URN: 1342

XIII K. K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2017

BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF CAMELOT

GOVERNMENT OF EREHWON

(APPELLANT)

v.

ELIZABETH BENNET

(RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 XIII K. K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities ................................................................................................................. iii

Statement Of Facts ...................................................................................................................vii

Issues Raised ............................................................................................................................. ix

Summary Of Issues .................................................................................................................... x

Written Arguments..................................................................................................................... 1

[1] WHETHER THE DEATH SENTENCE AS SOUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EREHWON IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION AS MADE OUT BY THE FACTS OF

THE PRESENT CASE. ................................................................................................................. 1

[1.1] PECULIAR NATURE OF SEC 421-A IN RELATION TO DEATH PENALTY ......................... 1

[1.2] FACTS OF THE CASE RENDER GIVING OF DEATH PENALTY IMPERMISSIBLE ................. 2

[2] WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 421-A, PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS MADE

OUT. ........................................................................................................................................ 4

[2.1] THE INGREDIENTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION 421-A (A) ARE NOT FULFILLED. .......... 4

[2.2] SECTION 421-A (B) AS CONTAINED IN THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS VIOLATIVE
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. ......................................................................... 6

[3] WHETHER OFFENCE UNDER SEC 351-A OF THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT. ...................... 9

[4] WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AS CONTAINED UNDER SEC. 210- B
OF THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE IS MADE OUT? ..................................................................... 10

[4.1] THERE WAS NO PRIOR MEETING OF MINDS OF RESPONDENT WITH OTHER(S). ............ 10

[4.2] MS. BENNET’S ACT OF CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW.... 11

[5] SANCTION GRANTED UNDER SEC. 196 OF THE CAMELOT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT
VALID?.................................................................................................................................. 12

Prayer ....................................................................................................................................... 14

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

1. The Penal Code of Camelot.

2. The Camelot Criminal Procedure.
3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Cases

1. A. M. A. Zaman v. Emperor, A.I.R.1933 Cal. 39 ........................................................... 9

2. Arjun Arora v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1937 All. 295 .............................................................. 6
3. Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 S.C.C. 377 .................................................... 5
4. Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 .................... 7
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684.............................................. 1, 2
6. Bakhtawar Trust v. M. D. Narayan, (2003) 5 S.C.C. 298 ............................................. 6
7. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of AndhraPradesh, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3483 ........................ 9
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)............................................................... 5, 8
9. Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ..................................................................... 6
10. Coleman v. Power, (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1 ....................................................................... 7
11. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, (1985) 3 All E.R. 935 .. 6
12. David Kaketta v. State of Jharkhand, 2002 (3) J.L.J.R. 181 ....................................... 13
13. Debi Soren v. State, I.L.R. (1953) 32 Pat. 1104 ............................................................ 8
14. G.V. Nair v. Govt. of India, 1962 K.L.T. 690 ........................................................ 10, 11
15. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ..................................................................... 5
16. Hector v. A.-G. of Antigua and Barbuda, [1990] 2 All E.R. 103 .................................. 8
17. In Re, Natural Resources Allocation, (2012) 10 S.C.C. 1 ............................................. 7
18. In Re, Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 413. 6
19. Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 S.C.C. 380 ......................................................... 5
20. Joseph Bain D’souza and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1995 Cri. L.J.
1316.............................................................................................................................. 10
21. K.T. Plantation (P.) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 S.C.C. 1 ............................... 7
22. Kamal Krishna Sircar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 636.............................................. 6
23. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955 .................................... 5, 6, 8

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24. Khyebari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 925.................................... 6
25. Lichhamadevi v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 4 S.C.C. 456 ............................................ 3
26. Livingstone v. Adjudication Panel for England, [2006] E.W.H.C. 2533 (Admin) ........ 8
27. Mahenda Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri. L.J. 1667 ....................................... 13
28. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 ............................................. 7
29. Manmath Kumar Behera v. State of Orissa, 2002 (11) Ori. L.R. 394 ......................... 13
30. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra & others, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 1 ................. 9
31. Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 S.C.C. 641 ................ 3
32. Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 S.C.C. 745 .................................................. 6
33. National Media Ltd. and others v. Bogoshi, 1998 (4) S.A. 1196 (S.C.A) ..................... 7
34. Niharendu Dutt Majumdaar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 22.................................. 5, 8
35. Parasaram v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1937 Sind. 8 ............................................................... 10
36. Parmanand v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 All. 156 ............................................................... 8
37. Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, (1897) I.L.R. 20 All. 55 ........................................... 8
38. Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 ............................................................................. 10
39. R v. Deleval, (1763) 3 Burr. 1434 ................................................................................ 10
40. R v. Jones, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 345 ............................................................................... 10
41. R v. Sulan, (1868) 11 Cox. 50 ...................................................................................... 11
42. R. v. B.B.C. ex. p. Prolife Alliance, 2003 U.K.H.L 23 ................................................... 8
43. R. v. Burns, (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 333 ............................................................................. 8
44. R. v. Meyrick, (1928) 21 Cr. App. R. 94 ...................................................................... 10
45. R. v. Secretary of the State for Home Department ex Parte Simms, [2000] 2 A.C. 115 7
46. R.R.Chari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1537 ...................................................... 12
47. Ram P. Sadaranganiv. Emperor, A.I.R. 945 Sind. 106 ................................................. 9
48. Ram Saran Das v. Empreror, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 892...................................................... 4
49. S. Banerjee v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 388 ................................................................... 12
50. S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1 .................................................. 12
51. S. v. Mamabolo, 2001 (3) S.A. 409 (C.C.) ..................................................................... 7
52. S.H. Jhabwala and Ors.v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 All. 690 ............................................ 3
53. Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2015 S.C.C. OnLine Bom. 587 ..... 6
54. Satya Ranjan Bakshi v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 698 ................................................ 4
55. Sham Das v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 874 ................................................................ 4
56. Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 S.C.C. 438 ......................................... 3

