PANGANDOY Remedial Special Civil Action Cases

Remedial Law Review PANGANDOY ZBA Notes
(You gotta STUDY, bitch)

Special Civil Actions
Interpleader
Case Name Reference Date Ponente Summary
Wak-Wack Golf G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 Castro, CJ. What is an action
and Country Club interpleader.
vs. Won
Eternal Gardens G.R. No. 73794 September 19, Paras, J. What is an action
vs, IAC 1988 interpleader.
Pasricha vs. Don G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008 Nachura, J. What is an action
Luis Dizon Realty interpleader.
Bank of G.R. Nos. September 24, Brion, J. What is an action

Commerce vs. 154470-71 2012 interpleader.
Planters Dev.
Bank
I can do all things through CHRIST who

Pananampalataya.Pag-asa.Pag-ibig strengthens me.- Philippians 4:13 1! of 143
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Wak-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won
G.R. No. L-23851
March 26, 1976
Castro, CJ.
FACTS
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader alleging two causes of action. For
the first cause of action, it alleges both Lee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan claims to be the owner of
membership fee certificate 201. Won’s claim is by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 in
CFI Manila while Tan’s claim is by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to
him by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201.
For its second cause of action, it alleged that the membership fee certificate issued to Won by CFI of
Manila is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and
cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the
transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary.
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the
lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of
membership fee certificate 201- serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
The trial court dismissed the complaint with the following findings: (1) ground for an action of
interpleader, and in holding that "the principal motive for that the allegations in its amended and
supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid the present action is to reopen the Manila Case and
collaterally attack the decision of the said Court"; and (2) that the decision in civil case 26044 of the
CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action.  
ISSUE
Whether or not an interpleader suit may prosper when one of the claimants is a winning litigant in a
previous suit involving the subject matter of the said interpleader.
HELD
The answer is in the negative for three reasons, namely: (1) action of interpleader was filed
inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay; (2) present application
for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case;
and (3) interpleader suit would compel the winning litigant to establish his rights anew, and thereby
increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit.
Action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to
hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits
against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable
diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
In this case, the Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for
interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their
conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that
the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this
remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of
the claimants.
Application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said
civil case.

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A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and
compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the judgment.
Instant interpleader suit is contrary to the purposes of an interpleader suit which is to diminish
litigation.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful establishment of his
rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the
number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the
latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having elected
to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the
Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.

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Eternal Gardens vs, IAC
G.R. No. 73794
September 19, 1988
Paras, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) executed a Land
Development Agreement whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own
expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent
into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and
price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net
gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a
designated depositary trustee bank.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question.
Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader
against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate. Private respondent presented a motion for
the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion,
the trial court denied the motion for judicial deposit.
Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court denying the motion for judicial deposit
before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). IAC issued an order setting aside the assailed order of
the trial court and directed Eternal Gardens to to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the
Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable bank to be designated by the
respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be
found entitled thereto. Petitioner opposed the IAC decision before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the stakeholder or the person who filed a complaint for interpleader may refuse the
order for judicial deposit of the subject matter of the interpleader.
HELD
The answer is in the negative. Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for
petitioner's objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance
of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not
only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the
Land Development Program.
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the
part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule
founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or
funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be
decided as entitled thereto."

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Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty
G.R. No. 136409
March 14, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the
former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis
Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn,
agreed to pay monthly rentals,
Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use
of telephone cables.

The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as
subjects of the lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis
Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by
Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista).
Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated
demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent.
Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent
through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until
November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in
respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. To further justify their non-
payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject
matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for
December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to collect
the rents for the months of July to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using
Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34.
However, they again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because of respondents refusal
to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners
alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January
1994.
On November 24, 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment.
because of Ms. Bautistas alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.

Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
94-72515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorneys fees.

ISSUE
Whether or not non-payment was the correct remedy of the petitioners.
HELD
No, non-payment is not the proper remedy.

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What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals
because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They
should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of
payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them
to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of one liability.

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.

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Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Dev. Bank
G.R. Nos. 154470-71
September 24, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS
I. First set of CB bills
The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank
(CB) bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would mature on
January 2, 1995. As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994, the RCBC sold these
CB bills to the BOC. As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment" of even date, the BOC, in turn,
sold these CB bills to the PDB. The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.
On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70
million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order and a Confirmation of
Sale. However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the
BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a "note: ** substitution in lieu of
06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills. Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached
Assignments. It is basically the nature of this April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot
agree on.
On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold back" to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn,
the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April
25, 1994, the BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap – so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these
three CB bills.
On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation
which transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). On September 30, 1994,
All Asia further transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.
On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused
to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill,
1particularly described as follows:
As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital and
Insular Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity,
the RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC –
ultimately, the BOC acquired these three CB bills.
All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.
II. Second set of CB bills

On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total face value of ₱ 20
million to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the corresponding Detached Assignment.
On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills (April 19 transaction). In turn, Bancap
sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, which in turn sold it to
the BOC.
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed the Officer-
in-Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department, Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDB’s claim over
these CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP to

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record its claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of
imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer.”
Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing Open
Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of the
Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred
on the books of the BSP.
The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills) and
the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to
transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the
BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused" the first set
of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value
of the CB bills on maturity. On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally
impleading the BOC and All Asia. In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were consolidated. On Ja
After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and second
sets of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no
cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. Contrary to the PDB’s
"warehousing theory," the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April 19
transaction – covering both sets of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title
(i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in
substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19
transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap, likewise by way of
substitution.
The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDB’s case because (i)
the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these bills from the PDB, as to
the 1st set of CB bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good faith and for value. The
BOC also asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No.
28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the
PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly
recorded in the BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an "owner."
Subsequent events
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader –
Accordingly, on June 9, 1995 and August 4, 1995, the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate
Escrow Agreements. The first agreement covered the first set of CB bills, while the second agreement
covered the second set of CB bills. The parties agreed to jointly collect from the BSP the maturity
proceeds of these CB bills and to deposit said amount in escrow, "pending final determination by
Court judgment, or amicable settlement as to who shall be eventually entitled thereto." The BOC and
the PDB filed a Joint Motion, submitting these Escrow Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave
its approval to the parties’ Joint Motion. Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the
CB bills by crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the
maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow.

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On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the
BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon. In October 2000, the
BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier
arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.
In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of the nine
CB bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as buyer in the April
15 transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19 transaction,
either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income that may have been
earned during the pendency of the case.
In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and the
BSP’s counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has
no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB
bills.With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration, the BOC and the BSP separately
filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not interpleader is a proper remedy in the instant case.
HELD
Yes, interpleader is a proper remedy in the instant case.
The remedy of interpleader

Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially assuming
jurisdiction over the PDB’s petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction.While the RTC agreed
(albeit erroneously) with the PDB’s view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not
only the BOC’s/the BSP’s counterclaims but the PDB’s petition itself as well, on the ground that it
lacks jurisdiction.
This is plain error.
Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of
jurisdiction believes that jurisdiction over the BOC’s counterclaims and the BSP’s counterclaim/
crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
allowance of the PDB’s petition even becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of
primary jurisdiction sua sponte.
Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the
trial court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDB’s petition, its decision would have to be
set aside on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it
dismissed the PDB’s petitions and the BOC’s counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction,
the trial court seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB
bills falls within its general jurisdiction.
Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDB’s petition but
on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no
longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the
remaining conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for
interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may
be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or

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in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in
respect of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter)
who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants.
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to
determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay
more than once on a single liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises,
where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is
relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper,
merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in
an action.
Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:

SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such order
that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.
This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSP’s motion to interplead. The PDB itself "agreed
that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC subsequently entered
into two separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted them to the RTC for
approval.
In granting the BSP’s motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to resolve
the parties’ conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties’ conduct -
and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon.
Suddenly, however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed
by the PDB’s argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDB’s petition - which means that it did not
actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOC’s and the PDB’s claims.
Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDB’s
petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims – not the
BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really
granted the relief originally sought in the PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the BSP’s
motion to interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal
of the PDB’s petition.
This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit "against the public respondents" because the grant of the order to interplead
effectively sustained the propriety of the BSP’s resort to this procedural device.
Interpleader
1. as a special civil action
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an
original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is
considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim
recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential

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claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative
position, made only in the BSP’s Answer.
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions
in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions.
Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of,
although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form
of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion
to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the
procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion,142 seeking relief which
essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that
"payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a
stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it,
thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness
of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary
civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-
party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not
required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-
interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint)
which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

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Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Almeda vs. G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008 Nachura, J. Nature; Kind -
Bathala requisites
Marketing Ind.
Republic vs. G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Quisumbing, J. Nature; Kind -
Orbecido requisites
Malana vs. Tappa G.R. No. 181303 September 17, Chico-Nazario, J. Nature; Kind -
2009 requisites,
jurisdiction
Chavez vs. G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 Mendoza, J. ?

Judicial and Bar
Council
Sabitsana vs. G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013 Del Castillo, J. Nature; Kind -
Muertegui requisites,
jurisdiction
Republic vs. G.R. No. 204603 September 24, Perlas-Bernabe, J. Nature; Kind -
Roque 2013 requisites
Dept. of Finance G.R. No. 209331 August 24, 2015 Carpio, J. Nature; Kind -
vs. De La Cruz, Jr. requisites,
jurisdiction

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Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Ind.
G.R. No. 150806
January 28, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS
Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its
president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as
lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract,
Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street,
Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of
four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract. The contract of
lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:

SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate
of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax,
charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located,
LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding
to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said
property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in
proportion to the portion leased by him;

SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the
value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In
a letter dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and
collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT
may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT
therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been
in effect.

On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its
monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article
1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners demand and insisted that there was no
extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this
Court in various cases.

Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to
pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.

On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent
damage and prejudice.

On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against
respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.
After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against petitioners.
Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
RTC decision.

ISSUE

13 !
Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is proper.
HELD
Yes, the action for declaratory relief is proper.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of
his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that
such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances.

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners
insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

We do not agree.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent
complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals
stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the
pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a
breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial
court the petition for declaratory relief.

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission,
ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the
subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

We are not convinced.

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief
case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred
over the action for unlawful detainer.
Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case
during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case
was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action
for declaratory relief.

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol where the declaratory relief
action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit.

14 !
Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the
declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro
to the instant case.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory
relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case
before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties dispute, as
it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual
stipulations subject of this controversy.


15 !
Republic vs. Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the present controversy can be answered by a declaratory relief.
HELD
Yes, he present controversy can be answered by a declaratory relief.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...

16 !
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

17 !
Malana vs. Tappa
G.R. No. 181303
September 17, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages
against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their
Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-127937[3] situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the
subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.
During the lifetime of Anastasia, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to
Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and
Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs
might need it.

Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the subject
property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials.
Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property.
Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same.
Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they
owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.

According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of
proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud
upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a
Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an
award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters
baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19
of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing
petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.
Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned
that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real
property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration
No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the dismissal of the instant case is not valid which in turn nullifies declaratory relief as a
proper remedy.

18 !
HELD
No, the dismissal of the instant case is not valid. The remedy of declaratory relief is also not
applicable in the instant case.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties
rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made
a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in
which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for
the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an
action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that
an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for
quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and
indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed
P20,000.00, thus:


19 !
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
x x x x
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach
or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no
more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.

In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed
only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of
their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of
possession over the real property as owner.


20 !
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in
the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one
(1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so
that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times
that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.
Then, under the 1973 Constitution, with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one
body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The
power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the
appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but
alternately or by rotation.

21 !
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member was
added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the
JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain
oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers
to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a
seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly
correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth
grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion
arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution
of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among
the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. The
Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience
and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be
in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie
in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately." Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the
Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.”
Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at

22 !
least a majority of all its Members." In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was
recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be
handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents
cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because
it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the
executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory
non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that
the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House
plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia,
the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral
returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation
in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at
a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial
Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of
the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of
a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC
and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may
be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in
the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic
and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To
permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention
that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one
member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with
him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the
JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks
and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is

23 !
subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is
composed of members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified.
This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products,
Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate.
Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into
the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a
perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to
the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration." Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated." "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In
cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either
an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of

24 !
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was
not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft
and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.


