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The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico
Author(s): Rogelio Hernández-Rodríguez

Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), pp. 97-127
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The Renovation of Old Institutions:
State Governors and the
Political Transition in Mexico
Rogelio Herndndez-Rodriguez
ABSTRACT
The process of political transition in Mexico has fostered several

institutional transformations in the political system. Such changes
do not modify the system's design, but they do reactivate some
basic institutions and forgotten powers that affect the operation of
the political system as a whole. The state governors have under-
gone one of the most relevant transformations: they have gained
more autonomy and have forged a new relationship with the fed-
eral executive. This essay analyzes the different actions governors
have taken depending on their partisan origin. While the PAN gov-
ernors focus on administrative and financial issues, the PRI gover-
nors have developed the most important political challenges to the
president's authority.
he process of political change in Mexico has been assessed-like

the rest of the processes that have taken place since the 1980s-by
the achievement, or not, of political alternation, considered since th
first analysis as the ultimate evidence of structural transformation i
nondemocratic regimes. Alternation has been regarded not just as an
important symptom of change but as the only one allowing observe
to decide whether regimes are pluralist or not. In established democra
cies, alternation and, in general, electoral competition are a relevant
issue, but not the main one. According to Dahl, democracy is a regim
in which citizens have the same opportunities for conveying their poli
ical preferences and acting according to them, and for governments t
take those preferences into account (Dahl 1971, 2). It is a system wher
public participation goes beyond the freedom to elect rulers, and a
system that is protected by a genuine rule of law.
In democratic transitions, however, elections and, above all, alter-
nation become much more important because they confirm that the
previous leaders have been deprived of power. When alternation is
attained, moreover, it can be said that the transition has been complet
and the consolidation stage has started. At this point, it is crucial to
create the legal and institutional conditions required to ensure compet
tion and, therefore, the respect for the open participation of citizensh
(O'Donnell 1992).
97
98 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 45: 4
By overrating alternation, this approach-which still prevails,

despite the changes it has undergone in recent years-does not take
into account other institutional transformations that, paradoxically,
while they may not modify the design of the political system, are asso-
ciated with a level of competition unknown in the past. Such changes
may thus reactivate some basic institutions and may put into effect for-
gotten powers that affect the operation of the political system as a
whole. It is a process that enhances competition and strengthens plu-
rality and political participation until it achieves a new institutional
order, without the inevitable collapse of the previous regime. This, of
course, is not a widespread experience because there is a crucial pre-
condition for its achievement: the original system must have been
endowed with a significant level of institutionalization so that, as the
change begins, institutions may be able to assess and regulate the pro-
posals of and the conflicts among the actors.
INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT
Analyses of political change have become increasingly complex and

specialized, but early studies were extremely optimistic as they assumed
that change would be relatively swift and would result in a full and
functional democracy. This optimism was based largely on the belief
that nondemocratic regimes (whether totalitarian, authoritarian, or dic-
tatorial) would entirely collapse, and thus their institutions would be
easily replaced. These forecasts, however, have not been confirmed. So
far, except for some cases in which democratic success has fulfilled all
expectations-such as Spain-the process has, for the most part, taken
longer than usual. In many cases, a number of practices and actors from
the previous regime have conspicuously reappeared, hindering the
change to such an extent that it has become common to talk about
authoritarian regression in countries that were depicted as democratic
examples, such as Russia or Peru, just to mention two remarkable cases
(Linz and Stepan 1996).
Recently, the analyses have focused on institutions that must regulate
the conflict, set out behavioral standards, and guide the democratic tran-
sition. This emphasis is the result not only of the reemergence of the insti-
tutional approach, proposed by the neoinstitutionalism model, but also of
having admitted a serious fault in early analyses that assumed that there
were no significant differences among nondemocratic regimes, whether
authoritarian, totalitarian, or dictatorial, and even less in their institutional
structures. Change therefore was expected to be virtually the same in
every case and always implied the breakdown of the system. It was taken
for granted that the old regime institutions would be entirely replaced,
since they were not democratic and could not facilitate the change.
HERNANDEZ-RODRIGUEZ: MEXICO'S GOVERNORS 99
While the replacement concept was stressed, the possibility

institutions to have a significant degree of social acceptance,
to be more resilient, was not considered. In early times, the su
an institution was regarded as promoted by conservative group
the result of a social or cultural identity. This is why, for exam
Eastern European countries, a first claim was the implementation o
liamentary systems that, while replicating Western models, ign
torical and political traditions that eventually hindered the real
tional function (Offe 1996).
A recurring phenomenon has been the endurance of a num
basic institutions from previous regimes. Analyses therefore had to
on the very nature of those institutions, or on trying to design ne
tutions that would facilitate and ensure change, regardless of intell
desires or formal political models. Scholars have thereby grad
recovered two essential proposals of classical sociology and polit
ence: institutions survive even under radical changes; and an i
tionalized regime implies a high level of resistance and social
ance (Merton 1968; Huntington 1968). As some researchers
established, all institutions have a historical background and a
tional foundation (Elster et al. 1998; O'Donnell 1992). While som
main political institutions have managed to survive radical ch
such as social revolutions or, more recently, the collapse of the
ist regime, in countries with a high degree of institutionalizati
as authoritarian Mexico, institutions have managed to assimila
incorporate changes into their structure.
This explanation is not new. It stems from a political socio
tradition that admits, almost without variation, that institutions ar
and that they impose recurrent social behavior patterns becau
were accepted and reproduced by people in society. Institutions
only a source of imposition and control; as such, their rigidit
make them extremely vulnerable. To survive, an institution m
only adapt to changes but also assimilate them so they do not g
conflicts and instability (Coser 1956; Goodin 1996).
These kinds of regimes tend to have more permanence
endurance, but the change still may be the result of contradict
the system in which the institutions work, their relation to th
the institutions in the system, or changes in the original ord
assign them specific tasks. Some unexpected economical and p
modifications may occur which, according to Thelen and S
could cause institutions that were previously marginal to inco
tasks, goals, and strategies different from their original ones. T
ronment could also impede their original functions, or the regim
impose on them some other assignments. After the setting is
formed, those goals and powers unknown in the past would sta
deployed without changing the institution as a whole (Thelen and

Steinmo 1992).
Without openly admitting it, scholars following the institutional
approach accepted this potential scenario only for democratic sys-
tems, largely because they did not consider that a nonpluralist regime
could have some level of institutionalization. The multiplicity of
cases, however, their endurance, and the limited pluralism character-
izing authoritarian systems led analysts to reconsider those systems.
In his first works, Juan Linz stated that authoritarism was based not
only on control and imposition but also on some legitimacy. But it
was Samuel Huntington who acknowledged that the institutionaliza-
tion of these regimes might be similar to that of the democratic world,
as he identified the existence of political parties, including those
regimes with a one-party political system (Linz 1964; Huntington and
Moore 1970).
This may be one of the basic reasons for the different routes fol-
lowed by countries whose transitions set off from a total lack of plu-
ralism or from an order that-as in authoritarism-had institutions akin
to the democratic ones, but restrained participation to an extent
reputed legitimate by the whole system. To achieve that kind of con-
trolled pluralism, institutions had to be deeply rooted in society, but
eventually their operation depended on the system, on the environ-
ment in which each of them was entrenched, thus being ready, in prin-
ciple, to adapt to change. A highly institutionalized system might resist
pressure for change, but it might also accept alterations that, despite
the original purpose and scope, would change the environment or the
general order, allowing certain institutions to take on new tasks or
simply to renew their operation. In this case, change should be
assessed not only by the alternation but by the enlargement of plural-
ism and the institutional changes facilitated by the transformations in
the environment.
The process of change in Mexico focused on electoral issues. But

although competition was strengthened and alternation reached even
the local congresses, municipalities, and governorships, the parties
and some observers considered this democratic progress as minor,
because alternation in the presidency of the republic-considered the
only and ultimate proof of change-had not been achieved (Cor-
nelius 1999; Serrano 1996). Although alternation did not reach the
presidential level before July 2000, however, it certainly released insti-
tutions from restrictions imposed by the hegemony of the ruling
party; and this change, although not quite remarkable, furthered the
expansion of participation and accelerated the achievement of presi-
dential alternation.
A PRESIDENTIAIST, ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
Mexico has been an example both of an authoritarian government and

of the most successful one-party regime. Analysts have stressed the
enormous relevance that institutions have had for maintaining a system.
Huntington was one of the first scholars to recognize this high level of
institutionalization and, thus, of the social acceptance of the regime,
which provided it with political stability and economic development.
Other studies followed Huntington's view and stressed this trait, identi-
fying both the single party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional,
PRI) and presidentialism as the key elements of this effective institu-
tional structure (Huntington 1970; Ames 1970). Indeed, as some more
recent research has shown, presidentialism in Mexico has not been
endowed with more constitutional powers than other regimes. Some
studies state, moreover, that in formal terms, presidentialism in Mexico
is virtually balanced, in a way quite similar to the U.S. model (Main-
waring and Shugart 1993, table 3, 672).
Mexican presidentialism reached an extremely high level of influ-
ence through a series of political practices that canceled out other insti-
tutions' capacities, including powers designed to control presidentialism
that ultimately overestimated the executive. Two factors were crucial for
this model to function: the political homogeneity resulting from the
PRI's electoral monopoly and, logically, the lack of political competition;
and the efficient political network that deeply permeated society and
that helped solve problems and regulate conflicts. In this sense, it was
the system's and its actors' style of operation that determined presiden-
tial primacy, not presidentialism's formal powers or constitutional
design (Casar 1999).
Political homogeneity was the most significant consequence, which
accounted for the lack of plurality. The PRI controlled every electoral
position and, in addition, the government apparatus itself. This preem-
inence made ineffective the institutional and real functions of Congress
and state governments, because it annulled political divergence.
Because of this homogeneity, the legal and political authority of the fed-
eral executive gained prominence. The president was not always forced
to use an extraordinary power or commit an illegitimate act to gain
approval from officers and institutions. He simply was the national polit-
ical leader, and he subordinated institutions to the interests of his gov-
ernment and even his personal power.
If we examine the powers of Congress and local executives, it is evi-
dent that since 1917, when the Federal Constitution was issued, initiat-
ing the institutionalization of the political system, those legislators had
enough legal resources to oversee the executive and to correct any
excess, if necessary. The Constitution provided not for a disproportion-
ate presidentialism but for a true balance of powers. The problem

that such a design had nothing to do with a regime that neede
extreme centralism to subdue the regional and local powers. Th
ation of the dominant party, in 1929, was the main political even
would guarantee the control of dissension and, at the same
enforce political homogeneity.1 The single party was the main re
for the federal center to achieve national control by means of
system's institutions.
The institutional network that was being created in the cou
moreover, could reach even to the roots of society. Because of
extensive network, the system could identify problems even before
appeared, meet socioeconomic claims, resolve contradictions amon
ferent actors, and therefore regulate social conflict. Institutions fulf
their essential task as intermediaries between society and govern
but also served as a means to disarticulate potential sources of in
ity. In addition, they conformed to the purpose of maintaining the
idential figure, which, although it was not their main role, was cruc
the system. That set of institutions gradually solved problems in the
and administrative levels, keeping them within limits that did not a
national stability or involve the president. The president had to inte
only in extreme cases. History reveals that each case in which th
ident got directly involved grew from political events that tended to
pass a great number of previous instances (Reyna 1976, 12).
Political partisanship, homogeneity, and institutional protection p
vided the means for the president to become the heart of the system
to dominate all aspects of it. It was not a deliberate agreement b
result of a political practice that favored the need to integrate
powers and to establish a single system throughout the country. Inst
tions may be forced to change, however, because of transformat
the structural context. In the Mexican system, some of the main ins
tions, such as the legislative branch and state governments, have
to act differently from the traditional way, not because they have g
additional faculties but because the political homogeneity resulting f
the lack of pluralism has been shattered.
Pluralism had an immediate effect on state congresses, but they
were dependent on a party-or a party coalition-different from t
the governor. Only with the prevalence of a nongoverning part
the congresses actually wield their autonomy and counterbalan
executive. In contrast, when the same party-be it the PAN
PRD-had control of both branches, subordination to the governo
virtually absolute, and resulted in a higher control of congresses (Lu
bio 1996).
While the strengthening of congresses was variable, that of gove
was immediate, as they managed to turn their political autonomy in
increase of internal controls, always mediated by the support of th

ties. Governors' success in gaining the support of their congresses t
imate local reforms that defied federal government policies and pro
was the result of party control. The best example of collaboratio
powers resulting in measures that the federal executive could no
was the so-called Bartlett Law, through which Governor Manuel
of Puebla changed certain criteria to allocate federal fiscal res
locally. This is one of the exceptions this article will analyze.
STATE GOVERNORS:
BE'VEEN SUBMISSION AND AUTONOMY
State governors could never escape the president's control. All the stud-
ies that have analyzed the long period of political stability and economic
growth in Mexico (1940-70) view the state governors as presidential
envoys; as the executive's employees, charged with truthfully imple-
menting federal programs and presidential desires (Scott 1964; Needler
1971). This idea has prevailed in the studies of regional political changes
in recent years. While Graham calls governors "elected prefects" (1971,
25), Ward and Rodriguez describe them as "modern viceroys" (1999,
675). The result of this perspective has been that state governments and
the real functions of their heads have not been properly analyzed.
Although this subordination was partly true, it was never absolute; nor
did state governors act as mere presidential delegates.
In reality, governors have played a significant role, requiring a great
deal of autonomy, that simply was not used to challenge the federal
executive because of political homogeneity. As regional research has
clearly revealed, states have always had enough power to oppose
national policies. The revolution itself, moreover, was developed with
regional leaders who systematically tried to strengthen themselves, even
at the risk of fracturing the integrity of the nation. With the rise of the
Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929, the control of local leaders and
caudillos began, and the governors became intermediaries responsible
for local control, stability, and peace (Meyer 1978).
Historical tradition was not the only factor to guarantee a certain
degree of regional autonomy. There was also the recognition that the
country's geographical and social complexity made it impossible for a
single institution to meet the huge diversity of citizens' claims and peti-
tions. In this sense, the creation of institutions was the result not of a
political estimation but rather of the pragmatic need to settle problems.
State governors were the formal and actual counterparts of the president
in each political entity. The control they exercised aimed not to ensure
personal power, as did the caudillos early in the century, but to guar-
antee domestic stability in line with so-called national objectives.
Because this function required a deep knowledge of the situati

the states, governors could not behave as mere presidential env
discuss everyday activities. On the contrary, those tasks demande
governors be granted enough autonomy to control political, int
and opposition groups; resolve claims; allocate benefits; and dise
gle any potential problems. While the president was responsible
national stability, each governor was responsible for a particular s
According to one author, autonomy consisted of a substantia
not exclusive and thorough-control of the local elite and governm
the legislative body, municipalities, and, of course, the local PRI (A
son 1971, 302). The management of public positions was an instru
used both for rewarding loyalties and for preserving the politica
trol of the state. Just as at the federal congress level, local con
members and municipal presidents were thus subject to each gove
interest in ensuring political homogeneity.
The relationship between the legislative and executive branch
was concurrent, though not formal. The channel for a fluid and effic
communication was, once again, the party, because it assembled
only social organizations but also the local political elites. Regard
their level of ideological conviction, party activists admitted that
mitment to the governor's projects was crucial to their political f
and inasmuch as they held all the public sector jobs, they serve
permanent mouthpieces of a single political perspective. Strictly
ing, local politics was an exclusive concern of the PRI activists, w
head was the governor. Homogeneity among institutions was main
result of the party's structural involvement-including local ma
ment-rather than of orders or pressure from the governors.
The governor's role in the party and institutions made him the lo
elite leader, and though he used that position to gain control, even
it granted him a significant level of power that could have result
confrontation with the federal authority. Of course, such autonom
not emerge; and, along with other factors, the relationship stress
governor's subordination to the president and the federal govern
Subordination, however, had only a threefold expression. One a
was the management of budgetary resources, collected by each sta
handed over to the federation, which decided on the allowance pu
to a program prepared by the secretary of the treasury. That allo
usually did not match each state's level of productivity. The secon
the traditional presidential faculty to select governors, and the third
the evident presidential intrusion in dismissing governors.
Whereas the first aspect extends beyond the objectives of
research because of the technical details involved (Diaz Cayeros
the second claim represents one of the most relevant aspects, e
though it is only partly true. Certainly, as shown by the scant ev
available (Loret de Mola 1978, 13; Farias 1992, 129), the president
the ultimate selection of the gubernatorial candidate, who, beca
the primacy of the PRI, could then be sure of victory. The selec
the candidate, however, did not depend entirely on the presiden
sympathies but took into account local conditions, group interes
example, entrepreneurs, workers' corporations) and the pres
leadership of the elite. The candidates' personality or closeness
president were elements that, for the most part, had to add to their
bility for fulfilling the mission of ensuring stability. This was reaso
apart from the presidential power, considering that the purpose
have governors who knew about each particularity and interest in
states. If arbitrariness had been customary among the appointed
dates, the most frequent consequence would have been conflict a
stability, as evidence confirms.
The third argument draws from the preceding one. Contrary
widespread view that governors were dismissed frequently, almost at
president's discretion, which supposedly reveals the institutional frag
of state governments and an excessive federal intervention, the d
tive trait of modern times has been governors' permanence in office
the legal end of their tenure. It is true that governors have alway
unable to make their interests prevail in conflicts between the local e
utives and the president-with the sole exception of Roberto Ma
governor of Tabasco, in 1994, who was able to resist pressure from
ident Ernesto Zedillo to remove him from office. This confirms the his-
torically indisputable authority of the president at the national level. But
despite this manifest superiority, federal intervention in the states has
aimed at restraining governors' excesses or tackling local crises that
revealed governors' inability to preserve political stability.
As table 1 shows, between 1946 and 2000, a small number of gov-
ernors have left their charge, whether they were forced to resign or pro-
moted to a federal office. Except for Miguel Aleman (1946-52) and
Carlos Salinas (1988-94), the percentage of governors who were
removed in each administration has ranged between 6 percent and 28
percent of the total of state heads. While 71 governors removed in 54
years is not a small number, more than 270 governors held office during
the same period, which means that more than two-thirds completed
their formal terms. This is an indicator of institutional stability.
This finding shows that the preeminence of the federal executive
and governors' traditional subordination never emerged through arbi-
trariness and that, on the contrary, the institutional functions of state
governments were acknowledged. Except for some cases during the
Salinas administration, moreover, forced resignations were caused by
serious political conflicts that put at risk both the states and the stability
of the political system. In each of these cases, the governor committed
Table 1. Removals of Governors, 1946-2000
Appointed
to Federal
Political
Presidential Administration Removed Positions Total
Miguel Aleman (1946-1952) 12 2 14

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) 5 3 8
Adolfo L6pez Mateos (1958-1964) 3 0 3
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) 1 1 2
Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) 6 3 9
Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) 3 2 5
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 4 2 6
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) 12 5 17
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 5 2 7
Sources: Anderson 1971; Bernstein 1993; H
serious mistakes, by imposing munic

violence to social organizations or public demonstrations, which
resulted in deaths and demonstrated the governor's political inability to
solve conflicts and respond to social claims. As Anderson found in the
1960s, when the governor tried to maintain influence by appointing
immediate or potential successors, it was undermining the institutional
reliability of state government to create personal power. In those cases,
the risk was the emergence of old cacicazgos (regional power bases)
(Anderson 1971, 315-17).
The relationship between state governors and the president was
always more complex than what is usually accepted. The president did
not have such a bearing on everyday activities; nor did governors lack
power or resources. The relation, as the total of removals shows, was
based on the governor's ability to uphold the authority to control and
regulate conflicts and to maintain local political stability. This ability,
moreover, depended less on the governor's personal skills than on the
governor's direct and unquestionable control over the politics and insti-
tutions of the state.
Eventually, those resources granted governors enormous power,
which could generate a conflict of interest with the president. This is not
a mere deduction, given that, as evidenced by some cases, some gov-
ernors tried to consolidate their influence by appointing successors
without discussing them with the president or the PRI's national lead-
ers. Not a single governor, however, was able to impose a personal view
over that of the president. As long as the governor fulfilled duties and
did not try to challenge the national project, the president would not
intrude in local politics, even though the governor could co

abuses. Only when the governor failed to solve problems and kee
state in peace-that is, when the governor failed to be functi
would federal intervention proceed. In any case, the relevant poin
is that the tasks of the governors needed a significant level of power
autonomy, which was invisible because of the party's control. Th
ical context was the key element of their behavior, not the instit
original design.
THE SHATIERING OF THE STRUCTURE:

PLURALISM
Since the 1960s, but mainly during the 1980s, the process of change in
Mexico has focused on the electoral field. Between 1973 and 1996, the
nation's electoral legislation has been amended seven times, resulting in
a radical and deep transformation of electoral laws, proceedings, and
institutions in charge of organizing, observing, and sanctioning the elec-
toral processes.
The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) was created in 1990, and six
years later became independent of the federal executive. Largely
because of the IFE, elections have attained a high level of equity, trans-
parency, and, of course, credibility. As a result of increasing participa-
tion, political competition has allowed opposition parties to gain victo-
ries and assume the control of governments, with institutional
responsibilities and tasks. Since 1989, when the Partido Acci6n Nacional
(PAN) won its first victory in the gubernatorial election in Baja Califor-
nia, the presence of governors from non-PRI parties has steadily
increased. As of August 2000, the PAN held 7 governorships and the Par-
tido de la Revoluci6n Democratica (PRD) 4-including the national cap-
ital-and an alliance that included both held 2. The PRI kept the major-
ity with 19 states (table 2).3
Table 2 shows that 32 percent of municipalities in the country are
also ruled by opposition parties, including the major capital cities, which
reflects their penetration into the most modern and developed areas of
the country. In only 11 years, electoral competition has increased and
generated a clear pattern of alternation, though this pattern still did not
reach Mexico's presidency until July 2000. Other political transforma-
tions occurred, however, that significantly modified the functioning of
the system as a whole.4
Electoral reforms focusing on political change have altered the polit-
ical order that defined each part of the system's function. In other
words, the political context that annulled institutional powers has
started to change. Pluralism resulting from electoral change has defi-
nitely shattered the political homogeneity of Mexico, the unity of the
Table 2. Opposition Parties in Local Governments, August 200
Party Governorship Municipal Presidencies

PRI 19 1,374
PAN 7 309
PRD 4 255
Coalitions and other
opposition parties 2 69
Municipal councils 2
Total 32a 2,009b
aSince the July 2000 election

one coalition PAN-PRD in C
To this total must be added
indigenous populations. In th
people, a procedure called u
Source: Federal Electoral Ins
Gobernacion.
dominant party, the president's control over it, and basically, the
grounds on which the federal executive was allowed to be the leader o
national politics. Pluralism has destroyed the elements ensuring institu
tional subordination to the president. Yet pluralism has had two differ
ent impacts: one on opposition governors who have focused on admin-
istrative rationalization, and the other-deeply political and thus more
potentially important for Mexico's future-represented by the PRI gov-
ernors who have started to challenge the president, despite sharing
common party origin.
An additional important aspect of the governors' political change
are the measures implemented by the Zedillo administration to pro-
mote a process of decentralization to the state governments. In con-
trast to previous presidents, Zedillo consented to give back a number
of responsibilities to the states, including public education and health
services. Zedillo, moreover, decided to reorganize the Pronasol (Pro-
grama Nacional de Solidaridad), Salinas's welfare program, and
directly allocate resources to the states and municipalities (Ward and
Rodriguez 1999). A major consequence of these measures was tha
governors had more opportunities to decide on local programs an
were thereby forced to negotiate with mayors, many of whom were
not members of the PRI. Both pluralism and the new economic
resources furthered the autonomy of local politics and strengthened
the governors' role as mediators between the states and the president
and federal government.
OPPOSITION GOVERNORS
The origin and historical tradition of governors and their parties account
for the different consequences of pluralism. As stated by democratic
theory, alternation in itself is a major achievement, but to have a real
impact on democracy it must bring about new political practices, includ-
ing those purely administrative or governmental that, at least in the first
stages, should clearly differ from those practiced by the authoritarian
regime. Governments arising from the PAN or the PRD should make
sure, both on the road to democracy and in the enforcement of politi-
cal practice, that their efforts are clearly distinguishable from those iden-
tified with the PRI.
Up to 1997, opposition governments came only from the PAN. This
is significant both in that it makes evident the PAN's opposition tradition
and experience and also establishes the grounds for its differences with
the PRD, also a PRI opponent. Most of the PRD governors do not have
a long history as activists identified with the party's projects but are,
instead, former PRI members who were not chosen by the party as can-
didates for state governments and therefore decided to resign and join
the PRD to participate in the elections.5
Their PRI origin, their sudden change of party, and their short life
as governors have all resulted in a performance not too different from
the PRI's traditional practices, from the members it has appointed as
cabinet officials, and from the programs it has developed. Indeed,
governors of the Federal District and Zacatecas have been the only
ones to have political impact on the system. While Ricardo Monreal,
governor of Zacatecas, took advantage of institutional facilities to
build his own presidential candidacy, the successive governors of the
Dzstrito Federal have reinforced their connections among the more
numerous middle class in the capital, and especially their privileged
position as the second-most important leader in the country com-
pared to the president.
With the PRD's wins in Michoacan and Chiapas (in coalition with
the PAN) and the PAN's victory in the presidency, the PRD governors
have developed strategic alliances with their PRI counterparts. They cre-
ated the Convenci6n Nacional de Gobernadores to resist the fiscal
reforms of President Vicente Fox, although all of them have declared
that this group has no other political intention than to design a new
fiscal relationship among states and the federal government. If in
Zacatecas and DF the governors' political practices are very close to
those of the old prifstas, predominant in the Convencion is the leader-
ship of PRI governors, who decide the agendas of the meetings. In the
long run, irrespective of their partisan militancy, both kinds of gover-
nors share the same priista origin.
110 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 45:4
Perhaps the foremost of the PRD's government experience

found at the municipal level. Like the PAN, the PRD gained
municipal presidencies, but its performance passed unnotice
of both the limitations imposed by PRI governors and the frequen
nal conflicts that impeded the PRD from developing a distinc
tics in contrast to the other two parties (Bruhn 1999; Bruhn an
1995). In this sense, the PRD's triumphs have more of a symbo
rather than being a practical democratic achievement. The PRD
are additional evidence of the progress of pluralism and altern
they have not had an evident impact on the government's way
and practicing politics.
The PAN, in contrast, has a long tradition as an opposition
the PRI and a historical legacy derived from the 1910 Revoluti
been, since its founding in 1939, a conservative party, identified
private sector; it openly rejects state intervention and has blamed
ernment for the economic crises and for official and political cor
(Loaeza 1999). Its long endurance, however, has not been enou
committed party activists to reach the most important electoral p
On the contrary, their electoral successes, since 1985, have be
ated with a decided involvement of entrepreneurs, who natura
the party's agenda. Each PAN governor, including Francisco Barrio
of Chihuahua from 1992 to 1998, and the most important presiden
didates, including Vicente Fox, have been successful entre
whose activism in the party totals five years at most. In most cas
have been candidates rushed into the elections by the PAN in the
of true politicians among the available party members.
As might be expected, the combination of entrepreneurs and a
program based on opposition to government intervention ha
determined the actions of PAN governors. As acknowledged
analysts and followers, the party's activities have focused on
ernization and administrative rationalization of the governmen
ture (Guillen 1993; Mizrahi 1995; Rodriguez and Ward 1995). T
has strengthened as the PAN governors, former entrepreneurs w
links to the party, have filled their cabinets mainly with busi
utives; these officials apply an administrative rationale aimed
efficiency and eliminate or reduce corruption.
According to different analysts, the PAN included executi
focused on administrative matters because it lacked experienc
ernmental issues, and because it assumed that once it had m
public administration efficient, improved attention to citize
reduced corruption, the electorate would become aware of t
tages of voting for the PAN. In reality, its members do not consi
itics a specific sphere of action or a different challenge apar
administrative matters. Thus, PAN governors do not seem to be v
from the technocratic generation style of politics that took ho

PRI and the national government during the last 18 years. This
derstanding, and the PAN's similarity to the PRI, have created
political problems for the PAN, which occasionally has been u
retain its elected positions or to maintain voting levels.
PAN governors have focused on drawing up laws and regul
related to accountability; they have reorganized and thinned the ra
public administration with the aim of reducing overall expenses
for society the measure has just meant losing jobs. They have tried
times unfruitfully, to redirect public policies that were previously
oped. On several occasions, the PAN's lack of experience ha
administrative mistakes that the PRI, now in the opposition, has ex
with some success. The most salient feature of PAN governments, t
that has had a real political impact and has shown a genuine dif
with the PRI tradition, has been their insistent assertion of modify
allocation of federal budgetary items, which represent the true sou
federalism (in terms of power and control). Again and again, b
governors and PAN mayors have promoted and even carried ou
to force the federal government to review the legal provision
allow for the collection of taxes or additional resources.
These measures have been consistently applied since the first PAN
government in Baja California, headed by Ernesto Ruffo. The governor
publicly demanded that the federal government revise fiscal agreements,
arguing that the state received much less than it produced and needed
to meet social demands. By threatening to withdraw from the federal
agreement program on public finance, Ruffo managed to get what he
asked from Salinas and the secretary of the treasury. When discussions
became harsh, both parties agreed to create a group of academic spe-
cialists, with no links to the parties, who would assess the terms of the
budgetary relationship and decide on the fairness of the allocations.
Contrary to Ruffo's and his staff's expectations, the commission's
resolution went against the state's petition and favored the treasury sec-
retary's model. Even worse, the group of specialists presented evidence
that Baja California had received more resources under the federal pro-
gram than those it would obtain according to the program proposed by
the state governor. Ruffo lost the battle; and what most affected politi-
cal relations was a feeling that the governor had acted unwisely and
lacked political and administrative experience (Guillen 1993, 24;
Rodriguez and Ward 1994, 110).
In Guanajuato in 1995, the PAN governor also called for a debate
on federalism, both on its constitutional rationale and on finance issues.
Afterward, the PAN mayor of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, decided to
close the tollbooths of the city's border with the United States. Interna-
tional crossings are considered federal areas, and therefore the treasury
secretary directly collects all the fees obtained. Obviously, the m

decision involved a federal infraction that cost him a temporary imp
onment (Aziz 1996, 84).
Each measure, despite its fair motivation, has gone along with
ous political mistakes and even, as in the mayor's case, with fe
infringements not justified by the claim. On the whole, the PAN has
unable to develop measures for the political protection of its g
ments; neither has it elaborated a set of congruent policies, in ad
trative and financing terms, through which its proposals could appea
fair revisions of federalism. On the contrary, PAN members' lack of
ical ability has made their administrations look like government
partisan interests and, especially, in search of revenge against the PR
Such mistakes, however, do not diminish a key factor concerning
renewal of the state governments' institutional functions. Both admi
trative issues and, particularly, the attempts to restate federalism h
nificantly challenged presidential power. Simply not being a PRI mem
has been enough for the governor to elude all kinds of informal con
which typified the old political homogeneity, and to resort to th
capacities required for reactivating functions of the state govern
Despite its limited political scope, the source of countless critici
the PAN-which is accused of not having detached itself from th
tradition and even of not responding to the political-electoral persua
that produces electoral defeats (as in the case of Chihuahua, whos
ernment and legislature the PAN won in 1986, whereas it lost th
congress in 1989 and the state government in 1992 to the PRI)-th
formance of PAN governors has set an important precedent in th
ordinated relationship between local leaders and the federal exec
While the emphasis on administrative issues has hardly been ben
PAN rulers have established, first, that governorships are institution
endowed with enough powers and autonomy to work with criter
programs of their own; and second, that the only thing needed for a
differently is the termination of the system's political constraints.
It is worth noting that the new role of governors has not ste
from a constitutional amendment increasing, or at least modifying,
powers. Strictly speaking, their capacities are the same as t
bestowed on PRI governors. The difference is that PAN governor
broken the dependency relationship. Opposition governors, how
have lacked PRI members' political capabilities and resources and
ticularly, have not been equipped with that close relation with the p
structure in each state. While PAN members have intentionally negle
to tie up their links with their local parties when they have take
the government, PRI members have tightened those links, both
front and defeat opposition and to evade presidential controls an
to detach themselves from ideological and governmental project
PRI GOVERNORS
The impact of pluralism has not been limited to alternation. On the one
hand, pluralism has led PRI governors to strengthen their relations with
the party's structure in each state for the purpose of challenging the
opposition; and on the other hand, the distance between the president
and the national PRI has allowed governors to increase their influence
on the local party decisionmaking structures. Since the early 1990s, and
motivated by its worst electoral defeat in 1988, the PRI has strengthened
local structures, which have been managed mainly by the governors.
The party has made a return to the regions; a return that, even though
it manages to resist the opposition, has also affected governors' politi-
cal functions and institutional autonomy.
As shown in tables 2 and 3, the opposition parties' progress is more
than evident in the states. They have won not only governorships but
also municipalities and local congresses, where they have obtained con-
trol of 38 percent of the legislative bodies and have equalled the PRI in
9 percent of them. Opposition presence in the federal congress is, of
course, relevant, and it has even surpassed the PRI in the latest legisla-
tures, thus being able to demand negotiations with the federal execu-
tive, something unthinkable in the past (Lujambio 1996). That the oppo-
sition victories occurred mainly in the states and did not reach the
presidency-at least until July 2000-means that the real challenge has
been at the level of state governors and local party structures. This
threat has imperiled the political unity and homogeneity that used to
guarantee leaders control, but it has also questioned the governors' abil-
ity to satisfy PRI demands and loyalties.
The local elites were the first to realize that their political future was
seriously jeopardized by the opposition victories in governorships, con-
gressional seats, and municipalities. Controlling not only the political
institutions but also the party, the governor managed to maintain stabil-
ity. As the opposition has advanced, the PRI elite has exerted pressure
on the governor-as the party's local leader-to ensure its position. This
has ultimately strengthened the traditional relationship between gover-
nors and party structures.
A first consequence has been the gradual alteration of the gover-
nor's profile. Anderson found that from 1940 to 1964, 59 percent of gov-
ernors' careers developed at the national level and 41 percent at the
state level (Anderson, 1971, 158). The national prevalence was a result
of the president's selection of candidates, because applicants were
forced to pursue their career in politics and federal posts in the capital
of Mexico, not in the states, if they were to keep close to the president.
For decades, having a local political presence was irrelevant; what
counted was a combination of experience and closeness to decision-
Table 3. Party Control of Local Congresses, August 2000
Party Number of Congresses

PRI 17
Opposition 12
Equilibrium 3
Total 32
Source: Federal Electoral Institute
making centers. Once chosen by the president and nominated by th

PRI, the politician's electoral victory was assured, and being or not
being involved in state affairs was virtually unimportant.
This practice reflects a total lack of political commitment. On the
other hand, the governor's personal links with local groups, in spite o
which, most of the time, he succeeded in keeping stability, proved tha
there were institutional channels supporting the regulation of conflicts,
both national and local. The interesting point here is that state govern
ments operated with a certain autonomy from their chiefs, even to com-
pensate for their lack of capacity. As Anderson stresses, the belief tha
an administrative governor was essential because eventually institution
and their joint relationships would resolve political problems has pre-
vailed for decades (Anderson 1971, 8).
As political conditions have changed and opposition parties actually
have been able to challenge the PRI, however, it has been necessary to
discard that practice. To the extent that being postulated by the PRI is
not enough anymore, applicants have been forced to seek local support
and, what is even more interesting, the party itself and its current lead-
ers have understood the need not to impose officers whose careers have
developed at the federal level. Candidates have been compelled to
change their profile to face the opposition successfully.
Table 4 demonstrates that PRI gubernatorial candidates have
increasingly pursued state-level careers and, over time, fewer federal-
level ones. These politicians are scarcely known in national politics, but
since they have remained in their home states they have managed to
build an interest network that serves to gain votes when candidacy and
campaign time comes. Although during the last three presidential terms
leaders with federal-level-only careers have been prevalent, this ratio
reveals a clearly descending trend, from 55 to 38 percent.
The table identifies candidates whose careers have largely a fed-
eral or a local character. When adding the two federal categories, the
federal primacy remains, but also its downward trend (from 75 percent
to 41 percent). State-profile candidates, mainly state, or mixed federal
and local experience (adding three columns) show a substantial
Table 4. Previous Political Experience of PRI Governors, 1982-200
Presidential Federal State Mainly Mainly

Administration Onlya Only Federal State Mixed NA Total
Miguel de la Madrid
(1982-1988) 17 1 6 2 4 1 31
Carlos Salinas
(1988-1994) 12 6 2 3 8 0 31
Ernesto Zedillo
(1994-2000) 12 2 1 1 15 1 32b
aThe first and second columns include only

The third and fourth columns include mix
lence of federal or local offices. The fifth column shows candidates with almost the
same number of local and federal assignments in their careers.
bIncludes the first Mexico City governor elected in 1997.
Note: Includes defeated candidates.
Source: Data collected by the author from periodical publications.
increase, from 23 percent in the 1982-88 term to 56 percent betw

1994 and 2000.
A relevant aspect of these data is the increase in the number of can-
didates following careers at both the federal and local levels ("Mixed").
The ratio in these cases doubled, from 13 percent in 1982-88 to 26 per-
cent in 1988-94, and reached 47 percent during Zedillo's administration.
These figures reveal a significant change in the PRI's candidate selection
criteria, which sought officers who were technically skilled but had
political expertise that would ensure their administrative performance
without losing local legitimacy. Change has also been evident in the
political actors who decide on the candidates. It is clear from these
trends that governors are likely to become more independent of the fed-
eral authority and that they are strengthening their local links.
This change has produced three basic effects in terms of the gover-
nors' autonomy. The first is that the local party structures-also identi-
fied with a local candidate, thus knowing the political problems, includ-
ing the needs of the party itself-have been reinforced. The second is
that the outgoing governor has an active local involvement, as well as
the power to select the candidate to succeed him; and, according to the
tradition aimed at ensuring the stability of the state, the governor may
choose the candidate he considers best suited for winning the election,
even though the decision may not agree with the federal view.
The third effect is that the gains of state governors and local struc-
tures represent net losses for presidential power. The president is forced
to accept them so as not to lose jobs held by party members or put the
country's overall political stability at risk. As the president loses

ence, governors gain loyalties both from the party and from suc
who, objectively, have no debt whatsoever to the president. Obv
the rationale for this change has not been a deliberate search for
ticipation but the need to face opposition parties. Again, the trad
resources of governors are involved in this change. As in the c
opposition governors, no additional faculties are used, nor is the
accomplish constitutional change. Governors simply make use o
powers and mechanisms they have always had but could not use
difference is that PRI governors now have an exceptional tool: t
machinery in each state. Thus pluralism is certainly a critical concept
PRI governors, though not because they are willing to extend i
because they are prone to contain it.
The role of governors in politics has also been favored by th
increasing detachment of the president as leader of the party. The p
ident's traditional leadership, over both the political elite and th
which made it possible to impose a political behavior consistent
the president's governmental programs by establishing the cand
profile and controlling the system's institutional network, has been
ously damaged in the last 12 years. The president's detachment
been affected by two factors. One is an ideological definition of the
elite ruling the country since the 1980s, conventionally called te
cratic, that has privileged governmental rationalism, both in adminis
tive and financial issues, and has underrated political activities.
other factor is the PRI's reaction to the increasing political comp
and the strengthening of opposition parties.
The advent of the new elite, highly specialized in financial an
nomic issues, resulted from the worsening of the economic crisis and
old politicians' failure to control it. Those young bureaucrats wh
never handled political activities before accused the former PRI g
ments of generating the economic problems, arguing that the
leaders had used public expenditures to attain political goals. In
view, the PRI was an example of the whole system's errors: the
union control that promoted the primacy of cacique leaders, whic
vented firms from improving their productivity; the administrative
economic muddle of governments, and the lack of democracy (
1979; Centeno 1994). Under these circumstances, it was obvious th
new elite would try to break away from the party and its actions.
The separation, however, transcended the governmental spher
affected the PRI's internal and electoral functions. For many PRI
bers, the new elite had overtly attacked the party, even helped the o
sition. What started as a differentiation of roles became a fight betw
two different views of what the party, and, of course, politics, shou
The relationship became increasingly harsh; PRI regulars believed
party leaders looked to them only when they needed help to pas
eral laws and programs at state congresses or support in their
gain power. This distance damaged the president's traditional aut
over the PRI, which had included institutional control. The party
ship has thus gradually been filled with politicians whom PRI ac
consider committed to the party and its future. As states have b
the main battlefield with the PAN and the PRD, the PRI has reinforc
electoral machinery, and governors are perceived as the closest a
ity, and the most experienced, in the fight against the opposition.
The governors' increasing weight in PRI decisions has app
simultaneously with the recent attempts to reform the party. In 198
under the official direction of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI bega
most significant reform since the one promoted by Carlos A. Mad
1965. In 1990, during the party's 14th National Assembly, a propo
made to eliminate the control exercised by corporations in orde
establish a democratic mechanism for the selection of candidates. In the
face of opposition from corporatist groups within the party, such as the
CTM (Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico), the CNC (Confed-
eraci6n Nacional Campesina), or the SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Tra-
bajadores de la Educaci6n), Colosio decided to look for the support of
the directive committee leaders of each state, all of them controlled by
state governors.
One of the major changes was the rearrangement of the National
Political Council (CPN), which ceased to be a formal agency and
became a collegiate body empowered to select the presidential candi-
date. The former council was formed by the national and state directive
committee leaders and by representatives from corporatist sectors. In
contrast, the CPN, created in 1990, reduced corporatist representation to
its lowest possible level and increased representation of municipal and
state leaders. Six years later, in the context of President Zedillo's con-
cern about the necessary separation between the party and the interests
of the federal government, a new national assembly took place in which
the reforms frustrated in 1990 were completed.
The 17th National Assembly reinforced the CPN's authority as an
internal decisionmaking body by according it a spectrum of activities,
ranging from the responsibility of allocating the party's financial
resources and real estate to the appointment of both the president and
the general secretary of the National Executive Committee (CEN), and
of the presidential candidate. This time, delegates decided not only to
increase the so-called territorial representation (that is, that of local and
state ruling bodies), but also the representation of governors them-
selves, who were allowed to attend and vote at the National Assembly.
Although the 1990 CPN acted under strong influence from the gov-
ernors, the one created after the 1996 meeting was thoroughly con-
118 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 45:4
trolled by the governors and their local allies. The governors' inf
attained such significance that the CEN had to create five secreta
oversee political and electoral activities in the states, supported b
committees. Although the appointment of head officers is a prer
of the party's president, it obviously cannot be done without dis
with and approval of the governors, who have the control of state r
bodies (PRI 1990, 1996).
With the president's resignation as the party's "natural" leade
17th National Assembly imposed two requirements for candida
heretofore inconceivable: a background of ten years of activism
experience as a party officer and in publicly elected posts. These
ditions were directed primarily toward the president and his ca
most of whose members did not fulfill either of them. The pres
authority had never been exposed to such an utter challenge, and
though the measures received spontaneous support from PRI mem-
bers-thus revealing their dislike for technocrats-they were prepared
and proposed by the state delegates, clearly controlled by governors.
Thus the governors' presence has gradually extended from local to
national scope and has gained control of the candidate selection
process-which means that they have snatched from the president the
traditional power to select a successor. The constraints imposed by the
PRI and the increasing influence of governors encouraged the involve-
ment of those who were most active and committed to the party, even
those critical of the president and his actions, such as Manuel Bartlett,
governor of Puebla, and Roberto Madrazo of Tabasco. For the first time
in Mexican modern history, the president could not freely select his suc-
cessor, as had been a customary practice in national politics. Instead, he
witnessed a competition in which actors received local state support not
completely controlled by him.
Although these events form the clear background of the PRI gover-
nors' increasing influence, their ability to challenge the president was
also based on a series of abuses committed during the previous presi-
dential term that moved the party away from tolerating the president's
intrusion. As shown in table 1, Carlos Salinas removed more governors
than any other president, either to resolve political conflicts or to appoint
them to federal jobs. In general, his dismissal of 12 governors sought to
solve serious political problems in their states, a procedure not unlike
previous practices. The difference was that all the conflicts were gener-
ated by the PAN and PRD, which ignored local authorities and always
appealed directly to the president so that he could give them immediate
solutions. Thus, governors' removal did not answer the need of working
out local conflicts, but instead prevented pressure on the president.
As Ward and Rodriguez stress, moreover, Salinas's goal of reducing
governors' opposition to federal policies often went along with political
and electoral motivations. Salinas implemented a series of progr

especially the Pronasol-that bypassed the governors' historical c
of communities and therefore nullified their political influenc
result, the implementation of programs was continuously hindere
nas actually did not trust in the governors' willingness to implem
political modernization projects (Ward and Rodriguez 1999, 677).
any case, the president's direct involvement in the resignations-b
of pressure from opposition parties-of three governors in 1991
(Fausto Zapata Loredo in San Luis Potosi, Ram6n Aguirre in Guan
and Eduardo Villasenor in Michoacan) who had formally won the
tions had an immediate and costly impact on the PRI. Clearly, dis
were considered a compelling means to calm the parties dow
silence criticism, irrespective of the formal PRI wins and the soverei
of the states (Prud'homme 1999; Hernandez Rodriguez 1994).
This way of using state governorships to maintain stability or to
a post in the presidential cabinet not only broke up an institution
of the governor's functions that had been thoroughly respected e
the most authoritarian presidents; it also implied an insult again
PRI state structures, which felt betrayed after having won elec
During the Salinas administration, a historically rooted feeling of
tion by the federal government gradually increased among PRI m
in the states. This had an immediate impact on the Salinas admin
tion's conclusion, because it bolstered local communities' autonom
their rulers' authority. During the Zedillo administration, four gover
challenged the presidential authority. Two of them (Ruben Figue
Guerrero and Jorge Carrillo Olea of Morelos) had been involved i
ous crimes-the assassination of several peasants and the cover-u
police officers accused of kidnapping-but Zedillo could never
enough evidence legally to remove them from office. Despite the
tial governability problems faced by those states, Zedillo always
at a distance to prevent his democratic will and respect for the law f
being questioned. The position of governors became untenable b
of pressures from social organizations and political parties, rathe
as a result of the president's authority.
TWO WHO OPPOSED THE PRESIDENT
In contrast, Roberto Madrazo in Tabasco and Manuel Bartlett in Puebla

managed to uphold their political and administrative actions as they
sought the support of the local PRI apparatus, congresses, and some
important social sectors. They also had a consistent defense strategy of
state sovereignty. When President Zedillo took office, he tried to remove
Madrazo with the same methods his predecessors had used, not realiz-
ing the power that governors had gained. The election of the governor
of Tabasco, simultaneous to the presidential election, had been st

questioned by the PRD, and by January 1995 that party was dem
that it be annulled. Zedillo wanted to exchange the governor's re
for the PRD's approval of a new electoral reform that was includ
the president's program.
In other circumstances the proposal would have been appr
with no problems, but in 1995, Governor Madrazo managed to m
remarkable social support-in the organization of which the loca
played an essential role-that forestalled his removal. While the f
government announced the governor's resignation in the capital,
numerous public demonstrations in Tabasco demanded that the state's
sovereignty be respected and that the president not void an election
process that had been sanctioned by the relevant legal authorities. This
was the first time in Mexican history that a governor-a governor of PRI
origins, moreover-managed to prevail over the will and even the polit-
ical resources of the president (Eisenstadt 1999).
In a manner less dramatic but equally significant, the governor of
Puebla, Manuel Bartlett, resisted the negotiations between the PAN and
the secretary of the interior to recognize the PAN's electoral triumphs,
and also enacted a state law by which his government could allocate
federal poverty funds according to criteria different from those estab-
lished by the national government. The law not only reversed the
accepted notion that the federal government could decide how to use
each state's budget, but helped the governor to win votes for the PRI,
which was threatened by the PAN.
The law, known ever since as the Bartlett Law, stipulated that the
main criterion for allocating resources would be not the number of
inhabitants but the level of poverty in each municipality. It was possi-
ble to enforce this measure because the grounds had already been set,
paradoxically, by the PAN governors, evidence of their lack of skill. But
the worst aspect was that it proved the social commitment of a PRI gov-
ernment and demonstrated that social benefits did not depend on polit-
ical alternation. The law's main impact, however, was that the new allo-
cation of resources reduced the funds for the urban, middle-class, and,
of course, heavily populated PAN-ruled municipalities while it benefited
those governed by the PRI, most of which were rural and had a greater
number of more deprived inhabitants (Vanderbush 1999). It was a meas-
ure totally independent of the state government; and while it was salu-
tary for the PRI, it faced strong opposition and broke the historical con-
straints imposed by the federation and the president.6
In both cases, what is worth stressing is that the PRI governors
overtly challenged the intrusion of the president and could defeat him
without committing legal infringements that would have facilitated their
removal. In accordance with the law and within the boundaries of their
powers, they looked for the support of their local congressional

sentatives, mayors, and partisan structures to resist the until-
unchallenged presidential power. Therefore it was not surprisin
Madrazo and Bartlett subsequently sought the presidential cand
profiting from the ascendancy they had gained in the PRI. Beca
party was not going to modify the conditions it had set forth, the p
ident's selection options were drastically reduced: the candidate
not be an official with a technocratic profile, as were the last three
idents. Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida was the only one
could challenge the two leaders who had already displayed their
to mobilize the party and defeat the president.
Labastida had been governor of Sinaloa, a prosperous nor
state, from 1987 to 1993, after several years' service in the feder
ernment. This background favored him both formally and actual
not enough to assure victory, because he could not depend, as b
on presidential support to win over two current governors. Ther
he recruited as his undersecretaries a number of governors whose
had concluded just a few months before. In January 1998, when h
office as interior secretary, he had already recruited two former
nors, Ausencio Chavez from Michoacan and Rafael Rodriguez Ba
from Campeche, and later added Guillermo Morales Jimenez, a f
governor of Puebla. In October of that year, he appointed the go
still in office in Hidalgo, Jesus Murillo Karam, and in Decembe
called Diodoro Carrasco, the former governor of Oaxaca. W
Labastida wanted through these appointments was not the skills
former governors but their understanding and, maybe, control
partisan machinery of their states. This thinking implicitly revea
the genuine hub of political decisionmaking had moved from the
eral government to the states.
This was the context that defined the design of the first PRI inte
elections, in November 1999. The CPN, under the control of the
nors, approved the candidates and established the voting system,
on two main provisions: the vote would not be limited to the PRI
bers but would be open to any citizen certified to vote; and the
would be the candidate who won the greatest number of district
ballots. The system was accepted, although conflict could arise
election showed two winners-either by the total number of votes
the majority of districts-not only because it adopted the model o
primary elections but because district voting favored the partisa
trol of governors.
Therefore Labastida, supported by the PRI national leader
sought the support of the greatest possible number of governo
order to ensure his victory in the electoral districts. Ultimately ther
no conflict, because Labastida won an overwhelming majority-f
total of almost ten million ballots, 55 percent went to Labastida,

cent to Madrazo, and 6 percent to Bartlett. But the relevant point is
the experiment was imposed and controlled by the governors,
the president or the federal government, as in the past. In the
Zedillo's candidate won the process, but this time it was necess
count on the state governors' explicit support.'
ANALYSIS
Primary elections, in spite of their shortcomings, represent progress in

the PRI's reform, as well as an additional defeat for the president, who
suffers a new constraint to his power. The presidential institution is no
longer the one to decide thoroughly the politics of the country; now
other institutions are involved. These institutions, specifically the state
governorships, have profited from the changes in the political context.
One must bear in mind, however, that this change does not neces-
sarily imply an increase in democracy. Although the PRI governors ben-
efited the most and not those who belonged to the opposition, this was
the result of the PAN governors' tendency to focus on administrative
issues, and of the PRI's skillful use of the partisan network that had been
in place since the beginning of the regime.
The first effect of this change has been the curtailing of the presi-
dent's influence on politics, an impact that, while it has certainly been
positive for the country by laying the party's control in the governors'
hands, has moved a key element to a sector not inherently homogenous
and, in addition, conservative and deeply identified with the authoritar-
ian regime. The risk is that this change may reactivate old cacicazgos
and develop a practice aimed at blocking the policies of the federal gov-
ernment. As in other countries that have experienced political change,
in Mexico the situation is favorable for the conservative sectors to gain
further capabilities to hinder the process.
This is where the resilience of the old regime is fully displayed, in
that some institutions that could well be used both by actors linked to
the previous regime and by the new ones committed to the change are
still standing. Nevertheless, the PRI governors' ability to coexist with
opposition governors means that what is at stake are the institutional
functions of local executives, rather than their personal skills or their
partisan origins. Thus a regulated change has remarkably reactivated
some institutions of the past, which may be useful for extending the
boundaries of participation and pluralism.
This situation could change in the next few years, because the prin-
cipal relation between the governors and the president has been broken
dramatically by an opposition party's achievement of the presidency.
The PRI governors could be forced to adopt institutional behavior, or
they might strengthen their ties with the local party structures, an
of them could decide to form an exclusive conservative group.
the first circumstance supports stability in the next stage of th
tion, the last could put the next administration at risk. On th
hand, the PAN governors could give in to the temptation to ren
old close relations among local and national executives. In this c
political alternation would be an enormous failure in the present
cult stage of the transition process. Whatever happens, political
cannot ignore the governorships.
CONCLUSIONS
Like other countries, Mexico underwent a political liberalization process

aimed at promoting democracy, starting in the 1980s. The change focused
on establishing an electoral system that would ensure fairness in electoral
and political competition and thereby foster alternation. As in other cases,
electoral issues and, in particular, the defeat of the PRI in the presidential
contest were the goals on which the activities of the political actors totally
focused, and by extension, they became the proof of democratization.
The process was long, and many people were disappointed as, although
pluralism was enlarged, the alternation so much desired was not yet
attained. Basically, it was assumed that because the system was presi-
dential, only when a party different from the PRI reached the executive
seat would the system be democratized (Cornelius 1999).
The process of democratization generated deep changes that
affected the institutional functioning of the system. Pluralism was not
limited to electoral competition and, accordingly, to increasing the
involvement of parties. Pluralism also made it possible for basic insti-
tutions, such as the federal and state congresses and the governor-
ships, to enhance their constitutional powers, after the political homo-
geneity resulting from the PRI's national dominance had disappeared.
Pluralism put an end to the compulsory discipline under the executive
and enabled both the legislative branch and the governorships to
become efficient political counterweights to balance the executive and
revitalize federalism. This process changed many traditional political
practices before alternation finally reached the presidency of the
republic in July 2000.
The transformation of the governorships has been significant, for it
has opened up numerous political opportunities. Those opportunities,
however, depend on both the governor's personal abilities and party
origins. Administrative, budgetary, or political gains vary, depending on
the PRI or PAN origins of governors-the two parties having obtained
the majority of state governments and gathered the greater expertise in
office. PAN governors have consistently developed a routine related to
administrative modernization and financial rationalization. Alth

these practices have generated friction with the president and th
eral government, they have not caused any serious political impa
could affect the overall functioning of the system. PRI governo
contrast, have been able to develop a series of administrative and
nomic programs of their own and to implement political measur
travening those of the federal government. As a result, a series o
flicts have led to a gradual presidential weakness that was unthi
before. In contrast to PAN governors who developed the same k
programs, the PRI leaders have operated in a different way an
sought different goals.
During Zedillo's administration-the last PRI presidency-whil
PAN governors focused on the debate over the federal budget all
system, four PRI governors challenged the old presidential pow
alter arbitrary actions or local autonomy efforts. Whether it was a q
tion of felonies and corruption or political programs different from
federal ones, the four governors relied on local resources and sta
ereignty to challenge the president's authority, even in a formerly e
sive domain, such as the selection of the presidential candidate.
Regardless of party origins or personal abilities, each leader c
act with more autonomy since the institutional transformation of g
norships took place. That is, the governorships are basically th
institutions as in the previous authoritarian system, but these instit
have regained their fundamental functions because of the enlarg
of pluralism. Under these circumstances, the process of democrat
solidation in Mexico will face not only the problems peculiar to
transition-such as the new government's inexperience and the
endurance of old political practices-but also the persistence of solid
and function-renewed institutions, such as the governorships, with
enough capabilities to restrain presidential initiatives. One risk of new
democracy is that state governments can become a democratic driver by
balancing federal executive power, but they can also represent a serious
obstacle if traditional cacicazgos-which, paradoxically, were success-
fully controlled by authoritarian centralism-are recreated.
The Mexican political transition shows that the enlargement of plu-
ralism not only paves the way for democratic forces to attain power, but
also redirects or endows with new functions the basic institutions of the
previous regime; and these institutions, once the change has been
attained, become crucial for its consolidation.
NOTES
I acknowledge the comments of two anonymous referees and my colleague

Jose Luis Reyna on earlier versions of this article.
1. As Huntington wrote, "someone who wishes to protest in Mexico

join a minor party, but someone who wishes to exert pressure would o
within the PRI" (1970, 6).
2. To date, Mexico has had just two women governors: Griselda Al
(Colima, 1980-86) and Beatriz Paredes (Tlaxcala, 1987-92).
3. Contrary to expectations from July 2000, the PAN and PRD have no
more state governorships. Until November 2001, the PRI was defeated
Yucatan, Chiapas, and Michoacan.
4. Finally, after years of expecting the change, the alternation was ach
in July 2000 when the PAN won the presidential election with 42 percent
vote. Despite the importance of this event, it does not affect the central c
of this paper.
5. The only exceptions are all in Mexico City government: Cuauht6moc
Cardenas and Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador, both ex-prifstas, founders of Cor-
riente Democritica and Frente Democratico Nacional in 1988; and Rosario
Robles, a former leftist activist. Only in November 2001 did the PRD win its first
governorship with an authentic militant: Lazaro Cardenas in Michoacan.
6. Because of reforms in the criteria for distribution of federal resources,
the state congresses had gained influence in the design of local fiscal laws. In
Puebla, however, this role was limited by the PRI's permanent control of the leg-
islative body. This control made it easy for the governor to obtain the necessary
support to approve the Bartlett Law and later to win the legal controversy in the
Supreme Court (Ward and Rodriguez 1999, 699; Vanderbush 1999, 12).
7. Although Madrazo lost the presidential candidacy, in the party his star
was still rising. In 2001 he became the PRI's national leader in a tough contest
with Beatriz Paredes (herself a former governor of Tlaxcala and current PRI leg-
islative leader). His high standing was not enough, however, to overcome the
power of the governors, who divided their support for each candidate. Ulti-
mately, Madrazo had to make an alliance with Elba Esther Gordillo, the leader
of the National Teachers' Union (SNTE) and an example of the PRI's most
manipulative politicians. It is obvious that Madrazo seeks control of the PRI to
build his presidential candidacy, but he will have to offer much to many actors
before he reaches his goal. The most probable outcome is that Madrazo will lose
his influence in the negotiations with governors, because he now is only the
leader of the PRI and is dependent on the governors' support; and they could
seek any other candidate who offers better opportunities for electoral success.
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The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico

Author(s): Rogelio Hernández-Rodríguez

The process of political transition in Mexico has fostered several

he process of political change in Mexico has been assessed-like

By overrating alternation, this approach-which still prevails,

Analyses of political change have become increasingly complex and

While the replacement concept was stressed, the possibility

deployed without changing the institution as a whole (Thelen and

The process of change in Mexico focused on electoral issues. But

A PRESIDENTIAIST, ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

Mexico has been an example both of an authoritarian government and

ate presidentialism but for a true balance of powers. The problem

increase of internal controls, always mediated by the support of th

Because this function required a deep knowledge of the situati

Table 1. Removals of Governors, 1946-2000

Miguel Aleman (1946-1952) 12 2 14

Sources: Anderson 1971; Bernstein 1993; H

serious mistakes, by imposing munic

intrude in local politics, even though the governor could co

THE SHATIERING OF THE STRUCTURE:

Table 2. Opposition Parties in Local Governments, August 200

Party Governorship Municipal Presidencies

aSince the July 2000 election

Perhaps the foremost of the PRD's government experience

from the technocratic generation style of politics that took ho

secretary directly collects all the fees obtained. Obviously, the m

Table 3. Party Control of Local Congresses, August 2000

Party Number of Congresses

Source: Federal Electoral Institute

making centers. Once chosen by the president and nominated by th

Table 4. Previous Political Experience of PRI Governors, 1982-200

Presidential Federal State Mainly Mainly

aThe first and second columns include only

Source: Data collected by the author from periodical publications.

increase, from 23 percent in the 1982-88 term to 56 percent betw

country's overall political stability at risk. As the president loses

and electoral motivations. Salinas implemented a series of progr

TWO WHO OPPOSED THE PRESIDENT

In contrast, Roberto Madrazo in Tabasco and Manuel Bartlett in Puebla

of Tabasco, simultaneous to the presidential election, had been st

powers, they looked for the support of their local congressional

total of almost ten million ballots, 55 percent went to Labastida,

Primary elections, in spite of their shortcomings, represent progress in

Like other countries, Mexico underwent a political liberalization process

administrative modernization and financial rationalization. Alth

I acknowledge the comments of two anonymous referees and my colleague

1. As Huntington wrote, "someone who wishes to protest in Mexico

Aziz, Alberto. 1996. Territorios de alternancia. Elprimergobierno de oposicion

Bruhn, Kathleen, 1999. PRD Local Government in Michoacan: Implic

Lujambio, Alonso, comp. 1996. Poder legislativo. Gobiernos divididos e

Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Shugart. 1993. Juan J. Linz: presidencialismo

Meyer, Lorenzo. 1978. Los inicios de la institucionalizacidn. Mexico City: El

Serrano, M6nica. 1996. La herencia del cambio gradual. Reglas e instituciones

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