete p r g of responslblltty that It is comfort-
o ICles to promote these responsibilities.14
2. 'Civic republicanism
The modern civic republican tradition is an extre . .
democracy largely inspired by Machiavelli me form of
enamored with the Greeks and R Rousseau (who were m turn
omans). t IS not surp " h We shall use the label 'civil society theorists' to identify a recent development
upsurge of interest in citizenship has' . . nsmg t at the recent
The feature that distinguishes civic a from communitarian thought in the 1980s. These theorists emphasize the
such as the left-wing theorists d' p d lCans partlClpatlonists,
intrinsic value of political above, .then· emphasis, on the
participation is, in Oldfield's words "th partICIpants themselVes. Such
together that most individuals can a' '. e form of human living-
. I' . " spne to (Oldfield 1990a 6) 0 . associations, women's support groups, charities-that we learn the virtues
View, po Itlcal hfe IS superior to the m . I . ,p. . n this
borhood, and profession and so sh y pnvate pleasures of family, neigh-
Failure to participate in politics people's lives.
stunted being" (Oldfield 1990b 187' f e a radically mcomplete and
1992; Beiner 1992). ' p. , c. Pocock 1992, pp. 45, 53; Skinner
As its proponents admit this conce tion .
people in the world IS at with the way
bfe. Most people find the greatest ha . and the good
or leisure, not in politics. Political I? famIly bfe, work, religion,
often burdensome, activity needed IS seen as an occasional, and
and supports their freedom to ure that government respects
ments. This assumption that personal occupations and attach-
ICS IS a means to . t I'r .
most people on the left (Ignatieff 1989 pnva he IS shared by
p. 254), as wel1 as by liberals (Rawls 197i pp. 72-73) 1986,
(Walzer 1989, p. 215) and feminist (El h 229-30), cIvIl socIety theorists
modern view of s s tam 1981, p. 327), and defines the
In order to explain the modern indifference to .. '"
republicans often argue that political life tod pobtIcal civic
compared to the active citizenshi of .ay has become Impovenshed
no longer meaningful and k
say
, ancient Political debate is
But it is more plausible to view ac . atcceshs to effectIve participation.
our a tac ment to pri t I'r
not of the impoverishment of publ' I'fI b e he as a result
life. We no longer seek Ie of the ennchment of private
social life is so much richer than th because our personal and
this .historical change, including the s. are many reasons for
famIly (and its emphasis on intimac d . love and the nuclear
hence richer forms of leisure a d y an mcreased prosperity (and
to the dignity of labor (which the Christian commitment
for war (which the Greeks s esplsed), and the growing dislike
164
RETURN OF THE CITIZEN
Those passive citizens who prefer the joys of family and career to the
duties of politics are not necessarily misguided. As Galston has put it, re-
publicans who denigrate private life as tedious and self-absorbed show no
delight in real communities of people, and indeed are "contemptuous" of
"everyday life" (Galston 1991, pp. 58-63).15
3. Civil society theorists
necessity of civility and self-restraint to a healthy democracy but deny that
either the market or political participation is sufficient to teach these virtues.
Instead, it is in the voluntary organizations of civil society-churches, families,
unions, ethnic associations, cooperatives, environmental groups, neighborhood
of mutual obligation. As Walzer puts it, "the civility that makes democratic
politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks" of civil
society (Walzer 1992, p. 104).
Because these groups are voluntary, failure to live up to the responsibilities
that come with them is usually met simply with disapproval rather than legal
punishment. Yet because the disapproval comes from family, friends, col-
leagues, or comrades, it is in many ways a more powerful incentive to act
responsibly than punishment by an impersonal state. It is here that "human
character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are formed," for it is here
that we internalize the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation
and learn the voluntary self-restraint which is essential to truly responsible
citizenship (Glen don 1991, p. 109).
It follows, therefore, that one of the first obligations of citizenship is to
participate in civil society. As Walzer notes, "Join the association of your
choice" is "not a slogan to rally political militants, and yet that is what civil
society requires" (Walzer 1992, p. 106).
The claim that civil society is the "seedbed of civic virtue" (Glendon 1991,
p. 109) is essentially an empirical claim, for which there is little hard evidence
one way or the other. It is an old and venerable view, but it is not obviously
true. It may be in the neighborhood that we learn to be good neighbors, but
neighborhood associations also teach people to operate on the "NIMBY"
(not in my backyard) principle when it comes to the location of group homes
or public works. Similarly, the family is often "a school of despotism" that
teaches male dominance over women (Okin 1992, p. 65); churches often teach
deference to authority and intolerance of other faiths; ethnic groups often
teach prejudice against other races; and so on.
Walzer recognizes that most people are "trapped in one or another sub-
ordinate relationship, where the 'civility' they learned was deferential rather
than independent and active." In these circumstances, he says, we have to
165
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
"reconstruct" the associational network "under new conditions of freedom
and whe? the activities of some associations "are narrowly
conceIved, partIal and parhcularist," then "they need political correction."
"Yalzer his "critical associationalism" to signify that the associa-
tions of clVlI socIety may need to be reformed in the light of principles of
citizenship (Walzer 1992, pp. 106-7).
But this may. too in the other direction. Rather than supporting
thIS approach may unintentionally license wholesale
m Governments must of course intervene to protect the
nghts of people mSIde and outside the group if these rights are threatened.
But do we governments reconstruct churches, for example, to make
them mternally democratIc, or to make sure that their members learn
to be mde?endent rather than deferential? And, in any event, wouldn't
churches, unions to make them more internally
democlatIc to undermme theIr essentially uncoerced and voluntary
character, WhICh IS what supposedly made them the seedbeds of civic virtue?
. Civil s?ciety theorists demand too much of these voluntary
m to the main school for, or small-scale replica of, demo-
cratic cItIzenshIp. Whtle these associations may teach civic virtue that is not
their raison d'etre. The reason why people join churches famili;s or ethnic
organizations is not to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honor cer;ain values
and enjoy certain human goods, and these motives may have little to do with
the promotion of citizenship.
Joining a religious or ethnic association may be more a matter of with-
from the of than of learning how to participate
I? It. To parents, pnests, or umon members to organize the internal
hfe of to promote citizenship maximally is to ignore why these
groups eXIst m the first place. (Some associations, like the Boy Scouts are
to they are the exception, not the ruie.)J6
A sImtlar Issue anses WIth theonsts of "maternal citizenship," who focus
on family, mothering in particular, as the school of responsibility
and vIrtue. Accordmg to Elshtain and Sara Ruddick, mothering teaches
women about the responsIblhty to conserve life and protect the vulnerable
and these lessons should become the guiding principles of political life as well:
m?thering a "metaphysical attitude" of "holding,"
WhICh gIves pnonty to the protectIOn of existing relationships over the acquisi-
of new 1981, pp. 326-27, 349-53; Ruddick 1987, p. 242).
ThIS has ObVIOUS ImphcatIOns for decisions about war or the environment.
However, some critics argue that mothering does not involve the same
attributes or virtues as citizenship and that there is no evidence that mater-
nal attitudes such as "holding" promote democratic values such as "active
citizenship, self-government, egalitarianism, and the exercise of freedom"
(Dietz .1985, p. 30; Nauta 1992, p. 31). As Dietz puts it, "An enlightened
qespohsm, a welfare-state, a single-party bureaucracy and a democratic
166
RETURN OF CITIZEN
republic may all respect mothers, protect children's lives and show compas-
sion for the vulnerable" (Dietz 1992, p. 76). . .
This criticism parallels that of civil society theories. Both maternal femmIsts
and· civil society theorists define citizenship in terms of the virtues of the
private sphere. But while these virtues may sometimes be necessary for
citizenship, they are not sufficient, and may sometimes be counterproducttve.
4. Liberal virtue theory
Liberals are often blamed for the current imbalance between rights and re-
sponsibilities, and not without reason. i? the 1970s and
1980s focused almost exclusively on the JustIficatIOn of nghts and. t?e
institutions to secure these rights, without attending to the responsIbIlttIes
of citizens. Many critics believe that liberals are incapable of righting this
imbalance, since the liberal commitment to liberty or neutrality or individu-
alism renders the concept of civic virtue unintelligible (MoutTe 1992a) ...
However, some of the most interesting work on the importance of CIVIC
virtue is in fact being done by liberals such as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo,
and William Galston. According to Galston, the virtues required for respon-
sible citizenship can be divided into four groups: (i) general virtues: courage,
law-abidingness, loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence,
(iii) economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay
ability to economic and technological change; and (IV) pohtIcal VIrtues:
capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to
only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those m
office, willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991, pp.
It is the last two virtues-the ability to question authority and the wllhng-
ness to engage in public discourse-which are the most distinctive components
of liberal virtue theory. The need to question authority arises in part from
the fact that citizens in a representative democracy elect representatives who
govern in their name. Hence, an important responsibility of citizens is to
monitor those officials and judge their conduct.
The need to engage in public discourse arises from the fact that the deci-
sions of government in a democracy should be made
and open discussion. But as Galston notes, the virtue of pubhc discourse IS
not just the willingness to participate in politics or to make one's views
Rather it "includes the willingness to listen seriously to a range of VIews
which,' given the diversity of liberal societies, will include the ystener
is bound to find strange and even obnoxious. The virtue of poltttcal dIscourse
also includes the willingness to set forth one's own views intelligibly and
candidly as the basis for a politics of persuasion rather than manipulation
or coercion" (Galston 1991, p. 227).
Macedo calls this the virtue of "public reasonableness." Liberal citizens
must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or
167
------------ - --- - -- - ---- 1\,::1... :&0",':1, VI "IlL UI1:&:DLlO.

make threats, Moreover, these reasons m b" ' " ,

that they are capable of persuad' lust e publtc reasons, In the sense not warrant the conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public
Hence it is not enough to e of nationalities, education to foster in children skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited
must justify their political demands in fture or traditIOn" ,Liberal citizens from parents or local communities" (Galston 1991, p, 253), Howevel', he
stand and accept as consistent with th that fellow CItIzens can under- admits that is is not easy for schools to promote a child's willingness to
,
I t reqUIres , . ell' status as free and e I 't' question political authority without undermining her "unswerving belief in
a conscientious effort to distin gUlS 'h h ' q,ua Cl Izens,
ters of private faith from those which are ose whICh are mat- the correctness" of her parents' way of life,
see how issues look from the point f ' e of defense and to This parallels the dilemma facing civil society theorists, They face the
commitments and cultural :Ifferin g question of when to intervene in private groups in order to make them more
Where do we learn these virtues? 0 h ' P , pp, 57-59), effective schools of civic virtue; liberal virtue theorists, on the other hand,
on the market the family 01' th ' t ,er,theonsts we have examined relied face the question of when to modify civic education in the schools in order
, ' , e aSSOCIatIOns of civil 't ' , to limit its impact on private associations, Neither group has, to date, fully
Virtue, But it is clear that peopl 'll ' socle y to teach CIVIC
public discourse or to question automatIcally learn to engage in come to grips with these questions,
spheres are often held together by pri / any of these spheres, since these
The answer accordin to m ,va e and respect for authority,
D. COl/clusiol/.' respol/sible citizel/ship al/d public policy
education, Schools mustgteach virtue is system of
reasoning and moral perspective th n engage In the kind of critical In most postwar political theory, the fundamental normative concepts were
t democracy (for evaluating procedures) and justice (for evaluating outcomes),
Gutmann puts it, children at As
earn Citizenship, if it was discussed at all, was usually seen as derivative of demo-
In accordance with authority but to think critic II b not ,to behave
to live up to the democratic ideal of ' a, a out If they are cracy and justice-that is, a citizen is someone who has democratic rights
People who "are ruled only by h b'tShadnng sovereignty as citizens," and claims of justice, There is increasing support, however, from all points
, , a I an aut onty a' bl of the political spectrum, for the view that citizenship must play an independ-
stItutmg a of sovereign citizens" (Gutmann' e of con-
However, thiS Idea that schools should h h' p" ent normative role in any plausible political theory and that the promotion
political authority and to distance them I teac , c to be skeptical of of responsible citizenship is an urgent aim of public policy,
, se ves fIOm their own c It I t d' And yet a striking feature of the current debate is the timidity with which
hons when engaging in public d' , , u ura ra 1-
to it on the grounds that it ;s authors apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy, As we
hon and parental or religious auth 't 'yea, s c I ren to questIOn tradi- have seen, there are some suggestions about the sorts of institutions or policies
correct, As Gutmann admits ed ortl? lTIfiPnvate life, And that is surely that would promote or enforce the virtues and responsibilities of good citizen-
, ' uca IOn or democrati 't' h' , ship, But these tend to be the same policies which have long been defended on
necessanly involve "equipping children with' c Cl Ip WIll
to evaluate ways of life different from th t SkIlls necessary grounds of justice or democracy, The left favored democratizing the welfare
if not all of the capacities necessar fora co, ell' parents," "many state long before they adopted the language of citizenship, just as feminists
necessary for choice among good hves are also favored day care and the New Right opposed the welfare state, It is not clear
Hence, those groups which reI heavil " ' pp, 30, 40), whether adopting the perspective of citizenship really leads to different policy
tradition and authority, while no[ stricti y
couraged b th f' "
°t an
Y ru ed out, are bound to be dis-
acceptance of conclusions than the more familiar perspectives of justice and democracy,
We can imagine more radical proposals to promote citizenship, If civility
education P5r30gr5e4s)sive", a!titudes which liberal is important, why not pass Good Samaritan laws, as many European coun-
th e A mlS ave sought to remove th' h'ld-
'h h ' pp, ,ThIS IS why groups h tries have done? If political participation is important, why not require
, ell' c I ren from the sch I suc as
mandatory voting, as in Australia or Belgium? If public-spiritedness is im-
ThiS creates a dilemma for liberals man f , 0 0 system,
law-abiding groups like the Amish S Wish to accommodate portant, why not require a period of mandatory national service, as in most
groups as regrettable but some' I s view the demise of such European countries? If public schools help teach responsible citizenship,
1975, p, 551; but see Rawls lTI a society (Rawls because they require children of different races and religions to sit together
to adjust citizenship education :'nim' lIberals, however, want and learn to respect each other, why not prohibit private schools?
gious authority, Galston for exampl Ize ehlmpact on parental and reli- These are the kinds of policies which are concerned specifically with pro-
how to en ' ," e, argues t at the need to teach children moting citizenship, rather than justice or democracy, Yet few authors even
. gage In public discourse and to evaluate political leaders "does contemplate such proposals, Instead, most citizenship theorists either leave

168 169
 the question of how to promote citizenship unanswered (Glendon 1991 On this view, members of certain g;oups would be incorporated into the
p. 138) or on "modest" or "gentle and relatively unobtrusive ways" political community not only as individuals but also the group, and
CIVIC virtues (!'1acedo pp. 234, 253).20 While citizenship theo- their rights would depend, in part, on their group membership. For example,
nsts the excessive focus gIven to rights, they seem reluctant to propose some immigrant groups are demanding special rights or exemptions to ac-
any pohcles that could be seen as restricting those rights. commodate their religious practices; historically disadvantaged groups, such
may be good f?r this. timidity, but it sits uneasily with the as women or blacks, are demanding special representation in the political
.that w.e face a cnsls of CItIzenship and that we urgently need a theory process; and many national minorities Kurds, are
of. citizenship. As a result, much recent work on citizenship virtues seems seeking greater powers of self-government wlthm the larger country, If not
quIte hollow. In the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate outright secession.
ways to or enforce good citizenship, many works on citizenship These demands for "differentiated citizenship" pose a serious challenge
to a platItude: namely, society would be better if the people in it were to the prevailing conception of citizenship. Many people regard the idea of
mcer and more thoughtful. 21
group-differentiated citizenship as a contradiction terms. On
Indeed, it is not clear how urgent the need to promote good CI·t· h·. view, citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treatmg people as I11dlvlduals
Th 1" .. .. Izens Ip IS.
. e Iterature on cItIzenship .IS full of dire predictions about the decline of with equal rights under the law. This is what distinguishes democratic citizen-
VIrtue, but Galston. admits, "cultural pessimism is a pervasive theme ship from feudal and other premodern views that determined people's
of m.nearly every (Galston 1991, p. 237).22 political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership. "the
If there are mcreasmg cnme and decreasl11g voting rates, it is equally true organization of society on the basis of rights or claims that derIve from
we are more tolerant, more respectful of others' rights, and more com- group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on
mitted to democracy and than were previous generations citizenship" (Porter 1987, p. 128). The idea of differentiated citizenship, there-
1990: pp. 6-7). So It remal11s unclear how we should be promoting fore, is a radical Bevelopment in citizenship theory.
good citIZenship and how urgent it is to do so. One of the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism is Iris Marion
Young. According to Young, the attempt to create a universal conception of
IV. Citizenship, identity, and difference citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally unjust because
it oppresses historically excluded groups: "In a society where some groups
is just a status, defined by a set of rights and re- are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons
sponslblhtIes. It IS also an Identity, an expression of one's memb h· . should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a
1". I . ers Ip m a
ItIca Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity that would general point of view serves only to reinforce the privilege; for the perspective
I11tegrate ex.cluded groups within British society and provide a and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public,
sourc.e of natIOnal umty. He was particularly concerned to integrate the marginalizing or silencing those of other groups" (Young 1989, p. 257).24
workmg classes, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded Young gives two reasons why genuine equality requires affirming rather
them from the "common culture" which should have been a "corn ignoring group differences. First, culturally excluded groups are. at a dI.S-
possessIOn. an d h entage"
. (Marshall 1965, pp. 101-2).23 mon
advantage in the political process, and "the solution lies at least m part III
It has become however, that many groups-blacks women Ab .. 1 providing institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representa-
Peop Ies, eth· d 1·· , ,ongma
mc an re IglOus minorities, gays and lesbians-still feel excl d d tion of oppressed groups" (Young 1989, p. 259). These procedural measures
from the 'common culture', despite possessing the common rights of would include public funds for advocacy groups, guaranteed representation
of these groups feel excluded not only because of their in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that affect a group
nomlC.status ?ut also because of their sociocultural identity-their 'difference'. directly (Young 1989, pp. 261-62; 1990, pp. 183-91).
An mcrea.sl.ng of theorists, whom we will call 'cultural pluralists', Second, culturally excluded groups often have distinctive needs can
ar.gue cItIzenship must account. these differences. Cultural plur- only be met through group-differentiated policies. These include language nghts
b.eheve that the common nghts of cItIzenship, originally defined by and for Hispanics, land rights for Aboriginal groups, and reproductive rights for
for white men, cannot the special needs of minority groups. women (Young 1990, pp. 175-83). Other policies which have been advocated
These g.roups only be mtegrated into the common culture if we adopt by cultural pluralists include group libel laws for women or Muslims, publicly
what Ins Manon Young calls a conception of "differentiated citizenship" funded schools for certain religious minorities, and exemptions from laws that
(Young 1989, p. 258).
interfere with religious worship, such as Sunday closing, animal-slaughtering

170 171
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
RETURN OF THE CITIZEN
legislation for Jews and Muslim s r
1990 p. 705' 1991 pp 197 204, °M mdotorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs (parekh and it is misleading to say that group rights are a response to a form of
, , ': - ; 0 ood 1992). oppression that we hope someday to eliminate. Aboriginal peoples and other
Much has been wntten rega d' th' .
how they relate to broader for these rights and national minorities like the Quebecois or Scots claim permanent and inher-
defends them as a response to "0 JUS Young herself ent i'ights, grounded in a principle of self-determination. These groups are
forms' exploitation " . ppressIOn, of whIch she outlines five 'cultures', 'peoples', or 'nations', in the sense of being historical communities,
violence cultural imperialism, and more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given homeland or terri-
1989 p 261) It would tak t Iva e y group hatred or fear" (Young tory, sharing a distinct language and history. These nations find themselves
". e us 00 1ar afield to consider th . 'fi within the boundaries of a larger political community, but claim the right
or the various objections to them.25 Inste d . ese Jus.tl cations
these rights on citizenship identit a ,we WIll focus on the Impact of to govern themselves in certain key matters, in order to ensure the full and
C.. y. free development of their culture and the best interests of their people. What
ntlcs of differentiated citizenshi worr h .
by the very terms of citizenship to t p. Y t at If groups are encouraged these national minorities want is not primarily better representation in the
(whether racial ethnic religious urn mwardd and focus on their 'difference' central government but, rather, the transfer of power and legislative jurisdic-
Iarger f raternity' of all Americans
, , sexua,l an so on) then "th h f tions from the central government to their own communities.
will ha t b b ' e ope 0 a
·· .
p. 227) . CIttzenshlp will cease to be" d . ve 0 e a andoned"
. (Glaze' I,1983
munity and a common sense of ur a" eVlCe to culttvate a sense of com-
Multieultural rights
p. 7; Cairns 1993). Nothing wilf 1990, p. r<,risteva 1993,
and prevent the spread of mutual mist t a groups m socIety together The case of Hispanics and other immigrant groups in the United States is
Critics also worry that c co h !ct (Kukathas 1993, p. 156). different again. Their demands include public support of bilingual education
of grievance" If as vc . I' I Izens Ip would create a "politics and ethnic studies in schools and exemptions from laws that disadvantage
. , .loung Imp les only oppr d '
differentiated citizenship this m ' esse groups are entitled to them, given their religious practices. These measures are intended to help
·. , a y encourage group leaders t d h . immigrants express their cultural particularity and pride without its hamper-
po IItlCal energy to establishin . . 0 evote tell'
working to overcome it-in Pt than ing their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant
Th 0 secure t ell' claIm to gr . ht society. Like self-government rights, these rights need not be temporary,
ese are serious concerns. In evaluating th oup ng s.
tinguish three different kinds of o"oups and th we need to dis- because the cultural differences they promote are not something we hope to
wh'IC h bot h Yioung and her critics er
tend t . ree I erent kmds of group ng . hts, eliminate. But unlike self-government rights, multicultural rights are intended
tion rights (for disadvantaged groups)' (a! special to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government.
and religious groups); and (c) self-g , mu tural (for ImmIgrant Obviously, these three kinds of rights can overlap, in the sense that some
Each of these has very different minorities). groups can claim more than one kind of group right.
Ica IOns 101' cItIzenshIp Identity. If differentiated citizenship is defined as the adoption of one or more of
these group-differentiated rights, then virtually every modern democracy rec-
Special representation rights ognizes some form of it. Citizenship today "is a much more differentiated
For many of the groups on Young's list such as the . and far less homogeneous concept than has been presupposed by political
Americans, and gays the demand fI '. poor, elderly, Afncan- theorists" (Parekh 1990, p. 702). Nevertheless, most cultural pluralists demand
r:presentation the political takes of special a degree of differentiation not present in almost any developed democracy.
vIews. these rights as a response to conditions e arger so.clety. Smce Young Would adopting one or more of these group rights undermine the integra-
plausIbly seen as a temporal'y mea h 0f oppressIOn, they are most tive function of citizenship? A closer look at the distinction between the three
sure on t e way to .t h kinds of rights suggests that such fears are often misplaced. The fact is that,
need for special representation no Ion . S. a socle y were the
the oppression, thereby eliminating seek to remove generally speaking, the demand for both representation rights and multi-
cultural rights is a demand for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded want to
be included in the larger society, and the recognition and accommodation
Self-government rights of their 'difference' is intended to facilitate this.
In some of Young's exampl h h . The right to special representation is just a new twist on an old idea. It
·
I nd lans, h es, suc as t e reservatIOn system of the A . has always been recognized that a majoritarian democracy can systematic-
t e demand for group right . mencan
, s IS not seen as a temporary measure, ally ignore the voices of minorities. In cases where minorities are regionally

172
173
 democratic systems have responded by intentionally drawing
the boundanes' of federal units, or of individual constituencies to create
the is in a majority (Beitz 1989, chap. 7). Cuitural plur-
sImply extend thIS .logic to non territorial minorities, who may equally
be m need of representatIOn women, the disabled, or gays and lesbians).
There are obstacles to such a proposal. For example,
how do we decIde whtch groups are entitled to such representation 26
and how do we ensure that their 'representatives' are in fact accountable
t?e group?27 But basic impulse underlying representation rights is integra-
tIOn, not separatIOn.
. Similarly, most demands are evidence that members of minor-
Ity to get 111to the mainstream of society. Consider the case of
Canadmn SIkhs who wanted to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) but, because of their religious requirement to wear a turban, could
not do so unless they were exempted from the usual dress code regarding
headgear. The fact that these men wanted to be a part of the RCMP, one
"national symb?ls," is ample evidence of their desire to par-
tIcIpate m the larger con:mumty. The special right they were requesting could
only be seen as promotmg, not discouraging, their integration. 28
. Some fear that multicultural rights impede the process of integra-
tIon for ImmIgrants by creating a confusing halfway house between their old
nation and citizen.ship i? the one: But these worries seem empirically
unfounded. Expenence 111 countnes WIth extensive multicultural programs
as Canada and suggest that first- and
.who rem am . proud of their heritage are also among the most
patnotIc cItIzens of theIr new country (Kruhlak 1992).29 Moreover their
.affiliation w.ith their new country seems to be based in large on
Its wtlhngness not Just to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference. 30
Self-government rights, however, do raise deep problems for traditional
n.0tions of citizenship identity. While both representation and multicultural
larger political community for granted and seek greater
mcluston m It, demands for self-government reflect a desire to weaken the
bonds .with the larger community and, indeed, question its very nature,
authonty, If democracy is the rule of the people, group
raIses the question of who 'the people' really are. National
t.hat they are distinct peoples, with inherent rights of self-
whIch not relinquished by their (sometimes involuntary)
WIth natIOns. a larger country. Indeed, the retaining
of ceI tam powers IS often exphCltly spelled out in the treaties or constitutional
agreements which specified the terms of federation.
Self-government rights, therefore, are the most complete case of differen-
they div.ide the people into separate 'peoples', each
WIth Its own hlstonc nghts, tern tories, and powers of self-government and
each, therefore, with its own political community. '
174
It seems unlikely that differentiated citizenship can serve an
function in this context. If citizenship is membership in a political
then in creating overlapping political communities,
necessarily give rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potentIal conflIcts
bout which community citizens identify with most deeply (Vernon 1988).
there seems to be no natural stopping point to the. for
increasing self-government. If limited autonomy. is thIS SImply
fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders who WIll be nothmg
short of their own undifferentiated DemocratIc multmatIon states
are, it would seem, inherently unstable for thIS reason. .
It might seem tempting, therefore, to ignore the demands of
minorities, keep any reference to particular groups out of the
and insist that citizenship is a common identity shared by all
without regard to group membership. This is often described as the
can strategy for dealing with cultural pluralism. But with a few excepttons-
such as the (mostly outlying or isolated) American India?, Inuit,
Rican and native Hawaiian populations-the United States IS not a multma-
tion It faced the problem of assimilating voluntary immigrants, not
of incorporating historically self-governing whose ?omeland
has become part of the larger community. And where It was to
tional minorities-for example, American Indians-the 'common
strategy has often been a spectacular failure, as even its supporters admIt
(Walzer 1982, p. 27; cf. Kymlicka 1991). Hence, many of these groups are
now accorded self-government rights within the United States.
Indeed, there are very few democratic muitination states that follow
strict 'common citizenship' strategy. This is not surprising, because refusmg
demands for self-government rights may simply aggravate alienation among
these groups and increase the desire for secession (Taylor 1992a, p. 64).3'
Hence demands for self-government raise a problem for proponents of
both citizenship and differentiated citizenship. Yet remarkably
attention has been paid, by either defenders or critics, to this o.f
ferentiated citizenship (or to the most common arrangement for 111stantmtmg
self-government rights, namely, federalism).32 .
What then is the source of unity in a multination country? Rawls claIms
that of union in modern societies is a shared conception of justice:
"Although a well-ordered society is divided and ...
ment on questions of political and social justice supports tIes of CIVIC fnend-
ship and secures the bonds of association" (Rawls 1980, p. 540). But the fact
that two national groups share the same principles of justice does not neces-
sarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than
remaining (or splitting into) two separate countries. The fact that people
in Norway and Sweden share the same principles of justice is no reason
for them to regret the secession of Norway in 1905. Similarly, that
the anglophones and francophones in Canada share the same pr111clples of
175
 RETURN OF THE CITIZEN

justice is not a reason to remain together, since the Quebecois rightly 7 For evidence that there is a set of social expectations that Americans have each
assume that own. national state could respect the same principles. A other, and of themselves, that must be fulfilled if people are to be perceived as
shared of Justice throughout a political community does not full members of society, see Mead (1986, p. 243); Shklar (1991, p. 413); Moon
(1988, pp. 34-35); Dworkin (l992, p. 131).
generate let alone a shared citizenship identity 8 Some people on the right have recognized this danger with. a market-b.ased
that will supersede nvalldentrtles based on ethnicity (Nickel 1990' Norm conception of citizenship and have sought to supplement It With an emphaSIS on
1993a).33 , an
volunteerism and charity. See the discussion of the British Conservative party's
c.lear, that this is one place where we really do need a theory citizenship rhetoric in Fierlbeck (1991, p. 589), Andrews (1991, p. 13), and Heater
of cItizenship, not Just a theory of democracy or justice. How can we con- (1990, p. 303). . . .
9 The New Right's emphasis on self-reltance puts women m a double bmd. If they
struc.t a identity a country where people not only belong to
stay home and care for their children, they are accused of.failing live up to
separate commullltIes but also belong in different ways-that is their duty to be self-supporting. (Hence the stereotype of
some are mcorporated as individuals and others through membership in ' mothers.) If they seek to earn a living, however, they are accused of failIng to lIve
Taylor cal.ls "deep diversity" and insists that it is "the only up to their family responsibilities. .
on ,,:hlch a state can remain united (Taylor 1991). However, he 10 Another theme in recent left writing on citizenship is the importance of constI-
admits that It IS an open question what holds such a country together. 34 tutional rights. Indeed, the left's reconciliation with liberal rights "is one of the
major theoretical phenomena of our times" (Phillips 1991b, p. 13; Andrews 1991,
. great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations pp. 207-11; Sedley 1991, p. 226).
multmatlOn states suggests that any generalized answer to this question will 11 Kant thought that the problem of good government "can be even for a
lIkely overstated. It might be a to suppose that one could develop race of devils" (quoted in Galston 1991, p. 215). Of course, other lIberals recog-
a.genera! role. of.elther a common citizenship identity or a nized the need for civic virtue, including Locke, Mill, and the British Idealists (see
differentiated cItizenship Identity m promoting or hindering national unity Vincent and Plant 1984, chap. 1). See also Carens (1986) and Deigh (1988), who
argue that basic liberal rights and principles ground a fairly extensive range of
1992b, Here, as with the other issues we have examined positive social duties and responsibilities, including the obligation to make good
.thiS It remams unclear what we can expect from a 'theory of use of one's talents, to vote, to fulfill the responsibilities of one's office, and to
cItizenship' . aid in the defense of one's country, as well as the duty to protect and educate
one's children.
12 According to a recent survey, only 12 percent of American teenagers said voting
Notes was important to being a good citizen. Moreover, this apathy is not just a function
of youth-comparisons with similar surveys from the previous fifty years suggest
Ra-:v ls that the "basic structure" of society is the primary subject of a theory that "the current cohort knows less, cares less, votes less, and is less critical of its
of Justice (Rawls 1971, p. 7; Rawls 1993, pp. 257-89). leaders and institutions than young people have been at any time over the past
2 ThiS may the !n citizenship promotion among govern- five decades" (Glendon 1991, p. 129). The evidence from Great Britain is similar
ments (e.g., Bntam.s CommissIOn on CItIzenship, Encouraging Citizenship [1990]' (Heater 1990, p. 215).
Senate. of Citizenship Revisited [1991J; Senate of Canada' 13 See Arneson (1992, pp. 488-92) for a range of potential conflicts between demo-
the Responsibility [1993]). ' cratic procedures and socialist goals. As Dworkin notes, there is a danger of
3 One Issue we Will not diSCUSS is immigration and naturalization policy (e g making democracy "a black hole into which all other political virtues collapse"
Brubaker 1989; van Gunsteren 1988). . ., (1992, p. 132).
4 in Marshall (1965). For a concise introduction to the history of citizen- 14 The left neglected many of these issues for decades, on the ground a
see Heater (1990) and Walzer (1989). with "citizenship" was bourgeois ideology. The very language of cItIzenship was
5 It IS noted idiosyncratically English this history is. In many European "alien" (Selbourne 1991, p. 94; van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9; Dietz 1992, p. 70; Wolin
countnes most of progress occurred only in the past fifty years, and often in 1992, p. 241; Andrews 1991, p. 13).
orde.r.. Even .m the historical evidence supports an "ebb and flow 15 Civic republicans rarely defend their conception of value at length. For example,
model of CItIzenship nghts, rather than a "unilinear" model (Heater 1990 271' after asserting that political life is "the highest form of human living-together
Parry 1991, p. 167; Held 1989, p. 193; Turner 1989). ,p. , that most individuals can aspire to," Oldfield goes on to say, "I shall not argue
6 When as.ked what to people are much more likely to talk for this moral point. It has in any case been argued many times within the corpus
nghts than ThiS is true in Britain as well as the of civic republican writing" (1990a, p. 6). But many critics have argued that these
States, although the BntIsh tend to emphasize social rights (e.g., to public earlier defenses rest on sexism and denigration of the private sphere (e.g., Vogel
educatIOn and health care), whereas Americans usually mention civil rights (e g 1991, p. 68; Young 1989, p. 253; Phillips 1991 b, p. 49) or on ethnic exclusiveness
freedom of speech and religion) (King and Waldron 1988' Con over et al 199i' (Habermas 1992, p. 8). Skinner's argument seems to be that while political par-
p. 804). For most people, citizenship is, as the U.S. Court once 'put it' ticipation may only have instrumental value for most p.eople, we. must people
"the nght to have rights" (Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 102 [1958]). ' to view it as if it has intrinsic value, or else they Will not Withstand mternal

176 177
--- todemocracr (Skinner 1992, pp. 219-21). For discussions of·
Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Amer,icans, Asian Americans, gay
the between repubhcan conceptions of the good and liberalism, see working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and phYSIcally dIS-
pp. 499-504), Taylor (1989, pp. 177-81), Hill (1993 pp. 67-84) abled people" (1989, p. 261). In short, everyone but healthy, relatively well-of!,
and S111opoh (1992, pp. 163-71). "
relatively young, heterosexual white males. Even then, it is hard to see how. thIS
16 Also, it is difficult .to see how reco.nstructed groups could teach what some criterion would avoid an 'unworkable proliferation', since each of these groups
regard as an aspect of cItIzenshIp-namely, a common identity and sense has subgroups that might claim their own rights. In the case of Britain, e.g., "the
of 1991,?' i?P. 117-18). We discuss this in Sec. IV below. all-embracing concept of 'black' people rapidly dissolved into a between
17 the the. of motivation" in Audi (1989, p. 284). the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities, and then subsequently mto finer
18 ThIS shows why cIvIl mIstaken to think that good citizenship distinctions between a wide variety of ethnic groups. What in this context then
can be pflvate vIrtues. The requirement of public reason- counts as 'adequate' ethnic representation?" (Phillips 1992, p. 89). Nevertheless,
ableness 111 pohtlcal debate IS unnecessary and undesirable in the private sphere. many political parties and trade unions have allowed for special group repres-
It be absurd to churchgoers to abstain from appealing to Scripture in entation without entering an escalating spiral of demands and resentment (Young
decIding how to run theIr church.
1989, pp. 187-89).
19 schools teach not only through their curriculum but also "by 27 "There are few mechanisms for establishing what each group wants.... Account-
tha.t SIt 111 theIr seats (next to students of differen t races and ability is always the other side of representation, and, in the absence of
rehglOns), raIse theIr hands before speaking, hand in their homework on time b for establishing what any group wants or thinks, we cannot usefully talk of theIr
good sports on its playing field" (Gutmann 1987, p. 53). . . .. e
political representation" (Phillips 1992, pp. 86-88). In t.he absence of
20 For other accounts of the "unobtrusive" promotion of citizenship see Haberm s ability, it might be more appropriate to talk of consultatIOn than representatIOn.
(1992, pp. 6-7), Hill (1993, pp. 216-20).' a
28 This is in contrast to many Aboriginal communities in Canada who, as part of
21 For examp!e, Mouffe reducing citizenship "to a mere legal their self-government, have been trying to remove the RCMP from their
status, sett111g out the nghts that the II1dlVldual holds against the state" (1992 and replace it with a Native police force. Of course, some demands for multl-
a
p. 227) and t? "reest.ablish the lost connection between ethics and politics ,: cultural rights also take the form of withdrawal from the society,
by cl.tlzenshlp as a form of "political identity that is created through this is more likely to be true of religious sects (e.g., the A111Ish) than of eth11lc
the IdentIficatIOn wIth the res p.ublica': (p. 230). Yet she offers no suggestions about communities per se. .
to or thIS public-spirited participation, and insists (against 29 Moreover, a proliferation of such demands is unlikely, since they usually
that must be free to choose not to give priority to their clear and specific cases of unintended conflict between majority rules and mmor-
pol.ltIcal Her of liberalism, therefore, seems to reduce to the ity religious practices. And since proof of oppression is neither necessarY.n.or
claIm the hberal. ci!izenship-as-Iegal-status is not an adequate sufficient to claim these rights, there is little risk that they will promote a pohtlcs
good. cItizenshIp, which hberals would readily accept. Many critiques
of grievance. .. . .
of hberal CItIzenshIp to the same unenlightening claim.
30 Of course, liberals cannot accept a group's demand to practIce ItS rehglOus or
22 Ind.eed, .we can find worries about political apathy in 1950s political cultural customs if these violate the basic rights of the members of these groups
socIOlogIsts, and even 111 Tocqueville.
(e.g., clitoridectomy, restrictions on exit). It is important to distinguish what we
23 See the discussion of citizenship's "integrative function" in Barbalet (1988 can call "internal" and "external" group rights. Internal rights are rights of a
p.93). ,
group against its own members, used to force individuals within the group to o?ey
24 See also of how citizenship is currently "constructed from traditional customs or authority. External rights are rights of the group agamst
men's attnbutes, capaCItIes and activities," so that citizenship can only be extended the larger society, used to provide support for the group against economic. or
"as lesser men" (1988, pp. 252-53; c( lames 1992, pp. 52-55; Pateman political pressure from outside for cultural assimilation: In
group-differentiated rights are almost always external fights, S111ce II1ternal fights
25 have objected that differentiated citizenship (a) violates equality: granting are clearly inconsistent with liberal democratic norms. See Kukathas (1992) and
nghts some but not on the basis of their group membership sets the reply in Kymlicka (1992).
a 111 which some cItIzens are 'more equal' than others; (b) violates
31 In any event, the state cannot avoid giving public recognition to particular group
the role of the state in matters of culture should be limited to identities. After all, governments must decide which language(s) will serve as the
mall1tall1mg a marketplace; and (c) is arbitrary: there is no principled official language of the schools, courts, and legislatures.
way to whIch groups are entitled to differential status. For a discussion 32 For a survey of philosophical work on federalism, see Norman
of these see Glazer (1983), Taylor (1991; 1992a, pp. 51-61), Hindess 33 If governments wish to use citizenship identity to promote national
(1993), .Kymhcka 1991), Phillips (1992), and Van Dyke (1985). fore, they will have to identify citizenship, not only with acceptance of pnnclples
26 Accordll1g to Young, Once we are clear that the principle of group representation of justice but also with an emotional-affective sense of identity, based perhaps
only to oppressed social groups, then the fear of an unworkable prolifera- on a manipulation of shared symbols or historical myths. For a discussion of this
of group represe,?tation should (1990, p. 187). However, her list strategy, see Norman (l993a).
of would seem to mclude 80 percent of the population-she 34 European philosophers are confronting increasingly these dilemmas as they seek
that 111 the Ul1Ited States today, at least the following groups are oppressed to understand the nature of the European Community and the form of citizenship
111 one or more of these ways: women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto it requires. Habermas and his followers argue that European unity cannot be based

178 179
 on .the shared traditions, cultures, and languages that characterized successful
European citizenship must be founded on a 'postnational'
constitutIOnal patnotIsm based on shared principles of justice and democracy
.199.2; Ferry 1992). Others, however, argue that such a
.for umty t.oo thm. As Taylor notes, even the model experiments in con-
stitutIOnal and the United States, have always also required
many of of. natIOn-states, including founding myths, national sym-
bols, and Ideals hi.stoncal and (Taylor 1992b, p. 61;
cf. I Smith to Taylor, It IS not for philosophers to
define a pnon the form of citizenship that is legitimate or admissible. Rather we
should seek forms of identity which appear significant to the people thems;lves
(Taylor 1992b, p. 65; Berten 1992, p. 64).
References
Andrews, Geoff. 1991. Citizenship. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Arneson, Richard. 1992. Is Socialism Dead? A Comment on Market Socialism and
Basic Income Capitalism. Ethics 102:485-51l.
1989. The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of
Citizenship. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18:259-96.
M. Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality. Minneapolis:
Umverslty of Mll1nesota Press.
Barry, Norman. 1990. Markets, Citizenship and the Welfare State: Some Critical
Reflections. In Raymond Plant and Norman Barry, Citizenship and Rights in
Thatcher's Britain: Two Views. London: lEA Health and Welfare Unit
Citizenship. In What's the Matter with Liberalism? Berkeley:
Umverslty of California Press.
Beitz, Charles. 1989. Political Equality. Prince ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Berten, Andre. 1992. Identite Europeenne, Une ou Multiple? In L'Europe au soil' du
et democratie, ed. Jacques Lenoble and Nicole Dewandre. Paris:
EditIOns Espnt.
Brubaker, William Rogers, ed. 1989. hnmigration and the Politics of Citizenship in
l!urope and North America. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
Cairns, 1993. The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship. In Belonging:
The Meanll1g and Future of Canadian Citizenship, ed. WiIliam Kaplan. Montreal:
McGiIl-Queen's Press.
Cairns, Alan, and WiIliams, Cynthia. 1985. Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society
in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Carens, Joseph. 1986. Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society. Political Theory
14:31-49.
Crewe, Ivor; and Searing, Donald. 1991. The Nature of Citizenship
111 the Umted States and Great Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes.
Journal of Politics 53:800-832.
John, 1988. On Rights and Responsibilities. Law and Philosophy 7:147-78.
Dletz, Mary. 1985. Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal
Thinking. Political Theory 13:19-35.
Dietz, Mary. 1992. Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship. In Mouffe
1992b, pp. 63-85.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1989. Liberal Community. California Law Relliell' 77:479-504.
180
Dworkin, Ronald. 1992. Deux Conceptions de la Democratie. In L'Europe au soil' du
siecle: Identite et democratie, ed. Jacques Lenoble and Nicole Dewandre. Paris:
Editions Esprit. .
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1981. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and
Political Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Ferry, Jean-Marc. 1992. Identite et Citoyennete Europeennes. In DEurope au soil' du
siecle: !dentite et democratie, ed. Jacques Lenoble and Nicole Dewandre. Paris:
Editions Esprit.
Fierlbeck, Katherine. 1991. Redefining Responsibilities: The Politics of Citizenship
in the United Kingdom. Canadian Journal of Political Science 24:575-83.
Fullinwider, Robert. 1988. Citizenship and Welfare. In Democracy and the Welfare
State, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press.
Galston, William. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
GiIligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Moral Develop-
ment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Glazer, Nathan. 1983. Ethnic Dilemmas: 1964-1982. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Glendon, Mary Ann. 1991. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse.
New York: Free Press.
Gutmann, Amy. 1987. Democratic Education. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Habermas, Jiirgen. 1992. Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the
Future of Europe. Praxis International 12:1-19.
Heater, Derek. 1990. Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics, and
Education. London: Longman.
Held, David. 1989. Citizenship and Autonomy. In Political Theory and the Modern
State. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Held, David. 1991. Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship. In Andrews 1991,
pp. 19-25.
Hill, Greg. 1993. Citizenship and Ontology in the Liberal State. Relliell' of Politics
55:67-84.
Hindess, Barry. 1993. Multiculturalism and Citizenship. In Multicultural Citizens: The
Philosophy and Politics of Identity, ed. Chandran Kukathas. St. Leonard's: Centre
for Independent Studies.
Hoover, K., and Plant, R. 1988. Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United
States. London: Routledge.
Ignatieff, Michael. 1989. Citizenship and Moral Narcissism. Political Quarterly
60:63-74. Reprinted in Andrews 199/, pp. 26-37.
James, Susan. 1992. The Good-Enough Citizen: Citizenship and Independence. In
Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics, and Female SubjectivUy,
ed. Gisela Bock and Susan James. London: Routledge.
King, Desmond. 1987. The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship. London:
Macmillan.
King, Desmond, and Waldron, Jeremy. 1988. Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the
Defence of the Welfare State. British Journal of Political Science 18:415-43.
Kristeva, Julia. 1993. Nations without Nationalism, trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York:
Columbia University Press.
181
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Kruhlak, Orest. 1992. Myth versus Reality. Institute for Research
on Public Policy, Montreal, typescript.
Kukathas, Chandran. 1992. Are There Any Cultural Rights? Political Theory 20: 105-39.
Kukathas, Chandran. 1993. Multiculturalism and the Idea of an Australian Identity.
In Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity, ed. Chandran
Kukathas. St. Leonard's: Centre for Independeilt Studies.
Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 1991. Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity. Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4:239-56.
Kymlicka, Will. 1992. The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas. Political
Theory 20:140-46.
Lenoble, Jacques. 1992. Penser I'identite et al democratic en Europe. In L'Europe au
soil' du, siecle: Identite et dhnocratie, ed. Jacques Lenoble and Nicole Dewandre.
Paris: Editions Esprit.
Macedo, Stephen. 1990. Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
MarshaIl, T. H. 1965. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. New York: Anchor.
Mead, Lawrence. 1986. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship.
New York: Free Press.
Modood, Tariq. 1992. Not Easy Being British: Cololll; Culture and Citizenship.
London: Trentham.
Moon, J. Donald. 1988. The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State. In
Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.l.: Prince ton
University Press.
Mouffe, Chantal. 1992a. Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community. In
Mouffe 1992b.
Mouffe, Chantal. 1992b. Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship
and Community. London: Routledge.
Mulgan, Geoff. 1991. Citizens and Responsibilities. In Andrews 1991, pp. 37-49.
Nauta, Lolle. 1992. Changing Conceptions of Citizenship. Praxis International
12:20-34.
Nickel, James. 1990. Rawls on Political Community and Principles of Justice. Law
and Philosophy 9:205-16.
Norman, Wayne. 1993a. The Ideology of Shared Values. University of Ottawa,
Department of Philosophy, typescript.
Norman, Way ne. 1993b. Toward a Philosophy of Federalism. In Group Rights, ed.
Judith Baker. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, in press.
Okin, Susan. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic.
Okin, Susan. 1992. Women, Equality and Citizenship. Queen's Quarterly 99:56-71.
Oldfield, Adrian. 1990a. Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the
Modern World. London: Routledge.
Oldfield, Adrian. 1990b. Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice? Political Quarterly
61:177-87.
Parekh, Bhikhu. 1990. The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy.
Political Studies 38:695-709.
Parekh, Bhikhu. 1991. British Citizenship and Cultural Difference. In Andrews 1991,
. pp. 183-204.
182
RETURN OF TJIE CITIZEN
Parry, Geraint. 1991. Paths to Citizenship. In Vogel and Moran 1991, pp. 167-96.
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Patriarchal Welfare State. In Democracy and the Welfare
State, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press. ..
Pateman, Carole. 1992. Equality, Difference and Subordination: The PolitICS of
Motherhood and Women's Citizenship. In Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizen-
ship, Feminist Politics, and Female Subjectivity, ed. Gisela Bock and Susan James.
London: Routledge.
Phillips, Anne. 1991a. Citizenship and Feminist Theory. In Andrews 1991, pp.
Phillips, Anne. 1991 b. Engendering Democracy. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylval1la
State University Press.
Phillips, Anne. 1992. Democracy and Difference: Some Problems for Feminist Theory.
Political Quarterly 63:79-90.
Pierson, Christopher. 1991. Beyond the Welfare State: The New Political Economy of
Welfare. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Plant, Raymond. 1990. Citizenship and Rights. In Citizenship Rights in
Thatcher's Britain: Two Views. London: lEA Health and Welfare Ul1It.
Plant, Raymond. 1991. Social Rights and the Reconstruction of Welfare. In Andrews
1991, pp. 50-64.
Pocock, J. G. A. 1992. The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times. Queen's
Quarterly 99:33-55. . .
Porter, John. 1987. The Measure of Canadian Society. Ottawa: Carleton Ul1Iverslty
Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. London: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John. 1975. Fairness to Goodness. Philosophical Review 84:536-54.
Rawls, John. 1980. Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Journal of Philosophy
77:515-72.
Rawls, John. 1988. The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good. Philosophy and
Public Affairs 17:251-76.
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ruddick, Sara. 1987. Remarks on the Sexual Politics of Reason. In Women and Moral
Theory, ed. Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & AIlanheld.
Rustin, Michael. 1991. Whose Rights of Citizenship? In Andrews 1991, pp. 228-34.
Sedley, Stephen. 1991. Charter 88: Wrongs and Rights. In Andrews 1991, pp. 219-27.
Selbourne, David. 1991. Who Would Be a Socialist Citizen? In Andrews 1991,
pp. 91-104.
Shklar, Judith. 1991. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, 10:386-439. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Sinopoli, Richard. 1992. The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the
Constitution, and Civic Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 1992. On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty.
In Mouffe 1992b, pp. 211-24.
Smith, Rogers. 1993. American Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service.
The Responsive Community 3:14-27.
Taylor, Charles. 1989. The Liberal-Communitarian Debate. In and the
Moral Lift, ed. N. Rosenblum. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ul1Iverslty Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1991. Shared and Divergent Values. In Options for a New Canada,
ed. R. L. Watts and D. G. Brown. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
183
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?

Taylor, Charles. 1992a. Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy
Gutmann. Princeton, N.l.: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1992b. Quel pIincipe d'identite collective. In L'Europe all soil' du 11
siecle: Identite et dernocratie, ed. lacques Lenoble and Nicole Dewandre. PaIis:
Editions Esprit.
Turner, Bryan. 1989. Outline of a Theory of Citizenship. Sociology 24:189-217. OUTLINE OF A THEORY
Van Dyke, Vernon. 1985. Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood. OF CITIZENSHIpl
van Gunsteren, Herman. 1978. Notes towards a Theory of Citizenship. In From
Contract to Community, ed. F. Dallmayr. New York: Marcel Decker.
van Gunsteren, Herman. 1988. Admission to Citizenship. Ethics 98:731-41. Brian S. Turner
Vernon, Richard. 1988. The Federal Citizen. In Perspectives 011 Canadian Federalism,
ed. R. D. OIling and M. Westmacott. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall.
Vincent, Andrew, and Plant, R. 1984. Politics, and Citizenship: The Life Source: Sociology, 24:2 (1990), 189-217.
and Thought of the British Idealists. Oxford: Blackwell.
Vogel, Ursula. 1991. Is Citizenship Gender-Specific? In Vogel and Moran 1991.
Vogel, Ursula, and Moran, Michael. 1991. The Frontiers of Citizenship. New York:
St. Martin's Press.
Abstract
Walzer, Michael. 1982. Pluralism in Political Perspective. In The Politics of Ethnicity.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. .. h' h re-emerged as an issue which
The problem of cItIzens IP. as olitical uestions concerning
Walzer, Michael. 1989. Citizenship. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, is central, not only to practical qinstitutions and the
ed. T. Ball and 1. Farr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. access to theoretical debates .in
Walzer, Michael. 1992. The Civil Society Argument. In Mouffe 1992b. welfare state, but a sOd' . f social integration and social
Wolin, Sheldon. 1992. What Revolutionary Action Means Today. In Mouffe 1992b. sociology the °ftution is thus constitutive of
Young, Iris Marion. 1989. Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of solidarity. CitIzenshiP. as ms debates typically
Universal Citizenship. Ethics 99:250-74. the societal commu.111ty. h ese tual framework of citizen-
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, N.l.:
Prince ton University Press. ship I1l the
an J This article
. M' hall's concept of citizenship and
the

standard to ars evelo s a critique of the unitar.y

the hyphenated society, in the Marshallian tradl-
character of the. concept 0 t mological development of t?e
tion. There are m fact, as tee I distinct forms of citizenship.
concept itself :eve ;y Michael Mann to the theory
In reply to a recent u IOn h histor of citizenship in
of citizenship, the artIcle and the United States;
g
Germany,. Franc.e, n identify two crucial variables.
n
on the basIs of this .we active nature of citizenship,
The first concerns t e is develo ed from above (via
depending on of mortlocal participatory
the state) or from e ow m. e The second dimension is the
institutions, such as the private arenas within
relationship between t e. pu .IC a citizenship (as passive and
of
civil society. A view revolutionary idea of active
private) mO:bining these two dimensions,
and public cItIzenship. y . 11 d namic theory of four
it is possible to pr?ducf,t for the realisa-
types of po lies as
tion of citizenship fights.

