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23-10-2017

Assignment 7:
End – Project report

CT3101 BASISAPSECTEN PROJECTMANAGEMENT


GROUP 9B
MIKE MORITZ - 4287932
LISE ANDRINGA - 4454952

TU DELFT Minor Project Management: from Nano to Mega


Project Scope
Product scope description:
The Queensferry Crossing is a cable-stayed bridge built alongside the existing Forth Road Bridge to the west and
carries the M90 motorway across the Firth of Forth between Edinburgh, at South Queensferry, and Fife, at
North Queensferry. The Forth Replacement Crossing was an essential project that will maintain a vital link in
Scotland's transport network, protect the Scottish economy and secure thousands of jobs.

Objectives:
The objective was to prevent economic consequences from appearing in the area due the possible shutting
down of the existing bridge in 2019 by means of successful development of an additional crossing point over
across the Firth of Forth between Edinburgh, at South Queensferry, and Fife, at North Queensferry to lessen
traffic moving along the existing Forth Road Bridge to the original number of 11 million vehicles per year, while
extending the total traffic capacity.

Project deliverables:
 The structure was to span 1.7 miles of road deck (with a total of 122 sections, weighing an average of
750 tonnes each, lifted up into position 60 metres above the Forth estuary and weighing an incredible
combined total of approximately 85,000 tonnes)making it the longest three-tower bridge in the united
kingdom.
 A total of 10 piers (eight on the south, two on the north) to support the two approach viaducts
connecting the bridge to the wider road network. The piers must comprise the V-shape concrete piers
with steel cross ties and hollow reinforced concrete cross section legs for stability.
 Plant 400,000 trees, shrubs and hedging plants, to provide a lasting woodland legacy for the project.
 A road connection between the bridge and highways on both sides of the crossing

Project Constraints:
The bridge had to be operational with traffic flowing freely from one side to the other over all of the bridges
road surface on 27 August 2017. The contractual penalties, budget constraints and milestones are extensively
described in the Planning. An import negative constraint is the weather conditions in Scotland. Other constraints
include the safety requirements for construction personnel and traffic. The environmental factors were also a
constricting factor. Finally the maritime traffic was a minor constricting factor during construction.

Business case
Foreseen benefits
The foreseen benefits of the Queensferry crossing project were largely social and economic. The main benefit
was foreseen to be the increase in traffic capacity over the crossing, allowing for a growth in economic
development on both sides of the crossing as well as increasing the appeal of the area. As a consequence of the
new bridge having a vastly increased traffic capacity the original bridge would be capable of remaining
operational due to no longer being having to exceed its design requirements instead of having to be shut down
at the projected year 2019.

The main value driver(s)


The main value drivers were factors that were having a major impact on the final value of the project. Naturally
one of these value drivers of this project consist of the major companies that were a part of this endeavour.
Another main value driver for the project was the strategic economic growth potential of the areas connected
to the envisioned crossing and finally the third most important value driver was brand recognition.

Transport Scotland and its venture partner JacobsArup, the FRC Main Crossing Ship Simulation Study were
important for the execution process, because it was necessary to understand the potential effects that the new
bridge would have on ship navigation during construction and once built. This included looking at scenarios
such as engine or rudder failure, in order to plan mitigation measures.

The two consortia serving the project included eight of the world's most respected construction and specialist
engineering companies. Vinci, Balfour Beatty, BAM Nuttall and Morgan establishment form the Forthspan
Consortium whilst Dragados, HOCHTIEF, American Bridge International and Morrison Construction Ltd formed
the Forth Crossing Bridge Constructors. The principal contract to build the new bridge and connecting roads
was awarded to the Forth Crossing Bridge Constructors consortium.

The economic growth facilitated by the building of the crossing was greatly dependent on the design of the
bridge itself, but also the extended area. The location had been chosen due to the fact that a large amount of
infrastructural development was located in the area, as well as towns on both sides of the crossing.

The brand name has proven to be an important aspect of the project. In order to draw attention and interest
from a vast array of different parties, including ones that indirectly would be responsible for said economic
growth envisioned a major propaganda campaign had been started. The bridge has become so widely known in
the extended area that it has become a major hub of transport.