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

57. Shiv Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P., 1978 Cri. L.J. 701 ................................................ 9
58. Smt. P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 1976 A.P. 375 ..................................... 8
59. South African Broadcasting Corporation v National Director of Public Prosecutions,
2007 (1) S.A. 523 (C.C.) ................................................................................................ 7
60. South African National Defence Union v. Minister of Defence, 1999 (4) S.A. 469
(C.C.).............................................................................................................................. 7
61. State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1627.............................................. 7
62. State of Haryana v. N.C. Tandon, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1793 ........................................... 12
63. State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, J.T. 1996 (4) S.C. 615 .............................. 10
64. Subhash Manmothe v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cri. L.J. 537 ................................ 13
65. Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja v. State, (1999) 9 S.C.C. 323 ............................ 3
66. Union of India v. Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1 .................................... 7
67. Vishambhar Dayal Tripathi v. Emperor, 1940 S.C.C. OnLine Oudh 43 ...................... 5
68. Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2433 ................................... 10, 11
69. Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ................................................................................ 5

Books

1. 1 V.R. Manohar & W.W. Chitaley, The Indian Penal Code, (4th ed. All India
Reporter, 2006), ..................................................................................................... 1, 2, 5

2. 11 Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th ed. Lexis Nexis), 288 ......................................... 1

3. Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech, (1st ed. Oxford University Press,
2008) .............................................................................................................................. 7
4. Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (1st ed. Oxford University Press 2007), 38 ............ 7
5. Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India: Analytical Commentary on Indian Penal Code,
(11th ed. Allahabad Law Publication, 2008) ......................................................... 10, 11
6. Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional
Laws, (1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2008) .............................................................. 7
7. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (32nd ed. Lexis Nexis, 2012) ........... 5
8. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (34th ed. Lexis Nexis, 2015) ............ 9
9. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (1st ed.
Harvard University Press 2000) ..................................................................................... 8

Other Authorities

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

1. American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 ............................................................. 3

2. Fredrick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 1985 ................................... 8
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 .......................................... 3
4. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Salaries, Allowances And Facilities To Members At a Glance
(2014) ........................................................................................................................... 13
5. The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2015 .................... 1, 2, 3
6. The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2016 ............................. 1
7. The Speaker’s Committee For The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority,
Appointment of an IPSA Board Member (2016) .......................................................... 13

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Camelot, a democratic country located in the Asian sub-continent, flanked by India and
Genghistan. Camelot follows Common Law and has adopted a Parliamentary system of
governance, wherein Constitution is the supreme law of the law. Camelot shares strong ties
with Republic of Tallisker but has equally bad relations with other neighbor, Genghistan, and
has also engaged in two wars with Genghistan.

2. Erehwon is a federal territory and is also the capital of Camelot. Erehwon enjoys special
status under the Constitution Act of Camelot. Erehwon has an elected Legislative council and
an executive government of its own.

3. The general election in Camelot was held in March 2014 were won by Vanity Fair Party
and Assembly elections in Erehwon, held in April, 2015 were won by Crouching Tiger Party.
Hogwarts Party, a student dominated party under the leadership of Elizabeth Bennet made a
considerable mark and won few seats in both the elections. The relationship between the
leaders of these three parties was not cordial.

4. Ms. Bennet, started Dawn of Justice campaign to analyse good qualities of various
developing and developed nations. She also mentioned certain good qualities of Genghistan
and also posted a selfie of herself on twitter with the flag of Genghistan, which caused
political uproar in the country. Chief Minister of Erehwon demanded a public apology from
Ms. Bennet for her actions and vehemently criticized her for her acts.

5. Ms. Bennet and the Hogwarts Party reacted to this by starting a new campaign ‘Mock and
shame the pseudo nationalist government’. Ms. Bennet supported one of her supporters who
referred government of Erehwon as well as Camelot ‘a bunch of useless war-mongers
seeking to cover up their inept governance under a charade of pseudo-nationalism’.

6. Ms. Bennet subsequently during a public rally on 01 June 2015, which was attended by
30,000 people, said that, the Government in power is against someone who holds a dissenting
opinion against them and we have no choice but to strike at the very root of this evil and
effectuate a fundamental overhaul. She also praised Genghistan numerous times and said that
the government has shut themselves from the world and stopped looking at their
shortcomings. She asked people to not to tolerate this and rise in rebellion against these dirty
leeches and corrupt people who have sold the country. She told people to overthrow the

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

government and break the government into pieces, in order to uphold the ideals of the
constitution. She ended her speech by saying that, ‘we will be the divine destruction which
shall vaporise the deep seated rot and ensure our beloved country has a more refreshing
start.’

7.Soon after the speech, the members of Hogwarts Party mobilized the public to protest
against the government by shouting slogans and attacking and burning the public property.
Almost 2,00,000 people gathered near the Parliament of Camelot to protest. Thousands of
people including members of Hogwarts Party gifted officials toys and asked them to play
with it, in view of their naïve and childish support for the current government of Erehwon.

8. A complaint under sections 421-A, 351-A and 210-B of the Penal Code of Camelot was
filed against Ms. Bennet and other unknown persons.

