Paper Industries Corporation v.

Asuncion
Panganiban. May 19, 1999

Petitioner: PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO
G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M.
MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION,
ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL

Respondent: JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND

NOTE: This is a different DATE and GR # than the PIC v. Asuncion case in Sir Cuison’s syllabus. It’s related
to search warrants though.

FACTS:
 January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before
the RTC of Quezon City:
o "1. That the management of PIC of the Philippines, located at Surigao del Sur, represented
by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be
used in committing the offense, and which are being kept and concealed in the premises
herein described.
o "2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
 70 M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, 10 M16 US rifles, 2 AK-47 rifles, 2 UZI
submachineguns, 2 M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm., ten (10) cal. 45
pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s],
assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'
 Attached to the application were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio
T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the statements of Mario Enad and Felipe
Moreno.
 Judge Asuncion issued the search warrant:
o After examining under oath, SPO3 Bacolod, he found that there is probable cause to
believe that the management of PIC of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G.
Santiago, has in its possession or control of the firearms in the application in violation of
 the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and
the same should be seized and brought before this Court.
o Authorizing them to make an immediate search in the daytime between 8 AM and 4 PM
and to seize and bring the articles and make an immediate return thereof.
 February 4, 1995 - the police seized several firearms and weapons.
 Petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" the search warrant before the RTC. Subsequently, they also
filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence."
RTC: Denied the motions.
 Appealed to SC on pure questions of law.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the search warrant is valid. NO!
 The respondents argued that the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, and
that the petition assails the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its
implementation.
o The court held that it is settled that “there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.” Petitioners do not question the truth of the facts,
rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at.
 The requisites of a valid search warrant are:
o (1) probable cause is present;
o (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
o (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by
the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
o (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
o (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
 The search warrant is invalid because:
o (1) The trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents:
o (2) SPO3 Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and
o (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

(1) No Personal Examination of the Witnesses

 Judge Asuncion insisted that the search warrant was valid because before issuing it, the court
propounded searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determine whether
there was probable cause.
  Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by the joint Deposition of
SPO3 Bacolod and SPO2 Morito, as well as a summary information and supplementary statements
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
 Except for Pascua and Bacolod, none of the witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial
court.
 The applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of
introducing Witness Bacolod. No other questions or statements were made by Chief Inspector
Pascua for the determination of probable cause except to identify SPO3 bacolod.
 Judge Asuncion relied mainly on affidavits
o The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that Judge may be able to properly determine the existence of
probable cause. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make
his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application."

(2) Bacolod’s testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him

 Bacolod’s testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in
violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives.
o When asked about how he had knowledge that PIC was in possession of illegal firearms,
he answered that in the course of his investigation he found several high-powered
firearms kept in the ammo dam and the security guards (Blue Guards) office and that he
believes they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the verification
at FEU, Camp Crame, is concerned, he said that they have no license.
 Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms in the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod
merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that some
of the firearms were owned by PICOP but made no statement before the trial court that PICOP
had no license to possess those firearms.
 The applicant and his witnesses also failed to attach to the application a copy of the
aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP
or to present it during the hearing. FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was
also based.
o People v. Judge Estrada: "The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause
must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. This is
necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the
offense charged and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant
 who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the
examination by the judge."

(3) Place to be Searched was not Described with Particularity

 Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.
 This right embodies the belief to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and
then only under stringent procedural safeguards."
 Particularity is related to the probable cause requirement. The lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in a particular place.
 In this case, the search warrant failed to described the place with particularity. It simply authorizes
a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur."
o PICOP compound, however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses,
1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some
800 miscellaneous structures, all of which spread out over some 155 hectares.
 The warrant therefore gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the
structures found inside the PICOP compound.
 In their Defense, the police stated that they complied with the requirement because they
submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add
that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among
those identified during the hearing. – COURT WAS NOT CONVINCED
o The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search
warrant issued by Judge Asuncion.
o The fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the
PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars
of the place to be searched. Confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant —
the place indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites
uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers.
 People v. CA: "The place to be searched as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. The particularization of the
 description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search."

(4) Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

 As a result of the seizure of the firearms, the PNP filed with the DoJ a complaint against petitioners
for illegal possession of firearms.
 Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
 The exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. They are the "fruits of the
poisonous tree."
 Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.
 The complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized
pursuant to the Search Warrant. Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible,
the Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
 This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so
only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
 There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No.
799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
[SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT]
07 PEOPLE V. DICHOSO
4 June 1993 | Davide, J. |

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, SONIA DICHOSO y VINERABLE and JAIME PAGTAKHAN y BICOMONG

Doctrine: The search warrant, while captioned for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the 'Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992," its body
(WHICH IS CONTROLLING) particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the offense involved

Facts:
● February 22, 1991 - the Narcotics Command of the 4th Regional Unit stationed at San Pablo applied for a search
warrant to be issued on the house of spouses Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso located at San Pablo City.
● After searching questions on the applicant and his deponent, the Court found probable cause to believe that said
spouses were keeping, selling and using an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana in said residence. Search
Warrant 28 was issued.
● February 23, 1991 (Saturday) - at the local NARCOM Unit stationed at San Pablo City, Sgt. Iluminado Evangelista, the
local District Commander organized a team to serve Search Warrant 28 upon the Spouses Dichoso at Farconville
Subd., Phase II, San Pablo City.
● Evangelista, the team leader, was with Sgt. Fabian Gapiangao, Sgt. Antonio Tila, CIC Rolando Besinio, Police Officer
Michael Exconde and a driver.
● An old man they met along the way led them to the nipa house where inside Redentor, Pagtakhan and two other
persons (Jun and Salamat) were sitting near a small table with suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top thereof.
Taken aback, they did not move. He called for the barangay chairman.
● Chairman Francisco Calabia arrived and was met by Evangelista who showed him a copy of the warrant which he
explained to Redentor.
● The nipa house was searched and the agents discovered 200 grams of suspected marijuana wrapped in plastic inside
a cabinet which was standing on the right side upon entering the door of the nipa house. Six decks of suspected
shabu wrapped in an aluminum foil and the 'Golden Gate' notebook containing the list of suspected customers of
dangerous and regulated drugs together with the corresponding quantity and prices were likewise discovered.
● From Pagtakhan's right hand, Evangelista recovered a small quantity of suspected shabu.
● The search shifted to the main house of the Dichosos but produced negative results.
● Besinio separately wrapped the items whereupon he and Gapiangao made markings on the same. Besinio also put the
names of Redentor and Sonia inside some of the pages of the Golden Gate notebook. The team got from the main
house a plastic bag where all the confiscated items were put.
● Besinio prepared in his own handwriting the PAGPAPATUNAY attesting to the result of the search conducted by
the NARCOM team listing thereon the different confiscated items, another PAGPAPATUNAY attesting to the
lawful manner the search was conducted, and the Receipt, all dated February 23, 1991 which Calabia signed.
● Calabia explained to Redentor and Pagtakhan the contents of said exhibits after which Redentor voluntarily affixed his
signatures thereon. Pagtakhan also affixed his signatures thereon.
● A certain Angelito Ancot affixed his signature on Exhibits B and C also as witness.
● After the agents left, they brought with them for further investigation at their headquarters Redentor, Pagtakhan and
the two other persons found inside the nipa house. Said two other persons were later released after having convinced
the investigators that they were innocent visitors or house guests of Redentor.
● Evangelista prepared a letter addressed to the PNP Crime Lab, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, requesting
examination of the confiscated drugs.
● Redentor and Pagtakhan executed their separate waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with the
assistance of counsel
● February 25 (Monday) - Narcom made a return of the search warrant and inventory to the Court
● February 26 (Tuesday) Besinio hand carried the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Lab for examination.
○ P/Major Royales, Forensic Chemist: the transparent plastic bag containing 1.3 grams of suspected shabu
placed in a plastic bag and the 6 foils containing 0.3 grams of suspected shabu wrapped in a foil gave positive
results for shabu. The aluminum foil containing 0.02 grams of shabu confiscated from Pagtakhan gave
 positive results for shabu and the light green plastic bag containing 103.7 grams of suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops, crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in a newspaper gave positive results for marijuana.
● Redentor and his wife, Sonia, were charged with selling, giving away, and distributing 1.3 grams of shabu and 6 decks
of aluminum foil of shabu in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425). In another
criminal case, they were charged with selling and distributing dried marijuana fruiting tops, leaves, and seeds.
● Jaime Pagtakhan was charged with illegally possessing shabu in another criminal case.
● Accused Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because she could not be located.
● The 3 cases were consolidated for joint trial in RTC San Pablo and trial proceeded as against accused Jaime Pagtakhan
and Redentor Dichoso after the two had entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.

RTC: Found both Redentor and Pagtakhan guilty for all offenses charged.

● From this decision, only Redentor appealed alleging that:

○ The Search Warrant was a general warrant because it was issued for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended" and did not specify the particular offense which he violated
under the said law. It was issued for 3 possible offenses: (a) illegal possession of marijuana dried leaves, (b)
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and (c) illegal possession of opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for prohibited drug.
○ He was framed by the police officers. Jun planted the deck of shabu.
○ When Calabia arrived, the seized articles were already on the table, and that the appellant was already
handcuffed.
○ The "Pagpapatunays” and the Receipt for Property Seized are inadmissible because he signed them while
under police custody without having been accorded his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel
which are uncounselled extrajudicial confessions.
○ The Golden Gate notebook containing the entries of names and figures, should not have been admitted in
evidence because it was not one of those specifically mentioned in the warrant, hence, its seizure was
unjustified.
○ The nipa house and the lot where it is located do not belong to him but to his brother, Abner Dichoso, hence,
the search conducted therein was unconstitutional and illegal and the items obtained thereby are
inadmissible in evidence against him.

Issue:
W/N the search warrant was a general one.

