11. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform

GR No. 78742, July 14, 1989
Background:
 Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
“The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the
State shall respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.”
 RA 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, substantially superseded almost a decade
later by P.D. No. 27, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners.
 E.O. No. 228, declared full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
 as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its implementation.
 R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
 P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. No. 27, provides that:
“No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected
or removed from his farmholding until such time
as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and
the landowner shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.”
Facts:
 Petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention
granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but
are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating
such lands.
 Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so
are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
 Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued
the implementing rules required under the above-
quoted decree.
 Petitioners ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
Public Respondent’s contention:
 Public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been
amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention
from persons who own other agricultural lands of more
than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
from which they derive adequate income for their
family.
 And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall
under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No.
27 have already been issued. For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking
this right.
 Public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have
prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the
pendency of their appeal to the President of the
Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the
implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been
done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot
be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is
especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this
case, to a separate department of the government.
Petitioners’ reply:
  Petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not
applicable to them because they do not own more than
seven hectares of agricultural land.
 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were
intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been
published as required by law and the ruling of this
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is
ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter
of instruction could not have repealed the presidential
decree.
Issue:
Whether or not PD No. 27, EO Nos. 228 and 229, and
RA No. 6657 are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. This is
within the power of the State to take and regulate private
property for which payment of just compensation is
provided.
DAR’s determination of just compensation is not by any
means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any
interested party. Dar’s determination is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
court of justice will still have the right to review with
finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the
owners of expropriated properties to accept just
compensation in less than money, the SC said: “This is not
an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific
and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is A
REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION.”
The Court assumes that the framers of the Constitution
were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. There
can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that
there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers.
The Court may therefore assume that their intention
was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided
for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the
balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with
other things of value. The transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the gov’t upon receipt of the
landowner of the corresponding payment OR the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
and accessible bank. Until then, the title remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated.
12. Bonifacio vs. Judge Dizon
GR No. 79416, September 5, 1989
Facts:
 Petitioner, Olimpio Bonifacio, filed a complaint before
the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the ejectment
of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from
Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at
Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-27298.
 The ground relied upon therefor was personal
cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
 Lower court ruled in favor of Petitioner Bonifacio,
issuing an order of ejectment of San Miguel.
CA:
 Court of Appeals modified said judgment with respect
to Private Respondent’s counterclaim by ordering
Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P 1,376.00.
The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.
SC:
 Still dissatisfied, Private Respondent San Miguel sought
relief from SC.
 During the pendency of her petition, on August 7,
1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such
death was given to the Court, no order for the
substitution of his heirs was made.
  the Court En Banc resolved to deny private
respondent's petition for lack of merit and to affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Back to CAR & RTC:
 Petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and
Gabriel, Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria,
Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion and Leonila all
surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio
Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in
CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 before the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.
 A writ of execution was issued, the Deputy Sheriff
submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession),
stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied
by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter
refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject
matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving
wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.
 Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash
the writ of execution. This was opposed by petitioners
who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition
and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt
of court for allegedly re-entering the subject land.
 Judge Dizon then issued a resolution, declaring the
Writ of Execution null and void; denying the Motion
for Demolition and Petition for Contempt.
CA:
 Petitioners assail the resolution in the petition
for certiorari , contending that respondent judge
 committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision, since it can
no longer be executed as said action is purely personal
in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio
Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs.
 They assert that being an ejectment case and not one of
those specifically provided by law to be purely
personal, survives the death of a party. Furthermore, a
judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also
on their successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled
to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.
 Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on
the fact that the action under consideration is not an
ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee.
 She theorizes that the right being asserted in the action
is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily
died with him. She further contends that the non-
substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered
the proceedings taken after his death null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not, the favorable judgment obtained by
the decedent is inherited by the compulsory heirs, thereby
vesting to the latter, all the rights conferred by the
judgment to the decedent.
Ruling:
Section 36(1) of RA 3844 provides that:
“Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an
 agricultural lessee shall continue shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized
by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of
the immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital
or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes . . . .”

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee

was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired
to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his
immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly
did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and
personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of
such right to the members of his immediate family. The
right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right
exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say
otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation
likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family
members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the

landowner's immediate family members evidently to place
the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee
who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the
aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed
that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding
with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the
contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation."

Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or

lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and
exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right
extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate
family members.
13. Garcia-Padilla vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Gabian C. Ver, and General Fidel V. Ramos & Lt. Col. Miguel
Coronel, GR No. 61388, April 20, 1983

Facts:
 July 6, 1982 – 9 out of 14 detainees were arrested when
3 teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya
led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt.
Baria, after securing a Search Warrant issued by Judge
Sofronio Sayo of the CFI of Nueva Viscaya conducted a
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong.
 Apprehended during the said raid were Dra. Aurora
Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco
Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto
Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having
a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's
residence.
 The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de
los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and
Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day.
 The 14 detainees/petitioners were all detained at the
PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the
morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place
reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague,
Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
 August 13, 1982 – Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of
detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, filed a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus.
 The mandamus (to disclose the petitioners' present place
of detention and to order the respondents to allow
counsel and relatives to visit and confer with the
petitioners) aspect of the instant petition has, however,
become moot and academic, and whereabouts of
petitioners having already become known to petitioner
Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
 The petition alleged that the arrest of petitioners was
patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected
without any warrant of arrest.
 That the search warrant was illegal per se because it
does not state specifically the things that are to be seized
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383);
 That no criminal charges have as of yet been filed
against any of the detainees;
 That there is no judgment, decree, decision or order
from a court of law which would validate the continued
detention of the petitioner;
 That while it is true that a purported telegram stating
the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12,
1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been
given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its contents,
raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in
fact been issued.
 That respondents are denying the detainees their
constitutional right to counsel;
 August 17, 1982 – In an en banc resolution, the writ of
habeas corpus was issued and respondents were required
to make a return of the writ.
  Sol-Gen in return to writ alleged that:
1. Detainees are all being detained by virtue of a PCO,
pursuant to LOI No. 1211, in relation to Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045. The said PCO was issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D.
No. 885.
2. The privilege of habeas corpus cannot be availed of
by petitioners. The courts cannot inquire into the
validity and cause of their arrest and detention.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts can inquire on the
Presidential suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Whether or not there is right to bail during the
suspension of the privilege of the said writ.

Ruling:
Attendant Circumstances Considered:
At the time of the arrest of the 9 of the 14 detainees,
records reveal that they were then having conference in the
dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of
that same day. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under
surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in
subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their
headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the 9 detainees
mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving
in top of their conference table numerous subversive
documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they
would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named
YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight
(8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16
armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos
(P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicine packed and ready for distribution, as sizeable
quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.
There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest
of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is
lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically
provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the
matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the
person to be arrested has committed or actually committing,
or is about to commit an offense in his presence.”
From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the
petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is,
therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest
of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the
law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

Comments on this part of the decision:

Besides the attendant circumstances aforementioned,
the SC maintained the position that the arrest of the said
detainees fall under the specific provision of Sec. 6(a), Rule
113 of the New Rules of Court. The law being clear and
specific, it concluded that the claim of petitioners was
without basis in fact and in law.

Contemporaneous circumstances (what was actually being

experienced by soldiers in battlefield):
It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel
forces capture government troopers or kidnap private
individuals, they do not accord to them any of the rights
now being demanded by the herein petitioners, particularly
to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As a matter of
common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are
not only not given the right to be released, but also denied
trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be
liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is,
among others, to put the government forces on equal
fighting terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention
of their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes
on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over
those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla
tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least, minimized,
thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their
enemy.

The historical basis of the President’s power to suspend the

privilege of habeas corpus:
Accordingly, the Court hold that in times of war and
similar emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution,
the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the
Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses
covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary
consequence, the withholding for the duration of the
suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power
could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President,
as it was so vested in the United States for which reason,
when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in
1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this
power under the Constitution.
14. Celso Halili and Arthur Halili vs CA and Helen Meyers
Guzman, GR No. 113539, March 12, 1989

Facts:
 Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died
sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, private
respondents, Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, David
Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens.
 August 9, 1989 - Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all
her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of
land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
 Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation,
situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing
an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered,
TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey
Guzman.
 February 5, 1991 - David Rey Guzman sold said parcel
of land to private respondent, Emiliano Cataniag, upon
which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
130721(M) was issued in the latter’s name.
 Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a
complaint before the RTC Malolos, Bulacan,
questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two
conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey
 Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag
-- and claiming ownership thereto based on their right
of legal redemption under Art. 1621of the Civil Code.
 March 10, 1992, RTC dismissed the complaint.
 It ruled that Helen Guzman’s waiver of her inheritance
in favor of her son was not contrary to the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an
alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to
authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their
properties in accordance with the Constitution and the
laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them.
 On the second issue, it held that the subject land was
urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their
right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
CA:
 CA denied the appeal, affirming RTC’s decision that the
subject land was urban.
 It further held that, although the transfer of the land to
David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to
the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing
herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has
passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified
person.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court:
1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that
the land in question is urban, not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners right of redemption under
Art. 1621 of the Civil Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers
Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not
declaring the same null and void

Ruling:
1. The land is urban. Thus, no right of redemption
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual
question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by this
Court. Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of
fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a
few exceptions, such as when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an
inference made by the appellate court from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when
the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the
specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on
the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on
record.