184
185

WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Citizenship as participation
With the development of a world economic recession and the emergence of
monetaristic politics, the threat to the welfare state has become a central
topic of social science debate in the 1980s (Lee and Raban 1988). This attack
on the principles of public welfare is directly associated with the emergence
of the New Right and the dominance of Thatcherism in British politics
(Green 1987; Kavangh 1987; Marquand 1988), but the parameters of this
issue are in fact global. From a sociological perspective, these changes in
political orientation and the creation of monetarist perspectives in social
policy may, however, be treated as symptoms of a fundamental change in
the politics of industrial societies, namely the break-up of corporatism and
the collapse of the reformist consensus which dominated the post-wai' period
of social reconstruction. The break-up of the corporatist consensus may be
furthermore linked to radical reorganisations in global capitalism which some
authors now regard as an entirely new stage in the development of world
capitalism, leading to the disorganisation of capitalism (Otre 1985) or to the
end of organised capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987).
These structural reorganisations in world capitalism and the demise of
government commitment to welfare expansion have had profound implica-
tions for social science research and teaching, producing a greater emphasis
on interdisciplinarity and applied research as a defence of the welfare state
(Bean, Ferris and Whynes 1985). While radical sociologists in the 1960s were
often influenced by the critical work of Louis Althusser (1971), for whom
the provision of welfare and the existence of health-care institutions were
merely facets of the ideological state apparatus, in the crisis of the 1980s,
critical theorists have returned to the questions of distributive justice, indi-
vidual rights and notions of equality as the basis for social reconstruction
and social reform (Turner 1986a). While the notion of abstract Human Rights
(possibly in association with some commitment to Natural Law) no longer
commands widespread intellectual support, it is clear that the institution
of definite 'rights' is an essential feature in the protection of public space as
an arena of legitimate debate. The secular institution of rights cannot, there-
fore, be separated from the question of democracy; and the infrastructure
of democracy is a fundamental, if limited, restraint on the employment of
coercive force. It is 'the democratic apparatus, which prevents the agencies
of power, law and knowledge from fusing into a single leading organ' (Lefort
1988: 29).
In this outline of a theory of citizenship, it is argued that the current
attempt to defend the principles of welfare in fact requires a far deeper
sociological, historical and philosophical enquiry into the character of social
membership and political participation, namely an enquiry into the extent
and characteristics of modern social citizenship (King and Waldron 1988;
Turner 1986b). This enquiry should have the theoretical goal of attempting
186
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
to achieve a synthesis in the levels of analysis between the individual citizen,
the organisation of social rights and the institutional ?f
This renewed interest in the issue of social participation and
has, in turn, resulted, at the theoretical level, in a revival mterest m t.he
work of T. H. Marshall (1963, 1965, 1981) which provides an Important pomt
of departure for any debate about the contemporary of the
relationship between citizenship entitlements and the economIC structure
of capitalist society.
Marshall's account of citizenship
In the United States Marshall was particularly influential on the .of
T. Parsons (1971), R. Bendix (1964) and S. M. Lipset (1960), but h.IS SOCIO-
logy of citizenship is perhaps only now being adequately recogmsed and
discussed in Britain (Halsey 1984; Roche 1987). In America Marshall's work
was developed as a framework for the analysis of ethnic problems and race
relations (Parsons and Clark 1966), whereas in Britain work
originally developed and flourished in the context of post-war
struction and as a social justification for an extension of state provISIOn m
the area of national welfare (Titmuss 1963).
While Marshall's analysis of citizenship is well known, it will be
here to outline briefly the three dimensions of citizenship which
in his original work. Marshall, whose intellectual roots were m
tradition of James Mill and J. S. Mill, elaborated a specifically SOCIal verSIOn
of the individualistic ideas of English liberalism. One theoretical and moral
weakness of the liberal tradition was its failure to address directly
problem of social inequality in relationship to individual freedoms
1962). At the heart of Marshall's account of citizenship lies the
between the formal political equality of the franchise and the persistence of
extensive social and economic inequality, ultimately rooted in the character
of the capitalist market place and the existence of private property. Marshall
proposed the extension of citizenship as the principal political means for
resolving, or at least . , ., .
The initial idea for hIS theory of cItIzenshIp was developed 111 CitIzenshIp
and social class' in 1949 (Marshall 1963). It was further developed in
Policy (MaI'shaIl1965), where he addressed the question of the evolutIOn.of
welfare policies in Britain between approximately 1890 and 1945 as. a
example of the growth of social rights. However, his famous to
the analysis of social policy contained no explicit statem.ent. of theory
of social citizenship. Finally, he proposed a theory of capItalIst socIety as a
'hyphenated society' in The Right to Welfare and Other (Marshall
1981) in which there are inevitable tensions between a capItalIst economy, a
welfare state and the requirements of the modern state. Marshall was thus
primarily concerned with the social-welfare history of Britain between the
187
 eighteenth. and in terms of the growth of citizenship as
expressed In three dImenSIons namely, the civil, the political and the social.
Marshall in the century there had been a significant
of cI;d :I?hts WhICh were mainly targeted at the legal status
and CIVIl nghts of IndlVlduals; and these rights were to be defended through
system of formal law Civil rights were concerned with such basic
Issues as the freedom of speech, rights to a fair trial and equal access to
leg.al Secondly, Marshall noted an important growth in political
thIS
In the
polItical
In 0:
century as an outcome of working-class struggle for
greater access to the parliamentary process. In
the development of electoral rights
and access p.olItIcal InstitutIOns for the articulation of interests. In
the B.ntIsh thiS Lllvolved the emergence of political rights whjch were
assocIated the secret ballot box, the creation of new political parties
and the expanSIOn of the franchise. Finally, he drew attention in the twentieth
century to the expansion of social rights which were the basis of claims to
welfare and whic.h established. entitlements to social security in periods of
unemployment, Sickness and distress. Thus, corresponding to the three basic
aren.as s?cial rights (the civil, political and the social), we find three cen-
tral InstitutIOns of contemporary society (the law courts, parliament and the
system). Mat'shall's final theorisation of this issue conceptualised
as.a dynamic system in which the constant clash between citizen-
ShIP and s?cral class determined the character of political and social life.
were in his notion of the hyphenated society,
that IS a SOCIal system In whIch there were perpetual tensions between the
need for economic profitability, the taxation requirements of the modern
state and the rights of citizens to welfare provision.
theory proved influential in the development of American
L11 the area of race relations and in the development of British
SOCIOlogy In the analysis of the welfare system, Marshall has been continu-
criticised for certain (alleged) problems in his theoretical analysis of
nghts. For example, Anthony Giddens (1982) has criticised Marshall for
de;el?ping. an perspective on the historical emergence of citizen-
ShIP In whIch SOCIal nghts appear to be the effect of a broad and imminent
society. Marshall was also criticised for failing to consider
the. within which welfare policy developed in Britain,
pal w.ar-tIme and post-war reconstruction. Giddens also noted
that are not.a unified, homogeneous set of social arrange-
ments. The lIberal whIch the outcome of bourgeois struggles,
be compared WIth the claims to welfare which were developed by
SOCIalIsm other forms of working-class action. Whereas liberal rights
to process tend to confirm and reaffirm the social and
of pI:ivate property over labour, welfare rights are, at
least In prInCiple, a potentIal challenge to the very functioning of capitalism
188
as an economic system. Therefore, there is no necessary similarity between
liberal bourgeois rights in the nineteenth century and socialist demands for
equality in the twentieth century. There is furthermore no necessary parallel or
even development of different rights. For example, while civil rights may be
developed in capitalism, political citizenship may often be denied (Jessop 1978).
Marshall was also criticised for perceiving the historical emergence of
citizenship as an irreversible process within contemporary society, whereas
the experience of the last fifteen years, following the oil crisis of 1973, shows
that welfare-state rights are clearly reversible and not to be taken for granted.
On these grounds Marshall has also been criticised by writers who regard
Marshall's underlying value system as essentially complacent and conserva-
tive (Roche 1987). Marshall was also challenged for failing to perceive that
additional social rights might be developed in the area of culture, where
citizenship could be regarded as a claim upon a national cultural system,
and these cultural claims might be further associated with the educational
revolution of the twentieth century with the emergence of mass education
and the university system of the post-war period. While the argument that
the university system expressed the cultural expansion of citizenship has
become associated with Talcott Parsons (Parsons and Platt 1973), in fact the
link between democracy and higher education was also fundamental to
the American pragmatist tradition which was grounded in Dewey's view of
mind (Mills 1966).
Although there are clearly problems in Mat'shall's theory, I suggest that
Mat'shall has often been criticised on the wrong grounds, and at least some
criticisms of Marshall are based upon a misunderstanding of the original
texts. Marshall was, for example, clearly aware of the broad social and
military context within which welfare rights have developed, because he saw
war-time conditions in Britain as providing favourable circumstances for the
successful claim for welfare rights and provisions. Furthermore, it is not clear
that Mat'shall's theory in fact requires an evolutionary perspective, assuming
the irreversibilty of claims against the state; Marshall saw the contingent
importance of war-time circumstances on the development of social policy.
It is clear however that political rights are of a very different order from
economic rights, since in many respects the development of citizenship in
capitalist societies stopped, as it were, at the factory gates. Democracy did
not develop fully into economic democracy, although experiences between
societies (in terms of workers' participation and control) are clearly variable
(Lash and Urry 1987). Giddens is clearly wrong to suggest that Marshall
treated civil and social rights as equivalent, or as having the same integrative
functions. Marshall specifically argued that, whereas individualistic civil rights
directly corresponded to 'the individualistic phase of capitalism', the social
rights of trade unionism were 'even more anomalous, because they did not
seek or obtain incorporation' (Marshall 1963: 103). There was, however, an
unresolved issue at the centre of Marshall's theory, namely that it is not clear
189

whether social r\ghts are in a relation of tension, opposition or contradiction
to the economic basis of capitalist societies (Goldthorpe 1978; Halsey 1984;
Lockwood 1974).
Although these criticisms are important, I would like to identify some
rather different criticisms of Marshall in order to suggest a more elaborate
version of his original scheme. Any theory of citizenship must also produce
a theory of the state, and this aspect of Marshall's work was the most under-
developed (Barbalet 1988: 109). In Marshall's scheme it is implicitly the
state which provides the principal element in the maintenance and develop-
ment of social rights, being the political instrument through which various
political movements seek some redress of their circumstances through the
legitimisation of their claims against society. Furthermore, Marshall failed
to develop an economic sociology which would provide some expltination
of how the resources which are necessary for welfare are to be generated
and subsequently re-distributed by the state to claimants in terms of health
provision and general welfare institutions. In considering these aspects of
Marshall's theory, it is important to put a particular emphasis on the notion
of social struggles as the central motor of the drive for citizenship. Marshall
failed to emphasise the idea that historically the growth of social citizenship
has been .typically the outcome of violence or threats of violence, bringing
the state mto the social arena as a stabiliser of the social system. Although
a number of writers on citizenship have drawn attention to the function
of mass wars in promoting successful claims to democratic participation
(Gallie 1983), it is necessary to have a broader notion of 'struggle' as a critical
aspect of the historic growth of citizenship. This emphasis provides the
context within which we can begin to see the real importance of new social
movements for social change (Klandermans 1986; Melucci 1981). However,
Barbalet (1988: 103) has correctly pointed out that the institutionalisation of
social rights also requires new political, legal and administrative practices
which may have been only indirectly related to these social movements.
We can further elaborate the Marshall scheme by adopting a notion from
Parsons (1966), namely that the development of citizenship involves a transi-
tion from societies based upon ascriptive criteria to societies based upon
achievement criteria, a transition which also involves a shift from particu-
laristic to universalistic values. Thus the emergence of the modern citizen
requires the constitution of an abstract political subject no longer formally
confined by the particularities of birth, ethnicity or gender. Parsons, follow-
ing Max Weber's work on the city (1966), thought that Christianity had made
possible the separation of the political and social, while also developing a
notion of social relations which were independent of ethnicity and which
faith, a?stract consciousness, as the ultimate source of community
m modern socIetIes (Parsons 1963). It is possible to regard the differenta-
tion of the political and the social as the Parsonian version of the classical
separation of the state from civil society (Berger 1986:75).
190
00 I LINE 01' A I HEORt 01' Cl I IZENSHIP
We can suggest therefore that the historical development of citizenship re-
quires certain universalistic notions of the subject, the erosion of particularistic
kinship systems in favour of an urban environment which can probably only
flourish in the context, initially, of the autonomous city. Citizenship is, as it
were, pushed along by the development of social conflicts and social struggles
within such a political and cultural arena, as social groups compete with
each other over access to resources. Such a theory of citizenship also requires
a notion of the state as that institution which is caught in the contradictions
between property rights and political freedoms. Finally, the possibilities of
citizenship in contemporary societies are, or have been, enhanced by the
problems of war-time conditions in which subordinate groups can make
more effective claims against the state. This emphasis on the importance of
mass war as a primary factor in social change is an important criticism
of the conventional 'society-centred' perspective of both classical sociology
and Marxism (Giddens 1985; Marwick 1974).
Although the welfare system was clearly expanded in Britain in the post-
war period of reformism and reconstruction, there has been both a political
attack on the welfare state and considerable institutional demolition of
welfare institutions with the rise of Thatcherism and the spread of global
recession since 1973. The causes of these changes are yet to be fully analysed,
but the decline of the welfare system may be associated with the historical
decline of the organised working class and class-based communities (Offe
1987). The spatial reorganisation of working-class communities under condi-
tions of disorganised capitalism also makes the articulation of interests far
more problematic, and these changes are also associated with the erosion of
neo-corporatism and the class de-alignment of traditional political alliances
with the restructuring of capitalism and the emergence of new social move-
ments (Lash and Urry 1987). With the growth of global capitalism, the state
is no longer able to mediate between private property owners and the work-
ing class, because its economic autonomy is constrained by international
agreements and institutions such that 'local' political decisions by the state
may have very adverse consequences for the value of its currency within the
international money markets. The problem with Marshall's theory therefore is
that it is no longer relevant to a period of disorganised capitalism. The British
state, in fact, has very little scope for manoeuvre: while capital operates on
a global scale, labour tends to operate within a local national market, arti-
culating its interests in terms of a national interest group. Marshall's theory
assumed some form of nation-state autonomy in which governments were
relatively immune from pressures within the world-system of capitalist nations
(Giddens 1985).
Marshall's theory was initially focussed on the British case, but a general
theory of citizenship, as the crucial feature of modern political life, has to
take a comparative and historical perspective on the question of citizenship
rights, because the character of citizenship varies systematically between
191
 """ .... :& :&LiCl,"bfitr I
different T?e of citizenship is a feature of the very dif-
ferent and specIfic his tones of democratic politics in western societies but a
genuinely historical analysis of citizenship would be concerned with, only
the Greek and Roman legacy, but with problematic comparisons between
western and non-western traqitions.
Ruling class strategies?
important and systematic criticism of Marshall's theory of
clttzenshlP. has be.en developed by Michael Mann (1987), who attacks the
ethnocentnc speclficity and evolutionism of the Marshallian perspective.
is that, while Marshall's scheme may fit the English example,
It IS hlstoncally and comparatively inappropriate for other societies. It may
be the case that England is the exception rather than the rule. Mann (1987:340)
notes that Marshall's argument is entirely about Great Britain. There is not
a single of any other country. Did Marshall regard Britain as typical
of the capitalist as whole? In fact, it would be more accurate to say
that the versIOn of the theory of citizenship is entirely about
England, smce he takes for granted the socio-political unity of Great Britain
(Turner] 986b: 46). The question of citizenship within the British state cannot
be analysed historically without reference to the erosion of the cultural and
autonomy of the Celtic (Hechter 1975; Turner 1984). As Anthony
(1986) argues, the creatIOn of citizenship within the gesellschaft-like
polittcal space of the modern state may well require the subordination or
even eradication, of gemeinschaft-Iike membership within an ethnic prim'ary
group (or ethnie).
However, Mann's comment on the Anglophile character of Marshal1's
theory is merely the for a more important exercise, namely the develop-
ment of a comparattve framework for the historical elaboration of five
strategies of citizenship (liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist fascist
and socialist). Having divided the regimes of pre-iddustrial
Europe mto two Ide.al-types. (absolute monarchies and constitutional regimes),
proceeds mqUIre mto how the traditional regimes developed strat-
egies to cope polIttcally first with the bourgeoisie and secondly with the urban
class the period of industrial capitalist development.
.Bntam. prOVides the pnncipal example of a liberal strategy. The state re-
tamed a liberal character and the working class was successfully incorporated
through the. welfare state 'meshes into, rather than replaces, private
and msurance schemes (Mann 1987:343). Under the impact of trade-
Ulllon struggle class conflict the nineteenth century, Britain eventually
moved from a lIberal to a reformist solution. The United States and Switzer-
land are also of a liberal strategy, but social citizenship remained
.m both. However, their buoyant economies have permitted
their clttzens to msure themselves against personal hardship. By contrast, in
192
OUtLINE 01' A IHEORY 01' CIIIZENSHIP
France, Spain, Italy and Scandinavia, the development of citizenship was b!t-
terly disputed by monarchical and clerical reactionaries, and the
legacy remained (with the exception of France) largely unchallenged, untIl
the modern period. . .
Germany, Austria, Russia and Japan provide examples of an authontanan
monarchist strategy. While these absolutist regimes initially resisted the
citizenship claims of both bourgeoisie and proletariat, they were eventually
forced to modernise their polities. Wilhelmine Germany enjoyed the most
successful strategy of political and economic development, which resulted
in the bourgeoisie, and to some extent the proletariat, being 'negatively
incorporated' (Roth 1963) into the system via a superficial development of
political citizenship. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany provide Mann
with two illustrations of authoritarian socialist and fascist strategies. Although
neither system provided comprehensive civil and political rights, there was
a significant development of social citizenship. In Germany, policies of full
employment and public works programmes were combined with another
objective: rearmament. In the Soviet Union, a programme of social citizen-
ship for all existed alongside substantial social inequalities in the shadow
economy and the black market. Both systems, while proclaiming powerful
legitimating ideologies, had to depend on an extensive apparatus of violen.ce
and repression. However, while German fascism was very unstable, the Soviet
system was more successful in domesticating its labour force by converting
the trade unions into 'a-political welfare state organizations' (Mann 1987:350).
Mann's treatment of citizenship represents, not only a major theoretical
advance over the Marshallian paradigm, but also an important contribution
to our understanding of the historical processes of citizenship formation.
However, Mann's theory appears to be weak on three crucial issues, and this
debate with Mann's ruling-strategy thesis then provides the context in which
I wish further to elaborate an alternative to, or at least a modification of,
Mann's theory.
The first criticism is that, because Mann perceives the origin of citizenship
as a strategy of class relationships in which the state has a major role to play
in creating social stability, he fails to consider the questions of aboriginality,
ethnicity and nationalism in the formation of modern citizenship. As I have
already noted following Smith (1986), the creation of citizenship within the
political boundaries of the modern nation-state has typically involved or
required the subordination or incorporation of ethnic minorities and/or
aboriginals. This incorporation may be achieved by the relatively painless
process of the cultural melting pot (Glazer and Moynihan 1970), or it may
be brought about by more violent means. Citizenship in societies like Canada,
New Zealand and Australia has, as its dark underside, the 'modernisation'
of aboriginal communities. The debate about citizenship in the United States
cannot take place without an analysis of the historical impact of the black
South on American civil society, and yet Mann curiously ignores the issue
193
 - -
of racial Any of Mann's account of citizenship
would have to examme SOCIal stratification in terms which are not class-
reductionist, and his laudable attempt to provide a historical treatment of
different types of ruling class strategies should be extended to include an
analysis of the white-settler societies (Denoon 1983).
My critical is that, while Mann (1987:340) warns
us tradItIon , he completely neglects the impact of organised
ChnstIanty and C.hnstIan on the structuring of private/public spaces,
and how the tYPIcally negative evaluation of the political in mainstream
Christian theology continues to place an individualistic brake on the expan-
sion of active citizenship. I have argued elsewhere (Turner 1986b: 16)
that both ChnstIalllty and Islam contributed to the development of citizen-
ship by providing a universalistic discourse of political space (the city of god
and of Islam) which challenged ethnicity and kinship as
the pr.Im?rdIal tIes of the societal community (Parsons 1971). However,
also an important limitation on the emergence of an
VIew of the .cItIzen as a of rights. Christianity has emerged
m modern peno.d as radIcal threat to authoritarian or reactionary
(Polan,d, SovI.et Ulllon, South Africa or some Latin American states)
m only exceptIOnal CIrcumstances, and specifically where alternative means
of legitimate protest have been destroyed. In these circumstances Christian
theology often requires considerable revision and redirection (Robertson
1986).
The. Protestant Reformation provided an ideology of rebellion against
CatholIc and papal and, partly through the development
vernacular of the BIble, established a cultural basis for the erup-
tion of the natIOn-state. However, once in power, the Protestant churches
were forced to turn to the local nation-state or to regional authorities for
secular (that is, military) support of the faith. In theory, of course, the re-
formed churches regarded the state as a necessary evil, but in practice they
cam,e, not only to depend on secular political support, but also provided
an Ideology of 'godly churches required, however reluctantly,
state power for the subo!'dmatIon of antinomianism, and in return they
offered a theory of paSSIve, obedient citizenship. In his Institution de la
chretienne, Calvin was at pains to emphasise the Christian obliga-
tI.on to obey the laws of the land and to respect government, since the
aIm state. was to create peace and stability during our miserable, but
happIly bnef, sOjourn on earth (Calvin 1939: 197ff). The effect of Protestant
.was to sphere (of devotional religious practice, the
subjectiVIty of the mdIvIdual conscience, the privatised confessional and
familial practices) in which the moral education of the individual was to be
achieved, and a public world of the state and the market place, which was
the realm of necessity. While religion through the institutionalised means of
grace monitored the interior subjectivity of the individual, the state through
194
UUILIpiln VI l"'IO IIIDVK1 ......, ........................ XiLJi:&:&:& ..
the institutionalised means of violence regulated public space. This division
did not provide an environment which was congenial to the full
of a view of the citizen as an active and responsible member of the publIc
arena. Mann's revision of the Marshallian version of liberal citizenship does
not have a perspective on these religio-cultural variations in the constitution
of political space.
Of course the churches were not merely the vehicles for Christian cultural
beliefs the political: they materially influenced the ways in which
public space was shared. For example, Colin has ?rovided an
important comparative framework for understandmg the mteraCti.0n. bet,:",een
state and religion in the formation of European states. He dIstmgUlshes
between: (1) secular liberalism versus Catholic corporatism (in the
Republic); (2) hegemonic Catholic corporatism (Portugal and Spam m
which as a result the liberal tradition was very marginal); (3) Protestant
neutrality (Denmark, Norway, Sweden); (4) consociationism (The Nether-
lands, Switzerland and Belgium) in which the public affairs of civil society
are organised separately for and by the different communities. Crouch argues
that these traditional patterns for 'sharing public space' had long-term
implications for modern politics. Thus,
It is important to distinguish this organic, Catholic fascism from the
secular Nazism of Germany. This was made dramatically clear by
Austrian history following the Anschluss, when the whole edifice of
Austrofaschismus and its corporatism was abolished and replaced by
the Nazi system, based on the Fiihrerprinzip rather than corporatism.
But the abiding, specifically Austrian tradition remained corporatist
and space-sharing.
(Crouch 1986:186)
Again any understanding the issue of citizenship in a society like Israel
would have to depend on an historical account of the settlement between
religion and politics during the period of state formation.
My final (and possible most important) criticism of Mann concerns the
notion of a 'ruling class strategy'. Mann can only conceive of citizenship
being handed down from above (for example by the state) such that rights
are passive. Thus, citizenship is a strategy which brings about some degree
of amelioration of social conflict and which is therefore a major contribution
to social integration. Such a view of citizenship from above precludes, or
restricts, any analysis of citizenship from below as a consequence of social
struggles over resources. Because Mann concentrates on strategies from
he cannot adequately appreciate the revolutionary implications of the OPPOSI-
tional character of rights. Is it possible that Mann regards the demands
of millenarian Fifth Monarchy Men, incendiarist peasants, revolutionary
republicans of the French Revolution, or radical Chartists as always capable
195
 VO:a::£t"-.a:Z4LJ """" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . """ ....... """" ..................... ......

of being successfully assimilated into the .

ship? I find Engels's view in A t '-D "h . system by.the oils of citizen- Revolutionary citizenship combines demands from below with an emphasis
n I u rzng more hlstoncally plausible: on the public arena, regarding the private world of the individual with sus-
picion. However revolutionary struggles for democratic rights often end in
in the same way bourgeois demands fI
by proletarian demands for equalit
.
0;
equalIty were accompanied forms of public terror. Where revolutionary citizenship collapses into total-
itarianism, l'imaginaire sociale (the social imaginary) results in the idea of
bourgeois demand for the abolition moment when the
'People-as-One, the idea of society as such, bearing the knowledge of itself,
alongside it appeared the proletarian· was put
classes themselves - at first in r 1" fI . the abolItIOn of transparent and homogeneous' (Lefort 1986:305). In liberal pluralism, while
itive Christianity and later d e orm, lean10g towards prim- interest group formation typically leads to movements for rights from below,
equalitarian support from the bourgeois the revolutionary thrust of social protest may be contained by a continuing
emphasis on the rights of the individual for privatised dissent. The classical
(Engels 1959:146-7) liberal view of politics insisted on diversity and freedom of private opinion
against the threat of uniformity of belief. Hence, 1. S. Mill in his essay 'On
There is an important distinction here In id . Liberty' in 1859 expressed the fear that the spread of mass opinion would
heuristic device for the development f th terms, and as a
as privileges handed down from b o. eory, we can eIther regard rights mean that Europe was 'decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of
a making all people alike' (Mill 1962: 130).
(Mann's thesis), or we can regard m for pragmatic cooperation
by subordinate groups for benefits g s as, e of radical struggle These forms of democratic citizenship may be contrasted with citizenship
related difficulties. The first is s. theSIS) ..There are in fact two rights from above in which the citizen is a mere subject rather than an active
the second is that, because the onl im gatIon of ng?ts. from below, and bearer of effective claims against society via the state. Passive democracy
are ultimately the Marxist m Mann's theory recognises the legitimate function of representative institutions, the courts
duction, the state and geo-politics he ss, as a mode of pro- and a welfare state system, but there is no established tradition of struggles
movement, feminism Solidarity deal theoretIcally with the peace for citizenship rights. For the reasons which are outlined in Mann's argument,
struggles for rights a' e. reen animal liberation or citizenship remains a strategy for the regulation and institutionalisation of
S
torical change _ at least such m genu me dOl' Important contributions to his- class conflicts by public or governmental agencies rather than a set of practices
h ovements 0 not figure in h' which articulate popular demands for participation. Finally, we can identify
t e co-optation of these movements l' th h .IS While
demands may be a common 0 t a. er t an the satIsfactIon of their an authoritarian form of democracy from above in which the state manages
always, or inevitably the (plVen Cloward 1971), this is not public space, inviting the citizens periodically to select a leader, who is then no
failure to satisfy within th an Turbett 1983). Furthermore, longer responsible on a daily basis to the electorate. Private life emerges as a
social movements which then b e state creates conditions for new sanctuary from state regulation and, in the Germany described by Max Weber
e and Carl Schmitt, the private offered one possible, if fragile, shelter from the
tion of needs (de Geest 1984)co;:;e ent .on the state for the satisfac-
. ann s analytIcal framework obrigkeitliche Willkur (arbitrariness of the authorities). This politico-cultural
prec1ude any such consideration of th . appears to
the expansion of citizenship from b I e Impact of new social movements on complex was the historical case of leader-democracy (Fiihrerdemokratie).
B b' . e ow. This typology is regarded here as a mechanism for transcending the limita-
y corn 10mg these two aspects of citizen h' (th . tions of MarshalI's theory of citizenship. Although Marshall distinguished
and the above/below distinction) ; Ip e division,
four political contexts for the canI' a typology of between various types of citizenship rights (civil, political and social), he did
rights: IOna IsatlOn or creatton of citizenship not develop any view of active or passive citizenship. While agreeing with
Mann's argument that we need a comparative perspective on citizenship in
different historical contexts, MaIll1'S thesis is limited by the (largely implicit)
Citizenship
Above Below
Marxist pardigm in which citizenship is merely a strategy of dominant to-
wards subordinate classes. Hence Mann does not consider social movements,
Revolutionary Passive which are not necessarily or directly tied to class, as social forces, which
contexts Public Space
democracy contribute to the expansion of social rights. In order to elaborate this alter-
Liberal Plebiscitary native typology, I shall proceed by an examination of the etymological and
pluralism Private Space cultural roots of the concept of citizenship in order to emphasise the argu-
authoritarianism
ment that citizenship does not have a unitary character.

196 197
 From denizens to citizens citizenship in) a common political community was a
Historically the concept of citizenship is bound up with the development of the fact that human beings qua humans have a common acu. y,
of the city-state in the classical world of Rome and Greece. In the ancient b t his idea of political involvement represented a loyahty
world, the city-state was a public arena for rational, free men which functioned towards his status in society. Eventually the of
as a collective insurance against external threats, and internal dispute. In . fru ality and industry reflected the changing political of t. e
classical Greek and Roman societies, the dominant classes depended exten- Em;ire, whose size, social differentiation and
sively upon slave labour for both direct production and domestic services. no longer corresponded to the moral idea of the polis as an ethIcal
.
tIOn Wh'l 1e
C'Icero (106-43 BC) had attempted to translate thel" anCIent . t
Thus, the dominant class was an urban population of free, legally constituted,
citizens who nevertheless depended on the exploitation of large agrarian conceptions of civic virtue and public to. t?e po IS m 0 a
estates by slave labour. Since these slaves were often acquired by military rhetoric which would be adequate to the changmg condItions of Roman
ne,,: ty in the world of later Roman absolutism, philosophers like
conquest, every free-born citizen was threatened by the possibility of servitude SOCle ,
and loss of status (Gouldner 1965). Because the full rights of citizenship (4 BC-65 AD) could at best offer comfort to th e 'Clf aId
t .in hIS .De
were conferred upon members of the polis who had a right to speak and Clementia beg rulers like Nero to rule with mercy. The cItIzen-legIOn
to govern, there was an ideological need to explain and to legitimise the had been the basis, not only of Roman military power, an
subordinate status of women, adult slaves and children; the homosexual basis of social solidarity had broken down (Anderson 1974.53-103, Mann
subordination of young men was therefore an acute legal and philosophical 1986:283-298). Thus,
problem (Foucault 1987). The problems of justifying on rational grounds the
existence of slavery came to dominate much of the central issues of classical in place of the value of citizenship there is a common equality shared
philosophy (Finlay 1960). by all sorts and conditions of men; and in. place of. the state as a
Of course, the class structure of the ancient world was far more complex positive agency of human perfection there IS a coerCIve power that
than a simple division between slave and non-slave (Turner 1988). In early struggles ineffectually to make an earthly life tolerable.
(Sabine 1963: 179-80)
republican Rome, the major social division was between the patricians and
the plebians; the patrician class was constituted by large landowners who
had the rights to function politicaIIy and to hold office, playing a major role The problem in late Roman antiquity was. to an
in the formation and direction of the army. The plebian class was composed notion of universal citizenship with that IS
primarily of landless tenants, who were forced to work patrician property to overcome political disengagement by cItIzenshIp (Wol.m 1961. 7?-78).:. ese
and were excluded from entry into political life (Darnsey 1970). Through the tensions in the classical world between the heavenly CIty of ratIOnal emgs
operation of credit relations, a plebian debtor would often be forced into and the earthly city of self-interested men, and between the moral.develop-
the status of a debt-slave. As the Roman Empire developed, these divisions ment of the individual and the need for political duty in the
in society became more precisely determined and defined, creating an endur- became in large measure also part of the Christian legacy wlthm whIch
ing division between the lower classes (the humiliores) and the privileged class political life was ethically dubious. . . . .. .
(the honestiores) (Hopkins 1974). Within this social context, the notion The term for citizen was derived in classical. tImes gIvI.n g.rIse
of citizenship rights had very circumscribed significance, being the status of in Roman times to the notion of a civitatus. ThIS etymologICal ongm
(rational) property owners who had certain public duties and responsibilities eventually the French term citoyen from cite, an ensemble of
within the city-state. enjoying limited rights within a city context. Thus m French we fin m t e
It would be wrong of course to imagine that the notion of citizenship
twelfth century the notion of citeaine and eventually in the
remained historically static. There was, for example, a definite decline in the the notion of comcitien (Dauzat A citoyen d
moral weight and importance of political commitment to the polis after its cite, d'une ville, d'un pays libre; qUI alme son pays 145).
initial Socratic formulation. The Cynics and the Epicureans tended to give citizen was 'brave, honnete'. It is interesting to note that m SOCial Contract
greater importance to the idea of individual autonomy and moral develop- of 1762 J J Rousseau complained that it was a common mIstake to
ment rather than to the more collective virtues of Aristotelian philosophy. 'with 'citizen'. He asserted that 'houses make a town, CItIzens
It was the Stoics who reformulated a notion of civic obligation. Thus Marcus make a city' (Rousseau 1973: 175). In English, the notion a can
Aurelius (121-80 AD) argued that our membership of (and therefore our be detected in the medieval concept of citizen, but at least the
century this term was interchangeable with the notion demzen (demsem .

198 199
 --WHI\'r IS CITIZENSHIP?
This limited notion of the citizen as simply the inhabitant of a city was both
extensive and continuous. Bailey's Dictionary says tersely that a citizen is 'a
Freeman of a City' (1757). Brown's Dictionary of the Holy Bible gives us
more 'one that has the freedom of trade and other privileges belonging
to (1851:241). was thus common to regard the inhabitants of a city
as cItIzens, whIle outsIders beyond the city walls were 'subjects' (Downing
1988:9).
The notion of the city and the historical evolution of autonomous cities
played a critical role in the development of philosophical thought about
freedom, individuality and civility. Weber thought this constellation was
unique to the West:
in the Occident is found the concept of citizen (cMs Ron;anus,
cltoyen, bourgeois) because only in the Occident again are there
cities in the specific sense.
(Weber 1966:233)
The issue of citizenship was consequently an important issue in his view
of the unique character of Western rationalism. These terms were also closely
related to ideas about civility and civilization. To leave the countryside in
order to enter the city was typically connected with the process of civiliza-
was. to 'citizenise' the person. The city emerged as a
tOPIC In SOCial phIlosophy WIth very contradictory meanings. Whereas Voltaire
thought the was the. of individual freedoms which challenged
the false hIerarchIes of tradItIonal rural society, by the beginning of the
nineteenth c:ntury the. city came to be more frequently seen as the great
centre of SOCial. corrupt.lOn and moral decadence. In German social thought,
there emerged In the nIneteenth century a strong nostalgia for country life
and rural practices. This romantic nostalgia crystallised around the concepts
of and. in the work of Ferdinand Tonnies (1887),
although Tonmes hImself dId not share necessarily this conservative com-
mitment to the 'organic' community (Mitzman 1971). However the whole
of the melancholy return to Nature and the development of bour-
geOiS Inwardness (innerlichkeit) and loneliness (einsamkeit) has to be located
much earlier in eighteenth-century romanticism (Lepenies 1972:96). In Ger-
many th.e radical generated an ideal vision of the Greek city-state
as alternatIv: to th: urban society which was developing alongside
capItalIsm. Thus SchIller, FIchte and Holderlin merged the features of the
Greek polis with those .of the medieval town to create an image of burgher
culture as an alternative to the emerging industrial cities of Germany
(Barasch 1968). We can therefore identify a rather significant distinction between
the emerging concept of citizenship in Germany and the more revolution-
ary idea of citizenship which had developed in France out of the French
Revolution.
200
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
In the German philosophical tradition, the notion of social rights and
citizenship was closely connected with the development of the idea of civil
society (die biirgliche Gesellschqft). Within the German conception of civil society,
a citizen was any individual who had left the family context in order to enter
the public arena which was dominated by economic competition and was
contrasted with the state as that institution which was the historical embodi-
ment of reason. In this German tradition the idea of the citizen was therefore
necessarily tied to the idea of the burger, and civil society was in a sense
merely burgerdom. In German this concept of burgerdom goes back to the
fifteenth and sixteenth century, when the notion of burgership embraced
the inhabitants of a burgh who enjoyed certain privileges and immunities.
The Biirgel'tum (bourgeoisie) was a product of the city who, through training
and education, achieved a civilized mastery of emotions; the result was a
new status group, the Bildungsbiirgertum (Martin 1969: 138-145).
In the Dutch language, there is the parallel notion of citizenship as a
status enjoyed by any person who is a member of bourgeois society (burger-
maatschappij) but there are other variations such as stadtbul'gerschap and
staatsburgerschap. This concept of the staatsburgel' also carries the idea of
a moral body of citizens (zedelijk lichaam van al de staatsburgers) (Kruyskamp
1961:355). We can identify many of the principal components of the Dutch
framework of citizenship in the religious conflicts of the Golden Age. Thus
in the seventeenth century, the United Provinces played an important part in
the development of the New Science; for example, Leyden, along with
Padua and Edinburgh, was a great university centre of learning, but it was
also crucial in the development of experimental science, especially in medical
sciences. We can detect the impact of the principles of the New Science on
the political philosophy of Spinoza (1632-77), whose Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus (1670) made an important contribution to the defence of individual
liberty. However, it was in the political works of Simon Stevin van Brugge
(1548-1620) that we find a specific attempt to define the character of citizen-
ship through an analysis of the life of a Dutch burgher. Stevin's Vita Politica
(Het Burgherlick Leven) of 1590 was a handbook for the conduct of a
citizen. It was written in the context of great social and political disruption
during the governor-generalship of Robert Leicester (1585-8) and, possibly
as a result, Stevin's concept of citizenship allows for no right of disobedience
against authority after an individual has rationally chosen the community
within which he wants to live. The limited nature of citizenship is evident in
Stevin's general rule of civic life that 'everyone must always consider as his
rightful authority those who at present are actually governing the place where
he chooses his dwelling' (Stevin 1955:493). A law-abiding burgher is a citizen
who finds his natural moral sphere within the private domain, and hence
Stevin wrote extensively on the architectural principles which must govern
the intimate physical relations between the private and public areas of a
house in his Materiae Politicae (Dijksterhuis 1955).
201

While the ,revolt of the (1565-1589) gave rise to a nationalistic,
urban: patncian cultu,re, whIch continued to flourish into the eighteenth
the elements of this patrician regime were eventually
hmlted by the comI?erclal of Dutch capitalism, by the rapid decline
of economIC domInance In the eighteenth century, and the social
ossi?catlOn the regents (Boxer 1965), Although Amsterdam and Rotterdam
retaIned ,theIr open, cosmopolitan character, industrialisation was late to
devel?p ,Ill t?e, as a whole, The Dutch Revolt was probably
also In I,tS pohtlcal horizons by a strong Protestant commitment to
authonty and (Parker 1977; Schama 1987), Thus in contemporary
I?utch the notIOn of burgerschap (citizenship) still carries the connota-
tion, only of civic duties but also of a narrow-minded, middle-class
world-VIew,
. In social concept of civil society was adopted
flOm the m which writers like Adam Ferguson in An
Essay on the HlstOlY of ClV/1 SOCiety (1767) and John Millar in Observations
C.0ncerning the ,Dis,tinction of Ranks in Society (1771) had attempted to pro-
Vide a systematic VIew of the social development of human societies towards
more complex systems, Both Ferguson and MiliaI' were concemed to under-
the a sharp contrast between the 'rude' society of the
J:Ilghlands, and the CivIlIsed and sophisticated world of the urban civiliza-
tIOn of and Glasgow (Lehmann 1960), For Ferguson, it was the
ownershIp of pnvate property which produced the crucial division between
and barbarism, but he feared that the egoism of commercial civiliza-
could destroy bO,nds of civil society, In the work of Hegel, civil
SOCIety was that terram Iymg between the family and the political relations
of where the resolved the struggles and contradictions of
confllCtmg a higher and more universal expression
of the partIculantles of SOCIety, Against Hegel, Marx and Engels (1965) in
The Ideology of 1845 came to see civil society as the real 'theatre of
all such that the state became merely an epiphenomenon of more
baSIC socIal pro,cesses, ,For the citizen of bourgeois theory was merely
an abstract whICh dIsgUIsed the real conflicts lying in the basic struc-
tures Marx in the debate on the 'Jewish question' saw
the of the Jewish community as a rather superficial
and partIa! hlstoncal,development in the absence of a genuine reorganisation
of the socw-economlc structure of society as such,
Ma,rx was high,ly of the abstract notion of bourgeois rights
and SOCIety, the of CIvil society survived in critical theory through
the wntmg of Antol1lo Gramsci (1971) who formulated the interconnections
between the state, society and economy in terms of a set of contrasts between
and coercion, private and public life, For Gramsci, civil society was
not the of individual wills but a system of institutions and
orgal1lsatlOn WhICh had the potential for developing freedom in a system of
202
VU I :o:t11n 01 ... :a:XLl""" 1 .... X 01 ................ L::;iLl ........;:.....
consent; Gramsci came to believe that the state could play an important part
in developing this self-regulation of civil society, .,
In Germany the absence of a successful radical bourge,ois
and the development of capitalism from above, via Bismarcklan legIslatIOn,
created a social context in which the conditions for the development of a
full and dynamic notion of citizenship were limited, giving r,ise
to the rather restricted conceptions of burghership as the mam camel' of
rights, The absence of a successful bourgeois-liberal revolution and the con-
tinuing political dominance of the Junker class an
civil or public realm, This political structure was reInforced and legltI,mIsed
by Lutheranism, which sanctified the ,state as of
the Volksgemeinschaft and as the guardIan of the pnvatIsed mdlvldual.
private realm of the individual and the enormous ethIcal
and educational significance over and agamst the publIc,
As the state emerged as the moral guardian of the people, it is easy to
see how the state acquired extensive social prestige and powers over civil
society, Because Lutheranism failed to offer a normative basis for dissent,
the bourgeoisie were, by the end of the nineteenth committed to
ideology which supported the state in a context where parlIamentary
was clearly lacking, Sovereignty rested in the law and the state, not m elected
assemblies, The result was that 'Nineteenth-century German Liberalism im-
plicitly accepted the subordination of the individual to the
of the Volle, while Gustav for example, was laVIsh m praIse of the
unification and rationalisation of control by bureaucratisation' (Lee 1988:34),
In the political life of twentieth-century Germany, the of the
World War, military defeat and the weakness of the Welmar RepublIc
created an environment in which totalitarian solutions were canvassed, Carl
Schmitt's view that it was not the responsibility of the state to enter into
consensual agreements with an electorate, but to take bold and firm actions
against its enemies was a natural consequence of these developments, To be
free, from the point of view of the individual citizen, was to serve the state
(Krieger 1957),
A typology of citizenship
These comparisons between different histories of citizenship in Europe
suggest a model of citizenship development in of two
first dimension is the passive-active contrast dependmg on whether CItizenshIp
grew from above or below,2 In the German tradition, citizenship stands in
a passive relationship to the state because it is primarily an effect of state
action, It is important to note that this distinction is in fact fundamental to
the westem tradition and can be located in medieval political philosophy,
where there were two opposed views of citizenship, In the descending view,
the king is all powerful and the subject is the recipient of priVileges, In the
203
 - - ---------wHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
ascending. view, a free man was a citizen, an active bearer of rights. In the
of Italy, the Roman law facilitated the adoption of a popu-
hst notion of cItizenship; the result was that the populo came to be regarded
as an. aggregate of citizens who possessed some degree of autonomous
so:erelgnty (Ullmann 1975). The second dimension is the tension between a
pnvate ?f the i?dividual and the family in relationship to the public
arena actIOn. In the German case, an emphasis on the private
family, relIgIOn, and individual ethical development) was combined with
a view of the state as the only source of public authority. This typology
allows us to contrast Germany with other historical trajectories.
between the English and the German traditions of political
participatIOn wo.uld appear to be very considerable. It was Weber of course
,;,ho drew to the historically important contrast between constitu-
law In the Roman continental system and the English judge-made law
the tradition. Weber argued that continental constitu-
tIon.ahsm prOVided better safeguards for the individual, but he underestimated
the of the common-law tradition in providing precisely a common
baSIS for The against the absolutist state in England had lead
to the executIOn Of. the king, an expansion of parliamentary authority the
Of. the Enghsh common-law tradition and the assertion of individual
nghts: Of it has long been held that the English tradition
of In fact supported an unequal and rigid class structure.
nghts resided in individual rights to property, thereby exclud-
Ing the maJonty of the population from real social and political participation
(Macpherson The a land army and the state's dependence
?n a navy: the eatly de-mlhtansatIOn of the English aristocracy and the
of the urban merchants into the elite contributed to English
graduahsm (Anderson 1974). After the demobilisation of the new model
army, royal guard units were retained for primarily ceremonial duties.
The Bntlsh army was not modernised until the late nineteenth century. The
could no. intimidate parliament (Downing 1988:28). A
more pOint IS that the constitutional settlement of 1688 created
as the British subject, that is a legal personality whose
Indehble. SOCial are constituted by a monarch sitting in parliament.
notIOn indicates clearly the relatively extensive
of SOCial nghts but also the passive character of British civil institu-
tions. The. defeat. . of absolutism in the settlement of 1688 Ie ft beh'In d a
core · 0. f institutIOns
1 . (the Crown, the Church, the oHouse ofr L d s an d
tra d ltlona attitudes about the family and private life) which co t' d t
d . t B .. h '1 n Inue 0
omlna e ntls untI the destructive force of the First and Second World
Wars brought Bntlsh culture eventually and reluctantly into the modern
world.
. By both the English and German cases, the French concep-
tion of citizenship was the consequence of a long historical struggle to break
204
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
the legal and political monopoly of a court society within a social system
which was rigidly divided in terms of estates. The very violence of this social
transformation resulted in a highly articulate conception of active citizenship
in the revolutionary struggles of the eighteenth century. The old myth that
the king represented, combined and integrated the multiplicity of orders,
groups and estates had become transparent during the political conflicts of
the eighteenth century. Revolutionary political theories, acting against the
absolutist conception of sovereignty, followed Rousseau in conceptualising
society as a collection of individuals whose existence would be represented
through the general will in popular parliamentary institutions. What bound
Frenchmen together into a common nation was again the concept of citizen-
ship (Baker 1987). Frenchmen had ceased to be merely subjects of the sovereign
and had become instead common citizens of a national entity. There are
therefore two parallel movements whereby a state is transformed into a
nation at the same time that subjects are transformed into citizens (Lindsay
1943). The differences between the French and English revolutionary tradi-
tions may be summarised in two contrasted views of citizenship by Rousseau
and Burke (Nisbet 1986). For Rousseau in The Social Contract the viability of
citizenship required the destruction of all particular intervening institutions
which separated the citizen from the state. By contrast, Burke in Reflections
on the Revolution in France in 1790 argued that the essence of citizenship
was the continuity of local groups, particular institutions and regional asso-
ciations between the sovereign power of the general will and the individual.
For Burke an organised civil society must have hierarchy, order, regulation
and constraint; its hierarchical character precluded the very possibility of
'the rights of man' (Macpherson 1980).
Finally, the American case represents another variation on the history of
western citizenship. The American example shared with the French a strong
rejection of centralised power, adopting also the discourse of the rights
of man and privileges of independent citizens. The Boston Tea Party was a
symbolically significant expression of the idea 'no taxation without repre-
sentation'. The radical nature of the 'democratic revolution' in America struck
observers like Alexis de Tocqueville with great force; he came to regard
America as the first macro-experiment in democracy in modern history. For
de Tocqueville, the democratic foundation of the nation was explained by
the absence of aristocracy, the frontier, and the exclusion of an established
church. Although there was a radical tradition of citizenship expressed in
the idea of an independent militia, American democracy nevertheless con-
tinued to exist alongside a divisive racist and exploitative South. In addition
America's welfare state was late to develop and provided very inadequate
forms of social citizenship and participation for the majority of the popula-
tion. This weak tradition of citizenship in welfare terms has been explained
by the very strength of American individualism, and by the checks and
balances of the federal system; American citizenship was expressed in terms
205
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP

of l.ocalism versus centralism, therby limiting the development of a genuinely The geo-politics of citizenship
of welfare rights. To some extent the dominance of
and the value of success have meant that the 'public Following the work of Barrington Moore (1966), the different routes towards
arena IS tYPIcally understood In terms of individual involvement in local modern polities have distinctive consequences for the character of citizen-
voluntary associations. 'h.ave difficulty relating this ideal image ship. Historically the presence of a successful bourgeois revolution in the
to the large-scale instItutIOns shaping their lives' (Bellah et al. development of politically modern systems was a significant ingredient in
1985:199!. IS seen as morally suspect. This cultural analysis establishing parliamentary democracy and its associated civil rights. The
of Amencan Indlvlduahsm would not therefore contradict Mann's analysis. revolutionary conflicts against aristocratic privilege in the Glorious Revolu-
On. the be regarded as complementary. In America, the tion of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 have been important in the
artIculatIOn of sectIOnal mterests through democratic institutions constrains establishment of the notions of sovereignty and citizenship, representation
the emergence of class-based politics. and social contract, and in the development of the concept of public opinion
The point histor!cal sketch has been partly to provide a critique as significant in the shaping of political life (Baker 1987). If a successful
of the monohthlc conception of citizenship in Marshall and revolutionary conflict against aristrocratic powers is at least one aspect of
partl.y to a model of citizenship along two axes, namely the historical emergence of democratic citizenship, then the failure of a liberal
pubbc .and pnvate defimtIOns of moral activity in terms of the creation of bourgeois struggle (as in Germany in 1848) provides one aspect of the
a space of political activity, and active and passive forms of citizen- peculiarly bureaucratic, authoritarian character of political life in Germany
ShIP 111 terms of the citizen is conceptualised as merely a subject of under the aristocratic dominance of the Junkers (Dahrendorf 1967).
an absolute authonty or as an active political agent. While Moore's primary orientation to the issue of the origins of demo-
W,e can now. indicate how this ideal-typical construction might now be cracy involved the historical relationship between lords and peasants in the
appbed to specIfic cases: development of modern societies, recent approaches to democracy (and by
implication citizenship) have been more concerned with the implications of
Citizenship geo-politics for long-term constitutional change. Thus contemporary demo-
Below Above cratic politics owes a great deal to the military victories of the 'Anglo-Saxon'
powers, but in the future, because of nuclear armaments, 'the war-assisted
Revolutionary Passive
French tradition + pattern of change' (Mann 1987:352) will not be an option. However, if we
English case
public examine a much longer period of western history, then we can also see that
American German space in early modern Europe the pattern of constitutionalism (parliamentary
liberalism fascism assemblies, city-state immunities, village councils and so forth) represented
an important foundation for later democratic movements. However, societies
.In France, a revolutionary conception of active citizenship was combined which were threatened by massive international military assaults were often
wIth. an attack on space of the family, religion and privacy. In a converted from constitutionalism to military-bureaucratic absolutism. Brian
passIve democracy, cItIzenship is handed down from above and the citizen Downing (1988) has shown how the different military histOlies of Brandenburg-
appears as a subject (the E.nglish the seventeenth century Prussia, England, Sweden, and The Netherlands were important in the
In a democratIc .solutIOn, posItIve democracy emphasises survival or destruction of early forms of constitutionalism.
pal tIClpatIOn: but thIs IS .by a continuing emphasis on privacy Thus, Downing is able to criticise Moore on two grounds, namely his
of mdlvldual opinIOn. In plebiscitary democracy, the failure to acknowledge early developments in democratic participation and
su?merged in the sacredness of the state which permits the role of warfare in creating conditions of authoritarian rule. Downing's
III terms of the election of leaders, while again family
thesis does however confirm the importance of gradualism in English demo-
hfe IS pnonty !n the arena of personal ethical development (Maier cratic history (in combination with the role of common law, demilitarisation,
.. Whtle revolutIOnary democracy may collapse into totalitarianism, and island isolation) as the basis for (passive) citizenship. These historical
pleblscltary democracy degenerates into fascism (Lefort 1988). In totalitarian accounts of the geo-politics of citizenship are compatible with the typology
democ.racy, the 'state, in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme closes off which has been developed in this argument, because the notion of demo-
the pnvate sphere from influencing the course of political affairs' (Prager cracy from above or from below is simply one version of Moore's perspective
,1985:187). on the rise of modern democracies. In addition, mass warfare has, in the

206 207
 W Hl\TlS-TITIZENSHIP'l
created conditions whereby there can be political mobilisation
to claIm nghts or to seek the satisfaction of rights through state mediation
(Turner 1986b:67-78).
. The add.ition to these comparative studies of the history of
111 thIS a.rttcle .is the that the ways in which public space
IS orgamsed (m relatIOn to notions of individualism, privatism
and the ethIcal. of the domestic) also has important implications for
whether the pnvate IS seen as an area of deprivation or an arena of moral
In classical the private was definitely a space of necessity
an.d whereas m modern societies with an emphasis on achievement
onentatIOn 111 public competition for material success, the private is seen as
the space of personal leisure and enhancement. If we regard the historical
of as in fact the emergence of the political, then the
sb between the private and the public, and their cultural
mean111gs, IS an essentIal component in any understanding of the relationships
between totalitarianism and democracy (Arendt 1962; Lefort 1986; Prager
198.5!. The of sovereignty from the body of the king to the body
polItIC of cIttzens IS thus a major turning point in the history of western
democracies, because it indicates a major expansion of political space indeed
the creation of political spaces. ' ical context as a 'ruling class strategy' indicates a number of important
The. revolutionary conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
gave nse to an expanded notion of political participation and membership.
Th.e of concept of the political citizen was an important
to hIstoncal development of the nation-state as the principal
polItIcal Ul11t of contemporary political life. The failure of absolutism and
the of created a niche for the gradual development
?f parhamentary nghts and political participation. Marshall's work was
Important therefore in providing a theoretical perspective on a broader and
deeper concepti.on ?f social membership as expressed through the idea of a
bemg Itself the embodiment of certain social rights and claims.
CIttzenshIp became a form of entitlement (Bell 1976).
Conclusion: the globalisation of citizenship
While the notion of citizenship continues to provide a normative basis for
the defence of the welfare state, certain crucial changes in the organisation
of global systems have rendered some aspects of the notion of citizenship
redundant and obsolete. The contemporary world is structured by two con-
tradictory s.ocial processes. On the one hand, there are powerful pressures
regIOnal and localism and, on the otheI; there is a stronger
o.f ?lobahsm and global political responsibilities. The concept of
cItIzenshIp IS therefore still in a process of change and development. We do
not the conceptual to express the idea of global membership,
and m thIS context a specIfically national identity appears anachronistic.
208
OUTLINE OF A. THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
Indeed the uncertainty of the global context may produce strong political
reactions asserting the normative authortity of the local and the national
over the global and international (Robertson and Lechner 1985; Robertson
1987).
The analysis of citizenship has in recent years become a pressing theo-
retical issue, given the problems which face the welfare state in a period of
economic recession. However, the problem of citizenship is in fact not con-
fined merely to a question of the normative basis of welfare provision;
its province is global. It includes, on the one hand, the international conse-
quences of peristroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, and, on the other,
the implications of medical technology for the definition of what will count
as a human subject/citizen. While Marshall's aim in formulating a theory
of citizenship was by contrast rather modest in its focus (to understand
the tensions in Britain between capitalism and social rights), his statement
of the issues has proved to be extremely fruitful in sociology and political
science.
The limitations of Marshall's approach, however, are equally obvious. His
framework is now widely regarded as evolutionary, analytically vague and
ethnocentric. Mann's treatment of citizenship in a comparative and histor-
directions by which the MarshaIlian framework might be expanded, elaborated
and finally transcended. My commentary in this article on different types
of citizenship could be regarded as compatible, therefore, with the spirit of
MaI1l1'S critique in the sense that only a historical sociology of citizenship
can take us out of the Anglophile orbit of the Marshallian view. It has also
been argued that Mann's thesis fails to deal with revolutionary conceptions
of citizenship, with cultural variations in the definition of public space, and
with the problem of status as opposed to class in the formation of citizen-
ship. For example, Mann appears to regard gender, age and race as variables
which are irrelevant in the historical emergence of citizenship. Since Mann
(1986:222) has declared status to be 'that most vacuous of sociological terms',
this absence is hardly surprising, and yet it can be argued that status is an
essential concept for the analysis of modern problems of citizenship (Turner
1988).
In this article I have been concerned with two dimensions which I believe
are missing in Mann's attempt to go beyond Marshall, namely the private/
public division in western cultures, and the issue of passive and active
versions of citizenship. However, any further development of the theory of
citizenship will have to deal more fundamentally with societies in which the
struggle over citizenship necessarily involves problems of national identity
and state formation in a context of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism.
The societies on which this article has largely concentrated - France, Germany,
England, the Netherlands and colonial America - were relatively homogeneous
in ethnic terms during their period of national formation. With the exception
209
 OUTLINE OF A OF CITIZENSHIP
- -- - -----w-H A I IS -err I Z E NS HI P?
· ., New York' Harcourt Brace
ARENDT, H. 1962. The Origins oJ Tota Ilfarlamsm. .
of North America, these societies had no internal problem of aboriginality.
The question of citizenship was less complicated therefore by questions of Joranovich. h ., London
N 1757 An Universal Etymological Englis DictIOnary. . I'
BAlLEY,.. . ,. k K M ( d) The French Revo utlOn
ethnic minorities, ethnic pluralism and cultural melting pots; it is partly for B K M 1987 'RepresentatIOn, 111 Ba er, . . e .
this reason that Mann's neglect of ethnicity is not an issue in the societies A:::'the' 'oJ the Political Culture oJ the Old Regime. Oxford: Pergamon
which he has chosen for debate, but ethnic migration has been critical (indeed Press: 469-493. .' if I H,' t I oJ
crucial) in other contexts such as in South Africa, the Middle East, Australia 'The City' in Wiener, P. P. (ed.) DictIOnary 0 t le IS or)
BARASCH,.· M 1968 , . , d S
Td V 1 1'427-434 New York: Charles SCflvner s an
and New Zealand (Turner 1986b:64-84). We may in conclusion indicate two "eas. o. . . u·ons. 't P ess
1 M 1988 Citizenship. Milton Keynes: Open l1lVerSI y r .
possible lines of theoretical development of the (western) notion of citizen- BARBALET, . .' . d Wh D (eds) 1985 In DeJense oJ Welfare. London:
ship. The first would be the conditions under which citizenship can be formed BEAN, P., Ferns, J. an ynes. . .
in societies which are, as it were, constituted by the problems of ethnic com- Tavistock. . I' N Yi k' Basic Books
BELL, D. 1976. The Cultural Contradictions oJ Caplfa Ism. ew or. S M 1985
plexity (such as Brazil), and the second would be an analysis of the problems
which face the development of global citizenship as the political counter-part
of the world economy.
Habi;s 0;
BELLAH R MADSEN, F., SULLIVAN, W. M., SWIOLER, A. and . . York:
the Heart, Individualism alld Commitment in American Lift· New .
Harper and Row. if Cl . Social
BENDlX, R. 1964. Nation-Building and Citizenship, Studies 0 our wngmg
Notes Order. New York: Wiley. . k
1986 The Capitalist Revolution. New York: BaSIC Boo s. h'
BERGER ,P..L. . 1800
A version of this article was first given as a public lecture to the West European 5 The Dutch Seaborn Empire 1600- . on 0 . Hutc 1I1son .
L d n'
BOXER, C .R, 196 . BI k'
Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh in 1989. I am grateful to the participants BROWN J 1851 A Dictionary oJ the Holy Bible. Glasgow: ac le. . S "t' I
for their commentary. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this CALVIN: j. 1939'. Institution de la Religion Chretienne. Volume 4. Pans: oCle e es
article for Sociology for their recommendations. My original interest in the whole
issue of citizenship was fostered by Dr. Karen Lane's unpublished thesis Broadcasting Belles Lettres. . d' t t in Western
Democracy and Localism University of Adelaide 1988. This research was originally C ROUCH,. C 1986 . 'Sharing Public Space: states andd orgal1lse 111 eres s
. BI k 11
undertaken while I was an Alexander von Hurnboldt Fellow at Bielefield University, Europe' in Hall A. (ed.) States in His/ory. Oxfm : BaSIS ac we '. b1 d
West Germany 1987-1988. D R. 1967. Society and Democracy in Germany. New York. e ay..
2 The active and passive notion of citizenship can be identified in medieval legal and D::SEY, P. 1970. Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empl/'e. Oxford.
political philosophy (Ulmann 1975) where it was the product of two contrasted Oxford University Press. .
views of sovereign power, namely whether the king was seen as primus inter pares DAUZAT, A. 1949. Diclionnaire Pans: Larousse.. t t' r."dschrift
or whether the king was regarded as the separate and exclusive source of legitimate DE GEEST, A. 1984. 'Nieuwe Sociale Bewegmgen en de Verzorgmgs s aa. I}
power. These two views therefore pinpointed an essential and permanent conflict voor Sociologie 5:239-267. I t ' tl e
within a feudal system between centralised and decentralised power, which involved D D 1983 Settler Capitalism, the Dynamics oJ Deve opmen 111 1
a struggle over the monopolisation of the means of violence (Giddens 1985:53-60). Oxford and New York: Oxford Unive.rslty Press. .
In this article, however, the idea of citizenship from above through the state or 'rhe Princl'P' al Works oJ Simon Stevlll. Amsterdam. Swets
from below via more localised, participatory, civil institutions is derived from Lash DIJKSTERHUIS, E . J, 1955 . 11
and Urry (1987:4-16). Within this framework, just as one can speak about the and Zeitlinger. d I" I h ge in early
'Constitutionalism, warfare, an po Itlca c an
historical organisation of capitalism as a socio-economic system as a whole from DOWNING, B.M' 1988 .
above (for example Germany) or from below (such as Britain), so one might ana- modern Europe'. Theory and Society 17: 1-5.6. .'
lyse the historical structuring of polities (through the formation of citizenship) ENGELS F 1959 Anti-Diihring. Moscow: Foreign pubhshmg .
within the same paradigm. This particular perspective on citizenship is also depend- A. 1767. An Essay on the History oJ Civil Society. Edmburgh: Edmburgh
ent on Claus Offe's analysis of capitalism in terms of the tensions between economic University Press 1966. .
and political functions (Offe 1985), but this article, at least by implication, is also FINLAY, M. (ed.)' 1960. Slavery in Classical Antiquity, Views alld Controversies.
an attempt to translate the historical sociology of Barrington Moore (1966) into
a political sociology of citizenship. Finally, my treatment of the private/public
Cambridge: Heffer and Sons. . PI if
FoucAuLT, M. 1987. The HistOlJI DJ Sexuality, vol. 2, The Use easure.
0
dimension has been influenced by Charles Maier's Changing Boundaries of the
Political (1988). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. . . .
GALLIE, D. 1983. Social Inequality and Class Radicalism ill France and Britain.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. .'11
References G S A 1982 Profiles and Critiques il1 Social Theory. London. Macml an.
IODENNS' A' 1985 The Nation-State and Violence, Volume TlI'O: A Contemporary
ANDERSON, P. 1974. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books. G lODE , . . . P
Critique oJ Historical Materialism. Oxford: Pohty ress.
ALTHUSSER, L. 1971. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London: New Left Books.

211
210
 GlAZER, N. I. and MOYNIHAN, D. P. 1970 .
Massachusetts: MIT Press. . Beyond the Meltmg Pot. Cambridge, MACPHERSON, C. B. 1962. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
GOLDTHORPE, J. 1978. 'The current inflatio . . MACPHERSON, C. B. 1980. Burke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirsch, F. and Goldthorpe 1 H (ed ) Th a socIOlogical account', in
Martin Robinson. '" s. e olltlcal Economy of Inflation. Oxford: MARQUAND, D. 1988. The Unprincipled Society, New Demands and Old Politics.
London: Heinemalln.
GOULDNER, A. W 1965. Enter Plato Cl . I Cl
New York: Basic Books. ,aSSlca reece and the Origins of Social TheO/)'. MARSHALL, T. H. 1963. Sociology at the Crossroads. London: Heinemann Educational
Books.
GRAMSCI, A. 1971. Selections from the P' n M b
GREEN, D. 1987. The New Rig'lt 'r'le crlsot Rote ooks. London: New Left Books. MARSHALL, T. H. 1965. Social Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Hutchinson.
• I" .. , 01111 er el'olution' p, I" I . MARSHALL, T. H. 1981. The Right to Welfare and Other Essays. London: Heinemann
Social Thought. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. m 0 ltlca , Economic and
HALSEY, A. H. 1984 'T H M h . Educational Books.
1-18. . . . ars all. past and present 1893-1981'. Sociology 18: MARWICK, A. 1974. War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century. London.
MARTIN, A. von 1969. 'Blirgertum' in Bernsdorf, W (ed.) Worterbuch del' Soziologie.
HOLTON, R. 1. and TURNER B S 1989 M. Wi b
and New York: . ax e er on Economy and Society. London Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enkeverlag.
MARX, K. and ENGELS, F. 1965. The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
HOPKINS, K. 1974. 'Elite mobility in the Roman Em . , . . MELUCCI, A. 1981. 'New movements, terrorism and the political system: reflections
Studies in London: Routledge. plre, m Fm1ey, M. I. (ed.)
on the Italian case'. Socialist Rel'iew 56:97-136.
JESSOP, B. 1978. CapItalism and d h
G., Smart, B., Wakeford, 1. and possible shell?' in Littlejohn, MILL, 1. S. 1962. Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government. London:
Croom Helm. aVIS, . e s. Power and the State. London: Dent.
MILLAR,1. 1771. Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society. London:
KAVANAGH, D. 1987. Thatcherism and Brit' hP, l' .
Oxford University Press. IS 0 It/CS, The End of Consensus. Oxford: John Murray.
MILLS, C. Wright 1966. Sociology and Pragmatism, the Higher Learning in America.
KING, D. S. and WALDRON,. J 1988 . 'CI't'Izens h'Ip soclal'f
. h'
of welfare provision'. British Journal of P, I' . ' I . Cl Izens Ip and the defence New York: Oxford University Press.
KlANDERMANs B 1986 'N . 0 ltlca SCience 18:415-443. MITZMAN, A. 1971. 'Tonnies and German society 1887-1914: from cultural pessimism
,. . ew socIal movements a d ' . to celebration of the Volksgemeinschaft'. Journalfor the History of Ideas 32:507-524.
European and the American approach' J. I ,r n resource mobIlIsation: the
4: 13-37. . ourna OJ Mass Emergencies and Disasters MOORE, B. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modem World. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
KRIEGER, L. 1957. The German Idea of Freedom Chi . . . NlsBET, R. 1986. The Making of Modem Society. New York: New York University
KRUYSKAMP C (ed) 1961 D I . cago. Ul11verslty of Chicago Press
'" . van a e groot Wi. 'd b " -1 •
Press.
's-Gravenhage: Martin Nijhoff.' 001'< en oe, "er Nederlandse Taal.
NODIER, C. 1866. Dictionnaire UniJlersel de la Langue /rancaise (fifteenth edition).
LASH, S. and URRY, 1. 1987. The End of O ' "
LASKI, H. 1. 1962. The Rise of European Oxford: Polity Press. Paris: Pierre-Jose ph Rey.
LEE, P. and RABAN ,C. 1988 . TV: Ifi 'r' I era Ism. ' on.on: Alien and Unwin. OFFE, C. 1985. Disorganised Capitalism. Oxford: Polity Press.
rre are .. ,leo OFFE, C. 1987. 'Democracy against the welfare state? Structural foundation of
LEE, W R 1988 ' E ' ry and Social Polrcy. London: Sage.
. . conomlc development and the t t ' . neo-conservative political opportunities'. Political Theory X:501-537.
Germany'. Economic Histo/)' Review 41 :346-367. sa e m nmeteenth-century
PARKER, 0. 1977. The Dutch Revolt. London: Alien Lane.
LEFoRT, C. 1986. The Political Forms of Modern Society Oxford' . PARSONS, T. 1963. 'Christianity and modern industrial society', in Tiryakian, E. A.
LEFoRT, C. 1988. Democracy alld Political Th ' . , . PolIty Press.
LEHMANN WC 1960 T 1 M.'ll eory. Oxford. PolIty Press. (ed.) Sociological TheO/)', Values and Sociocultural Change, Essays in Honor of
, " . JOl1l1 I ar of Glasgo , (1735 1801
Pitrim A. Sorokin. New York: Free Press.
W 1972. Melancholie und Arno Press. PARSONS, T. 1966. Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative PerspectiJles. Englewood
DSAY, A. D. 1943. The Modern Democrat' S p.
LIPSET, S. M. 1960. Political Man The S Oxford: ?xford University Press. Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Doubleday. , 0 C I a ases of PolitiCS. Garden City (N.Y): PARSONS, T. 1971. The System of Modem Societies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
PARSONS, T. and ClARK, K. B. (eds.) 1966. The Negro American. Boston: Houghton
D. 1970. 'For T. H. Marshall'. SOciology 8:363-367 Mifflin.
ANN, . 1986. The Sources of Social Power Vol .' PARSONS, T. and PLATT, 0. M. 1973. The American University. Cambridge, Mass:
beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge' C b"d ume /·1111story of power from the
MANN M 1987 'R I' I : am n ge Ul11veslty Press. Harvard University Press.
,. . u mg c ass strategIes d'f h"
MAIER C. S. (ed) 1988 c.,. Cllzens Ip. Sociology 21:339-354. PIVEN, F. F. and COWARD, R. A. 1971. Regulating the Poor. New York: Pantheon.
. . flangmg Boundanes of the P, Ft' I E PRAGER, 1. 1985. 'Totalitarian and liberal democracy: two types of modern
Balance between the State and Society P bl' d; I. Ica, . ssays on the Evolving
Cambridge Univesity Press. ' u IC all nvate, III Europe. Cambridge: political orders', in Alexander, 1. C. (ed.) Neofill1ctionalism. Beverley Hills: Sage
Publications.

212 213
 -<er CIIIZENSHIP?

ROBERTSON, R. ) 986. 'Liberation theolo . L . . "

of interpretation and explanation' in Amenca: SOCIOlogICal problems
Religions alld Politics: Religion ;nd
Paragon House. 0
.'
Wca
Shupe, A. (eds.) Prophetic
ruer. Volume I. New York: 12
ROBERTSON, R. 1987. 'Globalisation and societal m d . . .
Japanese religion'. SOciological Analysis erlllsatIOn. a note on Japan and WOMEN, EQUALITY,
ROBERTSON, R. and LECHNFR F 1985 'M d ...
R of culMture in theory;. problem AND CITIZENSHIP
OCHE, . 1987. CItIzenship social th d' I ' .
16:363-399. , e o r y an SOCla change. Theory and Society

ROBTH , ?t196p3. The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany. Totowa New "'ork'
ed mms er ress. ' LI.
Susan Motler Okin
ROUSSEAU, 1. J. 1973. The Social Contract and Discourses Lond .D
G. H. 1963. A History of Political Theory ent. . Source: Queen's Quarterly, 99:1 (1992),56-72.
fAn Interp;etation ;f Dutch Culture
S . nop.
CHRAM, S. G. and, TURBETT, 1. P. 1983. 'Civil disorder and the welfare '.
two-step process. American Sociological Review 48:408-414. explosIOn. a In the preceding paper, 1. G. A. Pocock invited a feminist
SMITH, A. D. 1986: .Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil BlackwelI response to his observations about the place of the "classical"
STEVIN, S. 1955. Cml Life. Amsterdam: Swest and Zweitlinger. . idea of citizenship in modern democracy. Can the concept of
TITMUSS, R. 1963. Essays on the Welfare State London' Unwi U' . citizenship devised by the ancients be expanded to include the
y female sex? Or has this ideal been flawed from the outset? In
TONNIES, F. 1887. Community and Association.' l1lVerslt
Press, 1957. . IC 19an state UllIveslty taking up John Pocock's challenge, Susan Moller Okin finds
the classical notion of the "citizen" very much wanting, and
TURNER, S. 1984. 'State, civil society and national develo' . argues that there has always been more at stake than "privacy"
T problem. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology Scottish when citizens seek to separate their public and domestic lives.
URNER, B. S. 1986a. Equality. Chichester: ElIis Horwood and London' .
Citizenship and Capitalism: The over

TURNER, B. S. 1988. Status. Milton Keynes: Open University P

RIolitical Books.
,. . le I y. encoe, IllinOiS: Free Press.
WOLIN, S. S. 1961. Politics and Vis' C . . I had planned to discuss here some of the ways in which gender inequalities
Thought Lond H /011, ontlllUlty and Innovation ill Western Political
. on: arrap. are universal, cross-cultural phenomena. This was to be a provocative response
to anti-essentialist critiques of feminist theory. However, my well-formed
intentions for a paper were altered several weeks ago, when I received from
Professor John Pocock a copy of his lecture "The Ideal of Citizenship Since
Classical Times." Professor Pocock then reiterated the invitation he had
offered in the course of his lecture - an invitation to feminists to take up
the questions of whether (and, if so, how) women can claim citizenship in
anything like the "classical" sense, as he construes it, or whether (and, if so,
how) they should "subvert or deconstruct the ideal itself as a device con-
structed in order to exclude them." These very questions are what much of
my own published work is about, and there are many other feminist political
theorists who have addressed them.
The answer many of us have given, which I would like to explain, is that
women can, and have every right to, claim citizenship in something like the
classical sense, but that in many respects the ideal does have to be subverted

214 215
 ..T"11nr.....-r1- - - - - - -
WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND CITIZENSHIP
or deconstructed - not only in .order t . . .
an improved ideal for men too A d Include women, but in order to be Let me now try to clarify the question that is being deferred to feminists:
. n so Instead f t1" first, Aristotle's explicit prerequisites for citizenship, as summarized by
preoccupations (which is what . 't' 'I 0 ou InIng my more current
VISI Ing ecturers 11 .
not always what their audI'en usua y want to dISCUSS but Pocock, are only too obviously irreconcilable with the elimination of class,
. ces want to hea ) I'd 1'k '
hons John Pocock raised _ especiaIl . th fi r I e to take up the ques- race, and sex qualifications. For each of the five prerequisites of his version
did not answer. Instead of cl' ,''! In e rst part of his presentation - but of classical citizenship requires that others - women and slaves - play their
conversation that you have mY current thing," I shall enter the non-citizenly, not fully human, role in the story. That citizens must be male
"UT y Stalte . Thus my P '11 b obviously rules out females; that they be of "known genealogy" - in a con-
nomen, Equality, and Citizenship" , a p e r WI e about
John Pocock addressed in aver . inte . text where only the male line of descent is considered significant - requires
citizenship - of which he 'd'" Y1 . the "classical ideal" of that women's sexuality be under the control of men; that citizens be patriarchs
tion" and its "tradition" Help' t we c allm [It] to be Il1herent in our "civiliza- requires that their wives, children, and household slaves all obey them;
. u severa of the foreg . d .
marks, both to draw attention to th db oll1g wor s 111 quotation that they be warriors requires that others take care of daily life, including
problematic. I would want to add an ecause finds them, reproduction and production, while they go out on expeditions to try to kill
"we" and "our." Who are the "we more - notably, to each other; and that they be the masters of slaves requires, of course, that
as Pocock's lecture proceeds he t IS It, anyway? Indeed, there be slaves.
lem that is still, unfortunately fai 1 Ica es a eglee of awareness of this prob- So this cannot be the question Pocock is asking; he does not need a
of political theory. He contemporary interpreters feminist to show him this. What he must be focusing on is not whether these
is fundamental to the classical _ b h' h h account of equality that prerequisites can be met by women, or any of the other excluded groups, but
- ideal of citizenship "excludes means, mall11y, the Aristotelian whether there can be an ideal of citizenship that includes ruling and being
access to it." A citizen must be " gl eatfel part of the human race from ruled and participating as equals in the taking of public decisions, but that
. a ma e 0 known gene I . does not exclude the great majority on grounds of race, sex, or class. Can
warnOl; and the master of the labo f h a ogy, a patnarch, a
adds, "these pre-requisites pe .ot ers (normally slaves)." As Pocock citizenship and political life be modified - while retaining the essentials of
millennia." Now we all th rSlS he 111 western culture for more than two the participatory ideal - so as to be inclusive rather than exclusionary? This
em, e says but haven't (" . " h is a much more important question, because it is directly related to whether
- rather more optimistic than so 0
f) . qUite, e suggests
raises the issue of whether the b us got of them. This, he says, women can be the political equals of men in any society that purports to be
essential to the ideal of but "in some way democratic. It is certainly not just a counterfactual question about ancient
inate race, class and gender as . :. s 1 POSSI le," he asks, "to elim- Greece. I, in the company of a great many other feminist political theorists,
being ruled, to ;articipate as to the of ruling and answer "yes" to this question. But we also argue that the modifications neces-
the classical description of that c d't' . mg of public deCISIOns, and leave sitated by this are considerable. Central concepts of both political theory
Professor Pocock defers to It IOn 111 othe.r unmodified?" and political life must be rethought, if this great inclusion is fully to take
0
earlier, the fact that he pays attenti t this questIOn. As I mentioned place. And we also argue that certain aspects of what has come to be known
All too many contemporary inter 0 ;se all is quite unusual. as "malestream" political thought (a phrase coined by Canadian feminist
in ignoring them, even after well past phi.losophy persist theorist, Mary O'Brien) are simply misguided, if we take them to be indica-
Finally, most have begun to use gende tecaldle of femll1lst Il1terpretations. tions of the way that political life has ever actually been lived.
do It. wh'de dIscussing
.
man hiloso
r-neu ra anguage H
. .
h
'. oweveI; w en they I am not going to focus here on all those whom classical Athens, and
worse than sticking to the this is much Aristotle in particular, regarded as non-citizens. I am going to focus primar-
I have come to call/alse gender neutrali . language. It is what ily on the changes that would be necessary if exclusions on the grounds of
the fact that Aristotle (and man othe ,t), simply refuses to confront sex are to be finally overcome. It is not that I think class and race are any
realm of the household (see fi y IS explICitly relegated women to the less important. Clearly, for many persons, they are at least as important as
1981 and Whose Justice? MacIntyre's A/ter Virtue factors in their political powerlessness. But issues of class have been addressed
fact that Pocock defers the question t fi . Y: . On the other hand, the quite thoroughly in political theory, and I am not an expert on questions of
does not perceive anything sugges.ts strongly that he race. Also, for reasons that I think will become clear, I think questions about
itself. The problem, apparently, is ont t .e of citizenship gender inequality often have different kinds pf answers.
can be thrown to the excluded to slY I h tIlls excluslOnary, and therefore I would like to make two arguments. The first is that there is no good
. 0 ve. s a return to this issue later. reason why women should not or cannot be included as equals with men in

216
217
 W HAI IS Cl I IZENSHIP7
"ruling and ruled" kind of citizenship, but that this would (still,
m the 1990s) reqUIre considerable social changes. Secondly, I believe that
these changes would not threaten but would actually help to support and
reproduce democratic citizenship.
of can be approached through challenging the publici
prIvate dlchot?my:, I to call the public/domestic dichotomy, for
reasons of clanty. ( Public/pnvate sometimes means government versus market
and is. not the distinction I wish to talk about.) Challenges
to the pubhc/domestlc diChotomy, and to the traditional definition of politics
are fundamental to feminist political theory, as I shall explain in more detaii
later on. And they are clearly what Pocock is most concerned about as he
envisages the inclusion into citizenship of the previously radically unequal
and excluded. He is not alone in his concern about such challenges. Often,
the. concern is more about the intrusion of the state into private
hfe. Pocock is clearly more concerned about the reverse intrusion: he does
not wa?t the classical clarity about what is "public" and therefore "political"
to be disturbed, or to have the public realm - that is the realm of civic action
- intruded upon by what he regards as private or domestic concerns. He says:
formulation depends upon a rigorous separation of public
from pnvate; of polis from oikos, of persons and actions from
.... To engage in [political relationships], the citizen must leave
hiS household altogether behind, maintained by the labour of his
slaves and women, but playing no further part in his concerns. The
citizens would never dream of discussing their household affairs with
?ne another, and only if things had gone very wrong indeed would
it be necessary for them to take decisions in the assembly designed
to ensure patriarchal control of the households.
. feminists have challenged the public/private dichotomy. But it
is important to understand, before I go any further, that part of what we
are is that it ever existed at all. Our argument is not only that
the relatlOnshlp between the public and the personal-domestic realms of life
needs to be changed, if women are to be equal citizens. We also argue that
a clear public/private dichotomy is, and always has been, a myth.
What do I by I several things. First, I mean that the very
attempt to mamtam a dlstmctlOn, as well as the hierarchical ordering of the
and .what went .on within it, were clearly the outcome of political
declSlons made m the pubhc sphere. Since I am no great expert on the actual
la",:s of ancient and since Pocock refers to Aristotle in making his
claim that dlstmctlOn was clear, I too shall refer to him, to argue that it
was not. Anstotle very clearly thought that political action and the laws not
only did but should regulate many important aspects of domestic life.
218
First, Book I of Aristotle's Politics is entirely concerned with establishing
and justifying as "natural" all the hierarchical relations within households
_ relations between free male citizens and their wives, slaves, and children.
Because of his own presentation of "politics" as separate from the realm of
everyday life, Aristotle says that these are not political relationships, and
distinguishes "political justice" from "household justice" (Nichomachean
Ethics, V, vi). But his whole discussion of these domestic relations, in Book
I, is phrased in terms of how "we" (the free male citizens) are to manage
"them" - the free women, slaves of both sexes, and children. And he clearly
thinks that he cannot even begin to discuss what he does regard as politics
until he and his fellow citizens have established the hierarchies of the dom-
estic base that is its sine qua non.
Later, too, in discussing the subject-matter that he does regard as "polit-
ical," Aristotle does not confine himself to the issues that Pocock regards as
properly "the affairs of the polis": that is to say, "affairs of war and com-
merce between the city and other cities, affairs of pre-eminence and emulation,
authority and virtue, between the citizens themselves." Rather, he makes it
clear that, in the ideal polis that he discusses in the last two books, as wel!
as these things, laws are to be made about such (mundane) things as contracts,
summonses, indictments, the prevention of slave revolts, health (he is very
concerned about the purity of the water supply) and, above all, education
(Bk.VII, Chs.xi-xii). In fact, he announces: "All would agree that the legis-
lator should make the education of the young his chief and foremost concern"
(Bk.VIII, Ch.i). In his discussion of the ideal state, he takes up more space
discussing this subject than everything else put together.
What Aristotle includes under the rubric of "education," moreover, is vast,
and extends to the most minute details of life in the household. He insists
not only that, from the age of seven, the future male citizens be educated
publicly, but that the interest of the polis in educating its citizens extends not
only to their diets in infancy, but to the health of their growing bodies and
minds in utero, and even back to the circumstances of their conception itself
(Bk. VII, Ch.xvi). Amongst the things he explicitly says the laws should
control for these purposes are: the ages and qualities of those who marry
(husbands should be 20 years older than their wives), the age at which they
should have children (not too young, or their children will tend to "have
imperfections," such as being small or female), at what season of the year
they should marry (winter), how pregnant women should exercise and eat
(they should exercise their bodies but not use their minds), whether children
should be reared or exposed (exposure of any who are deformed is to be
mandated by law), how many children each couple should have, up to what
point of fetal development it is permissible to have an abortion. In addition,
he feels that adultery should be punishable (for both sexes). Once the child
is born, this intensive regulation by the state continues: infants should be
habituated to endure cold, they should not be taught lessons or made to do
219
 CIIIZENSRIP?
tasks up to age of five but, rather, play games of a type "neither labori-
ous
th" nor effemInate,
. but such as become a freeman" (Bk .VII , Ch .XVll. ") An d
supenntendents of education," who regulate the way in which small
pass their at home, should ensure that very little of it is spent
wIth The legIslator should also regard it as one of his primary duties
to exorcIze. use of bad language and indecent behaviour wherever they
occur, those who commit them with "indignities," includin cor-
poral pUnIshment. g excluded on grounds such as race or class, are to be fully included as citizens.
Clearly there is no distinct separation of public from private-domestic
here. T?e very most basic laws of the ideal po lis have to do with the
legu.latlOn of Its households and are clearly designed to maintain th '.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a much more intrusive
of laws. If the ?o not have to be continually attending to these
as Pocock suggests, It IS only because they have been so well-established d encumbered both politics and political theory, biasing them toward the
have had strong sanctions attached to them, from the outset. The'
posals Anstotle . makes here" which he unlike Plato I'n the Repu hI'lC, d oes not
as .to be to his audience, amount to constant and
VIgIlant superVISIOn of vIrtually every imaginable dimension of private life
?y the state and its "superintendents." (The same phenomenon is present
In Plato's I;,aIVs, but I won't go into it here.) The "patriarchal control of
?ouseholds was not some purely private or something that normally
happened, as Pocock suggests; it was something very seriously and con-
by the laws. Though they were doubtless also concerned
:Vlt? polIcy, and other aspect of public policy, there is no
that the Greeks thought that political regulation of house-
lIfe ,was somethIng that was needed only in an emergency. At least in
s .of his preferred state, there were no barriers between
publIc. and pnvate bfe. That Greek politics was all about purely public con-
cerns IS a myth.
Thus if, Pocock suggests, this dichotomy, and the purity of the political
are the major obstacles to. the inclusion of the excluded, they would appea;
to have melted a:vay. BarrIers that were not there to begin with cannot be in
d.a?ger o! breakmg down. Thus, there is no danger on this account that the
of women and slaves would ruin classical citizenship. However
IS that he raises: whether those who are involved
m t.he of thmgs - m material, productive, domestic, or reproductive
can become citizens without hopelessly distorting the concept
of cItIzenshIp.
I said at. the outset
. . that I would show that making citizenship more mc . IuSlve
. emancipate oneself from things. At least from the male citizen's point of view,
:vou Id Improve CItIzenship itself, and I shall now try to do this. It is interest-
mg that Professor
. Pocock puts the burden of showl'ng ho w emanclpa . t'IOn
of the preVIOusly excluded can take place (and, indeed, whether it needs to
take place) on the excluded themselves. It is as if, from the free, male citizens'
220
WOMEN, EQUAL! I Y, AND Cl IIZENSHIP
point of view, there is no problem at all. But some of us - feminists -
been arguing that there is. Quite apart from the fact that we have never qUIte
been able to see why it should be that free, white males should be the ones
to decide what it is to be truly human, and that they constitute the standard
which anyone else must reach in order to be considered equal, we discern a
further problem: many feminists, including myself, have argued not only that
great modifications need to be made if women, and other groups previously
We also argue that there is something seriously amiss with the "classical"
ideal of citizenship, even if these exclusions were to be acceptable from the
point of view of the excluded. Feminists have argued quite persuasively
the division of labour between those who have reproduced and nurtured lIfe,
and those who have ordered society and determined its meanings, has greatly
allegedly transcendent, non-physical realm, toward excessive individualism,
reliance on reason and the so-called "manly" virtues, and denigration of the
emotions and the so-called "feminine" virtues. Prominent works that have
contributed to this argument include Mary O'Brien's The Politics of Reproduc-
tion (1981), Genevieve Lloyd's The Man of Reason (1984), Hannah Pitkin's
Fortune is a Woman (1984), Wendy Brown's Manhood and Politics (1988),
and Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract (1988).
But the point I want to emphasize here is a somewhat different one. I will
start by referring back to the part of Pocock's lecture where he moves from
his discussion of the "classical ideal" of citizenship to the more modern,
legal conception of citizenship, which he dates back to Gaius, and Roman
law. Here, making very clear his preference for the former, Pocock argues
that it is the preoccupation of the latter with "things," and the notion of
citizens as "act[ing] on each other through the medium of things," that he
finds, by comparison, degrading. He contrasts this later, proprietorial notion
of citizenship, preoccupied with rights, with Aristotle's, thus: "Aristotle's
citizens were persons acting on one another, so that their active life was a
immediately and heroically moral." While pointing out here that they dId
sometimes have to deal with things - "walls, lands, trade and so forth," mostly
"things had been left behind, in the oikos [household], and ... though one
must possess them in order to leave them behind ... citizens
themselves from their possessions in order to meet face to face In a polItIcal
life which was an end in itself."
Even if this were so (which I have disputed), let's step back and look at
the whole situation. It is clearly admirable, in Professor Pocock's eyes, to so
nothing is amiss. But surely we must ask: what did it take, for this
from things to occur? It took the ongoing capacity to treat the vast maJonty
of people more or less as things. Though he never actually denies that
or slaves are persons, Aristotle persistently writes of them instrumentally, In
221
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
terms of functions they serve for the free men. His very first introduction
of both, m Book I of the Politics, is to point out that females and slaves are
from each other since "[n]ature makes nothing in
a spmt of stint ... : she makes each separate thing for a separate end ... "
(Ch.H). And he goes on in the same vein: we can only find out what kind
of women .and slaves have, and the extent to which they share in
.by knowmg what their respective functions are (Ch.xIII). His
very defillltlOn of a slave is one who is "capable of becoming [and this is the
reason why he actually becomes] the property of another ... " (Ch. V). So
surely we to ask ourselves: Which is preferable? Which is likely to pro-
be.tter cItizens, capable of acting as each other's equals? Having to deal
wIth thmgs part of the time - even the "mundane" things of daily life? Or
treating most people as things? .
Feminist political theorists, including myself, have no doubt about the
to this We have argued explicitly, and not only in relation
to Anstotle, agamst the notion that an inegalitarian, undemocratic family is
an appropriate nurturing ground for citizens who are to treat each other as
equals (akin, Women in Western Political Thought 1979, and Justice, Gender.
and the Family 1:89; Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy 1990). We ask;
how can raIsed from the start to believe in their superiority, their entitle-
ment to over others, ever become the paragons of equal citizenship
that the stones tell us they become? Perhaps these exclusions and the
continual domination that they involve, have not been so much the reason
democracies of free white men have been able to exist, but part of the reason
they have often been so very frail, and not very democratic.
In this claim has roots deep in a related argument, one made by
theonsts 111 the western tradition who were certainly not feminists but who
were concerned about slavery and other vast inequalities amongst men. First
Rousseau, and then Hegel, argued that in a relation of domination, such
one a master and a slave, the powerful party was damaged in
hIS humalllty at least as much, if not more, than the one he dominated. As
puts it, at the beginning of The Social Contract, "Many a one
beheves .the mast.er ?f others, and yet he is a greater slave than they."
(Bk.I, Ch·9· Anstotle dIdn t seem to think it a problem that young boys,
grown up 111 the context where to be free and male meant instant superiority
over all who were not, ":,,ould then be expected to treat each other as equals
- to ru!e .and be ruled m turn. But why did he not consider it a problem?
Surely It IS one. It becomes less of one only if, as Aristotle did one sees all
beings on a sliding scale, from plants to animals to slaves to women to
free men - with "full humanity" referring only to the last. If one has a con-
ception of humanity as including women, slaves, or former slaves, all races,
and so on, then the problem of how the dominators become the free and
equal surely is much more obvious. One who thought so, and said so in very
strong terms, was John Stuart Mill. Arguing as he did both for universal
222
WOMEN, EQUALITY" AND CITIZENSHIP
adult suffrage and for the emancipation of women, he saw these as comple-
mentary projects. He regarded the typical, patriarchal, British household of
his time as "a school of despotism," whose "perverting influence" on boys
and men needed to be eliminated by reforming marriage into a relationship
of equals (The Subjection of Women, Ch.4). If an egalitarian
is the aim isn't as egalitarian a family as is possible a prerequISIte for It?
And if so: the restructuring of the relationship of public and private must
be a part of the needed transformation.
What I have just discussed leads me to a good example of how some of the
central concepts of political theory cannot retain their classical meaning if
the excluded are to be included: through much of western political thought,
including but not confined to classical Greek and Roman thought, t?e
concept of freedom has meant, amongst other things, freedom. daI!y
preoccupation with the needs of the body - freedom from
reproduction, production, or the provision of material serVIces. Now It IS
fairly obvious that, with this definition, the existence of a class of free
entailed having various classes of unfree persons, those whom Anstotle
unabashedly called the necessary "conditions" for the polis, as opposed to
the male citizens who were its intrinsic "parts." The only alternative would be
that these supposedly free persons would die, in two senses of the word - they
would fail both as individuals and as a species, to survive. Now of course
freedom not have to mean this at all; it is perfectly consistent with being
free that one play a role in the reproduction and nurturance of life and in
the production of material goods and provision of services. is co.nsistent,
however, only so long as society is not organized so as to these
activities and so long as the performance of them does not dIsquahfy one,
either fo;mally or in practice, from free status or equal political participation.
As is now clear, Pocock amongst others (Hannah Arendt is an obvious
example) so value what they present as purely public political action that
they fear its contamination by private, domestic concerns, and hence by those
consigned to this sphere. These republican or Aristotelian ideas, however,
while still influential, run against the current of liberal theory, which was to
be far more prominent from the seventeenth century on. In liberal thought,
there was far less concern that private, domestic concerns would pollute the
political sphere and far more emphasis placed on ensuring a realm of privacy
into which the state did not intervene. Thus, the value placed on the two
spheres has changed quite dramatically. Instead of the private sphere being
regarded solely as the means by which citizens are reproduced, reared, an,d
sustained from day to day - so that they can enter the truly human pubhc
sphere of political life - the situation is virtually reversed. The purpose of
political life comes to be seen as the protection of private life and .the promo-
tion of private (including, in this case, commercial) interests. It IS partly on
this basis that Locke makes his celebrated case for religious freedom, in A
223
 ... ""':a::a: IL..;ClI'dfilr (
Letter on But feminist theorists have been pointing out during
the last (<?arole and Frances Olsen prominent among them)
the pnzed lIberal rIght of privacy has not been the right of all indi-
vIduals to .control their own lives, free from government interference. It has
been the nght of male citizer,s to control not only their own lives but those
of the other of households those who, whether by reason of
sex, age, or servItude, were regarded as rightfully controlled by
t?em and wIthm their sphere of privacy. This is not always apparent,
much of hberal theory is written in neutral terms about "individual"
prIvacy. So I shall cite just two examples where this facade is briefly torn
showing us the real picture. The first example comes from Locke, the fathe;'
of the modern public/domestic distinction, the second from a much-cited
turn-of-the-century law article.
Locke's most well-known distinctions between political and other forms of
power are made at the beginning of the Second Treatise. But his strongest
for the protection of a private sphere from governmental intrusion
or are found in his Letter Concerning Toleration. Locke's defence
of freedom rests large part on an appeal to what he clearly
consIders to be an. already WIdely recognized right of privacy. In appealing
a of. "pnvate domestic affairs" in which no one would consider
111terfenng, he 111cludes a man's marrying off his daughter (A Letter Concern-
inl! Toleration,. 1950 28-9). the daughter herself, as an individual,
mIght have an 111terest 111 the chOIce, and might therefore have a privacy right
to ch?ose her own husband, does not seem to have crossed his mind.
. ThIS. same that individual privacy is really men's privacy, is
apparent 111 another, much more recent, classic argument _ that
111 Warren an? Brandeis's 1890 law article "The Right to Privacy." The argu-
starts the assertion: "That the individual shall have full protection
111 person and 111 property is a principle as old as the common law;" In the
very next paragraph, however, the limited meaning of "individual" is revealed
as are tOI.d "man's family relations became a part of the legal
ceptIO? of hfe, and the alienation of a wife's affections was held to be
remedIable. Now clearly, underlying the law that allowed husbands to sue
third parties for "alienation of affections" was the notion that a wife fell within
the aegis of a man's privacy, much as his property did. It is all the more
rema.rkable that contemporary discussions of privacy, in referring to such
claSSIC sources, do not mention this aspect of them - until we realize that
some of these aspects of patriarchy are still with us.
. In this it is very interesting, as well as disturbing, to think about
Just when It was, 111 the US, that the great controversy erupted about whether
there was a constitutional right to privacy. It wasn't very controversial during
the when cases decided on this ground were cases about family
IS typ.e Warren, and Brandeis were really defending,
despIte then· 111dIvIduahstlc language. Such cases confirm the rights of families
224
WOMEN, EQUAL! I Y, AND CITIZENSHIP
(therefore, in practice, their more powerful members) to make
regulating their (other) members. There are quite a few such cases, datln.g
back to the late nineteenth century. A well-known example of such a case IS
Wisconsin vs. Yoder, in which Amish parents were recognized as having a
privacy right to keep their children out of high school, to protect religi-
ous way of life. (Reference was made to what good citizens the AmIsh were,
and no one said too much about the children's right to finish their educa-
tions.) It wasn't even over the initial cases having to do with reproductive
privacy that the controversy erupted. In GrisIVold vs. Connecticut (1965), the
right to use contraceptives was seen as part of "a right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights." But it was viewed as a right that "protected the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms" (emphasis added). As long as it was so under-
stood, the right of privacy did not cause the ferment that it does today..What
changed all this? The dating of the furore suggests very strongly that It
in the early seventies, when privacy rights having to do with reproductIOn
became the focus of attention (when both contraception and abortion became
explicitly recognized as the rights of individuals - individual women), that
the subject became so controversial. The notion that everybody's privacy had
been equally protected by this ancient right was all of a sudden exposed as
the patriarchal myth it had always been. Once women's rights of privacy to
control their reproduction were at issue, the whole matter looked entirely
different to many people. And the controversy, of course, is still far from
being over.
Let me now summarize my answers (with which I think many feminists would
agree) to Professor Pocock's questions: (1) can women, labourers, and any
others previously excluded, be included in citizenship, by which is meant
ruling and being ruled in turn? (2) can this be done without blurring the
separation of public from private? The answer to the first question, we think,
is an undeniable "yes." The answer to the second is that the public and the
private will not be rigidly separated, but nor were they ever, except in one
of the most tenacious of all patriarchal myths.
Let me first make it clear that I, and most other feminists who challenge
the public/domestic dichotomy, do not wish to see the elimination of privacy
as an important right, so long as it is understood as a right of individuals,
whether alone or in their free and fundamentally equal relations with one
another. What, then, are we saying?
Most feminist theorists, while by no means claiming that privacy has no
value, now recognize that the sharp dichotomization of public from private
or domestic that characterizes virtually all of western political thought
has to give way to the recognition that the two are, and always have been,
inextricably connected. There are many reasons for this. Power (and therefore
politics) exists in both domestic and non-domestic life. Moreover, the public
world of government, law, and public opinion has always regulated and
225
 --------=E-=Q:--::UALlTY AND CITIZENSHIP
WOMEN, . "
- --------vv run 10:'1 ellIZBNSHIP?
. . . I t a democracy in any but the very flimsi-
influenced goes on and who dominates whom in the private sphere. The of individuals. But It IS certam y no f 't eaknesses glaring at us from
public/domestic distinction depends on the devaluation or even nonrecogni- est sense .0: the term, we a ;:r;e element of oligarchy in our
our televiSlon screens as wee . hink than in yours _ partly because of the
tion of women's work in the private sphere - however crucial it is to species
and social survival. Our gendered selves as women or men are constructed supposed democracy - t .' and the great political influence of
primarily by our early experiences in the family. Justice and democracy in weak controls on campaign. nancmg, r ver reat discrepancy, between
the world outside of the household seem fundamentally dependent upon the the corporate sector. There IS also a ve y: Yt g(This I think is not very
t t' "and those t h ey repIesen . , ' .
achievement of equality between the sexes at home. Last, but by no means our "represen. a d ) Women African and native Americans, Hispal11cs,
least, the typical division of labour between the sexes in the private sphere here 111 the poor, and the young, are all
restricts, both practically and psychologically, women's chances for equality Astans, gay a ., I n' ( ecially at the federal level) almost entIrely
in all spheres of life outside the household. As Carole Pateman wrote in "represented 111. pohtI.ca 1 e lderly supposedly heterosexual men.
1983, the "dichotomy between the public and the private is ... ultimately, by well-off, white, orf e l'k; last week's Senate confirmation
what the feminist movement is about." And, as she has more recently argued, This is glaringly ObVIOUS 111 a SI I Who knows what the debate or
"to develop a theory in which women and femininity have an autonomous hearings and debate on been conducted by a hundred
place means that the private and the public, the social and the political, also the outcome would have been I e that make up the citizen body
have to be completely reconceptualized; in short, it means an end to the long people actually of t _ after all, the two per cent
history of sexually particular theory that masquerades as universalism" of the United States. ThiS IS. har. to pIe s lit ri ht down the middle,
(Feminist Critiques 118; Introduction to Feminist Challenges 9-10). female representation that eXists m th.e s that she is not a
g
What, then, needs to happen if women are ever, finally, to achieve equal with Senator Nancy rem In" ln u we can surmise is that the
t ". she is a' senat or. Al1 that .
citizenship with men? The ancient assumption that the responsibilities of "woman sena. or , ould have been very different. The Issues
domestic life - caring for children and the aged - are "naturally" women's, debate, and plObably the w d on would all have appeared
must finally give way to assumptions and policies that will facilitate the equal of race, gender; a representative group
sharing of these things by men and women. Will the quality of citizens suffer very different If dlSCusse 111 e
if they are also child-carers and people who fold laundry and cook during of citizens.
part of their time? Pocock clearly thinks so, but I think not. I think, for one
thing, that having a vivid, day-to-day experience of both the joys and the Note
burdens of nurturing life is likely to make citizens less eager to risk lives in . h .
Okin refers to the Senate confirmatIOn earmgs or
r. Judge Clarence
unnecessary wars and is likely to make them readier to spend money on homes, televised the week before this paper was presented.
decent schools, and health care than on ever more sophisticated weaponry.
How can change toward a new division of labour be achieved? Public
provision of subsidized, high-quality childcare facilities will help parents to
share the care of their children and also avoid economic dependence. They
are also, of course, of crucial importance to the growing numbers of single
parents. The workplace is another area where changes such as flexible hours
and adequate family leave can greatly facilitate shared parenting, and where
policies like comparable pay for comparable work and affirmative action can
contribute to women's greater equality. And, as I have also argued (at much
greater length in my recent book than I am able to do here), we need renewed
reforms in divorce law - both to encourage equality and the sharing of roles
and to protect the vulnerable in more traditional marriages. And, obviously,
women have to be able to make their own moral decisions about their repro-
ductive lives. No one can be an equal citizen without this fundamental right.

