1
G.R. NO. 146224 January 26, 2007
VIRGINIA REAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SISENANDO H. BELO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated June 16, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed outright the petition for review of Virginia Real (petitioner) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58799, and the CA Resolution2 dated November 27, 2000 which
denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center
of the Philippine Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila.
Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall,
also located at the Food Center of PWU.
Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at
petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in
the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire
Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the
leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank
installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire,
respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to
accede to respondent's demand.
Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila (MeTC), docketed as Civil Case No.
152822.3 Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the
upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and
supervision of her employees; that petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of
the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls.4
In her Answer dated September 23, 1996, petitioner denied liability on the grounds
that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of her employees.5
After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision6 dated April 5, 1999 in favor of the
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter:
1) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 representing temperate or
moderate damages; and
2) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
The counterclaim filed by the defendant is hereby DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.7
The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate authority
revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove
and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall; that factual circumstances did not
show any sign of interference by any force of nature to infer that the fire occurred
due to fortuitous event; that the petitioner failed to exercise due diligence,
precaution, and vigilance in the conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining
the safety of her cooking equipment as well as in the selection and supervision of her
employees; that even if petitioner passes the fault to her employees, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code finds application; that in the absence of supporting evidence, the
amount of actual damages and unrealized profits prayed for by respondent cannot be
granted; that, nonetheless, respondent is entitled to temperate damages since
respondent sustained pecuniary loss, though its true value cannot, from the very
nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94606, insisting that the fire was a
fortuitous event. On November 26, 1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the
MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent
from P50,000.00 to P80,000.00.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the increase in the
award of temperate damages is unreasonable since she also incurred losses from the
fire.
In its Order dated April 12, 2000, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration holding that it cannot disregard evidence showing that the fire
originated from petitioner's fastfood stall; that the increased amount of temperate

damages awarded to respondent is not a full compensation but only a fair
approximate of what he lost due to the negligence of petitioner's workers. 9
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
58799.10 On June 16, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for
being "procedurally flawed/deficient." 11 The CA held that the attached RTC
Decision was not certified as a true copy by the Clerk of Court; that a certified true
copy of the MeTC Decision was not attached; that material portions of the record,
such as the position papers of the parties and affidavits of witnesses, as would
support the material allegations of the petition were also not attached. 12
On July 14, 2000, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, 13 attaching
photocopies of the Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk
of Court.14
On November 27, 2000, the CA issued its Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.15
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the submitted certified true copy of the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court as authenticated by a court employee other than the
Clerk of Court who was not around at that time said copy was secured
constitutes compliance with the Rules?
2. Whether the submission of a certified true copy of the Metropolitan Trial
Court's judgment is still an indispensable requirement in filing a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals despite the fact that said judgment was
already modified by the above decision of the Regional Trial Court and it is
the latter decision that is the proper subject of the petition for review?
3. Whether the submission of copies of the respective position papers of the
contending parties is still an indispensable requirement in filing a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals despite the fact that the contents
thereof are already quoted in the body of the verified petition and in the
subject judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court?
4. Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result
of the fire that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent
foodstalls at the Food Center premises of the Philippine Women's
University, including that of the respondent?
2
5. Whether the Regional Trial Court could increase the amount of damages
awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court in favor of the respondent who has
not even filed an appeal therefrom? 16
Petitioner submits that rules of procedure should not be applied in a very harsh,
inflexible and technically unreasonable sense.
While admitting that the RTC Decision and Order were not certified by the Clerk of
Court himself, petitioner insists that they were certified as authentic copies by
Administrative Officer IV Gregorio B. Paraon of the RTC.
As to the MeTC Decision, petitioner contends that the submission of a certified true
copy thereof is not an indispensable requirement because that judgment is not the
subject of the petition for review.
In any case, petitioner submits that she had substantially complied with the
requirements of the rule when she attached with her Motion for Reconsideration the
copies of the Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of
Court.
Anent the non-submission of the position papers of the parties, petitioner maintains
that the contents of said position papers were lengthily quoted verbatim in the
petition and in the attached copy of the MeTC Decision.
On the submission of affidavits of witnesses, petitioner contends that it was not
necessary because the case before the MeTC was not covered by summary
proceedings.
On the merits of her petition before the CA, petitioner avers that she should not be
held liable for a fire which was a fortuitous event since the fire could not be foreseen
and the spread of the fire to the adjacent fastfood stalls was inevitable.
Lastly, she argues that the RTC cannot increase the amount of temperate damages
since the respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the MeTC.
Respondent opted not to file a Comment, manifesting that the petition contains no
new arguments which would require a comment since the arguments are but a rehash
of those raised and decided by the lower courts.17
The Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda.18 In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted her
Memorandum.19 On the other hand, respondent filed a Manifestation stating that
since no new issues have been raised by the petitioner in her petition and in order not

