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1. FLORES V DRILON designation in any capacity to any public office or
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic,
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the
President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the
mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an
elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-
B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing
authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which he may have received
pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This
is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work
for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be
appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a
cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to
the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when
Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint
an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed
that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he

must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an
abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his
elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for
appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his actsas SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto
officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled
to such benefits.
2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA
FACTS:
Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in
theOffice of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary
promotionalappointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC a
pproved thetemporary appointment.New OMA Executive Director
terminated the appointment, ground: Not CareerExecutive Service
Eligible.CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was al
so noteligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid
backwages until theexpiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment.CA
reinstated Darangina.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
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HELD:
CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,only
salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of
histerm upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term
to beserved.Administrative Code of
1987Book VTitle ISubtitle AChapter 5Section 27. Employment Status. –
Appointment in the career service shall bepermanent or
temporary.(1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall
be issued to a personwho meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is beingappointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed,
in accordance
withthe provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuanc
ethereof.(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons
and itbecomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a tempa
ppointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirementsfor the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civilservice eligibility: Provided, that such temporary
appointment shall notexceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualifiedcivil service eligible becomes available
4. Liban v. Gordon
G.R. 175352July 15, 2009
FACTS:
Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court
to declare Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The
petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the PhilippineNational Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordon’s incumbency as a member
of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during
the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors,in which the
petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed
ceased tobe a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of
the Constitution:Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office ore mployment in the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,including government-
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owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term workers to their former positions without loss of seniority
without forfeiting his seat….
and other rights and privileges, and ordering them to jointly
Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional
provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled and severally pay the latter their full back wages, benefits,
corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec.13, Art. VI of the Constitution did
not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer and moral damages.
service to which is neither an office nor an employment

ISSUE: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat? Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and
HELD
No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing controlled corporation, on the other hand is Petitioner
public functions. Itdoes not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from the PhilippineCongress. The PNRC is financed primarily
METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was a
by contributions from private individuals and privateentities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apartfrom that,
qualified transportation corporation duly organized in
PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
accordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code,
andindependent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to
their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI,
Section 13 could not apply to Gordon’s case, in accepting the position in the and existing under Philippine laws.
PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit

Petitioner LRTA constructed a light rail transit system

5. LRTA vs. Venus
from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in
Gr. 163782 24 march 2006 Parañaque, Metro Manila. To provide the commuting public
with an efficient and dependable light rail transit system,
petitioner LRTA, after a bidding process, entered into a ten
Facts: (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of

This is a consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System from June 8,

Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization, Inc. 1984 until June 8, 1994 with petitioner METRO

(METRO), seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner METRO hired
of Appeals directing them to reinstate private respondent its own employees, including herein private respondents.

Petitioner METRO thereafter entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with Pinag-isang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. – National Federation of
Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC. – NFL
– KMU (Union), the certified exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner METRO.
On June 9, 1989 LRTA and METRO executed a Deed
of Sale where petitioner LRTA purchased the shares of
stocks in petitioner METRO. However, petitioners LRTA
and METRO continued with their distinct and separate
juridical personalities. Hence, when the above ten (10)-year
Agreement expired on June 8, 1994, they renewed the same,
initially on a yearly basis, and subsequently on a monthly
basis.
July 25, 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board – National
Capital Region against METRO on account of a deadlock in
the collective bargaining negotiation. On the same day, the
Union struck. The power supply switches in the different
light rail transit substations were turned off. The members of
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the Union picketed the various substations. They completely
paralyzed the operations of the entire light rail transit
system. As the strike adversely affected the mobility of the
commuting public, then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of
jurisdiction order directing all the striking employees "to
return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and
for the Company to accept them back under the same terms
and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike.
Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the
assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, the
Union officers and members, including herein private
respondent workers, failed to return to work. private
respondents, Perfecto Venus, Jr., Bienvenido P. Santos, Jr.,
Rafael C. Roy, Nancy C. Ramos, Salvador A. Alfon, Noel
R. Santos, Manuel A. Ferrer, Salvador G. Alinas, Ramon D.
Lofranco, Amador H. Policarpio, Reynaldo B. Gener, and
Bienvenido G. Arpilleda, were considered dismissed from
employment. Meanwhile the agreement between LRTA and
METRO expired and was not renewed and the LRTA
management instead took over the operations the private

respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC
Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a consolidated
judgment in favor of the private respondent workers
declaring that the complainants were illegally dismissed
from employment and ordering their reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority and other rights
and privileges.
On appeal, the NLRC found that the striking workers failed
to heed the return to work order and reversed and set aside
the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit against LRTA was
dismissed since "LRTA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order
No. 603 with an original charter"10and "it ha[d] no
participation whatsoever with the termination of
complainants’ employment."11In fine, the cases against the
LRTA and METRO were dismissed, respectively, for lack
of jurisdiction and for lack of merit. Hence, twin petitions
for review on certiorari of the decision of public respondent
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appellate court filed by LRTA and METRO which this
Court eventually consolidated.
Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-
employee relationship with private respondent workers as
they were hired by petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its
ten (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation
of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System with
petitioner METRO. Private respondent workers recognized
that their employer was not petitioner LRTA when their
certified exclusive collective bargaining representative,
the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. –
National Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-
METRO, INC. – NFL – KMU, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with petitioner METRO. Piercing the
corporate veil of METRO was unwarranted, as there was no
competent and convincing evidence of any wrongful,
fraudulent or unlawful act on the part of METRO, and, more
so, on the part of LRTA. LRTA further contends that it is a
government-owned and controlled corporation with an
original charter, Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as
amended, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of
the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC.

On the other hand Private respondent workers,
however, submit that petitioner METRO was not only fully-
owned by petitioner LRTA, but all aspects of its operations
and administration were also strictly controlled, conducted
and directed by petitioner LRTA. And since petitioner
METRO is a mere adjunct, business conduit, and alter ego
of petitioner LRTA, their respective corporate veils must be
pierced to satisfy the money claims of the illegally dismissed
private respondent employees.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over
LRTA’s employees or is it the CSC?
Whether or not private respondents were illegally
dismissed?
Held:
The SC agrees with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1),
Article IX – B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that
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"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." Corporations with original charters are those
which have been created by special law and not through the
general corporation law. In contrast, petitioner METRO is
covered by the Labor Code despite its later acquisition by
petitioner LRTA, SC holds that the employees of petitioner
METRO cannot be considered as employees of petitioner
LRTA. The employees hired by METRO are covered by the
Labor Code and are under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor and Employment, whereas the employees of
petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter, are covered by civil
service rules. Herein private respondent workers cannot
have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government
employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as
private employees under our labor laws. Petitioner LRTA
cannot be held liable to the employees of petitioner
METRO.
With regard the issue of illegal dismissal, petitioner
METRO maintains that private respondent workers were not
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illegally dismissed but should be deemed to have abandoned

their jobs after defying the assumption of jurisdiction and
return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary. Private
respondent workers, on the other hand, submit that they
could not immediately return to work as the light rail transit
system had ceased its operations. The contention of the
petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their
position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said
to have abandoned his work.

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for

termination of employment there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly established. As we
stressed in a recent case, mere absence is not sufficient; it
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to
the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.