9. Mr. Puddy Jedi, the Prime Minister of Camelot asked Ms. Bennet and Mr. K.F. Panda not
to raise tensions in the country.Mr. K.F. Panda despite PM’s request criticized Ms. Bennet’s
actions and asked for strong actions to be taken against her in order to restore people’s faithin
strong nation. An approval for prosecution of Ms.Bennet was given.

10. Mr. Puddy Jedi, criticized the unilateral actions of Mr. K.F. Panda and said that sedition is
an objectionable and obnoxious provision and the sooner we get rid of it, the better it will be.
Ms. Bennet reacted against the actions taken against her and said that it is a sad day for
Camelot and she will continue her struggle until Camelot wakes up for a better dawn.

11. The lower court held Ms. Bennet, Mr. Fun Toosh and Mr. Rebello Gonsalves guilty for
all the offences and awarded death sentence to Ms. Bennet under section 421-A of Penal
Code of Camelot. Ms. Bennet appealed against the said judgment and was acquitted of all
charges by the High Court of Erehwon. The State of Erehwon has appealed before the
Supreme Court of Camelot by way of a Petition by Special Leave.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE DEATH SENTENCE AS SOUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EREHWON IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION AS MADE OUT BY THE FACTS OF THE

PRESENT CASE?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 421-A, PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS MADE OUT?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER SEC 351-A OF THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AS CONTAINED UNDER SEC. 210- B OF THE
CAMELOT PENAL CODE IS MADE OUT?

ISSUE 5

WHETHER THE SANCTION GRANTED UNDER SECTION 196 OF CAMELOT PROCEDURE CODE IS

VALID?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE DEATH SENTENCE AS SOUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EREHWON IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION AS MADE OUT BY THE FACTS OF

THE PRESENT CASE?

Right to life is the most cherished right, from which any one can and should not be alienated
without the law taking its due course, the law if is unreasonable and unjustified then it is
likely to be kept down and generally it is allowed in the cases which falls under the ambit of
‘rarest or rare’ and lead to loss of life of other persons. It is a set principle of law that
imposition of death penalty depends upon case to case basis and also upon the fact whether
there is unanimity in finding of guilt. The present case however on the basis of facts of the
case, and on the grounds that court differed in opinion of guilt makes imposition of death
penalty improper.

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 421-A, PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS MADE
OUT?

Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression and to hold political opinion are very
fundamental to a healthy nation. In a democratic nation the government is always open to
criticism and a reasonable criticism should never be penalized as it promotes participation.
The offence of sedition has its own peculiar character and has certain ingredient fulfillment of
which lead to successful commission of the offence. The ingredients provided in the
provision were not fulfilled as the accused-respondent never intended to bring contempt or
hatred to the government which is clear from the analysis of her speech and the events which
unfolded later had no participation from her side, Further the clause which prohibits showing
government is mistaken and mislead fails the test of reasonability and constitutionality.

ISSUE 3

WHETHER OFFENCE UNDER SEC 351-A OF THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT?

For successful attraction of Section-351-A, it is of paramount importance that the specific

ingredients of the offence are fulfilled, for the application of Sec 351-A, the requirement is

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SUMMARY OF ISSUES

that the act should promote violence between different communities. Ms. Bennet gave a
speech which was political in nature, but it is pertinent to note that during the course of
speech nothing was mentioned which can be construed to promote enmity between two
groups and communities, and hence application of Sec 321-A is uncalled for.

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AS CONTAINED UNDER SEC. 210- B OF

THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE IS MADE OUT?

It is humbly submitted that Ms. Bennet has not committed the offence of criminal conspiracy
as contained under section 210B of the Penal Code of Camelot, as there is no evidence that
she at any point of time entered into any agreement to do an act which amounts to criminal
conspiracy. There is no prior meeting of minds and there exists no evidence either direct or
circumstantial in order to even establish a prima facie case against Ms. Bennet. She criticized
the government on basic governance issues and pointed out their flaws in her speeches. The
essence of criminal conspiracy is agreement to bare agreement and association to break the
law, or to do an illegal act but no such agreement was there, neither there is any proof for the
same. The charge of criminal conspiracy doesn’t stand on the ground that Ms. Bennet’s act
was in no way in contravention to law.

ISSUE 5

WHETHER THE SANCTION GRANTED UNDER SEC 196 OF CAMELOT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
WAS VALID?

Public Servants due to peculiar nature of their duties and responsibilities enjoy a special
status. Under this for the initiation of proceedings against any public official under Penal law
a prior permission of an appropriate authority is needed, which happened to be the Union
Government. If the sanction is not proper then the further proceeding cannot be deemed
proper and in such way the taking of cognizance by the Magistrate is also hit. Further the PM
Mr. Jedi abhorred the actions of filing a case against the respondent, which implies the lack
of consent from the Union Government, in issue of prosecuting Ms. Bennet, which happened
to be the appropriate authority. It is contended that since the sanction was not proper the
proceedings against the accused must be set aside.

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WRITTEN PLEADINGS

WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

[1] WHETHER THE DEATH SENTENCE AS SOUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EREHWON IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION AS MADE OUT BY THE FACTS OF

THE PRESENT CASE.

The counsel humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the punishment of death sentence
as sought by the Government of Erehwonis not an appropriate punishment for the offence of
sedition as made out by the facts of the present case.