Held:
NO. What is controlling as to the designation of the offense is not the caption of the warrant but its body.
● The search warrant, while for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the 'Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," its body
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the offense involved (illegal
possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection therewith). The warrant specifically states:
○ “… are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the
compound of their residence at San Pablo City."
● The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class of species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

On the issue of the frame-up

● The claim that he was framed requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcement agents acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Dichoso did not attempt to prove that
the NARCOM agents who obtained the search warrant; conducted the search and recovered the prohibited drugs had
motives other than to enforce the law and stem the menace of drug addiction and trafficking which has already
reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations.
● The claim of frame-up only concerns the deck of shabu allegedly taken out of the pocket of Jun who asked for and was
readily permitted by the appellant to use shabu on that occasion. It does not concern the origin of the other prohibited
drugs and paraphernalia seized during the search.

On the pagpapatunays and the receipt

 ● These were in the nature of uncounselled extrajudicial confessions made while under the custody of the NARCOM
agents and are therefore inadmissible.
● Bisenio wrote in bold letters below the name REDENTOR D. DICHOSO the words "MAY-ARI BAHAY" or "OWNER" in
the documents by which Dichoso was made to admit that he is the owner of the articles seized, the house searched,
and the articles inventoried in the receipt.
● This was a clever way of circumventing the Constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent.
● At the time Bisenio prepared the exhibits, the appellant was already in the effective custody of the NARCOM agents
and deprived in a significant way of his freedom of action. The preparation of the exhibits substituted, for all legal
intents and purposes, the custodial interrogation.
● The receipt for property seized is a document required by Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court to be given by the
seizing officer to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made but NEED
NOT BE SIGNED BY DICHOSO
● However, the inadmissibility of the above documents cannot alter the result of the appeal because these were not
appreciated as extrajudicial confessions but merely as proof that the articles therein enumerated were obtained
during the search which, by the way, was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the NARCOM agents
independently of the said exhibits.

On the Golden Gate Notebook

● There are exceptions to the rule that only items particularly described in the warrant may be seized. One of such
exceptions is the plain view doctrine.
○ Objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.
● However, this exception does not apply because the notebook was not per se an article possession of which is illegal
or criminal. It proves neither sale nor possession.

On the ownership of the house searched

● It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued. it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession.
● Dichoso and his spouse have been using the said nipa house. He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and
adjacent to the big or main house in the Dichoso residential compound, and the he and his family have been using the
nipa house as a resting place even before the search.
● Francisco Calabia affirmed that Redentor and his wife actually reside therein while Redentor's parents and brother
reside in the big house.

On Dichoso’s guilt
● The evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for unlawful sale of shabu and unlawful sale of marijuana. There is,
however, overwhelming evidence which establishes the guilt of Redentor for illegal possession of shabu and
marijuana.
● RTC, in finding Redentor guilty for selling and dsitributing shabu and marijuana, relied mainly on the Golden Gate
notebook. Conclusions drawn from this document are merely conjectural. Prosecution failed to prove that the
handwritten entries therein were made by Redentor. There was also no competent proof that the entries refer to
transactions regarding shabu or marijuana and that the figures appearing therein pertain to prices of dangerous drugs.
● In a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, what is material is the proof that the selling transaction transpired
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti is evidence, and that the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. However, not a single witness claims to have seen Redentor sell or deliver shabu or
marijuana. Although Sgt. Evangelista testified that he was told by his civilian informer or agent that the latter was able
to buy shabu from and was offered marijuana by the appellant, the said civilian informer was not presented in court
during the trial.
○ The unlawful sale of shabu or marijuana must be established by unequivocal and positive evidence.
● Redentor’s admission during the trial that he used shabu "once in a while" ensures his conviction for violation of §16 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act for ILLEGAL POSSESSION because the unauthorized use of a regulated drug like shabu is
one of the acts punishable under the said section.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, dated 11 June
1991, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6711-SP(91) and 6712- SP(91) is hereby modified. As modified, accused-appellant REDENTOR
DICHOSO y DAGDAG is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP(91) and Section 8 of Article II of the said Act in
Criminal Case No. 6712-SP(91). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentence in each case to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000

Notes
Insert notes
PEOPLE v SALANGUIT
April 19, 2001 | Mendoza, J.

People of the Philippines, petitioner vs Roberto Salanguit y Ko, respondent

DOCTRINE:

 Procedure for issuance of search warrant: Rule 126.4 of Revised Rules on Crim Procedure: search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
 In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes
to justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled

FACTS:
 Roberto Salanguit y Ko was found guilty for violations of RA 6435 (Dangerous Drugs Act). 2 Informations were filed
against him:
o Possession and/or use of 11/14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
o Possession of 1,254 g of Marijuana
 Prosecution established the ff:
o Decemeber 26, 1995: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC Dasmarinas Cavite to search the
residence of Salanguit on Binhagan St. Novaliches QC.
 He presented witness SP01 Edmund Badua who testified as a poseur-buyer: purchased 2.12 grams
of shabu from Salanguit
 Sale took place in Salanguit’s room where Badua saw shabu was held in a cabinet in Salanguit’s
room
o Application was granted and search warrant issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol
o December 26, 1995 at around 10:30pm: 10 policemen + 1 civilian informer went to Salanguit’s residence
 Knocked on door but nobody opened it, police operatives then forced door open and entered
house
 Showed searched warrant to occupants, Lt. Cortes started searching house
 Found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance
 Paper clip box containing same looking substance
 2 bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
 Receipt of items was prepared but Salanguit refused to sign
o After search, police brought Salanguit to Station 10 EDSA with the seized items
o PO3 Duazo requested lab exam of confiscated evidence. Substance was found to be shabu and marijuana
  Defense (Salanguit) testified:
o 20 men in civilian attire brandishing long firearms climbed voer gate and descended through roof. A piece of
paper inside a folder was waved in front of him when he asked for a search warrant. Could not read it
because he looked for his glasses. Police conducted search forcibly opening cabinets and taking bad with
money, licensed firearm, jewelry and canned goods
 Court found Salanguit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crimes charged and evidence custodian was directed to turn
over substances to NBI
 Salanguit appeals on 3 grounds:
o Shabu confiscated can’t be used against him because search warrant is invalid
o Marijuana confiscated can’t be used against him because violative of plain view doctrine
o Employment of unnecessary force by police in execution

ISSUE/S:
(1) WON search warrant was valid – PARTLY
(2) WON plain view doctrine was violated – YES
(3) WON unnecessary force was used - NO
HELD: “

(1) Salanguit argues that search warrant was invalid on 3 grounds:

a. No probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia
i. Warrant authorized seizure of shabe and drug paraphernalia but evidence presented only showed
probable cause of existence of drugs and not of the drug paraphernalia
ii. SPO1 Badua made no mention of drug paraphernalia in testimony to grant application for search
warrant
iii. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia would
only be material if the police managed to seize any drug paraphernalia but they didn’t.
iv. Search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized seizure of drug paraphernalia but valid as to
seizure of shabu.
v. Invalid portions only severable if warrant is not essential general in nature, and meets the
requirement of particularity
b. Warrant was issued for more than 1 specific offense
i. Possession or use of shabu and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under 2 different
provs BUT
ii. Dangerous Drugs Act is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses
which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one search
warrant may thus be validly issued for said violations of the DDA.
c. Place to be searched was no described with sufficient particularity
i. Warrant merely stated residence as: Binhagan St. San Jose, QC BUT there are other several
documents w/c identified premises:
1. Premises to be searched between No. 7 and No 11 of Binhagan
2. Witness described it as a house without number located in Binhagan
3. Pencil sketch of house
4. Senior Inspector lived in same neighbourhood
ii. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, without
reasonable effort, ascertain and identity place to be searched
(2) Plain View Doctrine: unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a)
prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence
before the police.
a. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
provide basis for admitting other items subsequently found. The plain view doctrine may NOT be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges
b. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salunguit’s
 person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid.
c. ALSO, marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint meaning there was NO APPARENT ILLEGALITY TO
JUSTIFY THEIR SEIZURE. Marijuana is inadmissible as evidence but confiscation is upheld.
(3) Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Right to break door or window to effect search. The
officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

 No evidence presented by Salunguit to substantiate claims of unnecessary force.

CRIME OF POSSESSION OF SHABU AFFIRMED

CRIME OF POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA ACQUITTED
THE SEARCH WARRANT:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R EE T I N G S :
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his
witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession
and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

which should be seized

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above- described and
forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL J u dg e

Kho vs. Makalintal
April 21, 1991
Purisima, J.

Facts:
 May 15, 1990 – NBI agent Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent judge against Kho in his residence in BF Homes Paranaque
 On the same day, Arugay, another NBI agent applied with the same court for the
issuance of search warrants against Kho’s house in Bgy. Moonwalk Paranaque.
 Warrants were applied for after they conducted a personal surveillance and
investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential info they
received that the said places were used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
chop-chop vehicles
 Respondent judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their
witnesses, after which he issued search warrants
 NBI agents searched the BF Homes house the next day and recovered various high
powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. The Moonwalk house also
yielded several high powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand
rounds of ammunition. Various radio and telecommunication equipment, two units of
motor vehicles and one motorcycle were also retrieved. No license was issued for the
firearms upon verification with Camp Crame. Radio transceivers and vehicles were also
unregistered.
 May 22, 1990- Raiding teams submitted separate returns requesting the items to be
seized
 May 28, 1990 – Petitioners presented a motion to quash said search warrants:
 o 1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
o 2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being
general warrants;
o 3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural
requirements set forth by the Constitution;
o 4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules
of Court; and
o 5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.

Issue #1: WoN there was an absence of any probable cause? – No

 Records who that NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation
testified that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched
and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein.
 Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together
with his witnesses and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being
unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to.
 NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded
from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought thr house in BF Homes, Paranaque
because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent
 These were all based on their personal knowledge
 The existence of a probable cause must be determined in light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations
 The Judge was able to observe and determine whether or not the witnesses
gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and ivestiagtion they conducted at the
premises to be searched

Issue #2: WoN the procedure followed in the issuance of subject search warrants were fatally
defective and deficient? – no
 The Judge asked: “How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by
Benjamin Kho at the BF Homes house?”
 Petitioners argue that the judge assumed that the firearms at the premises were unlicensed
by his question
 Nothing improper is perceived in the manner that the Judge conducted the examination.
He personally examined them under oath, asked them searching questions on the facts
and circumstanes personally known to them, in compliance with the prescribed procedure
and legal requirements. The sworn statements and affidavits were duly attached to the
pertinent records and proceedings.
 The judge has the discretion to determine what questions to ask the witnesses as long as
the questions are germane to the pivot of inquiry—the existence or absence of a probable
cause.

Issue #3: WoN the search warrants are general warrants – no

 According to petitioners, the things to be seized were not described and detailed
  The Court held that the warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory requirements
 Law does not require that the things to be seized must be descried in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt
 It would be virtually impossible to obtain that kind of warrant
 NBI agents were not in the position to know the exact caliber or make of the unlicensed
firearms within the premises to be searched
 Description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances would ordinarily
allow

Issue #4 WoN the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the search
warrants in question? – No
 The question of whether there was an abuse in the enforcement of the challenged search
warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash – it only assails the validity of the
issuance of the warrant
 The petitioners have other remedies

Petition dismissed

Worldwide Web Corp v. People

2014, Sereno, CJ.
Petitioner: Worldwide Web Corp, Cherryl Yu & Planet Internet Corp
Respondent: People of the Philippines, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)

Facts:
● Search warrants were applied before the RTC- Quezon City to search the office premises
of Word Wide Web Corp (WWC), and the office premises of Planet Internet Corporation
(PIC). It was alleged that WWC and PIC were conducting illegal toll bypass operations
which amounted to theft and violation of PD 401.
● According to Jose Rivera of PLDT, a legitimate international long distance call should
pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the
toll center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the country. The call is
then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic
submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center
of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter the call,
which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In
contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call services to any
part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme
constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing international long distance
 calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where
the call is originated
● According to the other witness, Raymund Gali of PLDT, he conducted a test call using
GlobalTalk, an internet based international call service , wherein he dialed a PLDT
telephone number 6891135 (registered to WWC). After entering a user code, PIN,
destination number, country code, phone number and pound (#) sign, a call was made
to a number in Taiwan. However, upon checking the records, the call to Taiwan was only
directed to the local number indicating GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
● It was also alleged that petitioners had illegally connected PLDT lines and equipment to
another piece of equipment that routed international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Because of this, it was alleged that WWC and PIC illegally stole business and revenues
of PLDT since the bypassing of PLDT’s IGF allowed them to evade payment of access and
avoid charges. Finally, it was alleged that they also violated MC No.6-2-92 of the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs
premises equipment (CPE) without an approval license from NTC.
● RTC granted the application for search warrants with the first search warrant issued for
violation of Article 308 (Theft) in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC against WWC while two
other search warrants were issued against PIC for Theft and violation of PD 401.
● Over a 100 items were seized. WWC, PIC and Yu filed motions to quash on the grounds
that the search warrants were without probable cause, the acts did not constitute theft,
the toll bypass was not a crime, the warrants were general warrants, and the objects
seized due to the general warrants, were “fruits of the poisonous tree”.
● RTC granted the motions as it held that the warrants were general warrants.
● PLDT mover for reconsideration, but it was denied.
● On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC and held that the warrants were valid and
effective.

Issue/Ruling:
Issue #1 - W/N the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal depsite the procedural
infirmities. - NO
● An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action and so it does not need the
conformity of the public prosecutor.
● An application for a search warrant is a “special criminal process, not a criminal action.
Its requisites, procudre, and purpose for the issuance of one are completly different
from those for the institution of a criminal action.
● Search warrants merely constitutes process. It is defined as an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A
 search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a
public necessity.
● It was also held that an order quashing a search warrant is a final order that can be the
proper subject of an appeal. It is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a
criminal case or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.
● If it is incidental to a pending criminal case, the quashal is merely interlocutory not
subject to appeal.
● If it is applied for in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the quashal of the
warrant ends the judicial process. When the RTC quashed the warrants, there was
nothing left to be done and were thus final orders, and an appeal may be filed.
Issue #2 - W/N the search warrants were issued upon probable cause- YES
● A trial judge’s finding of probable cause is accorded respect by reviewing courts when
the finding has substantial basis.
● Probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. There is no exact test for
the determination of probabe cause. It is wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges.
● Judicial function is presumed to have been regularly performed absent a showing to the
contrary. The court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the RTC.
● Petitioners insist that probable cause necessitates prior determination of whether a
crime has been committed. The application for the search warrant charge the
petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass, but of theft. It was previoulsy held in a
case that PLDT’s communication facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its
telephone servce and business. The use of said facilities without PLDT’s consent is theft.
● Under PD 401 Sec 1 - Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System...shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correcctional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 2 thousand to 6 thousand pesos.
Issue#3 - W/N the warrants were general warrants - NO
● The particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items
described bear a direct relation to the offense.
● general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized
● Rule 126 Sec 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
 and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
● Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched
for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. It need not
describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.
● A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things
to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued
●
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003
and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.

CARROLL et al. v. US
Cite as: 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280
Reargued and Submitted March 14, 1924.
Decided March 2, 1925

Defendant-plaintiffs Carroll and Kiro, were indicted and convicted for transporting in an
automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor (68 quarts of bonded whisky and gin), in violation of
the National Prohibition Act

They assail the conviction on the ground that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the 68
bottles, one of whisky and one of gin, found by searching the automobile, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence was not proper.

The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully, and Thayer, federal prohibition
agents, and one Peterson, a state officer.

(See page 1-2 for the events/facts surrounding the actual search and seizure.)

The Court gave the Constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case. (Most important
are: The Fourth Amendment, Sections 25 and 26 of the National Prohibition Act, the Stanley
Amendment, and the amendment to the Stanley Amendment as reported by the judiciary
committee—who was referred to by the House regarding such amendment. (pp. 2-3)

ISSUE 1: Can contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or

other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant?1

SC HELD 1:
YES. The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable.

A distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in (1) the searching of private dwellings
and (2) in that of automobiles and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act
has been clearly established by the legislative history of the Stanley Amendment.

RELEVANT DOCTRINE: On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure
without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that **284 is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstaces known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as
the interests and rights of individual citizens.

RELEVANT DOCRINE (p. 5): The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods
liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a
search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things differ
toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the
other it is not.

Citing, examples of reasonable searches and seizures, as well as statutes & laws allowing for
reasonable searches and seizures (pp. 5-7, the Court have made a somewhat extended reference
to these statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the
government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house,
or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

ISSUE 2: Under what circumstances can a reasonable search on contraband goods concealed
and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be made?

SC HELD 2:
DOCTRINE: If an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor in it without a warrant, and the
facts as subsequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture, the
officer may escape costs or a suit for damages by a showing that he had reasonable or probable

1
The Court, citing cases on the subject of search & seizure (p. 4), concluded that in none of the cases
cited is there any ruling as to the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a seizure without a warrant of
contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to forfeiture or destruction. (In other words,
this is a novel issue.)
cause for the seizure.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE: The measure of legality of such a seizure is, *156 therefore,
that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the antomobile
which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.

DOCTRINE: The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law was
promptly to suppress breaches of the peace (1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 193), while the
reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a felony was because the public safety
and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required that such arrests
should be made at once without warrant

DOCTRINE: The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer *159 has for belief that the
contents of the automobile offend against the law.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE:
The character of the offense for which, after the contraband liquor is found and seized, the driver
can be prosecuted does not affect the validity of the seizure.
This conclusion is in keeping with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the principles
of search and seizure of contraband forfeitable property; and it is a wise one because it leaves the
rule one which is easily applied and understood and is uniform.

ISSUE 3: Was there probable cause in the case at bar?

HELD 3: YES. The officers here had justification for the search and seizure. This is to say
that the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped
and searched.

DOCTRINE: Probable was cause defined as follows:

 'If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence
and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient. (Stacey v.
Emery)
 'The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' (by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania s McCarthy v. De Armit)

Other notes on probable cause:

 'If a constable or other peace officer arrest a person without a warrant, he is not bound to
show in his justification a felony actually committed, to render the arrest lawful; but if he
suspects one on his own knowledge of facts, or on facts communicated to him by others,
and thereupon he has reasonable ground to believe that the accused has been guilty of
felony, the arrest is not unlawful.' (Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Carey)
 ‘[G]ood faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on
facts within knowledge of the Director General's agent, *162 which in the judgment of
the court would make his faith reasonable.' (Director General v. Kastenbaum)
DECISION: The judgment is affirmed.

People v. Que | G.R. No. 120365 | December 17, 1996 | Puno, J

Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Accused-appellant: WILSON B. QUE

Summary: SPO1 Corpuz was given information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. While on patrol, the police officers saw
the truck and inspected it. Accused, the owner of the truck, admitted to carrying sawn lumber, but could
not present documents justifying such. RTC Laoag convicted him of violating Sec 68 PD No. 705 as
amended by EO No. 277. On appeal to the SC, accused claims that the evidence against him is
inadmissible because it violates his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court rules
that the search of moving vehicles is an exception to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures,
and that the evidence is admissible.

