Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No.

127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to
discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-
Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several
disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90
days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension
against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is
found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension
as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of
the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if

acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has,
more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to

Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission of Appointments

G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971
FELIZARDO S. PACETE, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.

QUOTED: See Bernas book (PAGE 1038) on Constitutional Commissions

“A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission
Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the
Constitution, the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

FACTS: (FERNANDO, J.:p)

Petitioner Felizardo Pacete alleged that he was appointed as Municipal Judge of Pagcawayan,
Cotabato by the President of the Philippines. He assumed his office and began to discharge the
duties as such. Since his appointment was made during a recess of Congress, it was submitted to
the Commission on Appointments in its next session. He was unanimously confirmed by the said
office. More than 9 months after his confirmation he received a letter from the Secretary of
Justice advising him to vacate his position because his appointment had been bypassed. He was
informed that after his confirmation, then Senator Ganzon wrote to its chairman filing a motion
for reconsideration

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ's orders are valid

RULING: SC granted petition and junked DOJ's order.

HELD:
The question raised in this mandamus and prohibition proceeding, whether the filing of a motion
for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, without its being thereafter acted on,
suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment, is not a new
one. That was put to us in Altarejos v. Molo. 1 As set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the
answer must be in the negative. The confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect. As
we decided then, so we do now. As a consequence, petitioner, as will be more fully explained,
has made out a case for mandamus and prohibition. He is entitled to the remedies prayed for.

The facts are undisputed. In his suit for mandamus and prohibition filed with this Court on April 4,
1966, petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office
on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during
the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session
in 1965. On May 20 of that year, he was unanimously confirmed. As a matter of fact, two days
later, he was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
who was likewise the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments. 2 More than nine months
after such confirmation, to be exact on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he
likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate
his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been by-passed.
Petitioner was taken by surprise and sought clarification from the principal respondent, the then
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments. 3 He was informed that on May 21, 1965, a day
after his confirmation, one of the members of the Commission on Appointments, the then
Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received. 4 Respondent
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of
Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that
the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment
in question ... ." 5 Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent then
advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly
confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent
as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries. 6

Petitioner would buttress his plea for prohibition against the enforcement of the directive of
respondent Secretary of Justice for him to vacate his position and mandamus to compel
respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments to issue to him the certificate of
confirmation on the ground that the letter of the then Senator Guanzon, even on the assumption
that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect
as it was not approved by the body as a whole. It is his contention that the confirmation of his
appointment had become final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session
of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965. 7 He further submitted "that the power to
approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on the Commission on
Appointments as a body and not on the members individually. The Commission exercises this
power thru the vote of the majority of the members present at a quorum as provided by Section
10 of its Rules. Once an appointment is approved by that majority, the approval becomes an act
of the Commission and it cannot be changed, voided, vacated or set aside except by the same
Commission acting thru the required majority. A mere motion to reconsider it, unless approved
by said majority, has no force and effect. To contend otherwise is to make the will of a single
member prevail over the will of the Commission and to make that member more powerful than
the very Commission of which he is only a part." 8

In a resolution dated April 13, 1966, this Court required respondents to answer such petition. In
the answer of respondent Secretary of the Commission filed on May 18, 1966, the dismissal of
the suit was prayed for on the ground that there was a recall of the confirmation of petitioners
appointment upon the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Senator Ganzon. It was likewise
alleged as a special defense that there was no infringement of the Constitution, the question
involved being merely one of interpretation or construction of the rules of the Commission
involving its internal business which cannot be made a subject of judicial inquiry. 9 The
respondent Secretary of Justice as well as respondent Disbursing Officer of the Department of
Justice, in the answer filed on their behalf on May 21, 1966 by the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, admitted the facts, but sought the dismissal of the petition
on the ground that with the notification of respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments that petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed, respondent Secretary of
Justice had no alternative but to give it full faith and credence coming as it did from the agency
entrusted by the Constitution with the power to confirm. 10

At the hearing scheduled on July 20, 1966, the parties after arguing were given an additional
period of ten days within which to submit memoranda of authorities. In petitioner's memorandum
submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became final and
irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21,
1965, as no rule of the Commission as to a motion for reconsideration could have the force and
effect of defeating the constitutional provision that an ad interim appointment is effective "until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next session of
the Congress." 11The memorandum submitted for the respondents squarely disputed such
contention on the view that there could be no confirmation in the constitutional sense until a
motion for reconsideration had been turned down, invoking at the same time the principle of the
respect to be accorded the actuation of an independent constitutional agency like the
Commission on Appointments.

