PEOPLE VS.

DIMAANO
Facts:
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually
abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant
entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face
down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept
the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on
her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina.
As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995 that
she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen
sink ….. xxxxxxx but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant immediately asked
her to dress up.
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant
down on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their
shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon
learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they
filed a complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant
and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.
Accused Defense:
He alleged that he worked in several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the
Philippines in September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant
because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to
another assignment overseas.
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1,
1996 because there were other people in the house.
He also maintained that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively
prove that he was responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual
intercourse with another man her age.
RTC RULING:
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated
the obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known
unless she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due
to the fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel
between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of
rape against appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-
uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same.
Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. ----- The
accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2
counts) and the crime of attempted rape.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.

The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance
that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
ISSUE: Did the complaint or information for attempted rape sufficiently alleged the specific acts
or omissions constituting the offense?
RULING: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.35 What is controlling is not the title of
the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege
specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute
sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The
allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not
satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by
the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering
a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him.

SASOT vs. PEOPLE

The crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code is a
public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands
as the injured party. The complainant's capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
Facts:
In May 1997, the NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties,
Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
competition. In its Report, the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA
trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as Chicago Bulls, etc. These names are
used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other
garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered
that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit NBA
garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners prosecution for unfair competition under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a Special Power of Attorney, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the
law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-
in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative
complaints, among others. The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New
York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines,
New York, authenticated the certification. Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February
12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:
(1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Welts's complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the
prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.
The prosecutor filed his Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the
original copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. The
prosecutor also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the
participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime.
The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and denied petitioners motion to quash.
ISSUE: Was the complaint substantially sufficient?
HELD: Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainant's affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn
to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in
their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All
these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S.
Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily
render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights
of the defendant on the merits.
In this case, Welts's Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole
Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on
February 12, 1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of
the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez
stated that complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court,
and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand. It is apt to state at
this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor
based his recommendation.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case,
the trial court should respect such determination.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which
principally stands as the injured party. The complainant's capacity to sue in such case becomes
immaterial. (Sasot vs. People, G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005)\

LASOY VS. ZENAROSA

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and
the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
FACTS:
Lasoy and Banisa were charged before the RTC with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
for transporting and selling 42.41 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Both pleaded guilty on
arraignment and were later on sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day. Both accused
applied for probation.
Subsequently, the prosecutor filed two separate motions: (1) to admit amended Information, and
(2) to set aside the arraignment of the accused. The prosecutor intended to amend the filed
information because for some reason, Lasoy and Banisa were charged of selling 42.41 grams
instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana.
The motions were granted. Thus the information now states “kilograms” instead of “grams". Both
accused filed a motion to quash.
Judge Zenarosa denied the motion to quash and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under
the amended information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a petition for certiorari on the ground of double
jeopardy. In response, respondent claims that the trial based on the first information was a sham
and that the petitioners participated in tampering the information.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches
HELD: Yes. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The issue boil down to whether or not the first information is valid.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and
the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of
the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch
as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the
law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably
complied with.
With respect specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused cannot claim their right
against double jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold that
while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot
overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the
first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it,
this does not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of another
inquiry.
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right
against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will
not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, the accused had been arraigned
and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying for probation. It
is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to
try again accused for the same offense without violating procedural rules and their rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. (Lasoy vs. Zenarosa, G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005)

PEOPLE V. BATIN (GR NO. 177223)

FACTS:
Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at
the gate to their compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went
to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor
going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed
the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of
the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him. When she shifted her glance from
the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by
drawing the gun from his waist line, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice
from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and
the latter landing on top of her. Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between
the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at
the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak,
banatan mo na."
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as principal by
inducement?
DECISION: The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is
inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun
back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting:"Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then
fired his gun twice ± were credible and sufficed to prove Castor’s indispensable cooperation in
the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio
as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was. While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted
"Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing
the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged
him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that
Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when
Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances
surrounding Castor’s utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same,
not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These
circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the
Batin’s grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun
to Neil ± a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of
a felony. Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and
after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments. Even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to,
the results would be the same. Castor’s argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words
“Sige, banatan mona” cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore,
he cannot be considered a principal by inducement. Inducement may be by acts of command,
advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence
must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that
words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The moral influence of the
words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same
words coming from a stranger would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that
Castor’s words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.
PACOY V. CAJIGAL
FACTS:
- SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal of RTC 68
of Camiling Tarlac.
- On July 4, 2002, an information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner for
shooting and killing his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
- However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend
the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime
to Murder.
- The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote
the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.
- Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the
ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide
case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As
petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent
entered for him a plea of not guilty.
- Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The MR was likewise denied. Thus, petitioner
went straight to SC and filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in amending the Information after petitioner had already
entered in plea to the charge of information for homicide – NO
HELD:
- In the present case, the change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee.
- While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble
of the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for
Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e.,
the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely
formal.
- Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not
prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended
Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could
not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
Bonifacio v. RTC Makati
Facts:
Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of Yuchenco Group of
Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complaint for 13 counts of
libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling
Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented plan holders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI)
which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due
to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.
That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains:
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com.
Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing
highly derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.
Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art.
360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.
Issue: How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect
to jurisdiction of the case provided by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?
Ruling:
Art. 360 of the RPC provides:
“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
xxxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for
in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the oofense. xxxx”
That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to:
1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for
the venue of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article
was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it
pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way
of determining the point of its printing and first publication. TO give credence to Gimenez’s
argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author,
writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the
Philippines.
The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