Human life is perhaps the most precious gift of the nature, which many describe as the
Almighty. This is the reason why it is argued that if you cannot give life, you do not have the
right to take it. Many believe that capital punishment should not be imposed irrespective of
the nature and magnitude of the crime.

As per the jurisprudence of punishment, maximum punishment is imposed when the offence
is of such a grave nature that law thinks that in order to deter him and others from repeating
the same offence maximum punishment should be imposed. Death penalty is the maximum
punishment that can be imposed on any criminal. This punishment occupies topmost position
among the grades of punishments. This punishment is imposed in extreme cases and rarely
that too in extremely grave crimes.1 The punishment is not appropriate owing to the peculiar
nature of the offence of Sedition [1.1], The facts of the case render the giving of death
penalty impermissible [1.2].

[1.1] PECULIAR NATURE OF SEC 421-A IN RELATION TO DEATH PENALTY

It is humbly submitted before this Court that the objects of punishment are now considered to
be retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation and protection and modern sentencing reflects
a combination of several or all of these aims.2 The punishment has moved from retribution
and focuses more on prevention of crime and reformation of the offender.3

It is contended that matrix of impunity added to Sedition makes it a unique offence in itself, it
treats successful events of commission and attempts at the same pedestal, which makes the

1
The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2015; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2
S.C.C. 684.
2
11 Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th ed. Lexis Nexis), 288.
3
1 V.R. Manohar&W.W. Chitaley, The Indian Penal Code, (4th ed.All India Reporter, 2006).

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WRITTEN PLEADINGS

law unduly harsh, as unsuccessful events or attempts usually attract lesser punishment that
one which is successful. The offence provides two modes of punishment viz. Death Sentence
and Life Imprisonment 4 whereas most of the other common law jurisdictions shun from
providing such grave punishments and in several peculiar cases have Life Imprisonment as
the maximum allowed penalty.

It is submitted that due to such nature of the offence at first place there is a need of special
precaution in the terms of implementation of punishments, as it is well established that the
Penal Statutes must be construed strictly.

[1.2] FACTS OF THE CASE RENDER GIVING OF DEATH PENALTY IMPERMISSIBLE

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Death Penalty is the gravest from of
the punishment given due to reasons of it being cruel, inhuman and degrading. Death Penalty
always has the idea of irreversibility attached to it and is a fallible system 5 and the
punishment sought for offence should always commensurate with the gravity of the offence.6

Death Penalty is not at par with the other punishments which are given and thus is subjected
to numerous checks. One of the most basic checks on handing out death penalty is the
extreme nature of the alleged offence. The Supreme Court of India adopted the ‘rarest of rare’
guideline for the imposition of the death penalty, saying that reasons to impose or not impose
the death penalty must include the circumstances of the crime and the criminal.7

In most of the jurisdictions, special reasons are to be provided for giving of death penalty,
‘special reasons’ in the context of this provision, means ’exceptional reasons‘ founded on the
exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the
criminal.8 In the present case there exist no such exceptional circumstances wherein giving
of death penalty can be justified.

It is contended that the jurisprudence in application of death penalty is that due to the given
irreversible nature of the death penalty, there should be consensus approach in application of
death penalty whereby it should be imposed only if there is vertical unanimity across all

4
STATEMENT OF FACTS, The K.K. Luthra Memorial Moot Court, 2-3, (2017).
5
The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2015, 167.
6
1 V.R. Manohar&W.W. Chitaley, The Indian Penal Code, (4th ed.All India Reporter, 2006), 1184.
7
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684.
8
The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2015.

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WRITTEN PLEADINGS

courts and horizontally across all benches9 and where the doubt is expressed on the in the
very guilt of the accused, it itself becomes the ground for not imposing death penalty. 10 Thus
it is explicit from them that even the doctrine of “rarest of rare” is subjected to more
conditions which include the unanimity in regards of guilt of the accused, in the facts of the
present case however, there are contrary opinions among the preceding court with the High
Court of being the opinion that guilt cannot be attributed to the respondent in the present
case. Hence it submitted that imposition of death penalty would not be a sound inclination.

It is submitted that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966
lays down that in the countries not abolishing death penalty, the sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime11, it is to be taken into consideration that while handing out
punishment of this nature it must be shown that the alleged serious crime resulted in death or
loss of life.12 It is contended that the present case falls short of these requirements and there
was no loss of life, the other loses were of a trivial nature for which giving death penalty
would violate the rarest of rare concept; what should be more taken into consideration is that
the events which unfolded were not a direct consequence of the speech of the respondent.

Moreover, it is contended the offence of sedition, by implication of its nature is political. 13

There is a strong opinion that in regards of the political offences and relating offences death
penalty should not be inflicted.14 It is contended that sedition as an offence stems due to the
political belief of the accused and severe sentences defeat their object. In practice severe
sentences confirm the belief of the offenders and thus making way for more evil and danger
to the public.15 Thus it is contended that in cases of sedition severe sentences are deemed not
being able to perform their function as well as in the present case the respondent did not even
intended to perpetrate ill will or public disorder, hence implication of most severe punishment
would be bad in eyes of the law.

9
Mohd.Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 S.C.C. 641 ¶165.
10
Lichhamadevi v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 4 S.C.C. 456 ¶ 15; Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja v. State,
(1999) 9 S.C.C. 323; Mohd.Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 S.C.C. 641.
11
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 § 6 (2).
12
The Death Penalty, 262nd Report, Law Commission of India, 2015.
13
SheonandanPaswan v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 S.C.C. 438.
14
American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, § 4 (4).
15
S.H. Jhabwala and Ors.v.Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 All. 690.

