Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 184849 February 13, 2009

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA
PAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-
AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on
October 28, 2008 by petitioners-spouses General (Ret.) Eliseo D. dela Paz (Gen. Dela Paz) and
Mrs. Maria Fe C. dela Paz (Mrs. Dela Paz) assailing, allegedly for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the orders of respondent
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (respondent Committee), through its Chairperson, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Senator Santiago), (1) denying petitioners’ Challenge to Jurisdiction
with Motion to Quash Subpoenae and (2) commanding respondent Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Jose
Balajadia, Jr. (Balajadia) to immediately arrest petitioners during the Senate committee hearing
last October 23, 2008. The petition thus prays that respondent Committee be enjoined from
conducting its hearings involving petitioners, and to enjoin Balajadia from implementing the
verbal arrest order against them.

The antecedents are as follow –

On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the
International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October
6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing
officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.

On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow
airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately
P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession
45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00).

Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the
PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government
confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting
them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to
conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.

On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the
hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to
Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.2 Senator Santiago emphatically defended
respondent Committee’s jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the
Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph
12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that
respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They
likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by
the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them
relative to the Moscow incident.

Respondent Committee filed its Comment3 on January 22, 2009.

The petition must inevitably fail.

First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:

"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process.4

The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner
in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full
discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v.
Cuenco,5 was characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at
liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication.

Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.
Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction
over the petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we are convinced that
respondent Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its authority.lawphil.net

Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:

12) Committee on Foreign Relations. – Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the
relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-
lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas
Filipinos.

A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow
incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committee’s jurisdiction.

The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia.
Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation
to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of "public" money
ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with
immigration and currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession
and detained him and other members of the delegation in Moscow.

Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of
the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two
conventions contain provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign

currency across borders.6 The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s compliance with
the obligations required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the respondent
Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and purpose of the
funds discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippines’ commitments under these
conventions.

Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by
the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).

Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee
may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance
in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its
attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can
investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to
the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced
from public funds.
Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiago’s verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the
Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order7 of arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the
Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.

Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation.8

Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual. In the
legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent Committee and the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions
propounded by the Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest.
Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to
dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian considerations.9 Consequently, the
order for her arrest was effectively withdrawn.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION

 CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 3-21.
2
Id. at 28.
3
Id. at 126-137.
4
See Morrero v. Bocar, 37 O.G. 445.
5
100 Phil. 101 (1957).
6
Art. 14(2) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption provides –

State parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor
the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders,
subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in
any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a
requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross border transfer of
substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime provides

–

Art. 7(1), Each State Party:

(a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic and regulatory and supervisory

regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, other
 bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in
order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which regime shall
emphasize requirements for customer identification, record-keeping and the
reporting of suspicious transactions;

Art. 7(2):

State Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor
the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders,
subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in
any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a
requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of
substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.
(Underscoring supplied.)
7
Rollo, pp. 138-139.
8
Publication was made in the October 31, 2008 issues of the Manila Daily Bulletin and
the Malaya.
9
Rollo, p. 143.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.

BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the
country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this
Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He
further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the
records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further
using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes"
abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue
with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator
Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s,
where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral
duties.7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the
body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the
Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the
"Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the
Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No.
179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued
in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III
of the Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on
the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino,

Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and
Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have
different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and
their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’
standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a

personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
 conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent
cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the
broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission.
The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving
serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty
under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging
that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by
the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously,
therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions
and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for
prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they
are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that
any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the
legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also
of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and
that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find
sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve
the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this
case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor
Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for
the guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior
cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of
petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases,
we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the
issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the
tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the
said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken
by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After
all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed
to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s
explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership,
the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate
may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with
the following rationalization:
 The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative
body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every
three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every
three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less
than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term
of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate
of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the
acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters
will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature
of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
 RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the
Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the
Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of
the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules
at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to
be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules
shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently
put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had
used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by

arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published
in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the
Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya.
While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the
respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of
the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No.
179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation
centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
*
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3
Id. at 9.
4
Id. at 1-38.
5
Id. at 36-38.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7
Id. at 169.
8
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
10
Id. at 3-17.
11
Id. at 7-13.
12
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 44.
14
Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16
Id. at 71-90.
17
Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the October 2,
2007 Oral Argument:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.

2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in
accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional

requirement.

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes," violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at
66.)
18
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26, 2007.
19
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
20
465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
21
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736,
755.
23
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 160.
24
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.
25
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26
Id.
27
Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.
29
Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.
31
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
33
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
35
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case.
36
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004).
37
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.
38
Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39
Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40
See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac published in
The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House committees in
‘Garci’ probe file report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25,
2006.
41
Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229
SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.
43
Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).
44
As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing for the
Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General
Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.
46
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47
Id. at 297-298.
48
Dated September 4, 2008.
49
TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial and
Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use Thereof and
For Other Purposes," approved on June 14, 2000.
51
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633,
October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52
Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:

Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied

legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data
message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to
in that electronic data message.

Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. – Electronic documents shall

have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal
writing, and –

(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by
an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and
reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in
that –

(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any
change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and
display; and

(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for
which it was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.

(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not
being presented or retained in its original form.

(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original
form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if –

(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document

from the time when it was first generated in its final form; and

(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it

is to be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to
 vary any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in
the execution of documents for their validity.

For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional

equivalent of a written document under existing laws.

This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of
electronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to
authentication and best evidence.

Sec. 10. Original Documents. – (1) Where the law requires information to be
presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic
data message or electronic document if:

(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first
generated in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic
document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and

(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information

is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information
not being presented or retained in its original form.

(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):

(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has
remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and

(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
relevant circumstances.