DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW

INDIAN PENAL CODE

FINAL PROJECT ON
“THE JOURNEY OF SECTION 121 OF IPC
FROM THE REVOLUTIONIST TO TERRORIST”

Submitted to:- Submitted by :

Mr. Malay Panday SURYANSH GUPTA

Assistant Prof. Law Enroll -160101153

RMLNLU Vth Semster.

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I SURYANSH GUPTA would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my Indian

Penal Code teacher Mr. Malay Panday who gave me the golden opportunity to do this
wonderful project on the topic “effect of non observance of principles of natural justice ”
and also for her guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing necessary
information regarding the project & also for her support in completing the project. I am
very grateful to her exemplary guidance.

However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many
individuals. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.

I would like to express my gratitude towards staff members of library for their kind co-
operation which helped me in completion of this project.

My thanks and appreciations also go to my colleague in developing the project and people
who have willingly helped me out with their abilities.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.........................................................................................................2

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................4

II. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF SECTION 121.....................................................................5

III. CORRELATED PROVISIONS OF THE IPC.....................................................................7

IV SECTION 121: PRE-INDEPENDENCE JURISPRUDENCE.............................................8

1. (A) WAGING WAR AND THE ‘KINGS TWO BODIES’.............................................9

2. (B) ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST STATE MACHINERY.....................................9

3. (C) SPEECH AND EXPRESSION INCITING VIOLENCE.......................................10

V. ‘WAGING WAR’ AFTER INDIAN INDEPENDENCE.....................................................10

4. (A) BURDEN OF PROOF............................................................................................11

5. (B) ACTS OF TERRORISM.........................................................................................12

6. (C) OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT POLICY.......................................................12

VI. JUDGMENTS THAT METAMORPHOSED SECTION 121...........................................13

7. MAGANLAL RADHAKISHAN V. EMPEROR (MAGANLAL)...............................13

8. (B) STATE V. MOHAMMED AFZAL AND OTHERS (MOHAMMED AFZAL) ....14

9. (C) STATE (NCT OF DELHI) V. NAVJOT SANDHU................................................15

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................15
 I. INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 2010, a Special Sessions Court in Mumbai convicted Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only

foot soldier of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai between November 26 and 29, 2008 to have
been captured alive, on eighty-six counts. He was sentenced to death on five charges. One of
these was the offence of ‘waging war against the Government of India’ under Section 121 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which reads:

“Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of
India - Whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war,
or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to fine.”

The development of Section 121 has provided a literal exposition of the proverb that ‘one
man’s terrorist is another man’s revolutionary’. Before independence, several freedom
fighters were convicted under this Section. The members of the Indian National Army, who
were tried between 1944 and 1946, were also primarily charged with waging war.
Subsequently, however, Section 121 has been employed as a mace to bring perpetrators of
terrorist activities to justice.

In modern times, the perception of the term ‘war’, especially in the intra-state sense, has
evolved significantly. In 2006, the Indian Army released a document entitled the ‘Doctrine of
Sub conventional Operations’. In this doctrinal piece, it was opined1:

“Total war as an instrument of state policy has become less relevant than ever before…
However, this has given further impetus to sub-conventional operations as the predominant
form of warfare. Sub-conventional warfare is a generic term encompassing all armed
conflicts that are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst states and below the
threshold of war. It includes militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism that may be
employed as a means in an insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently.”

The approach of the higher judiciary towards offences under Section 121 has developed in
this backdrop. This article seeks to analyze the development of Section 121 since it came into
force more than seven score years ago. The Supreme Court and the High Courts, particularly,
1 Mayur Suresh, “Dead Man Walking: Sovereignty and the Supreme Court in the Age of Terror ”, Sarai Reader
07, Sarai CSDS : 2007 (4).
the Chartered High Courts, have played a seminal role in keeping this provision in sync with
the evolving demands of modern criminal law.

II. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF SECTION 121

Waging war against the Government of India is one of the most serious of the penal offences
under Indian law. It differs from most other offences in certain respects:

1. Under the general law of abetment, a distinction is made, for the purposes of
punishment, between a successful and a failed act of abetment. Section 121
eschews this distinction. It deals equally with an abettor whose instigation has
lead to a war and one whose instigation has had no effect whatsoever. 2 In this
vein, the authors of the IPC stated3:

“The murderer is in greater danger after his victim is dispatched than before. The thief is in
greater danger after the purse is taken than before. But the rebel is out of danger as soon as he
has subverted the Government. As the penal law is impotent against a successful rebel, it is
consequently necessary that it should be made strong and sharp against the first beginnings of
rebellion, against treasonable designs which have been carried no further than plots and
preparations. We have therefore not thought it expedient to leave such plots and preparations
to the ordinary law of abetment ... Under that general law, a conspiracy for the subversion of
the Government would not be punished at all if the conspirators were detected before they
had done more than discuss plans, adopt resolutions and inter-change promises of fidelity. A
conspiracy for the subversion of the Government… would be punished very much less
severely than the counterfeiting of a rupee, or the presenting of a forged cheque. We have,
therefore, thought it absolutely necessary to make separate provision for the previous abetting
of great State offences. The subsequent abetting of such offences may, we think, without
inconvenience, be left to be dealt with according to the general law.”

Interestingly, this statement indicates that Section 121 of the IPC was never intended to tackle
a threat in the nature of terrorism. While the authors of the IPC contemplated that only a
rebellion (or preparation for such a rebellion) would fall within the sweep of this section,
Section 121 has been predominantly applied to sub-conventional warfare in recent times.

(ii) It is one of only nine offences under the IPC which prescribes the penalty of capital
punishment.4

(iii) Unlike most other capital offences, the ingredients of Section 121 do not necessitate the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, even a single act of homicide. Moreover,
2 Emperor v. Ganesh Damodar Savarkar, 12 Bom LR 105 : 5 IC 854.
3 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (2007 31st Edn. Wadhwa Nagpur) 616.
4 Note that Section 303 of the IPC, which compulsorily prescribes capital punishment for a life-convict who
commits a murder, has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Mithu, (1983) 2 SCC 277.
theoretically speaking, an offence under this provision can be committed without the
possession or use of any weapon, arms, explosives, etc. In practice, however, courts have
recognized that although the utilization of weapons is not a prerequisite for the commission
of an offence, it is a material element in ascertaining if an act meets the threshold of waging
war against the Government of India.5

III. CORRELATED PROVISIONS OF THE IPC

Section 121 is the spine upon which several provisions of Chapter VI of the IPC rest. Section
121A, for instance, punishes two forms of conspiracy:

5 Public Prosecutor v. Palathingal Valia, 84 Ind. Cas. 547, where the accused, who was charged with committing
an act of rebellion, was armed with only a stick, he was granted the benefit of doubt by the Court on the count of
waging war. See also State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, AIR 2005 SC 3820 : (2005) 11 SCC 600.
(i) Conspiring (within or outside India) to commit any of the offences punishable by Section
121; and

(ii) Conspiring to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, the
Government.

Section 121A resembles Section 121 in that the essence of an offence is merely an agreement
to do all or any of the prohibited acts. It is not necessary that any act or illegal omission
should take place in pursuance of the agreement.6

Section 122 seeks to draw the fine distinction between preparation and an attempt to commit
an offence. It reads:

“Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of India –
Whoever collects men, arms or ammunition or otherwise prepares to wage war with the
intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Government of India,
shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term
not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In order to establish that an offence has been committed under Section 122, it is incumbent on
the prosecution to not only prove that men, arms, ammunition, etc have been collected, but
that this has been done for no purpose other than to prepare to wage a war against the
Government of India.7

Further, Section 123 of the IPC encompasses the intentional concealment of a design to wage
war against the Government of India. Its essential ingredients are:

(i) The existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India;

(ii) Intentional concealment of such a design;

(iii) Such concealment should be with the intention to facilitate the waging of war against the
Government of India.

In Shaukat Hussain Guru v. NCT, Delhi8, the Supreme Court highlighted the distinction
between Sections 121 and 123 of the IPC:

6 Nilkanta v. Emperor, 13 CrLJ 305 : 14 IC 849.

7 Javed Ahmed v. State of Maharshtra, 2007 Cri LJ 1386
8 AIR 2008 SC 2419 : (2008) 6 SCC 776.
“To prove an offence under Section 121, IPC, the prosecution is required to prove that the
accused is guilty of waging war against the Government of India or attempts to wage such
war, or abets the waging of such war, whereas for proving the offence under Section 123, IPC
against the accused the prosecution is required to prove that there was a concealment by an
act or by illegal omission of existence of a design to wage war against the Government of
India and he intended by such concealment to facilitate, or he knew that such concealment
will facilitate, the waging of war.”

Section 125 prohibits the waging of war (or abetting the waging of war) against the
Government of any Asiatic power in alliance or at peace with the Government of India.

IV SECTION 121: PRE-INDEPENDENCE JURISPRUDENCE

Originally, Section 121 differed in three respects from the text which appears in the statute
book today:
(i) The offence consisted of waging war against the Queen rather than the Government of
India9;

(ii) The penalty prescribed was either that of death or transportation for life (as against life
imprisonment)10;

(iii) The compulsory forfeiture of all property was replaced with an unlimited fine.11

It was unequivocally accepted that the offence of ‘waging war’ prescribed by the IPC was an
offshoot of the English concept of ‘levying war’ in the Statute of High Treason 12. Most Indian
decisions drew assistance from English Law in determining when the threshold of waging
war had been breached.

1. (A) WAGING WAR AND THE ‘KINGS TWO BODIES’

In his acclaimed work ‘The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology’,
Ernst Kantorowicz draws the notional distinction between two bodies of the medieval ruler:
his personal being, and the political body of subjects which he ruled over. Courts recognized
this distinction as a facet of Section 12113:

“There are two kinds of levying war: one against the person of the King, to imprison, to
dethrone, or to kill him; or to make him change measures, or remove counsellors; the other,
which is said to be levied against the majesty of the King, or, in other words, against him in
his regal capacity; as when a multitude rise and assemble to attain by force and violence any
object of a general public nature; that is levying war against the majesty of the King; and
most reasonably so held, because it tends to dissolve all the bonds of society, to destroy
property, and to overturn government; and by force of arms, to restrain the King from
reigning, according to law.”

A majority of (if not all) Indian cases involved offences against the political, rather than the
personal body of the King.

9 The expression ‘Queen’ was replaced with ‘Government of India’ by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.
10 The expression ‘transportation for life’ was replaced by ‘imprisonment for life’ by Act 26 of 1955.
11 This change was effected by Act 16 of 1921.
12 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. III St. 5 c. 2.
13 Maganlal Radhakrishnan v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Nag 173
 2. (B) ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST STATE MACHINERY
In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor14, is was stated that Section 121 must be construed in
its ordinary sense, and that its ambit is not necessarily restricted to overt acts including the
collection of men, arms and ammunition. It was essential to establish that there was an
attempt to accomplish by violence, any object of a public nature, striking at the root of the
sovereign’s authority.15 There must have been an insurrection of a general nature, as well as
force accompanying that insurrection.16

3. (C) SPEECH AND EXPRESSION INCITING VIOLENCE

Apart from cases involving direct interference with state machinery, a few cases evoking the
question of whether speech and expression (not coupled with overt acts of violence) could
result in a conviction under Section 121 for abetting the waging of war arose. In Emperor v.
Hasrat Mohani17, the Bombay High Court was confronted with the issue of whether a speech
delivered by the accused, which encouraged members of the Muslim community to form a
machinery parallel to the British Government, including an independent police force,
parliament, courts and schools, with a view of attaining Swaraj, would amount to waging war
or abetting the waging of war under Section 121. The Court noted18:

“[S]o long as a man only tries to inflame feeling, to excite a state of mind, he is not guilty of
anything more than sedition. It is only when he definitely and clearly incites to action that he
is guilty of instigating and therefore abetting the waging of war. It is perfectly true that it is
not essential that as a result of the abetment the war should be waged in fact. But the main
purpose of the instigation should be the ‘waging of war’. It should not be merely a remote
and incidental purpose, but the thing principally aimed at by the instigator… The test - the
only test - is to read the words, and to decide what is the probable effect on the audience to
whom it was addressed.

The words must be taken in their natural meaning and in the order in which they stand. If the
result charged is not clear beyond reasonable doubt then the offence is not made out. If it is
not possible to say affirmatively that the accused intended to instigate his audience to
violence, then he must be acquitted, however mischievous the speech may be.”

14 14 Cal WN 1114 :
15 Hasrat Mohani, (1922) 24 Bom LR 885
16 Frost, (1839) 9 C&P 129.
17 (1922) 24 Bom LR 885.
18 (1922) 24 Bom LR 885.
 V. ‘WAGING WAR’ AFTER INDIAN INDEPENDENCE

Although in theory the scope of Section 121 has remained unchanged after independence, a
significant jurisprudential deviation has taken place in its interpretation. A predominant
segment of the development of this Section in the post-independence era is mapped in the
analysis of the Mohammed Afzal19 and Navjot Sandhu20 cases, in part VI of this article.
However, there is some other noteworthy case law that has emanated from this period.

4. (A) BURDEN OF PROOF

With the lapse of time, courts have increasingly emphasized the fact that due to the gravity of
the offence, a heavy onus of proof is placed at the door of the prosecution to establish the
commission of an offence under Section 121. The Gujarat High Court highlighted this when
it stated that ‘[i]t is not incumbent on the accused to show what the object and meaning of the
acts done were, but it is the duty of the prosecutors to make out their case against the
accused’21 .

In Mir Hasan Khan and Others v. State22, where the Patna High Court was faced with
determining whether a mutiny among certain sections of the police force constituted an
offence under Section 121, it opined:

“The expression ‘waging war’ means and can, I think, only mean ‘waging war in the manner
usual in war.’ In other words, in order to support a conviction on such a charge, it is not
enough to show that the persons charged have contrived to obtain possession of an armoury
and have, when called upon to surrender it, used the rifles and ammunition so obtained
against the King's troops. It must also be shown that the seizure of the armoury was part and
parcel of a planned operation and that their intention in resisting the troops of the King was to
overwhelm and defeat these troops and then to go on and crush any further opposition with
which they might meet until either the leaders of the movement succeeded in obtaining
possession of the machinery of government or until those in possession of it yielded to the
demands of their loaders.”

19 Mohammed Afzal Kumar v. State, 107 (2003) DLT 385.

20 State v. Navjot Sandhu, AIR 2005 SC 3820.
21 State of Gujarat v. Shahnawaz Abdulgafur Bhatti, (2008) 1 GLR 346.
22 AIR 1951 Pat 60. Cited in Javed Ahmed v. State of Maharshtra, 2007 Cri LJ 1386.
This decision sheds light on the fact that every assault on state apparatus does not, in the
absence of additional evidence, constitute an act of war. Courts have rightly emphasized that
there is a significant evidentiary ascent from a general offence to an offence against the state.

5. (B) ACTS OF TERRORISM

In State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Jamiluddin Nasser 23, the accused were chargedwith
actively guiding insurgents who opened fire on police forces guarding the American Center in
Calcutta. Two of the accused were handlers of the terrorists, while another was driving one of
the vehicles employed by them in their siege. The Sessions Court handed capital punishment
to them under Section 121. The Calcutta High Court confirmed the sentence31:

“The common purpose to cause a concerted attack on the Governmental machinery including
police force amounts to ‘waging of war’. From the nature of the attack it is clear that the
strategy was not only to attack the police force but also the police force guarding the
American Centre to attract global attention. This strategy can safely be called as ‘waging of
war’ against the Central Government...”