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It is contended that the purpose of prosecution for law of sedition should not be to take a
vindictive action.16 Heavy sentences are inappropriate in cases of the speech which was not
advocating violence either by innuendo or expressly17 or not couched in very intemperate
language.18 In the present case however the facts indicate that there was advocacy of violence
in any form and the respondent only advocated for a change, the events which later unfolded
were outside the intent and contemplation of the respondent and thus can’t be held guilty for
them. Moreover the government seems pushing for the death penalty in an attempt to seek
vengeance on the accused.

It is humbly submitted that due to the peculiarities of the present case a) difference of the
opinion of preceding courts in terms of the guilt of the accused, b) the seriousness that can be
attributed to the act, c) the nature of the offence being political and at the same time non -
lethal, and d) due to already peculiar nature of the offence of Sedition as contained under Sec
421-A of the Penal Code of Camelot imposition of death penalty would not be proper.

[2] WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 421-A, PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS MADE
OUT.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the present case at hand, the offence
under Sec. 421-A is not made out. The respondent did not intend or attempted to spread
hatred, contempt, or disaffection for the government. The ingredients of Sec. 421-A (a) are
not fulfilled [2.1]; Sec. 421-A (b) violates the freedom of speech and expression, and thus is
unconstitutional [2.2].

[2.1] THE INGREDIENTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION 421-A (A) ARE NOT FULFILLED.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the ingredients of Sec 421-A (a) are not
fulfilled in the present case and thus application of the above provision is improper. The
ingredients of Sec 421-A (a) are i) conveyance of ideas by words, signs, visual representation
or otherwise, ii) brings into hatred or contempt or disaffection the government established by
law. However the respondent in the present case did not intended to bring hatred, contempt or
disaffection against the Government established by law in Camelot.

16
SatyaRanjanBakshi v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 698.
17
Ram Saran Das v. Empreror, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 892 ¶ 14.
18
Sham Das v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 874.

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[2.1.1] THE RESPONDENT DIDN’T INTEND TO BRING HATRED, CONTEMPT OR

DISAFFECTION.
It is contended that the acts or words complained must incite violence or satisfy reasonable
men that that is their tendency or intention19 and the actions of the respondent were criticizing
the government in good faith, which is clear from the excerpts of the speech that what was
pointed out was the wrongs which the government’s stance.
The two expressions “brings or attempts to bring into hatred and contempt” and “excite
disaffection” must be construed together, the one results from another 20 and thus tend to
mean positive ill will, dislike or hatred and not merely lack of affection. 21In the present case
the respondent only said that the citizens of the Camelot need to clear their minds, and that
the present government is against the people criticized it and that needed to be changed, 22 no
inference to violence or enmity was made.

The quintessence of sedition is intention.23One must distinguish between advocacy of abstract

political doctrine, and advocacy designed to promote specific action. Only the latter falls
within the terms of statute. 24 There should be a differentiation between ‘expression of
philosophical abstraction’ and the ‘language of direct incitement’.25 In the present case there
was no express or implied approval for violence was used which implies that there was no
intention, the reference to ‘divine destruction’26 was more of a philosophical reference than a
real one as at the end the respondent said that the mandate of constitution would be followed.

It is contended that mere exiting of hatred is not enough there must be further intention to
foment public disorder or disturb public security27 and though every idea is incitement, the
difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement is the sense of speaker’s
enthusiasm for the results28 and Only speech that amounts to incitement to imminent lawless
action can be criminalized. 29 In the present case the intention of the respondent was to

19
NiharenduDuttMajumdaar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 22.
20
1 V.R. Manohar&W.W. Chitaley, The Indian Penal Code, (4th ed. All India Reporter, 2006),1168.
21
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955.
22
STATEMENT OF FACTS, The K.K. Luthra Memorial Moot Court, 2-3, (2017).
23
VishambharDayalTripathi v. Emperor, 1940 S.C.C. OnLine Oudh 43; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Indian Penal
Code, (32nd ed. Lexis Nexis, 2010).
24
Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
25
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26
STATEMENT OF FACTS, The K.K. Luthra Memorial Moot Court, 3, (2017).
27
1 V.R. Manohar&W.W. Chitaley, The Indian Penal Code, (4th ed.All India Reporter, 2006), 1168.
28
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
29
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 S.C.C. 380; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 S.C.C. 377;
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

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address the misgivings which were with the present government and not to incite violence
and the events which unfolded were not due to her creation or intent.

[2.1.2 ] TERM ‘GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED BY LAW’ IN CAMELOT.

It is contended that the Government established by law is different from the people who run
the government in the state. It is clear that the expression “Government established by law”
means the visible symbol of the state and has to be distinguished from the persons for the
time being engaged in carrying the administration.30 Government established by law, in fact
means existence of law and not particular form of law, therefore to even suggest another form
of government does not brings government into hatred or contempt 31 , and thus is not
sedition.32

The scope of Sec 421-A is very wide in nature and interpreting the term “Government
established by law” in a more liberal way would tend to curb the freedom of speech. It is
contended that the respondent did not targeted the Government in meanings of the
representative of the State as he said that the mandate of the constitution would be followed,
he only targeted the people who were administering for their inefficiency and the approach
they had, also there was no reference to violence and the existence of the state was not
jeopardized and obtaining change in the government with lawful means is not sedition.33

[2.2] SECTION 421-A (B) AS CONTAINED IN THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT IS

VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the devise of guaranteeing Fundamental
Rights in a written constitution was to protect individual from a state aggression. 34 It is well
settled in law that the validity of legislation can be challenged on the grounds of it being in
35 36
contravention ofa fundamental right , absence of legislative competence or on
unreasonableness of the law.37

30
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955.
31
Kamal Krishna Sircar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 636 ¶ 7.
32
ArjunArora v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1937 All.295 ¶ 8.
33
SanskarMarathe v. State of Maharashtra &Ors., 2015 S.C.C. OnLineBom.587 ¶ 15.
34
Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
35
Bakhtawar Trust v. M. D. Narayan, (2003) 5 S.C.C. 298; Khyebari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, A.I.R.
1964 S.C. 925 ¶ 43.
36
In Re, Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 413 ¶ 39.
37
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 S.C.C. 745 ¶ 11; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
Civil Service, (1985) 3 All E.R. 935.

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Though it is settled that the court cannot strike down the legislation based on its discernment
that the same is unwarranted, unnecessary or unjustified. 38 However, in the instant case,
Camelot, being a democratic and common law country has the freedom of speech and
expression [2.2.1]; a blanket ban placed on the criticism of the government place by the Sec.
431-A (b) of the Penal Code of Camelot, is against the spirit of the freedom of speech and
expression [2.2.2].

[2.2.1] CAMELOT BEING A CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND COMMON

LAW FOLLOWING COUNTRY HAS FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that freedom of speech and expression is one
of the most basic rights39 and is an essential for a democratic country. Freedom of speech and
expression is considered mother of all other rights.

Right to freedom of speech and expression lies at the heart of democracy,40 and is regarded as
the lifeblood of democracy41, a prerequisite for democracy42, an instrumental functionary as a
guarantor of democracy43 and thus is of utmost importance.44

The common law countries which do not have the same in the black letter law have
recognized the same by implication, e.g. Australia45, it is argued that a constitutional state
must recognize the freedom of speech, unless it has to forfeit its distinct character.46

It is contended that the governments are naturally inclined to suppress speech they do not like
and abuse their power47, Freedom of speech principle is needed to counteract this ‘slippery

38
K.T. Plantation (P.) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 S.C.C. 1; Union of India v. Madras Bar Association,
(2010) 11 S.C.C. 1;In Re, Natural Resources Allocation, (2012) 10 S.C.C. 1; State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co.,
A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1627.
39
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597; Michel Rosenfeld &AndrasSajo, Oxford Handbook
of Comparative Constitutional Laws, (1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2008), 892.
40
National Media Ltd. and others v. Bogoshi, 1998 (4) S.A. 1196 (S.C.A).
41
R. v. Secretary of the State for Home Department ex Parte Simms, [2000] 2 A.C. 115.
42
Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech, (1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2008).
43
South African National Defence Union v. Minister of Defence, 1999 (4) S.A. 469 (C.C.)¶ 7; South African
Broadcasting Corporation v. National Director of Public Prosecutions, 2007 (1) S.A. 523 (C.C.)¶ 25.
44
S. v. Mamabolo, 2001 (3) S.A. 409 (C.C.) ¶ 37.
45
Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106; Coleman v. Power, (2004) 220
C.L.R. 1.
46
Michel Rosenfeld &AndrasSajo, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Laws, (1st ed. Oxford
University Press, 2008), 892.
47
Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (1st ed. Oxford University Press 2007), 38.

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slope’ 48 , and the law of sedition must be interpreted keeping the social, political and
constitutional changes in the society.49

[2.2.2] SECTION 421-A (B) PUTS A BLANKET BAN ON THE FREEDOM OF

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the provisions as contained under Sec
421-A (b) of the Penal Code of Camelot are grossly unreasonable and impedes the exchange
of any kind of ideas related to the political arena, thus violating freedom of speech and
expression. It is contended that a in a democratic setup the government must always be open
to criticism of those who hold offices 50 and the same should ideally be immune from
sanctions 51 and may be curtailed only when it is directed to produce imminent lawless
behavior and is likely to produce it.52

A criticism of the measures of the Government in good faith53, however strongly worded
would be within the scope of freedom of speech and expression. 54 The respondent in the
present case did not called for violence and promoted only an abstract idea as has been dealt
earlier, which was well protected within the scope of rights granted to him, and merely
commenting in strong terms on the measures or acts of the government is no offense.55 There
is a distinction between incitement to a revolutionary change and advocacy of lawful reform
and the removal of grievances.56

Therefore, it is put forward that restrictions on this freedom to speech and expression need to
be examined rigorously57, especially in case of political criticism and time is long due past
when mere criticism was sufficient to constitute sedition.58 However, in the case at hand, the
impugned clause unreasonably restricts the political dialog and hence is liable to be struck
down for violation of right of speech and expression.

48
Fredrick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 1985.
49
Smt. P. Hemalatha v.The Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 1976 A.P. 375 ¶ 120.
50
Debi Soren v. State, I.L.R. (1953) 32 Pat.1104; Hector v. A.-G.of Antigua and Barbuda, [1990] 2 All E.R.
103.
51
Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (1st ed. Harvard University Press
2000).
52
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
53
Parmanand v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 All.156 ¶ 3.
54
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955.
55
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, (1897) I.L.R. 20 All. 55.
56
R. v. Burns, (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 333.
57
R. v. B.B.C. ex. p. Prolife Alliance, 2003 U.K.H.L 23; Livingstone v. Adjudication Panel for England, [2006]
E.W.H.C. 2533 (Admin) ¶ 35.
58
NiharenduDuttMajumdar v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 22.