Apart from the main value drivers a large amount of minor value drivers were located in the project, which
while individually minor all together could have a significant influence on the final project operating value.
These include the people working on the project, the transportation companies responsible of delivering the
resources, the law and legislation and the strategic organization of the overall project by the project director
and managers.

Planning and milestones


The individual planning of the separate sub-projects and departments created for the project is not available in
this project and can only be accessed by the authorized personnel, however by accessing the general timeline it
is possible to review the general milestones and from there extrapolate a visualization of the planning. The
following timeline is directly taken from the project information hub.

Milestones:
 During 2006 and 2007, Transport Scotland, together with a group of leading transport consultants from
Jacobs and Faber Maunsell, undertook a study of the possible options for a new Forth crossing. The
report recommended adoption of a cable-stayed bridge, located to the west of the Forth Road Bridge,
as the preferred solution. The study concluded that this option was significantly cheaper than a tunnel,
would take less time to construct, and would represent better value for money, though it was noted
that a tunnel would have fewer environmental impacts
 In December 2007 the costs of the Queensferry Crossing Bridge were announced by finance secretary
John Swinney.
 The start of 2008 saw Jacob Arup appointed as consultants of the new Forth Replacement Crossing
- In February 2008 the technical studies and environmental surveys were begun, continuing through
2009. Also the consultants meet with landowners in vicinity of the new crossing area to explain the
forthcoming works in February 2008.
 In the end of 2008 the Scottish Government announced that public funding would be used to finance
the project. Public consultations were held, and some changes to the scheme were made in response to
the comments received.
 In March 2009 beginning the tender process. Preparations need to be made to secure contractors to
build the crossing. Transport Scotland host a conference attended by around 130 delegates from 60
different firms to brief them on the project and allow them to prepare for the tender process. Over the
summer a Code of Construction Practice will be developed in consultation with the relevant authorities
and community organisations to ensure the successful contractor carries out the works with due regard
for the impact on communities and the environment.
 In November 2009 an environmental statement was published, coinciding with the introduction of the
Forth Crossing Bill into the Scottish Parliament by John Swinney. The Forth Replacement Crossing
scheme will be promoted via a Parliamentary Bill which will be introduced to Parliament towards the
end of the following year. The project will be funded by the Scottish Government and discussions will
be held with the industry over the next few months to allow them to respond efficiently to a tender
competition later in 2009.
 In April 2009 the design development work and consultation with the public and stakeholders started.
 In January 2010 the closing date for objections the Crossing Billl, 89 objections were received.
 In May 2010 the Stage 1 debate on the Forth Crossing Bill, MSPs vote overwhelmingly in favour to carry
the bill forward to Stage 2.
 On 16 December 2010 the new legislation was voted in favour. The bill is approved by the Scottish
Parliament.
 In January 2011 the Queensferry Crossing bridge received Royal Assent, the final tenders bids submitted
by the two consortium’s remaining in the bidding process- Forthspan and Forth Crossing Bridge
Constructors.
 On the 18th of March 2011: The Forth Crossing Act comes into force.
 In April 2011: The principal contract to build the new bridge and connecting roads is awarded to the
Forth Crossing Bridge Constructors.
 In September 2011 the construction finally started.
 In June 2012, the cylindrical caissons which would help form the main foundations for two of the
bridge's three towers were being floated to their location. The caisson works took up the rest of 2012.
 In November 2012, work began on one of the key stages of the foundations, the Beamer Rock
cofferdam, which would help form the concrete base for the Central Tower. Getting the foundations
right was absolutely critical to the success of the whole project. ITS would create a southbound bus lane
within the hard shoulder and use variable mandatory speed limits during congested periods to deliver
benefits to motorists and public transport users by smoothing traffic flow and making journey times
more reliable.
 In December 2012, Intelligent Transport System (ITS) on the M90 in Fife went live.
 In February 2013, the completion of construction work on the remodelling of Junction 1a of the M9.
 In June 2013, First Minister, Alex Salmond MSP, was onsite at the end of June to announce the result of
the "Name the Bridge" public vote. 37,000 people voted for their favourite from a shortlist of five, with
the Queensferry Crossing being the victor.
 In June 2013, finished the foundations.
 In September 2013, Finance Minister, John Swinney MSP visited the Queensferry Crossing site in
September to reveal that the overall cost of the project was set to be £145 million lower than previous
estimates. The lower cost was a result of successful management of the project and the delivery of key
milestones.
 In January 2014, 2014 opened with a huge milestone for the Queensferry Crossing as all three of the
Crossing's new towers were simultaneously under construction. The project is now out of the water and
heading upwards! Meanwhile the Southern Approach Viaduct to the west of South Queensferry was
taking shape on land and the team successfully began to move it into position ready to launch out over
the water in the weeks thereafter.
 In May 2014, Construction works were moving ahead strongly on all fronts. All three of the Crossing's
towers are now well above the level of the foundation caissons (of cofferdam on the Centre Tower) and
are steadily heading upwards. The towers should reach deck level by the summer.
 In October 2014, Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, visits the Queensferry Crossing site in
October to announce a further reduction of £50 million in the project budget. The overall budget for
the project is now £1.35 billion to £1.4 billion.
 In March 2015, significant progress was made with landscape planting during the latest planting season
from November 2014 to March 2015.
 In April 2015, the first of the steel anchor boxes was installed inside the North Tower. These boxes
anchor the bridge's steel cable "stays" which, in turn support the road deck beneath.
 In Juny 2015, the first of the four stay cables on either side of the North Tower and at the end of August
their counterparts on the South Tower were also installed.
 In September 2015, the operation to lift the bridge’s deck segments into place and install the all-
important stay cables.
 In December 2015, the towers are now at their full height of about 210 metres above mean sea level.
This makes them the tallest bridge structures in the UK.
 In June 2016, it was announced that the Queensferry Crossing would open to traffic by May 2017 not, as
previously targeted, by the end of 2016. The project was still on target to have traffic flowing in both
carriageways before its contractual completion date of June 2017.
 In July 2016, the first "closure" of the project was achieved with the North Tower span being joined to
the northern approach viaduct. This was followed a few months later in October by the closure of the
gap between the Centre and South Tower deck spans.
 In December 2016, work gears up on the mechanical, electrical and plumbing (MEP) areas of the
project, this involves starting the electricity.
 In February 2017, the bridge structure completed. The external work like stay cables, road surface,
expansion joints, wind & noise barrier, vehicle restraint system and lightning had to be started.
 On 27 August 2017 the construction is finished.
 On 30 August 2017, The Queensferry Crossing opened to traffic.

Earned value
After the tender process, the principal contract to build the new bridge and connecting roads is awarded to the
Forth Crossing Bridge Constructors consortium with a successful tender price of 790 million pounds,
significantly below the original estimated price range of 900 million to 1.2 billion pounds. June sees the
contracts to install elements of the project's Intelligent Transport System (ITS) on the M90 in Fife awarded to
John Graham Ltd with a successful tender price of 12.9 million pounds, below the original 15 to 22 million
pounds estimated range.

The final piece of the contracts puzzle is complete in July when the contract to upgrade the M9 junction 1a at
Kirk Liston is awarded to the consortium between John Sisk and Roadbridge with a successful tender price of
25.6 million pounds. Again, as with the other successful tenders, the price of 25.6 million pounds is substantially
below the estimated range prices of 45 to 65 million pounds. The lower than expected costs of these contracts
means the total estimated cost range of delivering the Forth Replacement Crossing project sat at 1.45 to 1.60
billion pounds, a substantial reduction on the previous estimate of 1.7 to 2.3 billion pounds.

Finance Minister, John Swinney MSP visits the Queensferry Crossing site in September to reveal that the overall
cost of the project is set to be 145 million pounds lower than previous estimates. The lower cost is a result of
successful management of the project and the delivery of key milestones. A further reduction of 50 million
pounds in the project budget. The overall budget for the project is now 1.35 billion to 1.4 billion pounds.

