Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
||| (Churchill v. Rafferty, G.R. No. 10572, [December 21, 1915], 32 PHIL 580-618)
I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona. I add these views on the specific issue of whether actual hearing is a mandatory
requirement in a termination of employment situation.
2
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the
termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of prima facie finding
by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before
whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor
dispute or is in implementation of a mass layoff. (as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715)
Historical Roots
At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode of procedure
to be followed. It is not a novel concept, but one that traces its roots in the common law
principle of natural justice.
Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals, when reaching
a decision, must do so with procedural fairness. If they err, the superior courts will step in to
quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the error by a writ of prohibition. 1 The requirement
was initially applied in a purely judicial context, but was subsequently extended to executive
regulatory fact-finding, as the administrative powers of the English justices of the peace were
transferred to administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures
reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two main
sub-rules: audi alteram partem 2 — that a person must know the case against him and be
given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex in sua cause debe esse3 — the rule against
bias. Still much later, the natural justice principle gave rise to the duty to be fair to cover
governmental decisions which cannot be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. 4
While the audi alteram partem rule provided for the right to be notified of the case
against him, the right to bring evidence, and to make argument — whether in the traditional
judicial or the administrative setting — common law maintained a distinction between the two
settings. "An administrative tribunal had a duty to act in good faith and to listen fairly to both
sides, but not to treat the question as if it were a trial. There would be no need to examine
under oath, nor even to examine witnesses at all. Any other procedure could be utilized which
would obtain the information required, as long as the parties had an opportunity to know and to
contradict anything which might be prejudicial to their case." 5 cSEAHa
In the U.S., the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution 6 provides the guarantee
for procedural due process, and has used a general balancing formula to identify the
procedural guarantees appropriate to a particular context. 7 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 8 Justice
Powell articulated this approach when he said:
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent
to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of
some type of property interest even if such hearing is provided thereafter. In
only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, has the Court ruled that a hearing
closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring
some type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right, the Court
has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. [Our] decisions
underscore the truism that "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content, unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. [Due process] is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Accordingly, the resolution of
3
For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a
written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days before effectivity of
the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination.
Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee and its implementation by reiterating that the
employer must furnish the worker to be dismissed with two written notices before termination
of employment can be effected: a first written notice that informs the worker of the particular
acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, and a second written notice which
informs the worker of the employer's decision to dismiss him. 15 Between these two notices,
the worker must be afforded ample opportunity to be heard in the manner the ponencia
has very ably discussed. TCacIA
The Confusion and Submission
4
a. Historical Reason.
Procedural due process cannot be read completely dissociated from its roots. While
the concept of procedural fairness that it embodies originated as a requirement in judicial
proceedings, the concept has been extended to procedures that were not strictly judicial as
regulatory fact-finding was devolved and delegated to administrative tribunals. The devolution
was driven by need; it was beyond the capability of the courts to attend to the ever-increasing
demands of regulation as society became increasingly complex. As discussed above, a
trial-type procedure is not an absolute necessity in administrative due process. In fact, in the
U.S., not every administrative decision-making requires a hearing. 18 As the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in the Mathews ruling we quoted above: "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. [Due process] is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." 19 [Italics supplied] IAEcCT
b. Philippine Procedural Due Process Developments.
Our Constitution does not expressly define the principles that embody due process,
as it is a concept intended to counterbalance a flexible power of state — police power. Early on,
jurisprudence has recognized distinctions between procedural due process in judicial
proceedings and in administrative proceedings.
In a long line of cases starting with Banco Español v. Palanca, 20 the requirements of
procedural due process in judicial proceedings have been defined. 21 In these proceedings,
the quantum of evidence that the prosecution must meet in criminal cases is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, 22 while in civil cases the standard has been described as "preponderance
of evidence". 23 The requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings
have been similarly defined in the early case of Ang Tibay v. CIR. 24 The proof required in
these proceedings is the lower standard of "substantial evidence". 25
The quantum of evidence required in these proceedings impacts on their hearing
requirements. While both judicial and administrative proceedings require a hearing and the
opportunity to be heard, they differ with respect to the hearing required before a decision can
be made. In criminal cases where a constitutional presumption of innocence exists, procedural
judicial due process requires that judgment be rendered upon lawful hearing where factual
issues are tested through direct and cross-examination of witnesses to arrive at proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In civil cases, evidentiary hearings are likewise a must to establish the
required preponderance of evidence. 26 Administrative due process, on the other hand,
requires that the decision be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties concerned. 27 Thus, substantial reasons
justify the variance in the hearing requirements for these proceedings.
c. Due Process in the Private Employment Setting.
Separately from the requirement of due process when State action is involved, the
Constitution also guarantees security of tenure to labor, 28 which the Labor Code
implements by requiring that there be a just or authorized cause before an employer can
terminate the services of a worker. 29 This is the equivalent of and what would have
satisfied substantive due process had a State action been involved. The equivalent
of procedural due process is detailed under Article 277 of the Labor Code, heretofore quoted,
which requires notice and ample opportunity to be heard, both of which are fleshed out in the
Implementing Rules of Book VI and in Rule XXIII of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, of
the Department of Labor.
Thus, from the concept of due process being a limitation on state action, the concept
has been applied by statute in implementing the guarantee of security of tenure in the private
sector. In Serrano v. NLRC, 30 we had the occasion to draw the fine distinction between
constitutional due process that applies to governmental action, and the due process
requirement imposed by a statute as a limitation on the exercise of private power. Noting the
distinctions between constitutional due process and the statutory duty imposed by the Labor
Code, the Court thus decided in Agabon v. NLRC 31 to treat the effects of failure to comply
differently. ETDSAc
5
To the same effect is the following statement of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, albeit in a
dissenting opinion, in Agabon: "[t]his is not to hold that a trial-type proceeding is required to be
conducted by employers. Hearings before the employers prior to the dismissal are in the
nature of and akin to administrative due process which is free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements", citing Mr. Justice Laurel's dictum in the landmark Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations. We have even held in China Banking Corporation v.
Borromeo 34 that no formal administrative investigation is necessary in the process of
dismissing an employee where the employee expressly admitted his infraction. All that is
needed is to inform the employee of the findings of management. TCHcAE
The identity of the actor should not also be lost on us in considering the "ample
opportunity" requirement. Judicial and quasi-judicial processes are undertaken by the state,
while the dismissal action the Labor Code regulates is undertaken by a private sector
employer. A distinction between these actors ought to be recognized and given a proper
valuation in considering the processes required from each. Due process in the private realm
does not address an all-powerful State clothed with police power and the powers of taxation
and eminent domain; it merely addresses a private sector-employer who, constitutionally,
shares the same responsibility with the worker for industrial peace, and who is also entitled to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. 35 Proportionality with the
power sought to be limited dictates that due process in its flexible signification be applied to a
private sector dismissal situation, ensuring only that there is fairness at all times so that the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure is not defeated. Thus, the required processes in a
private sector dismissal situation should, at the most, be equivalent to those required in
administrative proceedings; whether an actual hearing would be required should depend on
the circumstances of each case.
Last but not the least, reasonableness and practicality dictate against an actual
hearing requirement in every case of dismissal. There are simply too many variables to
consider in the private sector dismissal situation — ranging from the circumstances of the
employer, those of the employee, the presence of a union, and the attendant circumstances of
the dismissal itself — so that a hard and fast actual hearing requirement may already be
unreasonable for being way beyond what the statutory procedural due process requirement
demands. Such a requirement can also substantially tie-up management operations and
defeat the efficiency, growth and the profits that management and employees mutually need.
To recapitulate, the "ample opportunity to be heard" the Labor Code expressly
requires does not mean an actual hearing in every dismissal action by the employer; whether
an actual hearing would be required depends on the circumstances of each case as each
particular situation demands. Thus, the identical rulings in King of Kings of Transport, Inc. vs.