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[3] WHETHER OFFENCE UNDER SEC 351-A OF THE PENAL CODE OF CAMELOT.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the object of Section 351-A is to prevent
breaches of the public tranquility which might result from excited feeling of enmity between
classes of people. In the instance case, however, the counsel pleads that the respondent
cannot be punished under section 351-A of the Penal Code of Camelot as the speech given by
does not promotes enmity “between two groups or communities”

It is contended that scheme of provisions under Sec. 153-A of the IPC59is almost pari materia
with Sec. 351-A of the Penal Code of Camelot and provides that the gist of the offence is the
intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people.60

It is contended that the alleged acts for which the punishment is sought should be of the
nature that they then to bring two communities, whether communal, racial, religious or any
other, in clash and the provision cannot be invoked even if an alleged act causes or tends to
cause hatred or enmity between different political classes or between persons believing in
different forms of government, e.g., a democratic or totalitarian rule and cannot be aimed at
purely political movement.61

It is submitted that adverse criticism, however pungent, misdirected or unjustified against a

ministry or a government (although such ministry may have been formed on a communal
basis) will not come within the ambit of this section62 and where measures of the government
were severely criticized it cannot be claimed that the same attempted to bring hatred between
the ruler and the ruled.63 The Sec 351-A for its application inevitably calls for at least two
communities must be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group
without reference to any other community or group cannot attract its application.64

It is contended that for application of Sec 351-A of the Camelot Penal Code it must be proved
that the alleged speech or the acts of the accused caused two classes of people, However in
the present case the respondent throughout her discourse never called or addressed any
particular community and all her actions either to comment upon the shortcoming of the

59
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 153-A.
60
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (34thed. Lexis Nexis, 2015), 310.
61
Shiv Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P., 1978 Cri. L.J. 701.
62
Ram P.Sadaranganiv. Emperor, A.I.R. 945 Sind. 106.
63
A. M. A.Zaman v. Emperor,A.I.R.1933 Cal. 39.
64
ManzarSayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra & others, (2002)5 S.C.C.1; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of
AndhraPradesh, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3483.

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present government or to highlight the better of other countries.65 Thus the ingredients of the
offence are not complete and there are no grounds for conviction of the respondent in this
regards.

[4] WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AS CONTAINED UNDER SEC. 210- B
OF THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE IS MADE OUT?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the respondent has not committed the
offence of criminal conspiracy as contained under section 210-B of the Penal Code of
Camelot, as there is no evidence that she at any point of time entered into any agreement with
Mr. Funtoosh and Rebello Gonsalves to do an act which amounts to criminal conspiracy.

[4.1] THERE WAS NO PRIOR MEETING OF MINDS OF RESPONDENT WITH OTHER(S).

In order to make someone criminally responsible for the offence of conspiracy, it is essential
to establish that there was an agreement between persons who combined to carry on legal
proceedings in a vexatious or improper way.66 Thus it has been said that criminal conspiracy
consists in “an unlawful combination of two or more persons, to do that which is contrary to
law, to cause a public mischief, 67 or to do that which is wrongful and harmful towards
another person, 68 or to do a lawful act for an unlawful end, 69 or by unlawful means, 70 or
wrongfully to prejudice a third person.71The essence of offence of criminal conspiracy is bare
agreement and association to break the law, 72 or to do an illegal act. 73 There must be an
agreement and the persons must know what the conspiracy is about, otherwise they cannot be
said to have conspired.74 The conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of the two or
more but in the agreement of the two or more to do such acts. So long as such a design rests
only in intention, it is not punishable.75

65
Joseph Bain D’souza and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1995 Cri.L.J. 1316.
66
Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India: Analytical Commentary on Indian Penal Code, (11th ed. Allahabad
Law Publication, 2008).
67
R v. Jones, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 345.
68
Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495.
69
R v. Deleval, (1763) 3 Burr. 1434.
70
R. v. Meyrick, (1928) 21 Cr. App. R. 94.
71
Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495.
72
Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2433.
73
G.V. Nair v. Govt. of India, 1962 K.L.T. 690.
74
Parasaram v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1937 Sind. 8.
75
State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, J.T. 1996 (4) S.C. 615; Kuruchiyan Kunhaman v. State of Kerala,
1974 Ker.L.T. 328.

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It is a settled law that for an offence under Section 210-B the prosecution need not
necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal
act.76There is no prior meeting of minds and there exists no such evidence that adduce any
culpability on her part. There exists no evidence either direct or circumstantial in order to
even establish a prima facie case against Ms. Bennet, she being a politician did what a
reasonable politician is expected to do. She criticized the government on basic governance
issues and pointed out their flaws in her speeches, neither she conspired to disrupt public
order nor she did anything of that sort.

[4.2] MS. BENNET’S ACT OF CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO

LAW

Ms. Bennet belonged to Hogwarts party that has been quite critical of the present government
and this is the reason behind such frivolous accusations against her and other party members.
Ms. Bennet has frequently showed dissent against the existing government policies but the
charges framed against her are completely frivolous as her dissent has been equated with anti-
nationalism, which wasn’t the case. Every man has a right to give every public matter a
candid, full and free discussion and if a party publishes a paper on any such matter and it
contains no more than a calm and quiet discussion, allowing something for a little feeling in
men’s minds that will be no libel. 77 A mere criticism or denunciation of the Government
established by law is not objectionable. Citizens are certainly entitled to express their
grievances and endeavor to get them redressed through lawful means.78

She criticized the existing government for being corrupt, and failing to provide basic
amenities to citizens. She made a speech which was neither seditious nor demeaned the
government in anyway but she has been charged for conspiring the same with other co-
accused. The essence of criminal conspiracy is agreement to bare agreement and association
to break the law,79or to do an illegal act80 but no such agreement was there, neither there is
any proof for the same. The charge of criminal conspiracy doesn’t stand on the ground that
Ms. Bennet’s act was in no way, in contravention to law.

