LEGAL RESEARCH

Case Digest

Virginia Sarmiento and Apolonia Catibayan VS Court of Appeals and Simon Arguelles
GR No. 96740
March 25, 1999

Facts:

The petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio and Leogarda. The respondent is the half
brother of Leogarda, with Francisco as their common father. The petitioners filed a complaint for partition
of a piece of land. They claim that as granddaughters of Francisco, they and respondent are co-owners of
½ of the lot, as the only heirs of Francisco. But according to private respondent, petitioners are not legal
heirs of Francisco because the mother of the petitioners, Leogarda, was allegedly an illegitimate child of
Francisco and Emilia who were not married. Under the old Civil Code, Which should be applied since
Francisco died in 1949, an illegitimate child does not have successional rights. The lower court ordered
the parties herein to partition among themselves subject ½ portion of the lot. The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a man and a woman who lived together as husband and wife are presumed
married.

Ruling:

The fact that no marriage certificate of Francisco and Emilia was submitted as evidence does not
lead to the conclusion that the said parties were not legally married and that leogarda was their
illegitimate child. The respondent admitted that Francisco and Emilia lived and cohabitated together as
husband and wife. The presumption is that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present preponderant evidence to prove the marriage
of Francisco and Emilia. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the lower court’s decision.
Republic of the Philippines VS Court of Appeals and Castro
GR No. 103047
September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the
knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. After the
marriage, they did not live together since their marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. They only
decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four
months and the couple parted ways. When Castro was fixing her marital status before leaving for the
U.S., she discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage. She then filed for a declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license. As evidence, she presented a certification stating that their marriage license could not
be located. The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish
the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. RTC ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.” On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was reversed.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether or not the marriage is valid.

HELD:

Marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970. Hence, the law governing controlling that time was
the New Civil Code. NCC provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage
license. It is an essential requirement, hence, it’s absence would render the marriage void ab initio.
Jaime Sevilla VS Carmelita Cardenas
GR No. 167684
July 31, 2006

Facts:
In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latter’s father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to
sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for
a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and
the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.

Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they “failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,” for the reason that “the employee handling is
already retired.“ With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license
specified in the parties’ marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the
local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact
that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it “failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered.” Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

Issue:

The issue is whether or not there is a marriage license issued.

Held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
 tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that
all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.”
Engrace Ninal for Herself and as a Guardian ad Litem, petitioner VS Pepito Ninal JR, respondent
GR No. 133778
March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8
months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for
lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence,
his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
Herminia Borja- Manzano, petitioner VS Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Respondent
AM No. MTJ-00- 1329
March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on
May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993,
her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge
ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage
of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE:

Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract
that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and
void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Federico Suntay, petitioner VS Isabel Cojuangco- Suntay and Hon. Gregorio S. Sampaga, respondents
GR No. 132524
December 29, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the
estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and
the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico
anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s
Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive
portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.

ISSUE:

In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:

Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85
of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage
may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may
be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not
the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage,
is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”
Ma. Armida Perez- Ferraris, petitioner VS Brix Ferraris
GR No. 162368
July 17, 2006

Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time,
Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was
a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his
shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand
Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could
not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who
finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s
“leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD:
The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-
house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the
expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied
that such disorder “can be part of his family upbringing” She stated that there was a history of Brix’s
parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct
bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity”
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner VS Gregorio Nolasco, respondent

Social Security System, petitioner VS Teresita Jarque Vda. De Bailon, Respondent
GR No. 165545
March 24, 2006

Facts:

In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The
petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile
Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the
daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the
reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial
expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with
Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and
kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration
of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not
he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her
parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because
her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the
RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the
decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA
however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD:

There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death.

Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon
Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her
reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not
correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no
judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to
who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of
disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is
still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice
reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit;
in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage
herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however
impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clemente’s death.