We have, in name, a democracy in the United States today. And the constitu-
tional system has many virtues, in particular its potential to protect the rights

227
226
 second-class citizens, Social movements of oppressed and excluded groups
13 have recently asked why extension of equal citizenship rights has not led to
social justice and equality, Part of the answer is straightforwardly Marxist:
those social activities that most determine the status of individuals and
POLITY AND GROUP DIFFERENCE groups are anarchic and oligarchic; economic life is not sufficiently under
the control of citizens to affect the unequal status and treatment of groups,
A critique of ideal of universal citizenship I think this is an important and correct diagnosis of why equal citizenship
has not eliminated oppression, but in this article I reflect on another reason
more intrinsic to the meaning of politics and citizenship as expressed in much
Iris Marion Young
modern thought.
The assumed link between citizenship for everyone, on the one hand, and
Source: Ethics, 99:2 (1989), 250-74, the two other senses of citizenship-having a common life with and being
treated in the same way as the other citizens-on the other, is itself a prob-
lem, Contemporary social movements of the oppressed have weakened the
link, They assert a positivity and pride in group specificity against ideals of
assimilation, They have also questioned whether justice always means that
An ideal of universal citizenship has driven ' law and policy should enforce equal treatment for all groups, Embryonic in
of modern political life, Ever since the bo the, e,manclpatory momentum these challenges lies a concept of differentiated citizenship as the best way
privileges by claiming equal political ri h ,challenged aristocratic to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship,
workers, Jews, blacks and others h g tds or CItIzens as such, women In this article I argue that far from implying one another, the universality
, ave presse for' 1 ' , ,
status, Modern political theory a i d h mc uSlOn m that citizenship of citizenship, in the sense of the inclusion and participation of everyone,
' ssel e t e equal mo I h
an d SOCIal movements of the d ra wort of all persons stands in tension with the other two meanings of universality embedded in
, , oppresse took this ' l' ' modern political ideas: universality as generality, and universality as equal
mcluslOn of all persons in full citizensh' senous y as Implying the
of the law, Ip status under the equal protection treatment. First, the ideal that the activities of citizenship express or create
Citizenship for everyone,everyone
and a general will that transcends the particular differences of group affiliation,
" I th e same ' ,
po1Ittca thought generally assumed th t th ' , qua Modern situation, and interest has in practice excluded groups judged not capable of
sense of citizenship for all I'm I' a, e of cItizenship in the adopting that general point of view; the idea of citizenship as expressing a
' , pIes a uDlversahty of 'f h"
th at cItIzenship status transcend f I ' Cl Izens Ip ID the sense general will has tended to enforce a homogeneity of citizens, To the degree
social or group differences am s par anty and difference, Whatever the that contemporary proponents of revitalized citizenship retain that idea of
wealth, status, and power in the their inequalities of a general will and common life, they implicitly support the same exclusions
gives everyone the same status as y CIVil society, citizenship and homogeneity, Thus I argue that the inclusion and participation of every-
, peers m t e polItIcal bl' W' one in public discussion and decision making requires mechanisms for group
conceIved as sameness the id I of' pu IC, Ith equality
meanings in addition the exetaen , carries at least two representation, Second, where differences in capacities, culture, values, and
I , slOn 0 CItIzenshIp t behavioral styles exist among groups, but some of these groups are privileged,
sa Ity defined as general in op 't' , 0 everyone: (a) univer-
POSI IOn to partIcular ht" strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate
common as opposed to how th d'ffi ' w a CItIzens have in
1aws and rules that say the samey {; 1 eril and (b) UDlversa , I"
Ity ID the sense of oppression or disadvantage, The inclusion and participation of everyone
a
laws and rules that are bll'nd t 'd a nd apply to all in the same way' in social and political institutions therefore sometimes requires the articula-
, 0 111 IVI ual and, d'ffi '
Dunng this angry, sometimes blood ' , glOuP I tion of special rights that attend to group differences in order to undermine
and twentieth centuries many am thY' polItIcal struggle ID the nineteenth oppression and disadvantage,
that winning full th and thought
would lead to their freedom and eq polItIcal and civil rights, I. Citizenship as generality
however, when citizenship rl'ght h bY' ow ID the late twentieth century
, , save een formaII d ' Many contemporary political theorists regard capitalist welfare society as
m lIberal capitalist societies ' y exten ed to all groups
, some groups stdl find themselves treated as depoliticized, Its interest group pluralism privatizes policy-making, consigning

228
229
 est group citizenship status to all groups. Indeed, at least some modern republicans
making it difficult to assess I'SS ,po ICy the mterests of the individual, thought just the contrary, While they extolled the virtues of Citizenship as
, ues m re IatlOn to one th d "
ties, The fragmented and privatized nature ' er an set pnon- expressing the universality of humanity, they consciously excluded some
facilitates the dominance of th of the, polItICal process, people from citizenship on the grounds that they could not adopt the general
, " e more powerful Illterests,'
Inlesponse to tlus pnvatization of the oli' I point of view, or that their inclusion would disperse and divide the public.
for a renewed public life and a' I, d P ,tICa process, many writers call The ideal of a common good, a general will, a shared public life leads to
, lenewe commItment to th 't ',
ShIP, requires that citizens of weIr. ' eVIl' ues,of cltlzen- pressures for a homogeneous citizenry.
from theIr privatized consumerist sI b' ale corporate socIety awake Feminists in particular have analyzed how the discourse that links the civic
t?e sole right to rule, and challenge the, experts who claim public with fraternity is not merely metaphorical. Founded by men, the
tlOns through processes of actl've d'y ,conhtrol ?f theIr hves and institu- modern state and its public realm of citizenship paraded as universal values
"
deCISlOns, ? ISCUSSlOn t at aIm at r h' ,
- In participatory democratic in" , , eac mg collectIve and norms which were derived from specifically masculine experience: mili-
exercise capacities of reasonI'ng d' ,stltutlOns CItizens develop and tarist norms of honor and homoerotic camaraderie; respectful competition
he, dormant and th , ISCUSSlOn, anda SOCI' I"Izmg that otherwIse '
and bargaining among independent agents; discourse framed in unemotional
and face with their to address others tones of dispassionate reason.
virtues of citizenship in opposition Many who invoke the Several commentators have argued that in extolling the virtues of citizen-
capitalist society assume as mod I °fi ,e pnvatIzatlOn of politics in welfare ship as participation in a universal public realm, modern men expressed a
humanism of thinkers such as Me sh' Ol ICI?ntemporary public life the civic flight from sexual difference, from having to recognize another kind of exist-
WIth ' ac Iave 1 or, more often R 3
these social critics I agree that int ' t " ousseau, ence that they could not entirely understand, and from the embodiment,
privatized and fragmented facill'tat th edIes plurahsm, because it is dependency on nature, and morality that women represent. s Thus the opposi-
d , e s e ommatlOn of co t 'I'
an other powerful interests, With th I th' k ' rpora e, ml Itary, tion between the universality of the public realm of citizenship and the
the institutionalization of genuinely d,m processes require particularity of private interest became conflated with oppositions between
lems, however with uncritically pu ,IC ISCUSSlOn, There are serious prob- reason and passion, masculine and feminine.
" assummg as a model th 'd I f "
pubbc that come to us from the trad'f f ' ea s 0 the CIVIC The bourgeois world instituted a moral division of labor between reason
ideal of the public realm of citizen 0 pohtlcal thought. 4 The and sentiment, identifying masculinity with reason and femininity with senti-
S
of view and interest that citI'zens h Ip expresslllg a general will, a point ment, desire, and the needs of the body. Extolling a public realm of manly
dIfferences, has operated in fact as aave
' 111 common whi h t
d d fi 'h
d
c, ranscen s theIr
'
virtue and citizenship as independence, generality, and dispassionate reason
The exclusion of groups defined as 01 among citizens, entailed creating the private sphere of the family as the place to which emo-
before this century, In our time th I d,nt was expbcItly acknowledged tion, sentiment, and bodily needs must be confined,6 The generality of the
salist ideal of a public that exc u mg of the univer- public thus depends on excluding women, who are responsible for tending
they stilI obtain, les a common WIll are more subtle, but to that private realm, and who lack the dispassionate rationality and inde-
The tradition of civic republicanism stand' ," , , pendence required of good citizens.
vidualist contract theory of Hobb . L s:n clltlCal WIth the indi- In his social scheme, for example, Rousseau excluded women from the
regards the state as a necessary Ol e, hberal individualism public realm of citizenship because they are the caretakers of affectivity, desire,
action so that individuals can have to regulate and the body. If we allowed appeals to desires and bodily needs to move
the republican tradition locates freed ;m to then pnvate ends, public debates, we would undermine public deliberation by fragmenting its
activities of citizenship. By m. the actual public unity, Even within the domestic realm, moreover, women must be dominated,
decision making, citizens transcend thefr lC and collective Their dangerous, heterogeneous sexuality must be kept chaste and confined
the pursuit of private interests to ado t pal lives and to marriage, Enforcing chastity on women will keep each family a separated
they agree on the common good Cif p a pomt VIew from which unity, preventing the chaos and blood mingling that would be produced by
sality of human life; it is a of an expressIOn of the univer- illegitimate children, Chaste, enclosed women in turn oversee men's desire
a
the heteronomous realm of particular . d and freedom as opposed to by tempering its potentially disruptive impulses through moral education.
N th' . , nee ,mterest and desire Men's desire for women itself threatens to shatter and disperse the universal,
o mg m thIS understanding of citizenshi '. .
to particular, common as opposed t d'fii ,P as as opposed rational realm of the public, as well as to disrupt the neat distinction between
o 1 erentlated, Imphes extending full the public and private, As guardians of the private realm of need, desire,

230
231
 an? women must ensure that men's impulses do not subvert the
umversahty of ,reason. The moral neatness of the female-tended hearth
will temper possessively individualistic impulses of the
tIculanstIc realm of busmess and commerce, since competition, like sexuality,
threatens to explode the unity of the polity.7
It IS. Important to recall that universality of citizenship conceived as
generalIty operated to exclude not only women, but other groups as well.
republicans found little contradiction in promoting
a. of CItizenship that excluded some groups, because the idea that
IS the same for all translated in practice to the requirement
all CltIze?S be the The white male bourgeoisie conceived republican
vIrtue as rational, restramed, and chaste, not yielding to passion or desire
for luxury, and thus able to rise above desire and need to a concern for the
good. This implied excluding poor people and wage from
cItizenshIp on grounds that they were too motivated by need to adopt a
general perspective. The designers of the American constitution were no more
than .their European brethren in this respect; they specifically
mtended to the access of the laboring class to the public, because
they feared dIsruptIOn of commitment to the general interests.
These early American republicans were also quite explicit about the need
for the homogeneity of citizens, fearing that group differences would tend
to undermine to the general interest. This meant that the pres-
ence of and IndIans, and later Mexicans and Chinese, in the territories
of the posed a threat that only assimilation, extermination, or de-
humamzatIOn could thwart. Various combinations of these three were used
of but recognition of these groups as peers in the public was neveI:
an optIOn. Even such republican fathers as Jefferson identified the red and
black people in their territories with wild nature and passion, just as they
feared that women outside the domestic realm were wanton and avaricious.
They defined moral, civilized republican life in opposition to this backward-
desire that they identified with women and nonwhites. 8
A SImIlar lOgIC of exclusion operated in Europe, where Jews were particular
targets. 9
exclusions were not accidental, nor were they inconsist-
ent WIth the of universal citizenship as understood by these theorists.
They were a dIrect co.nsequence of a dichotomy between public and private
that the publIc as a realm of generality in which all particularities
left and defined the private as the particular, the realm of affect-
affil.latIOn, need, and the body. As long as that dichotomy is in place,
the mclusIOn of the formerly excluded in the definition of citizenship-women
workers, Jews, blacks, A.sians, Indians, Mexicans-imposes a homogeneit;
that suppresses group differences in the public and· in practice forces the
formerly excluded groups to be measured according to norms derived from
and defined by privileged groups.
232
Contemporary critics of interest group liberalism who call for a renewed
public life certainly do not intend to exclude any adult or. groups
from citizenship. They are democrats, convinced that only t.he
participation of all citizens in political life will for WIse
sions and a polity that enhances rather than inhIbIts the capacItIes of ItS
citizens and their relations with one another. The emphasis by such partici-
patory democrats on generality and commonness, however, still threatens to
suppress differences among citizens.
I shall focus on the text of Benjamin Barber, who, in his book Strong
Democracy, produces a compelling and concrete vision of
cratic processes. Barber recognizes the need to safeguard a democratic publIc
from intended or inadvertent group exclusions, though he offers no proposals
for safeguarding the inclusion and participation of everyone. He also argues
fiercely against contemporary political theorists who construct a model of
political discourse purified of affective dimensions. Thus Barber does not
fear the disruption of the generality and rationality of the public by desire
and the body in the way that nineteenth-century republican theorists did. He
retains, however, a conception of the civic public as defined by generality,
as opposed to group affinity and particular need and interest. He makes a
clear distinction between the public realm of citizenship and civic activity,
on the one hand, and a private realm of particular identities, roles, affilia-
tions and interests on the other. Citizenship by no means exhausts people's
soci;1 identities, but it takes priority over all social activities in a strong
democracy. The pursuit of particular interests, the pressing of the claims of
particular groups, all must take place within a framework of community and
common vision established by the public realm. Thus Barber's vision of
participatory democracy continues to rely on an opposition between the
public sphere of a general interest and a private sphere of particular interest
and affiliation. 10
While recognizing the need for majority rule procedures and means
of safeguarding minority rights, Barber asserts that "the strong democrat
regrets every division and regards the existence of majorities as a sign that
mutualism has failed" (p. 207). A community of citizens, he says, "owes the
character of its existence to what its constituent members have in common"
(p. 232), and this entails transcending the order of individual needs and wants
to recognize that "we are a moral body whose existence depends on the
common ordering of individual needs and wants into a single vision of
the future in which all can share" (p. 224). This common vision is not imposed
on individuals from above, however, but is forged by them in talking and
working together. Barber's models of such common projects, however, reveal
his latent biases: "Like players on a team or soldiers at war, those who prac-
tice a common politics may come to feel ties that they never felt before they
commenced their common activity. This sort of bonding, which emphasizes
common procedures, common work, and a shared sense of what a community
233
 needs to succeed" rather than monolithic purposes and ends, serves strong
democracy most successfully" (p. 244).
The attempt to realize an ideal of universal citizenship that finds the
embo?ying generality as opposed to particularity, commonness versus
dIfference, wIll tend to exclude or to put at a disadvantage some groups, even
they have formally equal citizenship status. The idea of the public as
unIversal and the concomitant identification of particularity with privacy
a requirement of public participation. In exercising their
cItIzenshIp, all CItIzens should assume the same impartial, general point of
view transcending all particular interests, perspectives, and experiences.
But such an impartial general perspective is a myth. 11 People necessarily
and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated
experience and perception of social relations. Different social groups' have
different needs, cultures, histories, experiences, and perceptions of social rela-
tions which influence their interpretation of the meaning and consequences
of policy proposals and influence the form of their political reasoning. These
differences in political interpretation are not merely or even primarily a result
of differing or conflicting interests, for groups have differing interpretations
even when seek to promote justice and not merely their own self-regarding
..In a SOCIety some groups are privileged while others are oppressed,
lllSIStlllg that as CItIzens persons should leave behind their particular affilia-
tions and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce
that privilege; for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to
dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.
Barber asserts that responsible citizenship requires transcending particular
affiliations, commitments, and needs, because a public cannot function if its
members are concerned only with their private interests. Here he makes an
confusion between plurality and privatization. The interest group
that he and criticize indeed institutionalizes and encourages
an egOIstIC, self-regardlllg VIew of the political process, one that sees parties
entering the political competition for scarce goods and privileges only in
order to maximize their own gain, and therefore they need not listen to or
respond to the claims of others who have their own point of view. The pro-
cesses and often the outcomes of interest group bargaining, moreover take
place largely in private; they are neither revealed nor discussed in a forum
that genuinely involves all those potentially affected by decisions.
Privacy in this sense of private bargaining for the sake of private gain is
quite different from plurality, in the sense of the differing group experiences
affiliations, and commitments that operate in any large society. It is
for persons to maintain their group identity and to be influenced by their
perceptions of social events derived from their group-specific experience, and
at the time to be public spirited, in the sense of being open to listening
to the claims of others and not being concerned for their own gain alone. It
is possible and necessary for people to take a critical distance from their own
234
immediate desires and gut reactions in order to discuss public proposals.
Doing so, however, cannot require that citizens abandon their particular
affiliations, experiences, and social location. As I will discuss in the next
section, having the voices of particular group perspectives other than one's
own explicitly represented in public discussion best fosters the maintenance
of such critical distance without the pretense of impartiality.
A repoliticization of public life should not require the creation of a unified
public realm in which citizens leave behind their particular group affiliations,
histories, and needs to discuss a general interest or common good. Such a
desire for unity slIppresses but does not eliminate differences and tends to
exclude some perspectives from the public. 12 Instead of a universal citizenship
in the sense of this generality, we need a group differentiated citizenship and
a heterogeneous public. In a heterogeneous public, differences are publicly
recognized and acknowledged as irreducible, by which I mean that persons
from one perspective or history can never completely understand and adopt
the point of view of those with other group-based perspectives and histories.
Yet commitment to the need and desire to decide together the society's
policies fosters communication across those differences.
ll. Differentiated citizenship as group representation
In her study of the functioning of a New England Town Meeting govern-
ment, lane Mansbridge discusses how women, blacks, working-class people,
and poor people tend to participate less and have their interests represented
less than whites, middle-class professionals, and men. Even though all citizens
have the right to participate in the decision-making process, the experience
and perspectives of some groups tend to be silenced for many reasons. White
middle-class men assume authority more than others and they are more
practiced at speaking persuasively; mothers and old people often find it
more difficult than others to get to meetings.13 Amy Gutmann also discusses
how participatory democratic structures tend to silence disadvantaged groups.
She offers the example of community control of schools, where increased
democracy led to increased segregation in many cities because the more
privileged and articulate whites were able to promote their perceived interests
against blacks' just demand for equal treatment in an integrated system. 14
Such cases indicate that when participatory democratic structures define
citizenship in universalistic and unified terms, they tend to reproduce existing
group oppression.
Gutmann argues that such oppressive consequences of democratization
imply that social and economic equality must be achieved before political
equality can be instituted. I cannot quarrel with the value of social and
economic equality, but I think its achievement depends on increasing polit-
ical equality as much as the achievement of political equality depends on
increasing social and economic equality. If we are not to be forced to trace
235
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
a circle, need to solve now the "paradox of democracy" by which
makes some citizens more equal than others, and equality of
cItizenshIp makes some people more powerful citizens. That solution lies at
least in part in institutionalized means for the explicit recognition
and of oppressed groups. Before discussing principles and
practIces mvolved m such a solution, however, it is necessary to say something
about what a group is and when a group is oppressed.
The of a social group has become politically important because
recent and leftist social movements have mobilized around
group IdentIty than exclusively class or economic interests. In many
cases s.uch mobIhzatIon has consisted in embracing and positively defining
a despIsed or devalued ethnic or racial identity. In the women's movement,
gay nghts movement, or elders' movements, differential social status based
on age, sexuality, physical capacity, or the division of labor has been taken
up as a positive group identity for political mobilization.
I shall n.ot define a social group here, but I shall point to several
marks. WhICh a social group from other collectivities of people.
A g.rouP. mvolves first of all an affinity with other persons by which
they Id,entIfy .wIth one and by which other people identify them. A
person s particular sense of hIstory, understanding of social relations and
personal her or his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive
constituted at least partly by her or his group identity. Many group
come from outside, from other groups that label and stereotype
cel tam people. In such CIrcumstances the despised group members often find
t?eir .affinity in their oppression. The concept of social group must be dis-
two concepts with which it might be confused: aggregate
and assoclatlOn.
An aggregate is any classification of persons according to some attribute.
Persons be aggregated according to any number of attributes, all of them
arbItrary-eye color, the make of car we drive, the street we live on.
At the groups that have emotional and social salience in our society
are as arbitrary of persons according
attnbutes of gemtals, or years hved. A social group, however,
defined pnmanly by a set of shared attributes, but by the sense of
people What defines black Americans as a social group is
not SkI? cOl.or; this is exemplified by the fact that some persons
IS .falrly lIght, for example, identify as black. Though some-
tImes objective attnbutes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or
others as a member of a certain social group, it is the identification of certain
persons with a social status, a common history that social status produces
and a. defines the group as a group. ' But what is oppression? In another place I give a fuller account of the
and SOCIal theonsts tend more often to elide social groups with
aSSOCIatIOns rather than aggregates. By an association I mean a collectivity
of' persons who come together voluntarily-such as a club, corporation,
236
POLITY AND GROUp DIFFERENCE
political party, church, college, union, lobbying organization, or interest group.
An individualist contract model of society applies to associations but not to
groups, Individuals constitute associations; they come together as already
formed persons and set them up, establishing rules, positions, and offices.
Since one joins an association, even if membership in it fundamentally
affects one's life, one does not take that association membership to define
one's very identity in the way, for example, being Navajo might. Group
affinity, on the other hand, has the character of what Heidegger calls "thrown-
ness": one finds oneself as a member of a group, whose existence and relations
one experiences as always already having been. For a person's identity is
defined in relation to how others identify him or her, and others do so in
terms of groups which always already have specific attributes, stereotypes,
and norms associated with them, in reference to which a person's identity
will be formed. From the thrownness of group affinity it does not follow that
one cannot leave groups and enter new ones. Many women become lesbian
after identifying as heterosexual, and anyone who lives long enough becomes
old. These cases illustrate thrownness precisely in that such changes in group
affinity are experienced as a transformation in one's identity.
A social group should not be understood as an essence or nature with a
specific set of common attributes. Instead, group identity should be under-
stood in relational terms. Social processes generate groups by creating rela-
tional differentiations, situations of clustering and affective bonding in which
people feel affinity for other people. Sometimes groups define themselves by
despising or excluding others whom they define as other, and whom they
dominate and oppress. Although social processes of affinity and separation
define groups, they do not give groups a substantive identity. There is no
common nature that members of a group have.
As products of social relations, groups are fluid; they come into being
and may fade away. Homosexual practices have existed in many societies and
historical periods, for example, but gay male group identification exists only
in the West in the twentieth century. Group identity may become salient
only under specific circumstances, when in interaction with other groups.
Most people in modern societies have multiple group identifications, more-
over, and therefore groups themselves are not discrete unities. Every group
has group differences cutting across it.
I think that group differentiation is an inevitable and desirable process in
modern societies. We need not settle that question, however. I merely assume
that ours is now a group differentiated society, and that it will continue to
be so for some time to come. Our political problem is that some of our
groups are privileged and others are oppressed.
concept of oppression. IS Briefly, a group is oppressed when one or more
of the following conditions occurs to all or a large portion of its members:
(1) the benefits of their work or energy go to others without those others
237
 (2) they are excluded from par-
and ready to implement such representation when it appears, ,These
tICIpatIOn m maJ?r actIvItIes, whIch in our society means primarily a
workplace (margl?ahzatlOn); (3) they live and work under the authority of siderations are rather academic in our own context, however, smce we
others, and have httle work autonomy and authority over others themselves in a society with deep group oppressions the complete elimination of whIch
(4) as a group they are stereotyped at the same time that
is only a remote possibility,
Social and economic privilege means, among other things, that the groups
theIr situatio,n is in the society in general, and they
which have it behave as though they have a right to speak and be heard, that
have httle and htt!e audIence for the expression of their experi-
ence and perspectIve on, SOCIal events (cultural imperialism); (5) group others treat them as though they have that right, and that they have the
material, personal, and organizational resources that, them to speak
members suffer vlOlence and harassment motivated by group hatred
?r fear, In the Umted States today at least the following groups are oppressed and be heard in public, The privileged are usually not to protect,
further the interests of the oppressed partly because their SOCIal posItIon
m one or, more of these ways: women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos
Puerto RIcans and other Spanish-speaking Americans Asian Americans a' prevents them from understanding those and par,tly because to some
I ' k' ' , gy degree their privilege depends on the contmued oppreSSlOn of, S? a
men, es b,Ians, mg-class people, poor people, old people, and mentall
and phYSICally dIsabled people, :' y major reason for explicit representation of oppressed groups m
and decision making is to undermine oppression, Such group
in sOI?e utopian future there will be a society without group
also exposes in public the specificity of the assumptions and expenence ?f
?PPI and We cannot develop political principles by start-
mg WIth the assumptlOn of a completely just society however but m st b ' the privileged, For unless confronted with different perspectives on SOCIal
f' 'h' h " ',u egm relations and events, different values and language, most people tend to assert
WIt m t e general hlstoncal and social conditions in which we exist.
their own perspective as universal.
ThIS that we mU,st deve!op participatory democratic theory not on the
Theorists and politicians extol the virtues of citizenship because through
assumptIOn of an undIfferentIated humanity, but rather on the assumption
there are group differences and that some groups are actually or poten- public participation persons are called on to transcend merely
tially oppressed or disadvantaged, motivation and acknowledge their dependence on and responsIbIlIty to
, I asse,rt, then, the following principle: a democratic public, however that others, The responsible citizen is concerned not interests
with justice, with acknowledging that each other person s and pomt
IS should provide mechanisms for the effective representation
of view is as good as his or her own, and that the needs and mterests of
recogmtIOn of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its con-
everyone must be voiced and be heard by the others, who must
or disadvantaged within it, Such group
respect, and address those needs and interests, The problem of umversahty
mshtutIOnal and public resources sup-
has occurred when this responsibility has been interpreted as transcendence
PO,I tmg three actIvItIes:, (1) self-orgamzatIOn of group members so that they
into a general perspective, , ,
gal? a of empowerment and a reflective understanding of
I have argued that defining citizenship as generalIty and ,obscures
collectIve and interes,ts in the context of the society; (2)
this requirement that all experiences, needs, and perspectIves on eve?ts
a group s analYSIS of how SOCIal policy proposals affect them, and
have a voice and are respected, A general perspective does not eXIst whIch
pohcy proposals themselves, in institutionalized contexts where
all persons can adopt and from which all experiences and, perspecti:es
?eCISIOn are obliged, to show that they have taken these perspectives
be understood and taken into account. The existence of SOCIal groups ImplIes
mto conslderatI?n; (3) havmg veto power regarding specific policies that
affect a group dIrectly, for example, reproductive rights for women or use different, though not necessarily exclusive, histories, experiences, and perspec-
of reservation lands for Native Americans, ' tives on social life that people have, and it implies that they do not entIrely
understand the experience of other groups, No one can claim to speak in
The principles call for specific representation only for oppressed or dis-
the general interest, because no one of the groups can speak for another,
groups, because privileged groups already are represented, Thus
and certainly no one can speak for them all, Thus the only way to have all
the pnnclple woul? n,ot apply in a society entirely without oppression, I do
not regard the prmclple as merely provisional or instrumental ho group experience and social perspectives v?iced, hear,d, and taken account
bIb ' " wever, of is to have them specifically represented m the publIc,
, eheve group difference in modern complex societies is both
mevltable and desirable, and that wherever there is group difference d'- Group representation is the best means to promote just, outc,omes ,to
d t , , IS democratic decision-making processes, The argument for thIS claIm relIes
a van age or oppressIOn always looms as a possibility, Thus a society should
on Habermas's conception of communicative ethics, In the absence of a
always be commItted to representation for oppressed or disadvantaged groups
Philosopher King who reads transcendent normative verities, the only ground

238
239
 ----". :en\! IS CTTTZENSHIP?
POLITY AND ORO.UP DIFFERENCE

for a c!aim !h!\t a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by
have at least partly or temporarily instituted such publics. Some political
a pu?hc has truly.promoted free expression of all needs and points
organizations, unions, and feminist groups have formal caucuses groups
?f VIew. hIS formulatIon of a communicative ethic, Habermas retains
(such as blacks, Latinos, women, gay men and lesbians, and dIsabled or
an appeal to a universal or impartial point of view from
old people) whose perspectives might be silenced ,wit?out
WhICh claIms m a should be addressed. A communicative ethic that
does not merely articulate a hypothetical public that would j'ustif d .. these organizations have procedures for caucus VOIce m orgalllzatIOn.
b t I' . Y eCIsIOns, sion and caucus representation in decision making, and some orgalllzatIOns
u actua condItions tending to promote just outcomes of decision-
also require representation of members of specific groups. in leadersh.ip
makmg processes, prom?te conditions for the expression of the
bodies. Under the influence of these social movements assertl11g group dIf-
of a!l mdIVIduals III their particularity.16 The concreteness of
ference, during some years even the Democratic party, at national and
lIves, theIr needs and interests, and their perception of the needs
state levels, has instituted delegate rules that include proVISIOns for group
and mterest.s of others, I have argued, are structured partly through group-
representation.
base? expenence and Thus full and free expression of concrete needs
Though its realization is far from assured, the ideal of a "rainbow
and socIal CIrcumstances where some groups are silenced or
coalition" expresses such a heterogeneous public with forms of gro.up repre-
.reqUIres that they have a specific voice in deliberation and
deCISIOn makmg. sentation. The traditional form of coalition corresponds to the Idea of a
unified public that transcends particular differences of experience and
The introduction of such differentiation and particularity into democratic
In traditional coalitions, diverse groups work together for ends whIch they
procedures does not encourage the expression of narrow self-interest· ind d
r t' 'hb ,ee, agree interest or affect them all in a similar way, and they generally.agree
g oup atIOn IS t e est antidote to self-deceiving self-interest masked
that the differences of perspective, interests, or opinion among them WIll not
as an or general interest. In a democratically structured public
surface in the public statements and actions of the coalition. In a rainbow
where is mitigated through group representation, individuals
coalition, by contrast, each of the constituent groups affirms the
?r SImply assert that they want something; they must say that
of the others and affirms the specificity of its experience and perspectIve on
Justice or allows that they have it. Group representation provides
social issues. 17 In the rainbow public, blacks do not simply tolerate the par-
t?e opportulllty some to express their needs or interests who would not
ticipation of gays, labor activists do not grudgingly work peace
hkely be heaI:d WIthout that representation. At the same time the test of
movement veterans, and none of these paternalistically allow feml11Ist par-
a claIm on the public is just, or a mere expression of 'self-interest
ticipation. Ideally, a rainbow coalition affirms the presence and supports
IS best made making it must confront the opinion of
the claims of each of the oppressed groups or political movements constitut-
explICItly dIfferent, though not necessarily conflicting, experiences
ing it, and it arrives at a political program not by voicing some ':principles
and needs. As a person of social privilege, I am not likely to
of unity" that hide differences but rather by allowing .each c?nstItuen.cy to
of and have a regard for social justice unless I am forced to
lIsten to the VOIce of those my privilege tends to silence. analyze economic and social issues from the perspectIve of ItS.
This implies that each group maintains autonomy in relating t? ItS constItu-
best institutionalizes fairness under circumstances
ency, and that decision-making bodies and procedures proVIde for group
of SOCIal oppreSSIOn and domination. But group representation also maximizes
representation. . .
knowled?e expressed in discussion, and thus promotes practical wisdom.
To the degree that there are heterogeneous publics operatmg
Group not only different needs, interests, and goals, but
to the principles of group representation in contemporary.
Important dIfferent social locations and experiences from
exist only in organizations and movements resisting polItIcs.
whIch SOCIal. facts and policies are understood. Members of different social
Nevertheless, in principle participatory democracy entaIls to
are lIkely to different things about the structure of social rela-
institutions of a heterogeneous public in all spheres of democratic deCISIOn
tI?ns and potentIal and actual effects of social policies. Because of their
making. Until and unless group oppression or disadvantages are
hIstory, theIr group-sp.ecific values or modes of expression, their relationship
political publics, including democratized workplaces and government declsIOn-
other groups, the kIlld of they do, so on, different groups have
making bodies, should include the specific representation of those
ways of understandmg the meanl11g of social events, which can
contnbute to the others' understanding if expressed and heard groups, through which those groups express their specific understandmg of
the issues before the public and register a group-based vote. Such structures
social movements in recent years have some
of group representation should not replace structures of regional or party
pohtIcal practices committed to the idea of a heterogeneous public and th
. , ey representation but should exist alongside them.

240
241

of group representation in national politics in
yn!ted States, or m restructured democratic publics within particular
such as factories, offices, universities, churches, and social service
agencIes, would require creative thinking and flexibility. There are no models
to follow. European models of consociational democratic institutions for
example, be taken outside of the contexts in which they have evoived,
and even wIthIn. them they do not operate in a very democratic fashion.
Reports ?f with publicly institutionalized self-organization among
mdIgenous peoples, workers, peasants, and students in contemporary
o!fer an example closer to the conception I am advocating. IS
The. pnncIple of group representation calls for such structures of repre-
sentatIOn oppressed or. disadvantaged groups. But what groups
Clear candIdates for group representation in policy making
m the States are women, blacks, Native Americans, old people, poor
people, dIsabled people, gay men and lesbians, Spanish-speaking Americans,
young peop.le, and nonpro.fessional workers. But it may not be necessary to
ensure specIfic representatIOn of all these groups in all public contexts and
in all policy discussions. Representation should be designated whenever
group's histOl!' and social situation provide a particular perspective on the
Issues, when the mterests of its members are specifically affected and when
its perceptions and interests are not likely to receive expression V:ithout that
representation.
An origin problem emerges in proposing a principle such as this which
no argument. can solve. To implement this principle; public
to decIde which groups deserve specific representation
What ;?e principles guiding the composi-
tIOn of such a constltutlOnal conventlon ? Who should decide what groups
should receive representation, and by what procedures should this decision
No program or set of principles can found a politics, because
pohtIcs IS a process in which we are already engaged; principles can
be t? the of political discussion, they can be accepted by
a pubhc as gUldmg theu' actIOn. I propose a principle of group representation
as a part of such potential discussion, but it cannot replace that discussion
or determine its outcome.
What should be the mechanisms of group representation? Earlier I stated
that the of the group is one of the aspects of a principle
of g.roup .. Members of the group must meet together in demo-
to dISCUSS Issues and formulate group positions and proposals.
ThIS pnncIple of group representation should be understood as part of a
larger program for democratized decision-making processes. Public life and
processes should be transformed so that all citizens have
sIgmficantly greater opportunities for participation in discussion and decision
making. All citizens should have access to neighborhood or district assemblies
where they participate in discussion and decision making. In such a more
242
POLITY AND GROUP DIFFERENCE
participatory democratic scheme, members of oppressed would also
have group assemblies, which would delegate group
One might well ask how the idea of a heterogeneous pubhc whIch enco.ur-
ages sdf-organization of groups and structures of group
in decision making is different from the interest group plurahsm cnttcIsm
which I endorsed earlier in this article. First, in the heterogeneous public not
any collectivity of persons that chooses to form an counts a
candidate for group representation. Only those groups that descnbe the
identities and major status relationships constituting the society or partIcular
institution and which are oppressed or disadvantaged, deserve specific rep-
in a heterogeneous public. In the structures of interest group
pluralism, Friends of the Whales, the National Association for the
ment of Colored People, the National Rifle Association, and the NatIOnal
Freeze Campaign all have the same status, and each influences decision
making to the degree that their resources and ingenuity can win out t.he
competition for policymakers' ears. While democratic politics must maXImIze
freedom of the expression of opinion and interest, that is a different issue
from ensuring that the perspective of all groups has a voice.
Second, in the heterogeneous public the groups represented are not defined
by some particular interest or goal, or some particular political
Social groups are comprehensive identities and ways of life. Because of theIr
experiences their members may have some common interests that t.11ey seek
to press in the public. Their social location, however, tends to gIve them
distinctive understandings of all aspects of the society and unique perspec-
tives on social issues. For example, many Native Americans argue that their
traditional religion and relation to land gives them a unique and important
understanding of environmental problems.
Finally, interest group pluralism operates precisely to forestall the emergence
of public discussion and decision making. Each group
only its specific interest as thoroughly and forcefully as It can, and It need
not consider the other interests competing in the political marketplace except
strategically, as potential allies or adversaries in the pursuit of its own. The
rules of interest group pluralism do not require justifying one's interest as
right or as compatible with social justice. A heterogeneous public, however,
is a public, where participants discuss together the issues before them .and
are supposed to come to a decision that they determine as best or most Just.
m. Universal rights and special rights
A second aspect of the universality of citizenship is today in tension with
the goal of full inclusion and participation of all groups in .P?litical and
social institutions: universality in the formulation of law and pohcles. Modern
and contemporary liberalism hold as basic the principle that the rules. and
policies of the state, and in contemporary liberalism also the rules of pnvate
243
 "ILn:I III Cl I IZENSHIP1

ought to be blind to race, gender, and other group differences.
The pubhc realm of the state and law properly should express its rules in
terms that from the particularities of individual and group
needs, and SItuations to recognize all persons equally and treat all
CItizens m the same way.
As long as political ideology and practice persisted in defining some groups
as unworthy equal status because of supposedly natural differ-
enc.es whIte male CItizens, it was important for emancipatory movements
to mSlst that are the same in respect of their moral worth and
Cltl.zenshlp. In this context, demands for equal rights that are
blmd to glOuP dIfferences were the only sensible way to combat exclusion
and degradatlon.
Today, however, the social consensus is that all persons are of equal moral
and deserve With the near achievement of equal
llghts all wIth the Important exception of gay men and lesbians,
remain. Under these circumstances many
femIlllsts,
d black
.. . hberatIon actiVIsts, and others struggling for the f u11'mc1USIOn.
an partlClp,atIOn of a.l1 in this society's institutions and positions of
power, rewald, and satisfactIOn, argue that rights and rules that are universally
a,nd thus .blind to of race, culture, gender, age, or
dlsablhty, pelpetuate lather than undermme oppression.
Contemporary movements seeking full inclusion and participation
oppressed .and groups now find themselves faced with a
dIlemma of dIfference. On the one hand, they must continue to deny that
there are any essential differences between men and women whites and bl k
c
a?le-bodied and disabled people, which justify denying black: os;.
dIsabled. people t?e opportunity to do anything that others ar: free to' do
or to be mcluded m any institution or position. On the other hand the h
fo nd 't
u
t fn
1 necessary 0 a rm that there are often group-based differences
' y ave
between men v.,'0men, whites and blacks, able-bodied and disabled people
that make.. fIapplIcatIOn. . of a strict principle of equal treatment , espeCla . 11y m.
or pOSItions, unfair because these differences put those groups
a example, white middle-class men as a group are social-
Ized mto the behavIOral styles of a particular kind of articulateness coolness
and compete?t authoritativeness that are most rewarded in and
managenal It.fe. To the degree that there are group differences that dis-
advantage, faIrness seems to call for acknowledging rather than b' bI' d
to them. emg m
in many respects the law is now blind to group differences, the
SOCIety IS not, and some groups continue to be marked as deviant and
the In everyday interactions, images, and decision making, assumptio::
contmue to be made about women, blacks, Latinos, gay men, lesbians, old
people, and marked groups, which continue to justify exclusions avoid-
ances, paternalIsm, and authoritarian treatment. Continued racist,' sexist,
homophobic, ageist, and ableist behaviors and institutions create
circumstances for these groups, usually disadvantaging them in theIr oppor-
tunity to develop their capacities and giving them particular experiences
and knowledge. Finally, in part because they have been a?d
excluded from one another, and in part because they have partIcular hlstones
and traditions, there are cultural differences among social groups---differences
in language, style of living, body comportment and gesture, values, and
perspectives 011 society.. . .. ..
Acknowledging group dIfference m capaCIties, needs, culture, and
styles poses a problem for those seeking .to eliminate only If dIf-
ference is understood as deviance or defiCIency. Such understandmg presumes
that some capacities, needs, culture, or cognitive styles are normal. I suggested
earlier that their privilege allows dominant groups to assert their experience
of and perspective on social events as impartial and objective. In a similar
fashion, their privilege allows some groups to project their group-base? cap-
acities, values, and cognitive and behavioral styles as the norm to WhICh all
persons should be expected to conform. Feminists in particular have argued
that most contemporary workplaces, especially the most desirable, presume
a life rhythm and behavioral style typical of men, and that women are
expected to accommodate to the workplace expectations that assume those
norms.
Where group differences in capacities, values, and behavioral or cognitive
styles exist, equal treatment in the allocation of reward according to rules
of merit composition will reinforce and perpetuate disadvantage. Equal
ment requires everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but m
fact there are no "neutral" norms of behavior and performance. Where some
groups are privileged and others oppressed, the formulation of law,
and the rules of private institutions tend to be biased in favor of the pnVI-
leged groups, because their particular experience implicitly sets the norm.
Thus where there are group differences in capacities, socialization, values,
and cognitive and cultural styles, only attending to such differences can
able the inclusion and participation of all groups in political and econorruc
institutions. This implies that instead of always formulating rights and rules
in universal terms that are blind to difference, some groups sometimes deserve
special rights. 20 In what follows, I shall review several contexts of contem-
porary policy debate where I argue such special rights for oppressed or
disadvantaged groups are appropriate.
The issue of a right to pregnancy and maternity leave, and the right to
special treatment for nursing mothers, is highly controversial among feminists
today. I do not intend here to wind through the intricacies of what has
a conceptually challenging and interesting debate in legal theory. As. Lmda
Krieger argues, the issue of rights for pregnant and birthing mothers m
tion to the workplace has created a paradigm crisis for our understandmg
of sexual equality, because the application of a principle of equal treatment

244 245

WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
on this issue has yielded results whose effects on women are at best ambigu-
ous and at worst detrimenta1. 21
. my.vie": an equal treatment approach on this issue is inadequate because
It eIther n?t receive any right to leave and job security
when havmg babIes, or It aSSImIlates such guarantees under a supposedly
gender neutral category of "disability." Such assimilation is unacceptable
because pregnancy and childbirth are normal conditions of normal women
themselves as socially necessary work, and they have unique and
v?nable and needs. 22 Assimilating pregnancy into disability
gIves a negatIve to these processes as "unhealthy." It suggests, more-
?ver, that. pnmary only reason that a woman has a right to leave and
Job secunty IS that IS physically unable to work at her job, or that doing
so woul? more than when she is not pregnant and recovering
chtldbllth. WhIle these are important reasons, depending on the indi-
vIdual woman, another reason is that she ought to have the time to establish
breastfeeding and develop a relationship and routine with her child, if she
chooses.
The pregnancy leave debate has been heated and extensive because both
feminists and nonfeminists tend to think of biological sex difference as the
most fundamental and irradicable difference. When difference slides into
deviance, stigma, and disadvantage, this impression can engender the fear that
sexual is not attainable. I think it is important to emphasize that
reproductIOn IS by no means the only context in which issues of same versus
different treatment arise. It is not even the only context where it arises for
issues .bodily The last twenty years have seen significant
success m wmnmg special nghts for persons with physical and mental dis-
Here !s a clear where promoting equality in participation and
lllclusl0n reqUlres attendlllg to the particular needs of different groups.
Another bodily difference which has not been as widely discussed in law
?nd policy literature, but should be, is age. With increasing numbers of will-
lllg and able old people marginalized in our society, the issue of mandatory
retirement has been increasingly discussed. This discussion has been muted
serious. of working rights for all people able and
wl11111g to work Imphes major restructuring of the allocation of labor in an
economy already socially volatile levels of unemployment. Forcing people
out of t?elr .w?rkplaces .solely on account of their age is arbitrary and unjust.
Yet I thmk It IS also unjust to require old people to work on the same terms
as younger Old people should have different working rights. When
they reach a certam age they should be allowed to retire and receive income
benefits. If they wish to continue working, they should be allowed more
flexible and part-time schedules than most workers currently have.
. of special rights in the workplace-pregnancy and
blrthmg, physIcal dlsablhty, and being old-has its own purposes and struc-
tures. They all challenge, however, the same paradigm of the "normal, healthy"
246
- l
POLITY AND GROU,P DIFFERENCE
worker and "typical work situation." In each case the circumstance that calls
for different treatment should not be understood as lodged in the differently
treated workers, per se, but in their interaction with the structure and norms
of the· workplace. Even in cases such as these, that is, difference does not
have its source in natural, unalterable, biological attributes, but in the rela-
tionship of bodies to conventional rules and practices. In each case the
political claim for special rights emerges not from a need to compensate for
an inferiority, as some would interpret it, but from a positive assertion of
specificity in different forms of life. 23
Issues of difference arise for law and policy not only regarding bodily
being, but just as importantly for cultural integrity and invisibility. By
I mean group-specific phenomena of behavior, temperament, or meamng.
Cultural differences include phenomena of language, speaking style or dia-
lectic, body comportment, gesture, social practices, values, group-specific
socialization, and so on. To the degree that groups are culturally different,
however, equal treatment in many issues of social policy is unjust because it
denies these cultural differences or makes them a liability. There are a vast
number of issues where fairness involves attention to cultural differences and
their effects, but I shall briefly discuss three: affirmative action, comparable
worth, and bilingual, bicultural education and service.
Whether they involve quotas or not, affirmative action programs violate
a principle of equal treatment because they are race or gender conscious in
setting criteria for school admissions, jobs, or promotions. These policies are
usually defended in one of two ways. Giving preference to race or gender is
understood either as just compensation for groups that have suffered dis-
crimination in the past, or as compensation for the present disadvantage
24
these groups suffer because of that history of discrimination and exclusion.
I do not wish to quarrel with either of these justifications for the differential
treatment based on race or gender implied by affirmative action policies.
I want to suggest that in addition we can understand affirmative action
policies as compensating for the cultural biases of standards and evaluators
used by the schools or employers. These standards and evaluators reflect at
least to some degree the specific life and cultural experience of dominant
groups-whites, Anglos, or men. In a group-differentiated society, moreover,
the development of truly neutral standards and evaluations is difficult or
impossible, because female, black, or Latino cultural experience and the
dominant cultures are in many respects not reducible to a common measure.
Thus affirmative action policies compensate for the dominance of one set of
cultural attributes. Such an interpretation of affirmative action locates the
"problem" that affirmative action solves partly in the understandable biases
of evaluators and their standards, rather than only in specific differences of
the disadvantaged group.
Although they are not a matter of different treatment as such, comparable
worth policies similarly claim to challenge cultural biases in traditional
247
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
in of female-dominated occupations, and in doing so
reqUlre attendmg to dIfferences. Schemes of equal pay for work of compar-
able require that predominantly male and predominantly female jobs
have sImIlar wage structures if they involve similar degrees of skill, difficulty,
stress, and so on. The problem in implementing these policies of course lies
in designing methods of comparing the jobs, which often ar: very diffe;ent.
Most schemes of comparison choose to minimize sex differences by using
supposedly criteria, such as educational attainment, speed of
work, It mvolves manipulation of symbols, decision making, and so
on. Some wnters have suggested, however, that standard classifications of
job traits may be systematically biased to keep specific kinds of tasks involved
in many female-dominated occupations hidden.25 Many female-dominated
occupat.ions gender-specific kinds of lab or-such as nurturing,
smoothmg over socIal relations, or the exhibition of sexuality-which most
task observation ignores. 26 A fair assessment of the skills and complexity of
many female-dominated jobs may therefore involve paying explicit attention
to gender differences in kinds of jobs rather than applying gender-blind
categories of comparison.
. linguistic and cultural minorities ought to have the right to main-
tam then language and culture and at the same time be entitled to all the
of as as valuable education and career opportunities.
ThIS nght ImplIes a pOSItIve obligation on the part of governments and
other public bodies to print documents and to provide services in the native
of recognized linguistic minorities, and to provide bilingual instruc-
tIon m schools. Cultural assimilation should not be a condition of full social
participation, because it requires a person to transform his or her sense of
identity, and when it is realized on a group level it means altering or anni-
hilating the group's identity. This principle does not apply to any persons
who do majority language or culture within a society, but
only to ImgUlstIc or cultural minorities living in distinct though not
necessanly In the United States, then, special rights
for cultural mmontIes applIes at least to Spanish-speaking Americans and
Native Americans.
The universalist finds a contradiction in asserting both that formerly
groups have a right to inclusion and that these groups have a
nght to dIfferent treatment. There is no contradiction here however if
a.ttending.to difference is necessary in order to make and
SlOn possIble. Groups with different circumstances or forms of life should
toget?er in public institutions without shedding their
dIstmct or suffenng disadvantage because of them. The goal is
not to gIve specIal compensation to the deviant until they achieve normality,
?ut rather to the way institutions formulate their rules by reveal-
mg the plural CIrcumstances and needs that exist, or ought to exist, within
them.
248
POLITY AND GROUP DIFFERENCE
Many opponents of oppression and privilege are wary of claims for special
rights because they fcar a restoration of special classifications that can justify
exclusion and stigmatization of the specially marked groups. Such fear has
been particularly pronounced among feminists who oppose affirming sexual
and gender difference in law and policy. It would be foolish for me to deny
that this fear has some significant basis.
Such fear is founded, however, on accession to traditional identification
of group difference with deviance, stigma, and inequality. Contemporary
movements of oppressed groups, however, assert a positive meaning to group
difference, by which a group claims its identity as a group and rejects the
stereotypes and labeling by which others mark it as inferior or inhuman.
These social movements engage the meaning of difference itself as a terrain
of political struggle, rather than leave difference to be used to justify exclu-
sion and subordination. Supporting policies and rules that attend to group
difference in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage is, in my
opinion, a part of that struggle.
Fear of claims to special rights points to a connection of the principle of
group representation with the principle of attending to difference in policy.
The primary means of defense from the use of special rights to oppress or
exclude groups is the self-organization and representation of those groups.
If oppressed and disadvantaged groups are able to discuss among themselves
what procedures and policies they judge will best further their social and
political equality, and have access to mechanisms to make their judgments
known to the larger public, then policies that attend to difference are less
likely to be used against them than for them. If they have the institutionalized
right to veto policy proposals that directly affect them, and them primarily,
moreover, such danger is further reduced.
In this article I have distinguished three meanings of universality that
have usually been collapsed in discussions of the universality of citizenship
and the public realm. Modern politics properly promotes the universality of
citizenship in the sense of the inclusion and participation of everyone in
public life and democratic processes. The realization of genuinely universal
citizenship in this sense today is impeded rather than furthered by the com-
monly held conviction that when they exercise their citizenship, persons should
adopt a universal point of view and leave behind the perceptions they derive
from their particular experience and social position. The full inclusion and
participation of all in law and public life is also sometimes impeded by
formulating laws and rules in universal terms that apply to all citizens in the
same way.
In response to these arguments, some people have suggested to me that
such challenges to the ideal of universal citizenship threaten to leave no basis
for rational normative appeals. Normative reason, it is suggested, entails
universality in a Kantian sense: when a person claims that something is good
or right he or she is claiming that everyone in principle could consistently
249
 .............. ... ...... t rULIIL
make that claim" and that everyone should accept it. This refers to a fourth
of universality, more epistemological than political. There may
tn?eed be for questioning a Kantian-based theory of the univers-
of reason, but this is a different issue from the substantive
pohttcallssues I have addresse<l here, and the arguments in this paper neither
Imply nor exclude such a possibility. In any case, I do not believe that chal-
lenging the i?eal of a unified public or the claim that rules should always be
umversal subverts the possibility of making rational normative
clatms.
Notes
Lowi:s classic .an.alysis of the privatized operations of interest group
hberahsm remams descnptIVe of American politics; see The End of Liberalism
1969). For more recent analyses, see Jiirgen Habermas,
LegllllnatlOl1 CrISIS Beacon, 1973); Claus Offe, Contradictions of the
Welfare State (Cambndge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984); John Keane Public Life in
Late Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984); Benjamin 'Barber Strong
Democracy (Berk.eley: University of California Press, 1984). ' D. Cornell (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 56-76.
2 For an recent account of the virtues of and conditions for such
democracy, see Phlhp Green, Retrieving Democracy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1985).
3 Barber and Keane both appeal to Rousseau's understanding of civic activity as
a model .for contemporary participatory democracy, as does Carole Pateman in
her. work, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
Press, 1970). (Pateman's position has, of course, changed.) See also
MlIler, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1984).
4 Many who.extol th.e virtues of the civic public, of course, appeal also to a model
of the. pohs. For a recent example, see Murray Bookchin, The Rise of
UrballlzatlOl? the Decline of Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
1987). In this however,.I choose to restrict my claims to modern political
thought. The Idea of the ancient Greek polis often functions in both modern
and contemporary discussion as a myth of lost origins, the paradise from which
we .have fallen an.d to which we desire to return; in this way, appeals to the
ancient. Greek pohs are often contained within appeals to modern ideas of civic
huma111sm.
5 a most detailed and sophisticated analysis of the virtues
of the as a flight from sexual difference through a reading of the texts
of Machtavelh; see Fort/me Is a Woman (Berkeley: University of California Press
1984). Carole Pateman's recent writing also focuses on such analysis. See:
e.g., Carole Pateman, The Social Contract (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1988). See also Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power (New York:
Longman, 1983), chaps. 7 and 8.
6 See Okin,. "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family," Philosophy
and Pubilc Affmrs 11 (1982): 65-88; see also Linda Nicholson Gender and His-
tor):: Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family York: Columbia
U111verslty Press, 1986).
7 For analyses of Rousseau's treatment of women, see Susan Okin Women in
Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press, 1978);
250
L"1I""IIJ UKVUI LlIZOlLI,"LlI.VLi
Lynda Lange, "Rousseau: Women and the General Will," in The Sexism of
and Political Theory, ed. Lorenne M. G. Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: U111-
versity of Tornoto Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), chap. 4. Mary Dietz
an· astute critique of Elshtain's "maternalist" perspective on political theory; m
so doing, however, she also seems to appeal to a universalist ideal of the civic
public in which women will transcend their particular concerns and become gen-
eral; see "Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking,"
Political Theory 13 (1985): 19-37. On Rousseau on women, see also Joel Schwartz,
The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984).
8 See Ronald Takaki, Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th Century America
(New York: Knopf, 1979). Don Herzog discusses the exclusionary prejudices of
some other early American republicans; see "Some Questions for Republicans,"
Political Theory 14 (1986): 473-93.
9 George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality (New York: Fertig, 1985).
10 Barber, chaps. 8 and 9. Future page references in parentheses are to this book.
11 I have developed this account more thoroughly in my paper, Iris Marion Young,
"Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques
of Moral and Political Theory," in Feminism as Critique, ed. S. Benhabib and
12 On feminism and participatory democracy, see Pateman.
13 Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversarial Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
14 Amy Gutmann, Liberal Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
pp. 191-202.
15 See Iris Marion Young, "Five Faces of Oppression," Philosophical Forum (1988),
in press.
16 Jiirgen Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon,
1983), pt. 3. For criticism of Habermas as retaining too universalist a conception
of communicative action, see Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and Young, "Impartiality and the
Civic Public."
17 The Mel King for mayor campaign organization exhibited the promise of such
group representation in practice, which was only partially and haltingly realized;
see special double issue of Radical America 17, no. 6, and 18, no. I (1984).
Sheila CoIlins discusses how the idea of a rainbow coalition challenges traditional
American political assumptions of a "melting pot," and she shows how lack of
coordination between the national level rainbow departments and the grassroots
campaign committees prevented the 1984 Jackson campaign from realizing the
promise of group representation; see The Rainbow Challenge: The Jackson Cam-
paign and the Future of us. Politics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986).
18 See Gary Ruchwarger, People in Power: Forging a Grassroots Democracy in
Nicaragua (Hadley, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey, 1985).
19 Martha Minow, "Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and
Special Education," Law and Contemporary Problems, no. 48 (1985), pp. 157-211.
20 I use the term "special rights" in much the same way as Elizabeth Wolgast, in
Equality and the Rights of Women (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980).
Like Wolgast, I wish to distinguish a class of rights that all persons should have,
general rights, and a class of rights that categories of persons should have by
virtue of particular circumstances. That is, the distinction should refer only to
different levels of generality, where "special" means only "specific." Unfortunately,
"special rights" tends to carry a connotation of exceptional, that is, specially
251
 ---- -----------------
WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?

