Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Morgenthau‟s
perspective in his book Politics Among Nations (1948).
Kennedy Mwangi1
What is Diplomacy?
Jacques Chazelle (1962) notes that "The term diplomacy means the set of means and specific
Ernest Satow states that "Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of
official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to
their relations with vassal states; or more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by
A nation that seeks to pursue its interest must do so bearing in mind that its one among many in
the international system and most probably there are other states that harbor similar if not the
same interests.
The international system has different players and a state need to take into consideration the
position that it occupies in this system. Although the state according to realists, both classical
and neo-classical is the primary players in the world system, that they have rational interests and
that security is at the centre of their concern, they must take serious note of other state and non-
1
Master of Arts in International Relations, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of
Nairobi, Co-Author of ‘Revitalization of Health infrastructure flagship project: The case of Mbagathi Hospital’ a
book Chapter in ‘Women’s Experiences with Selected Flagship Projects in Vision 2030’ and ‘Best Practice in
Implementation of Article 43 (1) (f), a book chapter in ‘Socio-economic Rights-Article 43 (1) of the Constitution of
Kenya: Best practices
apply peaceful diplomacy. This must not be taken to mean that they have to shelve their interests
in an event that there is a chance that war might occur but must also apply intelligent diplomacy
by way of compromise, persuasion or the threat of force. All this must be intelligent such that the
National Power
Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a world of anarchy
and self-help, in which individual man and men aggregated into states seek to maintain or to
increase power. In the modern era, this approach is reflected quintessentially by Hans
Morgenthau, who presents national power not only as an end in the Hobbesian sense that “power
is always the immediate aim,” but as a means to that end Jablonsky (1997).
In his book, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes states that „I put for a general inclination of all mankind,
a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.‟. He further
implores this notion by describing man as selfish, brutal and naturally evil in his „Hobessian
State of nature‟. It is this lust and self-centredness that Hans Morgenthau labels „animus
dominandi‟.
David Jablonsky (1997) notes that most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or
capacity that provides the “ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with
one‟s own objectives.” He further adds that at the national level, this influence is based on
relations between nation-state A and another actor (B) with A seeking to influence B to act in
statesmen may seek influence for its own sake. But for most, influence, like money, is
prestige, territory, raw material, or alliances. To achieve these ends, state A can use various
techniques of influencing, ranging from persuasion or the offering of rewards to threats or the
In this essay, I will expound the four points that Hans Morgenthau gives as the task of
diplomacy, whose execution must be both intelligent and peaceful to achive a states national
interests. Morgenthau notes that „a diplomacy that ends in war has failed in its primary objective:
He notes that of all the factors that make for the power of a nation, the most important, is the
quality of diplomacy. The conduct of a nation‟s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national
power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in
war. He defines the elements of national power as the geographic position of a state, natural
note that the possession of information by a state can be a source of national power. This
information must be strategic not only to its possessor but also to other states.
Morgenthau further notes that diplomacy is the brains of national power, as national moral is its
soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgment defective, and its determination feeble, all the
production, of military preparedness, of size and quality of population will in the long run avail a
nation little. A nation that can boast of all these advantages, but not of diplomacy commensurate
with them, may achieve temporary successes through the sheer weight of its natural assets. In the
In the long run, such a nation must yield to one whose diplomacy is prepared to make most of
whatever other elements of power are its disposal, thus making up through its own excellence for
Diplomacy of high quality will ring the ends and means of foreign policy into harmony with the
available resources of national power. It will tap the hidden sources of national strength and
He further notes that in the whole range of foreign policy, the task of diplomacy is fourfold:
1. Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially
States have different positions in the international system by virtue of the power it wields.
According to realists, this power is derived primarily from its military might. The state must
therefore asses its own objectives and what it aims to achieve in the implementation the same are
the gains immediate or they will be enjoyed later? Will the achievement of the objectives lead to
a multiplier effect?
In relation to its position in the international system, the objectives of a state may be achievable
or not in the case that the achievement of the said objectives is in conflict with those of a more
powerful state.
face the risk of war on two accounts. Such a nation is likely to dissipate its strength and not be
strong enough at all points of friction to deter a hostile nation from challenging it beyond
endurance. He adds that the failure of a nation‟s foreign policy may force the nation to retrace its
steps and to redefine its objectives in view of its actual strength or the strength of its rival.
The problem with that a nation will face if it had not assessed the strength of its rival relative to
its own power is that under the pressure of an inflamed public opinion, such a nation will go
forward on the road toward an unattainable goal, strain all its resources to achieve it, and finally,
confounding the national interest with that goal, seek in war the solution to a problem that cannot
Take for example a Nation A whose objectives is to make strategic economic ties with country2
B which is a dispute over territory with nation C. If nation C is weaker than Nation A but
stronger than nation B, and then it seeks war over the territory with nation B, it will be risking a
lot if it does not assess the objectives of nation A, determining to what extent it can go to protect
nation B. SM Makinda (yr?) notes that there is no nation that acts on another nation for purely
2. Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and
Morgenthau further notes that a will invite war if its diplomacy wrongly assesses the objectives
of other nations and the power at their disposal. Country A that mistakes the foreign policy of
nation B forigh policy of status quo may actually as that of imperialism will evoke through its
2
Note that the terms country, nation and state are used interchangeably in this essay
Country B which mistakes country A‟s foreign policy of imperialism that of status quo may not
be ready to meet the treat to its own existence which country A policy entails.
Morgenthau adds that again, there is the danger of war as the reverse could happen and in order
to meet the imaginary aggression of the rival nation, the states may rush to arms.
Underrating or overrating the power of a state may be fatal. The role of early diplomats were
shrouded in secrecy and this was, and still is, meant to access and evaluate a state‟s plan of
action against or for another state and use this information to inform foreign policy at the home
of the diplomat. Thus the diplomat must be intelligent in gathering information which may be
secret and advice his home country accordingly. This will ensure that a state does not overate or
Take for example Japan‟s attack on USA‟s Pearl harbor. The Japanese underrated the extent to
which the power of the US extended. It is can thus be deemed as tenable as a fact that Japan‟s
diplomacy was not intelligent. This is evidenced by the catastrophic defeat that Japan faced in
3. Diplomacy must determine to what an extent these objectives are compatible with each
other
Morgenthau notes that a nation that seeks to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy
cannot cease comparing its own objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light of their
compatibility. If they are compatible, no problem will arise. If they are not compatible, nation A
must determine whether its objectives are so vital that they must be pursued despite that
incompatibility with the objectives of B. If it is found that A‟s vital interest can be safeguarded
finds these objectives are essential for its vital interests, A must then ask itself whether B‟s
objectives, incompatible with its own, are essential for B‟s vital interests. If the answer seems to
be in the negative, A must try to induce B to abandon its objectives, offering B equivalents not
vital to A. in other words, through diplomatic bargaining, the give and take of compromise, a
If the incompatible objectives of A and B should prove to be vital to either side, a way might still
be sought in which the vital interests of A and B might be redefined, reconciled, and their
objectives thus made compatible with each other. Here, however, even provided that both sides
pursue intelligent and peaceful countries A and B are moving dangerously close to the brink of
war.
4. Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of these objectives
It is the final task of an intelligent diplomacy, intent upon preserving peace, to choose the
appropriate means of pursuing its objectives. This means at the disposal of diplomacy are three:
Persuasion, compromise and the threat of force. No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of
force can claim to be both intelligent and peaceful. No diplomacy that would stake everything on
persuasion and compromise deserves to be called intelligent. Rarely, if ever, in the conduct of the
foreign policy of a great power is there justification for using only one method to the exclusion
of others. generally, the diplomatic representatives of a great power, in order to be able to serve
both the interests of his country and the interests of peace, must at the same time use persuasion,
hold out the advantages of a compromise, and impress the other side with the military strength of
his country.
The art of diplomacy consists in putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of
these three means at its disposal. A diplomacy that as successfully discharged its other functions
may as well fail in advancing the national interest and preserving peace if it stresses persuasion
when the give and take compromise is primarily required by the circumstances of the case. A
diplomacy that puts most of its egg in the basket of compromise when the military might of the
nation should be predominantly displayed, or stresses military might when the political situation
Peaceful and intelligent diplomacy was mainly used by the Unites States of America during the
Cold War era. Everything was so much clearer during the Cold War. The United States used its
diplomatic, economic, and military might to contain and outmaneuver the Soviet Union. Then, as
the Cold War was winding down, the United States engaged Mikhail Gorbachev's rapidly
declining regime as a source of leverage to manage and resolve conflicts across the globe.