25 !
Sabitsana vs. Muertegui
G.R. No. 181359
August 5, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS
On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of
respondent Juanito Muertegui (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot)
located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD)
No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.
Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual
possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property
taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.
On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C.
Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992. TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD No. 5327,
was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty.
Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete
improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter dated August 24, 1998
addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’ CENRO/PENRO office in
Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that
the application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting ownership has been
resolved.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case No. B-109712 for
quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife,
Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and
ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and
void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the
property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches.
They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction
over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is
merely ₱1,230.00.
Both the trial court and the CA agreed with the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction on the case.
HELD
Yes, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.

26 !
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998
letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.

27 !
Republic vs. Roque
G.R. No. 204603
September 24, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing
the constitutionality of the of RA 9372.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising
the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. The said motion was
granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and
thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, contending that private
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases.
In their Comment/Opposition, private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not resolve the
issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based
purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief were met.
The RTC issued an Order which denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not
pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief
was properly filed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
HELD
Yes, the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is
well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law. In this relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degree of gravity, as
above-described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality
of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that
private respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief.
Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on
the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed
based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper (b) petitioners
therein lack locus standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy.
Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.

28 !
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency
of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, second, and third
requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain
wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by
"ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a
dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual
milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens,
and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement
of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’
fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed
to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any
prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In
other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern
Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the
realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any
power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on
the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the
RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the same.

29 !
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since
they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. While it has been previously held
that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation.
Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This private respondents failed to
demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the
availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in
the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as
well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief should
have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion.

30 !
Dept. of Finance vs. De La Cruz, Jr.
G.R. No. 209331
August 24, 2015
Carpio, J.
FACTS
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013, which
created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF).
EO 140 states that the CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies,
rules and procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the
same." Section 3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as
approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF
Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or
seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x." Section 9 of EO 140 states
that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."
EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.
On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano
Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO
189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI,
including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."
CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima).
On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. On 1 October 2013, Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period of 72 hours
enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013.
Thereafter, the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela
Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged
that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that respondents failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies available to them before filing the petition before the RTC.
Petitioners also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with application that is
limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief.
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality of
CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Respondents further alleged that EO
140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its publication.
In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their
filing of an action for declaratory relief. As regards its effectivity, petitioners alleged that EO 140 states
that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."
In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

31 !
In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing
the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents.
HELD
Yes, RTC has jurisdiction
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. The
CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases
and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus
Rules) which states:
SECTION 1. x x x.
As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be
known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of an employee from one
department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment." CPO 189-2013 is an order
detailing personnel from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass
detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith
and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be
a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further
assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013
was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective.
Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on
Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the
scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of
CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is
no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance
of the action.

32 !
Review of Judgements and Final Orders of the COMELEC and COA
Alliance for G.R. No. 206987 September 10, Perez, J. Review on

Nationalism and 2013 COMELEC’s
Democracy vs. order.
COMELEC

33 !
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206987
September 10, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to canvass the votes cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-List Elections.
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s

Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds, to wit:
(1)Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors
(2)There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D. Labandria are actually
nominated by ANAD itself.
(3)ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and
Local Elections.
ANAD went before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Comelec, the Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the
parameters prescribed in the aforesaid decision.
In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013,3 the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of
petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in
the 2013 Elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
HELD
No, COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion.
ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing of
23 August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to establish
said qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called another summary
hearing. The Comelec could, as in fact it did, readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence
previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can be
presumed that the qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the summary hearing
of 23 August2012 continued until election day and even there after.

34 !
As to ANAD’s averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election laws and
regulations, we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on
matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of
five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor). Such factual
finding of the COMELEC was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by
petitioner during the 22 and 23 August 2012summary hearings.
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute
and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to
the COMELEC.
In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec, the Court discussed the importance of Sec.8 of R.A. No. 7941 in this wise:
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list
organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended
nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the
individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list
organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation
serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices.
In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the
voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the
possibility of such circumvention.
Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANAD’s failure to submit a proper Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements as the
exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other persons, a list
of official receipts and amounts without corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on
order slips and donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject
to reimbursement or donated. This factual finding was neither contested nor rebutted by ANAD.
We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual
findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC – created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself – on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of
the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the
rules of evidence.

35 !
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections. Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC when it issued the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013.
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. As
such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics show that
it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.

36 !
Certiorari
Ampil vs. G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013 Perez, J. In certiorari, only
Ombudsman questions of lack
or excess of
jurisdiction or
grave abuse of
discretion are
entertained. (one
for R65, another
for R45)
A.L. Ang G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014 Perlas - Bernabe, Certiorari is a
Network, Inc. vs. J. proper remedy in
Mondejar small claims
cases. (R65)
Maglalang vs. G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. Where no
PAGCOR administrative
review is
provided by law,
certiorari will lie.
(R45)
People vs. G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013 Per Curiam Strict observance
Castaneda of the 60 days
time to file
petition for
certiorari.
UP Board of G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993 Romero, J. Certiorari -

Regents vs. Ligot - academic freedom
Teylan was not
considered.
Tuazon vs. RD of G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 Narvasa, J. The extraodinary
Caloocan writ of certiorari
may properly
issue to nullify
only judicial or
quasi-judicial acts
Prov. of Leyte vs. G.R. No. 203124 June 22, 2015 Perlas - Bernabe, Proof of service
Energy Dev. Corp. J. not required if
there is notice.

37 !
Ampil vs. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 192685
July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J,
dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin
(Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng
(Cheng), and the Order denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint
charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended.
The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J
on the administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the
Ombudsman issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct
and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of
Ampil, the Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled the one-
month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter.
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO)
entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium
building to be known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real
property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct,
and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium building.
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO
selling to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of
the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation
with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO
under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third
contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility
for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA,
ASB had already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48 purchase price of the realty.
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments.
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the allotted parking
spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs
covering the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin

38 !
in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs
which were originally issued in ASB’s name.
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote
respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively,
introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming
part of the ASB Group of Companies. Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name
the subject units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually,
already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.
Both the Ombudsman and the Appellate Court dismiss the compaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not probable cause exists to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for their commission of corrupt practices under
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
HELD
Yes, probable cause exists.
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently
hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally
mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal
case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so
patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining
probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.

While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we
are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents
committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the
Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve
the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." The

39 !
Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar
Ampil on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation
of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."
The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the specific
allegations in Ampil’s complaint-affidavit.
The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in issue allegedly
for the purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered owner of the condominium units
involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs considering that ASB, the
initially named owner, was changed into MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.
Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere drafts and are
not legally considered "genuine documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the
contention is partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that the CCTs issued in favor of ASB
were mere drafts.
The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance and contents of
the CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive difference between the two except that
one set was named in favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO. Nothing is shown that will
clearly prove that the former were mere drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the
appearance of the CCTs of ASB is concerned, all appear to be complete and genuine. Proof to the
contrary must be shown to prove otherwise.
Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally
categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by respondent
Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon
appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the
CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular
performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon.
On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and categorical, and ultimately
established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASB’s name resulting
in these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at The Malayan
Tower.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings
thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the
charges contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject units at The
Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not detract from, much
less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses
under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass,
no matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These
requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the
acquisition of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in personal
canvass. Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial
body assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur. It also

40 !
guarantees that no personal preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given the
best possible price for its procurements.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents
Espenesin and Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019.
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the two, as officers of
MICO, benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to their
collective responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration was admitted by respondents and was
affirmed in the Ombudsman’s finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and
Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against
respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more
so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are
entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability
for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of this
case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and
Serrano on the former’s good faith in effecting the alteration and the pending arbitration case before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and
ASB’s net saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which they should raise during
trial of the criminal case.

41 !
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar
G.R. No. 200804
January 22, 2014
Perlas - Bernabe, J.
FACTS
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71
which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from
the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot
8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family
consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of
₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of
water, amounted to ₱28,580.09. However, respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving
a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands.
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their
agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner
unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water
per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water consumption for a
household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid
₱23,111.71 claim.
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate
of Public Convenience (CPC) by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003,
then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum
of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to
establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount
sought to be collected.
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that
the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as
provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled
that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay
petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
HELD
Yes, RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

42 !
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in
the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy
of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of
Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."
In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this
rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all
other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an
appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so
defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at
some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s recourse
before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it
asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the
private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded.”
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or
dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion
by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the
RTC’s ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).

43 !
To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled
freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This procedure is also in
consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before
the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in
dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case
No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

44 !
Maglalang vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 190566
December 11, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated
by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or
controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869.
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions
as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his
booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00
bills. There were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total amount of ₱50,000.00. Following
casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the
bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed
markers for ₱10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia.
Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the
first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker
than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of
₱1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct
amount handed to him by the latter.
Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner
tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued
to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes,
petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate
petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to
air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he
submitted on the same day of the incident.
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino’s Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-
explanation dated January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and
imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the
alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the
appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for
Production dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the
case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of
the Board supposedly containing the latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply dated June 2, 2009, one
Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied
the said motion. Petitioner received said letter-reply on June 17, 2009.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009 practically
reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another
Memorandum dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource
and Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its

45 !
meeting on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner
received said memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, before the CA. The CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for
being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from
the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
HELD
No, the CA erred in dismissing the case.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following
exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is
a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by
Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal
of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any
legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

46 !
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an
error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent
court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record
does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the
bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this Court is
not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

47 !
People vs. Castaneda
G.R. No. 208290
December 11, 2013
Per Curiam
FACTS
The antecedents as culled from the records:
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.(Vestidas Jr.)were
charged before the CTA under an Information which reads:
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and
Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively,
conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160
pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by
misdeclaration under Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN17, filed with the
Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No.
KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and
plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties amounting to Three Million Three
Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in
violation of the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in the
amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos
(Php3,240,883).
In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and Vestidas Jr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
aforementioned charge.
On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,whichwas granted by the CTA.
Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claiming that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:
a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court;
b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence;
and
c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the two accused as the
ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group
(RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering
the entry of judgment in the case.
Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the
filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS
was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr.
(Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the
case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was
only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.

48 !
ISSUE
Whether or no the petition be given due course despite its late filing.
HELD
No, this belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized
exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this
grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming
rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered
by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court
processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not
lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities which rob the
government of millions of revenue every year.
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the case
against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present the
certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure to file this
petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and subdued
attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the
Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice.
Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they
still remain as officers of the courtf rom whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The
Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of
revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays
gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would
have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.
In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result
would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this case, a perusal
of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion
on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.

49 !
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on
evidence and existing jurisprudence.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the
canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

50 !
UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot - Teylan
G.R. No. 110280
October 12, 1993
Romero, J.
FACTS
U.P. Board of Regents issued a Resolution establishing the STFAP (Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program). All students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits. Applicants are required to
accomplish a questionnaire and at the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his
parent, signs a sworn statement – University may send a fact-finding team to visit my home/
residence to verify the veracity of the information.
Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law, availed of STFAP. A team conducted a
home investigation at the residence of Nadal in Quezon City and found discrepancies between the
report and Nadal’s application form. Villanueva (head of the office of scholarship) wrote Nadal
informing him that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had a 1977 Corolla car which was
owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers. He
reclassified him to Bracket (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit “proofs
to the contrary.” Nadal was required “to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees”.
Because of the discrepancies between Nadal’s application form and the certification, the U.P. charged
Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he willfully withheld and did not declare a
car and the income of his mother which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to
acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies.
SDT rendered a decision exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP
application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother. SDT imposed upon Nadal the
penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had
received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be “effected by the University
thru outside legal action.” SDT decision elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for
review which affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents
(BOR). BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT; the penalty was modified “from Expulsion to One Year-
Suspension. Nadal filed a MR of the BOR decision (guilty).
Nadal asked President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case and filed with the
RTC of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a TRO
against President Abueva and the BOR. The lower court ruled that they are temporarily restrained.
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining
order.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ
of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty
it had imposed on Nadal.
HELD
Yes, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993.
The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court’s finding that the implementation of the
disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal “would work injustice to the petitioner as it would
delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.” Sadly,

51 !
such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances
clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has
completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of
higher learning.