marked and deviating from the norm. As I assert however the oal is not
to c?mpensate f?r defici.encies in order to help people "normal," bur to denor-
tl?,at. m certam contexts and at certain levels of abstraction everyone
as specla ng h ts.
14
21 1. Krie,ger, ':Through a ,?Iass Darkly: Paradigms of Equality and the Search
Hypatia: A Jotlr1!al of Feminist Philosophy 2 (1987): CITIZENSHIP AND
. .' e Ola Rhode provides an excellent synopsis of the dilemmas involved
III pregnancy debate in feminist legal theory in "Justice and Gender" (t
scnpt), chap. 9. ype-
NATIONAL IDENTITY
22 See Scales,
375-444.
Feminist Jurisprudence," Indiana Law Journal 56
Little ton provides a very good analysis of the feminist
Some reflections on the future of Europe
ebate about. equal different treatment regarding pregnancy and childbirth
?thel legal Issues for women, in "Reconstructin Sexu I . ,;
Califorma Law Review 25 (1987)' 1279-1337 L'ttl t
b h .'
g a EqualIty,
. I e on suggests, as I have stated Jiirgen Habermas
ab' t fat onbly . the male conception of work keeps and
I.r mg rom emg conceived of as work.
23 suggests that difference should be understood not as a characteristic of
Source: Praxis International, 12:1 (1992), 1-9.
ICU but of the interaction of particular sorts of eo le
with specIfic mstltutlOnal structures. Minow expresses a similar point b p P
that difference should be understood as a function of the relationshi y saymg
groups, rather than located in attributes of a particular group p among
24 For among many discussions of such "backward and "forward
lookmg arguments, see Bernard Boxill, Blacks and Social Justice (Totowa N J .
Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), chap. 7. ' ... Until the middle of the eighties, history seemed to be gradually entering that
25 See R ..W Beatty and 1. R. Beatty, "Some Problems with Con tern oral' Job crystalline state known as posth isto ire, to use Arnold Gehlen's term to describe
EvaluatIOn Systems," and Ronnie Steinberg "A Want of H . pp Y.
UT D' " .
on .. age IscnmmatlOn and Comparable Worth" both' C
' armony. erspectJves
bl
that strange feeling that tout fa change mais rien ne va plus. In the iron grip
d Wi. D' " . ' m ompara e Worth
c;: . Technical Possibilities and Political Realities ed H I of systemic constraints, all possibilities seemed to have been exhausted, all
alternatives frozen dead, and all avenues still open to have become meaning-
emlC (PhIladelphia: Temple University Press 1981)' D J T '. . e edn
H I H t d ' , . . relman an
· d' ar mann, e s., Women. Work and Wages (Washington DC' Nat' I l6fs. This mood has changed in the meantime. History has become mobilized;
A ca. emy Press, 1981), p. 81. ' '" IOna
it is accelerating, even overheating. The new problems are shifting old per-
26 "Gendered Job Traits and Women's Occupations" (Ph D diss spectives and, what is more important, opening up new perspectives for the
Umverslty of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, 1987). ""
future, points of view that restore our ability to perceive alternative courses
of action.
Three historical currents of our contemporary period, once again in flux,
touch upon the relation between citizenship and national identity. First, the
issue of the future of the nation state has unexpectedly become topical in
the wake of German unification, the liberation of the East Central European
states and the nationality conflicts that are breaking out throughout Eastern
Europe. Second, the fact that the states of the European Community are
gradually growing together, especially with the impending caesura which will
be created by the introduction of a common market in 1993, sheds some
light on the relation between nation state and democracy, for the democratic
processes that have gone hand in hand with the nation state lag hopelessly
behind the supranational form taken by economic integration. Third, the
tremendous influx' of immigration from the poor regions of the East and
South with which Europe will be increasingly confronted in the coming
years lend the problem of asylum seekers a new significance and urgency.
This process exacerbates the conflict between the universalistic principles of

252 253
 VV fiJ\ I r:S-CITTZENSHIP?
democracies on the one hand and the particularistic claims of
commullltles to preserve the integrity of their habitual ways of life on the
other.
These topics offer an occasion for the conceptual clarification of some
normative perspectives through which we can hopefully gain a better under-
standing of the complex relation between citizenship and national identity.
I. The past and future of the nation state
Recent in the Eastern European countries have given
a new tWist to the m t.he former Federal RepUblic on the gradual
of postnatlOnal society. I Many German intellectuals have com-
plamed about the democratic deficit incurred by a process of unification that
at an administrative and economic level than by
enhstmg the partiCipatIOn of the citizens; they now find themselves accused
of . arrogance." The controversy as to the form and speed of
has not only been fuelled by contradictory feelings, but also by
thoughts and concepts. One side conceived of the five new states'
Jommg the Federal Republic as restoring the unity of a nation state torn
four ago. viewpoint, the nation constitutes the pre-
umty a commulllty with a shared common historical destiny. The
other the political unification as restoring democracy and
a constitutIOnal state a territory where civil rights had been suspended in
one form or another smce 1933. From this viewpoint, what used to be West
was n.o less a nation of citizens than is the new Federal Republic.
With repubbcan term "nation state" is stripped of precisely those
prepohtlcal connotatIOns with which the expression was laden in modern
Europe .. the connections between national citizenship
and natIOnal Identity takes mto account that the classic form of the nation
state is at present disintegrating. This is confirmed by a glance back to its
rise in early modern times.
In modern Europe, the premodern form of empire which used to unite
peoples re,?ained rather unstable - as in the cases of the Holy Roman
Empire or the Russian and Ottoman empires. 2 A different, federal form of
state from the belt of Central European cities in what was formerly
the heart of the Carolingian Empire. It was, in particular, in
SWitzerland where a federation sprang up strong enough to balance the
ethnic tensions within a multicultural association of citizens. However it
was only the territorial states with a central administration that exerted a
structuring influence on the system of European states. In the sixteenth
century, kingdoms ga:e birth to those territorial states - such as England,
France, Portugal, Spam and Sweden - which were later on, in the course of
democratization in line with the French example, gradually transformed into
nation states. This state formation secured the overall conditions under which
254
- l
CITizENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
capitalism was then able to develop worldwide. The nation state provided
both the infrastructure for rational administration and the legal frame for
free individual and collective action. Moreover, and it is this which
interest us here, *e nation lai.d the foundations !or cultural and
homogeneity on the basis of which It then proved possible to push ahead with
the democratization of government since the late eighteenth century,
this was achieved at the cost of excluding ethnic minorities. The natIOn state
and democracy are twins born out of the French Revolution. From a cultural
point of view, both have been growing in the shadow of nationalism.
Nationalism is the term for a specifically modern phenomenon of cultural
iptegration. This type of c?nsciousness is in social /
inents and emerges from modernizatIOn processes at a time when people ale
at once both mobilized and isolated as individuals. is a of
collective consciousness which both presupposes a refleXIve appropnatlOn
of cultural traditions that have been filtered through historiography and
which spreads only via the channels of modern mass Both
elements lend to nationalism the artifical traits of somethmg that to a
certain extent a construct, thus rendering it by definition susceptible to
manipulative misuse by political elites.
The history of the term "nation" mirrors in a peculiar way. the
of the nation state. 3 For the Romans, natio is the Goddess of Buth and
Natio refers, like gens and populus and unlike civitas, to peoples and tnbes
who were not yet organized in political associations; indeed, the
used it to refer to "savage," "barbaric" or "pagan" peoples. In thIS claSSIC
usage, therefore, nations are communities of people of the same .descent, who
are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements or
and culturally by their common language, customs and tradItI?ns,. but wh.o
are not yet politically integrated in the form of ThIS
meaning persists throughout the Middle Ages and m
times. Even Kant still maintains that "that group WhICh recogmzes Itself as
being gathered together in a society due to common descent shall be
a nation (gens)." Yet since the middle of the eighteenth century, the dIffer-
ences in meaning between "Nation" and "Staatsvolk," that is, and
"politically organized people," have gradually been disappeanng. the
French Revolution, the nation even became the source of state sovereignty,
e.g., in the thought of Sieyes. Each nation is now supposed to be granted
the right to political self-determination. Indeed, in century, the
conservative representatives of the German HIstoncal School equated
the principle of nationality with the "principle of revolution .." .
The meaning of the term "nation" thus changed from a
political entity to something that was supposed to play a role m
defining the political identity of the citizen within a In
final instance the manner in which national identity determmes cItizenship
can in fact b; reversed. Thus the gist of Ernest Renan's famous saying, "the
255
 -------wHAT- IS CITIZENSHIP?
CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
existence of a nation is a d'l I " .
nationalism After 1871 R'" al y p eblsclte," IS already directed against historical pact; it provides an abstract model for the very mode of how pol-
. . , enan was only able to cou t th G
claims to the Alsace by referring to the inh b' ,n er e Empire's itical authority is cOIistituted and legitimated. The intention is to purge the
he could conceive of the "nat'" a French natIOnality because remining strands of violentia from the auctoritas of the state's powers. In this
IOn as a natI f' .
citizens. does not derive its identit from s on 0 cItizens. !he nation of conception, to take Kant's words, "legislation can only issue from the con-
properties, but rather from the y. f common e.thnlc and cultural curring and unified will of everyone, to the extent that each decides the same
civil rights. At this J'unctuI'e the praxbls .0 cItizens who actively exercise their about all and that all decide the same about each ... "
, repu l ICan strand of"'f h"
parts company with the idea of belon ll1g . . .lZens lp' completely This concept of popular sovereignty does not refer to some substantive
grated on the basis of descent h .gd tod.a. pIepolitIcal community inte- collective will which would owe its identity to a prior homogeneity of descent
·
V lewed , a sale tra ItlOn and a I
from this end the initial f ' f common anguage. or form of life. The consensus achieved in the course of argument in an asso-
· '
on Iy f unctlOned as a catalyst. uSlOn 0 republicanism 'th .
WI natIOnalism . ciation of free and equal citizens stems in the final instance from an
The nationalism which was ins ired b . identically applied procedure recognized by all. This procedure for political
romantic writers founded a coIl t' P 'd the works of hIstorians and will formation assumes a differentiated form in the constitution of a demo-
fi h' ec Ive 1 entIty that played fi . cratic state. Thus, in a pluralistic society, the constitution lends expression
or t e Implementation of the cif h' h a unctlOnal role
In the melting-pot of national lp t at arose in the French Revolution. to aformal consensus. The citizens wish to organize their peaceful coexistence
. . SClOusness the ascriptiv fi t in line with principles which meet with the justified agreement of all because
ongll1 were now transformed int . t ' . e ea ures of one's
f ' 0 JUS so many achIeved pro'f .
rom a reflexIve appropriation of tradition H ' . pe! resultll1g they are in the equal interest of all. Such an association is structured by
to an acquired nationalism that' t . eredltary natIOnality gave way relations of mutual recognition, and given these relations, everyone can expect
t . '. , I S , 0 a product of one's . to be respected by everybody else as free and equal. Everyone should be in
s 1'IVll1g. ThIs nationalism was able to f i . " . own conscIOUS
role which demanded a high d f osteI people s IdentIfication with a a position to expect that all will receive equal protection and respect in his
point of self-sacrifice; in this res 0 personal even to the or her violable integrity as a unique individual, as a member of an ethnic or
side of the civil rights coin Naf. ' rneraldconsc1'lPtIon was only the other cultural group and as a citizen, i.e., as a member of a polity. This idea of a
willingness to fight and if n IOna lsm. an republicanism combine in the self-determining political community has taken on concrete legal shape in
' ecessary, d le for one's c t Th'
the complementary relation of mut I . fi oun ry. IS explains a variety of constitutions, in fact, in all political systems of Western Europe
between nationalism and republ' rell1 orcement that originally obtains and the United States.
lcalllsm the one becom' th .
the emergence of the other. ' Il1g e vehICle for For a long time, however, "Staatsbiirgerschaft," "citoyennete" or "citizen-
However, this socio-psycholo'lCa I . ship" all only meant, in the language of the law, political membership. It is
are linked in conceptual terms gc does not mean that the two only recently that the concept has been expanded to cover the status of
. d . ompare reedom" in the f' citizens defined in terms of civil rights. s Citizenship as membership in a state
111 ependence, i.e., collective self-assertion . , . h 0 natIOnal
d ". th VIs-a-VIS ot er natIOns 'th "f only assigns a particular person to a particular nation whose existence is
om 111 e sense of those political rb'f h' " ' Wl ree-
within a country' the two notl'o . I t e. Il1dlvldual citizen enjoys recognized in terms of international law. This definition of membership
. ' ns ale so luerent 111 mea . th
pomt, the modern understanding of bI' fl nmg at, at a later serves, along with the territorial demarcation of the country's borders, the
links to the womb of the national repu. ICan reed?m can cut its umbilical purpose of a social delimitation of the state. In democratic states, which
birth to it. Only briefly did the WhICh had Originally given understand themselves as an association of free and equal citizens, member-
between "ethnos" and "demos "4 natIOn state forge a close link ship depends on the principle of voluntariness. Here, the usual ascriptive
national identity. . CItIzenshIp was never conceptually tied to characteristics of domicile and birth (jus soli and jus sanguinis) by no means
The .concept of citizenship develo ed 0 f ,. justify a person's being irrevocably subjected to the sovereign authority of
determ1l1ation Initially "pop I p . ut 0 Rousseau s notIOn of self- that country. They function merely as administrative criteria for attributing
· ..'
deIImItatIOn , u ar sovereignty" had been d
or as the reversal f I un erstood as a to citizens an assumed, implicit concurrence, to which the right to emigrate
on a contract between a people sovereignty and was judged to rest or to renounce one's citizenship corresponds. 6
contrast, did not conceive of 0 lIS Rousseau and Kant, by Today, however, the expressions "Staatsbiirgerschaft" or "citizenship" are
power from above to below or as the transfer of political not only used to denote membership in a state, but also for the status defined
B I' IS 1'1 U Ion among two contr t' . by civil rights. The German Basic Law has no parallel to the Swiss notion
opu ar sovereignty rather signified th t fi' ac mg partIes.
self-legislated power. The social te ormatlOn of authoritarian into of active citizenship ("Aktivbiirgerschaft").7 However, taking Article 33, I, of
. con ract IS no longer conceived of as an the Basic Law as its starting point, mainstream German legal thought has

256
257
 ....... :&J1.0XIIX I
the 8
of civil rights and duties to generate an overall status
of a sImIlar kmd. The republican meaning of citizenship is, for example,
captured by R. work; for him, citizenship has as its reference point
the ?f socletal and at its core the political rights
of commulllC8;tlOn. He conceives of citizenship as "the
legal via which the individual member of a nation takes part as
agent m the concrete nexus of state actions. ,,9 The status of citizen
IS above those democratic rights to which the individual
can reflexively lay claIm III order to alter his material legal status.
. Two .contradictory interpretations of such a capacity for active
cItIzenshIp vie ot?er for pride of place in the philosophy of law.
!he. role Of. the gIven an individualist and instrumentalist read-
111g 111 the lIberal tradItIon of natural law starting with Locke whereas a
understanding of the same has in the
of that draws upon Aristotle. From the first
perspectIve, CItIzenshIp IS conceived in analogy with the model of received
in .an organizati.on which secures a legal status. From the second,
It IS analogy with the model of achieved membership in a self-
ethical community. In the one interpretation, the individuals
remam to the state, contributing only in a certain manner to its
reproductIOn .return the benefits of organizational membership. In
the are 111tegrated into the political community like parts
111to a I? a that they can only form their personal
and III thIS hOrIzon of shared traditions and intersubjectively
recoglllzed lllStItutlOns. In the former, the citizens are no different than ptivate
persons who bring their prepolitical interests to bear vis-A-vis the state
whereas in .the .Iatter, citizenship can only be realized as a joint
pra.cttce of self-determmatlOn. Charles Taylor has described these two com-
petmg concepts of citizenship as follows:
One (model) focuses mainly on individual rights and equal treatment,
a.s .well as on a government performance which takes account of
This is what has to be secured. Citizen capacity
consists mamly 111 the pOwer to retrieve these rights and ensure
equal treatment, as well as to influence the effective decision-makers
... institutions have an entirely instrumental significance ... No
value IS put on participation in rule for its own sake ... The other
model, by contrast, defines participation in self-rule as of the essence
of freedom, as part of what must be secured. This is ... an essential
component of citizen capacity ... Full participation in self-rule is
seen being able, at least part of the time, to have some part in the
fo.rmmg of a ruling consensus, with which one can identify along
with others. To rule and be ruled in turn means that at least some
of the time the governors can be 'us' and not always 'them.'1O
258
Cl flZENSHIP AND NAlIONAL WEN III Y l
The holist model of a polity in which each citizen is completely .up
is inadequate if one bears in mind many of the aspects of modern polItIcs.
Nevertheless it has an advantage over the organization model, for the latter
sets isolated individuals against a state apparatus, the two being linked only
via a relation of membership that regulates an exchange of benefits for
functionally specified contributions. The holist model emphasizes that polit-
ical autonomy is a purpose in itself, to be realized not by single persons in
the private pursuit of their particular interests but rather only by all together
in an intersubjectively shared praxis. In this reading, the citizen's status
is constituted by a web of egalitarian relations of mutual recognition. It
assumes that everyone can adopt the second person and first person plural
perspective of participants - that is, not merely the observer perspective of
an observer or actor oriented toward his or her own success.
Legally guaranteed relations of recognition do not, however, reproduce
themselves of their own accord, but rather require the cooperative efforts of
the active praxis of citizens, something in which no one can be compelled
by legal norms to take part. There are good reasons why modern compulsory
law does not apply to the motives and beliefs of its addressees. A legal duty
to make active use of democratic rights would have something totalitarian
about it· we would feel it to be alien to modern law. As a consequence, the
legally donstituted status of the citizen is dependent on the forthcomingness
of a kindred background of motives and beliefs of citizenship geared toward
the common weal- motives and beliefs that cannot be enforced legally. In this
regard, the republican model of citizenship reminds one that institutions
of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a populatIon makes of
them, and this would be a population accustomed to political freedom and
well-versed in adopting the we-perspective of active self-determination. There-
fore, the legally institutionalized role of a citizen had to be embedded in
the context of a political culture imbued with the concept of freedom. The
necessity of such a background seems to justify the communitarians in their
insistence that the citizen must identify himself "patriotically" with his par-
ticular form of life. Taylor himself emphasizes the requirement of a collective
consciousness which arises from identification with the consciously accepted
traditions of one's own particular ethical and cultural community: "The issue
is can our patriotism survive the marginalization of a participatory self-rule?
As we have seen, a patriotism is a common identification with a historical
community founded on certain values ... But it must be one whose core values
.
lllcorporate f ree d om. "11
With this, Taylor appears to contradict my proposition that there is
an historically contingent and not a conceptual connection between republIc-
anism and nationalism. Studied more closely, Taylor's remarks boil down to
the statement that the universalist principles of democratic states need an
anchoring in the political culture of each country. The principles laid down
in the constitution can neither take shape in social practices nor become the
259
 . . U1"<1 Cl I IZENSHIP?
CITIZENSHIP AND NA!IONAL IDENTITY

driving for, the project of creating an association of free and equal
.untIl they are situated in the horizon of the history of a nation of
cItIzens m such a way as to be connected with their motives and convictions
examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and
Umted States demonstrate that ,a political culture in the seedbed f h' h
t 't t' I . . 0 W IC
C??S I U prmclples are rooted by no means has to be based on all
cItizens shanng. same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins.
Rather, the polItICal culture must serve as the common denoml'n t fi
ft t' I " . a or or a
cons. I which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the
and of the different forms of life which coexist in a
multlCultural In a future Federal Republic of European States, the
would a!s? have to be interpreted from the vantage
natIOnal traditIOns and histories. One's own national tradi-
wIll, m each have to be appropriated in such a manner that it is
lelated to and relatIvIzed by the vantage points of the other national cult
It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a comm ures.
t' 11 h d " on, supra-
na y s are. polItical of the European Community. Particularist
anchonng of t?'S sort would m no way impair the universalist meaning of
popular sovereignty and human rights.
n. Nation state and democracy in a unified Europe
The political future of the European Community sheds light on th I t'
b t . I" . e re a Ion
e ween natIOna cItizenship and national identity in yet another respect Th
concept of national citizenship as developed from Aristotle to R . e
ft II .. II . ousseau was
a er a ,ongma y taIlored to the size of cities and city-states The t fi
t' f I' . . rans 01'-
ma IOn 0 popu mto nations which formed states occurred, as we have
under s.lgn of nationalism which apparently succeeded in recon-
cIlmg WIth the larger dimensions of modern territorial states
It was, moreover, m the political forms created by the nation state
modern. and commerce arose. And, like the bureaucratic state apparatus
the .capltalIst economy developed a systemic entelechy of its own.
f?r goods, and labor obey their own logic independent of
the mtentIOns of persons mvolved. Alongside administrative powel; money
has thus an medium of societal integration that functions
the mmds of actors. Now, this system integration competes
With of mtegration running through the consciousness of the
actors m:olved, I.e., integration through values, norms and processes
of Just one such aspect of social integration is
p.ohtIcalmtegratIOn via citizenship. As a consequence, although liberal theo-
nes often. deny fact, the relation between capitalism and democracy is
fraught With tenSIOn.
. Examples from Third World countries confirm that there is no linear connec-
tIon between the emergence of democratic regimes and capitalist modernization.
Even the welfare state compromise, practised in Western democracies since
the end of the Second World War, did not come into being automatically.
And, finally, the development of the European Community brings, in its ?W?
way, the tension between democracy and capitalism to the fore. Here, It IS
expressed in the vertical divide between the systemic o.f
and administration at the supranational level and the polItical mtegratIOn
that thus far works only at the level of the nation state. The technocratic
shape taken by the European Community reinforces doubts as to
the normative expectations one associates with the role of the democratic
citizen have not actually always been a mere illusion. Did the temporary
symbiosis of republicanism and nationalism not merely mask the fact that
the exacting concept of citizenship is at best suited for the less-complex rela-
tions within an ethnically and culturally homogeneous community?
The "European Economic Community" has meanwhile become a "Euro-
pean Community" that proclaims the political will to create a "European
Union." Leaving India aside, the United States provides the only example
for such a large edifice of 320 million inhabitants. Having said that, however,
let me add that the United States is a multicultural society united by the
same political culture and (at least at present) the same language, whereas
the European Union would be a multilingual state of different nations.
This association would still have to exhibit some similarities with de Gaulle's
"Europe of Fatherlands," even if - and this is to be hoped - it were to be
more like a Federal Republic than a loose federation of semi-sovereign indi-
vidual states. The sort of nation states we have seen to date would continue
to exert a strong structural force in such a Europe.
That nation states constitute a problem along the thorny path to a European
Union is, however, due less to their insurmountable claims to sovereignty
than to another fact: democratic processes have hitherto only functioned
within national borders. So far, the political public sphere is fragmented into
national units. The question thus arises whether there can ever be such a
thing as European citizenship. And by this I mean not only the possibilities
for collective political action across national borders but also the conscious-
ness of "an obligation toward the European common-weal."12 As late as
1974, Raymond Aron answered this question with a resolute "no." To date,
genuine civil rights do not reach beyond national borders.
The administration of justice by the European Court takes the "Five
Freedoms of the Common Market" as its point of orientation and interprets
the free exchange of goods, the free movement of labor, the freedom of
entrepreneurial domicile, the freedom of service transactions, and the freedom
of currency movements as basic rights. This corresponds to the powers the
Treaty of Rome conferred upon the Council of Ministers and the High
Commission in Article 3. This, in turn, is to be explained in terms of the
goal set out in Article 9: "The basis of the Community shall be a customs
union which extends to include the exchange of all goods." This goal will be

260 261
 reached with the advent of the currency union and the establishment of an
centra.l bank. The new level of economic interdependence will
gIve nse to. a growmg nee? for coordination in other policy fields as welI,
such as envIronmental polIcy, fiscal and social policy, education policy, etc.
And the ne.ed fo! will again be assessed primarily by criteria
of economIC - as securing equal conditions for competition.
These wllI be accomplIshed by European organizations which have
meanwhIle meshed to form a dense administrative network. The new elites
of speaking, stilI accountable to the governments
and mstItutIOns m theIr countries of origin; factually, however,
they out-grown theIr natIOnal context. In this respect, the Brussels
can best be equated with the German Central Bank. Professional
CivIl a ?ureaucracy that is aloof from democratic processes.
For the CItizen,. thIS .an ever greater gap between being
affected by somethmg and partIclpatmg m changing it. An increasing number
of measures decided at a supranational level affect more and more citizens
over an ever increasing area of life. Given that the role of citizen has hitherto
only .been institutionalized at the level of nationstates, citizens have no
effec.tlVe means of debating European decisions and influencing the decision-
makmg processes. M. R. Lepsius's terse statement sums it up: "There is no
European pu bl IC "'''13
opmIOn. Now, what interests me is the question whether
dispa.rity. is just a passing imbalance that can be set right by the par-
of expertocracy or whether these supra state
bureaucraCIes WIth theIr onentatIOn towards sheer economic criteria of ration-
merely highlight. a .general trend that has for a long time also been
gammg wlthm the nationstates. I am thinking of the fact that
Imperatives have gradualIy become independent of all else, and
that polItics ?as gradualIy become a matter of administration, of processes
that undermme the status of the citizen and deny the republican meat of
such status.
as T. H. Marshall l4 has studied the expansion
I?ghts .and dutIes m connection with capitalist modernization. His
dIVISIOn mto clvil, political and social rights is modelled on the well-known
classificatio.n of rights. Here, liberal negative rights protect the
legal subject agamst the state illegally infringing on his or her indi-
and property; the rights of political participation enable the
actIve CItizen to take part in the democratic processes of opinion and '11
r . . I . h WI
10rmatIOn; SOCla ng ts secure for the client of the welfare state a minimum
of social security. Mat'shall's analysis supports the thesis that the status of
the citizen in been expanded and buttressed step by
step. The nghts of mdlvldual freedom have been first supplemented
by democratic nghts and the two classical types by social rights in such
a way that ever greater sectIOns of the population have gradually acquired
full membership.
262
Even leaving the historical details aside, this suggestion of a more or less
linear development only holds for what sociologists term "inclusion." In a
functionally ever more differentiated society, an ever greater ?f
sons acquire an ever larger number of rights of access to and partiCIpatIon
in an ever greater number of sub-systems, be these markets, factories and
places of work, government offices, and schools
and hospitals, theaters and museums, msurance, publIc services and
political associations and public communications media, partIes; or
parliaments. For each individual, the number of memberships m
tions therewith multiplies, and the range of options expands. However, thiS
image of linear progress arises from a description that remains neutral toward
increases or losses in autonomy, it says nothing about the actual use made
of active citizenship by means of which the individual can himself bring
influence to bear on democratic changes of his own status. It is indeed only
political rights of participation which endow the citizen with kind o.f
self-referential competence. The negative rights of liberty and SOCial or POSI-
tive rights of participation can also be conferred by a
In principle then, the rule of law and the welfare can eXist.
the concommitant existence of democracy. These negative and SOCial nghts
remain ambiguous even in countries where alI three categories of rights are
institutionalized, as in the category of a "democratic and social constitutional
state."
Liberal rights, which have - viewed historically - crystallized
ownership, can be grasped from a functionalist viewpoint as the
alization of a market-steered economy, whereas, from a normative vlewpomt,
they guarantee individual freedoms. Social rights from
viewpoint the installation of a welfare bureaucracy, whtle, from the normative
viewpoint, they grant the compensatory claims individuals make. to .a. sup-
posedly just distribution of social wealth. It is true that
freedom and social security can be considered as the legal baSIS for the socral
independence necessary for an effective exercise of political rights in the
place. Yet, this link is contingent. For rights of individual SOCial
security can just as well facilitate a privatist retreat from cItIzenship and a
particular "clientelization" of the citizen's role. .
The occurrence of this syndrome, i.e., of citizenship reduced to the mter-
ests of a client, becomes all the more probable the more the economy and
the state apparatus - which have been institutionalized in terms of same
rights - develop a systemic autonomy and push citizens into the
of organizational membership. As self-regulated systems, economy and admm-
istration tend to cut themselves off from their environments and obey only
their internal imperatives of money and power. They no longer fit into the
model of a self-determining community of citizens. The classic republican
idea of the self-conscious political integration of a community of free and equal
persons is evidently too concrete and simple a notion to remain applicable
263
 to conditions, especially if one has in mind a nation, indeed an
homogeneous community which is held together by common tra-
dItIons and a shared history.
Fortunate.ly, modern law is a medium which allows for a much more
abstract notIOn of. the autonomy. Nowadays, the sovereignty of the
has Itself to become a procedure of more or less discursive
?pmIOn wIll formation. Still on a normative level, I assume a network-
mg of dIfferent communication flows which however should b . d
. , , e orgamze
m such a way that can be supposed to bind the public administration
to or. ratIOnal premises and in this way enforce social and eco-
on system without nonetheless impinging on
Its lOgIC. ThIS a model of a deliberative democracy that no
longer on the assumptIon of macro-subjects like the "people" of'''the''
but on anonymously interlinked discourses or flows of commun-
The model shifts the brunt of fulfilling normative expectations to
the mfrastructure of a political public sphere that is fuelled by spo t
·. h' n aneous
sources. CItlzens Ip can today only be enacted in the paradoxI'cal
1· . sense 0
comp lance wIth .the rationality of a political will-formation,
more character of which depends on the vitality of the
mformal of publIc c.ommunication. An inclusive public sphere cannot
orgamzed a whole; It depends rather on the stabilizing context of a
lIberal and egalItarian political culture. At the same time such a com . European culture between a common political culture and the branchmg
. . , mumca-
tIve pluralIsm would still be ineffective unless further conditions could be
met. In the,first place: the decision-making bodies should
open fOI and .to mflux of Issues, value orientations, contribu-
tIons programs ongInatmg from their informal environments. Onl if
such a? mterplay institutionalized processes of opinion and
those Informal networks of public communication occurs
today mean more than the aggregation of prepolitical indi-
mterests and the passive enjoyment of rights bestowed upon the
mdlvldual by the paternalistic authority of the state.
r cannot go into this model in any here. IS Yet when assessing
the chances for a future European CItIzenshIp, some empirical hints can at
be from the historical example of the institutionalization of
nation states. Clearly, the view that sees the rights
of essentIally the product of class struggle is too narrow in
focus.. ?ther types socral movements, above all migrations and wars, were
the force behmd the development of a full-fledged status for citizens.
!n factors that prompted the juridification of new relations of
mclusIOn also had. an on the political mobilization of a population
and thus on. the actIve exerCIse of given rights of citizenship. 17 These and other
related findmgs allow us to extrapolate with cautious optimism the course
developments could take; thus we are at least not condemned to
resIgnatIOn from the outset.
264
The single market will set in motion even more extensive m??il-
ity and mUltiply the contacts between members of different natIOnalItIes.
Immigration from Eastern Europe and the poverty-stricken of
Third World will intensify the multicultural diversity of these socIetIes. ThIS
will give rise to social tensions. However, if those tensions are
productively, they will enhance political mobilization in and mIght
particularly encourage the new, type of SOCIal movements
- I am thinking of the peace, ecologIcal and women s These
tendencies would strengthen the relevance public issues have for the hfeworld.
The increasing pressure of these problems is, furthermore, to be expected -
problems for which coordinated solutions are available only at a
level. Given these conditions, communication networks of European-wIde
public spheres may emerge, networks that may form a favorable context
both for new parliamentary bodies of regions that are now in the process of
merging and for a European Parliament furnished with greater
f To date, the member states have not made the legitimation of EC pohcy an
object of controversy. By and large, the national public
isolated from one another. They are anchored in contexts m whIch polItIcal
issues only gain relevance against the background of national histories
national experiences. In the future, however, differentiation could occur I? a
national traditions of art and literature, historiography, philosophy, etc. The
cultural elites and the mass media would have an important role to play in
this regard. Unlike the American variant, a European constitutional pat-
riotism would have to grow out of different interpretations of the same
universalist rights and constitutional principles which are marked by the
context of different national histories. Switzerland is an example of how a
common politico-cultural self-image stands out against the cultural orienta-
tions of the different nationalities.
In this context, our task is less to reassure ourselves of our common origins
in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence
commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century.
Hitherto, world history has accorded the empires that have come and gone ?ut
one appearance on the stage. This is not only true of the rise and fall of empIres
in the Old World but also for modern states like Portugal, Spain, England,
France and Russia. It now appears as if Europe as a whole is being given a
second chance. It will not be able to make use of this in terms of the power
politics of yester-year, but only under changed premises, namely a non-imperial
process of reaching understanding with, and learning from, other cultures.
Ill. Immigration and the chauvinism of prosperity: a debate
Hannah Arendt's analysis that stateless persons, refugees, and those deprived
of rights would determine the mark of this century has turned out to be
265
 ... -----wHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
frighteningly COl'rect. The displaced persons whom the Second World War
had left in the midst of a Europe in ruins have been replaced by asylum
seekers and immigrants flooding into a peaceful and wealthy Europe from
the South and the East. The old refugee camps cannot accommodate the
flood. o.f In coming years statisticians anticipate 20 to
30 mIlhon ImmIgrants from eastern Europe: This problem can be solved
only by the joint action of the European states involved. This process would
a dialectic that h.as taken place, on a smaller scale, during the
plOcess of German umficatIOn. The transnational immigrants' movements
function as sanctions which force western Europe to act responsibly in the
aftermath the. bankruptcy of state socialism. Europe must make a great
effort to qUIckly Improve conditions in the poorer areas of middle and east-
ern Europe or it will be flooded by asylum seekers and immigrants.
The experts are debating the capacity of the economic system to absorb
these people, but the readiness to politically integrate the asylum seekers
depends how citizens perceive the social and economic problems
by ImmIgratIOn. Throughout Europe, right-wing xenophobic reaction
agamst (iiberjremdung) caused by foreigners has increased.
The relatIvely whether they feel endangered by social decline
have a.lready mto segmented marginal groups, identify quite openly
the of their own collectivity and reject everything
ThIS IS the undersIde of a chauvinism of prosperity which is increas-
lllg the. asylum problem as well brings to light the latent
tenSIOn between cItIzenshIp and national identity.
One example is the nationalistic and anti-Polish sentiments in the new Ger-
m.an state. The newly acquired status of German citizenship is bound together
WIth the hope that .the frontier of prosperity will be pushed toward
the Oder and T?elr ?ewly gained citizenship also gives many of
them the ethnocentnc satIsfactIOn that they will no longer be treated as second
class They forget that citizenship rights guarantee liberty because
they contal11 a core composed of universal human rights. Article Four of the
Revolutionary Constitution of 1793, which defined the status of the citizen
g.ave to every who lived for one year in France not just
nght to remam wIthm the country but also the active rights of a citizen.
In Federal Republic, as in most Western legal systems, the legal status
of altens, homeless foreigners and the stateless has been adjusted to the
status of Since the structure of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) is
founded on t?e I?ea of hu,man rights, every inhabitant enjoys the protection
of ConstItutIOn. ForeIgners share equal duties with citizens, as well as
certam benefits legal protections. With a few exceptions, they also receive
treatment WIth regard to economic status. The great number of laws
WhICh to citizenship status only tempers the real meaning
?f cItIzenshIp. The human rights component of citizenship will be
mtensIfied and strengthened through supra national rights, and especially
266
CITIZENSHIP AND NA;TWNAL IDENTITY
through European Civil Rights, which might even effect core political exercise
of influence. The Federal German Constitutional Court's decision of 31 October
1990 is notable in this context. Though it declared unconstitutional the right
of foreigners to vote in municipal and district elections, that is the com-
munal voting right of foreigners, it recognized the principles raised by the
petitioners: "Behind this interpretation obviously stands the notion that
it corresponds to the democratic idea, especially as it contains the idea of
liberty, that there is a congruence between the possessor of democratic polit-
ical rights and those subject to a specific state power. This is the proper
. POl11
startl11g . t ... "18
These tendencies signify only that a concept of citizenship, the normative
content of which has been dissociated from that of national identity, cannot
allow arguments for restrictive and obstructionist asylum or immigration
policies. It remains an open question whether the European Community
today, in expectation of great and turbulent migrations, can and ought to
adopt even such liberal foreigner and immigration policies as the Jacobins
did in their time. Today the pertinent moral-theoretical discussion regarding
the definition of 'special duties' and special responsibilities is restricted
to the social boundaries of a community. Thus the state too forms a concrete
legal community which imposes special duties on its citizens. Asylum seekers
and immigrants generally present the European States with the problem of
whether special citizenship-related duties are to be privileged above those
universal, transnational duties which transcend state boundaries. I will out-
line this discussion in five steps.
A) Special duties are those which specific persons owe to others to whom
they are obligated by virtue of being "connected" to them as dependents, thus
as members of a family, as friends, as neighbors, and as co-members of a
political community or nation. Parents have special obligations toward their
children - and vice versa. Consulates in foreign countries have special obliga-
tions to those of their citizenry who need protection - these in turn are obligated
to the institutions and laws of their own land. In this context, we think above
all of positive duties, which remain undetermined, insofar as they demand
acts of solidarity, engagement and care in measures which cannot be accur-
ately determined. Help cannot always be expected by everyone. Special duties
are those which result from the relationship between the concrete commu-
nity and a part of its membership, and can be understood as social attributes
and factual specifications of such intrinsically undetermined duties.
From the utilitarian point of view, one could try to establish these special
duties by indicating the mutual benefit a community would gain through the
reciprocal performances of some act. Nations and states would thus be
defined as "mutual benefit societies." 19 According to this model every member
of the society can expect that the profit gained by interacting with other
members through exchange is proportional to their performances. With this,
utilitarianism justifies a prohibition against the exploitation of guest workers
267
 W"1\I IS Cl I'lZENSHIP'l
CITIZENSHIP· AND N,ATIONAL IDENTITY

through the of special duties and rights. Of course, this model

most disadvantaged by the restrictions, in this case the perspective
cannot determme. the obligations owed to those members of the community
of the alien who wants to immigrate. In the original position, then;
who cannot contnbute as much as others (e.g. the handicapped, the sick, and
one would insist that the right to migrate be included in the system
the old) or who needy (e.g. asylum seekers and foreigners). The instru-
'of basic liberties for the same reasons one would insist that the right
ethno.centnsm of utilitarianism would permit an immigration policy
to religious freedom would be included: it might prove essential to
allowmg foreigners to enter a country only when it could be justifiably guar- one's plan of Iife. 21
anteed t?at the existing balance of performances and claims, and thus the
expectatIOns of all, would not be disturbed by them.
Legitimate restrictions of immigration rights would then be established by
B) This c?u?terintuitive result is a reason to reject the utilitarian position,
competing viewpoints, such as consideration to avoid the enormity of claims,
and adopt m It.S place a ,?odel wherein special duties cannot be explained
social conflicts, and burdens that might seriously endanger the public order
through actIOns of exchanging performers but rather through
or the economic reproduction of society. The criteria of ethnic origin, lan-
the coordl?atlve achievements of a division of labor.20 Special duties, do not
guage and education - or an "acknowledgement of belonging to the cultural
vary only m e9 ual proportion with the social distance between individuals community" of the land of migration, in the case of those who have Ger-
so that. of t?ose who are near have priority over those who are
manic status - could not establish privileges in the process of immigration
far. This within the close confines of family and neighbor- and naturalization.
h.ood. But It IS confusmg insofar as all those persons beyond these intimate
D) Against this position the communitarians point to an issue which the
circles are equally. and far. We perceive these 'strangers' as 'others'
above mentioned individualistic arguments overlook: The social borders of
whether they are cItizens of our nation or not. A special duty toward these
a political community do not just have a functional meaning, as suggested
does not result primarily from their membership in a concrete com-
by the model of a judicially organized moral division of labor. They regulate
.. It more .from the abstract coordinating tendencies of judicial rather one's belonging to a distinct historical community united by a com-
mstltutlOns, which according to certain attributes, certain categories
mon fate and a political life form that constitutes the identity of its citizens:
of agents; thIS process, in turn, specifies and legally enforces those
"Citizenship is an answer to the questions 'Who am I?' and 'What should I
sOCial and factual obligations which would have been undetermined
do?' when posed in the public sphere.'>22 Membership in a political commun-
Acco.rding to this interpretation, institutionally mediated respon-
ity confirms special duties, behind which stands a patriotic identity. This kind
SIbilIties those specific obligations owed to certain others active in
of loyalty reaches beyond the validity claims of institutionally prescribed
a mora! divIsIOn labor. Within such a judicially regulated moral economy,
legal duties. "Each member recognizes a loyalty to the community expressed
of a legal community only have the function of regulat- in a willingness to sacrifice personal gains to advance its interests. ,,23 We have
mg the dIstnbutlOn of responsibilities throughout the community. That does
already discerned considerations against the communitarian notion of citizen-
not mean our responsibility ends at this boundary. More must be done
ship and thus against an exclusive moral and juridical consideration of this
by the natIOnal government so that the citizenry fulfills its duties toward its
problem. Such conceptions are no longer appropriate for complex social
- to the asylum seekers, for example. StilI, with this argument
relations, but they raise an ethical issue which should not be overlooked.
the questIOn, "What are these duties?" has not yet been answered.
The modem state also presents a political way of life which cannot be ex-
C) The point of view commits us to assess this problem impartially, hausted through the abstract form of an institutionalization of legal principles.
thus not Just from the one-sided perspective of those living in prosperous
The way of life builds a political-cultural context in which basic universalistic
regIOns, but also from the perspective of the immigrants, those who search
constitutional principles must be implemented. Then and only then will a
for grace. Let us say that they seek not only political asylum but a free and
population, because it is accustomed to freedom, also secure and support
dignified John Rawls's well-known thought experiment pro-
free institutions. For that reason, Michael Walzer is of the opinion that the
P?sed an ongmal in which individuals, under the "veil of ignorance," right of immigration is limited by the political right of a community to
dId n.ot .know society they were born into and the position they would protect the integrity of its life form. According to him, the right of citizens
have l11It. In VIew of our problem, the result of a moral test with regards to
a world society is obvious: to self-determination implies the right of self-assertion to each particular
way of life. 24
E) This argument, of course, can be read in two opposed ways. In the com-
Behind the 'veil of ignorance', in considering possible restrictions
munitarian version, liberal immigration rights should be placed under added
of freedom, one adopts the perspective of the one who would be
normative restrictions. In addition to functional restrictions, which result

268 269
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
from the conditions of reproduction of the administrative and economic
systems of a community, are those which would secure the ethnic-cultural
substance of a way of life. With this the particularistic meaning of the
argument triumphs, wherein citizenship is limited not according to national
identity but according to a historically defined cultural identity. Completely
in the spirit of Hannah Arendt's analysis, H. R. van Gunsteren specifies the
following conditions for permitting citizenship to a democratic community:
The prospective citizen must be capable and willing to be a member
of this particular historical community, its past and future, its forms
of life and institutions within which its members think and act. In
a community that values autonomy and judgement of its members,
this is obviously not a requirement of pure conformity. But it is a
requirement of knowledge of the language and the culture and
of acknowledgement of those institution that foster the reproduc-
tion of citizens who are capable of autonomous and responsible
judgement. 25
The requisite competence "to act as citizens of a special political community
(this particular polity)" is to be understood in another sense completely _
namely, the universalistic sense - as soon as the political community itself
universalistic basic laws. The identity of a political community,
whIch may not be touched by immigration, depends primarily upon the
constitutional principles rooted in a political culture and not upon an ethical-
cultural form of life as a whole. That is why it must be expected that the new
citizens will readily engage in the political culture of their new home, without
necessarily giving up the cultural life specific to their country of origin. The
political acculturation demanded of them does not include the entirety of
their socialization. With immigration, new forms of life are imported which
expand and multiply the perspective of all, and on the basis of which the
common political constitution is always interpreted:
People live in communities with bonds and bounds, but these may
be of different kinds. In a liberal society, the bonds and bounds
should be compatible with liberal principles. Open immigration would
change the character of the community, but it should not leave the
community without any character. 26
From the discussion which we followed from steps A) to E), we can draw
the following normative conclusion: The European states should agree upon
a liberal immigration policy. They should not draw their wagons around
themselves and their chauvinism of prosperity, hoping to ignore the pressures
of those hoping to immigrate or seek asylum. The democratic right of self-
determination includes, of course, the right to preserve one's own political
270
CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
culture, which includes the concrete context of citizen's rights, though it does
not include the of a privileged cultural life form. Only within
the constitutional framework of a democratic legal system can different ways
of lire coexist equally. These must, however, overlap within a common polit-
ical culture, which again implies an impulse to open these ways of life to
others.
Only democratic citizenship can prepare the way for a condition of world
citizenship which does not close itself off within particularistic biases, and
which accepts a world-wide form of political communication. The Vietnam
War, the revolutionary changes in eastern and middle Europe, as well as
the war in the Persian Gulf are the first lVorld political events in a strict sense.
Through the electronic mass media, these events were made instantaneous
and ubiquitous. In the context of the French Revolution, Kant speculated
on the role of the participating public. He identified a world public sphere,
which today will become a political reality for the first time with the new
relations of global communication. Even the superpowers must recognize
world-wide protests. The obsolescence of the state of nature between bellicose
states has begun, implying that states have lost some sovereignty. The arrival
of world citizenship is no longer merely a phantom, though we are still far
from achieving it. State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum
which already shows itself, at least, in outline form.
Notes
* I thank Inge Mous and Klaus Giinther for critical suggestions and commentary.
1 Peter Glotz, De,. I,.rll'eg des Nafionalstaats (Stuttgart, 1990).
2 M. R. Lepsius, "Der europiiische Nationalstaat," Interessen, Ideen und Institutio-
nen (Opladen, 1990), p. 256 ff.
3 See the article on "Nation" in Historisches Worterbuch del' Philosophie, Vol. 6,
pp. 406-14.
4 M. R. Lepsius, "Ethnos und Demos," Interessen, pp. 247-55.
5 See on what follows R. Grawert, "Staatsangehorigkeit und Staatsbiirgerschaft,"
Del' Staat, 23 (1984): pp. 179-204.
6 P. H. Schuck & R. M. Smith, Citizenship without Consent (New Haven, 1985),
Chapter I. Admittedly, not everywhere is the normative meaning of national
citizenship consistently uncoupled from ascriptive characteristics. Article 116 of
the German Basic Law, for example, introduces a notion of so-called "German
by status," someone who belongs to the German people according to an objectively
confirmed "attestation of membership in the cultural community," without at the
same time being a German citizen. Such a person enjoys the privilege of being
able to become a German citizen, although this is now contested by some con-
stitutional experts.
7 R. Winzeler, Die politischen Rechte des Aktivbiirgers nach Schweizerischem
BlIndesrecht (Berne, 1983).
8 K. Hesse, Grundziige des Verfassllllgsrechts (Heidelberg, 1990), p. 113, states:
"In their function as subjective rights, the basic rights determine and secure the
foundations of the individual's legal status. In their function as objective basic
271
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?

of a a.nd consitutional social order, they insert the indi-

vIdual III thIs order, whICh on!y become a reality if these rights are given
shape. The status of the
III and by the
of constitutional law, as grounded
fights laId out III the Basic Law, is thus a material
15
status? a status wIth. concretely determined contents, a status which
the not the state's powers can unrestrictedly adopt at will. This
lIl.constltutlOn?llaw forms the core of the general status of national citizen-
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF
ShIP, whIch, along wIth the basic rights, ... is laid down in law."
9 R. Gawert, "Staatsvolk und Staatsangehorigkeit," Handbuch des Staatsrechts ed
CITIZENSHIP AND THE
1. Isensee & P. Kirchhof (Heidelberg, 1987), p. 684 If.
10 C. Taylor, "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," Liberalism and the Moral Life
' .
EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE DEMOS
ed. N. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), p. 178 f. '
11 Tayl?r, "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 178.
12 P. Kielmannsegg, "Ohne historisches Vorbild," in Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung Jean L. Cohen
7 (December, 1990). ,
13 M. R. Lepsius, ".Die Gemeinschaft," contribution to the 20th Congress
of German SocIOlogIsts, Frankfurt on Main, 1990.
Source: International Sociology, 14:3 (1999), 245-68.
14 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, 1950).
15 1. ':Volkssouveranitat als Verfahren," Die Moderne _ ein unvollendetes
ProJekt (LeIpzIg, 1990), p. 180 If. .
16 B. S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism (London, 1986).
17 1. M. Barbalet, Citizenship (Stratford, England, 1988). Abstract
18 EuGRZ, 1990, 443.
19 R. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Etl' 98 Three distinct components of the citizenship principle have been
(July 1988): 663-686. " lICS identified in the literature: a political principle of democracy,
20 H. Shue, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98 (July 1988): 687-704. a juridical status of legal personhood and a ,form
ship and political identity. The modern paradIgm of cItizenship
21 J. H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders" Review of Politics
49 (1987): 258. ' was based on the assumption that these components would
neatly map onto one another on the terrain of democ.ratic
22 H. R .. van ,?unstere?, ''A?m!ssion to Citizenship," Ethics 98 (July 1988): 752.
welfare state. Globalization, new forms of transnatlOnal mIgra-
23 D. MIller, The EthIcal Slglllficance of Nationality," Ethics 98 (July 1988): 648.
24 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York, 1983),31-63. tion, the partial disaggregation of state sovereignty .and the
25 van Gunsteren, ''Admission to Citizenship," 736. development of human rights regimes have rendered thIS model
26 Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," 27l. anachronistic. Only if the various elements of the citizenship
principle are disaggregated and reinstitutionalized on independ-
ent levels of governance, some national, some supranational,
will the exclusiveness constitutive of the ideal of citizenship be
tempered with the demands of justice.

Due to the impact of 'globalization' the relationship between democracy,

identity and justice is being vigorously debated these days. 'Globalization'
involves a major intensification of transnational economic exchanges and
competition, of communications, of migration and of social and cultural
interactions, all made possible by key technological advances (Falk, 1992;
Held, 1995; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996). .
These processes facilitate fantastic technical and social creativity. How-
ever, they also have side effects that transcend borders and which can be
very destructive if uncontrolled: just think of the ecological issues or the

272
273
 .. u n . 'i) CIIIZENSHIP? CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP

new forms of int1quality generated· by the intensely competitive globalized fate and solidarity. If, however, the collective identity of the demos.is under-
market.
stood in civic and political rather than ethnic and cultural terms, It can" so
Recently doubts have emerged about the ability of democratic nation-states the republican or democratic theorist argues, be open and egalitarian
to con.trol directly affecting their citizens' lives. Both from hence; neither exclusionary nor unjust (Arendt, 1973; Habermas, 1995; MIller,
the of vIew of efficacy and moral legitimacy the nation-state is now 1995; Viroli, 1995).
conSIdered by many to be (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Held, 1995; I want to challenge the terms of this debate as well as the political and
That revIval ?f lIberal cosmopolitan ism focused on foster- institutional choices it delineates. I argue that it is based on a lack of ana-
1I1g 1I1ternatlOnal of Justice (human rights) and global institutions lytical clarity regarding the concept of citizenship and a questionable core
able to back them up IS hardly surprising in such a context (Ferrajoli 1996' assumption that both sides share, even if they evaluate it differently: the
Nussbaum, 1996! Po?ge, Soysal, 1994; Waldron, 1995). ' , various dimensions of the citizenship principle must be aggregated 1I1to a
On P?litics have re-emerged in a number of shapes uniform bundle of rights and protected by the same political instance: the
g.enera 1I1g. ot egltImate multIcultural demands for the recognition of diver- national state. It is this assumption that in my view generates a set of false
SIty, and vIrulent forms of exclusionary nationalist movements I :' alternatives in the face of what can only be described today as the decomposi-
democratIc . d . . .' . . n response,
an republIcan polItIcal theonsts try to theorize an I'n I . , .. , tion of the paradigmatic conception of citizenship that has been hegemonic
. . I " c uSlve CIVIC
or constItutlOna patnotIsm that is distinct from 'ethnic' nation I" b d in the West ever since the democratic revolutions of the 18th century.
d · I" I . a Ism, ase
on l.etm?crat po and oriented toward the strengthening of The mutual criticisms leveled by advocates of each position often hit their
I.anan cItIzens Ip nghts .1973; .Brubaker, 1992; Cohen, 1996; mark. It is certainly easy to point out the abstractness of cosmopolitan
Vlroh,. 1995). Some focus on cItIzenshIp laws so that they become less individualism, its failure to take particular identities (political and cultural),
excluslOnary and on strengthel1lng democracy in existing states (H b contexts and traditions into account, as well as its quixotic effort to conjure
1995; Tamir, 1993; WaIzer, 1983). Others stress the away the discreteness of the political and to .it with
democratIc 1I1stttutlOns t.o structure the power of emergent regional polities juridical relations based on the most abstract IdentIty of all: humal1lty
such as the European Ul1lon (Habermas 1996b' Held 1995' Poll' 1991' P (Arendt, 1973; Cohen, 1996). Republican and democratic theorists are right
1996) I . h .".' , , ,reuss,
. n elt. er case, for democrattc and republIcan political theorists onl to insist that 'humanity', even if positivized into 'legal personhood', is too
st.rong polIty of size can preserve democracy and thin an identity to motivate much mobilization, participation or solidarity
JustIce
.
from the dlSlntegratIve
1"Itanan natIOnalIsms.
. .
forces of globalization and fr om d'" IVlSlve' on its behalf. They are also right to insist that democratic political institu-
1I1ega
tions and active citizenship are indispensable for determining the common
Thu.s in :ecent p.oliticaI theory over the proper response to good and for protecting liberty, both public and private. The reciprocal
globalIzatIOn IS 1I1creasmgly be1l1g cast as a choice between lI'be I illusions of civic republicanism are less obvious, and I come back to them
· . ra cosmo-
po1Ital1lSm and some form of democratic civic republicanism Th fi . later but certainly they include a peculiar naivete vis-a-vis the exclusiveness,
'd 'I1'b . e Olmer
consl ers I I eral a.nd unjust the claims of any group, no matter how it is particularism and arbitrariness that are usually at work when states
defined, to the speCIal membership rights and privileges attached t 't' or sovereign citizens delimit membership in the demos and artIculate the
h" . . 0 Cl Izen-
s 111 a partIcular polIty. These allegedly violate the moral principle that
special rights of citizens.
POSItS the equal worth of all persons by elevating the good of members Our choice is not between liberal universalism that is focused on human
of the demos. above Accordingly they push an orientation rights and the rule of law US democracy construed as the sovereign self-
toward ul1lversa1 of individuals as persons, seeking to foster a more determination of a people whose representatives have exclusive rule over all
cosmopolItan conceptIOn of political life (Bader 1995' FerraJ'oli 1996' P the affairs and inhabitants of a territory. This old antinomy between rights
1992; O'Neill, 1996). '" ,ogge,
and democracy (reminiscent of Carl Schmitt) re-emerges today because
The civic republican co.mmitted democrat, on the other hand, argue theorists fail to adequately analyze the citizenship principle and to transcend
that dem?cracy and are intrinsically valuable, and should pIa core assumptions of a now anachronistic paradigm. Thus neither approach
the role 111 justifying and protecting citizens' right; is able to discern what I consider to be exciting possibilities for a new para-
the SOvereIgn self-determination of a people, and the digm of citizenship and new political forms of .. .
WIll to act 111 ItS name and to make sacrifices for its sake. It requires a d Before turning to these, I first briefly present an analYSIS of the cItIzenshIp
a' e't h' h . d"d I " emos,
WOW.lC 111 IVI ua cItIzens feel they belong, in whose deliberations principle. I then discuss the classic synthesis and its limits. I conclude by
they have VOIce, and toward which they can accordingly feel a sense of shared suggesting some new combinations and directions for the future that are

274 275
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
by. partial disaggregation of the various components of
the cItIzenshIp prmclple - a salutary development in my view.
The analytic 01 the citizenship principle
!hree of the citizenship principle have been identified
m the lIterature:
.. . . d. cItizenshIp. as a political princl'P· le oif democracy th at mvo
. 1ves
I? and decision-making by political equals for a
body polItic; a juridical status of legal person hood that carries
a se.t of legally nghts including the all-important ability of the legal
subject to sue m court. to claim .the state's protection; and citizenship
as a of members/up m an exclUSIve category that forms the basis' of a
tie and affords a social status and a pole of identification that can
Itself
... become da rather thick and important identity able to generate so I·d
I an y,
CIVIC VIrtue an engagement (Pocock 1995· Marshall 1964· TI·II 1995· W: 1z
1983 b '" , y, , a er,
.; Bru 1992). Depending on whether they are republican or demo-
for whom the active participatory dimension is the most
salIent, lIberals
.. concerned
. with personal rights and matter s 0 f·JUS t·Ice, or
theOrIsts for whom the dimension of collective identity and
solI?anty matters most, political theorists have focused on (and often hypo-
statized) ?ne or. another component when conceptualizing citizenship.
. clanty what each component logically entails facilitates
mSlght mto how an hlstoncally dominant paradigm of citizenship synthesizes
.and at what cost. It is my thesis that the components of the citizenship
can and ?? come into conflict, and that every historical synthesis
entaIls a s.et of polItical choices and tradeoffs that tend to be forgotten once
conception hegemonic. Since I also believe that we are experienc-
mg the. of the modern paradigm of citizenship and a new set
It IS worth the effort to become reflexive about the logic of each
the nature of the now decomposing modern paradigm.
CItizenshIp as a political principle of self-rule by a demos was first articu-
lated by Anstotle and has been embraced in some form by all d However, when dominant, the juridical model seems to be depoliticizing
bl · h . (A·
t eonsts
mo ern
Pocock, 1995). In this approach citizenship
I.S constlued as an actIVIty that mvolves participation in ruling and being
ruled. by who uniform political status and rights. The citizen
or VOIce m the public sphere, participates in deliberations
and decISIon-makmg .about .common concerns, and considers the common
good as well as mterests. Citizens are directly or through their
elected representatives the authors of the laws and procedures of d ..
· b h· eClSlOn-
ma k mg y w Ich they are bound (Petit, 1997).
This of citizenship puts political equality
and at ItS centeI; but It IS also particularizing and exclusionar .
Indeed, It has always been associated with certain prerequisites for
276
CHANGING PARADIGMS, OF CITIZENSHIP
that exclude important segments of the population. It has also entailed the
rule of citizen peers not only over one another, but also over non-citizens.
In short, in the republican conception, the competent exercise of public
autonomy requires a unique set of capacities which, until very recently, meant
that only some could become equals. We all know that in the classical ideal,
the citizen had to be male, of known genealogy, propertied, the head of a
household and able and willing to take up arms (Pocock, 1995). Even if
today the prerequisites for the democratic and/or republican conception of
citizenship have changed, no democracy is completely free of them (Pocock,
1995). The circle of people endowed with full participation rights has
everywhere remained narrower than the class of persons subject to the law
(Neuman, 1996). The question that must be faced, then, is whether or not
exclusion is constitutive of the very ideal of democratic citizenship.
·t
Modern struggles for inclusion in the category have reconfigured the ideal
of citizenship by drawing on a juridical conception derived from Roman law
(Pocock, 1995). The citizen in this approach is not a political actor but a
legal person free to act by law and expect the law's protection. The focus of
the juridical reconceptualization of citizenship is legal standing and personal
rights: the citizen can sue in court and invoke a law that grants him rights.
This does not entail having a hand in making the law. Nor does it require
uniformity of rights among the citizenry.
The juridical dimension of the citizenship principle is thus universalizing,
elastic and potentially inclusive: it is not tied to a particular collective iden-
tity, or membership in a demos, it can go well with a plurality of different
statuses, and it need not be territorially bound. The universalism inherent in
the juridical model of citizenship as legal personhood is open to the politics
of inclusion, and it is on this basis that transnational or global citizenship
is at least conceivable. Indeed, once the juridical model of citizenship is taken
up by liberals in the modern era it gets equated with the practice of claiming
and asserting rights, logically open to all. The push toward the global posi-
tivization of human rights is an example of this trend.
and desolidarizing. It undermines the will to political participation, as well
as the strong identification with a particular republic and the social solidar-
ity that the democratic/republican conception deemed so desirable (Miller,
1995).
Apparently the juridical and democratic components of the citizenship
principle are in tension: the former universalizing and inclusive but apolitical
and individualistic, the latter political, internally egalitarian and uniform but
externally exclusive and particularizing. Certainly the democratic dimension
coheres well with the membership component of the citizenship principle,
for it seems to presuppose and to foster a common identity of the demos
that is engaged in self-rule: as differentiated and bounded. But citizenship as
277
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CHANGING PARADIGMS ,OF CITIZENSHIP

membership, it acquired, is, as Brubaker (1992) correctly points The modern synthesis and its limits
out, a mechamsm of soctal closure,
The democratic constitutional nation-state synthesized the three elements
, It is o?vious that the I?embership dimension of the citizenship principle of the citizenship principle in a particularly successful way, T. H, Marshall (1964)
IS exclusIOnary, From thIS perspecztive, citizenship forms a specI'al t' d
'fi 'd ' " le an provides the classic articulation of the hegemonic paradigm for modernity,
a specI c 1 enttty: It mcludes some while excluding others and it is al Marshall defined citizenship as a personal legal status that is bestowed on
b d t' 1 ' , , ways
ase on par ICU ansttc consIderations regarding access to memb h'
I dd' , h" , ers lp, full members of a political community and endows them with a set of com-
,n ee Ip Itself IS a specia,l and, privileged status of membership mon rights and duties, This conception foregrounds the juridical component
m a ,It ,IS deSIrable apart from any democratic but links it to the principle of equality, Although it is a juridical status of
regardmg the mtnnslC value of participation in deliberations personal freedom and legal standing, citizenship in the modern state involves
or the value of the vote, Judith Shklar has understood well the
uniform and equal rights that all members have in common, As such, modern
dimensIOn of component of the citizenship citizenship is inclusive, universalizing and egalitarian and uniform, This is
pnnclple, In her analysIs, confers social standing - higher soCial partly why democratic citizenship in liberal juridical terrain has important
status - on those allowed mto the exclusive circle vis-a-vis those outside effects on social identities and a major role to play in social integration,
(Shklar, 1995)" I,ndeed: she, ar?ues that the desire for status and honor at- It is also well known that Marshall offers an evolutionary scheme for the
tached, to d"cItIzenshIp pnnclple (and not for voice or liberty) I' s th e major
, the '
development of national citizenship whereby the emergence of the three sets
motIvatIOn , nvmg struggles for inclusion on the part of those categories of of rights - civil, political and social - he sees associated with full citizenship
the populatIon have ?een denied full citizenship status (Shklar, 1995: is presented as a story of geographic fusion (a shift from local to national
27-62), The deSIre ,SOCIal esteem as distinct from the intrinsic or instru- levels of belonging) and functional separation among the categories of
mental value '" of VOice
h IS also what seems to drive multiculturalist deman ds
rights, The trajectory involves the enrichment of the status of rights-bearing
fior recogmtIOn m t e contemporary context (Honneth 1995' 92-130' 'T' 1
1992), ' ' , or, citizens (expansion of the civil rights of personhood) and a fuller measure
of equality for all those subject to the law (the granting of political rights
component of the citizenship principle is thus particu- to ever more categories of the population) (Marshall, 1964), Yet equal
lanstIc,
, d" exclusIOnary and exclusive, This is hardly news ' But my pom ' t IS
'
citizenship also requires social rights not only to guarantee the worth of
to m Icate' ,that h' there IS an 'elective affinity' between a strong democrat'lC
liberties to the working class but also as a mechanism of social integration:
st ress on lp as the self-rule of a sovereign demos (which presupposes to ensure that workers feel like full members of society who are able to
m:mbershlp) a stress on belonging and identity, as identify with the national community - as citizens, Indeed, the equality,
Walzel nottced long ago, Both involve a privileged status uniformity and universality of the modern conception of citizenship require
VIs-a-VIS the non-cItIZen, We cannot this logic or Wahlverwandtschaft, that social protections take the form of universal rights of citizenship and
mu,st we democrattc communitarian (Walzer) or liberal not group-differentiated benefits (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995),
natIOnalIst
,' h (Holhnger," Lmd, Miller
, Tamir) and conclude that democrat'lC In short, Marshall assumes that on the terrain of the liberal democratic
clttze,ns ,lP reqUIres a thick, shared, homogeneous, national cultural tradition constitutional, national, territorial and, now, welfare state, the three compon-
that IS gIven, not chosen (HolIinger, 1995; Lind, 1995; Miller, 1995; Tamir, ents of the citizenship principle that I identified (the juridical status of the
19?3; 1983), For democratic communitarians focused on member- legal person, the political status of the active citizen and the dimension of
ShIP, thIS IS necessary to motivate the commitment and engagement that the identity of the citizenry) would all map onto one another in a coherent
democracy, work and to generate the solidarity necessary for civic and friction less whole, Justice and the rule of law, the democratic demand
Virtue,
" The exclusIveness of the demos is not their worry" I on th e con trary,
for voice and equal rights, and the communitarian concern for solidarity
thrust of the democratic component of the and collective identity could come together on the terrain of the democratic
clttzenshlp
, I' d' pnnclple can and should be tempered, if articulated
a nd'ms t't 1 u- welfare state provided that social rights of citizenship are acknowledged,
ttona lze , m the 'proper
" way: that is, if it is decoupled from th e plemlses
. ' This is the core of what I have called the modern paradigm of citizenship,
of excIUSlve terntonahty and absolute sovereignty of the port' I b d It is this paradigmatic conception of citizenship that has lost its power to
th t fi ', , , 1 lca 0 y
, a, con el's CItizenshIp and mformed by the universalistic principles of convince today, But it always had a disturbing ambiguity that has now become
JustIce,
d' For , only
b under such conditions can the tension between dem ocracy apparent: are the uniform equal rights and respect owed to every citizen due
an ,Justtce e lessened, although I do not believe it can ever be e l' I to their individual status as legal persons or to their membership status as
abolished, n tre y

278 279

belonging particular community? To put this differently, is the
legal of nghts-bearing individual presumptively granted to
all huma? beIngs on model or only to the citizens of a particular state?
s happy conSCIOusness regarding citizenship as a principle of inclu-
equalIty and his assurirption that the components of the citizenship
pnncIple come together a way paper over this ambiguity. In
fact, he confronted It because he sImply assumed, like so many others,
the IdentIty of the citizenship principle into which he hoped
the workIng class through social rights was a given: the cultural
IdentIty of the demos construed as a nation.
If we s,hift perspective away !he substantive rights of citizenship
s focus) to the formal dImenSIOn of membership things 100kJ'ather
The presupposition of the modern paradigm of citizen-
IS that Involves membership in a sovereign, territorial
wIthIn a system of states. The nation-state is not only a territorial
orgamzatlOn legitimate rule within a bounded space, it is also,
as. nghtly argues, a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992).
CItIzen.shIp In. such .a state an instrument of social closure. It always has
an ascnptIve dImenSIon and It always establishes privilege insofar as it endows
with. particular. rights denied to non-members (today, primarily,
the ahen or foreIgner). Thus, in the modern system of states, the
of the self-determining demos merges with the sovereign
s In over all those in the territory through the construc-
tIon of natIOnal CItIzenship as a formal category of membership Excl .
· I' . . . uSlOn
an.d Ity, not mcluslOn, thus attach to citizenship seen as a membership
pnncIple (Brubaker, 1992).
To be certain political theorists noted long ago the tendency
of the t? VIOlate the egalitarian logic of constitutional democracy
by fostenng Inequahty and exclusion vis-a-vis national minorities and aliens.
Hannah Arendt (1973) argued that this danger is intrinsic to the nation-state
system. Because the nation-state equates the citizen with the member of the
nation it a. category into a category of identity and
perverts the egalItanan lOgIC of the constitutional state by rendering those
who are members of the nation implicitly into second-class citizens. On
the problem lies in the reduction of the political
pnncIple of CItIzenshIp to a substantive exclusionary conception of colI t'
'd' . I' ec Ive
I entIty: Arendt argued for disaggregating citizenship
from national belonging (ethnic or cultural) and insisted
of citizens should not be allocated on the pre-
baSIS of States should not be nation-states but civic
pohtIes that grant cItIzenship on legal criteria (Arendt, 1973).
.attempt distinguish civic from ethnic nationalism, or civic/
from nationalist communitarianism, relies on some
of thIS argument Including contemporary theories of liberal nationalism
280
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP
(Brubaker 1992' Habermas, 1995; Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993; Viroli, 1995). The
revival of'this discourse in recent years is a response to the resurgence of
ethno-, racialized and very illiberal or anti-democratic versions of nationalist!
communitarian identity politics. The fear that such nationalisms undermine
liberal and democratic institutions motivates political theorists to draw dis-
tinctions between good and pernicious forms of political identity, and between
open and inclusive as opposed to essentialized and inegalitarian criteria of
belonging and access to citizenship.
But we cannot leave the matter there. For there is another set of contradic-
tions inherent in the nation-state system that Arendt noted, namely the
tension between the rule of law and the concept of sovereignty regardless of
whether it is attributed to the nation, to the state or to the people (the demos).
Arendt understood that the attribution of exclusive territoriality and invio-
lable sovereignty to each nation-state over internal matters contributed to the
willingness of states to deprive non-citizens of basic rights and to threaten
the rights of national minorities, even if they were citizens. It is the presumed
sovereignty of the territorial nation-state, however democratic, that is at
the heart of the ambiguity noted above, namely whether the legal status of the
rights-bearing individual is granted to all human beings or only to the citizens
of a particular state.
Until quite recently the dilemma was resolved everywhere in the same way:
legal personhood was attached to citizenship status in a discrete state. Rights
of non-citizens depended on the state's (as representative of the sovereign
demos') will and on little else. Arendt and other democratic republican polit-
ical theorists tried to reconcile the egalitarian universalistic principles they
believed in with the discreteness and exclusionary logic of democratic citizen-
ship in the modern paradigm in two ways: first, by applying universalism to
the idea of citizenship as membership, such that citizenship itself becomes
the core human right: everyone born into a territorial state has the right
to citizenship within it and ought not to be deprived of it (Arendt, 1949).
Second, democracy and the rule of law could be reconciled if, internally, the
claim to unified sovereignty by the state (representing the demos) is resisted,
disaggregated and controlled through a constitutionalism which establishes
and limits powers by guaranteeing rights, by creating an overall separation and
balance of powers, and by creating counter-powers through erecting a
federalist structure. Constitutionalism of this sort would reconcile democratic
self-rule of the demos, state power and the rule of law by denying the claim
of absolute sovereignty (in the sense of legibus solutus) of 'the state' or any of
its particular organs (Arendt, 1963; Arato, 1995: 202-4.)
There are several theoretical and normative inadequacies with this solution.
I address three of them. First, the assumption that the 'exclusiveness of the
demos' is simply a function of rules of access to citizenship that stress pre-
political (ethno/cultural) instead of universalistic legal criteria is wrong. As
I already indicated, if the democratic component of the citizenship principle
281
 .. UBI CIIIZENSRIP?
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP
is interpreted to e;ntail self-rule by a self-determ' , ,
through its representatives) and if th' 'd Illlng demos (dIrectly or access to citizenship, distribution of rights and privileges and so forth, Thus
:-vith the concept of the
sovereign state that rules all the
will be a nation-state and the dem I
nation, Democratic c{tizenship in °t;1
a;r
I tea
o terntory, then such a polity
itself as a
the attempt to disaggregate sovereignty by constitutionalism internally will
not suffice if it is not complemented by similar developments on the supra-
nationaJ level (Cohen, 1996),
bers and non-citizens and it ine "a s a e entaIls a dlstIllction between mem- My argument here is not intended as a critique of civic republicanism per
and identification in a pole of ,identity-formation se but as an analysis of the paradoxes of any democratic conception of
articulated states, The very ambi f 11 eral constitutionally citizenship in the modern paradigm and of the logic of the democratic com-
, , gUI Y0 t le term natIonal'lm r
It IS used both as a synonym for a t t ' 'f pIes as much: ponent of the citizenship principle generally, It thus also applies to the idea
is to be a French citizen) and at th a e s ,Cl Izenry (to be a French national of constitutional patriotism recently developed by Habermas (1992, 1995,
collective identity, Even if e vely least, as a category of 1996a), The latter wants to construct a liberal democratic conception that
patriotism is all that is legally req t law
d ; are open and even if civic avoids the tendency of civic republicanism to thicken into communitarianism,
identity of the nation is 0 new and old CItIzens, even if, the In a series of important essays on citizenship, he offers the idea of constitu-
reinterpretation, national citizenshi open to constant tional patriotism as a way to address the problem of access to citizenship
con?otation identity oter time a within existing states and the problem of how to construe the identity of the
emocratIc, republIcan citizenshi P und t d' ' , , , citizenry on the level of the nation-state or within emergent regional polities
this tendency, it does not limit it D 00 III the above terms fosters (the European Union), in a just way,
, emocratIc self-rule does t d
exclude exclusion, because the political bod' ' , , ' no, an, cannot Constitutional patriotism involves commitment to liberal and democratic
is inevitably particular (one amon 1) III whIch It IS IllstltutlOnalized principles and procedures of a constitution, That is all that can be required
be defined and delimited Who b gl severa and because the demos must as a criterion of gaining access to citizenship, Neither cultural homogeneity nor
, e ongs to the demos t ' ,,
democratically established: it always i 1 ' , canno Illltlally be ethnic lineage should play any role here, If, in addition, popular sovereignty
political element no matter how unchosen, ethical- is understood in procedural and communicative rather than substantive terms
become (Whelan, 1983), In other word th of access for newcomers (as the will of a macro-subject) the exclusionary thrust of the demos can be
the political/constitutional (potentiall s, , e ?y Arendt between blocked (Habermas, 1996a: 463-90),
l
'pre-political' (potentially exclusive and just) and Habermas acknowledges the discreteness of the political and the un-
exists 1Vithin liberal constitutl'onal d unjust) bconceptlOns of belonging avoidable 'ethical' dimension of any actual, institutionalized constitution
emocracy etwe th ' "
democratic components of the CI'tl' h' ,', en e JundlCal and (Habermas, 1993: 1-19), Constitutional patriotism entails allegiance to 'our'
'b zens Ip
lI eral democratic constitutionalism a d 'll'b ' 1pnnclple and not 1 b particular constitution, not to any and every constitution, This entails
' on y etween
alisms, To pU,t this another way, states or antI-democratic nation- attachment to the particular way in which a specific polity has institutionalized
to be sovereIgn political entities that ' t ' ns when states are construed and interpreted abstract liberal and democratic principles, provided that
and when the demos the citizenry I'S eXls t III da system of sovereign states, these are open to reinterpretation, Accordingly, political identification with
, ' , cons rue as a memb h' ,
tIon that exercises self-determination th h' ers Ip orgalllza- the specific constitution of a specific polity, and the political identity of the
demos of the civic republican is on th rou; ItS own, state, In short, the demos construed as those who so identify, is particular but not anti-universalist
nation, ' e mo ern paradIgm of citizenship, a or illegitimately exclusionary,
Second, as the case of German h tI d With this synthesis of liberal and democratic principles of constitution-
states with very restrictive rules r y s o:-"s, e eral can be nation- alism Habermas apparently avoids the illiberal thrust of citizenship construed
as a birthright does not redress theepgulatl?g access to cItIzenshIp, Citizenship as membership in a territorially based, culturally specific, national identity,
recanousness of the ri ht f ',
who are resident in a territory that I'S t th ' g s 0 non-CItIzens The trick is accomplished by linking the three components of the citizenship
'
Th Ird, no elr Own state (Coh 1996) principle in a specific way: the 'ethical' or particular constitutional ethos is
as the example of the United St t
alize a separation and division f a shows, even they Illstitution- seen as a specification of universal moral principles through democratic
positivize fundamental rights ave a fe,derahst and procedures and discussion on the part of a particular political community,
entities if the international s;stem of can stIll, be sovereign But there's the rub, The ethical component of constitutional patriotism
sovereignty to them and to all other l'f e regIme) accords cannot be reduced to a mere specification of universal moral principles
would still have full powers over I ;es as states, Such polities (liberal or democratic), What makes a constitution American, German, French
. el na a11alrs, over entry to the territory, and so on, entails a lot more culture, tradition, habits of the heart, than this

282
283
 W HAl TSCTTIZENSHIP? -
conception allows (McCarth 1991· 181 .
tive identity component canYn' t b· d -99). The ethICal-political or coI1ec-
. 0 e re uced to a conte t I ..
uIllversal moral principles of justice. x ua applIcatIOn of
Moreover the problematic of the' I .
·th h exc USlVeness of the demo ' .
el er on t e national or supraIiational (re ional) s IS not resolved
as Habermas clearly does that th . g. level so long as one assumes
. . 1·1 , e vanous components of th .. ' may continue to exist, but as 'weak' versions of the globalization thesis
pnnclp e WI I come together on the s ... e cItIzenship
constitutional patriotism remal·n 1I1stItutlOnal level. Habermas's
h· s WI 111 t e modern p d·
s lp, even as he applies it to the supr f 11 ara Igm of citizen-
understood as a federal polity in th evel of the European Union
this approach, once it has a 1996b). Europe, in
European-wide sOcietepolitiqu (. I. a y legItImate constitution and a
. I e 1I1VO v1l1g European po!"t" I . tion regarding the rights of individuals or minorities within states have
sImp y be a federalist mega-state with I partIes),' would
word would better capture the p formmg around it. No
lIberal democratic constitutional E 0 I I entIty that such a sovereign
if successful, than nation. mega-state would foster,
not avoid the paradoxical dial f . h even on this level would
c
citizenship that drives republica: I 111 the. modern paradigm of
arms of thicker, more communitar. I era emocratlC conceptions into the
does not exclude exclusion. lan understandings of identity. It certainly
The 'postmodern' conundrum
the modern paradigm of citizenshi was . multiculturalism raised by new immigrants and, increasingly, by minorities
It dId promise to resolve the t . b P never normatIvely satisfactory
. . enslOns etween demo ..
tIty If only it was institutionalized· th . h cracy, JustIce, and iden-
undermined its core presupposif 111 ng t way. Today globalization has
The exclusive territoriality and n:a;;e promise appear hollow.
are being transformed due to th g 111 erent 111 the nation-state model
. e emeIgence of tran t· I These developments mean that we have to think the next step theoretically
supranationallegal regimes d . economic
notIOn that the state must be a.n post-?atlOnal polItICal bodies. The
. . a SOvereIgn totahty - bo d d .
an d exercIs1l1g uniform control .t. . . un e , self-suffiCIent
over I s Cl tIzen-subject . I
a IIy accurate (Sassen, 1996; Ruggie, 1993. Falk 199 .s - IS no onger empiric-
and Walker, 1990). That is why the ima e h ' 2, Held, 1?95; Mendovitz
geneous collective subject com 0 d t demos as a ul1lfied and homo-
no longer convincing. A new citizens is
g
is both adequate to empirI·cal d I CItIzenshIp has to be invented that
. eve opments and no t" I . .
The natIOn-state stilI eXI·sts and ., rma Ive y JustIfiable.
.
I dIsagree with strong versions of the remams sove·· ,.
. . reIgn many respects.
the nation-state is an anachronism d theSIS that assert that
modern city-state because it no I oome to the same way as the early
nomic wen-being' security or pr can. provIde the conditions for eco-
' oeclOntoltssub· t I I .
t h e overly eager pronouncements of the s.. a so dIsagree with
reality. We should be very clear her Th deathdof as an empirical
, e. e mo ern state cont1l1ues to exercise
284
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP
jurisdictional authority, the power to sanction and to legitimately use force
vis-a-vis those in its territory. Full citizenship in the state remains a very
important form of membership, security, status and power.
Nevertheless, the international system of states no longer grants exclusive
sovereignty over internal or external matters to any polity. The nation-state
correctly insist, the capacity of such states to act in fully autonomous ways
in such areas as the environment, the economy and even defense has been
seriously undermined. So has the normative legitimacy of imputing absolute
or exclusive sovereignty to such states over inhabitants of the territory they
continue to control. Claims to justice that caU for moral and legal interven-
emerged, as has the insistence that states have obligations (for example in
environmental policy) toward those outside its borders (O'NeilI, 1996; Pogge,
1992; Soysal, 1994).
Moreover, the drastic increase in transnational migration has rendered
anachronistic the assumption (central to the republican model) that those
present in the state are, for the most part, its citizens. So is the expectation
that to have rights one has to become a full citizen and assimilate to the
dominant cultural model. In the previous paradigm, all that equality required
for permanent residents was that blockages to the opportunity to acquire
citizenship and to assimilate be removed. Today, however, the challenge of
makes this expectation (cultural assimilation as a right but also as a precondi-
'
tion for rights and equal treatment) both practically and morally untenable.
So does the claim to rights by non-citizens who have no intention or desire
to become citizens of the place where they reside even for a large part of
their working lives.
and see that legal personhood can and should be disassociated from citizenship
status as a principle of membership in a discrete state or polity. It is not
enough to disassociate the rights of citizenship from ascriptive (ethnoracial)
criteria of belonging. Rather, we have to acknowledge the disaggregation
of the three components of the citizenship and renounce the goal of resyn-
the sizing them on a single political level of either a mega-state or, even more
far-fetched, a world government.
Instead I want to make a normative case for the partial disaggregation
and reinstitutionalization of the three components of the citizenship principle
on different levels of governance. We must, in short, abandon the modern
ideal (and ideology) of unified, uniform citizenship with each component
mapped onto the same institutional level and protected by the same sovereign
legaVpolitical instance. Once we take the step of disassociating legal person-
hood from citizenship status in a discrete state, once we see that the various
dimensions of citizenship are open to a variety of new combinations, the
285
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
appropriate institutionalizations of each level can come into view so that
new meaning can be given to the dimensions of legal standing, democratic
participation, identity and belonging.
Some progress has already been made. It has long been the case that
non-citizens enjoy legal rights. The expansion in the past four decades of the
range of civil rights that residents enjoy (from freedom to associate and
assemble, to social rights, and even to vote locally) and the explicit articulation
of the principle of the right to have rights (and a legal persona) for non-
citizens and even illegal aliens in various international and national codes
can be understood as a healthy and desirable disassociation of the status of
legal personhood from one's citizenship status (Soysal, 1994). Indeed, many
rights that used to be construed exclusively as the rights of citizens are now
deemed to be rights of persons that must be respected everywhere. Resident
non-citizens have not only the most basic civil rights but also the rights to
freedom of speech, assembly, association and even claims to social rights,
cultural expression and local voting (Soysal, 1994). Thus the further exten-
sion and enrichment of the civil component of the citizenship principle
discussed by Marshall is on the international agenda even though each step
is hotly contested and despite reversals.
States are coming increasingly under the pressure of international agree-
ments, supranational courts, transnational institutions, including regional
federations, to acknowledge and protect human rights. This emergent inter-
national regime signals the diminished legitimacy of claims to exclusive and
absolute territorial sovereignty of the nation-state: national constitutions,
parliaments, governments and courts are no longer necessarily the highest
authority when it comes to basic rights.
Indeed, vis-a-vis supranational courts and the quasi-governmental bodies
of regional federations, 'citizenship' has come to mean legal personhood and
legal standing, not active membership in a demos delimited with respect to
a territorially defined polity. The mUltiple levels of belonging and member-
ship that are involved transcend the modern citizenship paradigm. I have
already said that one aspect of this complex situation is the ability of persons
to enjoy a wide range of rights in states in which they are not citizens and do
not have or demand the same political status as full citizens. Another is the
right of individuals or groups (such as indigenous peoples and minorities) who
are citizens of the member states to appeal to supranational courts and other
political bodies to protect their rights against their own polities. This, together
with the increasing importance of the decisions made by the quasi-governmental
organs developed through regional treaties, indicates the degree to which
rights and powers are being disassociated from 'sovereign' states and the
importance of understanding where their claims to legitimacy come from.
Liberal cosmopolitans are quick to point out that civil as distinct from
political society has taken the lead in reviving human rights discourses
including the crucial idea that everyone has the right to have rights (legal
286
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP
protection and legalpersonhood) (Falk, 1992; Held, 1995). for
expanding rights irrespective of citizenship status, for new sorts of nghts and
for new forms of protections for rights emerge first from civil rather than
from political actors (Alter, 1996). For civil society is a locus for the spont-
aneous development of free association, civil publics and new powers.
Civil actors establish connections and relations that render economic and
technological interdependencies 'social', as the proliferation today on the
transnational level of a wide and highly articulated range of associations,
non-governmental organizations, networks, interconnected publics and social
movements witnesses. Thus a context is being created in which people can
act in concert as peers, exchange opinions and develop the civic competence
and trust needed for exercising influence on political entities, administrative
bodies and courts. The relations established by international civil society are
what carry and give political weight to the universalist dimension of human
rights discourses.
The more important supranational organizational structures become, the
more important the role of international civil society is in monitoring, gain-
ing access to and influencing them and keeping them open to the concerns
of relevant publics.
Thus supranational courts and the administrative/political bodies of
regional federations do not function in a vacuum, but they do lack the demo-
cratic legitimacy that courts and legislative bodies on the level of the
constitutional territorial state enjoy. The only meaningful way to rectify this
legitimization deficit is to construe such quasi-governmental institutions as
the receptors of influence from civil society and to institutionalize access to
these along with forums for public debate. But this influence not only has
to be institutionalized, it must also be 'legitimate' in the sense of following
certain standards. For this we must recognize the increased importance of
human rights discourses and supranational courts in such a constellation.
From the point of view of the liberal cosmopolitan, the most important
development in this regard is the emergence of supranational legal regimes
that take cognizance of interdependency by acknowledging new subjects of
international law ranging all the way from individuals, indigenous peoples,
and oppressed groups to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These
developments enable cosmopolitans to parry the charges of foundationalism
and abstract, empty moralistic universalism. The referent of human rights
is no longer a mere moral ought, a 'worldless' humanity stripped of all bonds,
relationships and context. Rather, human rights discourse now have a context
(various interdependencies) and refer to real subjects. This implies that the
appropriate symbolic referent of legal personhood is not the territorial state
but, rather and after all, a globally interrelated humanity whose rights are
articulated in international discourses and defended by a multiplicity of legal
and political instances (Cohen, 1996). The diversity of levels of governance
articulating and backing up rights is the key innovation here.
287
 - ------wHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
Indeed it is the case that the legitimacy of rights now lies at
level the order. The transnational discourse of human
nghts m international law and incorporated increasingly in
(regIOnal) covenants and national constitutions, backed up by
courts, and monitored by a range of NGOs provides a norma-
tive framework that constrains governmental actors, even if it remains the
case .that states. are. the entities that implement civil and political rights and
proVIde for s?cIal nghts (Alter, 1996). In short, human rights discourses are
now a pervasI:e. feature Of. global public culture. Their effectiveness goes well
morahstIc exhortatIOn: they constitute an international symbolic order,
a pohtlcal-cultural framework, and an institutional set of norms and rules
for the global system that orients and constrains states. , transversal domain of social relations characterized through the continually
The fact that these discourses refer to the rights of man rather than citizens
should not be I?isconstrued. It does not return us to natural law dogma, to
empty .or t? foundationalist forms of justification. But it does
leave us a question: If the new international institutions render discourses
of .human nghts effective, what serves to ground either the principle of
ul1lversal human nghts or particular interpretations and institutionalizations
of them?
In best analysis of political meaning and possible justification of
the of human nghts that I know, Claude Lefort argues that it is
preCIsely the mdeterminacy of the concept of man as the subiect of h
. ht th . 'b'I' J uman
ng s, e ImpossI I Ity of once and for all the content of human rights,
the fact that and certamly no governmental instance can occupy the
place from o.ne could claim full authority to grant rights, that gives
to nghts dIscourses their 'groundless ground' and their political
creative
. h . . thrust (Lefort, 1986). The indeterminacy of the discourse of h urn an'
ng IS Its greatest .advantage. Instead of opposing the 'concrete' rights of
to nghts of man like Burke, instead of attempting to show
that the Illdetermlllacy of the concept of man entails specific content _ man
as member of the nation, or man as the atomistic, natural, needy individual
or even man as pouvoir constituant - Lefort suggests that one should
construe human belllgs. - the referent of such discourses - simply as those
declare and recogl1lze one another's rights and press for their realization
III law (Lefort, 1986).
Human rights discourses are part of the same symbolic universe as demo-
both :say' that we grant to one another the possibility of
nghts which have not yet been institutionalized or incorporated
III particular body politic. The abstractness of 'man' entails the contest-
abilIty of who belongs. this 'we' and what precisely his or her rights are
(Lefo.rt, 986). Indeed It IS the availability of this discourse that allows the
marglllahzed and the excluded to claim inclusion, those who are treated
to challenge discrimination, and those who are silenced to exercise
vOice.
288
CHANGING OF CITIZENSHIP
This understanding of the discourse of human rights cannot be grounded
in a transhistorical' principle nor does it derive its justification from
membership in a particular polity. But it has a context and a
nonetheless. In answer to the unavoidable question of 'who' man as dIstmct
from the citizen is, Karl Marx answered that 'man' is the member of civil
society. Indeed Marx was right, although he badly misunderstood the
of the modern form of the social (Marx, 1972; Cohen, 1982). WhIle he
grasped that modern society is disincorporated, and hence can no longer be
represented as a totality that transcends its parts, he nevertheless tended to
base the new form of social relations on the model of the market economy.
That was the mistake. Instead, one must represent modern civil society as a
shifting establishment of contacts, relationships, associations, networks and
publics which can be expanded across locales, regions and borders, and 'of
which individuals are the terms but which confer on those individuals their
identity just as much as they are produced by them' (Lefort, 1986: 257).
I have thus far given a liberal interpretation and justification for a dis-
aggregated 'postmodern' paradigm of citizenship. Nevertheless, I do want
to place myself in the camp of liberal cosmopolitans who hypostattze the
juridical component of citizenship on the misleading that we
can make do with legal and administrative guarantees of human nghts and
legal personhood while ignoring issues of democratic participation, symbolic
identity and legitimacy. Certainly the developments just discussed give body
to the idea of universal human rights, institutionalizing them in a number
of instances without reincorporating right and power on a single level (Lefort,
1986). The proliferation of instances (courts, various types of federation
and pacts among polities) on the post- and international level articulating and
protecting the human rights of persons is indeed noteworthy.
But even with such support, civil society cannot 'monitor' or influence these
institutions or existing states on its own. Indeed, civil society itself requires
monitoring. Civil organizations can be exclusionary, unjust, and anti-egalitarian,
as we all know. Global justice requires attentiveness to the factors of exclu-
sion and inequality in civil as well as political society. For this, and in order
to keep states just, the democratic component remains indispensable in my
view. Yet, as we have seen, it will always require a particular mode of iden-
tification to have any motivating force. Of course, the democratization of all
existing states and emergent regional polities should accompany the develop-
ment of supranational institutions of justice. But the crucial issue would then
be to distinguish between the set of rights that should belong to citizens as
members of a discrete polity, the rights associated with residence and the set
of rights that should belong to everyone.
What place should the democratic component of the citizenship principle
have in a postmodern, disaggregated paradigm of citizenship applied to a
political universe where institutional powers and sovereignties enunciating
289
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
and partially defining rights exist on multiple levels and which renounces
the phantasm of a final absolute authority incorporating right power and
embodying the of the whole? Let me try to approach ;his qu;stion
from a democrattc cIvIc-republican point of view.
Recall that the .here is with participation, the ideal of self-government,
the legItImacy of law and policy. If full citizenship in a state
IS to contmue to have any meaning in a postmodern paradigm, its core would
have to be democratic participation, involving at the very least the right to
vote a?d f?r and hence to participate (directly or though rep re-
m legls!atIOn and policymaking. Citizenship from this perspective
mvolves the exerCIse of power and not only of influence. , be attended to. A key objection to liberal cosmopolitanism is that as the
. Bu.t who then decides who gets to enjoy full democratic citizenship I:ights
m thIS sense and on what basis? Membership in the active demos must as
w,e sa,:", be and it has an irreducible ethical and
dImensIOn to It. IdenttficatIon with one another as a demos, as a democratic
with. in common, and with a shared fate is necessary
to mottvate parttclpatIOn and solidarity among the citizenry. Moreover the
demos cannot initially be defined through democratic procedures without
infinite regress regarding who is an initial member.
conclude that history and tradition supply the answers
here: Identtty of and its thickness are not chosen but given. If
the pohttcal commumty WIshes to condition membership on commonalties
time, if it wi.shes to preserve its cultural identity through polit-
Ical means, It has every nght to do so in this approach.
The democratic civic republican, however, would insist that the relative
thickness of national identity be open to democratic redefinition and hence
coul? be open and receptive to diversity than
tradltIonahst commumtanan would prefer, should the demos so decide.
the ?em?cratic be 'postmodern' and 'disaggre-
gated from thIS pomt .of VIew, IS m the readmess (already exhibited by Arendt)
to acknowledge the nght of everyone to full citizenship somewhere. This is
of .a moral ,PrinCiple that would have to constrain ever;
demos s . The hberal and republican approach could converge
even more If the pnnclple of non-discrimination also informed whatever
criteria the demos articulated regarding access to citizenship so as to avoid
unjustifiable exclusions. Finally, there are good democratic as well as liberal
avoiding the permanent presence of a large immigrant popula-
tIon that IS permanently denied access to citizenship: this tends to turn
democracy despotic (the mle of privileged 'peers' over a subject minority or
even majority).
Beyond these strictures, however, the understanding of the thickness or
thinness of the identity of the demos would have to be left to the democratic
political process to decide. This is where the democratic dimension of the
citizenship principle has to lead. If, however, the above principles are observed
290
CHANGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZENSHIP
by every self-governing democratic polity, and if the basic rights of non-
citizens as well as citizens are respected and backed up by supranational
instances, including their right to exercise voice in civil publics, then the
exclusiveness of the demos would be tempered in an important way. After
all, political freedom always presupposed personal autonomy, at least for
the citizenry, even if the justification for personal freedom through the doc-
trine of rights had to wait for modern liberal theorists. It is democracy that
opens a creative and permanent tension between the person and the citizen,
the juridical and the political.
But there is one more concern of the democratic civic republican that must
human rights that are enunciated on the supranational level, backed up by
courts and other governmental instances, become more extensive, the less is
left to the demos of any polity to do. This makes the democratic component
of the citizenship principle paper-thin and cheapens participation. It would,
moreover, violate the principles of democratic legitimacy to leave the speci-
fication of all or the most basic rights up to courts, lawyers and bureaucrats.
The starting point for a disaggregated model of citizenship and the im-
perative behind the articulation of universal rights of persons is the presence
of large numbers of non-citizens in most countries and hence the impos-
sibility of pretending that all those subject to or affected by the law (given
interdependency) are also its authors. Consequently, the rights of non-citizens
have not been elaborated as special rights but as universal rights to which,
as indicated earlier, citizens themselves make claim, triggering the interven-
tion of supranational courts on their behalf against their own states. There
is no convincing democratic argument against the legal personhood of non-
citizens. However, when the articulation of universal rights applies to the
citizenry as well, this raises the legitimate fear that in the long run there will
be nothing left for the demos to decide. The demos, in order to be politically
autonomous, must have the competence to articulate and specify certain
principles, certain areas and certain key rights regarding the citizenry, other-
wise democracy is eviscerated.
Thus even in the postmodern disaggregated conception, there remains a
tension between the various components of the citizenship principle: the
liberal and democratic components, not to mention the identity dimension,
pull in opposite directions. But I believe that in the disaggregated model
the tensions can be reduced if the ideal of exclusive state sovereignty and
territoriality is abandoned, if a plurality of instances of governance are
acknowledged, and if some key rights are articulated and justified in the civil
public spaces of transnational civil society and guaranteed by the supranational
instances of a partly post-national international regime. Sovereignty must
be made ever more democratic and guided by principles of justice. Serious
reflection on the institutional structure, competencies and powers of the
components of the emergent supranational regime, especially of supranational
291
 -[
WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CHANGI NG PARADIGMS, OF CITIZENSHIP
I

courts and the quasi-governmental bodies of regional federations but also

of member states, is now crucial.
·
same t Ime eac h state's sovereignty
. d' be tempere d by the rules of the
could

New meaning can certainly be given to the multiple levels of belonging, federation and elements of the citizenship
the various loci of identity (local, national, regional, global), the differing My pomt IS that on I ft tionalized on independent levels of
principle are dIsag.gregated and I fng and backing them up will they
forms of participation and the intersecting complexes of rights, duties and overnance with different powers at ICU a l . n roduc-
loyalties that characterize multicultural polities existing in a global context.
able to counter the flaws to tte rights
But we must honestly acknowledge that the distribution of competencies in p
specifying rights is an issue that can only be resolved politically. Hopefully tively as mutual . or ex:m l:eady diminished the opposition
this will be done democratically, informed as much as possible by con- of persons from the of a: a reater separation of the identity
siderations of justice. We will avoid the Scylla of foundationalism and the between citizen and allowmg f citizenship principle. It is only
Charybdis of democratic despotism only if we acknowledge that substance
and process, justice and democracy are in a recursive relationship to/each
d;;'"
principles of justice (equal an public life) to be mutually
other. The assertion of basic rights in civil public spaces requires moral principle of democracy (partiCIpatory pan y d
justification through the giving of substantive reasons and free argumenta- reinforcing and to inform everyone's conception of the goo .
tion. An independent judiciary to protect rights is crucial. But so are
democratic political institutions that legislate and make policy in light of
Note
publicly justifiable reasons (Gutman and Thompson, 1997). Democracy
cannot guarantee justice, but neither can moral justification appeal to some b' L w School and Nadia Urbinati of Columbia
I thank Gerald Newman of Col.u.m la . a r hel ful comments on an earlier
absolute truth that exists independently of consensus. University'S Department of pohtIcak exa me to deliver this article
My abstract discussion of the logic of citizenship on a 'postmodern' para- draft of this article. I also thank Je D , t th 1998 ISA meeting in Montreal.
at the plenary session on 'Ethnos and emos a e
digm has institutional implications. I would like to suggest that instead of
assuming that the future will entail either a new system of sovereign federal
mega-states, a return to liberally national nation-states, a world government, References
or some sort of cosmopolitan world legal one must imagine a com- , n Court's Political Power: The Emergence of an
Alter, Karen (1996) The Europea . h E n Union' West European Politics
bination of the elements of all of these. The idea of world government in Authoritative International Court 111 t e uropea ,
which liberal and democratic considerations would merge is both implausible
and undesirable since it would threaten political diversity. As already stated, (1995) 'Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy',
quasi-governmental institutions must be open to the influence of civil society. Lml'. RI eVieldl' (1995) Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge:
Archlbugl, Dame e an , ,
Governmental structures on the national, supra- and subnationallevels must
have 'receptors' for this influence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that political Polity Hannah
Arendt, Press. (1949) 'The RIghts
. 0
f M an.. What Are They?'. , Modern Review 3(1):
parties might emerge on the supranationallevel to supplement national par- 24-37. .
ties and help to articulate and redesign political institutions in a democratic Arendt, Hannah (1963) On Revolution. New rk' Harcourt Brace
direction, as Habermas hopes. Institutional redesign that makes federations Arendt, Hannah (1973) The Origins of Totahtanamsm. New Yo .
more democratic and states more open to norms articulated on higher levels
and to the diversity emerging internally is also called for. Jovanovich. k 0 f, d' Oxford University Press.
Aristotle (1981) The Politics, ed: e\l' Democracy, Community
But it is not necessary to envisage federations replacing the territorial state. Bader, Veight (1995) 'Ci.tizenship al\h Political Theory 23(2):
Instead we must be open to a plurality of forums, and of modes of institu- and Justice, or What IS Wrong WI
tionalizing voice on the supranationallevel. Existing state jurisdictions would 211-46. C' . I' N w York' SUNY Press.
certainly retain control in many areas and be the instances that implement Beiner, Ronald, ed. (1995) in 'France and Germany.
many rights and norms articulated on other political and legal levels (covenants, Brubaker, Rogers (1992) 1lI! an a
b'd MA- Harvard Umverslty Press. ..
court decisions and so forth). Democratic, constitutional nation-states could CoCam
hen, JfteangeL' . (19'82) Class and Civil Society: The Limits of the Marxian Cnt/que.
remain a level of political identification for the local citizenry. But new iden-
tities and new forms of representation could follow new institutionalizations, Amherst: University of d the Modern Form of the Social:
L (1996) 'Rights CItIzens Ip an
complicating the levels of belonging and allegiance in salutary ways. At the of' Arendtian Constellations 3(2): 164-85.

292 293
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CHANGING PARADIGM& OF CITIZENSHIP

Falk, Richard (1992)"Evasions of Sovereignty', in R. Falk (ed.) Explorations at the Pogge, T. W. (1994) 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', in C. Brown (ed.)
Edge of Time. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, pp. 89-112. London and New York.
Ferrajoli, L. (1996) 'Beyond Sovereignty and Citizenship: A Global Constitution- Routledge. .
alism?', in Richard Bellamy (ed.) Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty, Poli, S. George (1991) Policy and Politics in the European Commul1lty, 2nd edn.
pp. 151-60. Brookfield: Avebury. 'I Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gutman, Amy and Thompson, Dennis (1997) 'Disagreeing about Deliberative Preuss, Ulrich (1996) 'Prospects of a Constitution for Europe', Constellations 3(2):
Democracy', Pegs: The Good Society 7(3): 11-15.
209-24. . .
Habermas, Jurgen (1992) 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional Ruggie, John (1993) 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing ModernIty m
State', in Amy Gutman (ed.) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An International Relations', International Organization 47(1): 139-74.
Essay by Charles Taylor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sassen, Saskia (1996) Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization.
Habermas, Jurgen (1993) Justification and Application. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. New York: Columbia University Press. . .
Habermas, Jurgen (1995) 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on Shklar, Judith (1995) American Citizenship. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ulllverslty
the Future of Europe', in R. Beiner (ed.) Theorizing Citizenship, pp. 255-82. Albany, Press. .
NY: SUNY Press. Soysal, Yasemin (1994) The Limits of Citizenship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Habermas, Jurgen (1996a) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Press. .
Habermas, Jurgen (I996b) 'The European Nation State, its Achievement and its Tamir, Yael (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Pril1ceton UniverSIty. Press.
Limitations. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship' Ratio Juris Taylor, Charles (1992) Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition'. Prmceton,
9(2): 125-37. '
NJ: Prince ton University Press. .
Held, David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: from the Modern State to Tilly, Charles (1995) 'Citizenship, Identity and Social History', International ReView
Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. of Social History 40 (Supplement 3): 1-17.
Hollinger, David (1995) Post-Ethnic America. New York: Basic Books. Viroli, Maurizio (1995) For Love of Country. Oxford: Press. .,.
Honneth, Axel (1995) The Struggle for Recognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Waldron, Jeremy (1995) 'Minority Cultures and the CosmopolItan Alternat!ve ,.m
Press. Will Kymlicka (ed.) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford Ulllverslty
Kymlicka, Will and Norman, Wayne (1995) 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Press.
Recent Work on Citizenship Theory', in R. Beiner (ed.) Theorizing Citizenship. Walzer Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Whelal;, Frederick G. (1983) 'Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundar.y
Lefort, Claude (1986) 'Politics and Human Rights', The Political Forms of Modern Problem', in 1. R. Pel1nock (ed.) Liberal Democracy. New York: New York Ulll-
Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
versity Press.
Lind, Michael (1995) The Next American Nation. New York: Free Press.
Thomas (1991) 'Practical Discourse: On the Relation of Morality to
Politics, Ideals and Illusions, pp. 181-99. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marshall, T. H. (1964) Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday.
Marx, Karl (1972) 'On The Jewish Question', The Marx Engels Reader. New York:
Norton.
Mendovitz, Saul H. and Walker, R. B. 1., eds (1990) Contending Sovereignties:
Redefining the Political Community. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.
Miller, David (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neuman, Gerald L. (1996) Strangers to the Constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha (1996) 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in Joshua Cohen (ed.)
For Love of Country. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
O'Neill, On ora (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Petit, Philip (1997) Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pocock,1. G. A. (1995) 'The Idea of Citizenship Since Classical Times', in R. Beiner
(ed.) Theorizing Citizenship, pp. 29-53. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Pogge, T. W. (1992) 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', Ethics 103: 48-75.

294 295

16
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
David Miller l
Source: Political Studies, 43 (1995),432-50.
!dea of citizenship has played a prominent role in recent
debate. But how is common citizenship possible in
societIes seem prone to cultural fragmentation
along an? other lines? The paper distinguishes three
conceptIOns of Cltlzensh!p - liberal, libertarian and republican
- asks how far each IS able to respond to cultural pluralism
conception, exemplified by Rawls, interprets
ship 111 terms of a set of principles that everyone has reason
to Rawls fai!s. to show why everyone should give
pnonty to. the perspective as he defines it. The
Iibertanan conceptIOn views the citizen as a rational consumer
who .through con.tract and choice can gain access to a range of
public g.oods. This caters to pluralism, but at the cost of erod-
I11g the Idea of ?itizenship as a common status enjoyed by all
members of society. The republican conception sees the citizen
as who plays an active role in shaping his or her
through public discussion. Contrary to the claims of
cntlcs such as.I. M. this does not require the imposition
of norms of Impartiality and pUblicity which exclude certain
cultural. groups. conception offers the best prospect of
developl11g a politICal consensus to which all groups can
subscnbe
The problem of and pluralism is easy to state but very difficult
to solve. Its premIse IS the cultural fragmentation of modern states M b
f th t . . em ers
o ese s. ates. a.re m the 'process of adopting an ever more disparate set of
personal IdentItIes, as eVIdenced by their ethnic affiliations theI'r l'el' .
11' h" , IglOuS
a t views of personal morality, their ideas about what is valu-
able ,m bfe: theIr tastes in art, music and so forth. In all these areas there is
less convelgence or agreement than there once was. Yet at the same time the
296
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
individuals and groups having these fragmented identities need to live together
politically, and this means finding some common basis or reference point
from which their claims on the state can be judged. Citizenship is supposed
to provide this reference point. Our personal lives and commitments may be
very different, but we are all equally citizens, and it is as citizens that we
advance claims in the public realm and assess the claims made by others. Yet
if fragmentation is as far-reaching as the premise implies, how is it possible
for us to share a common identity as citizens? We may share a common legal
status, a formally-defined set of rights and obligations, but how can we agree
about what it means to he a citizen, what rights and obligations ought to be
included in the legal status, and beyond that how we ought to behave when
occupying the role of citizen? The very state of affairs that makes common
citizenship so important to us seems at the same time to expose it as a
pipe-dream.
This view of citizenship as a unifying force in a divided world has appealed
recently to political thinkers both of the centre-right and of the centre-left,
although the underlying motivation has been somewhat different in the
two cases. The new-found enthusiasm of conservatives for the idea of citizen-
ship arises from a belated recognition that the individualism associated with
the free market is not a sufficient basis on which to hold a society together.
If the role of the state is cut back, and each person encouraged to behave
as a self-sufficient individual, two problems may arise. One is that people
cease to take an interest in the welfare of those around them in the local
community, so that those not able to stand on their own feet in the market-
place will have no means of assistance when state support is withdrawn.
The other is that individualism may take the form of criminal activity,
whether common-or-garden crime of the kind revealed in the steadily rising
figures for burglaries, car thefts and so forth, or the more sophisticated
activities of insider dealing on the stock market, corporate raiding and the
like. What is needed in both cases, conservatives will argue, is a reassertion
of moral values and social responsibility, and the citizen is portrayed as a
person who sticks to the rules of the economic game while at the same time
performing acts of public service such as charitable work in his or her local
community.2
For the centre-left, by contrast, the rediscovery of citizenship has coincided
with the gradual dissolution of the working class as a potential majority basis
for social democratic politics. If it is no longer possible to appeal to the
interests of a unified working class to defend redistributive economic policies,
or the provision of social welfare, then some other basis is needed. Citizen-
ship is the obvious candidate: economically our positions may be increasingly
divergent, but we are all citizens, and as such we are entitled to provision
by the state of a minimum income, health care and so forth. Moreover an
appeal to citizenship is needed to weld together the array of social groups
that are now looked to in order to secure the election of a social democratic
297
 --WHAT TS- CITIZENSHIP?
government - such 'as the residual working class welfare claimants ethnic
women. It is not possible t; create a political piatform
simply by appealmg to the special interests of each group, There have to
be some general principles which can both incorporate and harmonize the
of these constituencies.' The idea of citizenship, it is hoped, will
proVide Just such a set of principles,3
This coincidence of interest between Right and Left has created a climate
of for citizenship a political concept, which in the British
case m the, I.ate led to the establishment of a cross-party
CommissIOn on CItizenship whICh came up with a set of recommendations
for, as its report was entitled, Encouraging Citizenship (London, HMSO,
1990). Among these were proposals for citizenship education in schools and
proposals to encourage and co-ordinate volunteer activity on a nation:wide
baSIS. as number of commentators at the time pointed out, agreement
cl.tIzenshlp was a Good Thing may have been bought at the cost of
meradlca?le about what precisely the idea was supposed to mean.
If bnef. above is correct, quite disparate conceptions
of cItizenship were mvoked m the course of party-political debate, So we are
left
core Idea0: two o,ne to see whether there is indeed a single
IS bemg mvoked by the various camps, or whether
we sho.uld mstead thmk m terms of different conceptions of citizenship; the
other IS to see any of the available conceptions can cope with
of pluralism - whether they can provide an understanding of
cItizenship that can the kind of radical cultural disagreement
I gestured towards at the begmnmg of the paper,
Before beginning to tackle these problems, it is worth noticing that uncer-
tainty over the meaning of citizenship is not confined to members of the
pOlit,ical elite. There is some interesting research by Conover, Crewe and
Seanng on how members of the public in the US and Great Britain think
about their right,S, and identities as citizens,4 I shall not attempt a full
of their findmgs, but the following points are worth noting here.
FlI'St, understandings citizenship in both countries were shaped
the status of cItizens in each, people did not on the whole
thmk of as entirely by their legal rights and obligations
:- they an ethical element in citizenship as well, an idea of what
It. should Imply for social and political practice, Second, there was substantial
about what. citizenship amounted to - some understanding it
m ,terms of a notion of civic rights, others having a more
commumtanan understandmg of citizenship as entailing responsibilities to
the common good through active participation in the community's
ThIS suggests that; although citizenship may not be a word on everybody's
lips from day to day, It has a certain political resonance - when asked to say
what it means (in th,is in the context of an open-ended group discussion)
people are able to give fairly elaborate accounts, It also suggests, as we might
298
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
have anticipated, that theoretical disagreement about the meaning of citizen-
ship is reflected in popular understandings of the idea,
The liberal conception of citizenship
In order to tackle this disagreement, I am going to distinguish three concep-
tions of citizenship, which I shall label liberal, libertarian and republican,5
These are not the only possible ways of understanding citizenship,6 but what
unites them for present purposes, as I shall try to show, is that each can claim
with some plausibility to accommodate pluralism of the kind described at
the beginning of the paper. I begin with the liberal view because it seems to
me the dominant understanding, both in the literature of political theory
and in public opinion as revealed by the study cited above. However it runs
into difficulties when faced with the challenge of pluralism, and this para-
doxically may lead one towards either the libertarian or the republican view.
The main lines of the liberal conception can be seen in the classic statement
by T. H. Marshall. 7 Citizenship should be understood as a set of rights
enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question. In
analysis these are classified as civil rights, political rights and SOCial
When fully developed it embodies an idea of social justice: everyone IS to
enjoy entitlements which stand apart from and to some extent conflict with
the outcomes of a market economy driven by considerations of efficiency.
Citizenship carries potentially redistributive implications: citizens are entitled
to benefits such as free health care and free schooling for their children which
they might not be able to afford out of their market earnings. (Marshall
stresses however that there is a definite limit to the equalizing tendency of
citizenship.) It not seen as involving any particular pattern of activity.
Although citizens enjoy equal political rights, nothing is said about how
zealously they are supposed to exercise them. Marshall presupposes that the
bundle of rights constituting citizenship is, or at least has become,
of common agreement. Writing in the relatively homogeneous Bntam of
1950, he is preoccupied with the relationship between citizenship and class
inequalities, and can assert confidently that 'Citizenship requires a bond of
a different kind, a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty
to a civilization which is a common possession'. 8 This common civilization
would set the standard for, in particular, the social rights of citizenship;
it would define a minimum level of education, income, housing and so forth
that citizens must have as part of their common heritage.
Marshall's view runs into difficulties, however, once the idea of a common
civilization is challenged by the emergence of radical cultural pluralism,9 If
there is no longer a shared 'common heritage' or 'way of life' by reference
to which citizens' rights can be defined, how are we to arrive at the concep-
tion of social justice that defines citizenship? It is from this perspective that
I am going to consider the work of John Rawls, whose recent writing in
299

WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
particular can be seen as an attempt to develop a conception of citizenship
response to what he calls 'the fact of pluralism' - the fact that 'the diver-
of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines found
m modern societies is ,not a mere historical condition that may
soon pass away; It IS a permanent feature of the public culture of demo-
In light.of,this Rawls aims to delineate a political conception
of whICh WIll specIfy a point of view from which all citizens can
one another whether or not their political institutions are
JUst. : : . QuestIons of justice can be discussed on the same basis by
CItIzens, theIr social position, or more particular aims and
mterests, or theIr religIOUS, philosophical or moral views'."
It ma,Y not i.n what sense Rawls' theory of justice represents a
of cItIzenshIp, In his earlier presentations of the theory, most
A .T(leory of Justice, justice is identified as the set of principles that
ratIOnal cou!d endorse to fix the terms of social co-operation,
Although the pnnclples I?clude rights of citizenship, it seems that the parties
wh? the hypothe.tIcal contract are simply human agents advancing
theIr conceptI?ns. of the good life. In later presentations, however,
Rawls that the,pnnclples of justice are developed for people who are
already cItIzens .o,f a liberal-democratic state: they are supposed to think of
themselves as and Rawls aims to show them what they are more
concretely commItted to when they adopt this perspective, One sign of th'
shift, ?f is Rawls in his later writings always uses the
?f clt!ze?S?Ip: Theory Justice the subjects of his theory are
men or now (as m the above quotation) they are always
. More substantIally, the theory of justice is no longer regarded as
?emg.a account of what people can justly demand of one another
m ,th.elr s?cIal life, but as a. specifically political conception of justice, where
thIS ImplIes not only subject matter is a society's political arrange-
ments (as opposed to Its SOCIal or domestic arrangements) but also that it is
addressed to people who have taken up the role of citizen, The arguments
that Rawls advances for the theory presuppose that this perspective has
already been adopted,
T? put this .another way, Rawls now sees the members of liberal demo-
cracles. as havmg a d?uble identity. In their personal or private capacity
they ale as. conceptIOn of the good, a view about what a
valuable lIfe consists m, WhICh may include, for instance their personal tast
' 1" b I' ,es
or t helr re IgI?US e lefs. This conception is pursued in day-to-day life and
the basIs of the many voluntary associations that flourish in a liberal
society. Rawls that these conceptions of the good are radically diver-
and there IS no prospect of people coming to agree about what is of
ulhmate value t? them. In their capacity as citizens, by contrast, people are
cap,able reachmg agreement on principles of justice which will then govern
theu' polItIcal arrangements - the constitution and so forth. Moreover, Rawls
300
- r
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
claims citizen identities should take precedence over personal identities in
the that people will agree to confine the pursuit of their conceptions
of the good within the bounds prescribed by the principles of justice. Thus
my religion may demand that, say, no commercial activity should take place
on the Sabbath. My co-religionists and I will respect this norm ourselves,
but we will not attempt to pass legislation making it mandatory for those
who do not share our beliefs. We think of ourselves as citizens first, and as
citizens we implement only measures which we can justify to others who do
not share our personal conceptions of the good.
Clearly Rawls' task is to explain why it is reasonable for all of us to give
citizenship this sort of priority. Before examining his account more closely,
I should explain why I regard it as the paradigm of a liberal theory of citizen-
ship developed in response to the challenge of pluralism. What, for Rawls,
does it mean to be a citizen? It is first of all to adopt a certain perspective
on the world, and then to govern one's behaviour in accordance with prin-
ciples derived from this perspective. The perspective is to see oneself as one
among many free and equal individuals and to acknowledge that the political
society to which these individuals belong must be governed by principles that
all can potentially accept. In other words, I acknowledge that each other
person (a) has his or her own conception of the good life and (b) is as cap-
able as I am of reasoning about principles of justice, and I then ask what
principles we could all accede to. Having arrived at the principles - if Rawls
is right, the famous two principles of justice - I then comply with them in
my day-to-day life, respecting others' rights to free speech, for example, or
according them equal opportunities in the assignment of jobs.
It may strike us straight away that this is a particularly cerebral view
of citizenship. A citizen is just someone who subscribes to a certain set of
principles. Rawls appears to assume that citizens are always citizens of some
national society - this is what determines membership - but this assumption
is kept well hidden in the background, presumably for fear that if it were to
be brought out into the open, it might cause trouble for the distinction be-
tween justice and conceptions of the good. Equally a citizen is not conceived
as being an active participant in politics: although political rights are included
as part of the first principle of justice, so by definition a citizen is someone
who has the right to participate, all that is actually required of him or her
is acknowledgement of the principles of justice. So long as one can adopt
the citizen perspective in thought, one may live an entirely private existence.
Rawls makes this clear when he argues against a strong version of civic
humanism which holds that we are political beings 'whose essential nature
is most fully realized in a democratic society in which there is widespread
and vigorous participation in political life' , and defends the division between
politically active citizens and the rest as good for society 'in the same way as
it is generally beneficial that people develop their different and complemen-
tary talents and skills, and engage in mutually advantageous co-operation' .13
301
- - - - - -
-vv-rn-l.T DSCTTTZE N S HIP?
Participation is required only insofar as it is necessary to protect people's
basic rights and liberties.
Liberal and pluralism
H?w successfully this liberal conception of citizenship deal with plur-
Let us begI? that the citizen identity to which Rawls
to attach IS an unencumbered identity in the following sense:
It IS part of that Ide.nhty that people should regard their private aims and
attachments as contmgent and open to revision. This is made clear wh
·.
RawIs states t hat CItIzens h' en
Ip embodies a conception of the person as having
the power not only to pursue but also to revise their ideas of the
lIfe. 'As free persons, citizens claim the right to view their persons as
mdependent from and as not identified with any particular conception of
gOO?, or. of private ends."4 But he also concedes that people's
IdentItIes. may be encumbered ones. 'They may regard it as simply
unthmkable to themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical,
and moral conVIctIons, or from certain enduring attachments and loyalties."5
In other people say, belong to a certain church or are members
of an ethl1Ic commul1Ity may not see these memberships and the value-
that go with them as even potentially open to revision _ they
are defil1ItIve, for these people, of their personal identity. The problem is to
people whose aI:e in this way should give
to an CItIzen IdentIty which, as we saw, entails restrict-
mg .the ,PursUIt of theIr pnvate goals within the bounds set by the principles
of Why should not the principles of justice themselves be made
responsIve to the demands of an (encumbered) personal identity?
. We can look at the problem in the following way. In a liberal society there are
lIkely to be many people whose personal identities are themselves unencum-
they regard themselves as freely choosing a plan of life according to
theIr and without being inhibited by their ascriptive
or other. unrevIsable attachments. For these people adopting
the costs nothing, because the view of the person they
are leqUlre.d to up IS or less the one they already hold (as Rawls
would It theIr doctrine of the good life already supports
P?I.ltlcal conceptIon of JustIce). But there will also be people whose personal
IdentItIes encumbered, who see themselves as tied to a particular ethnic
group, for mstance, and here. to adopt the citizen perspective is already to
concede a good deal, because It means bracketing off all political claims that
be expressed using the language of liberal citizenship. Yo'u cannot, for
mstance, advance arguments that rely on the truth of a certain religious belief
even though your personal depends precisely on that belief's being true:
J:Ias.Rawls any response .to thIS problem? He invokes the ideal of a society
whlch?s based on free publIc reason, where we live under a set of institutions
302
CITIZENSHIP ANI? PLURALISM
that each of us can justify to the rest, using forms of argument that the
others will find acceptable. But to make this the basis of his argument is
either to make an empirical claim about what is overwhelmingly important
to people - in which case it is surely dubious - or else it is simply to restate
the liberal position. Once you adopt the liberal conception of citizenship, as
Rawls understands it, then you are committed to a certain way of justifying
social and political institutions, but our problem was to see why people whose
personal identities did not support the liberal view spontaneously could be
induced to give it priority. Faced with someone belonging, say, to a funda-
mentalist church who argues that religious moral standards should be
inscribed in law (that homosexuality should be criminalized for instance),
the liberal may say: as a citizen first and foremost you must see that the law
must be based ol} principles that every citizen can accept. But the reply is
equally obvious: why should I see myself as a citizen first and My
first duty is to God, and my political activities must fit in with that pnmary
commitment.
The failure of Rawls' argument here appears to leave a liberal with only
two alternatives. The first is to retreat to a pragmatic defence of liberal institu-
tions. Given the deep-seated nature of the cultural pluralism that formed our
starting point, there is never going to be universal or even perhaps
consensus on any comprehensive doctrine of the good life. In order to aVOId
open conflict between groups, the only option is to adopt liberal institutions
which while emasculating many groups politically, at least gives them the
security of knowing that their personal identities are protected from invasion
by other groups. Since we cannot get the whole loaf, each of us must settle
for half which in this case means a set of rights and liberties that gives each
group least some chance to pursue its own conception of the good life.
Rawls calls this a modus vivendi. It is plainly a less satisfactory defence of
liberal citizenship than the one that he aims for, appealing as it does to
ical prudence. Moreover, as Kymlicka has argued, it is not clear that thIS
defence will necessarily lead to liberal institutions: it might instead point
towards a segmented society in which each group is given the authority to
regulate the affairs of its own members within a general framework of
Kymlicka cites as an example the millet system under the Ottoman empIre,
which was pluralist and stable, but illiberal insofar as the various commun-
ities that co-existed under the system were allowed to impose severe restrictions
on the freedom of their members, in matters of religious belief especially.
The second alternative is to go on to the offensive, admit that liberalism
is a distinct and morally contestable way of life, but declare that it is valu-
able and worth defending politically. This strategy abandons any pretence of
neutrality. Everyone is to be treated as a liberal citizen, and political claims
and demands which do not conform to the liberal model are simply ruled
out as inadmissible. Moreover it is legitimate to attempt by non-coercive
means to channel people's identities in a liberal direction - so for instance
303
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
the liberal may ins'ist on everyone's participating in a liberal form of educa-
tion ",:hich lays emphasis on choice and autonomy. In this way, it is hoped
of the sort which initially posed problems for the liberal view of
cItIzenshIp can be conve.rted into, fl: benign form of pluralism in which every-
one agrees to treat theIr conceptIOn of the good life as a merely private
matter, to be pursued by non-political means.17
Militant liberalism of this type has the virtue of honesty, but its solution
to the problem of pluralism amounts in effect to declaring war on those
groups who are not prepared to accommodate themselves to the liberal under-
of since it no longer tries to give reasons for liberal
whlc? these groups might accept. Members of such groups will
feel abenated from the political realm; their citizenship remains
.a. fO,rmal .. Moreover liberals underestimate the difficulty of
they cannot see how much has to be given
up If people gomg to see their conceptions of the good life as freely
chosen and reVIsable. Communities whose identities are encumbered will
fiercely resist liberalization and, as the American example shows, this resist-
ance can be successful over several generations even in the context of a
society permeated with liberal values.
The libertarian conception of citizenship
For these reasons the liberal conception of citizenship does not constitute a
fully adequate response to pluralism, and we should explore the alternative
conceptions to see whether either of them provides a better solution. What
I shall call the libertarian conception has not to my knowledge been articu-
in the definitive way that Marshall and Rawls have articulated the
conception, but its outlines will I think turn out to be reasonably
to any?ne has. followed recent political debates. I believe, that
IS, somethmg bke the. hbertarian conception of citizenship lies behind
proposals emanatmg from the New Right which aim to alter the
relatIOnship between the individual and the state so that it becomes explicitly
contractual. This will become clearer as I proceed.
The easiest way to introduce the libertarian conception is to ask why from
this perspective, citizenship is needed at all. People seek to satisfy their pre-
ferences and values through private activity, market exchange and voluntary
with like minded individuals. The need for a common framework
only because there are generally desired goods that cannot be obtained
m these ways. Citizenship is not valued for its own sake; we are citizens
only because we demand goods that require public provision. The citizen to
.briefly, is. rational consumer of public goods. As far as possible 'his
actIvItIes as a cItIzen should be modelled on his behaviour in the economic
taken to be a of rationality. In its most extreme version,
thIS means that the state Itself should be regarded as a giant enterprise and
304
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
the citizens as its (voluntary) customers. This view is i.n
Nozick's Anarchy, Siate and Utopia, where the state is seen as ongmatmg.m
the competition of protective associations to provide their customers WIth
rights-enforcement services. More commonly, however, it is recognized that
the state must have a monopoly in the enforcement of basic personal and
property rights, and the citizens are seen as parties to a universal
which gives it that authority. The picture is quite different, however, WIth all
the other goods and services that the state may provide. Here consumer
sovereignty can be implemented by two means: contract, so that the citizen
who feels that she is not getting the service she is entitled to can take legal
action to oblige the agency in question to provide it, and choice, so that the
dissatisfied citizen can turn to some alternative provider, thereby creating a
quasi-market in the service in question. And this allows the libertarian to
respond to pluralism. If citizens differ in their conceptions of value, through
contract and choice each can gain access to his or her preferred bundle of
public goods. Provided the state responds efficiently to the demands of its
customers, the citizens, there is no need to reach agreement in principle about
what the rights of citizens, beyond the minimum set, ought to be.
But this formulation begs a number of important questions. One has to do
with deciding what the demands of citizens actually are. Clearly if the state
provides everyone with an amenity such as a free health or a
system, it is possible to deduce from the use made of the amemty that It IS
of some value to citizens. But we cannot say on this basis alone how much
value is being provided, either to one particular person or to the collectivity
of citizens; we cannot tell, for example, whether they would like more of the
budget to be spent on health care or more on roads. Again, introducing
choice into the system may provide evidence about particular features of
the service being provided that are liked or disliked, but it fails to resolve the
issue of overall value. If female patients when given a choice of doctors
overwhelmingly prefer to be treated by women, this gives state officials
reason to encourage more women to train in medicine, but it tells us nothmg
about the general level at which medical services ought to be provided.
In the case of goods and services which are not public in the technical
sense - goods that are excludable like schooling or health care, or goods l.ike
roads whose users can with technical ingenuity be identified - one solutIOn
is to charge their consumers a fee which covers at least a part of the cost
of providing them. As soon as someone's use of a good or .can .be
quantified, a market or quasi-market can be introduced to proVIde It, WIth
successful suppliers being rewarded with fee income. Either the state can
hand over provision of the good to private firms, or public agencies can be
set up in competition with one another with their budgets being made de-
pendent on their success in attracting customers. .
But let us note the limitations of this solution. If the consumers of pubbc
goods are to be made into genuine customers, this implies that access to such
305
 . - W HA} IS -CITIZENSHIP?
goods will depend upon market-determined incomes. 18 In other words the
character.of citizenship is entirely lost: no longer do free
entItlements serve to offse.t the inequalities of the market, as they
do under the .c.o?ceptl.on. Now a hard-bitten libertarian may
well thIS IS no cntIclsm; smce the kind of rights which would lead
to under Marshall's scheme - social rights, rights to housing,
e?UcatIOn, health care and so forth - have no standing on libertarian prin-
CIples. Even someone who stuck in this way to a strict Nozickian definition
of rights be moved by the observation that people generally
an altrUIstic desI.re their fellow citizens should enjoy living condi-
tions that meet certam mlmmum standards; they should not have to live
roug? on the streets, for instance. If that desire is to be respected, access, to
publIc goods cannot be made to depend entirely on market income. 19 •
. The equally obvious limitation of the citizen-as-customer approach
IS that It cannot apply to cases where citizens want goods that really are
M.any cultural goods are of this character. People want their
S?Clety s way of lIfe to have a certain character: they want it to be non-
vIOlent, or to respect religious beliefs, or to validate collective identities. As
we saw when considering the liberal conception of citizenship, to say that
such values can be pursued in private or through voluntary association is
not an response: it will not satisfy someone who thinks that porno-
?raphY.ls harmfu.l to women to tell them that the decision to use pornography
IS a chOIce, nor can an animal rights activist be assuaged by the
observatIOn that everyone can choose to be a vegetarian. The demand in this
case is for a good which.is public: the society must be pornography-
or respectful of ammals nghts. I am not here endorsing such demands,
may turn out to be impossible to satisfy, but simply under-
lnun? the. that are certain goods which necessarily cannot be
provIded If we mstall the lIbertarian conception of citizenship.
. Faced these problems libertarians may look to a second way of ensur-
mg that cItizens have access to the public goods they want, an alternative to
the fee-paying approach. This is to suggest that the society should encour-
age the formation enclaves within which people are supplied with a package
of goods and serVIces and pay a local tax to cover the cost. 20 The idea
here is that people should exercise choice by moving to the enclave whose
package best answers to their preferences. Thus someone who wants to live
in a community where moral or religious standards are enforced can choose
to do s.o; someone who prefers moral laissez-faire can live elsewhere. One
area have high and a high level of environmental protection
and amemty; another mIght reverse these features; and so on. Citizens here
would exercise consumer choice by moving from enclave to enclave, and they
thereby. preferences even for non-excludable public goods
msofa.r as theIr proVISIOn could be limited more or less to particular geo-
graphIC areas.
306
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
We can readily recognize tendencies in contemporary liberal societies which
point to something like this conception of citizenship. But it faces some
obvious difficulties. There is first of all a simple question of feasibility. Most
people do not have the option of upping sticks and moving to a new neigh-
bourhood because they find the public goods package on offer there more
attractive. They are tied by job and by family connections more or less to
one particular locality. Furthermore, mobility chances are generally much
greater for more affluent citizens. One illustration of this is the much-remarked
flight of the middle classes from the inner cities to suburbs and leafy villages.
This certainly reveals the value people attach to the essentially public good
of living in a safe and attractive physical environment; but the price of
obtaining this can only be paid by a minority of the population.
More serious than these practical issues is the question whether a society
in which citizenship meant nothing more than the right to choose a local
enclave whose package of goods and services suited you best could possibly
be stable. Citizens cannot in the end confine their demands to the local pack-
age. For one thing there are certain to be spillover effects. The vegetarians
in enclave A, where meat-eating is banned, cannot be indifferent to the fact
that when the wind is in the West, the fumes from the abattoir in enclave
B blow over their territory. Other concerns extend by definition to all the
members of a particular society (or even beyond this), such as the concern
that they should not read books which blaspheme against your religion.
Moreover, even if we think that some public goods problems can be solved
by allowing citizens to express their preferences by physical mobility, this
must depend upon a common framework of entitlements covering such things
as rights to education and social security. Without such a framework people
who cannot supply themselves with such basic goods by market exchange
will converge on enclaves with relatively generous schemes of provision,
creating a classic problem of adverse selection. (This problem was illustrated
by the Elizabethan Poor Laws, where in order to prevent parishes offering
more adequate levels of poor relief from being overwhelmed by vagrants, it
was necessary to pass laws confining paupers to the parish of their birth.)
The strength of the libertarian position is that it takes pluralism seriously.
It assumes that people have radically different conceptions of the good life,
and argues that the way to cope with this is to depoliticize citizenship, to
convert the public realm into an ersatz version of the market. People should
exercise consumer choice either through individual contract with public
agencies, or through voting with their feet, moving to the place which gives
them the best kind of collective life. It founders on the fact that citizenship
at its core concerns common rights and goods enjoyed in common. If we try
to privatize or localize the provision of goods that are not in the core, in
other words to pare down the rights of citizenship to the minimum, the effect
may be to weaken people's sense of citizen identity, and to erode the core
itself. If I can avoid the problems of inner-city crime by moving to the
307
 . . . . . . '----Ti>----.:7T 1 I Z; BN S HIP .,
suburbs, to pay for the extra levels of policing necessary to
protect the of those left behind? The libertarian view in the form I
have presented It IS fina!ly unstable: either it embarks on the kind of utopian
that you m last chapter of Nozick's Anarchy, State and
UtoPla, wher,e nothlllg to citizenship but the right to contract into
the ,o,f or else it pulls back to something like the
centre-nght posItIon at the beginning of the paper, which tries to
for t?e of rights of citizenship by morally exhort-
mg people to be good citizens through volunteer activity and the like,
The republican conceptiou of citizenship
The republican conception of citizenship conceives the citizen as
who plays a,n, active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society
debate decision-making,21 It takes the liberal conception
of cItizenship as set of nghts, and adds to it the idea that a citizen must be
who thmks behaves in a certain way, A citizen identifies with
the commumty to which he or she belongs, and is committed to
Its common through active participation in its political life,
Now It might seem that thiS conception is simply obsolete in the face of
Whereas both liberal and libertarian views can be
seen as ?ngm,atmg the fact of disagreement about questions of ultimate
value --: spnngs, as has often been argued, from the ideal of religious
",:hlc,h em,erged in the aftermath of the European wars of religion,
and IIbertanamsm simply takes this ideal to its furthest point - republl' , conditions of maternity leave. The first requirement of deliberation is simply
, h ' camsm
c,on]ures up t e Image of a small homogeneous society with common tradi-
tIons, a shared civil religion and so forth - 4th century Athens or 15th
century FI?rence as mirrored through Rousseau's Social Contract, Insofar as
the cO,nception to something akin to the notion of a
general will - the Idea that CItIzens through debate and discussion can come
to an agreement what ?ught to be done politically - it appears to be
by pluralIsm of the kmd I have been considering, Pluralism excludes
genumely agreement of this kind: the appearance of agreement
can ,be obtamed, force or manipUlation whereby some groups
are to theu' claims within bounds established by the stronger
groups m the polIty,
. This, is cer,tainly the charge laid by such as I. M. Young against the
View, Young argues that, lIke liberals, republicans are committed
an ,Ideal which acts to the disadvantage of those groups
m she as oppressed, including women and ethnic minorities.
She claIms th.at the Ideal of the, civic 'excludes women and other groups
as because ratIOnal and universal status derives only
from .ltS to a ffectlVlty, particularity and the body. Republican
theOl,'lsts mSlsted on the unity of the civic public: insofar as he is a citizen
308
CITIZENSJnp AND PLURALISM
every man leaves behind his particularity and difference, to adopt a universal
standpoint identical for all citizens, the standpoint of the common or
general will. In practice republican politicians enforced homogeneIty by
excluding from citizenship all those defined as different and associated with
the body, desire or need influences that might veer citizens away from the
standpoint of pure reason,,zz Young concedes that contemporary republicans
(she cites Benjamin Barber and Jiirgen Habermas) no longer wish formally
to exclude such groups from the public sphere, She claims, nevertheless, that
participation in that sphere is governed by an idea of reason that will exclude
claims based on the particular needs and desires of women and other groups.
The issue we must address, therefore, is what conception of reason or ration-
ality lies behind the republican idea of a general will. Republicans claim that
a citizen body can, through open discussion, reach a substantial degree of
consensus on issues of common concern, To justify this claim is it necessary
to appeal to a strong ideal of impartiality such that a citizen, upon assuming
that role, sets aside all his or her particular aims and preferences and reasons
from a completely universal standpoint, as Young alleges?23
Whatever the views of particular republicans, such as Rousseau, on this
question, the answer seems to be negative. All that is necessary in order to
embark on political dialogue is a willingness to find reasons that can persuade
those who initially disagree with us, and one cannot say a priori how
abstract those reasons will have to be. Suppose a group comes into a polit-
ical arena bearing a proposal that springs from the particular circumstances
and needs of that group - say women demanding a change in the terms and
that the reasons behind the proposal must be elaborated, which might
simply mean explaining why the existing rules were burdensome to women
and the proposed ones less so. Beyond that it would be necessary to connect
the reasons given to more general reasons that others were likely to accept,
but this requirement again might not be a very arduous one, Suppose, for
instance, that the maximum period of maternity leave had already been
agreed, and the proposal was to introduce greater flexibility into its timing.
Supporters could argue that the new proposal would be likely to place no
greater financial burden on employers or the state than the old - appealing
by implication to the premise that the existing arrangement was fair, and
that the new one would not change this materially.
Of course few political arguments are as simple as this. In most cases
engaging in political dialogue involves both moderating the claim that you
might initially wish to make and shifting somewhat the ground on which
you make it. 24 Consider the case of a pacifist engaging in a debate on nuclear
weapons, Her 'maximalist' position would presumably be the complete aban-
donment of all weapons of destruction, and she would argue for this on the
ground that no one might legitimately engage in acts of violence towards
another person. Seeing, however, that this position commanded little support,
309
 W HA!'
she might limit her claim in the present context to nuclear disarmament and
argue for this grounds, for instance, of the undiscriminating
of the damage mfllCted by nuclear weapons - a reason which might appeal
to many. Young does not deny that initial claims may have to be moderated
in this in political contexts. She distinguishes between demands stemming
from self-mterest and those stemming from justice and says that 'the test
?f a claim upon the public is just or merely an expression of self-
mterest IS best made when those making it must confront the opinion of
who though not necessarily conflicting,
expenences, pnonhes and needs. Indeed it would be absurd not to make
some such.concession: group can hope to win in political argument
all of the tIme, unless It IS willing to. moderate its demands in search of agree-
ment, an.d appeal to reasons whIch are generally accepted in the political
commumty, It cannot expect other groups to reciprocate. In this way a weaker
kind of impartiality emerges spontaneously from the search for agreement
itself.26
Is there any to think that impartiality of this kind disadvantages
gr?ups whose claIms depend upon particularity, i.e. groups whose claims
arIse from and refer to features that are specific to them such as women's
claims to maternity leave? Very broadly we can separate kinds of claims
that may be advanced in political debate. On the one hand there are claims that
appeal at base to an interest common to all the citizens of a particular
country, such as an interest in security from attack. On the other hand there
are claims that reflect the interest of a particular group and whose satisfac-
tion would typically impose some costs on other groups. In the second case
but not the first, in order to reach agreement an appeal has to be made to
a norm of justice, such as a principle of equal treatment. However, this does
not necessarily mean that claims in the second category are more difficult
to than claims in the first. The norm itself may be relatively uncon-
troverSIal: the problem may be to convince hearers that the group in question
really.does have a case the norm, which may be a matter of drawing
to that have hItherto gone unnoticed. In both cases the degree
of WIll on how extreme (relative to others in your political
commumty) vIews are: as I suggested earlier, if you are a pacifist you
may to shIft your ground quite radically in order to persuade your
fellOW-CItIzens even where there is no disagreement about the ultimate end
- a conflict-free world. Equally if you are a radical feminist who believes
that every act of heterosexual intercourse is equivalent to rape, you will not
be to rely on premise in a debate about criminalizing rape within
marnage - but agam that reflects the extreme nature of your views not the
fact that the issue concerns the body. ' trying in a public forum to persuade his fellow citizens to increase
It is fair to say that republican citizenship cannot accommodate everything
passes under name of 'the politics of identity'. If the public sphere
IS regarded as essentIally a means whereby various group identities are given
310
CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM
legitimacy through public recognition, then at a certain point this will inevit-
ably collide with the ideal of decision-making through open debate
above. 27 Group identities are recognized in the sense that groups are gl:en
access to decision-making forums, and there are no barrIers to the claIms
and demands they may make. If presence and the making of demands are
sufficient for recognition, the republican view can provide it. 2s But there can
be no guarantee that any particular demand will win no
how strongly the group making it feels that the demand IS to ItS
identity. Everything will depend on whether the demand can be lInked .to
principles that are generally accepted among the citizen body, such as prIn-
ciples of equal treatment. So, for example, in a context in v.:hich
already supports Christian and Jewish schools, Muslims argumg for
support for Islamic schools may validly claim that the status quo unfaIrly
privileges some religious identities at the expense of others, and demeans
Muslims. But on the other hand, if existing policy were to be based on the
principle that all formal education must be secular in the claim
that Islamic schools were essential to Muslim identity would have to be
assessed on its own merits, and might well be rejected in a democratic forum.
For a group to insist that only the full recognition. of can respect
its identity is to reject the very essence of republIcan ..
The republican conception of citizenship, then, places no lImIts on what
sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum. It does not
discriminate between demands stemming from personal conviction - say
demands for animal rights - and demands stemming from group -
say demands for religious schooling. In all cases the success of any partIcular
demand will depend upon how far it can be expressed in terms. that are cI.ose
to or distant from, the general political ethos of the commumty. It reqUIres
of citizens a willingness to give reasons for what they are claiming, but not
that they should divest themselves of everything that is particular to them
before setting foot in the arenas of politics. ., .
A second claim made by Young is that the republIcan Ideal relIes on a
public/private distinction which again serves to discriminate against those
whose concerns have traditionally been seen as private matters. What are we
to make of this? .
There seem to be two places at which a public/private distinction emerges
within the republican conception. First of all there is certainly a
between a person acting in his or her private capacity and as a CItIzen, as
evidenced by the ditTerent arguments that may be used in the two
A person trying to persuade his fellow church-members to engage m some
charitable work will typically reason in ditTerent ways from the same person
expenditures. I have argued already that there is no a priori way of drawmg
the boundary here; nevertheless there will typically be arguments that can
legitimately be deployed in the first context but not in the second. Secondly,
311
 .... ,.... ..... I Cl I ILnNI:5Hlr
a will emerge from public deliberation, in the sense
that there be matters that it is agreed should be confined to the private
sphere. ThIS may be done for reasons of principle - for instance, it may be
felt that there areas of eac? citizen's private life in which it is illegitimate
for the state to -. on the grounds that substantive political
on some Issue IS Impossible to achieve, so the fairest course is to
let cItizens pursue their own preferences by voluntary means (thus if we
cannot agre.e about which kinds of state support for the arts are justifiable
we may decide to leave arts funding entirely to the market). No doubt
ever the line. pu an.d private is drawn there will be some groups
who would hke It drawn III a dIfferent place, but there is no reason to think
that the groups identified by Young as oppressed will automatically be the
losers.
it be argued that the republican ideal of citizenship rests upon a
of the human good which may conflict with the private con-
held individual citizens? There is not much doubt that the
republican tradItion has held up the active and virtuous citizen as a model
life public participation above the various forms of
life that cItizens in. Once again, however, we need to distinguish
classical repub!lcans have said from what the republican view
?f cItIzenshIp actually reqUIres. What it requires is something weaker: that
It s??uld be part of each person's good to be engaged at some level in
P?lItIcal so that. the. laws policies of the state do not appear to
hIm or her sImply as alIen ImpOSItIons but as the outcome of a reasonable
agreement to which he or she has been party. This is consistent either with
regarding pOlitical. as intrinsically fulfilling or with regarding it as a
necessary precondItIon for other activities which do have intrinsic value just
as gourmets may .regard eating as intrinsically worthwhile, whereas rest
of us m.ay regard It merely as providing the sustenance which enables one to
engage III other pursuits. This difference will be reflected in the structure of
republican politics: some people may be engaged in it on a full-time basis
may listen the arguments being presented but only
actIvely IIlvolved from tIme to time, when major issues are being decided.
One need not, then, regard political activity as the summum bonum in order
to adopt the republican view, but can hold the more modest position that
although politics is a part of the good life, different people
can be expected to gIve It a dIfferent weight according to their own personal
values.
Where this pe.ople whose conceptions of the good categorically
exclude. partICIpatIOn, for instance religious believers who hold that
traffickmg wIth the secular world compromises their faith? Clearly from a
republican perspective such people cannot be regarded as full citizens even
t?ough will be sufficient grounds to extend to them the
rIghts of cItIzenshIp (one good reason is that we cannot predict how the
312
AND PLuRALISM
thinking of such groups may develop, nor what their individual members
may choose to do). So does the republican view alienate some groups from
citizenship in much the same way as the liberal view? The relevant difference
is this, On the liberal view to be a citizen just is to accept a certain set of
principles, and to regulate your private conduct within the boundaries set by
those principles. This means that the liberal has nothing to say to someone
whose own conception of the good is non-liberal except that he must set that
conception aside for political purposes. Groups who wish to influence the
parameters of politics, but attempt to do so by appeal to conceptions of
the good that are not already tailored to liberal requirements, are personae
non gratae in this perspective. Thus fundamentalists whose political arguments
appeal to the truth of certain religious doctrines are excluded a priori from
citizenship on the liberal conception. The republican view makes no such
prior demand; the only demand it makes is that each citizen should try
to persuade the others of the rightness of her cause, and not, say, resort to
violence to impose it. There is no set limit on the kind of argument that can
be advanced. Each person will in practice be forced to shift to a more
impartial standpoint, but this comes about precisely because of the need to
reach agreement. So here the only groups who are excluded from citizenship
are those groups who voluntarily exclude themselves because their beliefs
prohibit them from taking part in affairs of state (anarchists, for instance,
or religious groups such as the ultra-orthodox Jews who live in Jerusalem
but do not recognize the state of Israel as legitimate). And although from
a republican perspective this may be regrettable (and republicans may want
to take steps to discourage the formation of such groups), it is difficult to
see that the excluded groups themselves have any grounds for complaint.
Unlike groups who wish to be politically active but are deterred from par-
ticipating under the terms and conditions of liberal citizenship, these
anti-political groups cannot regard their exclusion as diminishing their dignity
or self-esteem.
Although liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship diverge at the
level of principle, in a society which exhibits a high degree of pluralism, they
are likely to converge substantially in practice. For the reasons given earlier,
what will emerge from public discussion, in a plural society, will be a liberal
constitution, and broadly liberal policies on what we might call the enforce-
ment of specific conceptions of the good. There are, moreover, reasons
internal to the republican conception of politics for having a formal constitu-
tion that places some limits on what decision-making majorities can do. I
am thinking here of the idea that a constitution represents a desirable form
of self-binding which is likely to enhance the quality of democratic decision-
making in the long run. 29 Thus it is not true that republican citizenship gives
minorities no assurance that their rights will be protected in the face of
majority will. The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not that
the liberal recognizes the value of entrenched rights whereas the republican
313
 Cl I AND

does not, but that toe liberal regards these rights as having a pre-political Notes
justification while the republican grounds them in public discussion. One This paper was originally written for the workshop on Citizenship
institutional corollary is that liberals will seek to make the judiciary the supreme at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Leiden, 2-7 April 1993. Subse<;luen.tly It as
arbiters of constitutional rights - in effect the interpretation of liberal resented to a seminar in the Department. of Goyernment: Umverslty of Uppsa a,
citizenship is entrusted to them - while the republican gives this role to the fo the Israeli Forum for Legal and Polittcal Phllosophy m Jerusa.le.m and. to the
citizen body as a whole. Thus the constitution will have a different status in Nuffield Political Theory Workshop. I am very grateful to the partlclpants m
of these seminars for their helpful comments, which have been incorporated mto
a republican regime. It will constrain everyday politics, but will itself be open
the present version. . b t th b' f
to amendment if the rights and liberties it protects are judged, following 2 I have not been able to find an extended statement of thls argument, u e ne
public discussion in which all have opportunities to participate, to stand in presentations by Douglas Hurd and others are usefully threaded together by Rut h
need of revision. There will be constitutional politics and not merely, as the Lister in The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor (London, CPAG, 1989),
liberal would want, constitutional interpretation by judges.
3 is very well put in R. Plant 'Social rights and the of
Contrary to what one might suppose, then, the republican view has welfare' in G. Andrews (ed.), Citizenship (London, Lawrence and.
resources to deal with the question of pluralism. I do not wish to claim that 4 P. 1. Conover, I. M. Crewe and D. D. S.e?ring, 'The nature of m th;
citizenship in this mode can cope with radical disagreement about the very United States and Great Britain: empmcal comments on theoretical themes.
existence of the state of the kind which gives rise to separatist movements. Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 800-32. .,... .I .
Faced with such disagreement, it is very unlikely that the conflicting groups 5 This threefold division is inspired by Adam SWI.ft s m For a Soc/O Oglc)-
all Informed Political TheOl)! (D. Phil thesls, 1992,
will be sufficiently motivated to search for political agreement on the basis PZrt Ill, though what I call the libertarian conceptIOn. m IS
of reasons that all can accept. For this reason, as I have argued elsewhere, in a way that departs somewhat from the first conceptIOn m SWlft s. ,.
a common sense of nationality is an essential background to politics of this 6 For an alternative typology, see G. Parry, 'Conclusion: paths to cltlzenshIp m
30
kind. The pluralism which forms the starting point of this paper is not of U. Vogel and M. Moran (eds), The Frontiers of Citizenship (London, MacmI1lan,
the sort which puts the continued existence of the state in question: it is plur-
7 Citizenship and Social Class, T. Bottomore (ed.), (London, Pluto,
alism in personal identities and conceptions of value of the kind that is endemic 1992, originally published 1950).
in liberal societies even where problems of nationality are not at stake. 8 Marshall, Citizenship, p. 24. .. . . r
9 It has also been argued that Marshall's concepti.on cltlzenshlp margma
women. See U. Vogel, 'Is citizenship gender-specIfic? m Vogel and Moran, T. e
Conclusion Frontiers of Citizenship. . , N Yi k
10 J Rawls 'The domain of the political and overlappmg consensus ,
The liberal view of citizenship set out by Marshall and Rawls is presently the Universi;y Law Review, 64 (1989), 234-5. C.f. 1. Rawls, Political Liberalism
dominant view, but it is also recognized to be under stress. We have seen that (New York Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 216-7. .
it embodies a conception of justice whose underpinnings may be unaccept- 11 J Rawls 'The idea of overlapping consensus', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,. 7
able to some groups, and to these groups no reasons (other than pragmatic (i987), 5-6. The reading of Rawls that follows to present the mam
ones) can be given for accommodating themselves to liberalism. In the face outlines of his view of citizenship, although has to s.md that the later Rawls,
in attempting to accommodate all possible lines of cntlclsm, has almost
of disagreement, the libertarian alternative is to fragment citizenship so that, infinitely malleable. In particular, as noted below, he. at to make
over and above the minimal core, each person is to choose his or her own substantial concessions to the republican view of cItlzenshlp, especIally when
package of 'citizen rights'. This we saw to be a recipe for social disintegra- presenting his account of public reason. . .. . 'PI'l
tion, albeit one to which liberal societies seem increasingly drawn in practice. 12 This is made explicit in 1. Rawls, 'Justice as faIrness: , 11 0-
The republican solution involves, paradoxically, the search for a higher level sopIJy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 240-2. Cf. Rawls, 1:Ibe:altsm: pp. 30-2.
13 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 206. Rawls claims that his IS mc?mpat-
of agreement between individuals and social groups, but it aims to achieve ible with 'classical republicanism', but to make good thIS claIm he lS .to
this in a more pragmatic way, through the give and take of politics. It does dilute the latter essentially to the claim that 'the safety of
not require participants to subscribe to any fixed principles other than those requires the active participation of citizens who nee e
implicit in political dialogue itself - a willingness to argue and to listen to to maintain a constitutional regime' (p. 205). On readmg Constant,
reasons given by others, abstention from violence and coercion, and so forth. for instance would have to be counted as a republIcan. ..
14 Rawls, 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphyslcal', p. 241. C.f. Rawls, Pollllcal
If a plural society is to be held together and legitimated by a common under-
standing of citizenship, this third conception is the best place from which to Liberalism, p. 30. ., 241 R I ['tical
15 Rawls, 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphysIcal, p. . aw s, 0 I.
start our thinking. Liberalism, p. 31.