Through sustained diplomatic negotiations, the USA took advantage of the shifting geopolitical
landscape to negotiate settlements and aid transitions in Afghanistan, Central America, Southeast
Asia, and southern Africa while laying the foundations for Europe's post-Cold War security
architecture. This approach helped the United States defeat Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf
War, launch the Madrid phase of the Middle East peace process, and facilitate the unification of
Germany. Thanks in large part to the United States' vision and diplomatic skill, the breakup of
affair.
The international Criminal Court (ICC) instated investigations into Kenya‟s post election
violence of 2008/9. The ICC indicted top politicians in the country including Uhuru Kenyatta
and William Ruto who later on went and became the president and deputy president of Kenya
respectively. In the stage while they served as ministers in 2013, Kenya applied shuttle
diplomacy to try and convince the African states to rally behind Kenya‟s quest of referring the
cases back to their home courts. Later after the 2013 elections, Uhuru Kenya as the president of
Kenya managed to convince African states through the African Union to protect any sitting
African head of state, from being subjected to the ICC. Although the full effect of the resolution
by the head of states is yet to be effectively demonstrated, peaceful and intelligent diplomacy is
quiet evident.
Coercive diplomacy in contemporary times must also be peaceful and intelligent. Coercive
diplomacy is use of threat of force in aid of persuasion, as its ablest exponent, Prof. Alexander I.
War. Two rules govern the game - the opponent must be allowed to save face by offering him a
line of retreat; the practitioner must have a fall-back position for himself or an exit strategy
before rushing into a confrontation. It follows that the lines of communication must be kept in
good repair.
persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping". Joblonsky
(1997) notes that the risks of miscalculation and bluff are high and deterrence can collapse. He
gives an example that, forty years ago, Henry Kissinger warned: "Deterrence is above all a
psychological problem. The assessment of risks on which it depends becomes less and less
precise in the face of weapons of unprecedented novelty and destructiveness. A bluff taken
What else was India's "forward policy" towards China but an exercise in "coercive diplomacy"?
It was based on miscalculation and bluff. A directive to the Army was issued after a meeting in
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's office on November 2, 1961. Defence Minister V.K. Krishna
Menon, the Chief of the Army Staff General P.N. Thapar, Chief of General Staff B.M. Kaul,
Intelligence Bureau chief B.N. Mullick, and Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai concurred: "So far as
Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible." Aimed at pleasing public
opinion, it rested on the assumption that China would not react militarily. It did, a year later.
In contrast, Indira Gandhi followed sound military advice before marching into East Pakistan in
November 1971. India and Pakistan have freely resorted to the use of force since their birth.
1947. The following month, Pakistan sent the raiders into Kashmir. In 1965, it launched a war.
India's military aid to Tamil outfits was designed to make the Sri Lanka government offer
acceptable terms to the Tamils. The record of coercive diplomacy in South Asia is anything but
creditable.
Conclusion
and clearly so its own objectives as well as the objectives of the other states. In so doing the
diplomat knows which objectives are similar and which are different, the ones which are
strategic and the ones which are not. Diplomacy should also be in a position to determine the
compatibility of the objectives of the states and determine which ones that can be pursued
through negotiation, compromise or threat of war. Diplomacy must also be timely since a tactic
can be very intelligent but the time makes war eminent. Diplomacy should therefore be both
5. References
Morgentahu, J. Hans (2001), Thompson, Kenneth. W (ed, six edition): Politics among Nations:
Jose Calvet De Magalhaes (1988):The pure concept of diplomacy: Green Wood Press, Inc,
Connecticut
London
Karen E. Smith and Murgot Light (Eds.)(2001) Ethics and Foreign Policy; Cambridge University
Press; London
David Jablonsky et al (1997): US National Security: Beyond the Cold War: New York