Vitug,

 Loisse  Danielle  D.    

 
Reyes  v  Mauricio  (2010)  
 
The  legitimacy  of  the  child  cannot  be  contested  by  way  of  defense  or  as  a  collateral  issue  
in  another  action  for  a  different  purpose.  
 
FACTS:  
 
A   complaint   was   filed   before   the   Department   of   Agrarian   Reform   Adjudication   Board  
(DARAB)  of  Malolos,  Bulacan  by  Mauricio  and  her  daughter,  Leonida  for  annulment  of  
contract  entered  into  by  Reyes.  
 
Eugenio   Reyes   was   the   registered   owner   of   a   parcel   of   land   located   at   Turo,   Bocaue,  
Bulacan.   Respondents   alleged   that   they   are   the   legal   heirs   of   the   late   Godofredo  
Mauricio,   who   was   the   lawful   and   registered   tenant   of   Eugenio   through   his  
predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   to   the   subject   land;   that   through   fraud,   deceit,   strategy   and  
other   unlawful   means,   Eugenio   caused   the   preparation   of   a   document   to   eject  
Respondents  from  the  subject  property.  
 
On   appeal   with   the   CA,   Reyes   assailed   the   status   of   Leonida   as   a   legal   heir   and   her  
capacity  to  substitute  Mauricio  who  died  during  the  pendency  of  the  case.  He  averred  
that  Leonida  is  merely  a  ward  of  Librada.  
 
ISSUE:  
 
Whether  Leonida’s  filiation  may  be  attacked  collaterally  
 
RULING:  
 
No.    
 
It   is   settled   that   filiation   cannot   be   collaterally   attacked.   The   legitimacy   of   the   child  
cannot  be  contested  by  way  of  defense  or  as  a  collateral  issue  in  another  action  for  a  
different   purpose.     This   principle   applies   under   our   Family   Code.  Articles   170   and   171   of  
the  Code  confirm  this  view,  because  they  refer  to  the  action  to  impugn  the  legitimacy.  
This  action  can  be  brought  only  by  the  husband  or  his  heirs  and  within  the  periods  fixed  
in  the  present  articles.  
 
 
 
 
Vitug,  Loisse  Danielle  D.    
 
Ko  v.  Aramburo  (2017)
 
Simeon's  sale  of  their  conjugal  property  without  his  wife's  conformity  under  the  Old  Civil  
Code  is  merely  voidable,  not  void.  The  imprescriptibility  of  an  action  assailing  a  void  
contract  under  Article  1410  of  the  NCC,  thus,  does  not  apply  in  such  case.  
 
FACTS:  
 
Subject   of   this   case   are   seven   parcels   of   land   located   in   Tabaco   City,   Albay,   under   the  
name   of   Corazon   (Simeon’s   sister).   The   complaint   alleged   that   Virginia   and   her   husband  
Simeon,  together  with  Corazon  and  her  husband  Felix,  acquired  the  subject  properties  
from  Spouses  Eusebio  and  Epifania.    
 
However,   allegedly   with   the   use   of   falsified   documents,   Corazon   was   able   to   have   the  
entire  subject  properties  transferred  exclusively  to  her  name.  She  alleged  that  in  1974,  
Simeon  sold  and  conveyed  his  entire  one-­‐half  share  in  the  co-­‐owned  properties  in  her  
favor.   Hence,   Corazon   became   the   sole   owner   thereof   and   consequently,   was   able   to  
transfer  the  titles  of  the  same  to  her  name.  
 
ISSUE:  
Whether  the  sale,  without  Virginia’s  consent  is  void    
 
RULING:  
 
No.    
 
As  far  as  Virginia  is  concerned,  this  case  falls  under  the  provisions  of  the  Old  Civil  Code.  
The  CA  erred  in  applying  Article  1410  of  the  NCC  stating  that  the  action  to  question  a  
void  contract  is  imprescriptible.  It  is  error  to  hold  the  subject  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  as  
void   for   lack   of   the   wife's   conformity   Simeon's   sale   of   their   conjugal   property   without  
his  wife's  conformity  under  the  Old  Civil  Code  is  merely  voidable,  not  void.    
 
The   imprescriptibility   of   an   action   assailing   a   void   contract   under   Article   1410   of   the  
NCC,   thus,   does   not   apply   in   such   case.   The   10-­‐year   prescriptive   period   under   Article  
173  of  the  Old  Civil  Code,  therefore,  should  be  applied  in  this  case.  Here,  the  invalid  sale  
was   executed   on   December   14,   1974   while   the   action   questioning   the   same   was   filed   in  
1993,   which   is   clearly   way   beyond   the   10-­‐year   period   prescribed   under   Article   173   of  
the   Old   Civil   Code.   Virginia's   recourse   is,   therefore,   to   demand   only   the   value   of   the  
property,   i.e.,   the   one-­‐third   portion   of   the   subject   properties   invalidly   sold   by   Simeon  
without  Virginia's  conformity  pursuant  to  the  same  provision.  
 
Vitug,  Loisse  Danielle  D.    
 
Imani  v.  Metrobank  (2010)  
 
The   party  claiming   that   the  property  is   conjugal   must   show   proof   that   said   property   was  
acquired  during  marriage.    
 
FACTS:  
 
Evangeline  D.  Imani  and  her  co-­‐sureties  signed  a  Continuing  Suretyship  Agreement  in  
favor  of  respondent  Metrobank.  As  sureties,  they  bound  themselves  to  pay  Metrobank  
whatever  indebtedness  C.P.  Dazo  Tannery,  Inc.  (CPDTI)  incurs,  but  not  exceeding  Six  
Million  Pesos  (P6,000,000.00).  CPDTI  defaulted  in  the  payment  of  its  loans.  The  sheriff  
levied  on  a  property  registered  in  Imani’s  name.  Petitioner  opposed  the  motion,  
asserting  that  the  property  belongs  to  the  conjugal  partnership.  Attached  to  her  
opposition  were  an  affidavit  executed  by  Crisanto  Origen,  the  former  owner  of  the  
property,  attesting  that  spouses  Sina  and  Evangeline  Imani  were  the  vendees  of  the  
subject  property;  and  the  photocopies  of  the  checks  allegedly  issued  by  Sina  Imani  as  
payment  for  the  subject  property.  
 
 
ISSUE:  
 
Whether  or  not  the  property  is  conjugal  
 
RULING:  
 
No.  
 
The  said  affidavit  can  hardly  be  considered  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  her  claim  that  
the  property  is  conjugal.    As  correctly  pointed  out  by  Metrobank,  the  said  affidavit  has  
no  evidentiary  weight  because  Crisanto  Origen  was  not  presented  in  court  to  affirm  the  
veracity  of  his  affidavit.  The  basic  rule  of  evidence  is  that  unless  the  affiants  themselves  
are  placed  on  the  witness  stand  to  testify  on  their  affidavits,  such  affidavits  must  be  
rejected  for  being  hearsay.  The  party  claiming  that  the  property  is  conjugal  must  show  
proof  that  the  property  was  acquired  during  marriage.