76
Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India: Analytical Commentary on Indian Penal Code, (11th ed. Allahabad
Law Publication, 2008), 1144.
77
R. v. Sulan, (1868) 11 Cox. 50.
78
Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India: Analytical Commentary on Indian Penal Code, (11th ed. Allahabad
Law Publication, 2008), 1261.
79
Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2433.
80
G.V. Nair v. Govt. of India, 1962 K.L.T. 690 ¶ 77.

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The counsel on behalf of respondent humbly submits that the offence of criminal conspiracy
as contained under section 210B of the Penal Code of Camelot has not been made out.

[5] WHETHER SANCTION GRANTED UNDER SEC. 196 OF THE CAMELOT CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS VALID?

It is humbly submittedbefore this Hon’ble Court that the permission which was required for
prosecution of the public servant was not taken as per the requirements of the Camelot
Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that the Magistrate did not had jurisdiction of taking
cognizance against the respondent at the first instance because the sanction granted by the
Government of Erehwon in the name of the Lieutenant Governor is not valid and thus the
proceedings against Ms. Bennet are liable to be set aside.

It is humbly submitted that the scheme of Sec 196 of the Camelot Criminal Procedure is pari
material with the scheme contained under Sec 197 of the CrPC.81 The intention underlining
Sec 197CrPC is not to put a wall round public servants, but to enable them to perform their
duties fearlessly by protecting them from vexatious, mala fide, or false prosecutions for acts
done in performance of their duties. 82 It is contended that for being able to successfully
invoke this provision two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the public servant is removable
from office either by the Union Government or a State Government or not by any lower
authority; and (2) he is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.”83It is submitted that in granting of the
permission to prosecute the public official it is of paramount importance that the relevant
government where the person was employed must give the sanction, even though the
employment was temporary in nature84 any sanction given by the lower or inferior authority
is invalid.85

THE INVALIDITY OF THE SANCTION

It is contended that the term “employer” means one who employs the services of others; one
for whom employees workand who pays their wages or salaries. It is a common phenomenon

81
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 197. (India)
82
S. Banerjee v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 388.
83
S.KuppuswamiRao v. The King, A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1.
84
R.R.Chari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1537.
85
State of Haryana v. N.C. Tandon, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1793.

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among the common law nations that the Members of Parliament are provided salaries by the
Union Government (ex. in India MPs are paid under The Salary Allowance and Pension of
the Member of Parliament Act, 1954. 86 ; in England MPs are paid under Parliamentary
Standards Act 200987) So, Members of Parliament are employed by Central government and
the appropriate authority is central government to grant sanction against Member of
Parliament.
It is contended that in the instant case, Ms. Bennet was Member of Parliament, and therefore
was in connection to the affairs of the Union, therefore the appropriate authority to seek
permission should have been the Union Government. It is contended that when the sanction is
granted by the incompetent authority it is consider as no sanction in the eyes of law88 and
cognizance of any offence against public servant without sanction is deemed illegal and thus
is liable to be set aside.89
Moreover what is pertinent to take into consideration is that Mr. Jedi abhorred the initiation
of case against Ms. Bennet, which shows that the Union Government had a contrary opinion
on the matter of sanction for prosecution.
It is therefore contended that the a) Ms. Bennet was MP; b) relevant employer of Ms. Bennet
was the Union Government; c) the sanction was needed from the Union Government which
was not taken; and d) the P.M. expressed his disapproval in regards of the same. Thus the
sanction which was taken was improper making the taking of cognizance improper and thus
making the trial vitiated, it is for this violation of statutory provision that all the charges must
be dropped against the respondent.

86
LokSabha Secretariat, Salaries, Allowances And Facilities To Members At a Glance (2014), available at
http://164.100.47.192/loksabha/writereaddata/Updates/EventLSS_635627139100708482_English%20FACILITI
ES64p.pdf.
87
The Speaker’s Committee For The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, Appointment of an IPSA
Board Member(2016), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmspeak/424/424.pdf.
88
Mahenda Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri.L.J. 1667.
89
David Kaketta v. State of Jharkhand, 2002(3) J.L.J.R. 181; SubhashManmothe v. State of Maharashtra, 2007
Cri.L.J. 537; Manmath Kumar Behera v. State of Orissa, 2002(11) Ori.L.R. 394.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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 XIII K. K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2017
WRITTEN PLEADINGS

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advance and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. The Death Sentence as sought by the Government of Erehwon is not a proper

sentence for the offence of Sedition as made out by the facts of the case.
2. The offence of Sedition as contained under The Penal Code of Camelot, Sec 421-A
has not been made out.
3. The offence of Promoting enmity between different groups, as contained under The
Penal Code of Camelot, Sec 351-A has not been made out.
4. The offence of Criminal Conspiracy, as contained under The Penal Code of Camelot,
Sec 421-A has not been made out.
5. The sanction under Sec 197 of the Camelot Criminal Procedure was improper, thus
rendering proceedings void.

And pass any other order, or direction, or relief that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in interest
of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed

Sd/-

Counsel for Respondents

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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