to be redundant, he adopts as his memorandum the memoranda he filed in the MeTC
and the RTC.20
In his Memoranda before the MeTC and RTC, respondent emphasized the evidence
he presented to establish his cause of action against petitioner, principally the
testimony of Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel G. Pinca stating that the fire originated
from the LPG stove and tank in petitioner's fastfood stall.
The requirements as to form and content of a petition for review of a decision of the
RTC are laid down in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies,
with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and
the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations
of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure to comply with the above requirements
"shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides that rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Indeed, rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.21
In the present case, petitioner's submission of copies of the RTC Decision and Order
certified as correct by the Administrative Officer IV of the RTC is insufficient
compliance with the requirements of the rule. Petitioner failed to show that the Clerk
of Court was officially on leave and the Administrative Officer was officially
designated as officer-in-charge. The rule is explicit in its mandate that the legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower
courts must be certified correct by the Clerk of Court.
3
Nonetheless, a strict application of the rule in this case is not called for. This Court
has ruled against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities in several
cases, especially when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal
requirements.22 There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure.23 When the CA dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a
motion for the reconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite
pleadings, documents or order/resolution, this would constitute substantial
compliance with the Revised Rules of Court.24
Thus, in the present case, there was substantial compliance when petitioner attached
in her Motion for Reconsideration a photocopy of the Decision of the RTC as
certified correct by the Clerk of Court of the RTC. In like manner, there was
substantial compliance when petitioner attached, in her Motion for Reconsideration,
a photocopy of the Decision of the MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court
of the RTC.
On the necessity of attaching position papers and affidavits of witnesses, Section 2 of
Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court requires attachments if these would support
the allegations of the petition.25 In the present case, there was no compelling need to
attach the position papers of the parties since the Decisions of the MeTC and RTC
already stated their respective arguments. As to the affidavits, the Court notes that
they were presented by the respondent as part of the testimony of his witness Fire
Investigator Pinca and therefore would not support the allegations of the petitioner.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at
the expense of a just resolution of the case.
The Court's pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals26 is
worth echoing: "cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to
all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better
served."27 Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him
to lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities.28
The next most logical step would then be for the Court to simply set aside the
challenged resolutions, remand the case to the CA and direct the latter to resolve on
the merits of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 58799. But, that would further delay the
case. Considering the issues raised which can be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings and documents filed, and the fact that petitioner herself has asked the
Court to decide her petition on the merits, the Court deems it more practical and in
the greater interest of justice not to remand the case to the CA but, instead, to resolve
the controversy once and for all.29

The Court shall now address the issue of whether the fire was a fortuitous event.
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will; (b) it
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor. 30
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from
the cause of injury or loss.31
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the
LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to
prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including
respondent's fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner's theory of
fortuitous event.
Petitioner's bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her
favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.32 In short, mere allegations are not evidence.33
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
4
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees.34 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.35
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG
stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and
periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking
equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary
inference was that petitioner had been negligent.36
As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof by the
RTC is improper. The RTC could no longer examine the amounts awarded by the
MeTC since respondent did not appeal from the Decision of the MeTC. 37 It is well-
settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the
lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.38 While there are
exceptions to this rule, such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical
errors,39 none apply here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated June 16,
2000 and November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, Manila is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the temperate damages
awarded is reduced from P80,000.00 to P50,000.00 as awarded by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila in its Decision dated April 5, 1999.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
 5

Southeastern College Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126389 – July 10, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondents are owners of a house near the petitioner’s four-story school
building along the same road. During a typhoon, the roof of the petitioner’s building
was partly ripped off and blown away by strong winds, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. In the aftermath, an ocular
inspection of the destroyed building was spearheaded by the city building official. In
his report, he imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the
building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams which caused the roof
be ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondents.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no liability, attributing the damage to a
fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence present petition.’

ISSUE:

Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be attributed to a fortuitous event.

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being attributable to a
fortuitous event.

Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable”

To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that petitioners were
negligent, with which they fall short, merely relying on the report of the city building
official. This is the same official that have approved the building plans of petitioner,
who made clear that there were no prior complaints regarding the building. Since
storms are common in the country, the part of the building in question should have
failed against stronger typhoons that preceded said storm, which it had not.
Furthermore, petitioner was able to present evidence that regular maintenance was
carried out. Respondents also failed to support the claim of the actual loss they
suffered, merely relying on estimates without considering that wear and tear of
respondents’ home which may have had a contributory effect to the damage. Petition
is granted and challenged decision is reversed.

tiva Sarangaya (2005)
1. YES.
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya
erected Super A Building, a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey
commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela
o It has three doors which were leased out
o The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second
and third doors of the building
 On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the
Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita)
 1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager
Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door beside
the Matsushita office
o It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he
parked a company car 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina which he
used to supervise different towns
 July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car
 3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd
sound. On the second try, there was again an odd sound and a small flames
came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped the car, went out and
pushed it out of the garage
o Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the
whole garage where he was trapped so he suffered burns in the
face, legs and arms
 The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2 loud explosions,
smelt of gasoline and fire burned all their belongings
 city fire marshall investigated and concluded that the fire was accidental
 Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and Perla for
lacking the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
 RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily
o Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
 CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages
ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable - YES
2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee. - NO
HELD: DENIED
6
 Res ipsa loquitur
o Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.
o It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the
cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case
o The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption
o facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and
they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct
evidence is lacking
o based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms
o plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence
o provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a
defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he
exercised to prevent the incident complained of
 defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no
negligence on his part
 Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur
o 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent
 “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events
 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is
switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a
car engine is revved.
 Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to
submit any proof that he had it periodically
checked - negligence
o 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and
o 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
 When there is caso fortuito:
o (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was
independent of the human will
 human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate
cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss -Not
because car not maintained
 7

o (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the

caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid -
NOT under the control of pascual
o (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to
perform an obligation in a normal manner - Spouses had no access
nor obligation for the maintenance
o (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have
participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident

2. YES.

 Perla did not include any rule or regulation that Pascual should have
observed in performing his functions
 There was no guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company
property like the vehicle that caught fire
 Did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties
o Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable
for the damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed
on all those who by their industry, profession or other enterprise
have other persons in their service or supervision
o Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in
the transportation business.
 8

Ilocos Norte Electric Company v CA  INELCO, however, theorizes that the deceased could have died simply by either
GR No 53401 | Nov 6, 1989 drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself. it was
pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner’s knowledge, caused the
When an act of God combines with defendant’s negligence to produce an injury, installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current
conduct. whenever the switch is on. This might have caused the electrocution.
 The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded
FACTS P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45000.
 Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and  The CA set aside the CFI decision and ordered INELCO to pay actual damages of
consequent flooding in its wake. P30229.45, compensatory damages of P50000, exemplary damages of P10000,
 After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, attorney’s fees of P3000, plus the cost of the suit.
the deceased, Isabel LaoJuan, ventured out, and proceeded to the Five Sisters
ISSUE
Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
W/N INELCO is liable for damages since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events
merchandise that might have been damaged.
– NO
 Wading in waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees. Suddenly,
the deceased screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into the water. The two girls
RATIO
attempted to help, but failed. There was an electric wire dangling from a post and
 While it is true that typhoons and floods are consideredActs of God for which no
moving in snake-like fashion in thewater.
person may be held responsible, itwas not said eventuality which directly caused
 Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
the victim’sdeath. It was through the intervention of petitioner’snegligence that
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he
death took place.
turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
 Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated that when he set out that morning for an
 When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in- law had been
inspection, there was no INELCO line man attending to the grounded and
electrocuted, they requested the police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the
disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise closed around the
electric current.
time of the electrocution.
 The body of the deceased was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
 At the INELCO, irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because
Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body.
“amperes of the switch volts were moving”. And yet, despite thesedanger signals,
The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by
INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that defendant’s switch be cut off—
electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an “electrically charged wound”
but the harm was done. Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero, one of INELCO’s
or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned
linemen answered that he “was not the machine tender of the electric plant to
wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as
switch off the current.”
“circulatory shock electrocution”
 In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to
 In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and
be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil
employees, andsought to prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao
life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
Juan’s death, the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the
area, did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and
area, nor even manning its office.
property. The servicelines, devices and other INELCO equipmenthad been newly-
 The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in line with
from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous
its business of supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed
event.
safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in
case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.  “When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to
produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but
 An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000 was instituted by the
for his own negligent conduct or omission”
heirs of the deceased with the CFI.
 9

 A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to
a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in perilor when he seeks to rescue his Facts:
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased’s
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.

RULING This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death
CA Decision affirmed with modification, increasing actual damages to P48229. of a participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the
route of the race. The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the
marathon were guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate
cause of the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of the
passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of
assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the
fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter who, being then
a minor, had no gainful employment.

In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of
plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants
Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering both defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the amounts of Twenty Eight
Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P28,061.63) as actual
damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the
total amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty
Three Centavos (P178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and
Sixteen Centavos (P17,806.16) as attorney's fees. On the cross-claim of defendant
Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames, Inc, is hereby ordered to
reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may be recovered by the
plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in