Topic: Warrantless searches; moving vehicles

FACTS
 Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte.
 March 8,1994: SPO1 Corpuz, SPO1 Asuncion and SPO1 Patoc went on patrol around the area and
saw a ten-wheeler truck with the plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and
apprehended it at Marcos Bridge.
 There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson
Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck
and the cargo.
 SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the
coconut slabs.
 SPO1 Corpuz asked for the following documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of
transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from
the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
o Accused-appellant failed to present any of the documents, just a certification from the
Communty Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that he legally acquired
the coconut slabs.
 Accused-appellant was brought to the office of the Provincial Task Force where he admitted that
there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.
 Members of the Provincial Task Force and three CENRO personnel examined the cargo and
confirmed that there was coconut slabs and sawn taguile lumber (258 pieces, with a total assessed
value of P93,232.50)
 June 23, 1994: Accused-appellant was charged in RTC Laoag with violation of Sec. 68 of PD No.
705 as amended by EO No. 277.
 Accused-appellant denied the charge, claiming that he acquired the tanguile lumber from a legal
source.
 At trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the DENR to Enrica Cayosa
and Elpidio Sabal.
o The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather, and dispose timber from the forest area
covered by the permit.
o He alleged that the tanguile limber came from the forest area covered by the PLTPs of
Cayosa and Sabal, and that they were given to him by the latter as payment for his hauling
services.
 Accused also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him
because they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure, and of an uncounselled extrajudicial
admission.
 RTC found accused guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber and the 10-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant.
 Accused appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
WON the RTC erred in convicting accused under Sec 68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277, since it is only
in EO 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized — NO
 Accused argues that he cannot be convicted under Sec 68 of PD 7052 because EO 277, which
amended Sec 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession
legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
o Accused interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws
and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of EO 277.
 Court: the suggested interpretation of accused is strained and would render the law inutile. The
phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of
timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the
documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
o Such documents include: Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO issued by the CENRO,
accompanied by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber
sales invoice.
 RTC found that accused failed to present any certificate of origin o the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber.
o When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a
single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. However, he was able to
show documents justifying his possession of the coconut slabs.
o It is clear that the accused was given permit by the DENR only to transport the coconut
slabs, not the lumber. The RTC had no doubt that the accused was aware that he need
documents for the lumber because he tried to hide the lumber under the coconut slabs.
o Furthermore, the RTC doubts his alleged letter to the CENRO informing them that he was
to transfer the lumber, and returned to him by the office because he “didn’t need a
permit”, because documents or other papers filed with a government agency are not
returned in its original copy.
 Accused’s possession of the subject lumber without documentation clearly constitutes and
offense under Sec 68, PD 705.

WON the RTC erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against unlawful searches and seizures and under custodial investigation — NO

2Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
  Court cites People vs. Bagista:
o The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person
shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. (Art.
III, Sec. 2 of 1987 Constitution)
o Art III, Sec. 3(2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
o The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
o With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that
the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
o When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
 The police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search the accused’s truck, since SPO1
Corpuz received reliable information that a 10-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, the police saw the
ten-wheeler truck as described, and the owner of the truck admitted to having sawn lumber in
between the coconut slabs, and could not present the supporting documents required.
o The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which
justified the extensive search of appellant’s truck even without a warrant.
o Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly
admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.

DISPOSITION: Instant appeal is DISMISSED. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Warrantless searches – moving vehicle
03 CABALLES V. CA
January 15, 2002 | Puno, J. |

Doctrine: Mere mobility of vehicles does not give police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause

Facts:
● Rudy Caballes y Taiño (petitioner) was charged for theft of 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductor worth P27,450 from
NAPOCOR
● Policemen were making a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Laguna, when they spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with kakawati leaves. Because of this they suspected it had smuggled goods and flagged down the jeep which
was driven by petitioner Caballes.
 ● He was pale, nervous, and did not answer when asked what was loaded. The police checked the cargo with Caballes’
consent, and discovered the stolen conductor wires.
● Caballes defense: denial and alibi
○ Said he was a NARCOM civilian agent
○ His jeep was stopped by Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport the conductor wires. He reported
this to his superior in NARCOM (Sgt Callos) and Callos advised him to go along with it
○ The cable wires were loaded in the jeep then covered with kakawati leaves by 5 masked men and he was
promised 1k for the job
○ Despite this explanation the police didn’t believe him, interrogated him in the police HQ and locked him up
for a week
● RTC: Search was valid; Caballes is guilty – automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant
upon facts not justifying warrantless search od a resident or office
● CA: affirmed the judgment of conviction by the RTC
● Caballes argues that
1. The search of the jeep and the seizure of the cable wires without a search warrant and the admission of the cable
wires in evidence as basis for his conviction contravened his constitutional right
 A suspicion that his jeep might contain smuggled goods does not constitute probable cause
 He did not give any express of implied consent for the search, ergo any evidence obtained therefrom
should be inadmissible
2. His defense that he was in an entrapment operation should not have been rejected by the CA as indulging in
speculation and conjecture
3. The evidence presented did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Issue:
W/N the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes NO

Held:
NO. No probable cause. There was no valid search of a moving vehicle, the cable wires were not in plain view, and there
was no consented search
● The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions
1. Warrantless seach incidental to a lawful arrest, recognized under Sec 12, Rule 126 of the ROC and by prevailing
jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view
3. Search of moving vehicles
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and frisk situations (Terry search)
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
● In warrantless searches, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question
determinable form the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search and seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured
Search of a moving vehicle
● Gov’t highly regulates vehicles because of their inherent mobility which reduces the expectation of privacy because of
practicality. It’s not practicable to secure a warrant when the vehicle can quickly move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought BUT mere mobility of vehicles does not give police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in
the absence of probable cause
● Probable cause: reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilt of the offense with which he is charged; facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched; not determined by a fixed formula, but is resolved according to the facts of each
case
● The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute probable cause as would justify a warrantless search
 ● The police also did not receive any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion
Plain view doctrine
● It cannot be said that the cable wires were in plain view because they were not exposed to sight, placed in sacks, and
covered in leaves. The police even had to ask Caballes what was loaded in the jeep.
● Plain view: must be immediately apparent that the items that they (police) observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
Consented search
● There was no consent. The evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. The police were imposing that they will search the vehicle rather than asking if they could – and consent
given under intijmidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
This is shown by the testimony of Sgt Noceja
o When asked what he did when the vehicle of Caballes was stopped, he said he removed the cover of the
vehicle and and saw the aluminum wires
o “I told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive” – court held it was a mere
afterthought after Sgt Noceja was asked if he talked to the accused
● Consented search: must be voluntary; unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion; not lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
● For a waiver, it must first appear that:
1. The right exists
2. That the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right
3. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITEED of the
crime charged

Notes
1987 Constitution, Art III, Sec 2
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

United States v. Chadwick

Burger, C.J., 21 June 1977

Doctrine
  The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of a car does not apply to luggage. Unlike an
automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of
personal effects. A person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater
than in an automobile
 There being no exigency, it is unreasonable for the Government to conduct a warrantless search
without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.

Facts
 8 May 1973 – railroad officials in San Diego reported seeing respondents who matched the profile
of drug traffickers load an unusual footlocker/trunk on a train bound for Boston (heavy, leaking
talcum powder used to mask smell the smell of drugs)
 Two days later, narcotics agents, who did not obtain search warrants, arrested the respondents
after they had loaded the trunk into the back of a car.
 The respondents and the trunk were brought to the Boston Federal Building. Without the
respondents’ consent and a search warrant, they opened it and found large amounts of marijuana.
 Respondents were indicted for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute but they moved to
suppress the marijuana obtained from the trunk.
 The District Court granted the motion to suppress, holding that it was unreasonable warrantless
search under the Fourth Amendment not justified under either the "automobile exception" or as a
search incident to a lawful arrest. CA for the 1st Circuit affirmed.
 Petitioner Government puts forward the arguments that where personal effects are lawfully seized
outside the home on probable cause, such searches without a warrant as not "unreasonable."

Ratio/Issues
I. WON the warrantless search done in this case was reasonable (NO)

Just as the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places," (as held in Katz v. US) the protections
a judicial warrant offers against erroneous governmental intrusions are effective whether applied
in or out of the home.

The trunk’s brief contact with Chadwick's car made it an automobile search. The Court has
permitted warrantless searches of automobiles, based in part on their inherent mobility, which often
makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable, as well as the diminished expectation of privacy.

However, the factors which diminish the privacy aspects of a car does not apply to the trunk.
Luggage contents are not open to public view, except in special cases. (borders, ports, etc.) Unlike
an automobile, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects.

A person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in a car.

By placing personal effects in the double-locked trunk, respondents manifested an expectation that
the contents would remain free from public examination. There being no exigency, it was
unreasonable to conduct this search without a judicial warrant. (It was 2 day train ride!)

The mobility of the trunk did not justify dispensing with the necessity of a search warrant. Once the
agents seized it and transferred it to the Federal Building, there was no danger that the trunk or its
contents would be removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. It was unreasonable
to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.

The search could not be viewed as incidental to an arrest because the search was conducted more
than an hour after federal agents had gained control of the trunk and long after respondents were
securely in custody; or as justified by any other exigency.
 Respondents were entitled to the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral
magistrate, before their privacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were invaded.

 Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.

Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, dissenting:

(1) A search of personal effects need not be contemporaneous with the arrest, and indeed may be delayed
a number of hours while the suspect remains in lawful custody.
(2) Once a car has been properly impounded for any reason, the police may follow a standard procedure
of inventorying its contents without any showing of probable cause.
(3) A warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person
properly arrested in public. A person arrested in public is likely to have various kinds of property with him.
In such instances the police cannot leave the property on the sidewalk or street while they go to get a
warrant.
(4) The mere fact that a warrant could have been obtained while the footlocker was safely impounded does
not necessarily make the warrantless search unreasonable.
(4) Law enforcement officers should not be precluded from conducting an inventory search when they take
a potential "Trojan horse" into their office.
(5) Finally, exigent circumstances may often justify an immediate search of property seized in conjunction
with an arrest, in order to facilitate the apprehension of confederates or the termination of continuing
criminal activity.
People v. Mariacos
June 16, 2010 | Nachura, J.
Topic: Search and Seizure – Warrantless Searches – Search of Moving Vehicle

Facts:
 Belen Mariacos was found guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002) for transporting and delivering 7,000 grams of dried marijuana.
 PO2 Pallayoc of the San Gabriel Police Station (La Union) was informed by an agent that a baggage of
marijuana was about to be transported on a passenger jeepney which was to leave for the poblacion.
3 bags, 1 blue plastic bag, and a backpack with an “O.K” marking were described. On board the jeep,
Pallayoc found the backpack and looked at its contents, which were bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper. He asked the passengers who the owner of the bag was, but they didn’t know.
 When the jeepney got to the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc saw the bags being carried away by 2 women.
One of them got away, but the other one, Mariacos, was apprehended and brought to the station.
 Mariacos maintained she was only asked to carry the bags by her neighbor and that she did not know
it contained marijuana
 The bags were opened in the presence of the mayor. The investigators marked, inventoried and
forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination.
 RTC convicted Mariacos.
 On appeal to CA, Mariacos argued:
o Her right against an unreasonable search was violated when Pallayoc searched the bag,
assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her
o There was no probable cause for her arrest
o The apprehending officer, immediately after seizure or confiscation, failed to have the drugs
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant
 People argued:
o The warrantless seizure was valid as it is a search of a moving vehicle
o physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team, whichever was practicable.
 CA affirmed RTC decision.
o Under the facts, Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check
the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search
warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.

Issue: W/N the warrantless search was lawful. YES

Held:
 the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant.
 This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
 It is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
 be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the
circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. Also, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police
received reliable information that marijuana was to be transported.
 Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.
 Although generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.

Other issue: W/N Mariacos is guilty of violation of RA 9165. YES

 When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not
necessary.
 Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum.
 appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption
that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.
 It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 (Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs) is not fatal and will not render
an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
 Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this
issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first
instance. But she did not.
 the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
U.S. v. GRAY
Date: Aug. 7, 1973
Petitioner: United States of America
Respondent: Derl Gray
Ponente: MILLER

Doctrine: The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

Facts:
 July 1972: John R. Miller (Kentucky State Trooper) received information that Derl Gray, the operator of a
small grocery store in rural Fayette County, Kentucky, was selling beer without a license.
 Trooper Miller requested Trooper Brodt to attempt to set up a sale.
 July 16, 1972 - Trooper Brodt, in plain clothes, went to Gray's store and purchased five cans of beer. He
then left the store to obtain a search warrant and a warrant for Gray's arrest.
 Troopers Miller and Brodt returned to the store to arrest Gray and execute the search warrant which directed
the seizure of "any intoxicating liquors, apparatus for manufacturing intoxicating liquors or materials used in
the manufacture of intoxicating liquors."
 Gray was immediately arrested in the store area of the building and the property was searched.
o Trooper Brodt seized a small quantity of beer in a cooler in the store.
o No alcoholic beverages were found in the upper residence area, but while Trooper Brodt was
conducting his search he noticed two rifles leaning against the wall in an upstairs clothes closet.
o The officer removed the rifles from the closet and took them downstairs to the store area of the
building where he copied down the serial numbers of the weapons.
 The officers ran the serial numbers through the computer of the National Crime Information Center and
learned for the first time that the firearms had been stolen in Tennessee on June 11, 1972.
 Trooper Brodt filed affidavits to obtain a search warrant for the seizure of the rifles and a warrant for Gray's
arrest for knowingly receiving stolen property.
 On the evening of the same day, the two officers returned to Gray's store to execute the second search
warrant and to arrest him.
  Gray was arrested but the officers were unable to locate the rifles until the officers indicated that unless Gray
turned over the rifles they were going to arrest his common law wife. Gray then took the officers to two
locations and retrieved the rifles.
 Gray was found guilty under both counts by a jury and subsequently sentenced to concurrent three year
terms of imprisonment.
 He appeals his convictions under a two count indictment charging violations of the federal firearms laws.

Issue: W/N Trooper Brodt's actions in removing the rifles from the closet, examining them, and copying down the
serial numbers pursuant to a warrant directing the seizure of alcoholic beverage was in violation of the Fourth
amendment - YES

Held:
 In plain view cases, police officers had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-
and permits the warrantless seizure.
o However, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
 The seizure of the rifles by Trooper Brodt cannot be justified.
 Plainview Doctrine (requisites)
1. "the police officer . . . had a prior justification for an intrusion." – met
 met in the present case since the officers were acting pursuant to a legitimate search
warrant directing the seizure of alcoholic beverages upon the defendant's property
2. During the search, the officers "came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused." Further, "the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them." – not met
 Here, Officer Brodt inadvertnetly discovered the rifles in the upstairs clothes closet while
searching for alcoholic beverages but it was not "immediately apparent" that the rifles
were "evidence incriminating the accused."
 The rifles were not contraband
 There was no nexus between the rifles and the crimes of selling or possessing
intoxicating liquor without a license
 The officers at that time have any knowledge that the rifles were evidence of any
other crimes.
 It was only after Trooper Brodt had seized the weapons, copied down the serial numbers,
left the defendant's premises, and then run the information taken off the rifles through the
National Crime Information Center that he learned that they were stolen and hence
incriminating.
 Under the plain view doctrine, the objects seized must be incriminating at the time
of seizure.

Dispositive: REVERSED; REMANDED

Arizona v. Hicks (US)

No. 86-1027; March 3, 1987
Scalia, J.

Facts:
 A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks’ apartment, injuring a man in the apartment below.
 Police officers arrived and entered his apartment to search for the shooter, other victims, and for weapons.
They found and seized three weapons including a sawed-off rifle, and also a stocking-cap mask.
 Officer Nelson noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place. Suspecting that
they were stolen, he recorded their serial numbers, moving some of the components, including a Bang and
Olufsen turntable.
 He reported this to the quarters. On being advised that the turntable was taken in an armed robbery, he seized it.
 Later, some of the serial numbers matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same robbery. A
warrant was obtained to seize the equipment as well.
 Hicks was indicted for robbery.
 The trial court granted Hicks’ motion to suppress the evidence seized.
 Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed.
o The initial entry and search, though warrantless, were justified by the exigent circumstance of the
shooting.
o The obtaining of the serial numbers is unrelated to exigency.
 Both trial court and CA rejected the State’s contention that what Officer Nelson did was justified under “plain
view” doctrine.

Issue/s:
1. W/N the warrantless search was valid under the “plain view” doctrine

Held:
1. No, the search was not valid.
 Mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure; it did not “meaningfully interfere”
with Hicks’ possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment.
 However, Officer Nelson’s moving of the equipment constituted a “search” separate from the
search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of the entry to Hicks’
apartment.
 Mere inspection would not have constituted an independent search, but taking action unrelated to the
earlier objective of the authorized intrusion produced a new invasion of Hicks’ privacy unjustified by
the exigent circumstance validating the entry.
 Justice Powell: distinction between “looking” and “moving” the object in “plain view” is important
 On the other hand, it is absurd to say that an object can be lawfully seized and taken from the premises
(it is an established rule that police may seize evidence in plain view without warrant), but cannot be
moved for a closer examination.
 Hence, the “plain view”doctrine would have validated Officer Nelson’s seizure of the stereo equipment
if he had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. However, he had only
“reasonable suspicion”, which is less than probably cause.
 Probable cause is required under the “plain view” doctrine.

Dispositive Portion:
“For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Arizona is affirmed.”
HORTON v CALIFORNIA (Stevens; 1990)
DOCTRINE:
Even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate “plain view" seizures, it is not a necessary condition.

FACTS:
• Horton convicted of armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, treasurer of San Jose Coin Club
• When Walker returned home after the Club’s annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by 2 masked men who were armed with a
machine gun and a stun gun
• They stunned him, handcuffed him, then robbed him of jewelry and cash
• While the two men were talking, Wallaker was able to identify Horton’s distinctive voice. His identification was partially corroborated by a witness
who saw the robbers leaving the scene and by evidence that Horton attended the show.
• Sergeant LaRault investigated crime and determined there was probable cause to search Horton’s home for proceeds of the robbery
• The search warrant issued to him authorized a search for the proceeds, including 3 specifically described rings. When he searched Horton’s
residence, he did not find the stolen property. Instead, he discovered weapons in plain view and seized them.
• LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he was also interested in finding other evidence connecting Horton to the robbery. The
seized evidence was not discovered “inadvertently.”

ISSUES
W/N the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment3 if the discovery of the evidence was not
inadvertent - NO

RATIO:
• A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his person or property

• If an article is already in plain view → observation and seizure would not involve invasion of privacy. A seizure of article, however, would invade
the owner’s possessory interest. It is the seizure, rather than the search, that is addressed by the characterization that the plain view doctrine is
an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

• Conditions that justify warrantless seizure

1. The incriminating character of the item in plain view must be immediately apparent
2. Not only must officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, the officer must also have a lawful right of
access to the object itself

In Texas v. Brown, Justice Steward described 2 limitations on the plain view doctrine:
1. Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence
2. Discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent
◦ Police officer must have prior justification for intrusion in the course of which he inadvertently came across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused
◦ Extension to the original justification is limited only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them
◦ The plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search form on object to another until something incriminating
emerges

Court disagrees with the inadvertence requirement

• Evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer
◦ The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure
if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement
• The suggestion that inadvertence is necessary to prevent the lice from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into
general warrants, is not persuasive because the interest is already served by the requirement that no warrant issue unless it “particularly describes
the place to b searched and the persons or thins go the seized”

In the present case

• Scope of the search was not enlarged by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant
• If the three rings and other items specified in the warrant had been found at the outset, no search for weapons could have taken place
• Seizure of an object in plain view does not involve intrusion on privacy. If interest in privacy has been invaded, the violation must have occurred
before the object came into plain view and there is no need for an inadvertence limitation on seizures to condemn it. The prohibition against
general searches and general warrants serves primarily as a protection against unjustified intrusions of privacy.
• The items seized were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. When they were discovered, it was immediately
apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence.

3
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

PMCA – A2021
 04 People v Musa
Warrantless Search – Plain View| Jan 27 1993 | Romero, J.

Nature of Case: Appeal for reversal of RTC Zamboanga decision finding him guilty of selling marijuana, in violation of
RA 6425
Digest Maker: BacheLAWr
Petitioner/s: People of the Philippines
Respondent/s: Mari Musa y Hantatalu

DOCTRINE: The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the “plain
view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.

FACTS:
Prosecution’s side: Testimony of police officers
● 12/13/89 surveillance operation made against RESP
○ Civilian informant said that RESP was engaged in selling marijuana in Calarian, Zamboanga City
○ Informant described RESP’s appearance to Sgt. Ani and guided him to the house of RESP
○ Ani bought one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10
○ Confirmed to be marijuana upon inspection
● 12/14/89 buy-bust operation of Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
○ Sgt. Ani assigned as the buyer, purchased P20 worth of dried marijuana using marked money at RESP’s
house
○ Convinced that it was marijuana, Ani and other police officers returned to the house
○ Upon frisking RESP, P20 marked money was not with him. It was given to his wife, who slipped away
from the house
○ They found a bag of marijuana in the kitchen
○ RESP placed under arrest and brought to NARCOM office

Defense’s side: Testimony of RESP and his wife Ahara Musa

● 12/14/89, 3 NARCOM agents (and introduced as such) in civilian clothes went inside RESP’s house without
permission
o Searched RESP’s house and did not reply when asked if they had a search warrant
o Agents found a red plastic bag which did not belong to RESP
▪ Could be owned by his brother or father
o RESP was handcuffed and brought to the NARCOM office
o RESP was investigated, and the investigation was written down
o Document was interpreted to RESP in Tagalog and stated that the marijuana belonged to him. RESP was
asked to sign it
o RESP claims he was not told that he was entitled to counsel, even though he told NARCOM agents his
request to be assisted
o RESP underwent physical abuse
▪ 4 bullets were placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed
▪ He was boxed and RESP lost consciousness
o RESP was brought to Fiscal’s Office and denied that he owned the marijuana found
▪ He did not tell the fiscal about the abuse because he was afraid that he might be maltreated in the
fiscal’s office
o RESP was brought to the City Jail
o RESP denied that he sold marijuana to NARCOM agents

RTC decision: found RESP guilty

● (RESP raised 2 other defenses but they’re not relevant to the topic and the SC ruled against them)
● RESP appealed, assailing the seizure and admission as evidence of the plastic bag found by NARCOM agents,
saying it was unconstitutional

PMCA – A2021
ISSUE/S & RATIO: WON there was a valid search and seizure. NO
● Rule 126 Sec 12 of Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
● In the case, NARCOM agents found nothing after searching the person of RESP. Upon searching the entire house,
they found the plastic bag
● The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the “plain view”
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
o EXCEPTION: where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the “plain view” of the
object. It must be obvious to the police that the items may be evidence of a crime
● In the case, the plastic bag was not in “plain view”. The agents went from room to room with the intention of
fishing for more evidence
● NARCOM agents also did not know the contents of the plastic bag. Only upon opening it did they discover the
marijuana.
● “Plain view” doctrine does not apply in this case. The evidence was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence.

NOTE: Appeal was still dismissed because the other evidence presented (the actual wrappings of marijuana, among
others) prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime committed by RESP. Sad.

PMCA – A2021
[SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Plainview Doctrine)]
05 PEOPLE V. DORIA
January 2, 1999 | Puno, J. |

Doctrine: The plainview doctrine requires them actually seeing the evidence as well as a detailed history of entrapment and the approved procedure
of buy and bust operations as narrated by our favorite Supreme Court Justice/historian.

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Facts:
● IMPORTANT PEOPLE
○ Florencio Doria – Sold drugs to the wrong cop. Got into deep shit.\
○ Violeta Gaddao – Rolled with the wrong crew. Her husband’s coming home to a mess.
○ PO3 Manlangit – The cop.
● The Charge
○ On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation
of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
● The Information
○ That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11)
plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW! :O
● The Bust
○ In November 1995, members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information from two civilian informants that someone called Jun
was engaged in illegal drugs in Mandaluyong. They decided to use the old buy-bust entrapment operation. One of the informants arranged
a meeting with Jun on December 5. That morning, the agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes designated PO3
Manlangit as the buyer and SOP1 Badua as his backup and the rest of the team did perimeter security.
○ 1600 of the 2000 pesos they were given was used for the money for the operation, the market price of a kilo of marijuana. The bills were
marked.
○ Upon meeting Jun, the informant introduced Manlangit as the one interested in buying the kilo. Jun instructed him to wait for him at the
corner of Shaw and Jacinto while he got the goods. He later appeared an hour later where the police were waiting. Jun took something
wrapped in plastic from his bag and gave it to Manlangit. Manlangit then arrested Jun as Badua and the rest rushed into help with the
arrest. They frisked him but didn’t find the marked bills. Jun revealed that the money was at the house of his associate, called Neneth. Jun
led them to his house nearby at Daang Bakal.
○ They found the door open and a woman, Neneth inside. Badua asked her about the money and Manlangit looked over the house. While
standing by the door, Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and something
was wrapped in plastic appearing similar to the marijuana sold earlier. He then entered the house and took hold of the box, peeked inside
and found ten whole bricks of the stuff!

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 ○ Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and arrested her and turned them over to the investigator at HQ. It was only then that the
police learned Jun was Florencio Doria y Bolado while Neneth is Violeto Gaddao y Catama.
○ They denied the prosecution’s story.
● The Defense (The accused denied all this)
○ Doria testified that at 7:00 in the morning, he was reading a newspaper at his house. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew Totoy.
He denied knowing any Totoy as the men were strangers and there were many Totoys in the area. Then men took him into his house and
accused him of being a pusher. When he denied, they led him to a car and ordered him to point out Totoy’s house. He eventually gave in
and took them to Totoy’s house.
○ Nobody was home. One of the men, Manlangit pushed open the door and he and his companions looked around the house, leaving Doria
outside. They came out and saw Violetta Gaddao carrying water from the well. They asked here where Totoy was she said he wasn’t home.
Onlookers were surrounding them already. When Violetta entered, three men were inside. Doria overheared them talking about the
carton box. They were ordered to go outside and board the car. They were brought to the police headquarters to be investigated. He said
that Violeta was the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy whom he was close to, but he hardly knew Violeta.
○ Violeta (a 35 year old rice vendor who lives with her husband and five children) woke up at 5:30 in the morning to buy pan de sal. Her
husband was out of town. She tended to her children before heading to the well fetch water. A man grabbed her left wrists and took her
to her house. The man was Manlangit. Inside, Doria and three other persons were there. They asked about the box. She never saw the box
before and knew nothing of it.
○ She confirmed that Doria was her husband’s friend but they didn’t know each other too well.
○ They were both tried after the information was filed and convicted in RTC Branch 156, Pasig City. The trial court also found the existence
of an organized crime group and sentenced them to death with a fine of 500,000. The death penalty arising from a provision in the law
that states that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by a person who belongs to a syndicate (two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for the purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
○ The drugs were turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction.
○ Automatic appeal to SC.
● ERRORS ALLEGED
● Doria:
○ Erred in giving weight to testimonies of prosecution despite inconsistencies. The drugs weren’t even positively identified by the poseur
buyer.
○ Erred in admitting the marijuana fruitlings found inside the box. It doesn’t fall within the plainview doctrine. <- OMG THE BIG ISSUE!
● Gaddao
○ Erred in finding her guilty despite the incredibility of police testimony.
○ PNP officers inconsistent as to where money came from.
○ Inconsistencies regarding the buy-bust testimony.
○ Upholding valid search

Issue:
1. W/N the buybust operation was valid
2. W/N the search was legal? Plain view doctrine?

Held:
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. Validity of buy-bust operation. (I don’t think this is important, but it’s the bulk of the case… needlessly.)
 Puno talks about how the buy and bust operation is a form of entrapment. In America, entrapment is a valid defense because they
define it as the police inducing innocent people to become guilty of crimes using persuasion, trickery or fraud and the origin of the
design was from minds of government officials, not criminals. That’s why they don’t like it though not all deceptions are illegal for them.
If the criminal intent originates from the accused, then he is indeed guilty.
 There are two tests, subjective in which all factors surrounding the origin of intent of the accused are considered then there’s the
objective test in which they analyze the methods of the police used in the bust. Both tests have been criticized before for their obvious
flaws and some courts combine the tests to make up for them.
 In the Philippines, the conduct of officers has always been analyzed in these operations. Puno delivers a plethora of examples.
 In the Philippines, entrapment is allowed. There’s a difference between entrapment and instigation. Instigation is when the officer
instigates the crime by inducing the criminal to commit a crime in which the officer would be a co-principal (similar to the definition of
entrapment in the US (Which makes one wonder why Puno even discussed it.). Entrapment is merely creating an opportunity for the
suspect to commit the crime and arrest him when he does. (People v. Laua Chu and Uy Se Tieng)
 So in the Philippines it’s not a valid defense. To determine if it’s entrapment or instigation the courts have to examine the conduct of the
apprehending officer, not the predisposition of the accused similar to the objective test used in US jurisprudence. The justification of
entrapment is that it’s difficult to get people for mala prohibita crimes because most of them are unattended due to being crimes
against public peace rather than actual acts of evil. That makes criminals difficult to detect and police have to be vigilant, but the
presumption of regularity has to be applied with restraint as the police also may delve into illegal means.

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  The objective test demands that the details of the transaction were clearly shown. The initial contact between the poseur buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment until the consummation of the sale by delivery. Manlangit was frank,
spontaneous and straight forward with his testimony which was corroborated by evidence. Inconsistencies are minor and the court
doesn’t usually require them to produce the informants to protect their identities unless absolutely necessary through the denial of the
accused.
 The warrantless arrest of Doria is lawful as he were caught in the act of the crime. The arrest of Gaddao is not because they didn’t
actually catch her doing anything. It was based on an illegal search which is the second issue.
2. Was the search legal? Plainview doctrine?
 The plainview doctrine applies when the following concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
 It’s only in plain view when the object itself is exposed to sight. The object was in a plastic package in the box and the plastic wasn’t even
translucent. He didn’t see the package and even if he had a good feeling that it was marijuana, the court can’t base validity on good
feelings.
 Since the prosecution couldn’t prove they worked together, as their evidence was illegally obtained, they can’t kill Doria.

Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed
and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00).

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted

Notes

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Valeroso v. CA and People
Sept. 3, 2009
Nachura, J.

Doctrine
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.

Facts
- Valeroso was found guilty of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition (PD 1866).
- Prosecution’s version (police testimonies):
o July 10 1966, 9am: The police officers received a dispatch order directing them to serve a
Warrant of Arrest against Valeroso for kidnapping with ransom.
o They conducted the necessary surveillance on his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
o In Culiat, Quezon City, they arrested Valeroso as he was boarding a tricycle. They informed him
of his rights and bodily searched him.
 They found a Charter Arms revolver with 5 bullets in his waist.
 It was licensed in another person’s name.
- Defense’ version:
o July 10, 1996: Valeroso was sleeping in a boarding house of his children in New Era, Quezon
City. He was awakened by 4 heavily armed men in civilian attire.
o They tied his hands and placed him outside the room.
o They proceeded to ransack the room and found the firearm.
o They did not show a warrant for the search.
- The OSG recommends his acquittal on the ground that Valeroso’s constitutional rights were violated.
- NB: This appeal came in the form of a Letter-Appeal, which is already the second MR filed.

Issue: WON the firearm found in his possession is admissible evidence. NO

Held
- Even if this is already a second MR, the Court suspends the rules to re-examined the records in order to
serve substantive justice.
- Sec. 2 Art. III protects the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.

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 - Generally, a warrant is required before an enforcer can validly search or seize the person or his things.
- Additionally, Sec. 3(2) adds that any evidence obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible.
- There are exceptions:
o Incidental to a lawful arrest
o Plain view
o Moving vehicle
o Consented warrantless search
o Customs search
o Stop and frisk
o Exigent and emergency situations
o Search of vessels and aircraft
o Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building
regulations.
- What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search is a judicial question, determinable from the
circumstances involved and the presence of probable cause.
- Was the search incident to a lawful arrest? NO
o It is for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
o A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
o The cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an
"area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or
to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
- Was it in plain view? NO
o Such is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
o In this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition.

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ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
August 31, 2011 | PERALTA, J

DOCTRINE:
- The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
- The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA decision affirming RTC decision which convicted petitioner from
Violation of Sec 11, Art II, RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act)
- Nov 11, 2002: An information was filed against petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA No. 9165
o his possession, custody and control [METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram
- petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Evidence of the Prosecution

P/Insp. Jessie Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
- gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

P03 Rodrigo Antonio, Caloocan Police Station- Drug Enforcement Unit (PNP-SDEU)
- SDEU received information relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera
Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo
- They formed a surveillance team and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant and/or memorandum.
- They were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe."
- PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed
themselves nearby.
- Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 1/2
meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu.
- Antonio inched his way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same.
- Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand,
after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets
the latter was earlier sorting
- They placed the suspect under arrest and brought him with the 4pcs of plastic sachets to their headquarterd.
- The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village,
Caloocan.

Evidence of the Defense

- At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father, were at the upper
level of their house watching the television soap "Cindy," they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting
the three (3) of them to go down.

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- There already inside were several male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police
operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing.
- One of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when he tried to resist the arrest.
- Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with his father, they were boarded inside the police
vehicle.
- PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by
the raiding police team from their house.
- At detention in the police headquarters, the father was later ordered to go home.

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165 and indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, plus 300,000 fine.
CA: Affirmed in toto.
- The evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against accused
- it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.

PET:
- Assails the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from
him.
- being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who
was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid
search warrant and/or warrant of arrest.
- the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police
surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued search
warrant.
- Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain
view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
- the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the
place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.
- arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even
during his detention

ISSUES:
1. WON the Police can validly make an arrest and search without a valid warrant having been first obtained from a court of competent
jurisdiction. – YES
2. WON peeping though a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of “plain view doctrine” for a warrantless
seizure to be lawful – YES

HELD:
#1
- It is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
- An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment.
- Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
- There was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the
trial court.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error.
- A settled exception to the right guaranteed by the Sec 2, Art III of the Constitution4 is that of an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
- 2 ELEMENTS must be present:
o the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
o such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- In this case, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest

#2.
- As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.
- The right against warrantless searches and seizure is subject to legal and judicial exceptions:

4SEC. 2, ART III, CONST. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

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 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
- What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.
- The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful
arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
- The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
- The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
- The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

On chain of custody:
- According to Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165:
o The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs… confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused…
(2) Within 24hours upon confiscation, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Lab for quali-quanti examination.
- The IRR also provides that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
- it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner's arrest illegal
nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.
- What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
- Here, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established from arresting
officer, to investigating to forensic chemist.5
- There is no doubt that the items seized from pet’s residence were also the ones that tested positive for shabu.
- Based on evidence, the elements of illegal possession of drugs were duly established. Mere possession of the drugs per se constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge (animus possidendi) sufficient for conviction unless there is a satisfactory explanation. The
burden of proof (onus probandi) is therefore shifted to the accused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

5The petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the
police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating of􏰉cer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the
petitioner were then entered in the of􏰉cial blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to
the National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.24 After a qualitative examination of the
contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 25 T

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Waiver or Consented searches

Schneckloth Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte

1973, Stewart J.
Petitioner: Merle R. Schneckloth, Superintendent, California Conservation Center
Respondent: Robert Clyde Bustamonte
Doctrine: Consented Searches are valid and constitutional. When the subject of a search is not in custody and the state attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4 th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily
given and not the result of duress or coercion. Knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken into account but is NOT a
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances
(Please see notes)
Facts:
 Officer James Rand, while on routine patrol in Sunnyvale California, stopped an automobile when he observed that a headlight
and its license plate were burned out. Six (6) men were inside; respondent Bustamonte along with Joe, Alcala, Joe Gonzalez,
and three older men.

 They were asked to step out of the car, and then Off. Rand asked Alcala if he could search the car and Alcala replied
“Sure, go ahead”.

 The police found three checks that had been stolen from a car wash.

 Bustamonte was brought to trial and charged with possessing a check with intent to defraud.

 He moved to supress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him alleging that the material had been acquired
through an unconstitutional search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the evidence, and convicted him.

 The California CA affirmed the conviction stating that the search was valid and that consent to the search was freely given.

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  Bustamonte then sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court but was denied. On appeal to the CA, it held that the
consent was a waiver of a person’s Fourth and Fourteenth amendment rights, and that the state has the burden of proof in
showing that the was uncoerced and that it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively
withheld. As consent was not shown nor was it shown that Alcala knew he could have withheld his consent and refused the
search, the CA vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Issue:
 W/N the search of the car was freely consented to - YES

Held:
 Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Whether or not the defendant
knew he had the right to refuse is only one factor. The totality of all the surrounding circumstances such as characteristics of
the accused (youth, level of intelligence, etc.) and details of the interrogation (length, presence of physical abuse,
psychological impact on the accused) have been taken into account.
 Government has no need to establish that the accused knew of his right to refuse as a condition sine qua non to an effective
consent.
 CA’s approach in requiring the need for the state to prove that the subject of the search knew of his right to refuse consent
would create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be conducted as those who have been subjected to
consented searches could frustrate the introduction of evidence of certain material by simply failing to testify that he knew of
his right to refuse consent.
 It is only by analyzing all the circumstances of the individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary
or coerced. If under all the circumstances it has appeared that consent was not given or coerced by threat or force, then
the consent given is invalid and the search conducted is unreasonable.

Issue 2: W/N the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver applies to searches and seizures – NO
 It is argued that consent is also a waiver of a person’s rights under the 4 th and 14th Amendments. By allowing the police to
conduct a search, a person “waives” his right to prevent the search.
 Johnson v Zerbst doctrine: To establish the waiver, the state must demonstrate an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.
 Johnson doctrine was in the context of the safeguards of a criminal trial, and is thus a prerequisite to a finding of a valid
waiver.
 The standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel is applied either at trial, or upon a guilty plea, or in a police
line-up.
 But there is a difference between rights under a fair trial and the rights under the 14 th Amendment which guarantees the
security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police (unreasonable search and seizure).
 Requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver of trial rights does NOT extend to the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 Miranda doctrine does not apply as well. There is no evidence of any coercive tactic used – either from the nature of the police
questioning or the environment in which it took place. There is no presumption that the response to the policeman’s question
was coerced.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, Judgment of the Court of Appeals of remanding the case must be reversed.
Notes
- Waiver – an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
- Under 2nd issue, it is implied that a consent to a search is NOT a waiver of a right

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[SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WAIVER OR CONSENTED SEARCHES]
02 US V. MATLOCK
February 29, 1974 | White, J. |

Doctrine: The consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared.

Facts:
● Matlock was arrested in the front yard of a house in which he lived along with a Mrs. Graff (daughter of the lessees and his common-law
wife) and others.
○ The home was leased from the owner by Mr. And Mrs. Marshall, who lived there with several of their children, including Mrs.
Graff, her 3 year old son and Matlock.
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 ● The arresting officers, who did not ask him which room he occupied or whether he would consent to a search, were admitted into the
house by Mrs. Graff. The officers told her they were looking for money and a gun and asked if they could search the house. With her
consent but without a warrant, they searched the house, including the east bedroom on the 2nd floor which she said was jointly
occupied by Matlock and herself.
○ The east bedroom was searched and the evidence at issue here, $4,995 in cash, was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in
the room.
● Matlock was indicted for the robbery of a federally insured bank in Wisconsin. A week later, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized by law enforcement from the home in which he had been living.
● The District Court held that where consent by a third person is relied upon as justification for a search, the Government must show,
inter alia, not only that (1) it reasonably appeared to the officers that the person had authority to consent, but also that (2) the person
had actual authority to permit the search.
○ The District Court held that the first requirement was met but the second was not – Mrs. Graff’s statements to the officers that
she and Matlock shared a room were enough to prove the officers’ good faith belief but were held to be inadmissible extrajudicial
statements to prove the truth of the facts during trial.
○ The District Court held inadmissible all Mrs. Graff’s extrajudicial statements (US CrimPro thing), rendering the remaining
evidence insufficient to prove “to a reasonable certainty that Gayle Graff and Matlock were living together in the east bedroom.”
○ They also rejected the Government’s claim that it was only required to prove that at the time of the search the officers could
reasonably have concluded that Gayle Graff’s relationship to the east bedroom was sufficient to make her consent binding on
Matlock.
● The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:
1. W/N the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render the
seized materials admissible in evidence
2. W/N Mrs. Graff’s relationship to the east bedroom was sufficient to make her consent to the search valid against respondent

Held:
1. YES.
● Recent authority clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against
the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.
○ Cited a case where evidence seized from a duffel bag shared by the accused and his cousin was deemed admissible after the
cousin consented to a search as the accused was held to have assumed the risk that his cousin would allow someone else to
look inside.
● The prior recognition of the constitutional validity of “third party consent” searches supported the view that a consent search is
fundamentally different in nature from the waiver of a trial right.
○ When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent
was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed
common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects.
2. YES.
● Both Courts were in error when they excluded from evidence Mrs. Graff’s extrajudicial statements that she and Matlock represented
themselves as husband and wife.
● The respondent himself admitted that he considered himself married to Gayle Graff.
● There was nothing in the records to raise serious doubts about the truthfulness of these statements.
● Cohabitation out of wedlock is not something one would falsely confess as it is a crime in the state of Wisconsin. Being that Mrs. Graff’s
statements were against her penal interest, they carried their own indicia of reliability.
● All these considerations warrant admitting the extrajudicial statements as evidence for consideration during trial supporting the
contention that Mrs. Graff possessed the requisite authority for her consent to the search to be binding.
● The Government sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of evidence that Mrs. Graff’s voluntary consent to search the east
bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting the evidence found.