As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, 12 which interpreted Rule
21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant
a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission.
Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a
final disposition of such a motion." Our holding was that the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. There was a need for its
being duly approved. Hence, as set forth at the outset, petitioner must prevail.

1. Altarejos v. Molo was an original action for mandamus to compel respondent therein as
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments to issue a certificate of confirmation of
petitioner's appointment as Provincial Assessor of Masbate. He was extended an ad interim
appointment on July 24, 1964. He took his oath of office and qualified as such on August 1, 1964.
His appointment was then submitted to the Commission on Appointments during the regular
session of Congress in 1965. It was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19,
1965. On same day, a member thereof, Congressman Jose Aldeguer, filed with its Secretary,
respondent Molo, a motion for reconsideration. The next day, there was a motion by the then
Senator Francisco Rodrigo that all pending motions be laid on the table. It was approved. Then
came the adjournment on May 20, 1965. Subsequently, about a week later, Congressman
Aldeguer withdrew his motion for reconsideration. 13

This Court gave full attention to the argument that motion for reconsideration of Congressman
Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's
appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. It rejected it. The Chief
Justice, who spoke for the Court, explained why: "This pretense is devoid of merit. Respondent's
theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would
have if the motion were approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such
approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. It is
inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission, reading: "... Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
more than none * (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to
grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the
Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table,
this shall be a final disposition of such a motion." 14 His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this
provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion for
reconsideration is necessary to "reopen" the appointment and, hence, to "recall" its confirmation
- and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation." 15 Moreover, in holding
that this Court "cannot escape the conclusion that petitioner's appointment as Provincial
Assessor of Masbate" had been duly confirmed, the Chief Justice likewise noted the categorical
answer of the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments to a question by Senator Almendras
as to the effect of motions for reconsideration unacted upon after adjournment. Thus: "In case of
an adjournment sine die, the motions for reconsideration are considered as not approved and
therefore the motion for reconsideration are not valid for of any effect whatsoever." 16 When the
question was repeated by Senator Almendras, who did not want to leave any doubt on the
matter, this was the reply of the Chairman: "The ruling of the Chair is reiterated. In case of an
adjournment sine die, the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under
Sec. 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and,
therefore, has no effect whatsoever. The confirmation, therefore, will stand." 17

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that this Court is committed to the principle that a mere
motion for reconsideration to a confirmation duly made which is not approved cannot have the
effect of setting aside such confirmation, a principle that is based not merely on the express
language of Rule 21, but a reflection of the settled interpretation of the Commission on
Appointments speaking through its Chairman. While on certain aspects not material, the facts of
this case may be distinguished, from Altajeros v. Molo, there being no motion to lay on the table
and no withdrawal of such motion for reconsideration, the principle that calls for application
cannot be any different. What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply
by a motion for reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.

2. The Altarejos ruling possesses the merit of interpreting Rule 21 of the Commission on
Appointments conformably to the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on the
appointing power of the President. The first one reads: "The President shall nominate and with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and air
forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." 18 The other provision is worded,
thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." 19

A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission
Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the
Constitution, the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

The constitutional requirement is clear. There must either be a rejection by the Commission on
Appointments or nonaction on its part. No such thing happened in this case. Petitioner, as
pointed out, had instead in his favor a unanimous vote of confirmation. He could thus invoke
constitutional protection. For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as
stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be
moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive
weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of
what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is
indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional
prescription. Rather it makes a mockery of what is therein ordained. Petitioner's stand is thus
unassailable.

3. Nor does the insistence of respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, in his
answer, that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, elicit approval. It
would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The
courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts
and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly there is nothing
sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case,
a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public
office. It certainly can be inquired into in an appropriate case, although the utmost deference
should be paid to the interpretation accorded it by the Commission on Appointments itself. In the
terse language of Justice Brandeis, speaking of the rules of the United States Senate, which,
under its Constitution, has the task of confirmation: "As the construction to be given to the rule
affects persons other than members of the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a
judicial one." 21 The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the express language
of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under
the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the fundamental law ordains.

Such an approach, it is heartening to note, is implicit in the memorandum on behalf of

respondent Secretary of Justice, submitted by the then Solicitor General Barredo. Thus:
"Although the Commission On Appointments is not a power in our tripartite system of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ. (Cf. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139)
Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointments submitted to it by the
President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of
due process. (Cf. Morero vs. Bocar, 37 O.G. 445)." 22 As due process is impressed with both
substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not unduly limited.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner.
The incumbent Secretary of Justice is prohibited from giving any further force and effect to the
Department of Justice directive of February 7, 1966 advising petitioner to vacate his position as
municipal judge in view of the communication received from then Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments, inasmuch as the right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge
of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
100 Phil 1101

FACTS:

Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as

members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
"petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused
to nominate two (2) more Senators."