314 315
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CITIZENSfJIP AND PLURALISM

16 W. Kymlicka, 'Two models of pluralism and tolerance', Analyse und Kritik, I3 27 On the olitics of recognition, see the very interesting with title by
(1992), 33-56. Charles in A. Gutmann A!ulticulturalism and The Polzflcs of Ree-
17 This is more or less the strategy advocated by Brian Barry in 'How not to defend o nition' (Prince ton Princeton Umverslty Press, 1992).. . I
liberal institutions' in B. Barry, Liberty and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991). 28 Ifis difficult to decide how far the republican view should go III
18 A way round this which has attra,qted some libertarians is for the state to issue mechanisms to ensure 'presence', for instance reserving seats or
vouchers on an equal basis to all' citizens which can be used to purchase e.g. women or ethnic minorities. It is clear that political IS only genumely
educational places or medical services. Note, however, that for such a scheme to democratic to the extent that all significant points of and are rep-
be possible there must already be agreement on what the vouchers are to be used resented in the deliberating body; on the other hand republicans Will want to
and what the value of each kind of voucher is to be - in other words there 'freezing' people into predefined identities, which be
must already be substantive agreement that each citizen is to be entitled to so b reservation schemes. There is a very good diSCUSSIOn .thls questIOn
much education, so much health care, etc. For this reason voucher schemes can- I. Phillips 'Dealing with difference: a politics of ideas or a
II t:
of ,
not cope with radical pluralism in the form of deep disagreement about what C· I (1994) 74-91. Phillips gives reasons why reservatIOn of political
goods the state ought to provide to all its citizens in common. onste a for
positions IOns"women poses fewer problems t han nug . h t anse
. 111
. th e case of other
19 For reasons why a system of private charity cannot be relied upon to provjde hitherto-excluded groups. . . ['
minimum levels of welfare, see my analysis in Market, State and CommUfiity: 29 See for example the essays in 1. Els!er and (eds.), ConstllutlOlla /SIn
Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), ch. 4. and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambndge Umverslty Press, ., of
20 As one might expect there is a body of economic literature exploring the efficiency 30 Miller, Market, State and Community, chs 9-11; 'The eth.lcal
arguments for and against this policy. The classic statement of the case in favour nationality', Ethics, 98 (1987-8), 647-62; 'In of natIOnality, Journal of
is C. Tiebout, pure theory of local expenditures', Journal of Political Economy, Applied Philosophy, IO (1993), 3-16; On Nationality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995),
64 (1956), 416-24. For discussion see W. E. Oates, 'An economist's perspective on Chs 4 and 5.
fiscal federalism' in W. E. Oates (ed.), The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism
(Lexington, MA, Heath, 1977) and D. C. Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1979), ch. 7.
21 Once again there is no definitive statement in the recent literature, but variations
on the republican theme can be found in H. Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958); B. Barber, Strong Democracy
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984); R. N. Bellah et al., Habits of the
Heart (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985); Michael Walzer, Spheres
of Justice (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983). The tradition as a whole is surveyed
in A. Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern
World (London, Routledge, 1990) and, much more briefly, in M. Walzer, 'Citizen-
ship' in T. Ball, 1. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and
Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
22 I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1990), p. 117.
23 Compare the careful discussion of impartiality and its preconditions in S. James,
'The good-enough citizen: citizenship and independence' in G. Bock and
S. James (eds), Beyond Equality and Difference (London, Routledge, 1992).
24 I have explored this point at somewhat greater length in 'Deliberative democracy
and social choice' in D. Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy, special issue of
Political Studies, 40 (1992), 54-67.
25 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 186. For a better and clearer
account of the way in which political participation forces us to relate our demands
to public standards of justice, see H. F. Pitkin, 'Justice: on relating private and
public', Political Theory, 9 (1981), section V.
26 It is a major weakness of Young's argument that she does not consider how
agreement is to be reached under the form of politics that she favours. She is
preoccupied with the question of how oppressed groups are to find their authentic
voice, and she does not ask what will happen when the (authentic) claims of some
groups are confronted by the equally authentic but conflicting claims of others.
There seems to be an unstated premise that when the groups she identifies
as oppressed make their case, this case will overwhelm the opposition. As an
understanding of politics, this seems naive in the extreme.

316 317

17
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
Andrew Mason
Source: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 10:3 (2011), 263-81.
Abstract
Are the rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship grounded exclu-
sively in considerations of justice, or do some or all of them
have sources? This question is addressed by distinguishing
three accounts of the justification of these rights, duties,
and vIrtues, namely, the justice account, the common-good
account, and the equal-membership account. The common-
good account is rejected on the grounds that it provides an
implausible way of understanding what it is to act as a citizen. It
is then argued .that the justice account and the equal-membership
account provIde complementary perspectives that differ in
terms of the scope of the duties they ground: the latter offers
an analysis of the duties that citizens proper (those with an
unconditional right of residence and full political rights) owe to
each other, whereas the former provides an analysis of the duties
that those who are under the jurisdiction of the same state
whether fellow citizens or not, owe to each other. The
concludes by arguing that the distinction between the justice
account and the equal-membership account cuts across the
traditional one that is drawn between liberal and republican
theories of citizenship.
Plenty of work has been done analysing the concepts of citizenship and
justice, but very little of it has explicitly addressed the issue of whether the
rights, duties, and virtues of citizens are grounded exclusively in considera-
of justice or whether some of them are justified (or could be justified)
111 other ways. Indeed, there is so little explicit attention to this question
that although we can distinguish different possible views of the matter, it is
hard to pin them on individual thinkers. This issue is important because the
318
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
dominance of theorizing about justice in political philosophy has made it
tempting to think that it provides the best way of grounding the rights,
duties, and virtues of citizenship, yet this may result in some of them being
neglected or misunderstood because they have other sources of justification.
Accordingly, in the first three sections of the article I explore three views of
the justification (or source) of the rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship,
which I call the 'justice account', the 'common-good account', and the 'equal-
membership account', in order to show how these accounts may reveal
different bases for them.
I argue against the common-good account in Section 2 because it has
counterintuitive implications for the issue of what it is to act as a citizen. The
equal-membership account avoids these problems, and indeed it can legitimately
be regarded as the common-good account better conceived. That in effect
leaves two potentially viable accounts of the source of the rights, duties, and
virtues of citizenship, namely, the justice account and the equal-membership
account. At this point it may look as if I am in danger of reinventing the wheel.
But the distinction between the justice account and the equal-membership
account is not simply a refashioning of the common distinction between
liberal and republican conceptions, nor indeed is it a reinterpretation of the
so-called Greek and Roman models of citizenship. There are points of con-
tact here, but I in Section 5 that my contrast cuts across these traditional
ways of thinking about citizenship. Moreover, I maintain that we do not have
to choose between the justice account and the equal-membership account
because they can be understood as analysing different, but complementary
sources of the rights, duties, and virtues of citizens.
In addition to identifying different sources of justification, I show in
Section 4 that the justice and equal-membership accounts also diverge in terms
of the scope of the rights, duties, and virtues that they ground. Focusing on
duties, we might say that the equal-membership account offers an analysis of
the duties that citizens proper (those with an unconditional right of residence
and full political rights) owe to each other, whereas the justice account, in
its dominant form at least, is primarily in the business of offering an analysis
of the duties that those who are under the jurisdiction of the same state, whether
fellow citizens or not, owe to each other.l From the perspective of the justice
account, the distinction between citizens and other residents is of little norma-
tive significance except in so far as it raises the important issue of when
resident aliens should, as a matter of justice, be granted the opportunity to
become citizens (or, at least, the opportunity to acquire voting rights) and
what conditions they can be justifiably asked to meet in order to do so.
I. The justice account
The justice account maintains that all of the rights, duties, and virtues of
citizenship are ultimately derived in some way from considerations of justice.
319
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
The rights of citizenship are owed as a matter of justice and the duties of
ci.tizenship are understood primarily as the means through which a person
discharges the duties of justice that she owes to her fellow citizens. As a
the demands by depend upon the requirements of
and a of citizenship is parasitic upon a logically
pnor theory of Justice. The justice account is really a family of views because
different theories of justice will generate different versions of it. (Questions
may be raised about what constitutes a theory of justice rather than some
other value, and answers to these questions may serve to place limiis on what
can constitute a justice account of citizenship, but I shall for the most part
bracket these issues.)
Some versions take the view that fundamental principles of justice are
universal in scope an? assign a range of rights (including what are generally
regarded as human nghts) and duties impartially, with no regard to citizen-
ship or nationality, but argue that the institutions of particular states should
be designed with a view to protecting the rights of their own citizens and to
.01' fellow citizens to discharge their duties of justice spec-
ifically m relatiOn to each other, on the grounds that this constitutes the
best .way of these principles. 2 They may take a range
of different positions on the issue of what 'social rights', if any, are owed to
citizens. Other versions maintain that fellow citizens are connected to each
othe!' in which mean even at the level of fundamental principles,
partially different sets of pnnciples of justice apply to fellow citizens than
to outsiders, while allowing that there are some principles, for example those
that identify human rights, which apply equally to outsiders. 3
According to the justice account, to act as a citizen is to act out of a concem
for what justice r.elation to one's fellow citizens. Citizens living
under reasonably Just mstitutlons are conceived as being under special duties
towards one another to sustain and promote the institutions that secure
their rights and entitlements and which force or enable them to discharge their
duties of justice to each other. 4 In a society in which institutions and policies
are significantly unjust, the justice account can hold that there are duties of
justice.to work to reform these institutions and policies, and that citizens owe
a special duty to other to do SO.5 The justice account can also give a
to a range vrrtues. S.ome of these virtues are conceived as dispositions
which enable Citizens to discem what their duties of justice to their fellow
citizens require of them in particular circumstances and motivate them to act
Other virtues might be conceived more broadly as dispositions
which support or promote just institutions. Particular duties might be associated
with this second group of virtues, allowing space within the justice account
for of citizenship that are not simply derived from prior duties of justice
(and. which may be properly regarded as duties of justice).
Different verSiOns of the jUstice account will hold different views concem-
ing the extent of the demands that citizenship places upon us. Some versions
320
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
suppose that principles of justice apply primarily to the basic structure of
society in such a way that the duties of citizens are limited to a duty to
port just institutions, a duty to work towards the reform of unjust institutions
(at least when that does not involve incurring excessive costs), and perhaps
also a duty of fair play, that is, a duty to bear a fair share of the burdens
of a practice when one enjoys its benefits. These limits are hard to sustain,
however. Consider the principle of non-discrimination, a principle of justice
that is generally thought to apply to the institutions which make up the basic
structure of society. This principle should surely govem not only the selection
decisions made by officials in public institutions, but also those taken within
private firms and corporations. 6 But how much further does the principle
extend? For example, does it also apply to the membership rules of associa-
tions in civil society and to the rules governing who can hold offices within
them? Some will resist this extension, but there is a general argument for
applying principles of justice widely, including to such matters. For if the
reason for applying principles of justice to the basic structure of society is
that this structure has profound effects on the life chances of individuals,
then this provides grounds for applying principles of justice to any practices,
or patterns of behaviour, which also have such effects, including those that
are part of civil society. On the basis of a nuanced form of this argument,
G. A. Cohen (1995, 1997, 2008: Part I) has maintained that John Rawls
cannot consistently deny that the difference principle should apply to personal
economic choices, such as an individual's decisions about what career to
pursue, what wages to negotiate, and how hard to work. If this argument
can be sustained, acting on duties of justice and corresponding duties of
citizenship may require considerable self-sacrifice, even if (as Cohen argues)
there are personal prerogatives which permit citizens to depart from these
duties when compliance with them would be particularly burdensome.
It might be thought that the dominant liberal political theories give a
justice account of the duties of citizenship. Rawls (1971: 334), for example,
maintains that citizens have a duty to support and to further just institutions.
He can also allow that there are duties of citizenship that do not derive from
the duty to support just institutions, but which have their place within the
virtues of citizenship (such as the virtue of civility), with these virtues just-
ified at least in part by the role they play in sustaining and promoting just
institutions. It would be too quick, however, to conclude that Rawls endorses
the justice account of citizenship. In his later writings, he is not committed to
it as an exhaustive account of how the rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship
are to be justified. Indeed, given the method of avoidance that he advocates,
he should refrain from endorsing any account of this sort, since he need not
deny the possibility of duties of citizenship which are grounded independ-
ently of considerations of justice, for example, in some aspect of the common
good, as the next account I shall examine maintains. The question of whether
7
there are such duties goes beyond the remit of his theory of justice.
321
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE

2. The common-good account good, This theory of citizenship is both a justice account and a comm?n-
good account, which shows that these categories are not mutually exclUSive,
According to the common-good account, the rights, duties, and virtues of
Common-good accounts seem bro,ad suppose
citizenship are grounded in the common good: rights protect the conditions
that acting in the light of the common good IS ordmanly suffiCient act as
required to secure the common good, while duties and virtues promote the
a citizen, There are ways of acting in the light of the common good, m each
common good, This account can in principle underwrite different kinds of
of the three senses I have distinguished, that do not seem, to ?ave ,much
duties, For example, it might maintain that we have a perfect duty to promote
do with citizenship, Voluntary work generally involves thiS way m
the common good in whatever ways we are able, Alternatively, and more
at least two of these senses (it promotes the of goods
plausibly perhaps, it can maintain that we have an imperfect duty to do so,
and, arguably, also helps to secure some of the conditions ,reqUired for each
that is, a duty sometimes and to some extent to act so as to promote the
individual to be able to achieve his or her own good), It doe,S not
common good (combined perhaps with a perfect duty not to undermine that
sarily have a strong connection with citizenship, Helpmg out m a chant?
good), The latter, though vague, is clearly less demanding than the former
shop which supports cancer be virtuous or a good but IS
in that it requires less self-sacrifice, It can give a key role to the idea of
it really an act of good citizenship, even I,f the benefits would ?e felt
virtue, conceived in part as the dispositions required for citizens to be able
by fellow citizens? The same question might be asked of vanous fOlms of
to judge what their imperfect duties require of them in particular circum-
stances and to act accordingly, paid employment which contribute to the common good, fO,r school-
crossing attendant, doctor, nurse, teacher, fire-fighter, or clvll s:rvant. These
The relationship between citizenship, so understood, and considerations
are all forms of public service, but in the absence of some speCial story they
of justice depends upon how we understand the common good (see Honohan,
do not seem to be acts of good citizenship,
2002: 150-4; Pettit, 1997: 287), Some of the rights needed to protect the com-
In response, it might be said that, in order employn:ent, count
mon good might turn out also to be rights of justice, and some of the duties
as an act of good citizenship, the pnmary motivatIOn for engagmg m It
which promote the common good might also be duties of justice, even if
be to contribute to the common good, rather than, say, to earn a higher
they are not justified in these terms, How then should the common good be
salary, in the sense that the reason one this f?rm,of employment
conceived? First, it might be conceived as an aggregate of individual goods,
rather than another must be that It mvolves thiS contnbutlOn rather than
so that promoting the common good is equivalent to promoting utility within
that it pays more money or provides greater job security or benefits,
the confines of the state, Second, it might be conceived as the set of condi-
We might even require that one's choice of employment mv?lve some
tions that in general need to be met before each individual can achieve his
financial sacrifice if it is to count as a form of good citizenship, so, for
or her own good, such as personal security or non-domination, (This includes
example, giving up one's job as a barrister in ord:r to as
some of what are technically public goods because they are non-excludable,
judge could count, but not giving up a poorly Job I,n
but not all of the relevant conditions will be public goods in this sense,)
private sector in order to join the civil service, still c?untenntUl-
Third, it might be conceived as involving, in addition to those conditions
tive, however; whatever the motivations of those ,m thiS and
that in general need to be met before each person can achieve his or her own
whatever financial sacrifice is made in order to perform It, It seems, I?appr?-
good, various goods that are partially constitutive of the good of each and
priate to regard them as thereby engaged in an act of good citizenship
every individual. If the common good is understood in either the second or
simply in virtue of contributing to the We need to
the third way (or both), then some of the rights and duties of citizenship
distinguish between public service and good citizenship, even If the two are
that are grounded in the need to protect and promote the conditions or
not necessarily mutually exclusive,
components of each individual's good will also be rights and duties of justice,
I do not mean to imply that public service can never a? of good
for in at least some cases securing these conditions and components will also
citizenship, Even justice accounts can regard public service m thiS, way, A
be a requirement of justice, This would nevertheless be a common-good ac-
justice account may claim that we ha:e a ,to make ,a con-
count rather than a justice account because the rights, duties, and virtues of
tribution to society that is grounded m a of fall' play ?l ,m
citizenship are grounded in the common good rather than in considerations
Stuart White (2003: 49) calls 'a fair-dues conceptIOn of reclpl:oclty , Pubhc
of justice, On one version of the common-good account, however, the rights of
service might then fulfil such a duty, and when it is understood ll1 terms
citizenship are conceived as the conditions for the realization of the com-
it could justifiably be regarded as an act of citizenship, But then It IS .not th,e
mon good, and these conditions are in turn simply conceived as rights of
way in which public service promotes the common good that constitutes It
justi,ce, so that, in effect, principles of justice are derived from the common
as an act of citizenship, but rather the fact that it is plausibly seen as a way

322 323
 W HA I rS-CITIZENSHI P?
in. a citizen his or her duty to make a productive con-
tnbution, grounded m a pnnclple of fair play. This is one point at which
common-good accounts diverge from justice accounts, and in a way that
suggests are too broad and undiscriminating. If they are too broad
and they cannot provide a plausible account of the
source of nghts, dutIes,. and virtues of Citizenship in particular. In
next I shall consIder an account which seems to preserve what
Important m the common-good account, yet avoids the problems that beset
It. Indeed, what I call the 'equal-membership account' can be regarded as
the common-good account better conceived.
3. The equal-membership account
I? . attempting to. draw the distinction between public service and acts of
we mIght suppose that citizenship involves being oriented to a
partICular part or aspect of the common good, namely, the good of equal
and that to be a good citizen is, at least in part, to act in ways
that expless or the good of equal membership. Let me call this the
Again, it is really a family of different accounts
whIch vary dependmg on how 'the good of equal membership' is understood.
. then the good of equal membership be understood? Judged
ImpartIally, we mIght say that this good consists in the value of a collective
whose members treat each other as equals, and which makes decisions
Importantly their conditions of existence, with each member hav-
mg the to o.n. terms in the decision-making
pr?cess, whereas fOI the mdlvldual cItizen Its good consists in the value of
?emg an equal member of such a body, that is, possessing equal standing in
It as a consequence of being recognized and treated as such. 8 Being an equal
member of a body of this kind might be regarded not only as a condition
of good, but also as an irreducibly social good that is partially
constitutIve of each person's good, namely, the good of being recognized
as an equal member of a collective body that makes important
deCISIOns that concern one's conditions of existence.
. According t.o equal-membership account, to act as a citizen is to act
m a way that IS onented towards expressing or realizing the good of e I and 'being prepared to give reasons for our actions whenever the interests
membership. This includes acting in order to express or promote that quda
s h
uc as
r f rom vanous. d' goo ,
utles that are grounded in it or acting to secure
the condItIons necessary.for its realization. Acting in ways that express the
good of can take many different forms, ranging from, for
example, votI?g m election to sitting at the front of a bus in order to
make some WIder pomt about one's equal status. More generally according
to the account one of the ways in which can be
good m societies is by striving to bring the good of equal
mto eXistence.
324
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
According to the equal-membership account, the role of the rights of
citizenship is to protect and promote the good of equal membership. The
rights which protect and promote this good might be thought to overlap
with,or even exhaust, the rights that are constitutive of justice, on the grounds
that the rights of justice are also conditions for the realization or protection
of the good of equal membership. In so far as a theory of citizenship grounds
the rights of citizenship in the good of equal membership, and regards it
as a further question whether they are rights of justice, then it is a version
of the equal-membership account, but not a version of the justice account.
On one version of the equal-membership account, however, the conditions
for the realization of the good of equal membership are simply conceived
as rights of justice, so that in effect principles of justice are derived from
that good. 9 This version of the equal-membership account is therefore also
a version of the justice account, which shows that these categories can over-
lap. This is not in itself a problem with the taxonomy I am employing. But
the close relationship between the conditions for the realization of the good
of equal membership and the conditions for realizing a just society may make
the equal-membership account seem redundant on the grounds that the good
of equal membership is simply equivalent to political equality, which in
turn is equivalent to the just distribution of political rights and opportunities.
From this perspective, the value of a collective body which makes key deci-
sions and in which each member has equal standing is simply the value
of a society that is just in terms of its distribution of political rights and
opportunities.
This equation is open to contest, however. First, it might be thought
that there is more to political equality than a just distribution of political
rights and opportunities. Full political equality requires citizens to treat their
fellows as equals in the political process, that is, to treat them with respect
in that process, which involves listening to their arguments and trying to
understand the reasons they are offering in a way that appears to transcend
what is required for just treatment alone. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
maintains that there is a natural duty of mutual respect which is a 'duty to
show a person the respect which is due to him as a moral being', which
involves 'a willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view'
of others are materially affected' (1971: 337, compare 1996: 217). But in so
far as a duty of mutual respect or civility goes beyond a duty to restrict
oneself to public reasons if one engages in public debate over constitutional
essentials, it is not clear that it can be justified by reference to considerations
of justice alone. Second, it might be thought that political equality, even
when it is understood narrowly, goes beyond what justice requires, for justice
obtains in the political sphere provided that people consent to the form
of government to which they are subject, whether that be a monarchy or a
democracy or a form of government based on what Rawls (1999: 61, 71-2)
325
 u vv nfU aCI IIZENSHIP7
as a decent consultation hierarchy. Even if political equality (whether
In sense or some broad sense that embraces more than equal
pohtIcal nghts and opportunities) can be justified within a justice account
the argument for it will often be instrumental, appealing to the idea
political is to, promotes, just outcomes, whereas equal-
membership accounts will regard It as non-instrumentally valuable.
the pI:ecise between the requirements of justice
pohtIcal equahty, there are Independent reasons for thinking that the
JustIce account and the equal-membership account can be kept apart. Polit-
ical equality does not ex.haust the value of the good of equal membership,
and an equal-membership account can appeal to other sources of its non-
instrumental value that ground rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship in
order to make that account distinctive and non-redundant. The value 0'[ a
collective body which makes key decisions and in which each member has
need as simply the value of a society
that IS Just 111 terms of Its dlstnbutIon of political rights and opportunities
and just in terms of the way in which fellow citizens treat each other in the
sphere. The good of equal membership embraces not only political
but social that is, each person enjoying equal standing
In society, beIng recog111zed and treated as an equal by his or her fellow
not .only the political process, but also in civil society and beyond.
SOCIa! eq.uahty might as an.irreducibly social good that is partly
constitutIve of each cItIzen s good, but mdependent of justice. David Miller
(1998), for example, maintains that a society in which people regard and
treat each other as equals, and in which there are no status divisions which
them to .people in different categories, has value in its own right,
of JustIce. justification for thinking that social equality
IS an Important good that IS partially independent of justice will be offered
in the next section.)
There is a tendency to think about the value of goods or relations in an
way. If the good of equal membership as consisting
m pol.ltIcal.equahty plus social then the value of social and political
mlg?t be as simply the sum of the value of its component
parts, the component that is partially constitutive of polit-
Ical equabty. But there IS another, more holistic way of thinking about the
value of t?e gOOd. of equal membership, namely, that part of its value emerges
from the 111teractlOn of these components, and indeed that this aspect of its
value is conditional the of all of them. The value of being a
member of a collective that exercises control over one's conditions of exist-
ence and in one status consists at least partly in the way
that both sOCial and pohtlCal equahty are enjoyed in a collective that exercises
such control. This is in effect to treat the value of the good of equal member-
ship as an organic whole in G. E. Moore's sense (1993: 79). The organic
whole formed by political equality and social equality in the context of a
326
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
collective that exercises control over its members conditions of existence
might be held to possess value that is more than simply the sum of the value
of those parts.
Conceiving of the good of equal membership in terms of social and polit-
ical equality makes the equal-membership account distinguishable from
both the common-good account and the justice account. Such an account
can hold that citizens have a special duty to treat each other as equals in
their social and political interactions in a way that seems to go beyond what
justice alone requires. So, for example, this duty might be thought to require
citizens to behave civilly towards one another in their ordinary dealings
beyond the political sphere. Here the equal-membership account can, like
the justice account, give a central role to civic virtues, though in the equal-
membership account they are best understood as dispositions that citizens
need in order to be able to discern in particular circumstances what behaviour
is required to treat their fellows as equals, and to motivate them to act
accordingly, rather than justified in terms of the role these dispositions play
in supporting or sustaining just institutions.1O
4. A distinction without a difference?
The equal-membership account seems to preserve the strengths of the com-
mon-good account while avoiding the potential problems with the scope
of the latter. Indeed, the equal-membership account can be regarded as
the common-good account better conceived, leaving us with only the two
accounts of the ultimate source of the rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship,
namely, the justice account and the equal-membership account. doubts
may persist concerning whether these can be kept apart. Is treatIng others
as one's equals in social relations not simply part of treating them justly? If
so, the duty to treat one's fellow citizens as equals in social interactions
be accommodated within a justice account and again the equal-membership
account starts to look redundant.
I do not want to insist that there must be a difference between the duties
which an equal-membership account and the justice account can justify
(though I shall argue that the most plausible variants of each will .to
some potential divergences). The fundamental difference between a Justice
account and an equal-membership account lies in the way that they justify
the duties of citizenship rather than in the content of these duties. But in
order to show that, I need to explain how a duty to treat others as equals in
one's social interactions might be thought to emerge from a justice account.
It is undeniable that some ways of treating people as equals in civil society
are part of what it is to treat them justly, for they involve acting from a
principle of non-discrimination that is unambiguously a principle of justice
(for example, Kymlicka, 2001: 299; Spinner, 1994: 45-8). When employers
refuse to hire members of an ethnic minority or rental agencies refuse to let
327
 their apartments to them or shopkeepers refuse to serve them, then their
behaviour represents a failure to treat those from that ethnic group as equals
in a way that violates the principle of non-discrimination and is deeply unjust.
When members of ethnic minorities are subject to harassment or racial abuse
in civil society or public spaces, on indeed to other kinds of disrespectful
treatment which give them the message that they are inferior,1l they are treated
unjustly. Even if these cases do not involve a straightforward violation of
the principle of non-discrimination, that principle can plausibly be extended
to cover them.
But there are also ways of acting that involve a failure to treat others as
equals in relation to which it is much less clear that the principle of non-
discrimination applies or indeed that an injustice (as opposed to some other
moral wrong) has been committed, potentially vindicating the claim made
in the previous section that social equality has a value that is independent
of justice. Consider the following behaviour: someone refuses to shop at their
local store because it is run by a member of an ethnic minority; when he
catches a bus, he would rather stand than sit next to someone from that
minority; when choosing a school for his child, he selects the one which
has the lowest proportion from that minority in it; when a member of that
minority buys the house next door to his, he decides to move away; he dis-
courages his child from playing with children from that minority in the
neighbourhood. Each of these forms of behaviour involves ethnic or racial
prejudice, and a consequent failure to treat others as equals, but it is not
clear that they involve injustice. A principle of non-discrimination, it might
be thought, governs a person's behaviour in some areas of civil society, but
not in all aspects of their private lives, and it is the limited scope of that
principle which makes it hard to think that the forms of behaviour I have
described involve injustice, even though they are problematic from a moral
point of view (Spinner, 1994: 45-8). An equal-membership account, in con-
trast, can hold that even though, say, discouraging one's child from playing
with children from a minority is not unjust, it represents a failure to be a
good citizen because it violates one's duty as a citizen to treat one's fellow
citizens as equals - not just when one is making decisions that affect their
access to the important goods made available by the basic structure or by
civil society, but in all one's interactions with them.
There does seem to be a strong connection, however, between treating
others as equals in one's social relations and promoting just outcomes. After
all, when the forms of behaviour I have described become commonplace
in a society, this contributes to the creation of ethnic or racial stigma, the
victims may suffer from a consequent loss in self-respect, and they may experi-
ence involuntary disadvantage, which makes the behaviour relevant from
the point of view of justice. Indeed, it might be thought that citizens have a
duty to treat each other as equals in their social interactions precisely in
to avoid being implicated in a pattern of behaviour that stigmatizes
328
and disadvantages some of their fellows. So it might seem that the justice
account, properly thought through, must converge with an equal-membership
account in terms of its implications for the duties and virtues of justice..
There is, nevertheless, a powerful reason for resisting the conclusion that
the justice account, properly thought through, must subsume the equal-
membership account. Whatever the implications of the justice account and
the equal-membership account, they will remain distinct in terms of the
justifications they give of these duties and virtues. A justice account justifies
duties and virtues by reference to the role they play in promoting and sus-
tainingjust institutions and outcomes, whereas an equal-membership account
justifies them by the role they play in realizing the good of social and polit-
ical equality, which it regards, in part, as non-instrumentally valuable in a
distinctive way. Indeed, it might be thought that it is an advantage of an
equal-membership account that it does not need to make the justification of
a duty to treat others as equals in one's social interactions contingent in
any way on the role that the fulfilment of this duty plays in sustaining just
institutions or generating just outcomes (including the role it plays in, say,
eliminating involuntary disadvantage). Patterns of behaviour motivated by
racial prejudice, such as not sitting next to a member of an ethnic minority
on the bus or not shopping at the local store because it is run by a an ethnic
minority family, would be morally problematic even in a world in which they
did not generate involuntary disadvantage, or did not even create ethnic or
racial stigma because human beings were psychologically secure in ways that
meant they were unaffected by such behaviour. In other words, when a duty
to treat others as equals in one's social interactions is grounded in the good
of equal membership it is more robust than when it is grounded in con-
siderations concerning how justice is best promoted.
Justice accounts are diverse, however, and some of them might seem
to regard aspects of social equality, or the conditions for its realization, as
non-instrumentally valuable components of justice. Consider, for example,
the idea that justice consists in non-domination or the minimization of domina-
tion (Lovett, 2010). The idea that a just society is simply one in which
domination is absent or minimized may appear to threaten the distinction
between the justice account and the equal-membership account. From the
perspective of a theory of justice as non-domination or the minimization of
domination, the violations of social equality I have described may look as
if they are simply ways in which members of one group dominate another
by exercising arbitrary power over them, and hence unjust in their own terms
and not merely because of their consequences, so appearing to bridge the
gap between the equal-membership account and the justice account. But even
if non-domination or the minimization of domination were by themselves
to provide us with a fully adequate conception of justice, there would still
be reasons for thinking that the value of social equality is partially independ-
ent of justice, for the failure to treat others as equals does not always involve
329
 WHAT IS CI'iIZENSHIP?
the exercise arbitrary over them. Imagine a society containing a
number of different ethmc groups, none of which have any inclination to
wield arbitrary power, and in which that society's structures are effective in
preventing the arbitrary exercise of power, but also in which members of
each group treat members of the others with disdain, as if they were of less
value, in civil society and beyond. This would involve a lamentable failure
of social equality, but according to an account of justice as non-domination
(or minimization of it would not involve any injustice. Ac-
cordmg to the equal-membership account, unlike the non-domination version
of the justice account, it would represent a serious violation of the duties of
citize?ship. Our concern for non-domination and preventing the arbitrary
exercise of power captures only part of why we worry about failures to treat
as equal.s in social interactions, so it can provide us with only a
tlal understandmg of the good of equal membership.
Although the account may differ from the justice
account not only 111 terms of the ultimate justification it provides for various
rights, duties, and virtues, but also the range of virtues and duties it under-
writes, there is a sense in which we do not have to make a choice between
them (and not merely because these categories overlap in ways that I
have acknowledged). Even though the justice account cannot subsume the
account, ,:ould be rather odd to suppose that the equal-
membership account could m Itself demonstrate that the justice account is
flawed, for it could not show that the justice account was mistaken about the
rights and duties that emerge from considerations of justice. We do not need
to choose between the justice account and the equal-membership account
because they are grounded in different considerations.
. Nevertheless, the.se accounts cannot be straightforwardly combined to pro-
a theory duties, and virtues of citizenship
In partIcular. For the group of mdlvlduals bound by the duties justified from
the justice .account may be rather different to the group bound by the
that are Yielded by the equal-membership account, for the former
might include not just fellow citizens, but anyone who is subject to the same
social, political, and economic institutions, including resident aliens. Accord-
ing to the account, there is something special about being
a member of a group which makes decisions that importantly affect its
members' conditions of existence, and in which each has equal standing (not
?nly when are taking those decisions, but also when they are interacting
m other account claims to be analysing
cItizenshIp, 111 reality It is mainly concerned with the way
111 which Justice IS secured by and for those who live in the same state and
of course that group is both smaller and larger than that of fellow citizens.
For example, on many justice accounts the relevant group is those subject to
the same social, political, and economic institutions, or those involved in the
same. cooperative scheme for mutual advantage, yet this group may include
330
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
resident aliens and exclude some non-resident citizens. (This feature of justice
accounts is disguised .by the fact that they often make idealizing assump-
tions, such as the assumption that a person is born, lives, and dies in the
same state. When this assumption is made, there is no distinction to be drawn
in practice between citizens and resident aliens.) For similar reasons, the
duties generated by the justice account are likely to extend beyond fellow
citizens and embrace at least some resident aliens living within the bound-
aries of the state, and they may not bind all non-resident citizens to the same
extent.
Moreover, it seems to me that one of the reasons we might have for
thinking that the equal-membership account illuminates the relationship of
citizenship as opposed to some other relationship is precisely because it can
explain why duties of citizenship are owed to fellow citizens rather than to
some different, but overlapping constituency of people (Mason, 1997). In
this sense, there is something special about the relationship of citizenship
(that is, it realizes a value that is not realized in other relationships), even if
its specialness does not mean that citizens have no obligations to non-citizens
(whether resident in the same state or living beyond its borders) or only
undemanding obligations to them and even if the specialness of this relation-
ship does not provide fellow citizens with a right to prevent others from
becoming part of it. Indeed, rather than providing reasons to exclude, the
benefits yielded by citizenship give powerful reasons for ensuring that resident
aliens have a fair opportunity to become part of that relationship.
It might be regarded as problematic, however, that the equal-membership
account not only grounds duties for citizens in a way that it does not for
resident aliens, but also justifies the idea that these duties are oIVed to fellow
citizens and not to resident aliens. According to this account, the duty to
treat fellow citizens as one's equals in social interactions is owed to fellow
citizens, but not to resident aliens, so it would not itself justify any complaint
when resident aliens are the victims of the patterns of prejudiced behaviour
I described earlier. But it is again illuminating to see the justice and equal-
membership accounts as complementary, for they cast light on different sorts
of relationship. The equal-membership account provides us with an account of
the rights and duties of citizenship proper, where citizenship proper is
taken to involve an unconditional right of residence and full political rights,
while the justice account provides us with a wider account of the rights and
duties of justice possessed by residents of different kinds. Understood in
this way, it need not be troubling that special duties grounded in the good
of equal membership are owed only to fellow citizens, for they are supple-
mented by whatever special duties to residents (whether citizens or resident
aliens) can be derived from the best theory of justice. These may even include
an obligation to treat others as equals in a variety of different social contexts,
even if this obligation is less extensive than one grounded in an equal-
membership account. There may also be non-moral obligations to resident
331

aliens, such as to .be civil and polite, which apply
even when consideratIOns of Justtce have no bearing.
5. Liberal versus republjcan conceptions of citizenship
Is the distinction between the justice account and the equal-membe h'
. I d" . rs Ip
account y a Isgulsed. verSIOn of the one which is commonly drawn
between ltberal and repubhcan conceptions of citizenship? Indeed is it
version of the distinction between Roman and Greek models of citlzenshi a
1995) on which the one between liberal and republican
IS often thought to be founded? I shall argue that it is not. Moreover it seems
to me that the distinction between the two accounts I have identified casts
doubt .on the usefulness of the conventional contrast between liberal and
repubhc.an of citizenship in helping us to understand the source
of the nghts, duties, and virtues of citizenship - though that is not to deny
that this distinction may be valuable for other reasons.
The distincti.on between liberalism and republicanism is drawn in different
and for purposes. Consider the commonly expressed view that
ltberal re.gards citizenship as a status that is exhausted by the
of nghts, whIle the republican conception treats it as a matter of
discharging responsibilities, (unlike the liberal conception) gives a
central to a range of. CIVIC .vlrtues. David Miller, for example, argues
that to the repubhcan View, citizenship is active rather than passive
?ec.ause I.t I.nvolves the of demanding duties. Being a citizen involves
bemg wllhng to take active steps to defend the rights of other members of
the and more generally to promote its common inter-
The CItIzen IS some?ne who goes to the aid of a fellow citizen who collapses
m .the street, or who mtervenes when he is able to prevent a criminal act
bemg committed'. Being a citizen also involves playing 'an active role in both
and arenas of politics' (Miller, 2000: 83). Although for
this may b.e a helpful way of distinguishing liberalism and
It does the issue of the source of the rights,
and of citizenship; It IS simply a description of the different
views that ltberals and republicans hold in relation to the 'demandingness'
of these duties and virtues.
. order to. their source, we need to look at how they are
IS, at their deepel: theoretical foundations. Here the republican
divides. theorists see their position as grounded
.the Idea that is the highest good, and that even if
It IS not an mgredlent of human flourishing for everyone, it is at
least a aspect of that flourishing for all. But this part of
the .traditIon founders in the face of the argument that human
fl?unshmg IS diverse: that individuals may lead fulfilling lives in a variety of
d1ffet:ent ways, and the life of political activity is just one such way. This is
332
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
not the only direction in which the republican tradition has been developed,
however. Much of the best recent work within this tradition has taken the
view that what at root distinguishes it from (other forms of) liberalism is
a particular conception of liberty: republicans understand liberty as non-
domination, whereas liberals conceive of it simply as non-interference
(Bellamy, 2007; Laborde, 2008; Maynor, 2003; Pettit, 1997; Skinner, 1997:
Ch. 2). We might think that this way of drawing the distinction between
liberalism and republicanism illuminates the issue of how the rights, duties,
,and virtues of citizenship are to be grounded: republicanism grounds them
in a conception of liberty as non-domination, whereas liberalism grounds
them in a conception of liberty as non-interference.
I doubt that liberalism as it is commonly understood is committed to
understanding liberty as non-interference; indeed, there are many strands of
liberalism which recognize that intervention is required in order to enhance
individual freedom. But there may still be a contrast to be made here: we
might say that liberalism has generally conceived of liberty as the absence
of constraints on action, or as the non-restriction of options, although there
has been considerable dispute among liberals on the issue of what is to count
as a constraint on action in the relevant sense, for example, liberals have
disagreed about whether a lack of resources may be so (Miller, 1983). Within
such accounts, threats, or the probability that one will be subject to the
exercise of power, can restrict one's freedom by acting as a constraint with-
out there needing to be any actual intervention. If a person knows that if
she tries to perform some action an agent with power over her will prevent
her or is likely to prevent her (and perhaps even punish her for attempting
to do so), then this constrains her actions (Carter, 2008: 67-8; Kramer, 2008:
43-5). But a theory of liberty as non-domination appears to go further, since
it allows that one's liberty may be restricted even in the absence of any con-
straints on one's actions, for example, when a slave is allowed by his master
to do everything that a free person may do and the slave knows that there
is no significant probability that his master will change his mind (Carter,
2008: 69-71; Kramer, 2008: 47-50; Pettit, 2008: 124--5; Skinner, 2008: 96-100).
Even if liberals have a different conception of liberty from republicans in
this way, their judgements concerning what counts as loss of freedom will
converge in most ordinary cases. Liberals have reason to be concerned about
what republicans call 'domination', for they have reason to value the secure
enjoyment of various basic liberties, understood as the absence of certain
sorts of constraint, and to be vigilant against both potential and actual
threats to these liberties. Furthermore, they will care about the stability of
institutions that protect individuals against constraints or restrictions and be
concerned to promote liberty (as they conceive it) in both the short term
and the long term. We might nevertheless think that a distinction between
liberalism and republicanism framed in terms of the different conceptions
of liberty they involve illuminates the issue of how the rights, duties, and
333
 WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
virtues of to be But how would this analysis relate
to the one that I have gIven, WhIch tnvokes the distinction between the justice
and equal-membership accounts?
If we see liberalism and republicanism as grounded in different under-
of we. beihclined to think of them as expressing
theones of m effect as providing competing versions of the
Justtce account of cIttzenship. But it is questionable whether the ideal of
is best as an interpretation of justice rather than
as a (parh.al) mterp.retat1On of the good of equal membership, and the
that hberty should be conceived as non-domination can figure
m .eIther Justtce or an equal-membership account. Domination is a serious
evtl, Its non-domination is an important value, but does this
provIde an mterpretati?n ?f justice? Non-domination is surely an
of JustIce, but arguably Justtce has a non-instrumental concern with
in the wealth and income that goes beyond a
commItment to non-dommat1On. Furthermore, it seems to me that the
notion of non-domination can be regarded as a way of giving partial content
to the good of equal membership, for when one person dominates another
there is a violation of social or political equality (or both).
. So rather .tha? thinking of liberalism and republicanism as different ver-
S10ns of the JustIce account, we would do better to see the distinction between
them as cu.tting bot.h the justice account and the equal-membership
account, WIth there bemg hberal and republican variants of each. Indeed in
my view the the justice account and the equal-membership
account provIde.s us WIth. a more way of understanding the
sources of the nghts, duttes, and VIrtues of citizenship, and disagreements
over these sources..If is distinguished from liberalism by being
fou?ded upon an Ideal of hberty as non-domination (rather than an ideal
of of constraints), then it may express a justice account
:-vhICh sees Justtce Itself as partially constituted by liberty so understood or
It may an equal-membership account which sees the good of equal
membershIp as wholly or partially constituted by liberty so understood.
If, on the other hand, what distinguishes republicanism from liberalism is
simply a belief in the importance of an active citizenry rather than a differ-
ent view of liberty, then republicanism can be grounded in a justice account
robus! view of what citizens need to do in order to sustain
Just mstttut10ns or It can be grounded in an equal-membership account that
takes a robust view of what citizens need to do in order to sustain social
Liberalism on this view could be grounded in either
a.. JustIce account that has a restricted view of what is required of
CItIzens m. order to just institutions or in a version of the equal-
account whIch supposes that social and political equality can
be even when much of the citizenry simply go about their own
busmess.
334
CITIZENSHIP AND JUSTICE
6. Concluding remarks
The distinction between the justice account and the equal-membership
account provides us with a better understanding of the sources of the rights,
duties, and virtues of citizenship than does the more traditional distinction
between liberal and republican conceptions. The justice account and the
equal-membership account can co-exist together, and indeed complement
each other, for the rights and duties they justify are grounded in different
considerations and may apply to different (though overlapping) sets of people.
1ustice accounts may in principle attribute different rights, entitlements, and
duties to resident citizens, non-resident citizens, and resident aliens, for ex-
ample, if doing so would provide the best means of fulfilling the requirements
of general principles of justice that include all persons within their scope,
but for most justice accounts it is the category of permanent residents
(including resident citizens and resident aliens) which is of greatest moral
significance. Even when these accounts converge they will do so for different
reasons, and on the justice account the status of citizenship in particular may
not be what is salient from a normative point of view. Indeed, defenders of
the justice account may think that the state has a general duty to treat all
of those who are resident long-term within its borders as equals in certain
respects, and that this provides the basis for an account of most (if not all)
of their various rights and entitlements.
Notes
I would like to thank Chris Armstrong, Roger Crisp, Iseult Honohan, John Horton,
Cecile Laborde, David Owen, Jonathan Seglow, and this joumal's referees for their
helpful comments on the arguments in this article. It also benefited from the questions
and comments of participants in the Association of Legal and Social Philosophy's
conference on 'The Future(s) of Democratic Citizenship', held at the University of
Southampton in April 2010. My work on it was supported by a Leverhulme Major
Research Fellowship.
I I shall use the terms 'duty' and 'obligation' interchangeably, rather than (as some
do) reserving the latter to refer only to moral requirements that are voluntarily
incurred. See, for example, Rawls (1971: Ch. VI).
2 According to this view, there may be duties of justice that extend beyond state
borders, and not all duties of justice will be duties of citizenship. Some justice
views will, of course, be radically critical of the existing state system on the
grounds that, in practice, the preference that states give to the interests of their
own citizens undermines rather than realizes impartial principles of justice. Some
of these critics of the state system favour dispersing the sovereignty that is cur-
rently concentrated in states in order to create a variety of different political units,
above and below. See, for example, Pogge (2002: Ch. 7). These new political
units would protect the rights of their members, but in a way that (it is supposed)
would better serve fundamental principles of justice.
3 See, for example, Nagel (200S) and Sangiovanni (2007). For relevant discussion,
see also Blake (2001), Risse (2006), and Armstrong (2009).
335

4 The justice accoun,t does, however, face a challenge in showing that the duty
to support just institutions is a special duty that is owed to fellow citizens. See
Waldron (1993).
5 To the extent that duties of justice are universal in scope, a citizen will continue
to have duties to outsiders, and indeed may have duties to support the develop-
ment of transnational institutions When these would facilitate the fulfilment of
his or her duties to outsiders and enable those beyond the state's borders to receive
their just entitlements.
6 Although some libertarians would resist this extension, on the grounds that private
employers are entitled to hire who they want, for whatever reason they want, as
a result of their property rights. See, for example, Narveson (1988: 315-8).
7 Although it is difficult to pin the justice account on individual thinkers, a number
of accounts of the rights, duties, and virtues of citizenship which have been
developed in the context of liberal responses to communitarian criticism, and in
the debate over political or comprehensive forms of liberalism and their implica-
tions for civic education, are compatible with it. See, for example, Macedo (1990:
Ch. 7), Galston (1991: Parts Ill-IV), and Callan (1997: Ch. 2). Stuart White's
account of economic citizenship (2003) is also compatible with a justice account.
The reason it is hard to attribute the justice account to particular thinkers with
any confidence is because I define it as the view that all the rights, duties, and
virtues of citizenship are justified by reference to considerations of justice, and this
proposition does not receive explicit attention in these debates. It might be thought
that this provides a reason to change the way I define the justice account, for
example, it might instead be defined as the view that the rights, duties, and virtues
of citizenship are derived primarily from considerations of justice, which would
allow some to be derived from other sources. But I resist this for reasons that will
become clearer in Section 4: other sources of rights, duties, and virtues tend to
give them different scope, so that they apply to different groups of people, and
incorporating them into the justice account obscures that point.
8 According to the equal-membership account, the value of citizenship depends in
part on the relevant collective being able to exercise significant control over
its members' conditions of existence. If processes of globalization undermine
the degree of control that it is possible to exercise over these conditions, then the
value of citizenship is correspondingly diminished.
9 This version of the equal-membership account needs to be distinguished from two
other accounts to which it bears some resemblance, but which are really versions
of the justice account: first, an account which starts from the idea that justice
accords each of us a fundamental right of justification, and argues that the good
of equal membership, with its commitment to political equality, is the best way of
respecting that right; second, an account which interprets justice as non-domination,
and regards the good of equal membership as the realization of that value. I shall
return to this second type of justice account in Sections 4 and 5.
10 The equal-membership account can regard the duty to treat fellow citizens as one's
social and political equals as partially constitutive of the good of equal member-
ship, rather than as simply a means to its promotion. See Mason (1997: 442).
II See Lawrence Blum's instructive example of a white customer who refuses to put
his money into the hands of a black cashier in order to avoid physical contact
with her (2007: 546-51).
12 If judgements about whether the distribution of wealth and income is just rely
solely upon whether the inequalities involved will lead to domination, then we are
likely to be led towards a principle of sufficiency rather than towards the more
demanding principles of distributive justice that many theorists of justice favour.
336
Cl ..... ILJLOiL"'IUILII ?'l:I"LI J OD I IGD
13 This is perhaps the way that Philip Pettit conceives of it. See Pettit (1997: 286-92).
Laborde's defence of critical republicanism might also be read in this way. See
Laborde (2008).
References
Armstrong C. (2009) Coercion, reciprocity, and equality beyond the state. lournalof
Social Philosophy 40(3): 297-316.
Bellamy R. (2007) Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitu-
tionality of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blake M. (2001) Distributive justice, coercion, and autonomy. Philosophy and Public
Affairs 30(3): 257-96.
Blum L. (2007) Race, national ideals, and civic virtue. Social Theory and Practice
33(4): 533-56.
Callan E. (1997) Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Carter I. (2008) How are power and unfreedom related? In: Laborde c., Maynor 1.
(eds) Republicanism and Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 58-82.
Cohen G. A. (1995) Incentives, inequality, and community. In: Darwall S. (ed.) Equal
Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 331-97.
Co hen G. A. (1997) Where the action is: On the site of distributive justice. Philosophy
and Public Affairs 26(1): 3-30.
Cohen G. A. (2008) Rescuing lustice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Galston W. (1991) Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Honohan I. (2002) Civic Republicanism. London: Routledge.
Kramer M. (2008) Liberty and domination. In: Laborde c., Maynor 1. (eds)
Republicanism and Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 31-57.
Kymlicka W. (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and
Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laborde C. (2008) Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Phi-
losophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lovett F. (2010) A General Theory of Domination and lustice. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Macedo S. (1990) Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal
Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mason A. (1997) Special obligations to compatriots. Ethics 107(3): 427-47.
Maynor 1. (2003) Republicanism in the Modern World. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller D. (1983) Constraints on freedom. Ethics 94(1): 66-86.
Miller D. (1998) Equality and justice. In: Mason A. (ed.) Ideals of Equality. Oxford:
Blackwell,21-36.
Miller D. (2000) Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moore G. E. (1993) Principia Ethica, revised edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Nagel T. (2005) The problem of global justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(2):
113-47.
337
Narveson 1. (1988) rhe Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Pettit P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom alld Government. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pettit P. (2008) Republican freedom: Three axioms, four theorems. In: Laborde c.,
Maynor 1. (eds) Republicanism a/!1 Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 102-30.
Pocock 1. (1995) The ideal of citizenship in classical times. In: Beiner R. (ed.)
Theorizing Citizenship. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 29-52.
Pogge T. (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Rawls J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls 1. (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Rawls 1. (1999) The Lall' of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Risse M. (2006) What to say about the state. Social Theory and Practice 32(4): 671-98.
Sangiovanni A. (2007) Global justice, reciprocity, and the state. Philosophjl and
Public Affairs 35(1): 3-39.
Skinner Q. (1997) Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner Q. (2008) Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power. In: Laborde c., Maynor
1. (eds) Republicanism and Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 83-101.
Spinner 1. (1994) The Boundaries of Citizenship. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Waldron 1. (1993) Special ties and natural duties. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22(1):
3-30.
White S. (2003) The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic
Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

338