A. IN GENERAL Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806.
February 13, 1926
Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for re-
election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the
city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183,
213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari
in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal
and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure
how complainants charging the government officials and employees with the commission of
irregularities should be guided.
Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal
complaints
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of commission of
irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to make it applicable thereto, it
could have been referred to the more specific terms like “accused,” “convicted,” and the like.
People of the Philippines v. Purisima G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession
of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information
because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state
one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of
a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with
or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public
policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent
and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte
by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with all the
powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the
conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice,
saying that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled
a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not
cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the enactment of Act
3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial
Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of
quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his petition
for quo warranto
Held: No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216 provides
“Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter,
unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or
committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless
within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.” The Supreme
Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to
the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the court made is with regard to the
rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to public officials, the
sentence after the word “committed;” should not be treated as a separate thought from the
preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.
StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to
indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it.
A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the
purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere
comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are
both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only
difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.
[G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956.]
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY
AUDITOR and the CITY ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.
In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918
Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount
of P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and
two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved
under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the
time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable
to his father’s will
Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition
Held: No.
Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of
the statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have
the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not
capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time,
Philippines was still a territory of the US).
G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-
appellant.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly
based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental
rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law
using the facial challenge.
Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced
under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said
doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools
developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of
statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court
holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Issues:
1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.
The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects
of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the
element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
“pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do
no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being
a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
“willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement
of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the
state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case
of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
G.R. No. 169080 December 19, 2007
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MACROASIA
CORPORATION (formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION), BLUE RIDGE
MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION, Respondents.
ESCALANTE VS SANTOS 56 PHIL 483
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-
appellee.
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is
within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force
and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in
any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration
Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of
any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee
of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election
or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice
of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its
operation.
Issue: Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the
First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to
include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the
more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed
with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are
judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance',
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the
words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its
operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term
"judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly
established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54,
justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at
bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition
under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower
courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term
"justices of peace".
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS COURT OF TAX APPEALS 224 SCRA 665, 671
Brigida Buenaseda et al vs Juan Flavier et al
FACTS: In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against
Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH).
The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The
suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over
Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on
the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a
lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers
constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he maintained
that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based
his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether
or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what
the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or
investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the
Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It
cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart
from the present special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be
carried away in espousing their client’s cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must
be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his
behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession.
REPUBLIC V. MERALCO (G.R. NO. 141314)
Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an
average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the
condition that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all
excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or
correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set
aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the
State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by
discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and
excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the
power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to
deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the
State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing
of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs INCIONG GR 49774
PLDT VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 90 PHIL 674
EMILIO Y. HILADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS; G.R. No. L-9408, October 31, 1956
Facts:
On March 31, 1952, petitioner filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City
wherein he claimed, among other things, the amount of P12,837.65 as a deductible item from his
gross income pursuant to General Circular No. V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue. On
the basis of said return, an assessment notice demanding the payment of P9,419 was sent to
petitioner, who paid the tax in monthly installments, the last payment having been made on January
2, 1953.
Meanwhile, on August 30, 1952, the Secretary of Finance, through the Collector of Internal
Revenue, issued General Circular No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared void his general
Circular No. V-123 but laid down the rule that losses of property which occurred during the period
of World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or
embezzlement are deductible in the year of actual loss or destruction of said property. The
deduction was disallowed and the CIR demanded from him P3,546 as deficiency income tax for said
year. The petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied so he filed a petition for review
with the CTA. The SC affirmed the assessment made by the CIR. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether Hilado can claim compensation during the war; and
Whether the internal revenue laws can been enforced during the war
Ruling:
1. No. Assuming that said amount represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim which
was not paid, the same would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner,
the last installment he received from the War Damage Commission, together with the notice that
no further payment would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In the circumstance, said amount
would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950 gross income. In the second place, said amount
cannot be considered as a "business asset" which can be deducted as a loss in contemplation of law
because its collection is not enforceable as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the
generosity and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of 1945, there was absolutely
no law under which petitioner could claim compensation for the destruction of his properties during
the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946,
the payments of claims by the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its discretion to be
exercised in the manner it may see lit, but the non-payment of which cannot give rise to any
enforceable right.
or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular
No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was
also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no
longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted
all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the
enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.
G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO
PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, as Chairman and Members, respectively; of the Seventh
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as an interested party,
respondents.

2. Yes. It is well known that our internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were
continued in force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by
the occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period
and income tax payment were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are deemed to
be the laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981]

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged in the business
of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade
or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of
30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner
issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and
turned over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the
Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing
the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc.
to “gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for
deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for
reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be
retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where
to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the
retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971,