RULING:

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts.

To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino
(77Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does
not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their
duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither
of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the
exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised.

As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised,
and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised.
In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch
of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the
duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the
Constitution has been violated by anything done or attended by either an executive official or
the legislative."

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire
into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the
Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of
any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled
without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be
evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue
before us is political or not.

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum(supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which
are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity
with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral
Tribunal, valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, thereof whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Petitioners maintain that said
nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without
power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the
Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other
Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party,
to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents. Respondents allege, however, that
the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine
(9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3)
Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he
thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the
aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure
members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the
adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to
prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof
is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the
Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance
of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the
Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of
said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in
violation thereof are null and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is
conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution.

Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted
maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a
tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by
the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to
the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he
should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The
same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously,
Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the
already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party.

Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the
same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the
Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said
Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between
the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of
the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be
thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of
election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our
Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified
in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may
nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the
other three(3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these
three (3)Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that
the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we
are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although
recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the
majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as
held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter
falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it
will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case
at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby,
enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from
acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the
qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 83767
27 October 1988

FACTS:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the
petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of
SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play
and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does
not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not
less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE:

Whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution

HELD:

No. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms
and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. It seems quite
clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and
'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated
one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent
that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators')
peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that the constitutional
provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in
the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-anunmistakable indication
that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to
the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24
Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 141469
29 November 2002

FACTS:

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were
held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Due to the votes it
garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to
various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) and
CA (Commission on Appointments) contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties
of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From available records, it
does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the
instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then
Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate
President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively,
to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its
Chairman and Members,12 and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.13Petitioners contend
that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have
1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, 14 and 2.4 seats in the CA.15 Petitioners charge that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator
Pimentel.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE
THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES TO
INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
HELD:
Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly
rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if
the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this
Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse
to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result that the
House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by
the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an
actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal
and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised
at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be
indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that
they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither
have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the
HRET or the CA.
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute
themselves.
The Court cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA
based on the "present composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners
and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of
the House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition assailing the present composition of
the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the
instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is
outside our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.
Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the House of
Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of
the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper." (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both Houses of Congress shall have
organized themselves with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented herein.
CONG. SERGIO OSMEÑA JR VS PENDATUN
GR NO 17144 28 OCTOBER 1960

FACTS:
Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the
annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and
asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by
Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during
his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of
the President’s administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of
his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution
and that his words constitute disorderly conduct.
Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the
speech and words of Osmeña.
Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.
HELD:
Osmeña, being a member of the House of Representative, has immunity as stated in Art 6 sec
15 of the constitution that” for any speech or debate, Senators or members of the House of
Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place”. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal and civil
actions before the courts or some other forum outside the Congressional Hall. But it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by them as disorderly or unbecoming a member.
What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not
the judiciary, since it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the
House knows best. With the theory of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot interfere because
each department had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. Therefore, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension that lead to the suspension of a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROMEO JALOSJOS
GR NO 132875-76 3 FEB 2000

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-pledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue:
Whether or not Romeo Jalosjos should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representative

Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The parliamentary immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution (Sec. 11, Art. VI), this immunity or
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as
a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC VS ISMAEL MATHAY

GR NO 25554 4 OCT 1966

Facts:
PHILCONSA has filed a suit against Ismael Mathay, former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before
December 30, 1969.

The Appropriation Act (Budget) for 1965-1966 implemented the increase in salary of the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being is that the term of the 8 senators
elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on
December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members
of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired
before the increase becomes effective?

Held:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without
distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that
the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that
approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more
evident the intent to consider both Houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following
phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of
Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it will have expired.

MAYAH GURO ( 4-6)

4. MARCOS VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Herein petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995.
However, On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate
of candidacy.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the
Constitution.

Held:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of
petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only
7 months, because of the following:
a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought the family to Leyte;
domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in
the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue;
the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not
mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium;
even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one
only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

NOTE: IF IN CASE ATTY. TAGARDA-MABILEN WILL ASK YOU TO DEFINE RESIDENCE FROM
DOMICILE. HERE IS THE ANSWER!
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
But remember that in this case. The court held that for political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
5. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for
the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the
entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a
motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification
of residence.

Issue:
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification
of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a
previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is
an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of
time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

6. COQUILLA v. COMELEC
This case is about the COMELEC, ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the
order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Special Civil Action in the SC.
Facts:
February 17, 1938 – Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
In 1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after
his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the U.S. October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the U.S. the last
of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was approved Nov. 7, 2000.
In Nov. 10, 2000 – oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of
Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three days after.
In November 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by
Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
In February 27, 2001 – filed certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."
March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarez—respondent, incumbent mayor of Oras and reelectionist sought cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had
resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won
over private respondent’s by 379 votes.
May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently
took his oath of office.
July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis the respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the
Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be added
to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days,
months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. The 1-yr
residency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January
30, 2002.
Issue:
1. WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
HELD:
No.
First, §39 (a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
“Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal residence—the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the
U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, ‘00, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner
was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him
to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. If immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which
entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines
(Caasi v. CA), much more does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines, as was the case with the petitioner. Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which
applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed
Forces of the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that,
by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines
and had not reacquired it until November 10, 00
Second, petitioner did not re-established residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for
the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly
declaring" to his town mates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status
of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine
citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident.
On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended,
or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of
Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on October and
December 1998, October 1999, and June 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his
1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on Aug 5, ‘00, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one
year stay."
Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a
former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines
and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year"
(§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a
visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, ‘00 upon taking his oath as a citizen
of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of
Oras
Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Bengson as
residency was not an issue in these.
Third, petitioner’s contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is
conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter
must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. But, registration as a voter does not bar the
filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency (Nuval v. Guray).
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be
allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),
proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a
formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since
he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the
COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim,
are complete and intact in the records.
COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the statement in
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the
time he filed such certificate is not true Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate
of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false.
In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in
this case is thus fully justified.
Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on
Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Facts:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter by defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and
that, even if it were, said letter is a privileged communication.
Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman
of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its
publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans
by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.
Issues: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
Held:
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the
purview of the phrase “speech or debate in Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11).
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not belong to
category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as
a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
The complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing
that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can
not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant
that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools
of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies
that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
The motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous is
hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

*a little discussion about the letter.

The letter began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of
Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present
circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose. It has come to my attention that
there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.
The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to
"have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are
"available to adequately finance a political campaign".

G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985.

HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
FACTS
Homobono Adaza and Fernando Pacana were elected as Governor and Vice-Governor
respectively. They both filed their certificate of candidacy during the Batasang Pambansa
elections. Adaza won while Pacana lost.Adaza took oath of office as a member of Batasang
Pambansa and Pacana took oath as the Governor of Misamis Oriental. Both started to perform
their duties of the office they were elected.Adaza petitioned that he be the Governor and exclude
the respondent therefrom because of the following reasons:
1. Petitioner was elected as Governor for a term of six years and remains as governor until
expiration.
2. Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned as vice governor when he ran for
the Batasang Pambansa
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Adaza can simultaneously be a member of the BP and the governor.
2. Whether or not Pacana can still be the vice governor and can succeed as the governor.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed.
1. Under the constitution, section 10 article 8, it is prohibited to be a member of the BP and a
governor at the same time.
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime
minister or member of the cabinet
2. Pacana can lawfully assume the office of governorship as provided by BP 697 Section 13.
"Governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing
a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office."

*Classmates, this case is also applicable to ;

Duty on conflict of interest:
Sec. 12, Art. VI
All members of Congress shall, upon assumption of office, make full disclosure of their
financial and business interests.

They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

And/or;
Incompatible office
First sentence,Sec. 13, Art. VI
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
- The prohibition from holding this office is not absolute,
what is not allowed is simultaneous holding of that office
and the seat in Congress.
- When the legislator opted to hold an incompatible office,
his seat in Congress will automatically be forfeited

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano CUenco.
In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators
were left in the hall.
The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing
so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature
of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the
Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.

Astorga vs Villegas
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill no. 9266, which became
Republic Act 4065 "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice Mayor of the City of
Manila,Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered
Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."

The housebill was filed in the house of representatives. It was passed for the third reading
without amendments. Forthwith the bill was sent to the senate for its concurrence. The
committee favorable recommended approval with aminor amendment that instead of the city
engineer it be the president protemore of the municipal board who should succeed svice mayor
in case of the latters incapacity to act as mayor.

some amendments were intoduced by senator tolentino which were approved by senate, in toto.
It was approved but with Roxas and not tolentino amendments which were the one actually
approved by the senate.The senate president addressed a letter to the president explaining that
the enrolled copy of teh house bill signed by the secretaries of both houses as well as by the
presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by congress and that he considered his
signature enrolled in teh bill as invalid and no effect.

The president sent a message to the presiding officers of both houses of congress informing
them that in view of the circumstances he was withdrawing his signature on house bill no. 9266.

AS far as the congress is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
of teh bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval
by Congress by Congress and not the signaturs of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus,
the 1935 consti says that "every bill passed by the congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the president."

Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and teh same is not
required for teh validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of
Congress for proof of its due enactment.

This court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of housebill 9266 signed by the chief
executive was the same text passed by both houses of congress. Under teh specific factsand
circumstances of this case, this court can do this and resort to the senate journal for that
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the senate but werenot incorporated in teh printed text sent to teh
president and signed by him. This court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
Thus they do, as indeed both the president of teh senate and the chief executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures.

The petition is denied and the so called Republic Act no. 4065 is declared to not to have been
duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA
910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued
by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while
that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President
Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It
follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.
RULING:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in
the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be
no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.

Summary: Gonzalez vs. Macaraig (GR 87636, 19 November 1990)

Gonzalez vs. Macaraig
[GR 87636, 19 November 1990]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave, 1 dissents in separate opinion
Facts: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year
1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for
consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed. On 2
February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 ("Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name
of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality
of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes") was adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus
was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara,
Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente T. Paterno,
Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando
S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as
members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by this case," with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing,
Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo
Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by
the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.'s cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when
she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution,
has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power. The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is
a political question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to
override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the
President's veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had
already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4
August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other "distinct and severable
parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
Issue [1]: Whether the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution (Whether the President has
the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill)
Held [1]: NO. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph
(1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general
rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto
over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than
all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a
provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
the subject of a separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in
an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to
the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the
authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings
lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority
of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests
in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the
department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings. More importantly, for such a special power as
that of augmentation from savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations
Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury" (Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power
of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is
a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
Issue [2]: Whether Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions, not items, in the appropriation bill.
Held [2]: NO. Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article
VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates." Explicit is the requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein. The challenged
"provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly,
the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be
made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by the "Legislative Budget
Research and Monitoring Office." Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in
respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and
Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items
for the purpose of the President's veto power.
Issue [3]: Whether the Legislature’s inclusion of qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds in the Appropriation Bill was proper.
Held [3]: There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be
spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is
not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The veto of a
condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed
invalid and without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the
term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an
Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures.
Again, the test is appropriateness. "It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds
are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with
money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness." Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to be
inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully drafted" to appear as true
conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate
legislation. Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason is that
items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself.
They can only be detected when compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55
(FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act." Herein, there is no condition, in the budgetary
sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously,
Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words,
"a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill."
Issue [4]: Whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional.
Held [4]: YES. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overriden by the
votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no
attempt to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.'s argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to
override" has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld. There need be no future conflict if
the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its
respective powers with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate
equilibrium of governmental powers remains on even keel.

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ A.

FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled
An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January
1 to December 1,1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some
of the provisions.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the
Constitution.

Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of
prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the
GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National
Treasurer and
questions:

1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994
and
2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.

Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of:

veto on four special provisions added to items inthe GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.)
the conditions imposed by the President in theimplementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority.

B: ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and
valid?

C. HELD: 1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the
president without vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are
germane to & have direct relation with debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be
vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation.VETO VOID.

2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &
creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State
Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law.VETO VALID.

3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of
roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. without
vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of
road maintenance & cannot be vetoted without vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.

4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress
required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any provision
blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj.
of a separate law.VET O VALID.

5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such
power
pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to
existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to
repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,

vs.
 HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
1991 Apr 22
G.R. No. 94571

Facts of the Case:

The declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D.
No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the appropriation of P86 Billion in the P233 Billion in the 1990 budget
violative of section 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution?
2. Whether or not PD No.81, PD No. 117 and PD No. 1967 are still operative under the
constitution?
3. Whether or not PD No.81, PD No. 117 and PD No. 1967 are violative of Section 29(1), Art, VI
of the Constitution?
Ruling:

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
A. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
B. As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by
its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,
the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
A. In People vs. Vera, 15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
B. The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms
and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
1937 Mar 13
G.R. No. 45459

Facts of the Case:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine
Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States
the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented
by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Ruling and Ratio:

Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and
their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,”
they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government”
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at
bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered
of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more
tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map
of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial
Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS CF PATERNO
MILLARE, respondents.
1988 Jun 15
G.R. No. L-39086

Facts of the Case:

Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of its college building to Northern Marketing
Corporation while the second floor thereof is used by the Director of the College for residential
purposes. The municipal and provincial treasurers served upon the College a “notice of seizure”
and later a “notice of sale” due to the alleged failure of the College to pay real estate taxes and
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. The "Notice of Seizure" of the college lot and building was
issued on July 6, 1972 for the satisfaction of the unpaid taxes. The "Notice of Sale" was served to
Abra Valley College on July 8, 1972 by the Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer for the
sale at public auction. It was sold to the highest bidder, Dr. Paterno Millare, in the amount of
P6,000.00 to whom a certificate of sale was then issued.

The school filed suit to annul said notices, claiming that it is tax-exempt based on Section 54,
paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known
as the Assessment Law, which provides:

"The following are exempted from real property tax under the Assessment Law:
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes.

Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application in the case at bar is
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes . . . ."
The RTC decided in favor of the respondents declaring the sale valid because of the use of the
second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes.

Issue:
Whether or not the lot and building in question can be exempt from taxes under Section 22,
paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution and/or Section 54, paragraph c,
Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409(otherwise known as the
Assessment Law)?

Ruling:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner.

Ratio:
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article
VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always
been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while
the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the
Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to
the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school
building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the
same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first
floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for
purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school
involved.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Granted
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege,
among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people.
Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO,
Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and
borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein)
of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests
in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind
the veil of corporate entity.
13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of
SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate
to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019.
The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its
investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected
petitioner Bengzon’s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring
their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond
the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
HELD:

1. YES.
· As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the
judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.

2. NO.
· The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
· The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee
alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution.

3. YES.
· Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens,
hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts.
· Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent
committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment
of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
4. NO.
· The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents
in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
· This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the
petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.

Arnault v Nazareno

Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison. Denied

Facts:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000,
respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a
nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for
both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first
from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was
not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said
owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to
the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The
Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural
Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate
the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the
committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to
Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon
of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which
he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to
the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a
resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in
this petition.
Issue:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES.
 Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
 The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation.
 The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity
for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a
single question.
2. NO
 Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
 Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the
witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court is always open to those whose rights might
thus be transgressed.
3. NO
 Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person
to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if
he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover,
it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or
evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable."
 Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

Dimaporo v. Mitra

FACTS:

Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the
House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and
functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the
Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is
not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution
of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4. Voluntary renunciation of office.

ISSUE:

W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another
government position

HELD:

NO.In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it
was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of
responsibility and integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office
other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the
people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.

The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the
people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.
Guingona vs. Gonzales G.R. 106971

Article VI section 18 of the 1987 constitution provides for the creation of a Commission on
Appointments and the allocation of its membership are as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a commission on appointments consisting of the president of the
senate as ex-officio chairman, twelve senators and 12 members of the house of representatives
elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation from political parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The chairman of the
commission shall not vote except in case of a tie. The commission shall act n the appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the congress from their submission. The commission
shall rule by a majority of all the members.

PETITION for prohibition to prohibit the respondent senators from sitting and assuming the
position as members of the Commission on Appointments
(a petition for prohibition to prohibit respondents senators Romulo and Tanada from sitting and
assuming the position of members of the commission on appointments and to prohibit senator
Gonzales , as ex-officio chairman of the said commission from recognizing and allowing the
respondents to sit as members thereof)

FACTS: # of senators as result to the 1992 elections representing their respective political
affiliations.

LDP – 15
NPC – 5
LAKAS-NUCD – 3
LP-PDP-LABAN – 1

Mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:

No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats

Total No. of senators elected

Result:

LDP – 7.5
NPC – 2.5
LAKAS – 1.5
LP - .5

August 27, 1992 at the organization meeting, senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority floor
leader nominated for and in behalf of LDP eight (8) senators for membership in the commission
on Appointment. Namely angara, Herrera, alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, ople, sotto, and Romulo.
The nomination of 8 senators was objected to by the petitioner guingona as minority floor leader
and john osmena in representation of NPC. To resolve, send tolentino proposed a compromise to
the effect that “12 members to the commission on appintments, 8 from LDP, 2 from NPC, 1 from
LP, with the understanding that there are strong reservations against this proportion or these
numbers so that if later on in an action in the supreme court, if any party is found to have an
excess in representation, that the party will necessarily reduce its representation, and if any
party is found to have a deficiency in representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and
have elected by this body its addition representative. “ the temporary arrangement inspite
the objections of guingona and osmena, to enable the commission to be organized by the
election of its members, it was APPROVED; 8 LDP, 1 LP, 2 NPC, and 1 LAKAS-NUCD. September
23, 1992, guingona in his behalf and in behalf of NUCD, filed a petition for the issuance of the
writ of prohibition to senate president Gonzales, as ex-officio chairman of the commission on
appointments from recognizing the membership of Romulo as the 8 th senator elected by LDP and
tanada as the lone member representing LP in the commission ON THE GROUND that the
proposed compromise of senator tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the senate consistent
with the constitution to combine their combine their fractional representation in the commission.
To comlete on seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be
additionally nominated and elected thereto.

Tanada’s Claim that he has the right to be elected as member because of (a) the physical
impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must be rounded up into
one senator. (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his party is entitled to be
represented in the commission. (c) having been elected senator, rounding up to into one full
senator his fractional membership is consistent with the provisions and spirit of the constitution
and would be in full accord with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.

ISSUE: a. WON the election of senators Romulo and tanada as members of the commission on
appointments is in accordance with the provision of section 18 of article VI of the 1987
constitution.
b. if said membership of the respondents senators in the commission is violative of the
constitutional provision, did the respondent senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing
the respondent senators?
c. if there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent senate, acting through the LDP
majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining, prohibiting and restraining the respondent
senators from sitting as members of and participating in the proceedings of the commission on
appointments be issued?

HELD:
a. (Romulo) the LDP majority in the senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator to be elect senator Romulo, and in doing so one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the
commission less that their proportional representation in the senate. This is clearly a violation of
section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with is mandate of membership.
(Tanada) Drawing from the ruling in the case of coseteng vs. mitra a political pary must have at
least two senators in the senate to be able to have a representative in the commission on
appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
commission on appointments. This applies to the respondent Tanada. We lay down the
guidelines accordingly: (a) in the senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly
elected senators for every seat in the commission on appointments. (b) where there are more
than two political parties represented in the senate, a political party/coalition with a single
senator in the senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the commission.

we find the respondents claim to membership in the commission on appointments by

nomination and election of the LDP majority in the senate as not in accordance with section 18
article 6 of the constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance
with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein.

b. The election of senator Romulo and Tanada as members of the commission by the LDP
majority in the senate was clearly a violation of section 18 article 6 of the constitution. Their
nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the
senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done with grave abuse of discretion.
YES. The court declared the election if Senator Romulo and Tanada as members of the
commission on appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional
representation under section 18 of article 6 of the constitution.

Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents to desist from
assuming, occupying, and discharging the functions as members of the commission. AND
ordering senate president Gonzales in his capacity as ex-officio chairman of the commission to
desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent senators and from allowing and
permitting them from sitting and participating as members of the said commission. SO
ORDERED.

Coseteng vs. Mitra G.R. 86649

Article VI section 18 of the 1987 constitution provides for the creation of a Commission on
Appointments and the allocation of its membership are as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a commission on appointments consisting of the president of the
senate as ex-officio chairman, twelve senators and 12 members of the house of representatives
elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation from political parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The chairman of the
commission shall not vote except in case of a tie. The commission shall act n the appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the congress from their submission. The commission
shall rule by a majority of all the members.

PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.

FACTS: On August 26, 1987, the house of representatives, upon the nomination by the Majority
floor leader, cong. Fransisco Sumulong, elected from the coalesced majority eleven out of twelve
congressmen to represent the house in the commission on appointments. On September 22,
1987 upon the nomination of the Minority floor leader, the house elected Honorable Roque Ablan
Jr. as the 12th member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the coalesced Minority
in the house. On September 16, 1988 LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202
members of the house of representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the house committees,
including the house representation in the commission on appointments had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner coseteng wrote a letter to speaker ramon mitra requesting that as
sole representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as member of the commission on appointments
and house electoral tribunal. Her request was endorsed by 9 congressmen. On December 5,
1988 the house of representatives on motion of the majority floor leader and over the objection
of cong. Raul Daza, revised the house majority membership in the commission on appointments
to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Daza (LP) with Singson (LDP).
Congressman Ablan (KBL) was retained as the 12th member representing the house minority.

1. Romero (LDP)
2. Cuenco (LDP)
 3. Mercado (LDP)
4. Bandon (LDP)
5. Cabochan (LDP)
6. Imperial (LDP)
7. Lobregat (LDP)
8. Beltran (LDP)
9. Locsin (LDP)
10.Singson (LDP)
11.Verano-Yap (LP)
12.Ablan (KBL)

On February 1, 1989 congresswoman coseteng and her party, KAIBA filed a petition for
extraordinary legal writs (QUO WARRANTO or Injunction) praying this court to declare as null
and void the election of respondent alblan, verano-yap, romero, cuenco, Mercado, bandon,
cabochon, imperial, lobregat beltran, locsin and singson as members of the commission and to
enjoin them from recognizing them as members of the commission on the theory that their
election to that commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
because: (1) the new majority(158LDP) is entitled only to 9 seats out of the twelve to be filled.
(2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by
their respective political parties or coalitions; (3) the nominations and elections of respondents
Verano-yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid. (4) that
similarly invalid was the retention of the respondents ablan as minority member in the
commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority parties in the
house. In their collective comment, the respondents excluding verano-yap(who filed a separate
comment) alleged that (1) the legality of the reorganization of the commission on appointments
is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this court to decide, and (2) that in any
case, the reorganization was “strictly in consonance with section 18, article VI of the constitution
i.e. on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. Representative Lorna
verano-yap in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better right than those already
selected, to be choses as a member of the commission because (1) the constitution was not
violated electing her and 11 others. (2) respondent yap is a rightful incumbent. (3) pertitioners
claim to a seat in the commission is without legal and factual basis.

ISSUE: the issue here is whether the members of the house in the commission on appointments
were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein.

HELD: after deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the
petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but
because the revision of the house of representation in the commission on appointments is based
on the proportional representation of the political parties therein. “even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by article VIII section 1 of the constitutin, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse ofdescretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

the compositon of the house membership in the commission on appointments was based on the
proportional representation of the political parties of the house which 160 members of LDP is
80% of the house membership and would equal 9.6 members which may be rounded of to 10
members in the 12 seat for the commission. And the remaining 2 were appropriated to the LP
(respondent Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the coalesced majority and the KBL rep.
Ablan as the principal opposition party in the house.

KAIBA (which is presumably a member also in the coalesced majority) are bound by the
majority’s choices. even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member
(petitioner coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the house membership, hence, she
is not entitled to one of the 12 seats in the commission on appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the house membership.

There is no merit in the petitioners contention. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. Cost against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Sarmiento v. Mison GR L-79974

(this case is so long…. And it talks about Statutory construction…)

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek
to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the
latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without
costs.

1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to demands of public
interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether
prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.

2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied
and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will
thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

3. President’s power to appoint

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional
Commission.

4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated

It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of
prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and
upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all
presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the
1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar
malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President
with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the
President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986
Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.

6. Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of different language of proximate sentences to

determine meaning
The word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner” which meanings could
stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can
appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the
interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive
significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other
underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition.

7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictly

The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of
such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the
President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8. The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import
deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the
word “alone” after the word “President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything
else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was
to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in
the third sentence the word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested
in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word
“alone” in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over
the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included with the first group
of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to
appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).

10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President
may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and
PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is
authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE: the issue at bar and to rule that the direct appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (without need of submitting a prior nomination to the Commission on Appointments and securing its
confirmation) is valid and in accordance with the President's constitutional authority to so appoint officers of the
Government as defined in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public interest and the
exigencies of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of such appointments be resolved expeditiously
in the test case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO
ORDERED.

Bondoc vs pineda

On May 19 1987 Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was proclaimed as winner in the
election for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the Province of Pampamnga. His rival Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of Nacionalista Party filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral (HRET) .
After the revision of the ballots, a decision has been made which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23
votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots on some precincts
which resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the
Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
However, Congressman Camasura revealed, moved by candor and honesty, to his Chief Congressman
Cojuangco , LDP Secretary General, that he voted for Bondoc.

Honorable Justice Ameufina Melencio-Herrera, Chairnan House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal recieved
a letter from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representative, informing the Tribunal that on
the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session, decided to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura.

As Judges of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the house of
representative , the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence- even independence from teh political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline", are not valid grounds for the expulsion of
a member of of the tribunal.

The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative
branches of the government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It
does not mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" on inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before
the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case.

In expelling Congressman Camasura from teh HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and recount of votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Also, another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the house of representative is that it violates
the congresmans right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election
contests are entitled to security of tenure under our consitution. Therefore, membership would not be
terminated except for a just cause such as death, expiration of term, etc. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for " party disloyalty" short of proof thaT he has formally affiliated with nother
political group.

As the records of this case fail to show that Cobgressman Camasura has become a registered member of another
party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET as not a valid cause, hence it violated his right to
security of tenure.

G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971

FELIZARDO S. PACETE, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.

Petitioner in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August
31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the
recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965.

On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial
Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had
been by-passed.

Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the
confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory
information which he had received.

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice
accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such
letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice
through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he
had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he
had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.

Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth
regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;

Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner.

The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his
confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the
absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would
be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad
enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can
find no shelter in the constitutional prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became final and
irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules
of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be
reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the
members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the
Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion."

1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for reconsideration of
Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's appointment and
that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a
majority of the members present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment —
and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation."

2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is
bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.

3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive
orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the
Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat
the right of an individual to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the express language
of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances, what
cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the fundamental law ordains.

As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not
unduly limited.