52 !
Tuazon vs. RD of Caloocan
G.R. No. 70484
January 29, 1988
Narvasa, J.
FACTS
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds
pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter
simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in
Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot
was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took
possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover
that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their
hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open
for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present
bona fide occupants thereof."
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand
Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree
No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor,
Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided
into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by
Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land
under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended.
Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the
price.
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos
decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in
violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the
provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that
the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its
efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for certiorari will prosper.
HELD
Yes, the petition for certiorari will prosper.
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may
properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may
be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals
with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions,
while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition
will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination
of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the

53 !
premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is
the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an
established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full
payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms,
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners)
stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has
remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has
never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts
affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null
and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in
the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never
vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the
circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his
office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had
assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law
thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce
evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the
finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that
there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense
conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were
never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and
present countervailing evidence.
This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due
process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words,
not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had
in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if
the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will
also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not
granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in violation
of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be
proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the
basic averments of the parties' pleadings.

54 !
Prov. of Leyte vs. Energy Dev. Corp.
G.R. No. 203124
June 22, 2015
FACTS
Sometime in 2006 and 2007, the Province of Leyte issued four (4) separate franchise tax assessments
against EDC which the latter, in turn, protested separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively
denied all protests, EDC appealed such denials before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City,
Branch 6 (RTC).
Notwithstanding the pendency of the cases before the RTC, the Province of Leyte issued another tax
assessment against EDC on February 27, 2008, with the Assistant Provincial Treasurer verbally
intimating to EDC that he was under strict instruction from the Governor to enforce the collection of
tax through the available administrative remedies upon the lapse of the sixty (60)-day period
mentioned in the assessment.
This prompted EDC to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated April 4, 2008
praying that the RTC enjoin the Province of Leyte "from assessing, or attempting to assess, collecting
or attempting to collect franchise taxes from, and availing [itself] of enforcement remedies or actions
against [EDC] until [the pending cases before the RTC] shall have been resolved with finality."
In an Order dated April 18, 2008, the RTC denied EDC's motion on the ground that its grant would in
effect dispose of the cases before it. However, on EDC's motion, the RTC issued an Order dated July
17, 2009 setting aside its earlier order, and accordingly, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in its favor.
In a Resolution dated September 21, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that, inter alia,
"there was no proper proof of service of the [p]etition to the adverse party. Certainly, registry receipts
can hardly be considered sufficient proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it due to
its failure to provide proof of service of the same on EDC.
HELD
No, for the CA erred when it dismissed the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it due to its
failure to provide proof of service of the same on EDC.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's initial action on the
petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA's jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating
its initial action on the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a
comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its
comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction
over both parties to the instant case.

55 !
Despite the foregoing, the CA still opted to dismiss the Province of Leyte's petition before it on the
ground that, inter alia, there was no proper proof of service of the petition to EDC in accordance with
Section 13, Rule 13, of the Rules,24 which reads:
SEC. 13. Proof of Service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or
the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place
and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Relying on Aramburo v. CA, the CA held that while the Province of Leyte presented the registry
receipt, it failed to include the registry return card; hence, there was no valid proof of service to EDC,
which must then result in the dismissal of the Province of Leyte's petition.
The CA erred in this regard.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules provides the procedural requirements in filing original actions before
the CA, to wit:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall contain
the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the
original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such
material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto x x x
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before the CA should include proof of service to
the other party. Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of the pendency of an
action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already been notified of the same and had even participated
in the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served.
Considering that in this case, the CA had already issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009
directing EDC to file a comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be denied that EDC
was already aware of the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired
over its person. The CA, therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte's procedural
mishap and resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice. The Court's
pronouncement in Barra v. Civil Service Commission is instructive on this matter:

56 !
Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of technicalities, every litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and even the Rules of Court
expressly mandates that "it shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Verily, the demands of justice require the CA to resolve the issues before it, considering that what is at
stake here are taxes, albeit locally imposed in this case, which are the nation's lifeblood through which
government agencies continue to operate and with which the State discharges its functions for the
welfare of its constituents. Thus, it is far better and more prudent for the Court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a substantive review of the case in order to attain the ends of justice than
to dismiss the same on mere technicalities.

57 !
Prohibition
Vivas vs. G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013 Mendoza, J. The proper
Monetary Board function of a writ
of BSP of prohibition is
to prevent the
doing of an act
which is about to
be done.
Corales vs. G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013 Perez, J. Prohibition, being a
Republic preventive remedy to
seek a judgment
ordering the defendant
to desist from
continuing with the
commission of an act
perceived to be illegal,
may only be resorted
to when there is “no
appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of
law.
Tan vs. CA

58 !
Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP
G.R. No. 191424
August 7, 2013
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution that the
corporate life expired on May 2005. Vivas and the new management team conducted internal audit
and introduced measures to revitalize the dismal operation of the bank. BSP on December 2006
extended RBFI corporate life for another 50 years and approve the change of its name to EuroCredit
Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI).
General examination of ECBI from 2007 to 2009 were conducted by BSP and was placed under
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) by the Monetary Board (MB) in 2008 because of the serious findings
and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination. The MB posited that ECBI unjustly
refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records and hence
issued Resolution No. 726 imposing monetary penalty/fine and referred it to the Office of the Special
Investigation for filing of appropriate legal action.
The MB issued Resolution No. 823 on June 2009, approving the issuance of a cease and desist order
against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered
unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting
fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets. It was also prohibited from doing business in the
Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership through OSI recommendation.
Vivas filed petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI
from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for prohibition will lie against MB.
HELD
No, the petition for prohibition must fail.
Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The resolution issued by MB placing the bank under receivership
may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari pursuant to RA 7653.
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy. Prohibition is
that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them
to the exercise of those powers legally conferred.
The proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Settled is the rule that
prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
*Fait accompli -a thing that has already happened or been decided before those affected hear about it, leaving
them with no option but to accept.

59 !
Corales vs. Republic
G.R. No. 186613,
August 27, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS
Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna Rosendo Corales appointed Dr. Rodolfo Angeles as
Municipal Administrator. The appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan
during his first term as Mayor but was disapproved during his 2nd-3rd term. Provincial State Auditor
Maximo Andal, after auditing local disbursements issued Audit Observation Memorandum to
Corales seeking his comment/reply regarding Angeles appointment and his emoluments. One of the
recommendations in the AOM was for Corales, being the appointing authority to be liable to pay for
Angeles’ salaries etc. Instead of replying, Corales filed with the RTC petition for prohibition and
mandamus against Andal and the Sanggunian to recall the AOM and desist from collecting from him.
RTC decided in favour of Corales. Republic as represented by COA, by Andal filed petition for
certiorari in CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA
granted certiorari and annulled the RTC order and dismissed the prohibition. Corales filed certiorari
under Rule 45 to nullify CA decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of Corales’ suit for prohibition.
HELD
No, the CA did not erred.
Corales insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition
under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.
Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on the observations stated in the AOM.
The issuance of the AOM is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit being conducted by Andal
as Provincial State Auditor to determine the propriety of the disbursements made by the Municipal
Government of Laguna.
Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from
continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there
is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
His action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase.
There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to
petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such
AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to
petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many
administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.

60 !
Tan vs. CA
FACTS
James L. King (King) charged Petitioners with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and
Estafa. In a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002, public respondent Montero found probable
cause. Accordingly an information was filed.
On December 17, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals. They sought to
restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed that
the same be dismissed.
On November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit. After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners interposed the instant
petition for review on certiorari to review the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed their
petition for prohibition. Therefore, the principal issue is whether resort to the extraordinary remedy
of prohibition was proper.
ISSUE
Whether or not an extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition may be availed of to assail the validity
of a prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause over a criminal complaint.
HELD
The answer is in the negative. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy
to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and
orderly administration of justice.
It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any
other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.
In fine, the arguments raised in their petition for prohibition ineluctably shows that petitioners are
principally questioning the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against them. This
is but a veiled attempt to litigate issues which should have been timely appealed to the Secretary of
Justice via a petition for review. However, petitioners, through their own fault, failed to avail
themselves of this remedy. Countless times we have ruled that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
or prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

61 !
Mandamus
Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay G.R. Nos. March 17, 2009 Chico - Nazario, J. The remedy of
174813-15 mandamus lies only
to compel an officer
to perform a
ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one.
Sanchez vs. G.R. No. 161735 September 25, Nachura, J. The writ can be
Lastimosa 2007 issued only when
the applicants legal
right to the
performance of a
particular act
sought to be
compelled is clear
and complete.
Social Justice G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007 Corona, C.J. The mayor has the
Secretary vs. duty to enforce an
ordinance as long as
Atienza it has not been
repealed by the
Sanggunian or
annulled by the
courts.
Funa vs. Manila G.R. No. 193462 February 04, 2014 Perez, J. Exception to the
Economic and moot and academic
rule.
Cultural Office
Cudia vs. G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015 Peralta, J. The remedy of
Superintendent of mandamus lies only
PMA
to perform a
Villanueva vs. JBC G.R. No. 211833 April 07, 2015 Reyes, J. The remedy of
mandamus lies only
to perform a

62 !
Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay
G.R. Nos. 174813-15
March 17, 2009
Chico - Nazario, J.
FACTS
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before RTC
presided by Judge Bay.
Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners
and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
Hipos and other filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. City
Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against them.
However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable
cause. City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the motion hence the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SC can compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by
virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no probable cause against the
accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information.
HELD
Petition bereft of merit.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond
the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled

by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw
Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not
available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the

63 !
issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

64 !
Sanchez vs. Lastimosa
G.R. No. 161735
September 25, 2007
Nachura, J.
FACTS
In 1989, petitioner Sanchez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was discharged from the
service for allegedly losing his service firearm. Petitioner Meteoro, also a constable, was likewise
discharged from the service in 1990 for being absent without leave. On appeal, they were both cleared
of all charges. They then applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up
to the integration of the PC into the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On January 27, 1998, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Resolution No. 98-037
considering as absorbed into the police force, among others, those who had been discharged by virtue
of pending administrative or criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed,
and who subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement that were not acted upon by the PNP.
Then, on April 3, 1998, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 98-105 affirming and confirming the
absorption into the PNP, effective on January 27, 1998, of the 126 ex-PC constables named in the list
submitted by Director Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP Directorate for Personnel and Records
Management (DPRM). Petitioners Sanchez and Meteoro are in numbers 90 and 122, respectively, of
the Galvante list.

Subsequently, on May 28, 1998, NAPOLCOM Commissioner Rogelio A. Pureza issued a
Memorandum to then Chief of the PNP Santiago Alino for the issuance of absorption orders to the 45
PC constables included in the initial batch of those covered by the PNP Board Resolutions. Petitioner
Sanchez is in number 45 of that list.

As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP, the constables in the list
requested the assistance of the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
On July 29, 1998, the Office of the Secretary of the DILG sent a memorandum to respondent Roberto
T. Lastimoso, then the Chief of the PNP, endorsing the constables entreaties and requesting for a
feedback thereon.

Without any response from the Chief of the PNP, and their pleas for the issuance of the absorption
orders still unacted upon, petitioners instituted, on September 30, 1998, a petition for mandamus
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35659 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 99-061 on April 19,
1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No. 98-105.

The RTC rendered its Decision in the mandamus case declaring as void ab initio NAPOLCOM
Resolution No. 99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners.
On appeal, the CA, , reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could
not be issued because petitioners had not established with distinct clarity their right to be absorbed
into the PNP.
ISSUE
Whether or not mandamus will lie in the instant case.
HELD
No, mandamus will not lie.

65 !

We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy of mandamus is employed only to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary one. The issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., we
emphasized, through the erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be
issued only when the applicants legal right to the performance of a particular act sought to be
compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law, thus:

In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear
legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform
that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of
mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the
aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.

Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chiefs issuance of the orders for the absorption of
herein petitioners in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the
same does not involve a performance of a ministerial duty. Let it be noted that petitioners were
discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them, applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP
in 1990 when R.A. No. 6975 was enacted.
Thus, we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the Philippine
Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we held in Gloria v.
De Guzman, technically an issuance of a new appointment.
The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of
mandamus.

Furthermore, the petitioners do not have a clear legal right over the issuance of the absorption orders.
They cannot claim the right to be issued an appointment based on the NAPOLCOM issuances,
specifically Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105. Suffice it to state that R.A. No. 6975 clearly provides
that the power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV
to which petitioners may be appointed is vested in the PNP regional director or in the Chief of the
PNP as the case may be.

Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a right from NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos.
98-037 and 98-105, still their right collapses and their mandamus petition becomes moot with the
issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-061 recalling the approval of their absorption. The
trial court should then have immediately dismissed the mandamus petition when the OSG submitted
a copy of Resolution No. 99-061 because well-settled is the rule that courts will not resolve a moot
question.

Also improper is the trial courts declaration that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 is void ab initio.
In the petition filed below, only the Chief of the PNP is impleaded as the party-defendant.
NAPOLCOM was never impleaded. As it was the latter, a separate entity, which had issued

66 !
Resolution No. 99-061, NAPOLCOM was an indispensable party over which the trial court should
have acquired jurisdiction. Since it was not impleaded, NAPOLCOM remains a stranger to the case,
and strangers are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.


67 !
Social Justice Secretary vs. Atienza
G.R. No. 156052
March 7, 2007
Corona, C.J.
FACTS
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and
Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property
covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was
extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the
MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
HELD
Yes, respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals.
Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act
and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its
object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are
citizens of Manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared

68 !
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.

69 !
Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office
G.R. No. 193462
February 04, 2014
Perez, J.
FACTS
The aftermath of the Chinese civil war left the country of China with two (2) governments in a
stalemate espousing competing assertions of sovereignty. On one hand is the communist Peoples
Republic of China (PROC) which controls the mainland territories, and on the other hand is the
nationalist Republic of China (ROC) which controls the island of Taiwan. For a better part of the past
century, both the PROC and ROC adhered to a policy of One China i.e., the view that there is only one
legitimate government in China, but differed in their respective interpretation as to which that
government is.
Even after its relocation to Taiwan, the ROC used to enjoy diplomatic recognition from a majority of
the worlds states, partly due to being a founding member of the United Nations (UN). The number of
states partial to the PROCs version of the One China policy, however, gradually increased in the 1960s
and 70s, most notably after the UN General Assembly adopted the monumental Resolution 2758 in
1971. Since then, almost all of the states that had erstwhile recognized the ROC as the legitimate
government of China, terminated their official relations with the said government, in favor of
establishing diplomatic relations with the PROC. The Philippines is one of such states.
The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan on 9
June 1975, when the country and the PROC expressed mutual recognition thru the Joint Communiqu
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the Peoples Republic of
China (Joint Communiqu).
Under the Joint Communiqu, the Philippines categorically stated its adherence to the One China
policy of the PROC.
The Philippines commitment to the One China policy of the PROC, however, did not preclude the
country from keeping unofficial relations with Taiwan on a people to people basis. Hence, despite
ending their diplomatic ties, the people of Taiwan and of the Philippines maintained an unofficial
relationship facilitated by the offices of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, for the former, and
the MECO, for the latter.
The MECO was organized on 16 December 1997 as a nonstock, nonprofit corporation under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code. The purposes underlying the incorporation of MECO, as
stated in its articles of incorporation.
At present, it is the MECO that oversees the rights and interests of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)
in Taiwan; promotes the Philippines as a tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and
facilitates the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines, and vice versa.
On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a copy of the latest financial and
audit report of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. The petitioner made the request on the belief that the MECO, being under
the operational supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned
and controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
In this COA memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was not
among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.

70 !
Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that the COA had never audited and
examined the accounts of the MECO, the petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on 8
September 2010.
The MECO prays for the dismissal of the mandamus petition on procedural and substantial grounds.
The COA, on the other hand, advances that the mandamus petition ought to be dismissed on
procedural grounds and on the ground of mootness.
At any rate, the COA argues that the instant petition already became moot when COA Chairperson
Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan (Pulido-Tan) issued Office Order No. 2011698 on 6 October 2011. The
COA notes that under Office Order No. 2011698, Chairperson Pulido-Tan already directed a team of
auditors to proceed to Taiwan, specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of, among other
government agencies based therein, the MECO.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition of mandamus can be dismissed, it being moot and academic.
HELD
No, the petition of mandamus can be dismissed, under the exception to the general rule of being moot
and academic.
A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it
ceases to present any justiciable controversy. Since they lack an actual controversy otherwise
cognizable by courts, moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.
The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases, however, is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. In
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court comprehensively captured these exceptions scattered
throughout our jurisprudence:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA of Office Order No. 2011698 indeed qualifies as a
supervening event that effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of the instant
mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO
would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to do the same.
Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing outright the petition. We believe that the
mandamus petition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing the commission of a grave
violation of the Constitution and involving paramount public interest, which need to be resolved
nonetheless:
First. The petition makes a serious allegation that the COA had been remiss in its constitutional or
legal duty to audit and examine the accounts of an otherwise auditable entity in the MECO.
Second. There is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning the failure of the
COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety or impropriety of such a refusal is
determinative of whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the guardian
of the public treasury, in which any citizen has an interest.

71 !
Third. There is also paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue regarding the legal status
of the MECO; a novelty insofar as our jurisprudence is concerned. We find that the status of the
MECO whether it may be considered as a government agency or not has a direct bearing on the
countrys commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing
public interest in the resolution of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling
thereon, if not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, then for the
formulation of controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in general. For
this purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic function.
If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince, We still add another:
Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office Order No. 2011698
does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. In the first place,
Office Order No. 2011698 did not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not auditing
the accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any
determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the COA, in fact,
only appears in the memorandum it submitted to this Court for purposes of this case.
Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No. 2011698 appears to be entirely dependent upon
the judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; susceptible of being undone, with or without
reason, by her or even her successor. Hence, the case now before this Court is dangerously capable of
being repeated yet evading review.
Verily, this Court should not dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of mootness.

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Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA
G.R. No. 211362
February 24, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of
2014.
On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR)
subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3:00pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher,
then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class
(English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The
tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their
OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus,
Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the
explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical
officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3:00pm while his English class started at 3:00pm also. To that the TO replied: that on
record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them
(the class) beyond 3:00pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3:00pm; that besides, under
PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may
be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3:00pm; that it was
a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class,
each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that
if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the
teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at
least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of saying that his class was
dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor
Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a
result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any
violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets,
conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with
their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was
8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote
means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of chambering where the members,
particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the
minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was

73 !
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately
placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the
PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a
re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC.
As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of
PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it
was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on
the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued
that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with
military matters.
ISSUES
Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
HELD
No, as the petition with regards to mandamus is not proper.
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate
him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the
Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and
entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed
against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within
PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is beyond the
jurisdiction of courts.

74 !
Villanueva vs. JBC
G.R. No. 211833
April 07, 2015
Reyes, J.
FACTS
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a
first-level court.
On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed
the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date,
the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the
list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated February 3, 2014,
that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to
include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening
the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served
in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more
than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court
ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of mandamus can be issued in the instant case.
HELD
No, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance
of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level
judge is not properly compellable by mandamus in as much as it involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the JBC.

75 !
Quo Warranto
Mendoza vs. Allas G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999 Puno, J. A judgment in
quo warranto
does not bind the
successor in office
Calleja vs. Panday G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006 Austria - Trial court must
Martinez, J. dismiss the action if
it has no jurisdiction
on it.
Lokin, Jr. vs. G.R. Nos. June 22, 2010 Bersamin, J. The objective of
COMELEC 179431-32 quo warranto is to
unseat the
ineligible person
from the office,
but not to install
the petitioner in
his place.
Aratea vs. G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012 Carpio, J. When candidates
COMELEC are proclaimed, quo
warranto shall lie.
De Castro vs. G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013 Sereno, C.J. If filed by a
Carlos private person,,
he must prove
that he is entitled
to the
controverted
position.
Velasco vs. G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016 Leonardo - De Quo warranto is
Belmonte Castro, J. different form
mandamus.
Sereno vs. G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018 Tijam, J. Quo warranto is a
Solicitor General proper remedy in
the instant case.

76 !
Mendoza vs. Allas
G.R. No. 131977
February 4, 1999
Puno, J.
FACTS
Petitioner became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received promotions until he became
Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he was temporarily
designated as Acting District Collector, while respondent was temporarily appointed to take his old
position.
In 1994, a letter was sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from the services of the Bureau of
Customs. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which the court granted.
Allas appealed, but became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as Deputy Commissioner
of Customs Assessment and Operations.
When Mendoza filed for motion for execution of its decision, it was denied because Godofredo Olores
was appointed to take his old position. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for quo warranto extends to to Olores.
HELD
No, a petition for quo warranto cannot be extended to Olores.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the successor
in office, even though the successor’s title comes from the same source. It is always directed to a
person, in this case, Allas.
Olores had never become part of the case; hence the decision cannot extend to him. Since Mendoza
has reached the age of retirement, he cannot be reappointed. Neither can he claim from Allas his back
wages, nor compel the Bureau of Customs to pay said back wages.

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Calleja vs. Panday
G.R. No. 168696
February 28, 2006
Austria - Martinez, J.
FACTS
Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to
respondents (Calleja, Tabora, et al) and took away the daily hospital collection from St. John Hospital
in Naga City. Calleja, et al filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto
with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order against Panday, et al.
“On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in
Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein
respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides.
However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case
for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to
another administrative jurisdiction.”
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons.
On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
“It is undisputed that the plaintiffs cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally
under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated functions (Section 5,
PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and
Regulation Code, the Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-
A were transferred []to the Court of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso
that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.
Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority,
promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000 designated
certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange Commission Cases
arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the
respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur,
(Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as special court (Section
1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).
Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on March
1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that all SEC cases originally assigned or transmitted
to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court specially
designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that
motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the

78 !
Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch
23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-
corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.”
ISSUE
Whether or to the trial court has jurisdiction over the instant case.
HELD
No, trial court has no jurisdiction.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents petition
for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-
corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by
the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of
the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on
the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

79 !
Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32
June 22, 2010
Bersamin, J.
FACTS
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,
CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from
which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying
votes.
The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C.
Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3)
Borje.
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of

the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to
act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
ISSUE
Whether or not the a petition for quo warranto is proper in the instant case.
HELD
No, quo warranto is not proper in the instant case.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities,
to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is
entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility
of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office,
but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be
seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking

80 !
to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning
party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in
which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of
the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case
does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines,
or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales.
The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari
and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

81 !
Aratea vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195229
October 9, 2012
Carpio, J.
FACTS
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due
course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior
to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible
for the office he sought election.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes
and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of
office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse
M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the
[COMELEC]."
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two
grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive
terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10)
counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code.
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because
Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February
2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his
name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the
May 2010 elections.
The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011 agreeing with Antipolo.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made
a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio (the rationale is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the
rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales)
HELD
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes

82 !
for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts
and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in
Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal
laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation
of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de
Venecia, this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are
criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition
under Section 68.
As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer
to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to
run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/
her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation
to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is
filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for
eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may
represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality when he is actually a permanent
resident of another country. In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies.
Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election.
Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using
grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.

83 !
The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in
Loong v. Commission on Elections with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur
Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the
office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false
representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the
prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that
Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for
disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should
be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of
candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would
want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that
there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is
made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the
results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so
that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo
warranto against him.
Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is
unnecessary and should be remedied.
At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates
for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission
may have seen the need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what
the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file
these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required one-year
residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a
petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the
question of the one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner
before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 780043 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or
resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for
disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds.”
A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a
candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section 78, and a
petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

84 !
De Castro vs. Carlos
G.R. No. 194994
April 16, 2013
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS
On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0. His
appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution
No. 09-10, Series of 2009.
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No. 106,
designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was
then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service
vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other
employees.
Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the

Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24, which in turn cited OP Memorandum
Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he
was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.
Petitioner sought a clarification from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper
classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply, Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones
(Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular
Nos. 1 and 2.
Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services
and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.
On 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as the
new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.
ISSUE
Whether or no a petition for quo warrant is proper in the instant case.
HELD
No, a petition for quo warrant is not proper in the instant case.
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible 9as it is not for violation of
the hierarchy of courts), the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-
founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private
person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to
all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a
non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the
MMDA is a non-CES position.

85 !
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of
AGMO of the MMDA.
This Court finds that an AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charter
specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career service, as
distinguished from a non-career service position.
In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES:
1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by
the CESB to be such position of equal rank; AND
2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee.
Records show that in reply to Chairperson Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general
manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered by the CES, the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones
– categorically stated that these positions are not among those covered by the CES.
Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter, the CESB similarly responded that the AGMO’s
position could not be considered as belonging to the CES. Additionally, Executive Director Allones
said that petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No. 799
already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.
Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated by law considering that it
belongs to a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. The nature of
AGMO is clear from the provisions of the MMDA Charter.
An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people,
resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of
managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving
functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.
For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within
the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his
appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.