CABO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

CASE SUMMARY:
Cabo was charged with violation of RA 3019 for allegedly bribing her co-accused. She claimed to
have been deprived of due process, so the Sandiganbayan (SB) ordered for the reinvestigation
of her case. While the investigation was ongoing, she filed for a motion to travel abroad. This was
granted by the SB in exchange for her “conditional arraignment”, in which she pleaded NOT
GUILTY. One of the conditions of her arraignment was that, IF the complaint was amended, she
automatically waived her right to object to the amendment and her right against double jeopardy.
Her arraignment was set on another date, and for this she filed another motion reiterating her
previous plea.
Meanwhile, her co-accused, Municipal Mayor Balahay moved to quash the information on the
ground that the facts did not constitute the crime charged. The SB did not grant his motion, but
ordered the amendment of the original complaint, of which the prosecution subsequently complied
with.
Cabo thus filed for a motion to cancel her second arraignment, on the ground that the amendment
was done after she had entered her plea, and that since she had already reiterated her plea of
not guilty, double jeopardy had already attached.
The Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy DID NOT attach to the amended information. Her
first arraignment was only conditional, and she was fully aware of one specific condition which
waived her right to double jeopardy. Double jeopardy was also held not to be applicable to the
case because its requisites were not met: The original information was not sufficient in substance
and form, and trial was not dismissed/terminated because the motion to quash was denied; the
complaint was simply amended.
The amendment in the second information was only as to form and NOT substance, therefore, it
was allowed by law.
FACTS: On June 24, 2000, Cabo and Bonifacio Balahay, Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were
charged for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. In the information, it was alleged that Mayor
Balahay received from Cabo the amount of P104,000, and that said mayor “intervened in the
undertaking by Cabo’s company (OIDCI) for consultancy services with the Municipality of
Barobo”.
Cabo claimed that she was deprived of her right to preliminary investigation so she filed a motion
for reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan (SB) granted her motion and directed the Special
Prosecutor to conduct one.
Meanwhile, Cabo filed another motion seeking permission to travel abroad for a family vacation.
The SB granted it in an order dated May 2004, which stated that, in light of the case still being
under reinvestigation, and considering that she had not yet been arraigned, Cabo expressly
consented to the order that she be arraigned conditionally. [CONDITIONS:] If it is found that there
is no probable cause to proceed against her, the arraignment will have no effect.
However, if there is a need to amend the present information, then Cabo would have then waived
her right to object under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure as well as her constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
When she was arraigned, she was duly assisted by her counsel and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
offense charged. She also duly affixed her signature in the minutes to signify her conformity to
the conditional arraignment and the legal consequence thereof.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded his reinvestigation and found probable cause to
charge her with the violation of RA 3019. The SB then set a new schedule for arraignment in
October 2004. On the day before arraignment, Cabo filed a motion (“reiterate-not-guilty motion”)
praying that she be allowed to reiterate her previous plea in the conditional arraignment so that
she may be excused from attending the arraignment the next day. SB, however, did not act on
her said motion.
Balahay, on the other hand, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the same
did not charge any offense. It failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract
under the law, in his official capacity as mayor.
The SB sustained Balahay’s contention that the information was defective for lack of necessary
facts, but it did not immediately quash the complaint. Instead, the court, in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, ordered only the amendment of the information and
ordered the prosecution to correct the defect. The amended information was filed in February
2005 containing all the necessary elements of the crime charged.
Cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April 2005, but she filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment on the ground that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended information
since amendment of the information based on the substance is not allowed after the plea has
been made.
SB denied petitioner’s motion. It held that her arraignment on the original information was only
conditional in nature to accommodate her request to travel abroad so that she could be tried in
absentia. She agreed to the condition that should the information be amended, she is deemed to
waive her right to object to the amendment and to waive her constitutional protection against
double jeopardy. She was considered estopped from raising her objection to the amended
complaint.
Petitioner filed an MR on the ground that double jeopardy had set in.
She asserted that her conditional arraignment had been confirmed by her October motion
(“reiterate-not-guilty motion”) reiterating her plea of not guilty. Thus, her arraignment on the
original information was no longer conditional, and double jeopardy must consequently attach.
SB denied her resolution. This prompted her to file the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N double jeopardy had attached on the basis of the “NOT GUILTY” plea (which
petitioner “reiterated” in her October 2004 motion).
HELD: Double jeopardy DID NOT attach. Petitioner’s assertions must fail.
RATIO:
Sandiganbayan’s practice of “conditionally” arraigning the accused has no legal basis. It was only
in People vs. Espinosa that the Court recognized “conditional arraignment”, provided that the
conditions attached are “unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened”. Otherwise, the
arraignment was considered simple and conditional.
The SB was declared to have unequivocally laid down petitioner’s conditions for arraignment.
Among those specified was that if there was a need to amend the original information, she forfeits
her right to object and her RIGHT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY”. She was assisted by counsel and
thereby informed of the legal consequences of such conditions.

With regard to her formal manifestation reiterating her not guilty plea (“reiterate-not-guilty
motion”), there was no showing that Sandiganybayan affirmed her motion. Section 1(b), Rule 116
of the Rules of Court explicitly requires the accused to be present at arraignment and personally
enter his plea.
With respect to the applicability of double jeopardy to the case, two requisites were absent:
The first requisite of double jeopardy was not present since the original information failed to allege
the essential elements for the violations allegedly committed by petitioner and her co-accused.
There was also
NO DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER (fourth requisite).
The SB merely ordered an AMENDMENT. According to Section 4, Rule 117, the prosecution is
given an opportunity to amend the defective information if the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. It is only when the prosecution fails to properly amend the information that the motion to
quash be granted.
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the original information can be cured by amendment even
after she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to
matters of form and not of substance (Section 14, Rule 110).
The amended information did not change the nature of the offense, which was for violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, but it only made the facts more precise. The first information only alleged
that Balahay committed the offense “with the use of his influence as public official” and “together
with petitioner”, which was too vague. The amended information now stated that he did so “in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position…with grave
abuse…while conspiring…with petitioner”. The amended information also simply specified that
Balahay received the money from petitioner “for his own benefit and use”.
In People vs. Casey, tests to determine whether defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of
the information were set forth, among them are:
If the defenses of the accused in the original information are still available in the amended
information, and/or if the amended information does not change the nature of the offense
charged—the amendment is one of FORM AND NOT SUBSTANCE, therefore not prohibited.
Section 14, Rule 110 is also not necessary, as petitioner suggested since there was no mistake
in the charging of the proper offense; the prosecution merely failed to allege the appropriate facts
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
FINAL VERDICT:
Petition DISMISSED.

ADDITIONAL DOCTRINE AND INFORMATION

SECTION 3(b) OF RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
JOCELYN CABO
Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy
group charged with conducting feasibility study for the community-based resource management
project of Barobo, Surigao del Sur.

Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of
AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing projects.
On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact
of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over the subject
property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq.
m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property
with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was presented by
Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property.
Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a supplemental
motion dated May 28, 1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of
prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal Jr., indeed
participated in an affixed his signature on the contracts and found probable cause. The
Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the arraignment of
Ramiscal Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on the ground that there
is a pending resolution of his second Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his
arraignment.
Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification of public documents.
Ruling: No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the corresponding information in Court
on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are:
unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the resolution of
the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr., failed
to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment
obtained in this case.
With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case
has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which
has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable cause in the filing of the case.

PANAGUITON JR VS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Facts: Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various
sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored,
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands
to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June
1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However,
Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was
not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed
out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed
a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's
business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson
to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and
to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved
for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed
the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State
Prosecutor's resolution.
In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after
four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco
v. Sandiganbayan. However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting
on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already
prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22"
against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the
DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a
prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and
not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the
instant petition, petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in
ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial
to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
noncompliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of
B.P. Blg.
22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive
period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not
Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24
August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine
(9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as
24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and
21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice
dated 9 August
2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE
the information against the petitioner. No costs.

PEOPLE vs. ROMUALDEZ

FACTS: Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with violations of Rep.
Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed “on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986”. However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the
Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced
only on 4 June 2001. The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, then
the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, using his influence with his brother-in-law, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign
countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such
appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador
or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby
enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and
the Provincial Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount
of P5,806,709.50.
ISSUE: whether or not the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.
HELD: The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of
the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section
11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the PCGG that
preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep. Act No.
3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only
to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to
investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the
preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is
void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive
period, notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls
the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary
investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only
when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.
As such preliminary investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed
acts were committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by
mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had
again to be adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the
amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet
such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by
amendment.
PINOTE v. AYCO
The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the
Rules. Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the
defense in a criminalcase to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even
in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State
Prosecutor Pinote was at that timeundergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in
Quezon City.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the
two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings
conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its
right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for
“Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the
defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor
HELD: As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction
of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in
case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court.
Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely
to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account
that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital
state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace
of the people.
Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no
matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due
process, so is the State.
Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings
or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of
his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It
does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. WHELAN

CASE SUMMARY:
Respondents were charged before the Department of Justice for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines and Republic Act No. 7916. State Prosecutor Lao-Tamano found
probable cause against them and recommended a filing of an Information (see background)
before the CTA. By a subsequent Resolution, the Secretary of Justice reversed State Prosecutor
Lao-Tamano’s recommendation and withdrew the Information. Lao-Tamano himself later on filed
before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw the Information against the respondents, a move which
petitioner BOC opposed. The CTA thereafter granted the Withdrawal of the Information, to which
the BOC filed an MR. the CTA Noted without Action this MR by the BOC. Hence, this appeal. The
Court ruled that the petitioner may not seek relief via certiorari because as all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public
prosecutors, the CTA’s Resolution granting State Prosecutor Lao-Tamano’s Withdrawal of the
Information means that the case against the respondents cannot anymore prosper. Moreover, as
petitioner’s MR of the challenged CTA Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the public
prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the case belongs, the petition must fail.
BACKGROUND
Herein respondents1 were charged before the DOJ for violation of Section 3601 vis-à-vis Sections
2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Republic Act No. 7916.
State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents and
recommended the filing of Information against them.
Respondents then filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice during the pendency
of which the Information was filed on before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about June 2005 to December 2007, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, in conspiracy with one another, made 40 unlawful
importations of 255, 870 pieces of finished printed bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal
papers from Australia valued at approximately US$ 1,240,880.14, and caused the removal of said
imported articles from the Clark Special Economic Zone and delivery to the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Offices without payment of its corresponding duties and taxes estimated at around
Php 15,917,611.83 xxx to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant.
Respondents:
1. MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman
2. Managing Director Michael Whelan
3. Country Manager Atty. Ofelia B. Cajigal
4. Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan
5. Erick B. Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs broker who acted
as agents of MSPI
Only respondents Cajigal and Lingan were served warrants of arrest following which they posted
cash bail bonds.
By Resolution of March 20, 2009, the Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutor’s
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information.
Petitioner’s MR having been denied by Resolution of April 29, 2009, it elevated the case by
certiorari before the CA.
In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw Information
with Leave of Court to which petitioner filed an Opposition. Respondents, on their part, moved for
the dismissal of the Information.
The CTA, by the herein assailed Resolution of September 3, 2009, granted the withdrawal of and
dismissed the Information.
Petitioner’s MR filed on September 22, 2009 was noted without Action by the CTA by Resolution:
Considering that an Entry of Judgment was already issued in this case on September 23, 2009,
no MR of the Resolution dated September 3, 2009 having been filed by State Prosecutor Lao-
Tamano of the DOJ; the "MR of the Resolution dated 3 September 2009" filed on September 22,
2009 by Atty. Christopher F.C. Bolastig of the Bureau of Customs is NOTED, without action.
Hence, petitioner’s present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner BOC may seek relief via certiorari NO
RESOLUTIONS AND ARGUMENTS
Major Point 1: As all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of public prosecutors, the CTA’s Resolution granting State
Prosecutor Lao-Tamano’s Withdrawal of the Information means that the case against the
respondents cannot anymore prosper.
- In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the
designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor. This designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies,
however, does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over
the case.
- The participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of
a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.
Major Point 2: Petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
instituting the present petition.
- This contravenes the doctrine that "the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers."
- Petitioner’s MR of the challenged CTA Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the public
prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the case belongs. Hence, the present
petition fails.
FINAL VERDICT The petition is DISMISSED

FLORES vs. GONZALES

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULINGS: