Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C.

Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala
of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a
motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him
and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma
filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full
time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the
motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of
the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did
not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register
of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused
in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest
importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed
of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809,
March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de
officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)
PEOPLE vs ROSCOE DABAN Y GANZON SIXTO P. DIMAISIP

Facts:

Respondent, Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip, started as counsel de parte of appellant. He

filed a motion for extension of time of 30-days within which to file appellant's brief. It was
granted.So were subsequent motions for extension. After having obtained 13 extensions in all,
he filed a motion asking that in view of the father of appellant being unable to raise money
for printing expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel de parte and be appointed as counsel
de oficio instead to enable him to file a typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he
had by then finished. This Court granted him to be appointed counsel de oficio, but required him
to file a mimeographed rather than a typewritten brief. In the light of his own representation, it
seems that Demaisip has no brief prepared yet because this time as counsel de oficio, he kept
on filing motions for postponement, four in number, likewise granted by this Tribunal. All in all,
he had 17 extensions. Still there was no appellant's brief.It was only when this Court issued a
resolution requiring Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip to explain,within ten (10) days why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. What passed for an explanation for appellant's
persistent failure to file appellant's brief was submitted worded thus: "[Comes now] the accused-
appellant, by and thru the undersigned counsel de oficio, unto this Honorable Supreme Court
most respectfully manifests and explains that, in the opinion of the undersigned lawyer,
grounded on settled jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner automatically makes the
appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered abandoned." It is his prayer,
therefore, that the above be considered a satisfactory explanation.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent was negligent of his duty?

Held: Yes. Doctrine: “There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are
called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State,the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal.Rather
the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his
attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree
of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying
cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled Nothing
can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent Demaisip, by such gross neglect of duty,
notwithstanding the many extensions granted him, was recreant to the trust reposed in him as
counsel de oficio. Respondent Demaisip ought to have known better. His explanation disregards
the facts and betrays ignorance of the law. Respondent Demaisip, according to his motion
wherein he prayed that he be appointed counsel de oficio and permitted to submit a
mimeographed brief, had assured this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he were not
careless of the truth, then there was no excuse why he wa sunable to submit such a brief to this
Court. It is not to be ignored either that as of that date he had already secured thirteen
extensions, ordinarily many more than any counsel is entitled to but nonetheless granted him,
because the sentence imposed was one of death.
The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill his
responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as counsel de parte ora counsel de oficio, hewas
indeed truly remiss in the discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar,he cannot
evade. It is by such notorious conduct of neglect and indifference on the part of counsel that a
court's docket becomes unnecessarily clogged. His transgression is indisputable; what remains
is the imposition of an appropriate penalty. Thus, respondent Sixto P. Demaisip is suspended
from the practice of law except for the sole purpose of filingthe brief for appellant Roscoe Daban
y Ganzon.

ANDRES v CABRERADw legal ethics nga case

Facts:

 Stanley R. Cabrera (Cabrera) was a successful bar examinee in 1977.

 Atty. Emilia Andres was a legal officer in the Ministry of Labor. She dismissed a
case filed by Cabrera’s mother against a certain Atty.
Perez.
 Because of the dismissal, Cabrera filed with the city fiscal of Manila criminalcharges against Andres (graft
and corruption, falsification of public documents)
 Andres then filed a case of disqualification against Cabrera. Cabrera apparentlyused in his affidavit vile,
incivil and uncouth language (e.g. moronic, unparalleledstupidity, idiotic)
 Cabrera’s oath
-taking was therefore postponed. The SC required him to file an
answer to why he should not be disqualified. In Cabrera’s reply he still used un
fitlanguage (e.g. calling Atty. Andres a moron). In subsequent motions by Cabrera,
he used the words “a victim of the court’s inhuman and cruel punishment
throughits supreme inaction”

 1979: The court thereafter deferred his oath-taking until he has shown that hehas changed his ways.
Cabrera then filed a motion for contempt of court. Andguess what, he still used unfit language (e.g.
supreme stupidity, degradation of the administration of justice)
 Napikon yata yung SC, they required Cabrera to file a reply to why he should notbe held in contempt.
Cabrera filed an apology but guess what, the language heused were still unfit and even insincere.

Issue: W/N Cabrera should be held in contempt

Held:

Yes! Fine of P500 and imprisonment for 50 days.

The duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts devolves not onlyupon lawyers but also upon those
who will choose to enter the profession. Their failure to discharge such duty may prevent them from being
inducted into the office of attorney.

People vs. Santocildes

Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9
years old. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named
Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even
conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal,
however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the
bar. Appellanttherefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime charged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact
that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due
process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said
person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in
general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner."

Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived, though no fault of his own, to be defended by
a person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due process.

Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the
1987 Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a
right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.

Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of conviction and ordered the remand of the
case to the trial court for new trial.

The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate Ompong's unauthorized practice of law.

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January 9, 1973]

16AUG

[Per Curiam]

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation”
— on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of
the Court, and “consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission’s]
Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine
Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine
Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:
YES. On all issues.

RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.”

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

In re: Cunanan

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past
few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.

The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.

Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in
the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)

4. It is a class legislation

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:
Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of
the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.

2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955)
is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Zaldivar vs enriquez

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored
one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation
theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;
that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of
the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to
ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily
imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor
who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide.
In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,

VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
 personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and
for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar, Melendrez.

FACTS:
1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter.
2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor
of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.
1. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.”
i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
2. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
“Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.
3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
1. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
2. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:
WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same
is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

1. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as “attorney”
whoever may have typed the letters. i. Unauthorized use of the appellation
“attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she
“has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.”
1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

Stemmerik v. Mas
FACTS
Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips in
thePhilippines, he met Atty. Mas. Since he was marveled at the beauty of
thecountry, he wanted to buy a real property and consulted Atty. Mas. The lattertold
Stemmerik that he could legally acquire a real property in the Phils. andeven
suggested a 86K hectare land in Subic, Zambales. Atty. Mas, as the atty.-in-fact of Stemmerik
bought the property from a certain Bonifacio de Mesa. Thecontract to sell provided that De
Mesa sold the property to Ailyn Gonzales for3.8M. Then, in another notarized deed made
by Atty. Mas, it was stated thatGonzales received the funds from Stemmerik. In preparing
all these documents,Atty. Mas received 400K fee from Stemmerik. The latter also gave Atty.
Mas, the3.8M purchase price to which the latter issued a receipt.S u d d e n l y , A t t y .
M a s b e c o m e s c a r c e a n d n o l o n g e r a n s w e r t h e c a l l s o f Stemmerik. When
Stemmerik visited the Phils, he engaged the service of theFernandez Law Office and found out
the subject property is inalienable, beinglocated in the former U.S. military reservation. Also, he
was apprised that alienscannot own real properties in the Phils.Meanwhile, Atty. Mas had
already abandoned his office and his whereabouts isunknown. Stemmerik filed an action for
disbarment against Atty. Mas before theCommission on Bar Discipline but Atty. Mas never
appeared.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Mas should be disbarred?HELD: YES!!!
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promoter e s p e c t f o r
t h e l a w a n d u p h o l d t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e b a r . A s m e n a n d w o m e n entrusted with
the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect libertyand not as an instrument
of oppression or deception.Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the
legal profession andhas been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He
is alsoguilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thecode of ethics of the legal profession.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant andthat de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase forand in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violatedthe Anti-Dummy Law.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do nofalsehood.
21
That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is asacred trust that should be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times.
22
Lawyers are servants of the law
23
and the law is their master. They should notsimply obey the laws, they should also inspire
respect for and obedience thereto byserving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is
the first precept of theCode of Professional Responsibility