6. (C) OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT POLICY

In Rahul Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Rahul Banerjee)24, the administration had
initiated criminal proceedings against certain adivasis for illegally felling timber and
unauthorized encroachment of forest land. Rahul Banerjee, a social activist, allegedly
encouraged the adivasis to take up arms against police officers and forest officials in protest.
On this account, the adivasis as well as Rahul Banerjee were charged under Sections 121 and
121A of the IPC. The Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the charges of waging war
against the Appellants in the following words25:

“Merely because the applicants or any citizen of the county is raising voice against the
Government or Government policy or according to him he is fighting for his fundamental
right and civil right would not be sufficient to say that individual person or group or group of
society is waging war or attempts to wage war or abets waging of war against the
Government of India… In the case in hand, the allegation against the applicants including
their leader Rahul Banerjee is that they were objecting the action of the administration
regarding seizure of illegally cut forest wooden logs, trees and encroachment of forest land

23 Death Reference 2 of 2005 in Sessions Case No. 79 of 2002 and C.R.A. 377 and 425 of 2005, decided on
February 5, 2010.
24 2005 (1) MPHT 58 : 2004 (4) MPLJ 359.
25 2005 (1) MPHT 58 : 2004 (4) MPLJ 359.
for constructing hut and they had expressed their anguish by attacking on them by use of
different weapons.”

This decision, which has a discernible natural law flavor, departs from the pre-independence
jurisprudential approach that violent opposition to government policy can neither justify the
ends of the opposition, nor act as a mitigating circumstance in ascertaining the gravity of the
offence committed.

It is a reflection of the fact that in recent times, the liberalization of civil society has impacted
the decision-making process of courts. Rahul Banerjee sheds light on the fact that Courts are
(and most likely, will continue to be) reluctant to charge citizens protesting against
administrative policy and diminution of civil rights, even if their protest assumes an
aggressive form.26

VI. JUDGMENTS THAT METAMORPHOSED SECTION 121

In this part, I analyse three cases which, to borrow the words of Lord Denning27, not merely
ironed out the creases, but altered the fabric of Section 121.

7. MAGANLAL RADHAKISHAN V. EMPEROR (MAGANLAL)28

Maganlal was an officer of the ‘Hindustani Lal Sena’, an anti-colonial group which was
formed on the anniversary day of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. In 1942, he addressed
public meetings, and exhorted his audience to secure Indian independence. He then raised a
‘sanrakshak dal’ of about a hundred volunteers, who were instructed to mobilize on the blow
of a whistle. Maganlal instigated this assembly to attack police outposts and station-houses,
murder police officers and seize inventory from these police establishments. An individual by
the name of Mallu Koshti was a member of the ‘sanrakshak dal’ that destroyed the station-
house. Maganlal and Mallu Koshti (Apellants) were charged under several provisions of the
IPC, including that of waging war against the Queen.

The Sessions Court convicted the Appellants under Section 121 and sentenced them to
transportation for life. The Nagpur High Court confirmed Maganlal’s conviction and
26 A similar approach was adopted by the Patna High Court in Mir Hasan Khan v. State, AIR 1951 Pat 60,
where there was a mutiny among certain sections of the police on account of the indignation aroused by the
punishment meted out to one of their colleagues.
27 Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 KB 481
28 AIR 1946 Nag 173.
dismissed the appeal filed by him. However, Mallu’s conviction under Section 121 was set
aside:

“It is no doubt true that there is no distinction between a principal and an accessory in an
offence under Section 121. But there is a line of distinction, though fine, which consists of a
difference between men who plan and execute a raid, and those who, swept along in the
maelstrom of events in the sudden frenzy, participate in an offence of that kind. The latter
cannot be held liable under Section 121.”

8. (B) STATE V. MOHAMMED AFZAL AND OTHERS (MOHAMMED AFZAL)

29

On December 13, 2001, five terrorists entered the complex of the Parliament House in New
Delhi while it was in session. They had planned to destroy the building and murder or take
hostage several state leaders. The terrorists, however, were neutralized by security forces.
Primarily, four persons were charged for their involvement in the planning and execution of
the attack: Mohammed Afzal, Shaukat Hussain, Navjot Sandhu (the wife of Shaukat Hussain)
and S.A.R. Gilani (an acquantiance of Shaukat Husain). The Special Court under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, convicted Mohammed Afzal, Shaukat Hussain and S.A.R.
Gilani on several counts, including that of waging war against the Government. Although the
three persons convicted were sentenced to death, they were given life imprisonment for
contravening Section 121 of the IPC. Navjot Sandhu was convicted under Section 123 of the
IPC.

The Delhi High Court, in the death reference before it, enhanced the punishment of
Moahmmed Afzal and Shaukat Hussain under Section 121, sentencing them to death. S.A.R.
Gilani and Navjot Sandhu were acquitted by the Court. Nandrajog J. stated 30: “…though there
were five terrorists who attacked Parliament… but from the fire power available with them
and they being armed to the teeth and had they succeeded, the entire Parliament which was in
Session would have been wiped out, we hold that the actions of the terrorists would be acts of
waging war against the Government of India. Accused Afzal and Shaukat were active
participants in providing the logistic support. If not acts of waging war what they did would
certainly be of acts of abetting the waging of war… The attack was on Parliament, when in
session. The sovereignty of the country was attacked. To borrow the words of the Apex Court
in … Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, the gravity of the offence is of a magnitude that the
29 107 (2003) DLT 385 : 2003 (71) DRJ 178.
30107 (2003) DLT 385 : 2003 (71) DRJ 178
collective conscious of the community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the
judicial power centre, to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards
desirability or otherwise of retaining the death penalty. Indeed, after the unfortunate incident,
this country had to station its troops at the border and large scale mobilisation of the armed
forces took place. The clouds of war with our neighbour loomed large for a long period of
time. The nation suffered not only an economic strain but even the trauma of an imminent
war.”

9. (C) STATE (NCT OF DELHI) V. NAVJOT SANDHU31

Appeals from Mohammed Afzal provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
conclusively lay down the law on the subject of waging war. The Supreme Court’s analysis of
Section 121 was built on the foundation laid by the Delhi High Court. The Court confirmed
the conviction and death sentence of Mohammed Afzal. Shaukat Hussain’s appeal was partly
allowed and he was convicted only under Section 123 of the IPC and sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for ten years. The Delhi High Court’s acquittal of S.A.R. Gilani and Navjot
Sandhu was affirmed.

The Supreme Court continued from where the Delhi High Court left off, in construing war in
a progressive sense in line with the Indian Army’s doctrine of sub-conventional operations.
The Court asserted32:

“The expression ‘war’ preceded by the verb ‘wages’ admits of many shades of meaning and
defies a definition with exactitude… War, terrorism and violent acts to overawe the
established Government have many things in common. It is not too easy to distinguish them,
but one thing is certain, the concept of war embedded in Section 121 is not to be understood
in international law sense of inter-country war involving military operations by and between
two or more hostile countries. Section 121 is not meant to punish prisoners of war of a
belligerent nation… Though every terrorist act does not amount to waging war, certain
terrorist acts can also constitute the offence of waging war and there is no dichotomy between
the two… The normative phenomenon of war as understood in international sense does not fit
into the ambit and reach of Section 121.”

31 AIR 2005 SC 3820 : (2005) 11 SCC 600.

32 AIR 2005 SC 3820 : (2005) 11 SCC 600.
 CONCLUSION

Section 121 was never intended to deal with terrorism - particularly the brand of terrorism
that exists today. However, in spite of being virtually unchanged in form since its inception, it
has gradually acquired the status of being one of the most potent weapons against terrorist
activity. Credit must be given, first to the draftsmen for their broad yet precise codification
and tremendous foresight; and second to the courts for adopting a dynamic approach to meet
the evolving demands of the criminal justice system. The relatively speedy and effective
prosecution of Ajmal Kasab led the Home Minister to suggest that the framework of laws in
India is effective in dealing with terrorist activities.33 However, one cannot help but believe
that although Section 121 has been a valuable servant in bringing perpetrators of terrorism to
justice, it remains a temporary solution in India’s battle against terror.

33 ‘Conviction Came without Anti-terror Law: Chidambaram’, The Hindu (New Delhi, May 6, 2010), available
at http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article423365.ece.