Dispositive
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand the case to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Notes
Douglas, J., dissenting
A total of three searches were conducted, all without procuring a search warrant. The officers merely obtained consent from the people that lived
in the home. There was no exigent circumstance or emergency which could provide an excuse for the officers’ failure to secure a warrant.
The crux of the matter was not the authority of Mrs. Graff but the impermissibility of the search because of the failure of the officers to secure a
search warrant when they had the opportunity to do so.
With such a decision, the risk is that consent is granted in submission to authority. And without a search warrant, the officers are free to search
anything indiscriminately.
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It is inconceivable that a search without a warrant can give more authority than a search conducted with a warrant.

Brennan, J., dissenting

“In my view the determination is also required that Mrs. Graff consented knowing she was not required to consent. ‘It wholly escapes me how our
citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence.’”

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 Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) | No. 1016 | June 03, 1968 | Ponente: Stewart, J.

Nature of the Case: Certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina

Petitioner(s): Wayne Bumper
Respondent(s): North Carolina

SUMMARY: Petitioner was found guilty of rape. He assails his conviction, saying the Jury was “prosecution
prone” and that the rifle used to convict him was obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable and
warrantless search and seizure. (“Consent” to the search was given after the searching officers said they
“have a search warrant”)
DOCTRINE: When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the
burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be
discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in
reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was
invalid.

FACTS:
 All jurors who are opposed to death penalty or have conscientious scruples against imposing the death
penalty are excluded for cause from the Jury.
 A rifle was presented in evidence against Petitioner. 4 officers went to his grandmother’s house (Hattie
Leath), where he lives. They told Leath that they have a search warrant, so she told them to “go ahead”
and let them into the house to search. Officers found the rifle hanging behind the kitchen door.
 Petitioner Bumper was found GUILTY of RAPE, an offense punishable by death. But the Jury
recommended life imprisonment instead.
 Petitioner appealed his conviction on 2 grounds:
1. The way the Jury was selected makes it “prosecution prone”, therefore violative of his 6 th and 14th
Amendment rights to an impartial Jury.
2. The rifle used to convict the Petitioner was obtained in violation his 4 th and 14th Amendment rights
against unreasonable and warrantless search and seizure.

*Raf’s format not applicable

ISSUES + RULINGS:
1. WON the Jury was necessarily “prosecution prone”, thereby violating Petitioner’s right to an impartial Jury?
– NO
 Petitioner: All Jurors against death penalty were removed for cause from the Jury. Such a selection of
Jurors must necessarily be biased as well with respect to his guilt. Therefore, his conviction must be
reversed.
 Witherspoon v. Illinois: The death penalty could not be executed when imposed by a Jury where all Jurors
against death penalty were removed.
 Court: Witherspoon case is not applicable here because Petitioner was actually sentenced to life
imprisonment instead. Also, Petitioner adduced no evidence to support the claim that a Jury selected as
this one was is necessarily “prosecution prone.”

2. WON the rifle was unconstitutionally-obtained, making its admission violative of Petitioner’s right against
unreasonable and warrantless search and seizure? – YES

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  Prosecution: They did not rely upon a warrant to justify the search, but upon consent of Leath.
 Leath: “He told me he had a search warrant, but he didn’t read it to me. … He said he was the law and
had a search warrant to search the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had a search
warrant. I took him at his word. … At that time, I did not know my grandson had been charged with
crime. Nobody told me anything. ... They didn't tell me nothing about my grandson.”
 Court: “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the
burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be
discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in
reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant
was invalid.”
 Court: “When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he
announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with
coercion -- albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent.
 Court: “We hold that Mrs. Leath did not consent to the search, and that it was constitutional error to
admit the rifle in evidence against the petitioner.”

FINAL RULING: Judgement of SC of North Carolina REVERSED. Case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Douglas, J., Concurring
 Would also reverse on the ground that petitioner was denied the right to trial on the issue of guilt by a Jury
representing a fair cross-section of the community.
 Transcript of the hearing comes in the form of narrative. The effect is to put into the mouth of the witness
some of the words of the attorneys. The result is a narrative that has the tone of decisiveness but is shot
through with contradictions.
 Prosecution: “The fact that [the search] did reveal the presence of the guilty weapon…justifies the search.
… [The petitioner’s] rights have not been violated. Rather, his wrongs have been detected.”
 A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.
 “Orderly submission to law enforcement officers who, in effect, represented to the defendant that they had
the authority to enter and search the house, against his will if necessary, was not such consent as constituted
an understanding, intentional and voluntary waiver by the defendant of his fundamental rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.”
 The legal effect is that consent is on the basis of such a warrant, and his permission is construed as an
intention to abide by the law, and not resist the search under the warrant, rather than an invitation to
search.
 Prosecution argues that the officers did in fact have a warrant, but no warrant was ever returned so there’s
no way of knowing whether it was a valid warrant.
 It is not the function of this Court to determine innocence or guilt. Our duty is to uphold the Constitution.

Harlan, J., Concurring

 The reversal of this conviction is not a "penalty" imposed on the State for infringement of federal
constitutional rights. Reversal by this Court results, as always, only from a decision that petitioner was not
constitutionally proved guilty, and hence there is no legally valid basis for imposition of a penalty upon him.
 Crediting or discrediting evidence is the function of the trier of fact, in this case a jury. The jury's verdict is a
lawful verdict, however, only if it is based upon evidence constitutionally admissible. When it is not, as it is

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 not here, reversal rests on the oldest and most fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence -- that a
defendant is entitled to put the prosecution to its lawful proof.
 Nothing Mrs. Leath said in response to that announcement can be taken to mean that she considered the
officers welcome in her home with or without a warrant. What she would have done if the sheriff had not
said he had a warrant is, on this record, a hypothetical question about an imaginary situation that Mrs. Leath
never faced.
 If the officers had a valid search warrant, no consent was required to make the search lawful. There was a
search warrant in this case, and it remains possible that it is a valid warrant. However, the prosecution here
explicitly and repeatedly renounced any reliance on the warrant. Like all other parties to lawsuits, a
prosecutor has an obligation to the courts and to other parties to present its claims at the earliest
appropriate time.
 The question cannot be whether the defendant actually committed the crimes charged, so that the error
was "harmless" in the sense that petitioner got what he deserved. The question is whether the error was
such that it cannot be said that petitioner's guilt was adjudicated on the basis of constitutionally admissible
evidence; whether the properly admissible evidence was such that the improper admission of the gun could
not have affected the result.
 The jury could, of course, have found the testimony of the victims credible beyond a reasonable doubt, and
convicted petitioner on this basis alone. But it might well not have. The addition of a tangible cross-check
linking petitioner with the crime can hardly be said, from the judicial vantage point, to have been harmless
surplusage.

Black, J., Dissenting

 Question of the Jury being “prosecution prone” is moot. They sentenced him to life imprisonment instead
of death despite the horrible facts of the case.
 Believes that searching officers had valid permission to conduct their search. When one of them approached
Leath saying they have a warrant, he didn’t appear to be holding a paper nor did he read any warrant, and
yet her immediate response was not to demand the warrant but to let them in.
 Leath: “I was willing to let them look in any room or drawer in my house they wanted to. Nobody threatened
me with anything. Nobody told me they were going to hurt me if I didn't let them search my house. Nobody
told me they would give me any money if I would let them search. I let them search, and it was all my own
free will. Nobody forced me at all.”
 Leath consented to the search. In fact, she wanted them to search her house to prove that she has nothing
to hide. I do not believe that the Court should substitute what it believes Leath should have said for what
she actually said. Her consent is sufficient. Especially since the rifle wasn’t found in Petitioner’s room but
behind kitchen door.
 Overwhelming evidence in the case, even when the rifle and related testimony are excluded, amply
demonstrates Petitioner’s guilt.
 The couple positively identified Bumper. There was substantial evidence corroborating their testimonies.
Their characters were in no way impeached or challenged.
 Court should not automatically reverse every decision in which they find a violation of the Constitution. If
the guilt can stand without the invalidly-obtained evidence, they should leave the decision as it is.

White, J., Dissenting

 When "consent" to a search is given after the occupant has been told by police officers that they have a
warrant for the search, consent as conditioned on there being a valid warrant, absent clear proof that the
consent was actually unconditional.
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 Not every search following conditional consent is invalid. If upon a motion to suppress or upon an objection
to evidence offered at the trial, the State produces a valid warrant for the search, there is no good reason
to exclude the evidence simply because police at the time of the search relied on the consent and neither
served nor returned the warrant.
 Since the existence and validity of the warrant have not been determined in the state courts, the case is not
ripe for reversal or affirmance. I would therefore vacate this conviction, returning the case to the state courts
for a determination of the validity of the warrant.
 If the warrant would not have been a proper predicate for the search, I would require reversal of the
conviction unless it is saved under the harmless error rule.
NOTE: What happened according to the victims, as found in J. Black’s dissent:

 Victims were parked shortly after dusk on a country road not far from where the petitioner Bumper lived.
 Bumper approached the car, stuck a rifle barrel up to the window and ordered the girl to get out of the car
 Bumper ordered the girl to undress. When she refused, Bumper pointed the rifle at the man, and the girl,
followed Bumper's orders.
 Bumper then forced the young man into the rear seat of the car while Bumper raped the girl on the back
of the car.
 Bumper forced the couple to drive to another spot and made them get out of the car.
 Bumper told the couple he was going to kill them. The couple suggested that Bumper tie them up and
blindfold them so he could get away with no problem.
 Bumper tied each to a separate tree. He raped the girl again. After this, he shot the guy then the girl and
drove away using their car.
 The victims were able to free themselves and made their way to a nearby house where the owner got
them to a hospital.

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