The final costs of the project resulted in 1.35 billion pounds despite the original expected budget value of 2.3
billion pounds. This shows that the project has an extremely high earned value compared to real costs with it
being severely underspend.

Risk management
This risk management end-project report will only mention the major risks that happened or almost happened
without reviewing the minor risks happening on specific sub-parts of the projects. For these risks please refer to
the end-project report for the specific sub-projects.

 Risk1: An increase in down time resulting in delays in the schedule due to high winds preventing
construction from taking place. An estimate of 25% down-time has been taken into account due to
weather circumstances but this turned out to be 40%. This risk has thus been inappropriately mitigated
by having a flawed estimation of Scottish weather.
 Risk 2: Environmental agencies being highly resistant to the new project resulting in additional resources
needed to be diverted to environmental areas, taxing the budget of the project. This risk has been
reduced by incorporating environmentalism at the very start of the project and continuously doing
checks during the execution phase. This risk did not happen apart from the usual interference caused by
environmental agencies. The mitigation is considered a success.
 Risk 3: Budget cuts resulting in costs being shifted. This risk did happen, but it was directly done not as a
negative result, but in response to the great amount of budget spared due to active management of
contractors. This this budget cost did not have an impact on the project completion.
 Road safety impacts could have had a major influence on the project due to the road authority
(Transport Scotland) requiring the project to fulfil their safety requirements. Therefore, customized
safety techniques were developed to take into account local factors, both procedurally as well as
technically.
 Risk 4: The stringent safety requirements of the bridge deck meant that new innovations had to be
made in order to fulfil these requirements, however in the case that the bridge design did not satisfy the
safety authorities, either due to a bad design or due to sudden safety legislation changes the design
would have to be redone resulting in significant delays or budget implications. Luckily these events did
not happen due to active cooperation with the safety authorities, thus avoiding this risk.
 Risk 5: Due to the large amount of stakeholders and participating parties in the project communication
was at times not always as clear as possible. To mitigate this the project team was divided into multiple
departments responsible for a specific set of tasks and personnel. This way the chance of
communication causing problems was significantly reduced. In the case that the problems would have
reared their head they could have caused unforeseen image or material damage.

Table 1: Major risks

# Cause Risk Event Consequences Happened Mitigation

1. Bad weather Construction Increased down time to 40%. Yes Plan in 25%
conditions. works being down time.
halted.
2. Protest from Design Negative time and budget No Active
environmental alterations or implications. cooperation
agencies. location shift. with agencies.
3. New monetary Budget cuts. Reallocation of money and Yes Underspend
policies or possible negative during the
priorities. consequences. project.
4. Road safety Project being Severe schedule and budget No Active
impacts too high. halted. implications due to redesign participation of
of bridge deck being needed HSE agencies.
5. Large groups of Communication Damage to project image, or No Create
parties interacting errors. material damages (e.g. individual
with each other. wrong deliveries, etc.). departments.

Quality assurance
Quality has been one of the main focusses of the project. In order to get a proper quality assessment CALTROP
has been providing quality assurance personnel at the construction site, but also at the fabrication site of the
prefabricated parts such as the bridge cables that have been manufactured in China.

Apart from ensuring the quality of the materials and manufactured parts is in line with the specifications the
personnel active at the project site in cooperation with other firms constantly monitor and check whether the
construction works are done without any errors.

Lastly to ensure that the quality of the project does not diminish over time due to resistance to the project the
active media and propaganda campaign has been started and is continuing up to today to provide positive
information of the bridge to keep the operating of the bridge according to predictions or better.
Stakeholder and team management

Stakeholders
The Queensferry crossing project has during its entire lifetime a closely managed policy for stakeholders. Even
during the conceptualization phase the project has involved the necessary stakeholders that would only be
involved later in the project.

Local and environmental stakeholders have been managed by encouraging active participation with the project
by means of investing, events and other opportunities such as a naming competition. This together with an open
information flow ensured that the complaints and issues raised by local stakeholders have been able to be
handled discretely or kept a very low priority, due to them being stated by a minority.

The corporations making up the consortium that provided its services for this project have been involved since
the very first outset of the project. This ensured smooth cooperation, while at the same time ensuring a
successful transition from theoretical to practical tasks and maintaining transparency.

The government has been a very powerful stakeholder, hence the project has done everything in its power to
satisfy their requirements.

The large amount of media efforts and information provided through a multitude of channels such as internet,
television and community notifications by the project organization has allowed the project to gain a generally
positive reputation with the populace, despite having a cost of well over a billion pounds.

The project team


The main project team consisted of a project Director, operations director for employers delivery team, FCBC
project director, FCBC survey manager, FCBC temporary works coordinator for foundations and towers and an
FCBC deputy laboratory manager. Apart from this each of the aforementioned managers had their own
contractor team beneath them that has been decided based on their own needs and skills needed for the tasks
they were responsible for. Each of these managers worked parallel to each other, their tasks not influencing
each other as much as realistically possible, with their own departments. With exception of the project director
who was the overseer of the individual departments and in the end responsible for the delivery of the entire
project.

How each of the managers handled their own respective teams differed from person to person, but central to
the projects modus operandi were the people. It was expected that the managers involved their contractors as
much as possible with the project apart from merely the work they were expected to be doing. They
encouraged individual thinking by taking a more participative leadership style. In the end it proved that this style
allowed for a much higher morale and better work ethic during the project.

Lessons learned and recommendations


The project has provided ample opportunity to test out new management types and to learn from the events
that happened during its execution. There are a number of activities that went very well and should be
approached in a similar manner in other projects if applicable and possible.

The project has an excellent track record with maintaining relations with stakeholders, most notably the local
and extended population of Great Britain. The immensely active public relations campaign as well as dedicated
personnel for each of the individual stakeholders to be contacted has ensured that there were almost no
negative influences from the respective stakeholders. This was mainly done by having the stakeholders as a part
of the project from the very start, allowing for a greater participation as well as a greater interest in the success
of the project.

Another excellent policy that partly stems from the stakeholder management is budget management. During
multiple occasions in the project timeline it had been announced that a lower estimated cost was achievable.
This was mainly possible due to excellent management of resources allowing for saving on procurement costs,
but also by continued negotiations with contractors, allowing for cutting down on other costs. A direct effect of
this is that when a budget cut came it did not affect the project in any way due to the great amount of excess
money.

However despite the great amount of money saved and stakeholder risks avoided there were a number of
things that should have gone better. One of these thing is risk management. There were significant delays due
to inappropriate risk management, for example: It is known that the weather in northern England and Scotland
is abysmal at the end of the year, yet the expected down time taken into account into the scheduling was set as
only 25%. The extra downtime that was not taken into account resulted in a mayor delay of five months on the
delivery of the project. Other risk management lessons to be learned include the legislative risks. While the
project has always had a very proactive stakeholder management, during the design phase multiple small
alterations or mitigations had to be made due to safety concerns. While the risk technically did not happen due
to it being narrowly avoided, the extra work that resulted from extra changes at the end of the design phase
could have been avoided.

The errors made in risk management directly influenced the schedule itself, but from the way the schedule was
set up it was clear that there were more cases where the activities and procurement of resources were
scheduled too tight upon each other. This resulted in a schedule that was very sensitive of outside factors that
were not taken into account, resulting in every delay in itself causing additional delays due to affecting the tasks
that happen after it.

Recommendations
Hence, as first recommendation we would like to propose to plan additional float time for activities, this will
allow for a more flexible schedule and will allow for mitigation of delays caused within individual tasks. While
extending the early schedule it will in the end save the project time as well allow for extra safety.

A second recommendation would be to make a better risk assessment and to mitigate the risks in a more
proactive way. While this may cause some extra costs in the short term, it will vastly improve safety and stability
of the project.

A last recommendation for the project would be to involve less parties with it. Despite the successful
stakeholder management and public relations campaign it became painfully clear that managing the wishes and
requirements set up by all the different parties was a monumentally chaotic task that could have easily fallen
apart like a house of cards. By involving less parties it would allow the project team more time to spend getting
deeper involved with the parties chosen instead of having the obligation to share information with every layman
in the area. This would further allow for saving on personnel and smoother communication.

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