ABROGAR v. COSMOS
conducting the marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements
ABROGAR vs. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES INC.
of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the
G.R. No. 064749 accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to
exercise due diligence; that the respondents could not be excused from liability by
March 15, 2017 hiding behind the waiver executed by Rommel and the permission given to him by
his parents because the waiver could only be effective for risks inherent in the
marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe

exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the respondents towards the
participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the
event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits
from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants
and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had
been an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third persons; and
that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be
recovered by the petitioners from Cosmos.
All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not
awarding damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason
that such damages were not recoverable due to Rommel not yet having finished his
schooling; and that it would be premature to award such damages upon the
assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed. The CA reduced
the issues to four, namely:
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames were negligent in its conduct of the 1st Pop
Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with
appellant Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant
Intergames is found to have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon
and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss
of earning capacity" of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and
exemplary damages granted to them by the Trial Court. In its assailed judgment on
March 10, 2004 and in view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the
death of Rommel Abrogar, appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral,
exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son. The
10
third and fourth issues are thus moot and academic. UPON THE VIEW OF THIS
CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo. The appellants
shall bear their respective costs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in
holding that respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:
A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the
marathon route; and
B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of
marshal during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of
the injury to its participants.
2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in
holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar
even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an inherent risk in a marathon
race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such waiver as claimed,
still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being against
public policy.
3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and) in
absolving respondent Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that
respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent Intergames contained a stipulation
exempting the former from liability.

4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and
consequently holding respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding
petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary damages for the death of their child,
Rommel Abrogar.
Held:
1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under
Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the person, of the time and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for
negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes
himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that
may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to
relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance
of injury from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or
not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or
implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include
acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not
ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. As
a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of
three elements, namely; the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;he must
further understand its nature; and his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or
implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample
authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk
involved in a known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or
11
experience, and thus will not be taken to consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the
doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race.
Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations
for the actual conduct of the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by
Intergames, through Castro, Jr.
4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Valenzuela v. CA (1996)
G.R.No. 115024 February 7, 1996
Lessons Applicable:
 Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)
 Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue
towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she
had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place
her emergency lights and seeked help
o She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the
tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard
Li who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to
the ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.

o Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27,
000 (aritificial leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840
actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of
plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral
damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but
absolved Li's employer
o Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
o Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located
just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very
fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery
road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space
for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going
towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to
Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
12
o an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search
for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where
she would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away,
behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
o situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by
large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or
their representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were
together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that
it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we
are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial
court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical
 13

and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the
accident. PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
o the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it vs.
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo BONIFACIO, respondents.
through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments
will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational BENGZON, J.P., J.:
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are
painful.

FACTS:

The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos) collided with
the truck of PEPSI, driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a
result, the Ramoses sued Bonifacio and Pepsi.

The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the
plaintiffs damages.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently
proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA
stated the basis for its decision:

“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant

company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the
bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had
size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: first, theoretical
examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
Our Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the defendant may be
considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experiences and record of service.’ Defendant Company has taken
all these steps.”

ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its

employee.
 14

HELD: that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the
driver-employee.
The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased
and an interested witness. This is a question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own
findings of CA. negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to
properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. We do not — and
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due have never — followed the respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited
diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. This
responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be
relieved from liability (rebuttable presumption of negligence).

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars M.V.O. Administrative

Order No. 1 in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total
weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond
the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor
provided with a helper for the driver. There is no finding that the tractor-truck did
not have a rear-vision mirror.

Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the
Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, alleging that the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It
is not enough that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in
addition, it must also appear that there was no special permit granted under Sec. 9.
Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing. There was no proof
much less any finding to that effect.

We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We

cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit
mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all
damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the
owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO,
BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge,
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9,
2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and denying their motion
for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil
indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged
with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical
Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of
the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was
convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there
was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability
was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan,
Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil
action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of
summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum
shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of
the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to
file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the
finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision
15
convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was
clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of
action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi
delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from
the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed
on the ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the
complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal
department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.[6]
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than four (4)
years after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the improper service of summons,
the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed on this
ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed
the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.[8] The appellate court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the respondent trial
court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal,
certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners
and they failed to allege that the petition was brought within the recognized
exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari
cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing
obligation arising from the criminal liability of private respondents. Petitioners insist
that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not
based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi
delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the action is based on the
criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality
of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed,
petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules
as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for the

deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil liability
had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point out
that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4)
years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since
Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case
was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was
made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via
certiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the
trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping; lack
of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and
non-indication of the full names and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents
filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the
damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages.[14] When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured
party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when
the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a
separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his
cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a
private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which
governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right
to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:
16
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way
of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action
as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as
a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the
municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any
pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a
separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners
assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading
of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that
petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought
within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of
the accident.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with
petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from
crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron
Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in
cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce
civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual
or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action
ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of
action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto
does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided upon a similar
set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an express
reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which
conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for
damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon
finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the
accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another
action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court
dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a
bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction
for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the
17
commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is
so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after
the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to
be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in their complaint,
opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18] of the
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from
crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance
of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of
the offender.[19] However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict
should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file
multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to
pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of
dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict
application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.[20] We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which
they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a
technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively
dismissing the present action and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, as
well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let
the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.