Mamac 36 and R.B. Michael Press vs. Galit 37 that an actual hearing is a mandatory
requirement in employee dismissal should now be read with our present ruling in mind. The
Department of Labor and Employment should as well be on notice that this ruling is the legally
correct interpretation of Rule I, Section (2) (d) (ii) of Book VI of the Rules to Implement the
Labor Code. aSTECA
6
||| (Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co., G.R. No. 152048, [April 7, 2009], 602 PHIL
522-564)
EN BANC
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis & Pejo for appellants.
SYLLABUS
||| (People v. Fajardo, G.R. No. L-12172, [August 29, 1958], 104 PHIL 443-449)
1.A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408. This A.M. involves the constitutional
validity of the appointment of two (2) RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 — a date that falls
within the supposed ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. We nullified
the appointments.
2.G.R. No. 191002 and companion cases, promulgated on March 17, 2010.
3.Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Jose Catral Mendoza.
4.G.R. No. 191002, Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
6.The JBC reiterates its position in its Comment (dated April 12, 2010) on the motions for
reconsideration that it is still acting on the preparation of the list of nominees and is set to
interview the nominees.
7.See, for instance, the motion for reconsideration of intervenor Alfonso Tan, Jr.
9.A prohibition petition seeks to stop the proceedings of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions if any of its act is without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
7
A first reality is that the JBC cannot, on its own due to lack of the proper authority, determine
the appropriate course of action to take under the Constitution. Its principal function is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary and it has no authority to interpret constitutional
provisions, even those affecting its principal function; the authority to undertake
constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts alone.
A second reality is that the disputed constitutional provisions do not stand alone and cannot
be read independently of one another; the Constitution and its various provisions have
to be read and interpreted as one seamless whole, giving sufficient emphasis to every
aspect in accordance with the hierarchy of our constitutional values.The disputed
provisions should be read together and, as reflections of the will of the people, should be
given effect to the extent that they should be reconciled.
The third reality, closely related to the second, is that in resolving the coverage of the election
ban vis-à-vis the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Members of the Court,
provisions of the Constitution other than the disputed provisions must be taken into
account. In considering when and how to act, the JBC has to consider that:
1. The President has a term of six years which begins at noon of June 30 following the
election, which implies that the outgoing President remains President up to that
time. (Section 4, Article VII). The President assumes office at the beginning of his or her
term, with provision for the situations where the President fails to qualify or is unavailable
at the beginning of his term (Section 7, Article VII).
2. The Senators and the Congressmen begin their respective terms also at midday of June
30 (Sections 4 and 7, Article VI). The Congress convenes on the 4th Monday of
July for its regular session, but the President may call a special session at any
time. (Section 15, Article VI)
3. The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban provision applies
to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower court judges,
specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any reference to
the filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4 (1), Article VIII
constitutes obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and was not ruled upon.
These provisions and interpretation of the Valenzuela ruling — when read together with
disputed provisions, related with one another, and considered with the May 17, 2010
retirement of the current Chief Justice — bring into focus certain unavoidable realities,
as follows:
1. If the election ban would apply fully to the Supreme Court, the incumbent President cannot
appoint a Member of the Court beginning March 10, 2010, all the way up to June 30,
2010.
2. The retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice — May 17, 2010 — falls within the period of
the election ban. (In an extreme example where the retirement of a Member of the Court
falls on or very close to the day the election ban starts, the Office of the Solicitor General
calculates in its Comment that the whole 90 days given to the President to make
appointment would be covered by the election ban.)
3. Beginning May 17, 2010, the Chief Justice position would be vacant, giving rise to the
question of whether an Acting Chief Justice can act in his place. While this is essentially
a Supreme Court concern, the Chief Justice is the ex officio Chair of the JBC; hence it
must be concerned and be properly guided.
4. The appointment of the new Chief Justice has to be made within 90 days from the time the
vacancy occurs, which translates to a deadline of August 15, 2010.
