[G.R. No. 143297.

February 11, 2003]

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT,
petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally intended his two properties,
one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself
while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.

Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, CerefinoMiat, who said testified the original agreement
that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed
upon Moises’ return to the Philippines.

The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to
December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the latter date and title was secured under Moises name
as widower.

Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and
fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal
reasons.

February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC,
petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty
thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son.

April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was
made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his
brother because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s possession.”

Downpayment information corroborated by VirgilioMiat (brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who
worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he
did not consider the money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo.

Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the land to
his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco
property to parents of petitioner VC.

December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the 16 th, a
letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by
virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that the title of
the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that he’d be able to
retrieve it from his son.

Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of
conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2)
Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants
to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying that: (1)
the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3)
for defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to
the SC.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:

(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.

Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had
long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because
marriage was celebrated before FC):

Art 153 (1) -

“The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x xx.”

Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It
is clearly conjugal property.

Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired
does not appear.

In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia
bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has
to be considered as conjugal.

(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said property is valid.

Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which stated
that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the
oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to by extended
Family members).

We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly,
Romeo and his witnesses, CeferinoMiat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of
Alexander’s share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel.

(3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.

Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC:

“In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant.
The most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro
talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and
Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the
property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of
an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the
title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property.

“Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A
purchaser who was fully aware of another person’s possession of the lot he purchased cannot
successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.”
JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)

FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then the
husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of
Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they
be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him
and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because
they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor
of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160
he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner
rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See
Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio
Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties
were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because the words “married
to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In
other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Alejandra Poblete.
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she
received as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which
was the duly authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union
Assurance Company in the Philippines. The car’s value was estimated with the help
of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought
by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done,
estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value
was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith,
Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance
claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and
averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a
warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs.
Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
HELD: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift
made by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that
the cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for
P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints
which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at
the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an
inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth
P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured.
All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it
would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon
the absolute correctness of such estimated value.