86 !
Velasco vs. Belmonte
G.R. No. 211140
January 12, 2016
Leonardo - De Castro, J.
FACTS
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as
candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque,
allegeging that Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC
was accordingly cancelled.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMMENCE Resolution, the Marinduque
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections
for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan
Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the
HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes."
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality in SPA No. 13-053 (DC).
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the
COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void
and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's
motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new
PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written
demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction.
ISSUE

87 !
Whether or not the issuing a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco is proper.
HELD
Yes, it is proper.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special
civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of
the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of
a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of the office.
In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in
G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of
the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act
or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence
final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy.
There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null
and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

88 !
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond
dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque.

89 !
Republic vs Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
May 11, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s
appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her
therefrom.
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She
also served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until
2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the
SC.
Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been
employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP
Human Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
show that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and
filed by Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
and 2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to
2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she
resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government
service as of 16 August 2010.
Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010 by President Benigno Aquino III.
When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for
applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December
2011 (instead of the usual last two years of public service) and stating that, “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.”
Respondent accepted several nominations for the position of Chief Justice, and submitted
requirements in support thereof.
On 20 July 2012, the JBC in a special meeting en banc deliberated on nominees with incomplete
documentary requirements. The minutes of the deliberation show that Respondent has not submitted
her SALNs for a period of ten years, from 1986 to 2006, the duration for which, according to Senator
Escudero (ex officio member of the JBC), she was a professor in UP and was therefore required to
submit SALNs.
Apart from Respondent, several other candidates had incomplete documents such that the JBC En
Banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission. It also delegated to the Execom the determination
of whether or not the candidate has substantially complied, failure to do so resulting in the exclusion
from the list of candidates to be interviewed and considered for nomination.
Pursuant to this, the OSRN required Respondent to submit her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the
period within which she was employed by UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering
that such government records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured OSRN that UP has cleared her of all
responsibilities, accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that her

90 !
service in the government was not continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her service in
UP ended) and 2010 (when she was appointed to the SC).
Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC. Neither can the JBC Execom produce
minutes of the deliberations to consider the issue of substantial compliance with documentary
requirements. However, despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report
regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows that her name was annotated
with “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all files. The
same annotation was found in another list regarding SALN submissions of 20 candidates, including
Respondent.
Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice.
Included in the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statement of
her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio
Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.
Case for the Petitioner:

The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in questioning the validity of
Respondent’s appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It also
argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of
Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs, Respondent has
not proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes
that since Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has
no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
Case for the Respondent:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by
impeachment on the basis of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she
argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should have been filed within one year from the
cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the disqualification.
It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not
receive compensation are not required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that
she was on official leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to
require the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided
by the Constitution.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and
deem as sufficient and acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently filed her
SALNs.” Respondent argues that the Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude
failure to file SALNs simply because these documents are missing in the Office of the Court
Administrator's files should likewise be made applicable to her case.
In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forum-shopping against Petitioner.
Motions for Inhibition:

Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices (Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and
Leonardo- de Castro), imputing actual bias for having testified in the House Committee for Justice on
the impeachment complaint and on Justice Tijam for allegedly stating, in a Manila Times article, that
Respondent is in culpable violation of the Constitution if she continues to ignore the impeachment
process. She alleged that their testimonies show that they harbored personal resentment and ill

91 !
feelings towards her, and that she has already been pre-judged by some as having committed a
culpable violation of the Constitution for having failed to submit her SALNs, among others. She also
sought to disqualify Justice Martires for his insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her
mental and psychological fitness.
ISSUES
A. Preliminary Issues
1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.
2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the Associate Justices on the basis of actual
bias is proper.
B. Substantive Issues
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription;
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC, and whether such determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required
by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file
SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;
c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice; and
d. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured
such ineligibility.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
HELD
Ruling on the Preliminary Issues:
1. Motions for Intervention
The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the motions for intervention filed by
several other groups. It observed that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion; that movant- intervenors have no legal interest in the case, as required in order to qualify a
person to intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in a
particular group.
Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned position, which is the only time when
an individual himself/herself may commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the movants-
intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the
ones charged with the usurpation thereof.
2. Motions for Inhibition

There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear
and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a whole, was only
to prod the Respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment. It does not
appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that
some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining
probable cause for the impeachment of Respondent does not disqualify them to hear the instant
petition. Their appearance was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional

92 !
duty to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be doubted. Their
appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed
the parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing should be carefully
viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against
Respondent.
Ruling on the Substantive Issues:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto
against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already
been filed with the House of Representatives.
YES
a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This
jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section
7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of
Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified
considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public
concern.
The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one of first
impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility
and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being
scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.
b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto petition
cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto
are materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the
public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are
political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in
the courts.
Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and
impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2)
grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The
causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of
action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two
proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding
a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction
shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.
Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings
in the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought
to be determined.
c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected

impeachable official may be removed from office. Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules

93 !
expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to
question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto
petition against an impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v.
Macapagal- Arroyo where SC took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against former President
Macapagal- Arroyo considering whether former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his
official status as President).
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an
alternative mode of effecting the removal.
That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to be taken as a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may” cannot also be understood to qualify
only the imposable penalties because it would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may
be imposed — a situation not contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision.
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To
hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer
cannot be questioned, on the basis of citizenship or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such
an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue
discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such
would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office
through impeachment.
d. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo warranto does not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce
such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not
preclude the House of Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable
cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed part of the allegations in the
Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional requirement, the violation of which
constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable officers, Respondent’s
position also demands compliance with the qualifications of having to be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence — and the failure to submit SALNs goes into the
very qualification of integrity.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obviate confusion in the future as to when quo
warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the
Court’s function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein
demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement
thereof are present. On the contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity,
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly

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appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and
the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
e. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced. An outright dismissal of
the petition based on speculation that Respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle an actual controversy squarely presented before it. There is
also no possibility of a constitutional crisis upon which an abdication of such duty is to be premised
because, as discussed, it is within the Court’s judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual
controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is not arrogating
upon itself the power to impeach, which is a political exercise.
f. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance. Respondent
cannot now be heard to deny the Court’s jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an
impeachable official because Respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court
by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court and by moving that the case be heard
on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription.

NO
a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year limitation is not applicable when the
Petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself
seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest. In the three instances enumerated by
Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo
warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.”
In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation,
civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.” In
effect, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights,
there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that
“prescription does not lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the
Civil Code, applies in this case.
b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the prescriptive period. That
prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto, which is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. The Republic,
then, cannot be faulted for questioning Respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of
the cause of ouster.
Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the
said documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to
retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are more than fifteen years old;
and that U.P. already cleared her of “all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities and from administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether she
had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in
this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress
against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.
c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued with
public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.

95 !
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice.

NO
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the
JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s
supervisory and review powers.
NO
The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own
rules. In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that
the Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. Furthermore, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is
determined based on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on
the part of the nominating body. Proceeding from this, qualifications under the Constitution cannot be
waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification is the requirement of possession of
proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also mentioned in administrative cases, in
the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of
Professional Integrity, and in the JBC- 009 Rules.
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and
its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice.
YES
i. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates
to a person’s integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation
to the requirement of integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement,
under Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing
of SALN is rendered even more exacting when the public official concerned is a member of the
Judiciary.
ii. Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity. To be of
proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the Constitution, means that the applicant must
have established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line, failure to file the
SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the
ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency
as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply
with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may
consider him/her disqualified from holding public office.
Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate integrity does not persuade.
Whether or not Respondent accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but whether
she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs.
iii. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and
the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be
deemed to be a person of proven integrity. Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the
filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent
opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason.

96 !
Her defenses do not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada was
able to present contrary proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus
rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a number of years, as opposed to
the present case where no proof of existence and filing were presented; 2) Being on leave from
government service is not equivalent to separation from service such that she was still required to
submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her
SALNs, logic dictates that she should have obtained a certification to attest to the fact of filing; 4) That
UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to
comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for the UP
HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that time; 5) That Respondent’s
compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist
prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications which
were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should have been disqualified at the outset.
iv. Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent covering her years of
government service in U.P. appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious circumstances;
her SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were either belatedly filed or belatedly notarized, while SALNs
filed as Chief Justice were also attended by irregularities. This puts in question the truthfulness of
such SALNs, and would amount to dishonesty if attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or
to make false statements.
c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice.
YES
i. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. The established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the
required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of
nomination. The JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as
remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already required. There was
no indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by
Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years as Justice, as
substantial compliance. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for
having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law.
In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10)
SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc
did not do away with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance
therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all
SALNs, was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-incumbent
Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent,
who submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for
the submission to do so. Her justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs
are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back
to 1985.
Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having complied with the submission of the
SALN by submitting a Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however,
hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.

97 !
Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file several SALNs during the course
of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from
the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.
For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Respondent for interview as it already
required the submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding 10 years
up to December 31, 2011.
ii. Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was
not established at the time of her application. Contrary to Respondent’s argument that failure to
submit her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for disqualification, the requirement to submit the SALNs,
along with the waiver of bank deposits, is not an empty requirement that may easily be dispensed
with, but was placed by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on its mandate
of recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be unsusceptible to
impeachment attacks due to inaccuracies in SALNs. Without submission of such requirement, the JBC
and the public are without opportunity to measure the candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit
corruption or dishonesty. Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was
not able to prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
d. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
NO.
i. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest
standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent
nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In
other words, the inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President
cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of impleading the
JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the Office of
the Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the circumstances relative to the selection and nomination of
Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify
Respondent. The action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member, is
reflective of the action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and
nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the same mistake
and the President’s subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect.
While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other
legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.
ii. The Court also took into account, while conceding that the petition is not an administrative case
nor an inquiry into tax evasion against her, that Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts
and omissions demonstrating dishonesty and lack of forthrightness are discordant with any claim of
integrity. In addition to the suspicious and highly questionable circumstances surrounding the
execution of her SALNs, the following untruthful statements and dishonest acts ultimately negate
Respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity:
a. She engaged in private practice even if she had no permit from U.P. to do so while she was in
government service.

98 !
b. She represented that after her resignation from U.P. in 2006, she was engaged, full time, in private
practice. However, in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS), it was stated that she was engaged as counsel by
the government in the PIATCO cases from 1994 up to 2009.
c. She claims that it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its
personnel are properly filed and accomplished. However, U.P. HRDO could not have been expected
to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Respondent because such rule was not
yet in existence at that time.
d. Her PDS shows that she was Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights only
later to be disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument stating that it was only a functional title.
e. In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent represented that her SALNs were infeasible
to retrieve when the SALNs that she selectively filed were available all along in U.P. and in fact the
OSG was able to get copies of the same.
f. In the Letter, the Respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to retrieve" all her SALNs because of the
age of said documents, i.e., that they are more than fifteen years old. However, during her Oral
Arguments, she explained that it was "infeasible" to retrieve them only because of time constraints.
g. She claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position did not comply with the SALN
requirement for the application, when it was only she who did not comply.
h. She committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her income in her income tax returns
for the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT) returns for the years 2005-2009.
iii. Further, Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of candidness are
manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which
are now matters of public record and also determined to be constituting probable cause for
impeachment:
a. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least Php5,000,000.00;
b. Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding and who received
excessive compensation amounting to more than Php 11,000,000.00;
c. Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La

Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting;
d. Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the Regional Court
Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Court En Banc;
e. Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules misrepresented that the TRO
was issued upon the recommendation of the Member-in- charge;
f. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of
Mindanao;
g. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which
caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices;
h. Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the
Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the approval of the Court En Banc;

99 !
i. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high- ranking positions in the Supreme
Court;
j. Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during the Supreme Court
En Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent
judges in illegal drugs and undermined the co-equal power of the Executive Department by ordering
the Executive Secretary himself to file cases against the judges;
k. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice
Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the
latter;
l. Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan
without legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary;
m. Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there were Justices who
requested to do away with the voting of recommended applicants to the vacant positions in the
Supreme Court;
n. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate Justice Fernanda
Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals;
o. Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives on the alleged misuse
of the tobacco funds in the Province of llocos Norte by unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement, asking
the House of Representatives to reconsider its show cause order against the Justices of the Court of
Appeals, and then pressuring then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to likewise sign the same; and
p. Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings conducted by the House of

Representatives against her.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

DE FACTO
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For
lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and
is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never attained the status
of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified.
The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Respondent
from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of Respondent from holding and
exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance of the Sub Judice Rule:

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.

Pananampalataya.Pag-asa.Pag-ibig strengthens me.- Philippians 4:13 ! 100 of 143
!
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of the Government and even men
and women learned in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert the instant quo
warranto action from its primary purpose. Even worse, Respondent and her spokespersons chose to
litigate Respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before several
media-covered engagements. Through her actuations, Respondent appears to have forgotten that this
is a court action for quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant rule on sub judice applies.
Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on hand, camouflaging the charges
against her with assaults to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this
is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor
for judicial independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the
Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or otherwise, of
Respondent to occupy the highest position in the Judiciary.

!
Expropriation
City of Manila vs. G.R. No. 142304 June 20, 2001 Mendoza, J. Writ of possession
Serrano is different from
expropriation.
National Power G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004 Carpio, J. When the
Corp. vs. CA defendant claims
that he suffered
damage because
of the
expropriation, the
dismissal should
not foreclose the
defendants right
to have his
damages
ascertained.
Republic vs. G.R. No. 160656 June 15, 2007 Quisumbing, J. In expropriation
Andaya cases, an essential
element of due
process is just
compensation.
Asia’s Emerging G.R. Nos. 169914, April 18, 2008 Chico - Nazario, J. The right of eminent
Dragon vs. DOTC 174166 domain extends to
personal and real
property, and the
NAIA 3 structures,
adhered as they are
to the soil, are
considered as real
property.
Abad vs. Fil- G.R. No. 189239 November 24, Carpio - Morales, The city
Homes Realty 2010 J. ordinance
authorizing the
initiation of
expropriation
proceedings does
not state that it
would transfer
ownership to the
petitioners.
NPC vs. YCLA G.R. No. 193936 December 11, 2013 Reyes, J. The measure is
Sugar Dev. Corp. not the taker’s
gain, but the
owner’s loss.

!
Limkaichong vs. G.R. No. 158464 August 02, 2016 Bersamin, J. While a petition
LBP for the fixing of
just compensation
with the SAC is
not an appeal
from the agrarian
reform
adjudicator's
decision but an
original action,
the same has to be
filed within the
15-day period
stated in the
DARAB Rules

!
City of Manila vs. Serrano
G.R. No. 142304
June 20, 2001
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manilas First District in Tondo, which are to be sold and
distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila.
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square
meters. It is covered by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of
Feliza De Guia. After her death, the estate of Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of
a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Manila in
its decision, dated May 8, 1986.
In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of which his estate,
consisting of his share in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C
was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia. On April 15, 1994, Edgardo De
Guia was issued TCT No. 215593, covering Lot 1-C.[4] On July 29, 1994, the said property was
transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT No. 217018 was issued.
The property was subsequently sold on January 24, 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT No.
226048 was issued.
On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the
supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and
138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora,
Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano.
On November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that their
mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the
bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C
would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased
mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land
among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents,
therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt from expropriation and
ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048, regarding the
pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282 for eminent domain filed by petitioner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner
to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After
petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998,
directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the expropriation
of Lot 1-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof, landless; that Lot 1-C is
exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential
lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation; that
respondents would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot 1-C which

!
consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of
the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.
On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot 1-C is not exempt
from expropriation.
ISSUE
Whether or not that the Court of Appeals erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been ordered
condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the trial court, dated December 15, 1998,
merely authorized the issuance of a writ of possession and petitioners entry into the property
pursuant to Rule 67, 2.
HELD
Yes, the CA erred.
At that stage, it was premature to determine whether the requirements of R.A. No. 7279, 9-10 have
been complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the trial court.
This contention is well taken. Rule 67, 2 provides:
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the
court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall
be fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff
in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to
the parties.
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance
with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these
requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the
writ of possession.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid
down in 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in
Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial
court in that case.
Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone
beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in R.A. No. 7279. It is, therefore,
premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without
first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in of the law.
R.A. No. 7279 in pertinent parts provide:

!
SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land.--- Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands.
SEC. 10. Modes for Land Acquisition.--- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
amount others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further,
That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and
escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be
acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through
negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall
be given the right of first refusal.
Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence,
although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements.
The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation,
particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

!
National Power Corp. vs. CA
G.R. No. 106804
August 12, 2004
Carpio, J.
FACTS
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public corporation created to generate geothermal,
hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized
by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain.
Private respondent Antonino Pobre (Pobre) is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land (Property)
located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot
Springs Resort Subdivision.
NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three instances.
First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved
subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to
acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property. On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered
the expropriation of the lots upon NPCs payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of
P207,790. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the
site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre.
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to
acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property.NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with
the Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots
covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot
upon the trial courts issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
On 29 April 1987, the trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre.
On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court but deleted the award
of attorneys fees.
ISSUE
Whether or the the award of damages to Pobre with regards to the expropriation case is proper.
HELD
Yes, it is proper.
No outright dismissal of complaint.

Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for
public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. The power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public
utilities such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain.
Eminent Domain was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still found in
Rule 67, but its title is now Expropriation.

!
A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not
intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
provided that:
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the
answer.
The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his motion to dismiss/answer
even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on
2 January 1985. However, as early as 10 December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court
and served on NPC his motion to dismiss/answer. A certain Divina Cerela received Pobres pleading
on behalf of NPC. Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court could not
save its cause.
NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right
under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served
on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice
of dismissal of the complaint. Pobres motion to dismiss/answer, filed and served way ahead of NPCs
motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies.
Dismissal of expropriation case does not dismiss the case for damages.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the complaint
precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The
plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court
approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right
over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that
the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law.
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may
have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case
cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,
then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that
his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not
foreclose the defendants right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate
action.
Thus, NPCs theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobres claim for
damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the
dismissal of the defendants claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law
holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made
either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the

!
reservation of the defendants right to recover damages either in the same or in another action. The
trial court in this case reserved Pobres right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has
become final due to NPCs own fault.
Damage when property cannot be used despite the dismissal of expropriation.

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the
landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it
is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to
restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-
subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely
lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property.
In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered
uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed
complete. Such taking is thus compensable.
In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation
and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment
of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, the Court compelled
the National Housing Authority (NHA) to pay just compensation to the landowners even after the
NHA had already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government
agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, and then just decide
not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and capricious and
was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to the landowners
for the prejudice that they had suffered.
In this case, NPC appropriated Pobres Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC
dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute
expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second
expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation
and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no
longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the
government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPCs taking of Pobres property without
filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression
of procedural due process.
From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobres entire 68,969
square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the
Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the
damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobres
repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.

!
NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had
found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second
expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC
has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the
just compensation for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further delay in
his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC.
Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss. The trial and appellate courts endeavored
to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property is
reasonable considering that the Property was already an established resort-subdivision. NPC has
itself to blame for not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square
meter valuation, the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre is P3,448,450.
The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking up to
the time of full payment by the government.

!
Republic vs. Andaya
G.R. No. 160656
June 15, 2007
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Bading, Butuan City.
These properties are subject to a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation
ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or public enterprise, at no cost to the
government, except only the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60-meter
easement of right-of-way. The easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of
the Lower Agusan Development Project. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. The trial court issued a writ of
possession on April 26, 1996 It also constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the
just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of Expropriation upon payment of just
compensation.
On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10,380 square meters
of Andayas properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. The Board
also reported that the easement would diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a
result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting to P2,820,430 for the
remaining area.
Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced the easement to 10 meters or an
equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still granted it 4,443 square meters.
After considering the Boards report, the trial court decreed on April 29, 1999, as follows (among
others):
a)That the plaintiff is legally entitled to its inherent right of expropriation to, viz.
b)That however, the plaintiff is obligated to pay defendant the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY (P2,820,430.00) PESOS as fair and reasonable
severance damages;
c)To pay defendants counsel FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as Attorneys fees.

The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision by imposing a 6% interest on the
consequential damages from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking, and by deleting
the attorneys fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-
way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.
HELD
Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government
actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also
when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. Using this
standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andayas property. True, no burden
was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. But, as correctly

Pananampalataya.Pag-asa.Pag-ibig strengthens me.- Philippians 4:13 ! 111 of !143
observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the floodwalls
would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress
to the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. One of the basic principles enshrined
in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of
law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article III of
our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that just compensation
should be paid only for 5,937 square meters of the total area of 10,380 square meters. Admittedly, the
Republic needs only a 10-meter easement or an equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also settled
that it is legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of 4,443 square meters. Clearly,
although the Republic will use only 701 square meters, it should not be liable for the 3,742 square
meters, which constitute the difference between this area of 701 square meters and the 4,443 square
meters to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge except for damages to affected
existing improvements, if any, under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is liable for just compensation of
only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full payment is made.

!
Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs. DOTC
G.R. Nos. 169914, 174166
April 18, 2008
Chico - Nazario, J.
FACTS
Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy,
Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore
the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal.
To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp.
(AEDC).
AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/[Manila

International Airport Authority (MIAA)] for the development of NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, in accordance
with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.
The PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the
Paircargo Consortium.
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the
Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity as
Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.
On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO,
through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997
Concession Agreement).
As to the merits of the Petitions in Agan, the Court concluded that:
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo
Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, considering that the 1997 Concession
Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the
1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997
Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under
Sections 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in
relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by,

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among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The
Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.
Republic v. Gingoyon (G.R. No. 166429)

According to the statement of facts in Gingoyon:
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession
of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate
operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities.
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate
holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a
writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in
Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for
taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick
F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an
Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter
upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities.
The RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No.
8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974
and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary.
Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard
for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the
value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77
to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government "specifically made
available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of
just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC.
Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds
signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation.

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Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or
"perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal,
pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the
Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing
any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed by the government
on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7
January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action
on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005.
The Court resolved the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines and Manila International Airport
Authority in Gingoyon in this wise:
In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:

(1)The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may
take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and
equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as
pronounced in the Agan cases.
(2)Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the
Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation
standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.
(3)Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over
NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered
value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.
(4)Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3
Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an
international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-
stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the repair, reconditioning and improvement of
the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment,
provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services
that are integral to a modern-day international airport."
5)The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from
finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with the standards set under Rep. Act No.
8974 and its Implementing Rules. Considering that the NAIA 3 consists of structures and improvements, the
valuation thereof shall be determined using the replacements cost method, as prescribed under Section 10 of the
Implementing Rules.
(6)There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the
purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar
as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in
Agan.
(7)The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO
immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
(8)There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.

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All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the
questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the
pronouncements made by the Court herein.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Baterina (G.R. No. 174166)
As mentioned in Gingoyon, expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the
Government with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Case No. 04-0876CFM. Congressman Baterina,
together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention in Case No.
04-0876CFM by filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention (with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Baterina, et al. believe that the Government
need not file expropriation proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not
entitled to payment of just compensation,
On 27 March 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order and Writ of Execution.
The Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining,
among other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the questioned Orders, dated 27
March 2006 and 15 June 2006.
ISSUE
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings is not proper on the ground that NAIA IPT III is
already public property.
HELD
Yes, the expropriation proceedings is proper in the instant case.
This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in
Agan that for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA IPT III facility, it has to
compensate PIATCO as a builder of the structures; and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in
accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
PIATCO and its investors."
As between the Republic and PIATCO, the judgment on the need to compensate PIATCO before the
Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already conclusive and beyond question.
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely:
(i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation
is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any
mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain.
It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines
which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of
respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation,
pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.
The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of the Republic's
resort to expropriation proceedings:
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added
benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO.
We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a
building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort to

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eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the
property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this
case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the
Government of NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through
the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood
after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by
lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they
are to the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It
should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property
sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant
expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the
NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the
most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable
immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through
which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent
domain proceedings in this case.
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or construe
these rules in accordance with the Court's prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the
Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution
is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if
not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court
will be severely diminished. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, also in Gingoyon, categorically recognized PIATCO's ownership over the structures it had
built in NAIA IPT III,.
Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by
PIATCO.
It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation proceedings shall be held in accordance with
Republic Act No. 8974,67 thus:
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution,
which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the
takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a
writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare
minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered
value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one
which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled in Gingoyon that:

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Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the owner of the property the
amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the
amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and regulations for the
equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land." Under the present implementing rules
in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based using "the replacement cost method."
However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just
compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount
of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to
the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the
improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act
No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of
the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation.
Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is
of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the
standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered value" may strike as a highly subjective
standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant
standards by which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial
determination of the propriety of the proffered value.
In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount of P3
Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of
the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the
erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the
amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value
under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value,
the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its
proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.

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Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty
G.R. No. 189239
November 24, 2010
Carpio - Morales, J.
FACTS
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents),
co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City a filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against above-named petitioners before the Paranaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but
ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.

Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents
predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they
contend that the question of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be
resolved.

During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paranaque filed expropriation
proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque with the intention of
establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including
petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the
City.

Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer
case against petitioners.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008 reversed the MeTC
decision and dismissed respondents complaint
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they maintained that
respondents act of allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an
ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession. The CA ruled in
favor of respondents.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA decision was correct.
HELD
Yes, the CA’s decision was correct.
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension.
Eminent Domain; Socialized Housing Project.—

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use
upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use
as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice.
Same; Ejectment; Under Commonwealth Act No. 538, ejectment of tenant is suspended while expropriation
proceedings is pending but tenant must pay the rent and be entitled to suspension.—
When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants

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occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter
case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the
suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit
the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.
Petitioners posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer
assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there.
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing
the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the
lots on the basis of the ordinance.
Same; The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local
Government Code (LGC).—
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the
property.
Same; Stages of Expropriation.—

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of
“the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment
of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write
finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the
NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation.
Same; Writ of possession in expropriation proceedings.—

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents
prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by mere tolerance.

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Same; Ejectment; Effect of Possession by Mere Tolerance.—
It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

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NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Dev. Corp.
G.R. No. 193936
December 11, 2013
Reyes, J.
FACTS
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government owned and controlled corporation
created for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the
Philippines. NPC is thus authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the said
purpose.
Respondent YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels
of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.
In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties,
including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA.
Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against
YCLA and several other individuals for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that
would be affected by the construction of transmission lines. YCLA filed its Answer, alleging that the
Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPC’s failure to allege the public use for the intended
expropriation of its properties.
On May 2, 2001, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just
compensation of the subject properties at ₱500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount
recommended by the Board of Commissioners, claiming that the amount of just compensation should
be fixed at ₱900.00 per sq m considering the improvements in their properties.
On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report, which fixed the just
compensation of the subject properties at ₱1,000.00 per sq m. The Board of Commissioners’ Report
dated September 15, 2003, in part, reads:
On May 12, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, which adopted the report and recommendation of the
Board of Commissioners.
The CA modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the amount of just compensation to
₱900.00 per sq m instead of ₱1,000.00 per sq m, since YCLA only sought an award of ₱900.00 per sq m
as just compensation for the subject properties in the proceedings before the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just
compensation of the subject properties.
HELD
No, thus case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in
conformity with this Decision.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to

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convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the

market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after
conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties on August 27, 2003.
However, the Board of Commissioners’ recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was
based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of
the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was
filed by NPC on December 2, 1997.
Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated September 15, 2003,
merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of ₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for
the subject properties based on actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the
opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report dated September 15, 2003 is
not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn declarations of the "reliable persons"
that were supposedly interviewed.
The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several
factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.
The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for
fixing the value of the condemned property. A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not
based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report
submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in
character. It may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In
this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the Board of Commissioners' Report dated
September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any documentary evidence.
Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the subject properties
is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA should be set aside.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot fix the amount of just compensation for the subject properties at
₱500.00 per sq m pursuant to the Board of Commissioners' Report dated May 2, 2001. The said Report
suffers from the same infirmity as the Report dated September 15, 2003 - it is unsupported by any

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documentary evidence and its recommendation as regards the amount of just compensation are based
on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2001.

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Limkaichong vs. LBP
G.R. No. 158464
August 02, 2016
Bersamin, J.
FACTS
The petitioner was the registered owner of agricultural lands situated in Villegas, Guihulngan,
Negros Oriental. For purposes of placing those lands within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657
(R.A. No, 6657), the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator, in Dumaguete City sent to her in 1998 several Notices of Land Valuation and
Acquisition by which her lands were valued for acquisition by the DAR.
After the petitioner rejected such valuation of her lands, the DARAB conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation. On May 28, 1999, the DARAB
issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon finding the valuation consistent with
existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.
On August 19, 1999, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City a
complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands, impleading as defendant the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) and the DAR.
After filing their answer, the respondents filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss, stating that the
petitioner's failure to timely appeal the May 28, 1999 DARAB order had rendered the order final and
executory pursuant to Section 5112 of R.A. No. 6657.
In her opposition to the respondents' motion to dismiss, the petitioner admitted that Civil Case No,
12558 was filed beyond the reglementary period, but insisted that the RTC sitting as special agrarian
court (SAC) was not barred from acquiring jurisdiction over the complaint for determination of just
compensation, because her cause of action was anchored on the respondents' violation of her right to
due process and their taking of her property without just compensation due to the DARAB valuation
being too low and having been arbitrarily arrived at.
On June 7, 2001, the RTC as the SAC granted the respond ents' motion to dismiss.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but to no avail.
On November 22, 2002, the CA rendered its decision affirming the order of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the failure to file before the decision/order of the DARAB after the reglementary
period will make such order, final and executory pursuant to Section 51 of R.A, No. 6657.
HELD
Yes, but such ruling should be applied retrospectively.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts
under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor
decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is
stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time we answer in the affirmative.
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow

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the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
The Court has reiterated EPZA v. Dulay in its later decisions, stressing that such determination was
the function of the courts of justice that no other branch or official of the Government could usurp.
Upon the effectivity of R.A, No, 6657 in 1988, the DAR, as the central implementing agency of the law,
promulgated the DARAB Rules of Procedures in 1989, 1994, 2003, and 2009 pursuant to the provisions
of Section 4937 and Section 5038 of R.A. No. 6657 vesting it with the power to issue rules and
regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of the CARL,
Moreover, Section 57 of the CARL defines the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as the SAC, viz.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, which was principally relied upon by the petitioner herein, reiterated
that the determination of just compensation for the taking of lands under the CARL was a power
vested in the courts and not in administrative agencies, clarifying that the jurisdiction of the SAC was
not appellate but original and exclusive.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and
to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and
therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the
ultimate power to decide this question.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided
in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case
and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the
bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica
and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just
compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision but an
original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules;
otherwise, the adjudicator's decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and
settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before
the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR
adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value
of his property.
In all of the foregoing rulings of the Court as well as in subsequent ones, it could not have been
overemphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain is a judicial function.
However, the more recent jurisprudence uphold the preeminence of the pronouncement in Philippine
Veterans Bank to the effect that the parties only have 15 days from their receipt of the decision/order
of the DAR within which to invoke the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC; otherwise, the
decision/order attains finality and immutability.
It remains uncontested that the petitioner filed her complaint in the RTC for the determination of just
compensation after more than two and a half months had already elapsed from the time the DARAB
issued the assailed valuation. Following the pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Banks, her failure
to file the complaint within the prescribed 15-day period from notice would have surely rendered the

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DARAB's valuation order final and executory. As such, it would seem that there was sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for having been filed out of time.
However, we cannot fairly and properly hold that the petitioner's complaint for the determination of
just compensation should be barred from being tried and decided on that basis. The prevailing rule at
the time she filed her complaint on August 19, 1999 was that enunciated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals on October 30, 1996. The pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank was promulgated on
January 18, 2000 when the trial was already in progress in the RTC, At any rate, it would only be eight
years afterwards that the Court en banc unanimously resolved the jurisprudential conundrum
through its declaration in Land Bank v. Martinez that the better rule was that enunciated in Philippine
Veterans Bank, The Court must, therefore, prospectively apply Philippine Veterans Bank. The effect is
that the petitioner's cause of action for the proper valuation of her expropriated property should be
allowed to proceed. Hence, her complaint to recover just compensation was properly brought in the
RTC as the SAC, whose dismissal of it upon the motion of Land Bank should be undone.

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Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Ramirez vs.
Manila Banking
Corp.
Marquez vs.
Alindog
Ardiente vs.
Provincial Sheriff
LZK Holdings vs.

Planters Dev.
Bank
Goldenway
Merchandising
Corp. vs.
Equitable PCI
bank
Solid Builders vs.

CBC (also on
injuction)
Robles vs.
Yapcinco
MBTC vs. CPR

Promotions and
Marketing, Inc.

!
Ramirez vs. Manila Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 198800
December 11, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land located at Bayanbayanan, Marikina City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-107226 and N-230337 in favor of respondent, The
Manila Banking Corporation to secure his ₱265,000 loan. The real estate mortgage provides that all
correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to
petitioner Ramirez at his given address.
Respondent filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage before Atty. Hipolito
Sañez on the ground that Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite demands. During the auction sale on
September 8, 1994, respondent was the only bidder for the mortgaged properties. Thereafter, a
certificate of sale was issued in its favor as the highest bidder.
In 2000, respondent demanded that Ramirez vacate the properties.
Ramirez sued respondent for annulment of sale and prayed that the certificate of sale be annulled on
the ground, among others, that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage was violated for he was not
notified of the foreclosure and auction sale.
In its answer, respondent claimed that the foreclosure proceedings were valid.
The trial court ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were null and void and the
certificate of sale is invalid.
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the non-observance of paragraph N in the mortgage agreement warrants the
foreclosure to be null and void.
HELD
Yes, it warrants the foreclosure to be null and void.
We rule that when respondent failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it
committed a contractual breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale on September 8, 1994 null and void.
In Carlos Lim, et al. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, we held that unless the parties stipulate,
personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in
paragraph N of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including
notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at his given address.
Respondent had no choice but to comply with this contractual provision it has entered into with
Ramirez. The contract is the law between them. Hence, we cannot agree with the bank that paragraph
N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an additional obligation upon it to provide personal
notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.

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Marquez vs. Alindog
G.R. No. 184045
January 22, 2014
FACTS
Records show that sometime in June 1998, petitioner Anita J. Marquez (Anita) extended a loan in the
amount of ₱500,000.00 to a certain Benjamin Gutierrez (Gutierrez). As security therefor, Gutierrez
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated June 16, 1998 over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay
City (subject property), registered under the name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez, married to Liwanag
Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage was duly annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No.
T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had verified as clean prior to the mortgage.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the subject property. At the public auction sale held on January 19, 2000, Anita emerged
as the highest bidder for the amount of ₱1,171,000.00.9 Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same
property within the prescribed period therefor, title was consolidated under TCT No. T-4193910 on
November 5, 2001 (in the name of Anita J. Marquez, married to Nicasio C. Marquez) which, however,
bore an annotation of adverse claim dated March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-spouses Carlito
and Carmen Alindog (Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was copied from an earlier annotation on TCT
No. T-13443 made only after the subject property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, or on March 21, 2000, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real estate
mortgage and certificate of sale with prayer for damages against Sps. Marquez and a certain Agripina
Gonzales (Gonzales) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1966 (annulment case). In their
complaint, Sps. Alindog alleged that they purchased the subject property from Gutierrez way back in
September 1989, but were unable to secure a certificate of title in their names because Gonzales – to
whom they have entrusted said task – had deceived them in that they were assured that the said
certificate was already being processed when such was not the case.Eventually, they found out that
the property had already been mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and that when they tried to contact
Gonzales for an explanation, she could no longer be found. Separately, Sps. Alindog averred that
when the mortgage was executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead.
In their defense, Sps. Marquez disputed Sps. Alindog’s ownership over the subject property, arguing
that the purported sale in the latter’s favor was never registered and therefore, not binding upon
them.
Further, they insisted that their certificate of title, TCT No. T-41939, was already indefeasible, and
cannot be attacked collaterally.
Meanwhile, on March 16, 2005, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
(ex-parte petition) before the RTC, claiming that the same is ministerial on the court’s part following
the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the subject property.
In an Order dated August 1, 2005, the RTC granted Anita’s ex-parte petition and thereby directed the
issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. Consequently, a notice to vacate dated September 23,
2005 was issued by Acting Sheriff Teodorico V. Cosare (Sheriff Cosare) against Sps. Gutierrez and all
persons claiming rights under them. Sps. Alindog were served with a copy of the said notice to vacate
on September 27, 2005.
Claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury if the implementation of the writ of possession in
favor of Sps. Marquez would be left unrestrained, Sps. Alindog sought the issuance of a temporary

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restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for damages, in a separate
case(injunction case) which was raffled to the same court.
While it appears that the RTC issued a 72-hour TRO on September 29, 2005 in Sps. Alindog’s favor,
records nonetheless show that said order was not extended to a full 20-day TRO.To this end, the
Sheriff’s Return dated November 14, 2005 shows that Sheriff Cosare was able to implement the writ
of possession on November 11, 2005, turning over the possession of the subject property to Sps.
Marquez.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC, through an Order dated November 14,
2005, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property until after the controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. The said issuance
was based on the RTC’s appreciation of the initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog, concluding that
they appear to have a right to be protected. Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps.
Marquez’s title over the subject property, the RTC granted Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief,
holding that any further dispossession on their part would cause them irreparable injury.
The CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part
when it issued the injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
property.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
property.
HELD
Yes, the CA erred.
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as
amended. The purchaser at the public auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may
seek possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a
period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath
and filed in form or an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered,
or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage
duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the
clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety six as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-
eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue
addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing provision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:

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As may be seen, the law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or
cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of such motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession. Under the legal provisions above copied, the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of
course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to
the court. And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation of
the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is not to be
raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding
for this is ex parte.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks
possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period for redemption. Upon the
purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a
matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the purchaser’s favor.
In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, the Court reasoned that if under Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the RTC has the power during the period of redemption to issue a writ
of possession on the ex parte application of the purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also
have the same power after the expiration of the redemption period, especially where a new title has
already been issued in the name of the purchaser. Hence, the procedure under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking possession of the foreclosed property he
bought at the public auction sale after the redemption period has expired without redemption having
been made.
xxxx
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is
not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the
possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of
the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper
application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations and emphases in the original omitted)
In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. CA, the Court expounded on the ministerial nature of the
foregoing issuance as follows:
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the
consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a
ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection
with such issuance is misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial

foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33,45 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in
an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or
right.