8
5. The deadline for the appointment is fixed (as it is not reckoned from the date of submission of
the JBC list, as in the lower courts) which means that the JBC ideally will have to make
its list available at the start of the 90-day period so that its process will not eat up the
90-day period granted the President.
6. After noon of June 30, 2010, the JBC representation from Congress would be vacant; the
current representatives' mandates to act for their principals extend only to the end of
their present terms; thus, the JBC shall be operating at that point at less than its full
membership.
7. Congress will not convene until the 4th Monday of July, 2010, but would still need to organize
before the two Houses of Congress can send their representatives to the JBC — a
process may extend well into August, 2010.
8. By July 5, 2010, one regular member of the JBC would vacate his post. Filling up this
vacancy requires a presidential appointment and the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments.
9. Last but not the least, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII is that "a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments." This prohibition is expressly addressed to the
President and covers the act of appointment; the prohibition is not against the JBC in the
performance of its function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary" — an act that
is one step away from the act of making appointments.
17.The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183791, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
183962, October 14, 2008.
18.By virtue of its power of administrative supervision, the Supreme Court oversees the judges'
and court personnel's compliance with the laws, rules and regulations. It may take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. See Ampong v.
CSC, G.R. No. 107910, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293. The Constitutionseparately
provides for the Supreme Court's supervision over the JBC. See Article VIII, Section 8 of
the CONSTITUTION.
19.Judicial Review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts
for their conformity with the Constitution, Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
157584, April 2, 2009.
20.Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means
overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may
take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Nachura, J., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2006 ed., p. 276.
25.See the Motions for Reconsideration for PBA, WTLOP, Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Atty.
Roland B. Inting, Peter Irving Corvera and Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
27.CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4 (1):
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
28.See Petition on Intervention of WTLOP, as cited in the decision in the above-captioned cases;
see also: PBA's motion for reconsideration.
9
29.Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44,
citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1994); Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30
(1978); Ang-Angco v. Castillo, G.R. No. 17169, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619
(1963).
30.Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 310 SCRA 614,
citing Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil. 771 (1949).
31.Article VI for the Legislature, Article VII for the Executive, and Article VIII for the Judiciary.
32.See Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49; where the court
resolved the clash between the power of the President to extend ad
interimappointments and the power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm
presidential appointments.
||| (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, 191032, 191057, 10-2-5-SC, 191149,
191342, 191420, [April 20, 2010], 632 PHIL 657-716)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, CONSTRUED. — It should be
obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER FORMS OF PSYCHOSES MAY BE
CONSIDERED INDICIA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — The other forms of
psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT BASED ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; FAILURE TO RETURN HOME FOR MORE THAN FIVE (5)
YEARS, NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR NULLITY. — I agree that under the circumstances of
the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of private respondent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON WHY PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS NOT
DEFINED. — By incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil
Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in
the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity.
Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be
existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE. — Admittedly, the provision on
psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this,
"the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a
case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law."
PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT BASED ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; INDICATED BY LACK OF INTENTION TO COHABIT
WITH SPOUSE IN CASE AT BAR. — To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
11
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife,
herein private respondent. A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in
marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic
and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between
the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases,
compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contacts with the other to inform the latter of
his/her condition and whereabouts. In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or
maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting
with him. To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although
these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage. It would be a great
injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the
law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling
her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A SANCTION FOR ABSOLUTE DIVORCE; EVIDENT
PURPOSE OF LAW MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN GRANT OR DENIAL
THEREOF; BASIC PUBLIC POLICY INVOLVED. — Besides, there are public policy
considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate
children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled? I do not go as
far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit
that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced
by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which
declares:
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeals, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses' family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January
1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got
a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
12
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 10 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried
to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental. cdasia
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in
fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage
was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular
28-91, which requires a certification of non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of merit. cdasia
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
". . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate
with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos is one such wife."
The Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
"'Article 35. — The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
'xxx xxx xxx
'Article 36. — . . .
'(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.'cdasia
"On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say 'wanting in sufficient use' instead
of 'wanting in the sufficient use,' but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to
say 'wanting in the sufficient use.' On the other hand Justice Reyes proposed
that they say 'wanting in sufficient reason.' Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"'That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.'
each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt
that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should
not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it
should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as
long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer
true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage. cdasia
"Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be
a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
"Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who
is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of
the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
"Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
"xxx xxx xxx
"Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent
while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice of consent.
"Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes
of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"'On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
'psychological or mental impotence' is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
'psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .'
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the
phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited
in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."cdasia
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
"Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code."
(Italics supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
"Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).cdasia
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are no doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
18
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Romero, J ., see separate concurring opinion.
Padilla, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
I agree that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a
no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation,
legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses,
with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter. cdasia
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition
of marriage as —
'a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.'
'Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage shall not prescribe.'
xxx xxx xxx
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but
she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same. cdasia
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without
Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed
that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner,
bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent
spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition
and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In
fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts
and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although
these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent,
his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is
legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by
declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation. cdasia
21
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the
basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Footnotes
2.Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justices Pedro Ramirez and Ramon
Mabutas, Jr.
3.Rollo, 37–42.
4.Rollo, 13–18.
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official matrimonialia essentialia
mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere non valent.
10.Ibid., 131–132.
||| (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, [January 4, 1995], 310 PHIL 21-49)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS.
— I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J.,Concurring Opinion:
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:First,the incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical, in nature; Second,the
psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand assume and
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering mutual help and support; Third,the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter;and Fourth,the
mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to
declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in
the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage
of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
24
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She
also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that
the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the
trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights . . .." It concluded that:
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion
in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity ...and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
"COURT
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some
effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness
and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae,namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative
and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up
with written memoranda.
26
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological —
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
27
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr.and Torres, Jr., JJ .,concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v.Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos,G.R.
No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage.
The facts of the present case, after an in-depth study, do not support a similar conclusion.
Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
28
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage"
and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is,
in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge ..." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may
be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
"and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question
of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." liblex
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls"
a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
29
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being
more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917).This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable according to law' in order to give
valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due
competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of
marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent." 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage ...is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
its totality community of the whole of life; i.e.,the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love;and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage
is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship.A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse. 3
30
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind,lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well as in Santos v.Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more than five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity
as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain
valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with
his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the
physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage
null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1) on psychological incapacity,
concluded:
"This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court."
31
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
spouses.
VITUG,J ., concurring:
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law —
"3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio,or Article 45 that would make the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 3 viz:
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be legitimate.'
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests;viz.:
First,the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second,the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third,the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth,the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not
a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also
put it, to be an alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better;
if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
"Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution ..."
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz,121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than
by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or
convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1.Rollo,pp. 25-33.
5.The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision as
follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital
obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent,
33
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at
the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going
steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent
causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise,
petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness.
After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of some
differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in
Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close
and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know
each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and
get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other
well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated
their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to
respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and
fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for
their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalties (sic).Neither of them can accept and understand
the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever
problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely
responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because both
parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in
marriage.
5a.Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the
basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The
unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong
relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand
and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in
marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among
others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding,
acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires
them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband
and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate
situation in this case." (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
6.240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7.Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
8.TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9.The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of
each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal,
Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of
Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-General of the
Second Plenary Council of the Philippines — PCP II — held from January 20, 1991 to
February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional
convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council
member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful
discernments.
34
10.Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author,
noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11."Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the state.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so
through just programs of social security.
12."Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code."
13.Salita vs. Magtolis,233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14.This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used
in Santos vs. CA reads:
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage."
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact
that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded
English translations.
ROMERO, J.,concurring:
1.Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
3.The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of America, Paulist
Press, New York, 1985.
4.Zwack, ibid.,p. 47
1.Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, in Salita vs. Hon.
Magtolis,233 SCRA 100.
2.In Santos vs. Court of Appeals,240 SCRA 20.
3.Supra.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, [February 13, 1997], 335 PHIL
664-693)