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In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno, citing the case of China
Banking Corp., the Court illumined that "the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the
property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely
the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.”
In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, the third
person must therefore claim a right superior to that of the original mortgagor.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had
already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in
nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their
purported purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the
original mortgagor).
Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez)
successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior to them.
That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which
enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property.

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Ardiente vs. Provincial Sheriff
G.R. No. 148448
August 17, 2004
Carpio - Morales, J.
FACTS
In mid-November 1979, the spouses Rustico Ardiente and Asuncion Paloma, together with their son
Angel P. Ardiente and the latters wife Gliceria Ardiente, obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00
from the Peninsula Development Bank (the bank) at its main office at Lucena City, to be amortized in
six years, on account of which they executed a November 15, 1979 Promissory Note in the same
amount.
To secure the payment of the loan, the Ardientes executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate
Mortgageon November 14, 1979 over a parcel of land situated at Mabutag, Cawa, Buenavista,
Quezon.
Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a mini bus costing P81,875.00.
After the bus was in operation for several months, it met an accident in August 1980 as result of
which it sustained heavy damages and rendered the Ardientes unable to meet their obligation to the
bank. As the Ardientes were later granted by the bank an additional loan of P46,000 for which they
executed an October 29, 1981 Promissory Note, the Real Estate Mortgage was amended.
Demands for the payment of their obligation to the bank notwithstanding, the Ardientes failed to
settle the same.
The bank thus extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were
sold at public auction to the bank which was the highest bidder.
The bank later notified the Ardientes by letter of February 24, 1984 that they had one (1) year from
November 11, 1983 or up to November 11, 1984 to redeem the foreclosed mortgage.
Two days before the period to redeem the foreclosed mortgage expired or on November 9, 1984, the
spouses Rustico and Suncion Ardiente filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon at
Gumaca a complaint, denominated as Petition, against the bank, the provincial Sheriff of Quezon, and
the Register of deeds of Quezon, for Annulment of Auction Sale with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages, anchored among others, the alleged lack of notice to them of the judicial foreclosure
auction sale.
The Complaint was later amended whereby the spouses Ardiente alleged that, among other things,
the purchase price of the mortgaged parcels of land was so grossly and greatly inadequate, hence, the
foreclosure sale should be annulled; by reason of the unlawful foreclosure of the real estate mortgage,
they suffered damages; and to protect their interests, they filed a formal request with the Register of
Deeds to cause a notice of lis pendens.
RTC: “Therefore, in the absence of convincing proof that the statutory provisions governing publication of
notice of mortgage foreclosure sales have been strictly complied with, this Court has no other recourse except to
declare as null and void the sale in favor of judgment creditor”.
By Decision of January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE

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Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings should be dismissed.
HELD
No, it should not be dismissed as it is proper.
It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.
With respect to petitioners argument that the bank, in paragraph 25 of its Answer, in fact put in issue
its compliance with the requirements of Act 3135, more specifically with regards to the notices of the
public auction sale as well as the extra-judicial application in accordance with law, to thus call for the
presentation of evidence, they citing again Benavides, the same fails.
Benavides bears on the rendition of judgment on the pleadings. It holds that where the defendants
answer tenders an issue, as where it does not only deny the material allegations of the complaint but
also sets up certain special and affirmative defenses, the nature of such answer calls for presentation
of evidence, hence, it is error to render a judgment on the pleadings thereon without such evidence.
No doubt, it is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of

mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom
will invalidate the notice and the sale at least voidable.
Despite petitioners non-allegation of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure in their Complaint,

the bank pleaded in its Answer (1) that petitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure
and public auction sale and [t]here was sufficient notice and publication served to all concern[ed] of
said public auction sale, and (2) that it and the Office of the provincial Sheriff fully compl[ied] with
the requirements of law under Act 3135, more specifically with regard to notices of the public auction
as well as the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with law.
Yet petitioners never refuted in their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim such defense of the bank nor
presented evidence before the trial court to disprove the same.
In fact, in its Comment on petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence before the trial court, the bank,
passing on Exhibit D its letter to petitioners advising them that they had one year from November 11,
1993 to exercise their right of redemption, stated that said exhibit was admitted with the qualification
as to the purpose to the effect that said extra-judicial foreclosure was filed in accordance with law and
that all requirements of said law were complied with and that plaintiffs were duly notified of said
proceedings.
Despite the banks repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extra-judicial foreclosure
had been complied with, the banks plea of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised
by petitioners either in the Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. It was
not also raised during the trial as the entire transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings
before the trial court show. Nor even in their memorandum filed before the trial court, petitioners
having merely assailed the lack of personal notification to them of any intended extrajudicial
foreclosure and the grossly and greatly inadequate purchase price of the lands.
As the appellate court thus held, the issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.
In disposing of the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of mortgage which was
raised for the first time on appeal, this Court in Go held:

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Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of
the mortgage was raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint
in Civil Case No. 8920 the validity of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice. His own Statement of the
Facts and of the Case in the instant petition makes no reference to such lack o notice as one, or even just as a
basis for any, of his causes of action in the complaint. He sought the cancellation of the contract of mortgage
because he allegedly never received the amounts indicated in the promissory notes. Of course, nullity of the
mortgage due to absence of consideration is leagues apart form the nullity of the foreclosure of a mortgage
because of non-publication of the notice of foreclosure.
Additionally, petitioner presented no evidence before the trial court to prove the absence of publication of the
notice despite the fact that private respondents, in their Answer, squarely pleaded as a defense the foreclosure
sale and petitioners receipt of the notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper of general circulation.
That the lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised in issue by petitioner and that it is not
within the issues framed by the parties in the trial court are then too obvious. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

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LZK Holdings vs. Planters Dev. Bank
G.R. No. 187973
January 20, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS
LZK Holdings obtained a ₱40,000,000.00 loan from Planters Bank on December 16, 1996 and secured
the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union.
On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK Holdings' failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank
emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale and its certificate of sale was registered on
March 16, 1999.
On April 5, 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, a complaint for
annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and damages. LZK
Holdings also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.
On December 27, 1999, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
with the RTC-San Fernando.
On March 13, 2000 or three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the
RTC-Makati issued a TRO effective for 20 days enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating its title
over the property. On April 3, 2000, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose but the writ was issued only on June 20, 2000 upon LZK Holdings'
posting of a ₱40,000.00 bond.
In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the property on April
24, 2000. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was
suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in an Order dated May 11, 2000 in view of the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati.
Meanwhile, upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null and void the
consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order dated June 2, 2000. Such ruling was affirmed by the
CA.
Planters Bank also appealed the May 11, 2000 Order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in abeyance
the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. This time, Planters Bank
was victorious.
The CA granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San Fernando.
Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the Court in a petition for review docketed as G.R.
No. 167998.8 In Our Decision dated April 27, 2007, we affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed that
Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser of the property in
the foreclosure sale.
Armed with the above ruling, Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San Fernando a motion to set ex-
parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession.

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The RTC-San Fernando issued an Order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and academic and
granting Planter Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession which was filed as
early as December 27, 1999.
The CA affirmed the foregoing ruling and dismissed LZK Holdings' petition for certiorari docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 103267.
LZK Holdings also claimed that the writ of possession issued to Planters Bank should be annulled for
the following reasons, to wit:
(a) with the cancellation of Planters Bank's consolidated title, LZK Holdings remain to be the
registered owner of the property and as such, the former had no right to apply for a writ of
possession pursuant to PNB v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, which held that right of possession is
based on the ownership of the subject property by the applicant;
(b) LZK Holdings was deprived of due process because the RTC did not conduct a hearing on Planter
Bank's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession;
(c) the P.2,000,000.00 bond posted by LZK Holdings does not conform with Section 7 of Act No. 3135
which mandates that the bond amount shall be equivalent to "twelve (12) months use of the subject
property" which in this case amounted to P.7,801,4 72.28 at the time the writ was issued.
ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of possession issued to Planters Bank should be annulled.
HELD
No, the writ cannot be annulled.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter's Bank to a writ of possession
as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was
rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA.
It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of
possession.
Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of possession over the
subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of such
particular issue.
Moreover, the authority relied upon by LZK Holdings defeats rather than support its position. The
ruling in PNB echoes the very same rationale of the judgment in G.R. No. 167998 that is - the
purchaser in foreclosure sale may take possession of the property even before the expiration of the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon posting of the necessary
bond.

!
The pronouncement in PNB that right of possession is based on the ownership of the subject property
by the applicant pertains to applications for writ of possession after the expiration of the redemption
period, a situation not contemplated within the facts of the present case.
We cannot also uphold the contentions of LZK Holdings that the RTC, in issuing the writ of
possession, transgressed Act No. 3135.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the following
disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. which reiterates the settled rules on writs of
possession, to wit:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial
proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of
interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought
an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition
for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed by the CA The allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve
factual matters within the competence of the trial court to address as this Court is not a trier of facts.

!
Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank
G.R. No. 195540
March 13, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over its real properties situated in Valenzuela,
Bulacan (now Valenzuela City). The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) loan
granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.
As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on
December 13, 2000. During the public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for ₱3,500,000.00
to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On
February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655
and T-214528.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by
tendering a check in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00. However, petitioner was told that such redemption
is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered.
On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the
respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should
apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791.
In its Answer with Counterclaim,8 respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot claim that it was
unaware of the redemption price which is clearly provided in Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, and that
petitioner had all the opportune time to redeem the foreclosed properties from the time it received the
letter of demand and the notice of sale before the registration of the certificate of sale.
On January 8, 2007, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the
counterclaim.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the redemption period for juridical persons is different from that of natural ones.
HELD
Yes, it is different.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of
sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s
default and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose
the mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with
Act No. 3135, as amended.
However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as "The General Banking Law of 2000" which
took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135.
Under the new law, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are allowed to
exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of
foreclosure sale" and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.

!
When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it
with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and
every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.18 Indeed, those who petition this Court to declare
a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the
petition must fail.
Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription against
impairment of the obligation of contract has no basis.
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of
contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered
with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties.21
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions,
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the
parties.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only
modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided
in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and
expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is
earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47
exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/
property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class
privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed
or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all
persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. We have ruled that one class may be treated
differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. If
classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies
equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for
juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 3135.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the
statute,and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other
individual rights to contract and to property, it has to give way to police power exercised for public
welfare. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.

!
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier
purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the
demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses
extends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably
imbued with public interest.

!
Allied Bank vs. Mateo

!

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Remedial Law Review PANGANDOY ZBA Notes

(You gotta STUDY, bitch)

Bank of G.R. Nos. September 24, Brion, J. What is an action

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II. Second set of CB bills

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

The remedy of interpleader

This is plain error.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:

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I can do all things through CHRIST who

Chavez vs. G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 Mendoza, J. ?

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

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RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

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This disposition is immediately executory.

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Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Ruling of the Court

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Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

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Alliance for G.R. No. 206987 September 10, Perez, J. Review on

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Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs. COMELEC

On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s

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UP Board of G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993 Romero, J. Certiorari -

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Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.

The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.

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The decision shall be final and unappealable.

In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:

This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals: