India's Reluctant Urbanization - Thinking Beyond-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2015)

India’s Reluctant Urbanization
This page intentionally left blank

India’s Reluctant
Urbanization
Thinking Beyond
Piyush Tiwari, Ranesh Nair, Pavan Ankinapalli, Jyoti Rao,

Pritika Hingorani, and Manisha Gulati
© Piyush Tiwari, Ranesh Nair, Pavan Ankinapalli, Jyoti Rao, Pritika Hingorani,
and Manisha Gulati 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-33974-4
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-67402-2 ISBN 978-1-137-33975-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137339751
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tiwari, Piyush.
India’s reluctant urbanization : thinking beyond / Piyush Tiwari, Ranesh
Nair, Pavan Ankinapalli, Jyoti Rao, Pritika Hingorani, Manisha Gulati.
pages cm
Summary: “Given the expected scale of the urban transformation in India over the
next few years and the time span within which this will occur, this study presents
a crucial analysis of the challenges facing ‘urban’ India. Through a close
examination of India’s policies, economic system, social systems and politics, it
explores the numerous perspectives and debates on India’s urbanization.The book
attempts to disaggregate the overall macro ‘picture’ of increased urbanization
painted in recent policy discourses to understand where it is happening, what the
drivers/forces are – local, regional, national and international, the dividends
and perils of urbanization, actors/stakeholders and their engagement with ‘urban’
at various levels – from grass root level to overall city level, and the future of
urbanization. The authors link contemporary urban issues with emerging
challenges associated with policies and city management, matters which are yet to
attract sufficient attention in public discourse. They present the alternative
paradigms and ‘innovative’ responses that have emerged to deal with challenges of
‘reluctant’ urbanization, which often work on the boundaries of ‘formal’ systems.
The findings identify over lapping and intertwined areas for possible action,
although the objective of the book is not to be prescriptive of any particular
strategy of paradigm, but rather survey the potential options for the future
development. India’s Reluctant Urbanization is essential reading for scholars and
researchers of urban economics and those interested in development economics and
in particular India’s economy” — Provided by publisher.
1. Urbanization—India. 2. Urban renewal—India. 3. Cities and towns—India.
I. Title.
HT147.I5T587 2014
307.760954—dc23 2014029184
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vi
Acknowledgements vii
1 India’s Reluctant Urbanization: Setting the Stage 1
2 Drivers of Emerging Urban Landscape 27
3 Built Environment 51
4 Productive Environment 120
5 Living Environment 153
6 Natural Environment: Towards (Re)Generative Cities 174
7 Governing Environment 193
8 Thinking Beyond 219
Notes 243
Index 250
v
Figures and Tables
Figures
2.1 Share of urban population across different classes of cities

in India 30
2.2 Exponential decadal growth rate of urban and rural
population in India (1961–2011) 33
2.3 Distribution of population by age groups as per place of
residence (2011) 34
2.4 Contribution of different sources to increase the urban
population of India (1971–2011) 34
2.5 Percentage of literates by level of education (2001) 35
2.6 Reasons for migration in India (2001) 37
2.7 Cycle of employment opportunities and “employable”
population 38
2.8 Vicious cycle of infrastructure and economic
growth/degrowth 41
2.9 Distribution of workers in formal and informal sectors in
rural and urban areas 45
4.1 Performance of SEZs 133
4.2 Manufacturing employment growth (1998–2005) 135
5.1 Trend of GDP per capita in current US dollar (1989–2012)
across BRIC countries 156
5.2 Decadal change in number of poor (1974–2004) 157
5.3 Annual rate of decline in headcount ratio of poor 158
5.4 Number of households in India 164
8.1 Section of LPR scheme depicting original and new plots 224
Tables
2.1 Trends of urbanization in India (1951–2011) 32

2.2 Economic characteristics of migrants in urban areas by
monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) 36
2.3 Current performance of Indian cities across key indicators
of quality of life (2010) 40
2.4 Gini coefficient for rural and urban areas in India 43
5.1 Housing affordability across fractile classes 161
vi
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Pushpa and Anushka, Subha, Bhavani, and

Durga, Anusha, Janaki, Anjala, and Swati for all the support, understand-
ing, and encouragement during those hours of solitary confinement
which we spent writing this book. We would also like to thank Taiba and
Ania at Palgrave for their patience in waiting for the final chapters to be
delivered. Thanks to Jaime Marshall of Palgrave for his encouragement
and being the sounding board for the initial idea of the book.
Thanks are also due to Naganika Sanga for her intellectual contribu-
tions to Chapter 3.
vii
1
India’s Reluctant Urbanization:
Setting the Stage
Introduction
India has been reluctantly urbanizing. The caricature of “urban” in India

today is mired in numerous contradictions – both physical and visual –
to coalesce in a “landscape of pluralism” (Mehrotra, 2008). Urban migra-
tion has added 20 million to cities during the last decade but the charm
of big cities is fading away (Pradhan, 2013). This is when only 31 per
cent of the country is urbanized, far below other developing countries
like China (50.6 per cent). There have been concerted efforts from state
and central government to mainstream slums and informal sectors in
urban India. Yet there are attempts to clean up Indian cities by ridding
streets and public lands of squatters and slums and reclaiming public
spaces for the use of “proper citizens”. Even as these public spaces are
reclaimed for general use, there is still a proliferation of segregated and
protected spaces for elite consumption (Chatterjee, 2004).
There is a stark difference between the quality of life of “haves” and
“have nots” in the cities. For those who “have”, the quality of life resem-
bles that of Latin American cities (LSE, 2009), and for those who “have
not”, it is not very different from that of many sub-Saharan African
countries. The informal sector is the major employer in cities, employ-
ing 25 per cent of urban employment compared to the formal sector,
which employs 5 per cent. There is rising income inequality between
rich and poor, which affects the latter’s ability to access resources and
creates cities that are deeply divided. Goldman (2008, p.53) put it elo-
quently in his article while critiquing the Bengaluru model of world city
making:
while the second largest Indian IT firm has backup diesel genera-
tors that can run for days at a time, and ships in water from deep
1
2 India’s Reluctant Urbanization
rural aquifers, most of the population only receives water from the
public distribution system a few hours every third day, access to
sanitation/sewerage services is minimal, and flows of electricity are
irregular.
Even the new cities built from the scratch are riddled with social
and economic contradictions, such as well-planned serviced areas
co-existent with slums and shanties – a perennial and almost unavoid-
able feature of urban growth in the country (Shaw, 2004). These tensions
and contradictions have been the result of uneven economic growth,
changing demographic patterns in cities, and, lastly, new legislation
that politically empowers the excluded. The typical notion of slums,
which combines, to varying extents, inadequate access to safe water,
inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructures, poor struc-
tural quality of housing, overcrowding, and inadequate and insecure
residential status (UN-HABITAT, 2003, p.12), does not fully describe
slums in Indian cities. Slums in Indian cities have characteristics which
are far more complex, the explanation of which cuts across economic,
social, urban, and development disciplines far away from the simple
segregation-based notion of ghettos or enclaves used in the context of
American cities (Nijman, 2010).
The urban planning and urban form presents another picture of con-
tradiction. Over the years, India managed to mystify the very meaning
of planning. At the national level, planning refers to discourse on eco-
nomic planning and development, whereas “planning” at local level
refers only to preparation of a statutory land use plan. This is further
reduced to regulating activities through building bye-laws, usually by
corruption and deception rather than in a transparent and participative
manner (Sivaramakrishnan, 2006). Between these two facets, planning
is practised – largely by state-level parastatals and other departments –
through the implementation of a collection of projects and schemes
(Ibid.). While the coverage of these plans is often limited to core areas of
the city, much of the urban growth happens outside the planning juris-
diction. This presents another picture of contradiction through urban
form and structure – the core of cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Bengaluru,
are becoming low density settlements, while suburbans are becom-
ing denser and denser. In many cities, like Delhi, the rural has been
engulfed by the urban but both co-exist, often complementing each
other functionally. These cities are also witnessing peri-urbanization
on an unprecedented scale: where rich and poor, modern and agrar-
ian economies, nova and traditional cultures contest for space – and
Setting the Stage 3
this contest is far from harmonious. The governance structure of cities is

fragmented, with an inefficient elected government but a powerful non-
elected civil society, which often takes the elected government hostage,
with mass support from public raising a question: Of what value is suf-
frage? Often courts, responding to public interest litigations (PILs), have
taken centre stage in law-making by issuing directives to the executive
and bypassing the formal processes of debate and public participation
of a democratic governance system. Mohan and Dasgupta (2004), in the
context of infrastructure services and environmental policy, argued that
“Judicial criticism may be seem to have become a proxy for urban policy
making” (p.22). However, the consequences of such “judicial activism”
combined with “bourgeoisie environmentalism” (Baviskar, 2003) have
been mixed. While, on the one hand, some of these actions may have
been instrumental in improving the urban environment, some of the
activism surely curbed the access to urban space and livelihoods, and
thereby urbanization itself (Mohan and Dasgupta, 2005; Kundu, 2011).
Understanding the political economy of urban development and the
policies would provide much-required pointers to understand these
numerous contradictions in urban development in India since indepen-
dence. From a policy perspective this is a crucial link as the political
economy of development provides a lens to understand some of India’s
development errors and provide avenues to correct them.
Political economy of development in India
When India got independence, two in three Indians lived in absolute

poverty. The modernization of economy under British rule, though,
brought railways, canals, property rights, and commercial law, textile
mills in Mumbai (or earlier Bombay) and Ahmedabad, and iron and steel
industries in Bihar and Orissa, but the overall economy was tattered
due to involution of the countryside and the undermining of India’
craft industries as imports flooded in from Lancashire and elsewhere.
Loss of the jute economy of East Bengal (first East Pakistan and now
Bangladesh) and the major port of Karachi at the time of independence
further compounded the economic crisis that the country was facing.
After independence, India chose to become a federal democratic
republic, with universal suffrage coupled with the establishment of a
central state with considerable executive and emergency powers and
vast geographical reach (Corbridge, 2009). The architects of modern
India, Nehru and his team, agreed that the social and economic modern-
ization of India would have to be achieved through concerted planned
actions emanating from New Delhi. Earlier paradigms for economic

development conceived modernization as a diffusion process wherein
economic and social change would transpire from major cities to the
smallest towns and finally to the countryside (Ibid.). In that process,
Mehrotra (2000) argues, India produced a society that the nation had
not yearned and hoped for. All efforts were directed to dealing with
the splintered society the nation inherited – a society fractured by
caste, class, economic disparities, rural urban divides, and a multi-
tude of beliefs and religious affiliations that were wielded together as
a nation-state.
According to the theory of “comparative advantage” developed by
Ricardo, India, being a latecomer, should develop as primary good pro-
ducer. However, the theory was already under criticism, as empirical
evidence suggested that the prices of non-primary goods rose faster
than those of primary goods. So, for a country specializing in primary
goods, it would be unfair trade over time. India had to build up local
industries as a priority even if it meant a regime of protectionism and
tariff barriers. Another development paradigm of the time was import-
substitution industrialization, which required the production of capital
goods such as iron and steel, chemicals, heavy engineering, and so on.
Given that the history of British colonial rule was in the back of mind of
our policymakers, foreign direct investment was not encouraged. Strict
controls on foreign exchange to promote import-substitution industri-
alization, and poorly formed capital markets inclined the Government
of India to think of “economic development as a project that had to
be planned for and delivered by a beneficial state” (Corbridge, 2009,
p.6). The economic growth was to be funded by high personal and gov-
ernment savings rates and their effective mobilization for purposes of
large-scale industrialization. India would be governed by a development
state model, with the Planning Commission and their Five Year Plans
playing a central role. It was assumed that the Government of India
would be able to funnel resources from the agricultural sector to the
non-agricultural sector without much rural backlash (Ibid.). The first
wave of capital goods-based production would not be labour intensive.
The Arthur Lewis (1954) model of economic development would be real-
ized in second stage of industrialization, which would combine capital
goods and surplus labour from countryside to produce consumer goods.
But this was too presumptuous, and a mass farmers’ leader, Charan
Singh, in his writings on India’s agriculture and agriculture policy,
anticipated that India was suffering from an “urban bias” (Corbridge,
2009). Opponents were quick to point out that, in a country where
Setting the Stage 5
three-quarters of the population lived in rural areas and agriculture pro-

duced more than half of GDP, it made little sense to waste capital on
inefficient urban and industrial projects. Instead, the effort should be to
fund irrigation infrastructure and create off-farm employment in rural
areas. The view gained further currency as the country faced the fail-
ure of the monsoon in 1965 and 1966, and new data showed a rise in
rural poverty. The economic situation of the country was further dam-
aged after a disastrous war with China in 1962. All these conditions,
and deepening democracy, changed the course from “command pol-
itics” to “demand politics” (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). There was
a rise of credible opposition parties and this was also a time when a
“prospectively developmental state imploded” (Corbridge, 2009, p.8).
The modernizing agenda of Nehru driven by the progressive elite had
to negotiate with local level politicians who rarely shared the same
commitments to larger benefits or the long term. Country’s modernist
state was rooted in the rural India (Kaviraj, 1984). As discussed by
Corbridge (2009), the development state was captured by three inter-
locking groups: rich farmers (who blocked agrarian reforms), industrial
bourgeoisie (who took advantage of state-induced scarcities and who
blocked competition and innovation), and the country’s leading bureau-
crats (who benefited from Permit-License-Quota Raj) (Bardhan, 1984;
Bhagwati, 1993). The state was forced to accommodate the demands of
various interest groups, irrespective of whether such demands were in
the larger interest of the state or not. Consequently, the growth in the
1970s suffered.
At the systemic level, the failure of the Congress Party in 1950s and
1960s to support a development state left the economy between two
stools. One, the state was not strong enough to force economic growth
with a sound fiscal structure. The state could not do away with subsidies
and protectionist barriers that were meant to be temporary (Srinivasan,
1991; Bhagwati, 1993). Second, the central role occupied by the state in
India’s productive economy stifled innovation and new start-ups in the
organized private sector. The political platform of Congress in the 1970s
became “garibi hatao (eliminate poverty)”, but this was never achieved
and the policies that hampered growth, in fact, had precisely the oppo-
site impact. The popular politics during 1960s and 1970s showed bias
towards “rural” where the majority of the voters lived. The industrial
bias was towards the “public” sector. Overall, the GDP grew at a snail’s
pace and there was no real rise in per capita income.
During 1980s, neighbouring China commenced its journey, based on
a market-oriented growth. In India, the governments of Indira Gandhi
and Rajiv Gandhi began to tilt economic policy in the direction of big
businesses. Foreign direct investment was still not a priority but a few
deals were successfully negotiated. The mantra of “garibi hatao” was
retired to the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which made
it hard for big businesses in core sectors like chemical, cement, and so
on (Corbridge, 2009). Large companies now found it easier to get credit
than in the earlier period. Labour activism, which had become the face
of industrialization in the 1970s, was also tamed. Private sector invest-
ment was encouraged through some tax concessions. This was to shift
the balance of capital formation in 1980s. The private sector, though still
small, began to contribute to economic development, while the public
sector’s role in capital formation had stabilized after a period of rapid
growth in 1970s.
The bigger push to embark on liberalization in 1990s did not come
from the objective to reduce poverty – in fact Deaton and Dreze (2002)
point out that the rate of decline in poverty during 1990s did not differ
to that during 1980s despite government claims – but from the real-
ization that huge subsidies in and out of agricultural system (fertilizer,
electricity, water into and cheap food out of public distribution system)
would push the country deeper into the fiscal and balance of payment
crisis that had erupted in 1991. To finance subsidies, the government
had resorted to deficit financing and borrowing domestically and abroad
as the tax revenue were not sufficient. Tax concessions to big businesses
in the 1980s, combined with pervasive tax evasion, did not help either.
The push for reforms in 1990s also came from business communi-
ties who were tired of the pro-farming agendas of the National Front
government led by Prime Minister V. P. Singh. Global economic think-
ing was also changing. The USSR had collapsed. Margaret Thatcher had
succeeded in dismantling public sector unions in the UK and privatiz-
ing production in sectors that had been largely public. Ronald Reagan
had succeeded in reversing many ills that the US was facing, having
inherited low growth, high unemployment, and high inflation.
The balance of payment crisis in 1991 provided the perfect opportu-
nity for India. Development economics was already out of fashion and
what was needed was sound monetary and fiscal policies and to open
trade and capital accounts. The system of industrial licensing was dis-
mantled in all but 18 industries and for all locations other than 23 large
cities with a population above 1 million (Varshney, 1999). Foreign direct
investment was invited into the Indian economy. This signalled India’s
new connection to the landscapes of globalization. The telecommunica-
tion sector reveals, more than any other, the implications of liberaliza-
tion, as the telecom revolution swept through middle-class India.
Setting the Stage 7
The relation of centre and state has also changed significantly since
1990. Prior to this, India’s states had largely depended on the centre.
Given the inelasticity of major state revenues, they were dependent
on the centre to seek extra funding as grants-in-aid under Article
275 (Part XII, Constitution of India 1949). Post-1990, the bargaining
position of states has changed and they are now actively competing
against each other to host foreign direct investment or the funds of
non-resident Indians. It is in the states who have used land acquisi-
tion and harsh labour laws as two major instruments to attract capital
where the momentum of economic reform has taken root. The centre
is de facto encouraging states to free up extensive parcels of lands for
the deployment of private capital, and nearly 300 special economic
zones (SEZs) that have been created since 2005 epitomize this attitude,
which is a clear shift in economic policy from agriculture to non-
agriculture. The Planning Commission has reinvented its role in stark
contrast to the past, from “centralized planner” to “indicative planner
and policymaker”, though it continues to engage in preparing Five Year
Plans.
In the words of Corbridge (2009, p.19),
What is now evident in India, even more so than previously, is a

yawning gulf between the country’s haves and have-nots. For the for-
mer, India is shining brightly. It is a land of SUVs and shopping malls.
It is a country that seems to be leap-frogging the industrial revolution
to land talented people directly to those jobs – in IT, information
processing and finance – that connect India to the globalizing world
outside. This is the land of SEZs, the Golden Quadrilateral, Gurgaon,
the Bandra-Kurla complex in Mumbai, and various technopoles in
Bengaluru, Chennai and Hyderabad.
A major impact of advances in capitalism has been that it is sweep-

ing away those institutions that are likely to slow down the circulation
time of capital. This is blatantly evident in unprecedented development
activity that is taking place on urban fringes or peri-urban locations.
Cities in India, which are also the places where rural young men and
women want to locate to as they attain higher levels of education, do
represent the “modern”.
Role and position of cities: Lessons from Mumbai
Cities acquired an important position in the post-independence devel-

opment agenda for economic growth. Investment in the capital goods
industry, realized through establishing public sector enterprises, was to

drive India’s ambition of a modern nation and was to locate this in
cities. Capital investment needed space and this was acquired through
the use of “eminent domain”. While a number of factors (such as
proximity to resources) determined the location of capital investment
after independence, a large proportion went to big cities, in partic-
ular those which had been industrialized during colonial times and
offered agglomeration economies. During the pre-reforms period nearly
one-third of investment in organized manufacturing went into the
top 23 cities with more than 1 million people (calculated based on
Chakravorty, 2003). Some of these cities, Mumbai and Ahmedabad,
already had large industrial footprints from colonial times, albeit in
private ownership. Combined with the capital investment of post-
independence times, in these cities large tracts of land came under
industrial use. These cities played an important role in the industrializa-
tion of India. However, during the post-reform period, the share of these
cities in total manufacturing investment has reduced to less than half of
their pre-reform levels (Ibid.). In the words of Chakravorty (2003),
the most successful pre-reform districts are not the most successful
post-reform districts. There has been a shift in geographical focus
whereby new investments seek locations within the existing leading
regions (or clusters), but at new locations within these regions. To use
a concrete example highlighted earlier: Greater Bombay (Mumbai)
is still successful in attracting investment, but not to the extent it
was earlier; its neighbours, Raigarh and Thane, are now the preferred
investment destinations.
Consequently, large tracts of land that were under industrial use are
becoming degenerated. This has not been the only reason for degen-
eration of industrial land. There were a number of factors inherent to
industries themselves. Global market conditions and, to some extent,
urban planning also contributed to industrial decline in large cities. The
problem for the cities has been that, in the absence of proactive and
responsive urban planning, large parcels of land in cities degenerated
into low productive usage.
The case of textile mills’ development and degeneration in Mumbai
illustrates the failure of economic policy and urban planning in time
that was characteristic of the period 1970–85 and had a profound impact
on the urban space. The development of the textile industry in Mumbai
was largely driven by cheap labour from the hinterland, which helped
Setting the Stage 9
people from the hinterland survive during the second half of 20th
century. With the imposition of trade quotas on textile exports in inter-
national markets, competition from Hong Kong, China, and Pakistan
in the world market and slow expansion of the domestic market wiped
away the competitive edge of Mumbai cotton textile mills. Working on
low profitability margins, mill owners found it difficult to either mod-
ernize the mills or offer benefits to workers. Trade unions were formed
and the persistent dissatisfaction with the compensation led to the
biggest trade union industrial action in the history of labour struggle
in India in 1982 (Wersch, 1995).
By the end of the strike, more than a third of workers lost their jobs
and a number of mills, saddled with huge debts and with no produc-
tion for almost a year and half, became unviable and were declared
sick. It became uneconomical to maintain these large-scale industrial
units within city limits due to high power and Octroi (a municipal tax
imposed on the value of goods from other states that enter the city) costs
(Knight Frank, 2005). Of the 58 mills that were right in the heart of the
city, 25 were deemed sick (loss-making units) and were referred to the
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), Government
of India, for legal, financial, and managerial restructuring. BIFR trans-
ferred these mills to the management of public sector entities such as
the National Textile Corporation (NTC) and the Maharashtra State Tex-
tile Corporation (MSTC). Various attempts to revive these sick units by
government were to no avail. The remaining 33 mills continued to be
managed by the private sector (Jain and Bhatt, 2006).
Land use and planning policies seemed to operate contrary to
economic policies. Instead of being proactive in responding to the
challenges of industrialization, the planning adopted a reactionary
approach. During the early part of the 20th century, when indus-
trial activities in Central Mumbai were at their peak, this region
faced problems associated with industrialization such as congestion,
environmental degradation, rising land values, and shortage of housing.
The first Regional Plan 1970–91 for Mumbai identified problems such
as inadequate living conditions, polarization of land uses, with office
and service sectors located at the southern tip of island and residential
use located towards north, heavy concentration of industries in Central
Mumbai causing huge in-migration, air pollution, odd mix of industries,
residential and other uses of metropolitan land, transport congestion,
and haphazard development of residential space in fringe areas, that all
required planning intervention (BMRPB, 1974). In its growth manage-
ment strategy, the plan viewed the burgeoning population as the root
cause of Mumbai’s problems. The plan recommended a poly-nucleated

city with restrictions on Greater Mumbai’s population to 7 million, and
adopted a “decentralization” and guided development through land use
control (zoning) approach to achieve this. New development of com-
mercial space in the central business district (CBD) was prohibited. The
development of counter magnets such as the Bandra–Kurla complex and
Navi Mumbai were accorded priority, with the objective of relocation
of office space from CBD and industry from Central Mumbai to these
new locations. Limits were imposed on the total industrial land area in
Mumbai to 800 hectares. The industrial policy thrust was to disperse
and decentralize industries from Mumbai Island and restrict the type of
industry to consumer-oriented and service ones.
The Industrial Location Policy (ILP) (see for details: MMRDA, 1996)
remained oblivious of the declining competitive strength of the textile
industry in Mumbai, and the focus towards textile mills was on provid-
ing incentives to revive them and retain them in Central Mumbai. The
share of employment in the cotton textile industry in total employment
in Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) had dropped during 1976–91.
The share of cotton textile mills in MMR’s value added had also shrunk.
The Regional Plan for MMR 1973 had recommended decentralization
of industries from Mumbai, reduction in the zoned area for industries
in Greater Mumbai, and the creation of new industrial zones outside
Island City to relocate existing industries. The ILP that remained in
force from 1984 to 1992 prohibited any new small-, medium-, or large-
scale development of industrial units in Island City of Mumbai and its
suburbs.
During 1974–84, any modernization and expansion of small-scale tex-
tile mills located in the Island City was not permitted under the ILP.
Medium- and large-scale textile units could expand without restriction
on built-up areas and on consumption of water and power. However,
the renovation and expansion was allowed on the condition that addi-
tional labour would not be employed. The modernization of medium-
and large-scale units was allowed subject to pollution control. Though
the ILP was focused on shifting industries out of MMR, in the case of
the textile mills its position was diametrically opposite and often restric-
tive. By the policy of May 1977, textile mills were not permitted to shift
outside the MMR (Ibid.). Restriction on relocation only accelerated the
demise of cotton textile industries in Mumbai.
Another example of restrictive planning approach, which stalled
redevelopment or development to the highest and best use, is evi-
dent from the fact that, during mid-1970s, the construction activities
Setting the Stage 11
in Mumbai Island were frozen. Reclamation of land at Backbay was

stopped in 1975 and the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) limit of 1.33 was
imposed in 1977. Most of the buildings in the CBD (south of the
Mumbai Island) were built prior to the imposition of FAR restrictions
and are at much higher FAR levels. Scholars argued that FAR restrictions
diminished the potential of redevelopment of commercial properties
in Mumbai (Bertaud and Brueckner, 2004; Adarkar and Phatak, 2005;
World Bank, 2013). Textile mill lands, which were lying between the
CBD and the suburban location of the Bandra–Kurla complex, offered
significant potential for commercial and residential development. How-
ever, mill lands could not be developed due to BIFR and land use
restrictions.
Probably the most important Act related to land, which has much
wider implications on land holdings and is considered to be one of the
policies that had affected the development of textile mill land, is the
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976. The Act specifies that
“persons are not entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling
limit”; the ceiling limit for different urban agglomerations have been
specified by the Act (MMRDA, 1996). As per the Act, the land in excess
of the specified limit is deemed to have been acquired by the state gov-
ernment. The policy, in general, has not been effective in the acquisition
of land but has been a big deterrent to the supply of land in the market.
According to MMRDA (1996), till January 1990, about 14,000 hectares
of land were identified as excess land by competent authorities in MMR,
but only 5,700 hectares of land have actually been acquired. Instead of
bringing the land to the market, the ULCR Act locked landowners in
legal disputes.
A similar pattern of degeneration of industrial land is visible in areas
like the textile mill land in Kanpur, Hindustan Machine Tools land
in Bengaluru, textile mill land in Lucknow, Heavy Engineering Cor-
poration land in Ranchi, and land in many more cities across the
country.
Cities: Fragmentation in time and space
Indian cities present fragmented images both in time and space. The
fragmentation has emerged in the urban economy, urban society,
land uses, and urban growth. Different worlds and spaces in cities –
economic, social, and cultural – occupied different spaces in different
times and operated under different rules with a view to maximizing con-
trol and minimizing conflict among the opposing worlds. Today these
worlds share the same place but understand and use it differently. With
the emergence of the service-based industry these worlds became even
more intertwined within the same space (Mehrotra, 2008). In time, the
economic profile that cities present is a co-existence of economic activi-
ties that are from two time zones with little connection. To illustrate this
further, let’s take the example of Bengaluru, which until the 1980s was
known for its mild, salubrious climate and was considered a pensioners’
paradise. During World War II, the city had seen the establishment of
some public sector enterprises and this tradition continued after inde-
pendence. The development economic paradigm that was pursued after
independence saw a number of heavy engineering and knowledge-based
public sector entities – such as Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, Bharat
Earth Movers Limited, Hindustan Machine Tools, Indian Telephone
Industries, Hindustan Aeronautical Limited, and National Aerospace
Laboratories – locating here. These entities established their own town-
ships, housing, and transportation systems. This was followed by growth
in state bureaucracy and state-run businesses in the city (Dittrich, 2007).
During the 1980s, when Indian economic paradigm shifted towards pri-
vate capital, a number of private enterprises were established. The big
shift came in 1990 with economic liberalization, and Bengaluru became
preferred destination for IT/ITES industries and recently for biotech-
nology industries (Ibid.). The impact of this economic transition has
been that the pre-and post-liberalization economies have become dis-
connected. Both exist in parallel, but if viewed in a single time frame,
discontinuities emerge in their demographics of workforce, income
potential, and connection to globalization. The growth in Bengaluru
has also led to the massive expansion of an informal sector resulting
from large influx of migrant labour, which is not absorbed by the formal
sector.
In space, the fragmentation is obvious. The three locations of IT/ITES
industries – Whitefield, Electronic City, and Software Technology Park –
are located at the urban fringes of the city. These have also become
the location of new housing and other real estate development activ-
ities. Rising prices of housing and the real estate sector overburdens the
financial capabilities of the lower middle classes as well who are gradu-
ally being pushed from the formal to the informal housing market. The
infiltration of lower middle-class people into many of the more than
eight hundred slum settlements certainly results in their constructional
and social upgrading. However, the resident slum population is forced to
leave their homes and to resettle in unexploited marginal settlements,
often located far away from the large urban labour markets where they
make their living (Dittrich, 2007).
At the same time, upmarket service complexes, self-contained apart-

ment complexes, and Euro-American-style gated residential enclaves for
the elites have sprung up both close to the modern city centre and in
the newly developed high-income residential areas of the urban mid-
periphery. On the urban fringe, luxurious clubhouses with swimming
pools, surrounded by discotheques, tennis clubs, and golf courses, have
also been erected to cater to the new lifestyles of the most privileged.
This reorganization of urban settlement structures has resulted in
aggravated disparities in the urban landscape. Despite all globaliza-
tion processes the city centre is still characterized by the dualism of
indigenous urban settlement areas and the former British cantonment,
where the modern CBD is located nowadays. In words of Dittrich (2007,
p.51), “A ‘cordon sanitaire’ consisting of an extensive green buffer
zone separates the two distinct areas and is clearly visible even today.”
This has also become the characteristic of the urban mid-periphery
and periphery, which are increasingly marked by a highly fragmented
and polarized spatial structure that exhibits extreme social disparities.
These images suggest a “city functioning within the benign disorder of
democracy and within cultural traditions averse to ostentation . . . the
city’s emergent urban fabric is closer to its fragmentation, disjuncture
and sprawl to that of Los Angeles or of Asian cities (such as Kuala
Lumpur, Bangkok, etc.) that have grown incrementally” (Mehrotra,
2007, p.63).
Emerging scepticism about ‘Urban’ in India
India is poised for rapid urbanization. Yet the current nature of urban
“stubborn realities” highlight the contemporary contestations and scep-
ticisms about urbanization in India. As the global evidence suggests,
with rapid economic growth comes rapid pace of urbanization (largely
“metropolitan urbanization”) and high levels of poverty. A key manifes-
tation of urban poverty is the growth of slums and informal settlements.
As the growth continued at high levels, India has seen the emergence of
“big and poor cities” (Mukhopadhyay, 2006). About 70 per cent of the
urban population live in cities with more than one lakh population.1
All these cities are resource intensive and lack concerns for improving
the living environment. Therefore, Mukhopadhyay (2006) argue that,
if one thought that urbanization is producing problems and leading to
contestations among the various groups for control over resources and
environment now one would be mistaken – the deluge is yet to come
and our cities clearly not prepared for this. Historically, implicitly, and
explicitly, the government tried to stop this from happening through
various policies and programmes. Each of the processes and paradigms

have produced different categories of problems and produced unwar-
ranted spaces. These “stubborn realities” continued to shape the various
facets of urban environment.
Urban space: Slums and informality
Oft understood conceptualization of slums is that these are neglected

parts of cities where housing and living conditions are appallingly lack-
ing. Slums range from high-density, squalid central city tenements to
spontaneous squatter settlements without legal recognition or rights,
sprawling at the edge of cities. Urban slums are settlements, neighbour-
hoods, or city regions that cannot provide the basic living conditions
necessary for its inhabitants, or slum dwellers, to live in a safe and
healthy environment (Ibid.).
A similar definition was proposed by the United Nations Human Set-
tlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), where slums have been defined
as settlements that cannot provide one of the following basic living
characteristics: durable housing of a permanent nature, sufficient living
space, easy access to safe water in sufficient amounts at an affordable
price, access to adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public
toilet shared by a reasonable number of people, and security of tenure
that prevents forced evictions. The inaccessibility to one, or more, of
the above basic living conditions results in a “slum lifestyle” in which
housing units are vulnerable to natural disaster and destruction. Dense
and overcrowded living quarters creates a breeding ground for transmit-
table diseases, which can lead to the rise of an epidemic. Poor access to
clean drinking water and sanitation leads to high risk of waterborne dis-
eases and malnutrition, especially amongst children. Poor slum dwellers
commonly suffer from all urban ills – unemployment, illiteracy, drug
addiction, and low mortality rates.
The above characterization of slums seems totally inadequate when
we look at the slums in Indian cities where the urban slum has an
overwhelming significance of place for its dwellers and where different
realms of life (residential, work, religious, public, etc.) seem function-
ally and spatially integrated (Nijman, 2010). These spaces are part of
an indigenous urbanism which has its particular “local” logic. They
create a richer sensibility of spatial occupation and suggest how spa-
tial limits are expanded to include formally unimagined uses in dense
urban conditions (Mehrotra, 2008; Brugmann, 2009; Roy, 2011).2 Failure
of this national and global urban conventional wisdom to understand
the productive side of the city led to a focus on fixing the “space and
infrastructure” of these settlements rather than providing opportuni-
ties to enhance their dynamism. Cohen (2008) argues that this kind of
approach to slums and informal settlements – “entering the city through
the ‘housing and the bathroom’ rather than through the place of work
and the market” – has created “fault lines” between most discussions on
urban policy and issues of inequities and inequalities.
Take, for instance, Dharavi – the largest slum in India – which houses
67 slum communities, 550,000 people (in 2006), has 1,230 manufac-
turing units which contributed US$360 million to the GDP in 2002, has
27 temples, 11 mosques, 6 churches, and where an estimated 70 per cent
of Dharavi’s residents work (Sharma, 2000; Gruber et al., 2005; MM Con-
sultants, 2006; Nijman, 2010). The per capita economic contribution of
Dharavi is not very different from the per capita contribution of urban
in India to the GDP. Most of Dharavi combines a whole range of func-
tions of living, retailing, wholesaling, manufacturing, customer services,
producer services, public functions like schools, places of worships, civic
organizations, and so on (Nijman, 2010). The overwhelming majority of
Dharavi residents are Dalits, who combine material poverty with social
stigma as soon as they move outside of their circles. Venturing outside
of this designated territory can lead to apprehension, stress, and feel-
ings of insecurity (Pendse, 1995). Overall, there is a powerful overlap of
ethnic ties, kinship ties, and economic interdependence in these slums
(Nijman, 2010). The UN-HABITAT’s definition of a slum, if applied to
Dharavi, presents an outsiders’ view where it tends to appear as, more or
less, a contiguous area of decrepit housing, but to those inside the slums,
territoriality is often important in terms of belonging, identity, safety,
community, status, and political organization (Pendse, 1995; Nijman,
2010). Dharavi is not an isolated territory, as the standard definition
of slum would expect, but has a strong economic relationship with
Mumbai. In some ways, Mumbai and Dharavi exist by virtue of each
other in a symbiotic relationship. The existence of Dharavi for more
than 150 years illustrates how the state in fact endorses and encourages
illegality with one hand while trying to curb it on the other (Sharma,
2000).
In words of Nijman (2010, p.14), “the promise of modern city then
seems a false promise”. The city of slums may not be intended, but it
is likely to be indispensable (Ibid.). However, without understanding
the dynamics of this “kinetic city”, the recent urban policies and pro-
grammes focused on destroying these dynamic networks and replacing
them with sterile and static buildings.
Urban development strategies: Peri-urban
In “What is a city?”, Lewis Mumford, America’s most prolific, popularly

read, and lavishly honoured theoretician of cities, lays out his funda-
mental propositions about city planning and the human potential, both
individual and social, of urban life. According to him, the city “is above
all else a theatre of social action”, and everything else – art, politics,
education, commerce – only serves to make the “social drama . . . more
richly significant, as a stage-set, well designed, intensifies and underlines
the gestures of the actors and the action of the play” Mumford (1937,
reprinted 2003, p.91). He describes the need for planning to effectively
account for a city’s relationship to the national environment and to the
spiritual values of the communities within it, more so than the phys-
ical designs and economic functions. He spoke to the ever-changing,
multi-dimensional personality of urban residents and how they have
transcended “traditional” displays of societal norms. Planners need to
recognize the social nucleus of cities as the interrelationship of schools,
theatres, community centres, and the like, because those are what lay
the foundations of an integrated city. Mumford suggested limitations
on population, density, and urban growth to promote efficiency, and
argued for urban planning to be given an active role.
In India, after independence, planners and politicians began to look
to the experiences of developed countries to tackle issues of rampant
urbanization. Urban planning practices, in particular of master planning
for a wider region, with the city as the nucleus of metropolitan region
including the rural hinterland, were often imported by being channelled
through Bretton Woods institutions (Arabindoo, 2009). Metropoli-
tan development authorities with unprecedented power, despite being
unelected bureaucratic bodies, were set up in major cities including
Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, and Chennai, which, with the help of Western
expertise, undertook the preparation of a 20-year master plan for a large
metropolitan area with a traditional city at the core. These master plans
changed the relationship of the city with peripheries, as planners set
out to decongest the city cores with proposals for new townships and
satellite development in the metropolitan hinterland (Ibid.). It did not
take long to realize that the usefulness of such exercises was limited,
as these lacked public participation, had insufficient implementation
initiatives, and took up inappropriate amounts of time. Despite sev-
eral elements of the first master plan remaining unrealized and even
becoming obsolete, metropolitan development authorities continued to
prepare such plans as routine (Ibid.). One of the major problems with
master plans for metropolitan regions was that while these legitimized
the peripheries, they left them “intentionally” unregulated in a “fuzzy
zone” (Roy, 2002). Therefore, these areas have become destinations for
polluting manufacturing units and new communities where the easi-
est environments were available for absorbing large numbers of poor
migrants (Kundu et al., 2002; Kundu, 2003, 2011). In addition to this
growth, a large number of urban poor and slum households have been
evicted or pushed out from the core city to these parts, along with
the informal and polluting activities, leading to “degenerated periph-
eralisation” (Ibid.). The resulting peri-urban areas are characterized by
a prevalence of rural poor migrants and by the resettlement of slum
dwellers, a lack of basic services, and the presence of polluting and
heavy industries. As the urban areas expand, in need of more land for
consumption, these peri-urban areas become prime real estate land and
another wave of rehabilitation hits these underprivileged sections of the
society.
Contemporary urban theories rooted in Western developed coun-
try contexts are of limited use for understanding the pace, scale, and
complexity of urbanization in India. These theories espouse a certain
physical structure, political-economic framework, and socio-cultural set-
ting for emerging cities in developing world. It is assumed that global
flows of capital, people, information, ideas, services, and goods come
together and reconfigure the space (Chen et al., 2009). These models
tend to focus on global actors as the change agents, with a relatively
passive role for local actors. Local actors are portrayed as “powerless and
neutral mediators, facilitators, or enablers of new forms of urban devel-
opment in a globalizing world” (Ibid.). This competitive environment
pressures local governments to take on a new approach, shifting away
from political control to market guidance, and acting as a local sovereign
to an entrepreneur (Orum and Chen, 2003).
In the last two decades, after liberalization, the demand and impact
of private capital on urban landscape has increased, which has led
development authorities with the powers to implement master plans
to actively solicit private capital investment. This has had a profound
impact on urban fringes. In Delhi, Delhi Development Authority found
itself in a new role, as a lessor of land in the city’s fringes on a long-
term lease basis to private developers to create dwellings to house urban
professionals (Baviskar, 2003). In Hyderabad, Hyderabad Metropolitan
Development Authority acquired land, using eminent domain, for pri-
vate development of IT parks and special economic zones in peri-urban
areas (Tiwari and Rastogi, 2010). Many new urban spaces in the form of
new integrated townships, on the fringes of large urban centres, have

emerged, actively promoted by local or state governments. In words of
Chen and colleagues (2009, p.436),
images of such new towns show very little difference in the actual
built environment of these cities that are marked by gated high-
rise developments, expensive shopping malls and entertainment
complexes, convention centres, high-tech business and institutional
districts, and state of art infrastructure such as roads, dedicated power
lines, and water supply, that cuts them apart from the existing, older
larger urban centres.
Due to fragmented forms of governance and landownership patterns

on urban fringes (peri-urban areas), planning – as pursued by devel-
opment authorities – empowers real estate markets and market elites
(Baviskar, 2003). These new townships, touted as megaprojects, are
being financed through private developers – local, national, and inter-
national – while the acquisition and development of large tracts of land
continues to be a state-regulated process, and large-scale infrastructure
development such as roads and drainage, also provided by the state, lead
to new social and economic contestation (Chen et al., 2009).
These urban development patterns driven by capital are causing
social and spatial polarization of rich and poor. The overall empha-
sis on “exclusiveness” of new developments commanding world-class
infrastructure with little or no regard for large numbers of poor urban
inhabitants is leading to what Graham and Marvin (2001) describe as
“splintering urbanism”. However, one has to be careful and not label
them as the “pariah edge” of Mike Davis (2006), as these are not peri-
urban areas dotted by slums or shanty towns; in fact, they are precisely
the reverse. The irony, however, is that despite the pace at which these
developments have taken place, there has been lack of organized protest
in general from those who are displaced by the rapid transformation
of agriculture land to urban land under the guise of “public purpose”;
that is, when state exercises its power of “eminent domain” to forcibly
acquire large tracts of land on these fringes.
Governance
The governance of cities in India presents a picture of contradictions.

The Constitution (74th) Amendment Act of 1992 (CAA) extends the
principles of decentralized democratic governance to cities. Even the
most recent urban programme of the central government, Jawaharlal

Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) includes “strength-
ening municipal governments and their functioning in accordance with
the provisions of [the 74th Amendment]”, and also argues for a commu-
nity participation law. However, the widespread absence of metropolitan
planning committees, the disappointing results of ward committees at
the neighbourhood level, the lack of financial devolution from the
state (provincial) government to the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), the
marginalization of municipal councillors, among others, are explained
by the “non-committal nature of the legislation itself in contrast to the
73rd amendment for rural areas” (Baud and Joop, 2008, p.24), as well
as the actual implementation of the amendment. Even in reality, the
process of decentralization is in fact “deconcentrated” decision-making
with few “selected” agencies at the state and central level. Despite the,
albeit ineffective, 74th CAA and decentralization movement, little is
understood about the rather dramatic transformation of the respon-
sibilities of local planning and governance structures, or about the
responsibilities of these transformations for other actors in planning.
The well-intentioned 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, which legis-
lates for the constitution of three types of municipalities, for devolution
of greater functional and financial responsibilities to these urban local
bodies, for adequate representation of women and weaker sections, and
for constitution of ward committees as an instruments of increased local
participation, was reportedly enacted as an afterthought by the pro-
tagonists of “panchayati raj” for villages (Harriss, 2010). Despite the
perceived benefits, the demand for the decentralization of powers did
not arise from people on the ground and, due to this, the functional
and financial decentralization has not been effected. The whole agenda
of decentralization is being driven from the centre through missions like
JNNURM or by the state. Harriss (2006, 2007) presents evidence to sup-
port views that institutions of democratic decentralization and various
participative initiatives in Indian cities are being hijacked by members
of the middle class in a way that is exclusive in regard to the poor. Direct
community participation has empowered influential community mem-
bers, non-governmental organizations, small private entrepreneurs, and
middlemen, and poor people have ended up on the losing side as these
act as agents of the state rather than as representatives of the poor
(Zerah, 2009).
Another contradiction that exists in urban India is urban finance with
unfunded mandates. Even the tax reforms at the local level in recent
decades have not reached to taxes. States preferred to increase transfers
rather than undertake tax and user charge reforms. The tax reforms were
not reforming tax, in regard to tax amount and efficiency of collection,
rather states preferred to increase transfers instead of undertaking tax
and user charge reforms. Even the reforms undertaken as part of the
JNNURM are not deep enough to meet the “mandates” of the 74th CAA.
As a result of these inherent problems and dependencies on a higher
level of governments, local governments have not been able to break
free. Financially their dependence on higher government organizations
is so strong that even a Rs 1,000 billion centre-led JNNURM capital
investment programme could not capture the attention of all municipal-
ities who were eligible for this assistance.3 The local sources of funding
in India have been inelastic. Property tax, as a share of GDP, is only
0.48 per cent. In other developing countries this share is far more –
Argentina (2.9 per cent), China (1.7 per cent), South Africa (1.4 per cent),
Brazil (1.3 per cent), and Russia (1.2 per cent) (Prakash, 2013). This too
when the top 5 per cent of households possess 38 per cent of assets and
the bottom 60 per cent of households own merely 13 per cent of assets
in India (Ibid.).
The fragmentation in governance is evident in the way organs of
government approach cities. States set up parastatals to assist them in
acquiring land on urban fringes to achieve economic growth objec-
tives by completely bypassing local governments. States also invest in
urban infrastructure projects through parastatals and ask local govern-
ments to recover the cost. When government has to engage with the
poor, instead of engaging directly, it does so through non-governmental
organizations, but otherwise despises them as non-democratic.
“Reluctant urbanization”: Relevance and objective

of the book
Oxford Advanced Dictionary defines reluctant as “hesitating before

doing something because one does not want to do it or because one is
not sure that it is the right thing to do”. In the urbanization context, an
application of the word “reluctant” would imply that urban managers
(economic policymakers, planners, governments at different levels) are
unwilling to do something (proactively plan for urbanization in policies
and actions based on past and current available information and future
expectations) because they are not sure if this is the right way to develop
(due to political or ideological or intellectual or resource compulsions).
While the discussion in this chapter points to number of outcomes
attributable to “reluctant urbanization in India” – in economic growth
ideologies, urban development practices, in management of slums,

inequity in social outcomes, in management of land use – the link
between policies, their impact on urbanization and cities, and actual
hard evidence that one sees on ground, will be explored in subsequent
chapters of this book.
It would not be presumptuous to assume that the physical and social
outcomes in urban India over the last six decades, and the debate around
“urbanization”, give the impression that, in India, urbanization was
“reluctant”. Most policies and politics in India lived the tension of rural–
urban explicitly or implicitly. The development paradigm that wanted
cities to lead the development, at least in first two decades and since
mid-eighties, was cautious to be not seen as pro-urban. The politics at
the centre had to negotiate with the local, which had a significant pro-
rural sentiment which started capturing development state particularly
during seventies and early eighties, also the time at which democracy
had taken root. Be it industrial policy or energy policy or social poli-
cies there has been rural bias. Early industrialization policies with stated
objective as balanced regional growth promoted rural-looking indus-
trialization. Energy policies favoured subsidized power for agriculture.
Social policies and programmes were oriented towards rural employ-
ment growth. Budgetary allocation at the central and state levels had
a large allocation for rural infrastructure such as canal building, even
though the data on net irrigated areas by canal indicates was becoming
irrelevant.
A dominant perception that prevailed since colonial times among
policymakers until 1980s and probably continues in some policymak-
ing even now was that Indian cities were not a product of economic
development process, unlike their counterparts in developed countries.
Rather, according to this view, cities have been inducted into a mecha-
nism of surplus expropriation – through rents and the taxation system.
Hence, “urban” has been viewed as core of all social ills in Indian
society and the whole urbanization process has been seen as “evil”. Con-
sequently, planning for urban development has always been reactive
rather than proactive.
Evidence of the reactive nature of urban policymaking in India is that
a number of urban policies and policies for urban infrastructure are the
result of judicial activism and crises. Though there has been some accep-
tance towards “accommodating urbanization” in urban planning since
1990s, instead of clarifying the planning paradigm this has confused
it further, arguably resulting in lop-sided city development with a low
density core and high density peripheries.
“India’s reluctant urbanization: thinking beyond” is an enquiry into

existing reality and emerging landscapes of urbanization in India,
using “reluctance”, as defined earlier, as the core concept. The chap-
ters in this book attempt to disaggregate the overall macro “picture”
of increased urbanization painted in recent policy discourses to under-
stand where it is happening, what the drivers/forces are – local, regional,
national, and international, the dividends and perils of urbanization,
actors/stakeholders and their engagement with “urban” at various lev-
els – from grass-root level to overall city level, and to look at the future
of urbanization. These chapters provide granularity and texture to the
overall picture of urbanization as well as explain various forces that
guide the process.
Structure of the book: An analytic lens using five distinct yet

interlinked environments
Five dimensions – referred to as environments – have been used as the

analytic lenses to structure the analysis contained in the book. Set out
below is a summary of each of the dimensions.
Built environment: Built environment, addressed in Chapter 3, pro-
vides a lens for understanding the “built” in our cities and discussing
the role of planning and land management over time and in space in
guiding these built forms. Economic policies, political ideologies, land
policies, and urban development strategies are some of the tools that
shape built environment.
Productive environment: Urban “productive” environment provides
a lens to understand the economic function of cities at two levels: the
competitiveness of cities as places of economic activities in an urban sys-
tem and the quality of “productive” environment within a city. This is
covered in Chapter 4. By looking in space, the productive environment
allows us to explore whether cities are internalizing the rationalization
of locations of industry, urban, agriculture in order to stay competitive
and in accordance with a clear strategy, or whether they are an outcome
of a “reluctant” attitude to the existing productive space where the only
possibility of responding to competition is by creating private enclaves.
The quality of the “existing” and “new” productive environments in a
city is also important as this leads to the degeneration of some locations
and the emergence of others. This also creates overlapping and often
conflicting boundaries between formal and informal productive envi-
ronments. In time, the productive environment looks at the relation
between the existing economic activities and the new activities that are
being strategized by city managers in their aspirations for the city.
Living environment: Enhancing the productivity of cities is closely
linked to the ability to make cities liveable from a social and economic
perspective. Described in Chapter 5, the living environment, as a lens,
weaves key social dimensions/well-being factors of urban development
that have become critical to making Indian cities socially competitive
in the global context. Living environment as a tool allows us to discuss
qualitative aspects of “living” in urban India, such as slums, congestion,
pollution, and availability and access to social amenities. Using this lens,
the issue of urban poverty in time and space and its consequences for
health, productivity, and crime can be explored.
Natural environment: A striking aspect of urban development in
India has been the neglect of the natural environment in urban areas.
As with many of the policy formulations, management of natural
resources has historically been viewed as a rural phenomenon. Natural
environment as a lens, covered in Chapter 6, allows us to understand
the state and management of natural resources such as water, air, and
“greenfield” land in cities; urban expansion and the encroachment of
natural environments, peri-urban areas, and the loss of their environs
as a consequence of cities’ burgeoning demand for water and building
materials; policies to protect natural environment and their ineffective-
ness; and the natural environment in the urban planning process.
Governing environment: India’s federal structure and plural society
means that there is no one solution or governance model in which to
place the urban development agenda. Innovations will be required not
just on the technology front, but in governance and city management.
Some of this is already happening, albeit driven by individuals, not
by the system. The challenge would be to make change system driven
and embraced by the political class. In doing so, “next best” solutions
instead of ideal ones may well hold the key to India’s governance and
financial challenges. At present, decisions that impact cities are made at
the state or central level. Chapter 7 seeks to understand how to extricate
cities and give them more autonomy and in which areas.
In the concluding chapter of the book, we attempt to weave the find-
ings from the various environments to explore possible solutions to
usher and embrace urbanization in India, moving away from the reluc-
tance that has historically plagued the sector, and drawing inspiration
from the pockets of success that are emanating from the cities and towns
of India.
References
Adarkar, N. and Phatak, V. K. “Recycling Mill Land”, Economics and Political
Weekly, XL(51), 17 December 2005.
Arabindoo, P. (2009). “Falling Apart at the Margins? Neighbourhood Transforma-
tions in Peri-Urban Chennai”, Development and Change, 40(5), 879–901.
Bardhan, P. (1984). The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford:
Blackwell, USA.
Baud, I. S. A. and de Wit, Joop (Eds.) (2008). New Forms of Urban Governance in
India: Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Baviskar, A. (2003). “Between Violence and Desire: Space, Power and Identity in
the Making of Metropolitan Delhi”, International Social Science Journal, 55(1),
89–98.
Bertaud, A. and Brueckner, J. K. (2004). “Analyzing Building Height Restrictions:
Predicted Impacts, Welfare Costs and a Case Study of Bengaluru, India”, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3290. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Bhagwati, J. (1993). India in Transition: Freeing the Economy. Oxford: Clarendon.
BMRPB (1974). Regional Plan for Bombay Metropolitan Region 1970–91. Mumbai:
Bombay Metropolitan Regional Planning Board.
Brugmann, J. (2009). Welcome to the Urban Revolution. India: Harper Collins
Publishers.
Chakravorty, S. (2003). “Industrial Location in Post-reform India: Patterns of
Inter-Regional Divergence and Intra-regional Convergence”, The Journal of
Development Studies, 40(2), 120–152.
Chatterjee, P. (2004). The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in
Most of the World. Columbia University Press, USA.
Chen, X., Wang, L., and Kundu, R. (2009). “Localizing the Production of Global
Cities: A Comparison of New Town Developments Around Shanghai and
Kolkata”, City & Community, 8(4), 433–465.
Cohen, M. (2008). “The Crises of Urban Capital and Labor: The Cases of China
and India”, Presentation for Conference on Prosperity and Inequality, India-
China Institute.
Corbridge, S. (2009). “The Political Economy of Development in India Since Inde-
pendence”, In P. Brass (Ed.), Handbook of South Asian Politics. United Kingdom:
Routledge.
Davis, M. (2006). Planet of Slums. New York: Verso.
Deaton, A. and Dreze, J. (2002). “Poverty and Inequality in India:
A Re-examination”, Economic and Political Weekly, XXXVII(36), 3729–3748.
Dittrich, D. (2007). “Bengaluru: Globalisation and Fragmentation in India’s
Hightech-Capital”, ASIEN, 103, 45–58.
Goldman, M. (2008). “Inside the ‘Bengaluru Model’ of World-City Making:
Excitement, Inter-Urban Accumulations, and Large-Scale Dispossession”, Paper
Presented at the Social Science Research Council Conference on Inter-Asian
Connections, Dubai.
Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures,
Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition. New York: Routledge.
Gruber, D., Kirschner, A., Mil, S., Schach, M., Schmekel, S., Seligman, H. “Living
and Working in Slums of Mumbai”, April 2005, http://www.isoz.ovgu.de/isoz_
media/downloads/arbeitsberichte/36.pdf (Retrieved on 02 November 2014).
Harriss, J. (2006). “Middle Class Activism and the Politics of the Informal Work-
ing Class: A Perspective on Class Relations and Civil Society in Indian Cities”,
Critical Asian Studies, 38(4), 445–465.
Harriss, J. (2007). “Antinomies of Empowerment: Observations on Civil Soci-
ety, Politics and Urban Governance”, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 June,
Mumbai.
Harriss, J. (2010). “ ‘Participation’ and Contestation in the Governance of Indian
Cities”, Working Paper 3/2010, Simons Papers in Security and Development,
School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Canada.
Jain, M. C. and Bhatt, H. M. (2006). Commentary on Development Control
Regulations for Greater Mumbai 1991, Law Times (Bombay), Mumbai.
Kaviraj, S. (1984). “On the Crisis of Political Institutions in India”, Contributions
to Indian Sociology, 18, 223–243.
Knight Frank (2005). Mumbai Cotton Textile Mills, Knight Frank (India), July,
Mumbai.
Kundu, A. (2003). “Urbanisation and Urban Governance: Search for a Perspective
Beyond Neoliberalism”, Economic and Political Weekly, XLVIII(29), 3079–3087.
Kundu, A. (2011). Trends and Processes of Urbanisation in India. Urbani-
sation and Emerging Population Issues-6, IIED and UNFPA, London and
New York.
Kundu, A., Pradhan, B. K., and Subramanian, A. (2002). “Dichotomy or Contin-
uum: Analysis of Impact of Urban Centres on their Periphery”, Economic and
Political Weekly, 37(14), 5039–5046.
Lewis, W. A. (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of
Labour”, The Manchester School, 22, 139–191.
LSE (2009). Cities and Social Equity: Inequality, Territory and Urban Form. London:
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Mehrotra, R. (2000). Emerging Landscapes: India, a Crucible of Currents, Atlas,
http://www.rmaarchitects.com/essays/emergent-landscapes.pdf (Retrieved on
2 November 2014).
Mehrotra, R. (2007). “Bengaluru: Dysfunctional Boom Town”, Harvard Design
Magazine, 63–69.
Mehrotra, R. (2008). “Negotiating the Static and Kinetic Cities: The Emergent
Urbanism of Mumbai”, In A. Huyssen (Ed.), Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban
Imaginaries in a Globalising Age. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University
Press, 205–218.
Mehta, D. and Mehta, M. (2010). “A Glass Half Full? Urban Development (1990s
to 2010)”, Economic and Political Weekly, XLV(28), 20–23.
MM Consultants (2006). Dharavi Redevelopment Project, Powerpoint Presenta-
tion, Mumbai 2006.
MMRDA (1996). Regional Plan for MMR 1996–2011, Mumbai Metropolitan
Regional Development Authority, Mumbai.
Mohan, R. and Dasgupta, S. (2004). Urban Development in India in the 21st Cen-
tury: Policies for Accelerating Urban Growth. Working Paper No. 231, Stanford
Centre for International Development, Stanford University.
Mohan, R. and Dasgupta, S. (2005). “The 21st Century: Asia Becomes Urban”,
Economic and Political Weekly, 40(3), 213–223.
Mukhopadhyay, P. (2006). “Whither Urban Renewal?” Economic and Political
Weekly, XL(10), 879–884.
Mumford, L. (1937), “What Is a City”, reprinted in R.T. LeGates, and F. Stout

(Eds.), The City Reader, Third Edition, 2003, Routledge: London and New York,
91–95.
Nijman, J. (2010). “A Study of Space in Mumbai’s Slums”, Tijdschrift voor
Economische en Sociale Geografie, 101(1), 4–17.
Orum, A. and Chen, X. (2003). The World of Cities: Places in Comparative and
Historical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pendse, S. (1995). “Toil, Sweat, and the City”, In S. Patel and A. Thorner (Eds.),
Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 3–46.
Pradhan, K. C. (2013). “Unacknowledged Urbanisation: New Census Towns of
India”, Economic and Political Weekly, 48(36), 43–51.
Prakash, P. (2013). “Property Taxes Across G20 Countries: Can India Get it
Right?”, Oxfam India Working Paper Series, January.
Roy, A. (2002). City Requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the Politics of Poverty.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Roy, A. (2011). “Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism”, International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(2), 223–238.
Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H. (1987). In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political
Economy of the Indian State. New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited.
Sharma, K. (2000). Rediscovering Dharavi: Stories from Asia’s Largest Slum. Delhi:
Penguin.
Shaw, A. (2004). The Making of Navi Mumbai. New Delhi: Orient Longman Private
Limited.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2006). Growth in Urban India: Issues of Governance.
Occasional Paper No 13. New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.
Srinivasan, T. N. (1991). “Reform of Industrial and Trade Policies”, Economic and
Political Weekly, XXVI(37), 2143–2145.
Tiwari, P. and Rastogi, A. (2010), “What Has Been the Impact of Special Economic
Zones on Land and Property Markets in Hyderabad”, Fibre Series, June, Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, London.
UN-HABITAT (2003). The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements.
Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.
Varshney, A. (1999). “Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in
Comparative Perspective”, In J. Sachs et al. (Eds.), India in the Era of Economic
Reforms. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 222–260.
Wersch, H. V. (1995). “Flying a Kite and Losing the String: Communication
During the Bombay Textile Strike”, In S. Patel and A. Thorner (Eds.), Bombay
Metaphor for Modern India. Bombay: Oxford.
World Bank (2013). Urbanization Beyond Municipal Boundaries: Nurturing Metropoli-
tan Economies and Connecting Peri-Urban Areas in India. Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
Zerah, M.-H. (2009). “Participatory Governance in Urban Management and
the Shifting Geometry of Power in Mumbai”, Development and Change, 40(5),
853–877.
2
Drivers of Emerging Urban
Landscape
Introduction
Is India actually “shining” or is it a mirage preserved intentionally? India

is boasting about its burgeoning urbanization, which is often linked
with economic growth, but the actuality is that the pace of urbanization
is slow, as is the pace of economic growth and infrastructure develop-
ment in the country. Small patches of development concentrated in
few primate cities cannot be the true representation of the holistic pic-
ture of the country. With only 2.5 per cent urban land area, the outcry
about the availability and affordability of land for development of cities
is appearing very illusive. To exaggerate the misery of cities, the solution
to the problem of growing population inside cities, if it is considered a
problem at all, is addressed by the creation of policy-level checks, and
the rationale behind doing that is often linked with existing congestion
and high density in most Indian cities. The question then arises whether
policy control over population growth of cities is the best thing to do?
A broad answer to this can be stated simply by appreciating the fact that
cities are emerging as modern centres of growth and development, offer-
ing better work opportunities and quality of life, and therefore shall be
expanded in all dimensions so as to cater to the emerging needs of its
original inhabitants as well as the newcomers.
With polarization of economic opportunities and concentration of
resources and amenities in primate cities, there exists a large diversity
in the quality of life between small and big cities in India, more so
between rural and urban India. This second most populous country in
the world, after China in regard to urban population, is only 31 per
cent urbanized, and this proportion is estimated to increase up to 40 per
cent by 2030, and urban areas are expected to contribute approximately
27
70 per cent to the country’s GDP (McKinsey, 2010). Though the per-
cent share of urban population in the total population of India is much
lower when compared to the percent share of urban population in
total population of other developing countries but in absolute figures
the population is very high, and therefore it will not be an exaggera-
tion to state that the existing problems of space crunch, inadequacy of
infrastructure, and decaying environmental conditions will get bigger.
Considering the existing and forecasted contribution of urban areas to
the country’s GDP, it is not wrong to forecast “cities” as engines of eco-
nomic growth, and therefore it is justifiable to facilitate them with better
infrastructure and management so as to provide good quality of life and
more economic opportunities to the ever-expanding urban areas.
This chapter provides a deeper insight into the present state of urban
landscape in India while also discussing about emerging opportuni-
ties and possible methods to prepare for changes to come, which may
convert to threats should the present conditions of ignorance and
reluctance persist.
Scale of urbanization in India
With a total geographical area of approximately 3 million square kilo-

metres, India is the 11th largest country in the world (World Bank
Organization, 2013b), which is roughly 2 per cent to the world’s total
land area (Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, 2001).
Urban areas in India are confined to only 2.34 per cent of the total
land area of the country (Ministry of Urban Development, Govern-
ment of India, 2001), whereas the share of urban population is 31 per
cent of the total population (Census, 2011). Disproportionate distribu-
tion of land and population between rural and urban areas is leading to
densification and congestion in cities. Under such a situation the out-
cry for availability and affordability of space seems fictitious as there is
a huge undeveloped land mass available. In addition to the restrictions
on horizontal spread, the resistance towards increase in height further
enhances the problems associated with congestion. The built-up area
per person remains low, and this leads to unhygienic and unhealthy liv-
ing conditions. Due to this visible resistance towards freeing more land
area for the development of existing or new urban centres, prime Indian
cities like Mumbai and Delhi are continuously topping the list of most
dense urban centres in the world. These megacities1 are approximately
six times more populous than comparable cities of similar population
size; for example, New York and Beijing with a population of 20 and
Drivers of Emerging Urban Landscape 29
17 million have a density of 1,800 and 5,000 persons per square kilome-
tre, respectively, compared to Delhi and Mumbai with a population of
22 and 17 million and density of 30,900 and 11,500 persons per square
kilometre, respectively.
Big cities (class I cities with population over 100,000) are receiving
a higher load of population increase, as shown in Figure 2.1, and the
increase in land area is not keeping pace. Concentration of population
in big cities (or rather Class I cities) is resulting in the formation of
monocentric primate cities and is reflective of the concentration of eco-
nomic opportunities in these cities, thus demonstrating imbalance in
development and unevenness in the distribution of economic opportu-
nities over space across smaller cities and towns. Class I cities are home
to 70 per cent of the urban population, and interestingly, within Class I,
the million-plus cities dominate the landscape in population terms; in
three decades (1981–2011), their share of urban population has gone up
from 26 per cent to 42.6 per cent, whereas the share of urban population
in other categories of cities has been consistently declining (Figure 2.1).
Class I cities have been witnessing relatively higher population
growth due to a natural increase or migration from the rural and other
urban areas. Due to the present lack of details on migration patterns, it is
difficult to suggest whether migration was happening from rural to class
VI and gradually to class I, or there was a direct proceeding from rural
to class I, as may be the case with villages on urban fringes. While the
former case is desirable as it would induce preparedness towards meet-
ing the increase in demand for space and infrastructure, the latter case
appears to be the actuality in India, due to which big cities continue
to face the malice of income disparity, emergence of slums, increased
unemployment and crime rate until measures are taken to develop small
towns and urban fringes as intermediaries to conduce economic, social,
and cultural transition.
Kundu (2011) observed that size classes of urban centres are in sync
with the pattern of infrastructural investment and of the levels of basic
amenities, including those pertaining to education in urban centres.
Class I cities have been able to pocket much of infrastructural and
developmental resources available from both the private and public sec-
tors and consequently attract more people seeking higher education
or employment opportunities in modern, skilled, and capital-intensive
sectors that have grown significantly in recent years (Kundu, 2011).
With different economic forces at work, “urbanization” is often
imposed, not invited, and is being dealt with as an afterthought rather
than with proactive plans to seek opportunities arising out of the
100%
90%
80%
Class I cities
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Class I 51.42% 57.24% 60.37% 65.20% 68.67%
Class II 11.23% 10.92% 11.63% 10.95% 9.67%
Class III 16.94% 16.01% 14.33% 13.19% 12.23%
Class IV 12.77% 10.94% 9.54% 7.77% 6.84%
Class V 6.87% 4.45% 3.58% 2.60% 2.36%
Class VI 0.77% 0.44% 0.55% 0.29% 0.23%
Class VI Class V Class IV Class III Class II Class I
Figure 2.1 Share of urban population across different classes2 of cities in India
Source: Census 2001; Census 2011.
economic evolution. This reactionary approach to urbanization is lead-

ing to several problems in cities, the major ones being (i) lack of
harmonious urbanization across space, (ii) inadequate infrastructure,
and (iii) inefficient management. Thus, although income opportunities
and infrastructure facilities of urban centres appear charming, they are
not satisfactorily developed in terms of quality and quantity so as to
efficiently grab the economic opportunities in the global market and be
able to use the large pool of young workforce.
In regard to economic contribution of cities in 2011, 53 cities with
population over a million – 13 per cent of the country’s population –
constitute about a third of total economic output while confining to
only 0.2 per cent of land area. Similarly, top 100 cities with 16 per cent
of the country’s population account for 43 per cent of total economic

output and occupying 0.26 per cent of land area (Urban India, 2011).
These figures confirm that there can’t be any reason good enough to
justify existing reluctance towards provision of land and space for exist-
ing or new urban centres, especially when their economic importance is
increasing and so their demographic popularity.
There are arguments over the consumption of agricultural land for
the purpose of physical infrastructure supported by the fact that food
self-sufficiency achieved in the 1960s is fast eroding and that the gap
between population growth and food grain production has progres-
sively widened over the past few decades. But it is worth noting that
the reasons for reduction in food production have been the constraints
of land degradation, groundwater depletion, and insufficient power sup-
ply, which hamper the productivity of agricultural land. In view of the
prevailing trend, it is estimated that domestic food production will likely
fall significantly short of projected food demand by 2030. Therefore, it
is important to derive a balance between the distribution of the natural
and the built environment on land.
Besides the lack of intention and willingness due to latent politi-
cal advantages, the only other reason behind this hesitation towards
expansion of urban centres is the deep-rooted malice of land titles and
ownership issues, which curtails availability of land for buying and sell-
ing in the open market. The present land title framework in India rests
principally upon the Registration Act of 1908, which requires the reg-
istration of documents relating to property rights in the office of the
Sub-Registrar of a subdistrict within which the whole or some portion
of the property is situated. If the recipient of a document fails to do
so, that document cannot subsequently be introduced in court (Zasloff,
2011). Areas under “Zamindari”,3 including Delhi and Northwestern
Province, never enabled land rights of peasants, which is evident from
the fact that people in the villages of North India and other parts of
the country where this system was prevalent are still lacking claimable
property titles. With people’s ignorance of the Registration Act of 1908
and with passage of time, it is even more challenging now than ear-
lier to identify and resolve issues related to land title. To add to the
confusion are obvious issues of death of original owner, claim of heirs
or successors, transfer or buying and selling of registered/unregistered
properties, land acquisition, inclusion of village into urban boundaries,
land use conversion from agricultural, and similar changes that entangle
the already messed-up case of land titles. As per McKinsey report (2001),
most land parcels in India – 90 per cent by one estimate – are subject
to legal disputes and lack clarity on title. This discourages fair market
performance and involvement of private players in the development
process, who are extremely important for acceleration of “urbanization”
and thus facilitation of economic activities.
Urban demography of India
With a total population of around 1.22 billion, India is the second most
populous country, constituting approximately 18 per cent of the world’s
total population (World Bank Organization, 2013a). It is undergoing var-
ious transformations as a developing country, and a gradual shift from
“rural” to “urban” is observed. Table 2.1 shows the population trends
and rural to urban shift as indicated by the change in rural–urban pop-
ulation composition and also by the increasing number of towns and
urban agglomerations.
As shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2, India’s urban population over
the past six decades has shown only a slight increase of 14 per cent in the
total population, and the decadal growth rate of urban population has
almost been stagnant between 2 and 3 per cent except during 1971 and
1981 when it reached its peak as a consequence of economic liberaliza-
tion and emergence of 788 new towns. Currently, India is world’s second
largest urban centre, after China, in regard to urban population consti-
tuted by 377 million people spread across 7,933 urban centres, including
53 cities with million-plus populations and three megacities (Greater
Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) (Census, 2011), but the population in
Table 2.1 Trends of urbanization in India (1951–2011)
Year Total No. of towns Urban4 Share in total

population and urban population population (%)
agglomerations
(UAs) Urban Rural
1951 36.11 2,843 6.24 17.30 82.70

1961 43.92 2,365 7.89 18.00 82.00
1971 54.81 2,590 10.91 19.90 80.10
1981 68.33 3,378 15.95 23.30 76.70
1991 84.63 3,768 21.76 25.70 74.30
2001 102.86 5,161 28.61 27.80 72.20
2011 121.06 7,933 37.71 31.15 68.85
Note: Population in 10 million.

Source: Census 2011; Planning Commission of India.
3.87%
3.29% 3.15%
2.77% 2.80%
2.38%
1.84%
1.68%
1.89% 2.00%
1.78% 1.16%
1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

Urban Rural
Figure 2.2 Exponential decadal growth rate of urban and rural population in
India (1961–2011)
Source: Census 2011; Planning Commission of India.
urban areas constitutes only 31 per cent of the total population, which
is very low when compared to other major developing countries, for
example, 45 per cent in China, 54 per cent in Indonesia, 78 per cent
in Mexico, and 87 per cent in Brazil. The slower pace of urbanization is
an indication that there exists some reluctance towards the process, but
superseding it many cities are emerging as economic centres and pop-
ular destinations for work and residence. The situation that a majority
of the population in the working age group of 15–59 years is residing in
rural areas is alarming, as shown in Figure 2.3, and therefore, the need
for the development of cities and economic opportunities – we call it
“urbanization” – is deeply felt.
The problem of urban population may be explained better by various
factors, majorly (i) natural growth, (ii) migration, (iii) reclassification of
rural settlements into urban, and (iv) expansion of boundaries of exist-
ing cities. From Figure 2.4, it is clear that natural growth has been the
most prevalent source of population increase except in 1981 and 2011
when inclusion of new rural areas and expansion of boundaries com-
bined with migration have caused the maximum increase. Also, it is
important to note the contribution of migration to urban population
growth, though increasing at a slower pace.
Lower increase in the contribution of migration to rise in urban pop-
ulation suggests that there has not been enough addition of space and
Urban 96.16 251.15 29.79
Rural 257.54 508.41 67.51
–100 100 300 500 700 900

0 to 14 15 to 59 >59
Figure 2.3 Distribution of population by age groups as per place of residence

(2011)
Source: Census 2011.
100%
16.7% 14.7% 19.6%
28.4% 32.0%
80%
18.7% 22.6%
21.1%
60% 19.9%
24.0%
40%
64.6% 62.7% 59.2%
51.7% 44.0%
20%
0%
1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Reclassification and boundary expansion (%)
Net rural–urban migration (%)
Natural increase (%)
Figure 2.4 Contribution of different sources to increase the urban population of

India (1971–2011)
Source: Census 2001 and 2011.
opportunity in the cities to absorb or attract more population. With

decreasing growth rate of rural population (Figure 2.3), majorly consti-
tuted by the young age group, and simultaneous increase in the number
of urban centres, it is predictable that the contribution of migration will
increase in near future, especially when 70 per cent of the working age
group in rural locations are looking out for opportunities.
Drawing from the experience of developed countries, it is clear that
cities, if developed as places conducive for economic growth, attract
young workforce seeking alternative income opportunities and better
quality of life. If the development of cities fails to meet this objective,
this workforce would seek out opportunities at other locations than
within the country.
Graduate and above 6.7

Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree 0.7
Nontechnical diploma or certificate not equal to degree 0.1
High secondary/intermediate/preuniversity 6.7
Matriculation/secondary 14.1
Middle 16.1
Primary 26.2
Below primary 25.8
Literate without educational level 3.6
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Per cent of literates
Figure 2.5 Percentage of literates by level of education (2001)

Demographics: Dividend or burden
Demographic dividend refers to where the labour force grows faster than
the population dependent on it. A majority of the population, thus,
falls under the working age group, thus leading to economic develop-
ment. There is now optimism that the demographics of urban India are
paving way to this demographic dividend. This optimism is based on
two hypotheses. First, the concentration of population in the working
age group underpins a potential earning opportunity for the economy.
And second, a surge in the working age population coupled with a lower
dependency ratio means that the burden of supporting dependents will
be less, leaving more savings and more income to plough back into
investment.
But, these favourable demographics could become a burden on several
counts. The first and most important is the nature of the labuor force
and its employability. Though approximately 60 per cent of the popula-
tion falls under the working age group, unfortunately not many possess
the skill set required for tapping global economic opportunities. This is
due to lower literacy rate5 and extremely low number of graduates and
educated professionals among literates, as shown in Figure 2.5.
The literacy rate improved significantly during the past 54 years
(1947–2011), wherein it was as low as 18 per cent in 1951 and is cur-
rently at 74 per cent, but the improvement has been basically at primary
and preprimary levels (Figure 2.5). According to the National Skill Devel-
opment Policy, the skill base in India is quite low compared to other
developed economies. This is a constraint on productivity and eco-
nomic growth (CRISIL, 2010). The shortage of skilled workers would
adversely affect productivity. Further, if relatively low-quality workers

are added to the workforce, it would pull down the overall workforce
quality and thus impact productivity (CRISIL, 2010). Though literacy
rate and level of education are basic indicators of the level of devel-
opment achieved by a society, the fact remains that the gap between
“literate” and “employable” is yet to be bridged.
Similarly, an analysis of data on migration in urban areas by differ-
ent economic classes, as available under the National Sample Survey
(NSS), shows that the migration rate increased for lowest income groups
(Table 2.3). While considering income as a proxy for level of educa-
tion and professional skill sets, the fact that the majority of migrants
were from lowest income groups contradicts the general notion that
migration adds to the skilled workforce (Table 2.2).
This can be linked with the lack of physical and social infrastruc-
ture and alternative sources of income, other than agriculture, in rural
areas and smaller towns from where the majority of migrants originate
(Chakraborty and Kuri, 2013). Figure 2.6 describes work and employ-
ment as the most dominant reason for migration among men, whereas
for women, marriage is usually linked to their movement to another
location.
For example, Bengaluru has the largest proportion of in-migrants to
its total population, the economic reasons being better job opportuni-
ties and higher expected income (Sreedhar et al., 2010). It was found
Table 2.2 Economic characteristics of migrants in urban areas

by monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE)
MPCE Male Female
2007–08
Q1 22.47 14.27
Q2 10.12 11.23
Q3 7.88 10.45
Q4 7.09 9.81
Q5 8.03 10.80
1999–2000
Q1 3.30 5.81
Q2 3.94 7.51
Q3 5.53 8.96
Q4 6.98 10.52
Q5 12.62 13.24
Source: Mahapatro (2012).

Other
Moved with households
Moved after birth
Marriage
Education
Business
Work /employment
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Female Male
Figure 2.6 Reasons for migration in India (2001)

that over 50 per cent of migrants who had been in Bengaluru for less
than a year had moved for better job opportunities and higher expected
income. Similarly, an estimated 74 per cent of migrants in Chennai had
come for jobs.
The supply side of employable population should meet the demand
side by way of job creation and quality of jobs. A historical analysis
shows that India has moved from being an agrarian economy to a ser-
vice sector-driven economy. But data for 2009–10 show that over 50 per
cent of the population continue to be engaged in agriculture, which
accounts for only 15 per cent of the GDP, whereas 27 per cent of the
service sector workers make a significant contribution of 59 per cent
to the GDP. Despite the growth in service sector, it could not create
adequate employment to shift more people away from agriculture, lead-
ing to a lopsided employment distribution in India. More disturbing
is the problem of unemployment among the youth than unemploy-
ment among the entire working age population (Chandrashekar et al.,
2006).
The cycle (Figure 2.7) indicates that the supply of employable pop-
ulation is, in turn, dependent upon the availability of employment
opportunities and vice versa. In order to break this cycle and to ben-
efit from the demographic dividend, economic planners and policy-
makers have to trigger the process of development instead of getting
locked in the cycle. In the absence of adequate employment oppor-
tunities for the working age population, the government will need
Economic growth
Increase in
Increase in
investment in
employment
field of education
opportunities
and research
More demand for

educational and More demand for
research skilled workforce
infrastructure
Figure 2.7 Cycle of employment opportunities and “employable” population
to earmark more funds for social security schemes to support the

unemployed and underemployed (CRISIL, 2010). The rise in transfers
to employment-generating schemes creates a permanent fiscal burden
and reduces expenditures on education, healthcare, and infrastructure
(CRISIL, 2010).
In addition to creating more jobs, a pressing challenge is to shift
jobs from the unorganized sector to the organized sector. In sum,
due to the reluctance towards urbanization, lack of infrastructure,
lower standards of education and employability, low quality of life,
food insecurity, poor governance, and other economic problems fac-
ing India, a full realization of the demographic dividend seems
problematic.
Urban infrastructure: An economic stimulus
The famous economist Karl Marx had envisaged that the forces of capi-
talism would herd together scattered village populations into dense and
optimal production and consumption centres. Going by this, one of
the major facilitators of economy would be a conducive environment
that holds adequate physical infrastructure and capable workforce into

it. Where the country is severely lacking in both, which means cities
have neither sufficient infrastructure nor enough skilled workforce, the
issues of reactionary planning and inefficient implementation of poli-
cies deserve urgent resolution. The pace with which cities grow in terms
of population and size is usually associated with economic growth, and
in case of India, both have been drastically slow! Being an agriculture-
based economy, India took some time in deriving the trajectory of
nonagricultural income opportunities after which economic growth
started to get associated with the emergence of urban centres that were
otherwise not gaining visible acceptability at the political front because
cities were considered antirural in agrarian societies, which are still pre-
dominant in India. Though urbanization is being portrayed as the most
visible trait of growth and development, ironically it is happening at a
much slower pace compared with other developing countries, as stressed
in earlier sections.
Lack of infrastructure to support healthy and productive residential
and work environment is the biggest challenge in front of existing cities.
This condition is depicted in Table 2.1, which shows that Indian cities
fall much below normal standards of important infrastructure services
such as water supply, sewer, solid waste management, slum population,
and open space, which are considered the key indicators of quality of life
in cities, according to the McKinsey Global Institute (2010) (Table 2.3).
Cities have neither kept pace with infrastructure demand nor main-
tained the existing facilities to the best levels, resulting in a grave
deficiency in quality of services. The gap is expected to widen fur-
ther if the trend of infrastructure service delivery continues to remain
unchanged, especially in regard to expenditure on development of new
infrastructure and operation and maintenance of the existing ones.
As per McKinsey’s (2010) analysis, India’s annual spending per capita
on infrastructure is only 14 per cent that of China and 4 per cent that of
United Kingdom and needs to increase up to eight times so as to bridge
the gap in the coming 20 years.
The lack of accountability of urban authorities towards service provi-
sion for city dwellers and the limited power of elected representatives
in city administration have led to inefficient city operation, lack of
transparency in financial distribution, and irresponsive sectoral policy
formulation (McKinsey, 2010). Also, the visible lack of coordination
between the agencies responsible for urban development and infrastruc-
ture provisioning created growth bottlenecks and affected the capacity
of cities to productively absorb a growing workforce. These issues have
Table 2.3 Current performance of Indian cities across key indicators of quality
of life (2010)
Indicators of quality of life India (2010) Basic service Best in class

standard
Water supply (litres per 105 150 220

capita per day)
Parks and open spaces 2.7 9 16
(square metres per
capita)
Share of public 30% 50% 82%
transportation (% of
total trips)
Sewage treated (% 30% 100% 100%
sewage generated)
Solid waste collected (% 72% 100% 100%
total waste generated)
Slum population (% 24% 0% 0%
total population of the
city)
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (April 2010).
been dealt with in more detail later in the book. The moot point here is
that efficient infrastructure and services in urban centres will be a key to
providing a productive environment for the workforce and, therefore,
for the optimization of the demographic dividend.
Urban agglomeration: Economies and diseconomies
The availability, and confinement, of physical and social infrastructure

in big cities leads to a higher concentration of economic opportuni-
ties, whereas the lack of infrastructure amenities in smaller cities and
towns makes them less attractive for establishment of industries or ser-
vice organizations. Insufficient infrastructure creates a cycle of degrowth
(Figure 2.8), where cities generating lesser revenue continue to receive
lesser investment in infrastructure and thus remain unattractive for
bigger economic establishments.
Different economies and diseconomies are associated with spa-
tial agglomeration of industries and economic activities at a partic-
ular geographical location. According to Zheng (2000), economies
of agglomeration include high productivity owing to the spatial
concentration of various economic activities, while diseconomies are
Increase in Availability of Inadequate

investment physical and investment Lack of physical
into social into and social
infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure
Small
Big cities cities &
village
Increase in Concentration Not enough

Lower revenue
revenue of economy in economic
generated by
generated by Class I cities opportunities
the city
the city
Figure 2.8 Vicious cycle of infrastructure and economic growth/degrowth
linked with high tendency of businesses to locate in a well-facilitated,

developed market, thus leading to high housing/land prices, densifica-
tion, traffic congestion, increased travelling time, and environmental
pollution. In the Indian context, it may appear that diseconomies are
superseding economies, arising due to agglomeration of economic activ-
ities in urban areas. A broader perspective about diseconomies invokes
two major questions. First, in a reactionary approach towards provision
of a better quality of built and natural environment, as is the case with
Indian cities, are effective and efficient efforts being made to resolve the
issues of high housing/land prices, high travelling time, traffic conges-
tion, and environmental pollution? Second, are urban agglomerations
actually concentrated with economic opportunities that are attractive
and adequate enough for the quality and size of workforce in India, or
is it merely a “visible chaos”, which is imaging cities as congested and
concentrated?
We will discover answers to these questions as we proceed further
in this chapter to discuss about lack of investment in infrastructure,
irresponsive reactionary planning of cities, towns and rural areas lack-
ing synchronization with market demand for space and infrastructure,
unaccountable governance leading to inefficient implementation of
plans of policies, and decision-making power resting with government-
appointed representatives rather than with elected representatives who
chose to ignore citizens’ dissatisfaction expressed over services pro-
vided to the city. The “reluctance” towards urbanization, majorly due
to above mentioned reasons, is controlling its free response towards
economic growth, which has been demanding spread of urbanization

in all dimensions.
Social and spatial fragmentation
Urbanization has been accompanied by social polarization and fragmen-

tation of cities. The phenomenon of social fragmentation is multilay-
ered and manifests in different ways. For example, there is sociospatial
fragmentation; economic polarization that is reflected in the widen-
ing segregation in incomes, lifestyles, and even location of economic
zones; and lack of social cohesion between different cultural identi-
ties (Banerjee, 2012). Spatial fragmentation can be attributed to many
factors: diverse backgrounds of immigrants, upgradation of favourable
locations in cities and consequent reorganization of urban settlement
structures, emergence of wealthy enclaves and new towns located away
from older parts of the cities (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2011),
shifts in housing areas for urban poor due to stronger economic pur-
poses and attractive land use, poor public facilities and infrastructure
at relocation sites, loosening social ties, and competition over scarce
resources (Pantoja, 1999).
Literature conveys that the problem of social fragmentation is big-
ger in megacities. In case of Hyderabad, the economic boom of the
IT industry in the 1990s led a change in the economic conditions for
some; migration out of the country particularly to Gulf countries and
the consequent financial receipts as well as social influence; continuous
migration into the city leading to a pronounced diversification of the
population; and differing traditional identities of the population, which
meant the city has no collective identity (Krank, n.d.).
Similar is the case of Bengaluru, with the city reflecting a highly
fragmented and polarized urban society. Bengaluru’s development as a
globally integrated urban centre of modern service industries has been
accompanied by socioeconomic zones that can be characterized as (i)
mainly globally integrated corporate economies, (ii) mainly domestic
market-oriented corporate economies (large public sector undertakings
with their own townships, and private sector companies in master-
planned industrial estates), and (iii) wide areas dominated by localized
economic coalitions in almost unplanned areas where the bulk of the
city population lives (Dittrich, 2007). The economic disparities accom-
panied by social changes have led Bengaluru to becoming a multiply
divided city where both social and geographical barriers are reinforced
(Dittrich, 2007).
Table 2.4 Gini coefficient for rural and urban areas in India
Year Rural Urban
1983 0.298 0.33

1993 0.282 0.34
1999 0.258 0.341
Source: Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC, 2014).
The economic development of big cities has been accompanied by an

urban restructuring that led to the relocation of the marginal population
to undeveloped areas on the urban fringe. The income gap between the
privileged and the deprived of urban India has widened as indicated by
a consistent increase in the Gini6 index (Table 2.4).
Despite an increase in the level of education, income opportunities,
and standard of living, the increase in Gini index suggests an inequitable
distribution of wealth and resources between the rich and the poor.
A spatial imprint of this gap is represented in big cities, like Mumbai,
in the contrast between modern and metropolitan development clus-
tered in prestigious locations of the city and overcrowded “chawls”,
tenements, and makeshift dwellings that increasingly characterize the
majority experience of the city (Gandy, 2008).
The planning of megaprojects follows a less democratic participatory
approach and is not integrated in the city planning, leading to social
polarization (Swyngedoum et al., 2002), and is an exemption from and
to planning laws (Barthel, 2010). Budgets for megaprojects are often
outside the normal city budgets (Ibid.). A consequence of external gov-
ernance – that is, outside the purview of an urban local body – of
megaprojects is that these take place outside the earlier established cen-
tral business centre of the city, thereby drawing away investments from
old areas into new areas, often located at urban peripheries, as has hap-
pened in Durban, South Africa (Michel and Scott, 2005), or Hyderabad
(Tiwari and Rastogi, 2010).
The impact of megaprojects is the emergence of new locations of busi-
ness/capital, mostly in the periphery, which often lack synchronisation
with the existing urban landscape and cause spatial and architectural
segregation (Levy and Lassult, 2003). These new locations of capi-
tal compromise the existing metropolis (Tiwari and Rastogi, 2010), its
administrative boundaries, and the way they are managed (Kennedy
et al., 2011). May et al. (1998) argue that megaprojects are increas-
ingly leading to specialization of urban spaces, which is causing urban
fragmentation of material networks such as a separate network for water

and electricity distribution, privatized transport networks, and toll roads
(Jaglin, 2001). These create enclaves characterized by restrictions to
access and gating (examples are special economic zones (SEZs) in India).
The prioritization of resource allocation across localities within the
city at a micro level and across cities at a macro level is a physical reflec-
tion of a socially fragmented society. This signifies the need for equitable
distribution of wealth and opportunities across space and societies so as
to derive a balanced equation of development.
“Unorganized” synergies: Informal7 sector in India
As discussed earlier, a country can benefit from its large pool of work-
force only by ensuring employability, which may be achieved, firstly,
by improving the quality of education to meet the demands of formal
sectors and, secondly, by creating opportunities that match with cur-
rently possessed skill sets of the people. The latter approach is practically
feasible in the Indian scenario where the country is still transitioning
from a predominantly rural and agricultural economy to a predomi-
nantly urban and nonagricultural one, whereas the former approach
would require investment for improving and creating research and edu-
cational infrastructure at all levels in a long term. It is important to
accept the reality that though the size of population in the working
age group is huge, the portion of formally employable workforce is very
timid. Presently, more than 86 per cent of the workforce (Figure 2.9)
and about 50 per cent of the national product are accounted for by the
informal economy (NCEUS, 2008).
In rural areas, the share of informal workers is as high as 92 per cent,
the major reasons being lack of employment opportunities in the formal
sector, especially in nonprimary fields, and excessive dependency on
agriculture as the prime occupation.
There is severe resistance towards the transition from rural to urban
and from informal to formal sector, both being mutually linked. For
example, in case of Delhi, when city boundaries expand to include
village areas, agricultural land is usually acquired whereas the settle-
ment area, called the Lal Dora,8 is left untouched. Rural planning is of
recent origin in India, and most village settlement areas are unplanned
and organic in their built form and therefore their inclusion into the
urban mainstream is a challenge. Furthermore, lack of clarity on land
title curtails landowners from buying and selling land in the open mar-
ket. Due to the allowance for establishment of nonpolluting small-scale
8.16% 13.68%
30.22%
91.84% 86.32%
69.78%
Rural Urban Total

Informal sector Formal sector
Figure 2.9 Distribution of workers in formal and informal sectors in rural and
urban areas
Source: NCEUS, 2008.
industries, relaxation of building bye-laws, and advantages associated

with nearness to urban centres, Lal Dora areas are emerging as a pre-
ferred destination for residence and work for the urban poor. The rental
is low in consideration of high density, congestion, and lack of infras-
tructure and formal property titles in Lal Dora areas. There is a latent
mutual agreement between the urban local bodies (ULBs), which choose
to ignore violations of health and hygiene conditions, and Lal Dora
residents, who continue to benefit from rising demand for space and
growing rental market while overlooking congestion issues. This adjust-
ment is offloading ULBs of their responsibility of providing affordable
residential and workspace for the urban poor, whereas latently it is
making original residents vulnerable to land acquisition and disloca-
tion when the area deteriorates to be entitled as “slum9 ”, as is the
case with Dayalpur, Takmirpur, and Khajuri village settlements that are
now falling into the category of “unauthorized colony10 ” (Unauthorised
Colony Cell, 2014).
The example of Lal Dora in Delhi demonstrates there is undoubtedly
a huge employment dependency and a significant contribution of the
informal sector in the economy of urban, “rurban11 ”, and rural areas.
Also, it is observed that a high proportion of socially and economically
underprivileged sections of the society are concentrated in informal eco-
nomic activities. The high levels of economic growth during the past
two decades are accompanied by increasing “informalization”. There
are indications of growing interlinkages between informal and formal
economic activities (NSC, 2012). Considering the prevalence, relevance,

and dominance of the informal sector across all locations, including
cities, towns, and villages, it is important to pay attention towards a for-
mal inclusion and facilitation of informal sectors so as to be able to earn
demographic dividend in an inclusive manner. Sustaining high levels of
growth are intertwined with improving the domestic demands of those
engaged in informal economy and addressing the needs of the sector in
terms of credit, skills, technology, marketing and infrastructure (NSC,
2012).
Politics of “Escapism”
There exists a severe lack of trust on political promises and willing-

ness to participate in the democratic system, especially in the election
of the lowest tires of government, as the degree of freedom of local
government is less and thus their capacity to bring about consider-
able improvement is always doubted by the public. The expression of
dissatisfaction through nondemocratic movements has been gaining
popularity while influencing the political scene in urban India in the
recent past. For example, the wave against corruption and the formu-
lation of a new Lok Pal Bill, initiated by social activist Anna Hazare in
Delhi, gained national attention and resulted in the formation of a new
political party that won in majority of seats in the Delhi state elections
of 2014.
It is a major concern that important urban centres like Mumbai,
Delhi, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Ahmedabad have been con-
sistently witnessing low voter turnout in elections, demonstrated by
46 per cent voting across Maharashtra for ten municipal corporations,
including Mumbai in 2014; BBMP (Greater Bengaluru Metropolitan Cor-
poration polls) in March 2010 witnessed less than 45 per cent; Greater
Chennai Corporation polls in October 2011 had 48 per cent votes; and
Ahmedabad witnessed just 44 per cent voting in 2010 (IBN, 2014). The
turnout was much less in elite areas (Ibid.) that are clearly disenchanted
with the election process, further weakening the system.
Though the devolution of powers to local governments occurred since
mid-1990s, local governments still remain financially and politically
weak, and the state governments continue to impose such political
powers. Cities do not have sufficient resources or capacity to drive
social and economic policy, and state or national government contin-
ues to drive the process with regard to urban infrastructure development
(Zerah, 2008; HPEC, 2011), the most recent example being the launch
of an urban reform scheme called the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban

Reform Mission (JNNURM) by the national government in 2005. In con-
trast, in South Africa post-1994, a hierarchy of administrative units
ranging from larger metropolitan areas (Johannesburg, Cape Town, and
Durban) to district municipalities has been created, and these demo-
cratically elected metropolitan governments have considerable social
responsibilities in accordance with national policies (Kennedy et al.,
2011). Local governments are mandated to reduce poverty, provide
urban services and housing, redress inequality, and promote economic
development (Ibid.). In this context, literature argues that external eco-
nomic constraints and intercity competition compel officials to focus on
attracting investment. While global capital is driving changes at territo-
rial scales, the variation across cities can only be explained by internal
dynamics of local governance (Ibid.). Politically, megaprojects are seen
as expressions of public authority even when they are partially financed
with public money (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) and in some cases without the
political involvement of local government. India is a case in point where
the whole process of development of SEZs was driven by the state gov-
ernment pursuing regional growth agenda without the involvement of
local political processes. In these circumstances, cities become canvases
for political and economic ambitions of upper tiers of governments,
and therefore, the role of public in the formulation of urban landscape
reduces and so does the perception of ownership and responsibility.
Conclusion
The urban landscape in India is turning active but is still waiting to

receive signal to explode, and considering the nature and strength of
forces demanding that, it does not seem to hold the motion for long.
Despite prolonged reluctance, “urbanization” is happening, though in a
slow, unplanned, and unorganized manner. We derive the following key
aspects associated with the existing landscape of urban India:
Planning
• The myth of “urbanization” being antirural brings in political hes-
itation towards freeing more land area and built-up area for urban
development and continued concentration of urban population in
large cities, and the existing city agglomeration is continuously
deteriorating the quality of life and city environment.
• There is a lack of preparedness to meet the emerging demands
for space and infrastructure. Reactionary planning and inefficient
implementation lead to monocentric, unorganized, and unprepared

urban landscape.
Funding
• Inequitable distribution of wealth and opportunities causes a huge
difference in the quality of life across various spatial locations, and
there exists distinct differences in the spatial spread of economic
opportunities.
Governance
• Lack of accountability of urban authorities and government agencies
leads to irresponsive plans and policies, inefficient implementation,
and nontransparent working.
• There is a severe loss of trust on political promises and lack of willing-
ness to participate in the democratic system, especially in the election
of the lowest tires of government. The dissociation is more among the
elite class as their capability to resolve basic issues is much higher.
This dissociation further weakens the governance system.
References
Banerjee, S. (2012). “India’s ‘Revanchist’ Cities”, Economic & Political Weekly,
XLVII(51).
Barthel, P.-A. (2010). “Arab Mega-Projects”, Built Environment, 36(2).
Census (2011). http://censusindia.gov.in/ (Retrieved on 14 May 2014).
Chandrashekar, C.P., Ghosh, J. and Rohchowdhury, A. (2006). “The ‘Demo-
graphic Dividend’ and Young India’s Economic Future”, Economic and Political
Weekly, 9 December, 5055–5064.
Chakraborty, D. and Kuri, P.K. (2013). “Rural Urban Migration and Urban Infor-
mal Sector in India: An Interstate Analysis”, International Journal of Current
Research, 5(4), 950–956.
CRISIL (2010). Skilling India, The Billion People Challenge, p. 14.
Dittrich, C. (2007). “Bengaluru: Globalization and Fragmentation in India’s
Hightech Capital”, Asien, 103, 45–58.
Dewaelheyns, V. and Gulinck, H. (2008). Rurality Near the City, 1, http://
www.vlm.be/SiteCollectionDocuments/Rurality%20near%20the%20city/rnc_
editorial.pdf.
Expert Committee on Lal Dora (2007). Report of the Expert Committee on Lal
Dora and Extended Lal Dora in Delhi, 15, http://delhi-masterplan.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Expert-comittee-report-on-lal-dora.pdf (Retrieved
on 31 August 2014).
Flyvbjerg, B., Nils, B. and Werner, R. (2003). Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of
Ambition. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Gandy, M. (2008). “Landscapes of Disaster: Water, Modernity, and Urban Frag-
mentation in Mumbai”, Environment and Planning A 2008, 40, 108–130.
HPEC (High Powered Expert Committee for Estimating the Investment Require-
ments for Urban Infrastructure Services) (2011). “Report on Indian Urban
Infrastructure and Services”, http://www.niua.org/projects/hpec/finalreport-
hpec.pdf.
IBN (2014). http://ibnlive.in.com/news/low-voter-turnout-a-reality-for-big-
indian-cities/230915-37-170.html (Retrieved on 11 May 2014).
IDFC (2014). Infrastructure Development Finance Company, http://www.
indiastat.com (Retrieved on 11 May 2014).
Jaglin, S. (2001). “Villes disloquees? Segregations et fragmentation urbaine en
Afrique austral”, Annales de Geographie, 619, 243–265.
Kennedy, L., Robbins, G., Scott, D., Sutherland, C., Denis, E. Andrade, J., Miranda,
L., Varrel, A., Dupont, V. and Bon, B. (2011). “The Politics of Large – Scale
Economic and Infrastructure Projects in Fast Growing Cities of the South”,
Chance2Sustain, www.eadi.org.
Kundu, A. (2011). “Trends and Processes of Urbanization in India”, Urbanization
and Emerging Population Issues – 6, Human Settlements Group, Interna-
tional Institute for Environment and Development, http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/
10597IIED.pdf (Retrieved 31 August 2014).
Krank, S. (n.d.). Cultural, Spatial and Socio-Economic Fragmentation in
the Indian Megacity Hyderabad, http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/
fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/urbanplanet/identities/ws2/050%20Krank.pdf
(Retrieved on 22 August 2014).
Levy, J. and Lussault, M. (2003). Dictionnaires de la Geograhie et de Pespace des
Societes, Paris: Belin.
Mahapatro, S. R. (2012). The changing pattern of internal migration in India:
Issues and challenges, European Population Conference 2012, 13–16 June
Stockholm, Sweden, http://epc2012.princeton.edu/papers/121017 (Retrieved
on 31 August 2014).
May, N., Pierre V., Landrieu J. and Spector T. (eds.) (1998). La ville éclaté. La Tour
d’Aigues, France: Editions de l’Aube.
McKinsey Global Institute (2010). India’s Urban Awakening: Building
Inclusive Cities Sustaining Economic Growth, http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/urbanization/urban_awakening_in_india (Retrieved on 31 August
2014).
McKinsey Global Institute (2001). India: The Growth Imperative.
Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India (2001). Area, Population
and Density of Cities and Towns of India – 2001.
Michel, D. and Scott, D. (2005). “The La Lucia-Umhlanga Ridge as an Emerging
Edge City”, South African Geographical Journal, 87(2), 104–114.
NCEUS (2008). Report on Definition and Statistical Issues Relating to Informal
Economy, New Delhi.
NSC (2012). Report of the Committee on Unorganized Sector Statistics.
Pantoja, E. (1999). Urban Poverty in India. Washington DC: World Bank.
Sarwar, F.-H. (2012). “A Comparative Study of Zamindari, Raiyatwari and
Mahalwari Land Revenue Settlements: The Colonial Mechanisms of Surplus
Extraction in 19th Century British India”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social
Science (JHSS), 2(4), (Sep–Oct 2012), 16–26.
Sreedhar, K. S., Reddy, A. V. and Srinath, P. (2010). Is It Push or Pull? Recent
Evidence from Migration in India. SANEI Report 10-04.
Swyngedoum, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A. (2002). “Neoliberal Urbanization

in Europe: Large Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy”,
Antipode, 34(3), 542–577.
Vakulabharanam, V. and Motiram, S. (2011). “Poverty and Inequality in the Age
of Economic Liberalization”, in D. Nachane (Ed.), India Development Report
2011. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Tiwari, P. and Rastogi, A. (2010). What Has Been the Impact of Special Eco-
nomic Zones on Land and Property Markets in Hyderabad?”, Fibre Series, Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, UK.
Unauthorised Colony Cell (2014). Department of Urban Development, Govt. of
NCT of Delhi, http://delhi.gov.in (Retrieved on 11 May 2014).
Urban India (2011). Evidence – Report by Indian Institute for Human Settle-
ments.
World Bank Organization (2013a). http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
Population-ranking-table (Retrieved on 22 August 2014).
World Bank Organization (2013b). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.
TOTL.K2/countries?display=default (Retrieved on 22 August 2014).
World Bank Organization (2013c). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.
GINI (Retrieved on 1 November 2014).
Zerah, M.-H. (2008). “Splintering Urbanism in Mumbai: Contrasting Trends in a
Multi-layered Society”, Geoforum, 39(6), 1922–1932.
Zheng, X.-P. (2000). “Determinants of Agglomeration Economies and
Diseconomies: Empirical Evidence from Tokyo”, Socio-Economic Planning Sci-
ences, 35, 131–144.
3
Built Environment
Introduction
Urban discourse in India as an object of study is of recent origin, despite

India being one of the earliest urban civilizations known to mankind.
The urban question in India’s early decades of development planning
after independence typically started with a stopper: “but the urban
environment is not important, it is in the villages that India must
succeed or die . . . investments of time, capital or planning in the cities
only aggravates things by attracting more innocent from their villages”
(Benninger, 1971, p.12). While it is true even today that the majority
of India’s population live in rural areas, it is, however, unreasonable
to accept the “polemical discourse” of the after independence develop-
ment planning that forces upon the country a policy of urban neglect.
Urban development policies formulated “reluctantly”, based on these
arguments, are, as we argue in this chapter, often counterproductive to
not only the urban poor but also the rural poor (Ibid.).
The genesis and processes of urbanization in modern India can be
traced back to two distinct phases in the development dynamics of
the colonial period. In the first phase during the 17th century, when
the foundation of Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay was laid, the intent
was to generate strong flows of commodities and people to satisfy the
economics of a colony in an imperial regime. This has led to the weak-
ening of regional centripetal forces established during the medieval
period (Khilnani, 1997; Kundu, 2011). During this phase, these large
metropolitan cities also served as focal points for generating and extract-
ing economic surplus, and linked India to other globally expanding
economies more extensively than ever. This has established an enduring
relationship of subjugation and uneven exploitation (Khilnani, 1997)
and also disrupted symbiotic relationships between rural and urban
51
areas (Kundu, 2011). Indian cities, as a result, Kundu (2011, p.3) argues,
were not a “product of economic development”, rather they were a
product of a “surplus expropriation” mechanism. This process of surplus
expropriation through the colonial policy of industrialization resulted
in a centralization of manufacturing activities in large cities and also
a displacement of the workforce, including artisans and crafters, from
primary and secondary sectors in rural areas (Gavsker, 2011). Lack of
alternative forms of industry and employment for these people resulted
in non-absorption in the formal urban economy and serious problems
of unemployment and poverty (Gavsker, 2011; Kundu, 2011).
During the second stage, which began in the late 19th century, the
British built more schematic cantonment cities laid out as military base-
ments. The urban development, planning, and sanitation policies of
these cities were largely influenced by the revolt of 1857, plague epi-
demic in 1896, and the introduction of British planning ideas. The
British colonial city was kept at a distance from the existing Indian
city (Chaplin, 2011). Indian cities were looked at askance and treated
as places of “melancholy decay” and “flabbergasting squalor” (Khilnani,
1997). The British Raj, within the cities, governed public space accord-
ing to its own logic and concepts. The cities were designed to flaunt
the “superior rationality” and “power” of British but with deficient
productive capacities (Khilnani, 1997). The urban built environment
was ordered, sanitized, and amenable to regulation, and structured to
improve and enhance the material flow of economic activities. The
norms and standards that shaped the built environment were used
“both consciously and unconsciously, as social technologies, as strate-
gies of power to incorporate, categorise, discipline, control and reform
the inhabitants of the city” (Yeoh, 2003, p.16). Cities were planned with
high-quality city amenities available to the ruling British class and those
who could afford high prices. The geographical zoning and segmenta-
tion of the cities ensured that the service class lived nearby but “did
not overburden the infrastructure of the core areas” (Kundu, 2011, p.3).
This dualistic nature of “colonial cities” has led to, on one hand, a pro-
liferation of islands of poverty and squalor, and, on the other, islands of
power and prosperity. The premise that poverty and stagnation in India
were the consequence of colonial rule, and the prominent role of colo-
nial cities in this process, has led to rhetoric labelling of cities as evil,
unhealthy, anti-social, and regressive. As a result of the “discomfort” in
cities and their development, the continued development was neglected
and cities’ importance in economic development was subdued during
the post-independence era.
Built Environment 53
The national leaders, post-independence, were faced with the chal-

lenge of constructing a new identity for an India that was recovering
from colonial exploitation. Two distinct images emerged for consider-
ation within the discourses of modernity and identity. While “urban”
embodied modernity, rural personified the identity discourse (Suri,
2011). While Tagore and Gandhi advocated for village life, terming
city life as discomfort, Ambedkar and Nehru, though with different
purposes, advocated for greater urbanization. Ambedkar argued for
the eradication of social inequalities through a democratic vision of
the urbanization process and termed villages as the “sink of localism,
a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism” (Guha,
2007, p.107). Tagore pleaded for the conservation of village customs
and standards of living and opposed migration of population to cities
(Benninger, 1971). These priorities were undoubtedly important for
India but the rhetoric in which they were framed – labelling the
city as evil, unhealthy, and anti-social – had a significant impact
in the way in which cities and urban development were treated in
India.
The city was seen as a parasitic growth on the rural side, “siphon-
ing away its surplus, draining its manpower, without recompense for
the village” (Menon, 1997, p.2933). This perspective was evident in
Gandhian philosophy; it “strikes[d] a sympathetic chord in the Indian
mind and continues[d] to colour our world view current economic
reforms notwithstanding” (Menon, 1997, p.2933). “Green” politics had
also reinforced this perspective. Sustainability and equity perspectives
have dominated the thinking of the Gandhians and “greens”, and
the resultant discourse of this thinking is not the “implicit pro rural,
agrarian perspective but its anti urban implications” (Ibid., p.2933).
Post-independence, despite Nehru’s dogged determinism for a strong
industrial base, a dominant rural base pervaded into several aspects of
society, economics, and policy. The effects of this approach can still
be found in the Indian policy discourse. Alongside the village fetish,
a Soviet-influenced “redemptive mystique of large industry” model
(Chakravorty, 2000, p.372) was relevant to India for large part of post-
independent history (Suri, 2011). Most of the industries were controlled
by the state or through partnerships with the private sector. The location
of these industries in a few selected centres had restructured the urban
hierarchy (Kundu, 2011). It was believed that the construction and con-
trol of industries would bridge the gap in development across regions
through a “trickle-down effect”, irrespective of the spatial location of
the industries.
However, the general perception of the policymakers that India is pre-

dominantly an agricultural and rural economy and there are potent
dangers of over-urbanization which will lead to a drain of resources
from the countryside to feed cities, has dominated the development dis-
course. The positive aspects of cities as engines of economic growth in
the context of national economic policies were not much appreciated
and, therefore, the problems of urban areas were treated more as wel-
fare problems and sectors of residual investment rather than as issues
of national economic importance. As a result, even in the industrial-
ization development process, the spatial context of the industries was
“neglected” and the industrialization process which should have guided
urbanization process completely failed to catalyse urban development.
To add to this, the urban policy discourse has been to control the growth
of cities, decongest cities, and encourage industry to move out. There
has been no attempt to formulate an urban policy at national level. Also,
a general neglect of city-level development projects added to the further
neglect of cities and their development.
Urban development and built environment in India must be seen
within this wider ideology of political economy and development since
independence. There are at least four resultant consequences of the
Indian policies and their discourses on urbanization. First, national poli-
cies post-independence have not encouraged urbanization, or rather
were “reluctant” to project urban development as a catalyst of economic
and social development. Second, the much-talked-about decentraliza-
tion in urban governance since 1990s has not provided the required
fillip to push city governments to perform their role in the city’s
development activities (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). Third, there has been
commodification of land markets, post-liberalization. This had a major
impact on the built environment structure in cities (Mahadevia, 2008).
Finally, the acceleration of India’s economy in the global arena has also
led to rapid changes in cities – including a huge surge in property devel-
opment and increased urban land values in cities, alongside a section of
the society being “marginalized” during this process.
Against this background, in this chapter we will explore the dynamics
of the built environment in the face of changing political, econom-
ical, and sociological perspectives and policies in urban India. The
overall analytical method employed in this chapter is “historical recon-
struction” (Baken, 2003), that is, the reconstruction of the urban built
environment history in order to explain the current structure and
built-up space of the cities. With an analytical focus on how the urban
space, streets, and networks are interwoven in cities, and how different
institutions and people react to these processes, this chapter explores
the extraordinarily complex and dynamic processes through which
built environment is shaped in Indian cities (Graham and Marvin,
2001). The most important inputs of such processes and reconstruc-
tions are paradigms and policies (historical) and how these relate to
one another, as many of these policies and ideologies have roots in
economic, sociological, political, and historical insights.
Following Handy and colleagues (2002), we define built environment
as a system that “comprises urban design, land use and the transporta-
tion system”, which “encompasses patterns of human activity within
the physical environment” (Handy et al., 2002, p.65). In this chapter
we will review the history of national, state, and local governments in
urban planning and policy – that shaped built environments – with
a focus on historical antecedents to the contemporary roles. We focus
on three critical components of built environment, as Harvey (1989) in
Jauhiainen (2006) describes: built environment for production (indus-
tries, land, and related buildings), built environment for consumption
(housing, shopping malls, urban services, etc.), and built environment
for both production and consumption, such as transport infrastructure
networks within the history of national, state, and local governments’
planning and policies that structured, altered, and restructured the
urban space, and therefore the built environment. This approach offers
us a powerful and dynamic analytical tool of seeing and understanding
contemporary Indian cities, and maps the processes that will shape the
future of our cities.
We develop our arguments in three parts. First, we review the devel-
opment paradigm in India broadly in a historical political economy
perspective, identifying some of the major phases/eras leading to the
contemporary practice and their relationship to various stages of India’s
urban development. Second, we focus on built environment history
immediately after independence and the role of different actors and
factors in structuring the urban development framework, emphasiz-
ing some of the contradictions and ambivalences inherent in India’s
contemporary urban planning and development. Third, we attempt to
explain the consequences of these ambivalences and contradictions that
have structured and restructured the built environment components,
and conclude by proposing some general propositions about the urban
planning and development that will play a critical role in shaping the
future built environment.
Cities in India’s development planning: Some perspectives
The making of modern urban discourse in India is linked to ideologies

and practices of development planning and role of the state. Planning
in post-colonial India has been associated with national-level planning
though Five Year Plans produced under the aegis of the National Plan-
ning Commission (Banerjee, 2005). Planning at central level was sectoral
and very little attention was paid to spatial aspects. Urbanization and
the problems of the cities were treated as secondary to the larger macro-
economic problems of the country (Shaw, 2004). Rondinelli (1991) cited
in Shaw (2004), in this context, noted that “in the past, urbanisation was
a stepchild of national economic policies, attended to only when critical
urban problems caused serious political difficulties” (p.791). “Command
and control planning” of the state was now considered to be an anachro-
nism in an era of globalization and economic liberalization. Shaw (2004)
argues that much of what had been written on paper remained ineffec-
tive on the ground. Taking a similar tone, Banerjee (2005) noted that
Five Year Plans in India have had much less impact than French and
Japan models in shaping the course of economic growth and reduc-
ing poverty. Awasthi (1991) and Banerjee (2005) further argue that, in
reality, the role of planning had more to do with the allocation of invest-
ment over time, and the preparation of revenue and budget outlays,
than in assessing the social and physical outcomes of the plans at the
levels of cities, regions, and states. In fact, Indian national planning did
not have a national urbanization strategy (Shaw, 2004; Banerjee, 2005)
until a series of infrastructure projects under Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) emerged as de facto national urban
policy in India (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011).
To understand the “reluctance” to cities and their development in
India, it is necessary to understand the political economy of the post-
colonial state. Cities historically occupied an ambivalent place in Indian
imagination, despite the fact that most of the national leaders hailed
from cities and towns (Prakash, 2002). The central preoccupation of the
colonial state has been capital accumulation for economic development,
and state-directed development has been an integral part of India’s
modernization project (Shaw, 1996). However, given the social het-
erogeneity and economic inequality and the resultant conflict-ridden
social and political environment, it is difficult to build consensus and
organize collective action towards long-term investment and reforms
(Bardhan, 2011). Even though, in the early years of independence, such
a broad consensus did exist among the leading proprietary classes, since
the mid-1960s it has become increasingly difficult and has been possi-
ble only through the appeasement of demands (Shaw, 1996). The lack
of collective action and demand politics has been an acute politico-
economic problem, especially in the matter of long-term infrastructure
investments (Bardhan, 2011). Even after the recognition that that infras-
tructure is crucial for sustaining economic growth in the long run,
Indian policymakers and the state have not been able to sacrifice short-
term gains over long-term benefits that would accrue to the nation as
a whole (Bardhan, 1984). Urban development and urban infrastructure
sectors have also been prone to these “demand politics”, therefore, the
“reluctance and neglect” in building cities and investing in city infras-
tructure should be analysed through this perspective to understand the
forces that shaped the current urban built environment.
India has seen several phases of urban development initiatives, each
initiated by a crisis or a need. It would be useful to step back and reflect
on the broad trends in urban development in India since independence.
The story of urban development and planning post-independence is
essentially the story of economic planning in four distinct political
eras. These are the era of Nehru (1950–67), the era of Indira Gandhi
(1967–84), the era of Rajiv Gandhi (1984–91), and the era of liberal-
ization and decentralized politics (1991–present). Each era represented
a distinct political tone and hence a different emphasis in the corre-
sponding Five Year Plans, and, more generally, a different approach to
economic and development policy (Lall and Rastogi, 2007).
The first three Five Year Plans (1951–67), understandably, focused
on increasing food production, developing basic and heavy industries,
and repairing the damage of Partition. The first plan was something
of a “damp squib and remained broadly neutral as between the agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors” (Corbridge, 2009, p.4); it was
essentially a programme of public expenditures that reflected the pri-
orities of that time. The plan further declared that “even the limited
objective of increased production cannot be attained unless the wider
objectives of social policy are constantly kept in mind and steadily pur-
sued. On the other hand, equality and social justice will have little
content unless the production potential of the community is substan-
tially raised” (Planning Commission, n.d.). However, the plan could
not visualize the role of cities in raising the “production potential”.
Consequently, it did not include urban development as a sector of eco-
nomic growth. By the time of the preparation of Second Five Year Plan,
Nehru had cemented his position as undisputed leader of the Congress
Party. This era was also characterized by “a democratic regime with
a no-authoritarian command politics” (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987,

p.225). Nehru-led Congress government was able to invest in the “long
run” as the party could rely on Nehru’s persuasive leadership (Rudolph
and Rudolph, 1987). The accent and tone of the Second and Third Plans
reflected these command politics and allocated resources very much on
ambitious industrial development, such as the development of large-
scale industries and irrigation projects (Lall and Rastogi, 2007). India was
able to build steel factories at Bokaro and Rourkela during this era. How-
ever, preoccupied with problems of economy and building a sustainable
industrial base, the first Three Plans have rather been low on urban-
ization priorities (Shaw, 1996), except in the building of Chandigarh,
Gandhinagar, and Bhubaneswar to accommodate refugees and create
new capitals in the wake of Partition and bifurcation. The development
models of these plans conjectured that the government could channel
resources from agriculture to non-agriculture sectors without too many
repercussions. Nehru believed that he could use aid from the US and
land reforms – to break up unproductive estates to enfranchise efficient
small farmers – to achieve this (Corbridge, 2009; Ganguly and Mukherji,
2011). Agriculture was the bargaining chip that Nehru depended on
to free up resources for modernization projects. However, this had not
materialized as Nehru hoped (Corbridge, 2009).
During the same period, despite the elaborate planning machinery, a
strategic approach to urbanization and infrastructure development was
completely missing at the time of first three Five Year Plans. There was
more consensus than dissent over the general philosophy and orienta-
tion of these plans, which devoted much of their resources to heavy
industrialization. The differences were not fully discussed, if there ever
were any, because of the overwhelming stature of Nehru in the party
(Patel, 2002, cited in Lall and Rastogi, 2007). In this context, urban
development and infrastructure were developed almost on a piecemeal
basis as a supporting activity to the development of large industrial
projects (Lall and Rastogi, 2007). Whatever the underlying motives,
the Nehruvian industrial model failed to generate enough new jobs to
reduce the growing number of poor and unemployed (Kohli, n.d.).
Nehru’s demise in 1964, and the untimely death of Lalbahadur
Shastri, led to a power struggle within the Congress Party. However,
Indira Gandhi ascended the throne at a time when India’s democracy
was deepening and when the dominance of Congress Party was being
challenged at the centre and as well as in the states. This was also the
time when society–state relations had changed from the “command pol-
itics” that dominated Nehru’s era to “demand politics” (Rudolph and
Rudolph, 1987). Poor economic performance both reflected and com-

pounded the effects of exogenous shocks on demand politics.1 Industrial
and agricultural productivity declined by the end of third Five Year
Plan. There were agrarian unrests, food shortages, industrial unrests,
demonstrations demanding food rationing, and so on. There was also
an agrarian version of demand politics that began in West Bengal with
intensity after the state government was replaced in 1967 (Ibid.). Amidst
these crises, Charan Singh, who had earlier opposed Nehru’s plan for
industrialization at the cost of agriculture, deserted the Congress Party.
In his writings, Charan Singh, as Corbridge (2009) notes, predicted that
India was suffering from high levels of “urban bias”. He further argued
that wasting capital on urban and industrial projects made no sense
in a country where a large share of the population lived in rural areas.
In fact, the limited investments made in urban areas were used to sustain
the “urban bias” arguments in national development policy (Varshney,
1998). This view had permeated into policy circles by the end of 1960s
following the failures of monsoons and increased incidence of rural
poverty that influenced the policy paradigm in subsequent plan periods
(Corbridge, 2009).
To counter the raising opposition within and outside the Congress
Party, Indira Gandhi dismantled and deinstitutionalized the Congress
Party by “splitting [the] party, [and] purging the old guard states bosses”
(Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, p.239). The direction and prescriptions
of economic policy were used to strengthen this process. She resorted to
progressive populist measures like the nationalization of the commercial
banks (Ibid.), and direct appeals to the voting public through wel-
fare programmes that would allow the central government to directly
reach out to poor by bypassing the state governments. She introduced
the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) in 1969 to
prevent concentration of economic power in order to safeguard the
interests of consumers. But, in effect, the Act had been used, as Lall and
Rastogi (2007) present Marathe’s argument (1986), as a device to con-
trol “the money power of the large business houses” which supported
the opposition.2 Lall and Rastogi (2007) note that she did this “by wrap-
ping herself in the ideological cocoon of socialist rhetoric and adopting
harshly anti-big business and anti-urban stances” (Lall and Rastogi,
2007, p.6). The spill-over effect of MRTP policy (along with other indus-
trial policies of that time) was that industries and firms were discouraged
to “agglomerate” at a particular location – a process that is funda-
mental to the existence of cities. Industries could not exploit the scale
economies and, as a result, industrial growth suffered (Varshney, 1984).
State control and autarkic industrialization did not meet the expecta-
tion of poverty alleviation and human development. Economy grew at
a dismal rate of 2.9 per cent per annum in 1970s and poverty remained
high (Corbridge, 2009). The food crisis and the need for political survival
led to the pouring of resources into rural India throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s. While this strategy was clearly successful in regaining
political power, it also led to distortions in public spending priorities.
The massive programme of rural support created a fiscally expensive
practice of free power and fertilizer subsidies to farmers, food subsi-
dies to consumers, and other subsidies to the industrial capital class
(Lall and Rastogi, 2007), which have been plural and heterogeneous
interest groups/classes on the Indian scene (Bardhan, 1984). Industrial
business groups were able to utilize the policies and programmes despite
the measures aimed at capital accumulation and monopoly; rich farm-
ers and landlords succeeded in strengthening their position through
various efforts; and the professional class influenced state policies of
taxation and subsidies for their benefit. In essence “the Indian public
economy has become an elaborate network of patronage and subsidies.
The heterogeneous proprietary classes fight and bargain for their share
in the spoils of the system and often strike compromises in the form
of ‘log-rolling’ in the usual fashion of pressure group” (Bardhan, 1998,
pp.65–66). In the entire process, the urban poor and the urban middle
class have not been able to exert their weight on the policymaking and
have not been able to demand their share. On the contrary, the urban
poor were the most affected in this era – starting from the Turkman Gate
demolition and rioting.3
Following his mother’s assassination in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi came into
power with a landslide victory. His era was largely marked with empha-
sis on industrial de-licensing and deregulation with a pro-modernization
bias. He dismantled the “License Raj” within 12–18 months of his taking
office, through new industrial policy (Lall and Rastogi, 2007). The legacy
inherited from Mrs Gandhi, of “private draining of public resources”
and direct and indirect subsidies led to a decline in both private and
public investment in the economy. The looming fiscal crisis also made
it impossible to continue any state-led economic development strategy
(Bardhan, 1998). However, Mr Gandhi continued to invest in infrastruc-
ture with public sector funding, as he had committed serious amounts
to the infrastructure sector. He could not break away from inefficient
and distortionary investments in groundwater irrigation and power sec-
tors that defined the political imperative of Indira Gandhi’s era, due to
a lack of political muscle (Lall and Rastogi, 2007; Corbridge, 2009). As a
result he had to continue these “inefficient” investments and “neglect”

the development of critical urban infrastructure and transportation (Lall
and Rastogi, 2007). These investments led to serious fiscal deficits of
about 10 per cent of GDP by the end of 1980s (Khilnani, 1997). Infras-
tructure issues had drawn attention from the research community, if not
the political realm, to the growing problems of urban India (Mohan,
1985, cited in Lall and Rastogi, 2007).
The crisis and subsequent economic reforms in 1990s led a change in
political relations between centre and state – from a command economy
to a federal market economy (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001). Dismantling
of controls exercised by the centre has created greater scope for state
governments to elaborate their own policies. States started demanding
a larger share of economic sovereignty, as the success of the reforms is
dependent on the state’s cooperation – especially when state politics and
governance took prominence in India’s overall development (Kennedy
and Zerah, 2008; Kennedy et al., 2013). The reforms undertaken by the
centre as part of the liberalization were in fact introduced through a
process of political negotiation rather than through “shock therapy”
(Khilnani, 1997). Therefore, the majority of the reforms were in the areas
of trade and industry which concern the “elite” – such as the restructur-
ing of capital markets, liberalization of trade regimes, and simplification
of investment rules (Varshney, 1998). Reforms that “are economically
desirable but concern mass politics” such as “labour laws, privatization
of public sector, agriculture” have “either been completely ignored or
pursued with less exemplary policy resolve” (Ibid. p.322). On the other
hand, forced by fiscal constraints and pressures from coalition and “mass
politics” – which were largely dominated by regional parties, the centre
was forced to reduce spending on infrastructure and other long-term
investments. Government resorted to the easiest thing that any weak
government would do – favour existing vote banks over future voters
by cutting capital expenditure in favour of spending on subsidies and
other current consumption. “Explicit subsidies” rose from 0.3 per cent
of GDP in 1971–72 to 1.4 per cent in 2001–02 (Ministry of Finance,
2004). Infrastructure spending plunged back to post-independence lows
during the 1991–2004 period (Lall and Rastogi, 2007). However, cities
did receive some attention in the post-liberalization period – as a means
to generate economic growth centred on state policies (Kennedy and
Zerah, 2008). This attention to cities and urban areas in states, however,
is due to the fact that “changes and realignments of the dominant coali-
tion” supported the reforms (Bardhan, 1998, p.131), and that there was
a need for reform in the earlier model of economic development which
served the interests of urban, industrial, and financial elites (Corbridge

and Harriss, 2000).4
With the renewed interest in cities and urban areas as key sites for
economic growth, states, probably for the first time, have become the
focal points in driving the economic agenda of the central government
(Shatkin and Vidyarthi, 2014).5 However, while there were some piece-
meal programmes put forward by the Government of India and states,
problems “in” cities and urban areas were given little attention till the
arrival of JNNURM. The Indian government, through a constitutional
amendment, has, during this era, attempted to decentralize governance
functions to urban local bodies which subsequently shifted the scale
of action from states to cities (Sami, 2014). While the implementation
of the decentralization has been far from perfect in most of the states,
many experiments were undertaken by states, cities, and other elite
groups to take the economic agenda forward. With state governments’
“reluctance” to let the control on urban space go, and the Government
of India’s slack in enforcing decentralization efforts, several grass-root
and civil society actors have begun to drive the decentralization agenda
and have configured power relations in the cities (Sami, 2014). How-
ever, as has been happening in the development discourse of India,
opportunities for participation in urban politics and, thereby, to influ-
ence the urban space and network dynamics have not been equal for
all sections of the society. The “new liberalising middle class”, along
with the urbanized rural elites, have dominated the urban development
agenda (Fernandes, 2004). This process has led to the marginalization
of a section/some sections of urban society (Chatterjee, 2004; Ghertner,
2011; Sami, 2014), and new forms of urban participation have emerged
when structuring urban space (Chatterjee, 2004; Roy, 2009; Ghertner,
2011; Weinstein et al., 2014, among others). The contestations over
urban space, infrastructure services among these actors have signifi-
cantly influenced the dynamics of built environment in cities, which
will be discussed in the subsequent sections in detail.
Dynamics of built environment: a residual history of

“reluctant” urban paradigm?
As discussed in the previous section, urban development and infrastruc-

ture building in independent India took place in four distinct waves,
each corresponding to a different political economy era. Each wave
of the urban development has a different focus, shaped largely by
the changing political priorities in each era. Each of these eras has
also displayed a different level and tone of “reluctance” and “neglect”

towards the urban development. While all the programmes and poli-
cies of central, regional state and local governments have a significant
impact on built environment components from various standpoints
either explicitly or implicitly, addressing the complex and diverse facets
of these policies in detail would require a whole library rather than one
brief chapter. Moreover, exploring shifts and paradigms across a full
range of urban built environment components is clearly a Herculean
task. Therefore, we present a perspective on selected built environ-
ment components that explores the interlocking dynamics that have
effectively undermined post-colonial urbanism in India.
The urban question has been given little importance in the Five Year
Plans that guided many decades of development in many decades of
post-independence (Benninger, 1971; Baken, 2003; Batra, 2009; Roy,
2011; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). The Government of India, after inde-
pendence, was not prepared for the urban growth, or rather it was
prepared for it in its own way (Baken, 2003). But cities have under-
gone tremendous transformations, especially during last four decades.
The gradual “disempowerment” of urban local bodies (Mahadevia,
2008; Maringanti, 2011; Sivaramakrishan, 2011, among others), the
rise of the regional capital, the waxing and waning of ideas on urban
poverty reduction through transnational aid chains (Maringanti, 2011),
the emergence of urban development authorities (Banerjee, 2005; Pal,
2006; Maringanti, 2011; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011), and the changes
in the social and physical mobility of populations are some of the
transformations that urban India had witnessed in last three or four
decades.
However, as we forcefully argue in the remainder of the chapter,
despite many efforts since independence, there was no coherent urban
policy at both state and central levels that was developed to drive urban
planning and an urban development agenda. Rather, the resulting pol-
icy was an implicit strategy of “isolated and episodic incidences of urban
growth control” through building bye-laws and zoning regulations
(Benninger, 1971, p.12). Even until the mid-2000s, urban development
was relegated to the background, largely as a supplementary within the
concerns of regional development, economic, and industrial growth –
despite the recognition of cities as engines of economic growth. This
approach to urban development also hurt the spirit of the govern-
ment policies and Acts aimed at inclusive and decentralized growth.
It has, further, led to ambivalence in treating urban issues in policy
circles. Mathur (1971) cited in Benninger (1971, p.16), in this context,
noted that “our treatment of the problems of urbanisation and urban

growth has been passive, and to a large extent ambivalent. It is passive
because we have not assigned any definite role to urbanisation in the
great economic and social transformation currently taking place in the
country.”
The same view was also shared by the National Commission on
Urbanisation (NCU) in 1988.6 The Commission noted that public atti-
tudes to cities have remained ambivalent, while India’s urban popula-
tion increased fourfold since 1947. The NCU further noted that “on the
one hand, we see them as heroic engines of growth . . . on the other, these
urban centres have also generated the most brutal and inhuman living
conditions” (Bapat, 1987, p.689). Urban centres that should generate
wealth and provide employment and housing have, instead, degener-
ated into parasites looking elsewhere for support (Harris, 1991, p.12).
Even 40 years after the observations of NCU (1988) and Mathur (1971) –
years of rapid urbanization, structural transformations in the economy,
and recognition of urbanization as a catalyst to economic growth –
there exists the same ambivalence, however at a different level, towards
urbanization in India. IIED (2012) observes that
India has not yet come to terms with its urbanisation and there are
signs that . . . India is inhibiting rather than planning for it. India’s
ambivalence is a threat to its economic success, particularly for poor
people who find it increasingly difficult to secure a place in India’s
cities. But India is at the earliest stage of its urban transition, and will
hopefully learn from the experiences of the other BRICS countries.
This inhibition and reluctance towards urbanization has, in fact,

excluded a large number of rural poor migrants from growth prospects.
For a country which is still at the earlier stages of urbanization, that has
socialist and inclusive growth ideas, these exclusions can have serious
implications on how future urbanization will unfold the socioeconomic
potential of the country.
Urban planning
Indian urban planning in the early decades of independence presents

an important and interesting case for any study of post-colonial urban
development in India because it was during this time that many of
the new towns were built and key institutions supporting urbanization
were established (Shaw, 2009). This was also the time when spatial divi-
sions in existing cities such as Delhi were heightened. Partition saw
millions of refugees enter India, and 7.3 million refugees were regis-
tered in 1951. An estimated half a million Hindu and Sikh refugees
from Pakistan stormed into Delhi alone, literally transforming the city
into a “refugeeistan” (Lahiri, 2011). Several thousands of these refugees
forcibly occupied abandoned Muslim homes, and estimates suggest
that nearly 44,000 Muslims houses were occupied in old Delhi alone.
On the other hand, the government sought to rehabilitate Muslims
from “mixed localities” to “Muslim areas” or what were called “Muslim
zones”. Authorities cordoned off the Muslim localities and “abandoned”
houses were kept empty so that Muslims could return or other Muslims
could be moved there from “mixed areas”. A large number of refugee
colonies (as many as 36) were created around the planned Delhi area,
including Rajendra Nagar, Patel Nagar, Tilak Nagar, Lajpat Nagar, and
so on. Most of these areas are “named after the Congress Hindu who
were not as pro-Muslim as Gandhi and Nehru were thought to be!” and
also “several government colonies [were named] on the basis of who the
occupants were” (Lahiri, 2011, p.21).
To accommodate refugees and address the huge housing demand,
existing cities were enlarged through the development of new colonies
and suburbs, but these measures were clearly not enough. Within
these colonies too (as discussed above), an inherent class bias favoured
migrants of a high social class. Parts of these colonies often lacked
proper urban services: these were occupied by the poorest people and
low social class refugees. In about 14 new towns nearly 500,000 refugees
were accommodated. However, the increase in urban growth had also
increased the housing requirement in cities. By 1961, the urban hous-
ing shortage reached 3.6 million. With the reorganization of some of
the India’s states, new capitals and administrative centres were cre-
ated to meet the part of the demand for urban housing. The building
of new towns and resultant urban planning and paradigms of this
era significantly altered the built environment in cities in subsequent
decades.
Urban planning during this era, dominated by modernist paradigm,
was an outcome of the visions of several parties that included the
state government, national governments, and planners involved in the
project. Therefore, there were contesting visions about what constituted
modernity and Indianess (Shaw, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence
of conflicting views on urban planning during the pre-independence
period which reflected the views of planners in the post-independence
period, though outcomes continued to be dominated by colonial urban

planning thinking. Beattie (2003) succinctly provides evidence on
Patrick Geddes’ alternate plan for the improvement of Barabazar in
Kolkata (erstwhile Calcutta) and the rejection by the city government
of the proposal. Patrick Geddes was commissioned by Calcutta Munici-
pal Corporation to review the Plan of Improvement Trust for Barabazar.
Geddes argued that “in the Indian context Improvement Trusts were
doing more harm than good in their activities in cities”, and empha-
sized that “the improvement methods” were designed for the interests of
propertied and land speculation classes, thereby “making site space and
working class dwellings permanently dear” for the poor (Beattie, 2003,
p.15). Subsequently, Geddes prepared a report that outlined an alterna-
tive scheme. After comparing Geddes’s report with the general proposal
of the Improvement Trust, the Corporation dismissed most of his ideas
but “did adopt some of the alignments suggested by Geddes”. The Cor-
poration also suggested the abandonment of the general improvement
scheme as it would “entail enormous destruction of property and dis-
location of business” (p.16). Meller in Beattie (2003) underscored that
Geddes “committed to trying to put his civic reconstruction doctrine,
with its commitment to places and people, in an urban context most
hostile to such priorities” and therefore was “out of step with the pace
of modernisation in India” (pp.16–17). While “Geddes was eulogising
about ancient Indian urban forms and the domestic arrangements”
Indian leaders were “taking their own families from traditional homes
to the new style bungalows” (p.17).
Guha (2007) emphasized that Geddes’s outlook and the methods –
respect for nature (ecological approach towards town planning), respect
for democracy (participation of disadvantaged groups in the plan-
making process), and respect for tradition (appreciation for the old
domestic architecture of Indian cities) – are precisely the elements that
the administrators and policymakers had left out in post-independence
planning in the interests of economy or efficiency. Geddes’ efforts to
inculcate a more humanistic alternative to the technocratic and engi-
neering approach did not make any significant dent in the engineering
paradigm that continued to dominate the culture of urban planning in
India (Banerjee, 2005). With Nehru himself spearheading the modern-
ization agenda and emphasis on industrial development as a principal
focus, technology and engineering continued to dominate planning
paradigm and the engineering perspective was reinforced further in
other areas (Ibid.). Even at city level, planners practised the Western style
of comprehensive planning, creating master plans which embodied a
vision of modern cities with distinctively separated land uses connected

by a transport network. At city level, most planning offices were poorly
staffed without any resources, and there was not even the basic infras-
tructure necessary for serious technocratic planning that required huge
database and resources (Sanyal, 2005). Yet, the aspirations of moderniza-
tion were so strong that Nehru invested in large sums in creating brand
new capital cities. Planning for these cities was carried out by architects
from outside with little knowledge of “local planning culture”. In fact,
the lack of knowledge was considered to be an asset, as the “goal was to
interject a culture of modernisation in both in physical form of the city
and in its planning process” and because external experts were expected
to be independent of traditional values and ethos (Sanyal, 2005, p.6;
Shaw, 2009).
Building these cities and undertaking Nehru’s ambitious moderniza-
tion programme of the First and Second Plans required many planners
(largely foreign) who had been trained in the “modernist way” (Shaw,
2009). In 1950, Nehru invited Le Corbusier to design the new city of
Chandigarh. Nehru asked Corbusier to create a city that was “unfet-
tered” by traditions and the Indian past (Prakash, 2002; Kalia, 2004).
This exuberant spirit of modern urban planning gripped many other
cities in India. Planners and architects enthusiastically promoted this
modern urban planning ideal as a rational solution to urban problems
of haphazard growth and congestion. They argued for bold planning
that would build “orderly” and “efficient” urban society. But they subju-
gated the ground realities of society and politics and, most importantly,
“they forgot the powerful force of greed” (Prakash, 2010, p.253). Master
plans were prepared for other cities, such as Delhi, with comprehensive
rational planning approaches. These static and mechanical approaches
echoed in subsequent master plans of cities and significantly altered the
society–space relationship. These plans “addressed a need” of housing,
rather than the “rich and symbolic sense of home”. Transport infrastruc-
ture, in the form of road and rail networks, was expanded to cater to the
demand for “efficient” movement of people and goods, but neglected
“the cultural experience of mobility”. Land use zoning aimed at orga-
nizing the spatial relations of work and life, but failed to incorporate
the “practices and experiences of daily living” (Prakash, 2010, p.262).
With the inherent centralized control of the centre over the devel-
opment of new cities, national government built planned cities (not
only state capital cities) as solutions for modernization, economic
growth, slowing rural depopulation, and restoring regional balance.
It was hoped that these new cities would break away from traditional
structures and improve communication systems, raise economic stan-

dards, and provide social mobility (Kalia, 2004). But cities, including
Chandigarh – the expensive poster-child of master planning – have
not been able to generate economic or cultural value since their new
birth and existence. The apparent “cleanliness” in their grids left no
space for the urban poor and their “greenery” created a false sense
of being environmentally friendly but is mostly the result of a lot
of land per capita. The cities remained sterile and heavily subsidized
entities that encourage neither entrepreneurship nor job-generating
activities. While Nehru had wanted Chandigarh to be symbol of mod-
ern India, instead the modern symbol of Indian city is the one which
is “chaotic” yet orderly, “unplanned” yet functional, “infuriating” but
extremely “kinetic” (Mehrotra, 2008; Sanyal, 2011). Ironically, the
dynamic vibrancy that is evident in Chandigarh’s urban area in fact
comes from the suburb of Mohali, which is outside Corbusier’s original
plan (Sanyal, 2013).
The existing cities and their built environment had also been
restructured/reconfigured with comprehensive planning techniques.
The dynamism with which refugees built their houses and the briskness
with which the government rehabilitated them had, in fact, expe-
dited haphazard urban growth in Delhi. There was no such thing as
urban land policy. Poor migrants occupied public land and cities grew.
By 1950s, this unprecedented growth attracted the attention of policy-
makers – among them Nehru. He pointed out that the city would be
completely spoilt if attention was not paid to urban growth that was
quite unconcerned with larger considerations of planning, health, san-
itation, and keeping open spaces for future growth of the city (Lahiri,
2011). Landowners and speculators subdivided and sold their land with-
out authorization. This process was rampant around Delhi in the 1950s
and involved all kinds of people, including several government officials.
This was accepted practice and in fact was a continuation of the old ways
of doing things (Baken, 2003). Nehru, in his letter to Swaran Singh, the
then Minister of Works, Housing and Supply, wrote about his concerns
on landholdings on both sides of the Ring Road (present Inner Ring
Road), which had been sold in small lots for extravagant profits by the
Chairman of the Delhi Improvement Trust and other officials. Nehru
opined that senior officials and surely the chairman should not make
money that way (Lahiri, 2011).
Nehru had finally decided that there should be a central authority
to “control and regulate” the expansion of Delhi. Delhi Development
Authority (DDA) was created in 1957. Physical development by Western
standards was given utmost importance. Similarly, town and coun-

try planning legislations were enacted in many states and institutions
were created for the preparation of master plans with a view to counter
the problems of industrialization (Batra, 2009). Most of the regula-
tions were largely influenced and derived from British town planning
experience and there was no history of indigenous planning thought
to break the colonial influence on the way in which policymakers
conceived urban problems in India (Menon, 1997). However, no real
policy that manages the development of cities was discussed while rural
reforms – abolition of the zamindaris, establishment of democratic vil-
lage panchayats and village school programmes were perceived with
much anticipation and political zest (Benninger, 1971). For Delhi, the
master plan had already been prepared by a team of Indian planners
with the assistance from the Ford Foundation, even before the DDA was
formed. The plan introduced the principles of the polycentric devel-
opment model with segregated functional zones, which has become
“a stock in trade in the repertory of town planners” in India (Menon,
1997). This approach was completely incongruent with the existing
morphology of Indian cities. As a result of the rigid land use functional
zones, the plan ignored the dynamics of urban living and proposed
urban growth by expelling the practicalities of mixed land use. The plan
in fact had the kind of impact that License Raj had on economic activi-
ties, through exercising a “right to tell citizens” where to live and where
to live without a spatio-social-economic context (Sanyal, 2011). These
statutory plans have rendered much of the “existing city area” illegal as
these geographies did not conform to the “utopian” city enshrined in
the master plans (Shaw 1996; Batra, 2009; Roy 2009).
Influenced by City Beautiful Movement ideology, planners also have
shown a propensity for patterns instead of policies and social values
propagated by these models. As a result, rational comprehensive plan-
ning approaches dominated the planning paradigm in India until the
1980s. Menon (1997), underscoring the inadequacy of cross-cultural
translation of ideas, emphasized that “even a cursory study will indicate
that there is no understanding of Burnham’s proposals for beautifying
American cities at the turn of the century, only a superficial percep-
tion of the idea of beautification” (p.2933). The resultant practice of
“sanitized” and “deodorized” urban planning in many other Indian
cities also led to the creation and intensification of “bourgeois envi-
ronmentalism” (Baviskar, 2002) – an ideology that defined the urban
landscape and determined the lives of millions of urban citizens. This
included efforts to evict informal settlements, slums, street hawkers,
and migrants from urban spaces. Notions of cleanliness, sanitation, and

order played an important role (McFarlane, 2008). Menon (1997) force-
fully argued that this Haussmannian approach to the city was “not only
anti-urban” but also possessed “an out-of-sight out-of-mind approach
to solving urban problems” (Ibid., p.2933). Adopting a similar tone,
Bapat (1990) argued that master plans have discarded the critical com-
ponents, such as cultural institutions and indigenous family structures,
that defined Indian cities. Starting from Bombay Town Planning Act
1915, urban planning plans, policies, and Acts have regarded these com-
ponents as obsolete. These plans separated the future development into
various zones and low density residential areas. Mohan and Rajagopal
(2010), in the context of the Devanga community in Bengaluru, empha-
sized that Bengaluru Master Plan regulations have been far from the
ground reality. The urban fabric and built form generally followed the
laws and demands of the traditional occupations of the Devanga com-
munity. However, the Master Plan (2015), while making an attempt
to incorporate and formalize these demands, did not formulate any
implementation mechanism to accommodate the demands of these
groups and incorporate the complex negotiations that exist between
the public agencies and communities living in these kinds of areas.
Bapat (1990) further argued that master plans and development plans
largely existed on paper and most of the proposals remained unim-
plemented. In fact, Toutain and Gopiprasad (2006) provided evidence
that only 8 per cent of the land area allocated under Development Plan
(1995), Bengaluru, has been developed by the year 2003. The results
of comprehensive rational master plans such as these have been frus-
trating because of their unrealistic assumptions (Bapat, 1990; Sanyal,
2000).7
Similarly, many other master plans prepared for other cities also had
these problems inherent in their preparation and implementation in
India. The urgency for urban planning for Kolkata was first recognized
after the disastrous cholera epidemic in 1958 (Bagchi, 1987; Banerjee
and Chakravorty, 1994; Pal, 2006). A team from the World Health
Organization (WHO) recommended immediate efforts for treated water
supply, and improved drainage and sewerage, and planning to address
issues of the city’s transportation system, housing, slums, and land use.
West Bengal government had requested the Ford Foundation in 1960 to
prepare a blueprint for Kolkata’s development. The Basic Development
Plan (BDP) prepared by the Ford Foundation differed from the Master
Plan of Delhi of other cities in terms of its coverage of urban planning
issues and its:
approach to planning for urban development as a positive, integrated

package designed to strengthen not only the civic infrastructure but
also the economic base of the city rather than viewing the task as a
single shot exercise confined to working out the contours of future
land use with only a regulatory role for local government.
(Bagchi, 1987, p.597)
The influence of American-style planning was apparent from the very

beginning of the BDP (Pal, 2006). The plan was meant to be compre-
hensive, covering all sectors and aspects of urban development, and
thus requiring a huge amount of data. However, resources for providing
this were limited (Ibid.). The plan was finally published in 1966. While
the BDP was never intended to be project-specific, the inclusion of a
list of projects already underway or under consideration, had compro-
mised the plan’s original intent and became the very essence of the plan
(Banerjee and Chakravorty, 1994, in Pal, 2006, p.509) – a practice that
resurfaced in the preparation of city development plans (CDPs) under
JNNURM. The plan, even though it advocated a dynamic approach,
was criticized for “pre-empting any scope for discussion and debate on
the relative merits of the possible alternatives” (Bagchi, 1987, p.598),
which left no options for the officials but to follow “all-or-nothing
approach”.8 Moreover, the informal sector, despite its superiority in size,
was not incorporated in the plan – a key aspect that master plans often
“neglect”.
The first phase of plan implementation (1966–71) envisaged an
investment of Rs 100 crore. However, the local authorities and state
governments could not mobilize the resources for this ambitious imple-
mentation. The Government of India, too, “neglected” the unrestrained
requests for financial assistance. The political turmoil further delayed
the implementation of the plan. The Government of India finally
offered assistance in 1970. By then the costs of the projects had esca-
lated to Rs 150 crore. Congress Party at national level reasoned that huge
amounts of funds would be required for the physical improvement of
the city and to create jobs that would counter the rising Marxist forces
in West Bengal (Bagchi, 1987; Banerjee and Chakravorty, 1994). There-
fore, a special entity – Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority
(CDMA) – was created to channel funds into plan implementation. The
role of CDMA (now KDMA) was to coordinate the implementation of
the projects but not to “duplicate the functions of the Calcutta Improve-
ment Trust and other line agencies” (Banerjee and Chakravorty, 1994, in
Pal, 2006, p.510). The creation of special entities such as these (CDMA,
DDA) was the starting point for the diminishing power of the “third
tier” government in urban planning.
With the assurance of a steady fund flow coming from the World
Bank, the central assistance, which was so long ad hoc in nature, had
become a predictable, although meagre, source. The World Bank tagged
on to the list of projects identified under the BDP, to expedite the project
implementation. The Bank also selected the projects that met its criteria
and development agenda at that time. As a result, the slum improve-
ment programme was not included in the projects list (Bagchi, 1987;
Banerjee and Chakravorty, 1994, in Pal, 2006). At the state level, a sep-
arate head “Calcutta Urban Development Project” was created under
the plan budget. This project continued to receive central assistance
until 1973–74 (Bagchi, 1987). KMDA was made the statutory planning
body for metropolitan planning, in accordance with the West Bengal
Town and Country Planning Act, 1979. While a number of metropoli-
tan development authorities were created by state governments to guide
urban growth with a range of public policies that acknowledged the
role of private firms in generating economic growth (Banerjee, 2005;
Sanyal and Deuskar, 2012), citizen participation was absent and plan-
ning remained a centralized and top-down process (Banerjee, 2005). The
planning practice continued to be a “rational modern urban planning
ideal” in Indian cities. This kind of large-scale master planning has been,
understandably, criticized by many scholars for not being able to pro-
duce the desired results. There were also arguments that state and local
officials use master planning as a source of power for controlling urban
land (Ibid.). Sanyal (2000) summarized these arguments against urban
planning in three strands – left wing, right wing, and post-modernist.
While leftists argued that planning was intended to represent the inter-
ests of the upper class (see Harvey, 1985, for a detailed review), the right
wing argued that “planning, at best, is ineffective and worst counterpro-
ductive” (p.331). The centrist thinkers and post-modernists argued that
planning is another form of “social control to implement a hegemonic
vision of progress” (Ibid., p.331).
The failure of the “big plans” in driving social change also led to an
attitudinal change towards small-scale self-help projects, such as slum
networking programmes in India and self-housing programmes around
the world. This preoccupation with planning from below, along with
the distrust towards centralized planning, has led to a lack of attention
to planning at the top level, which always remains a critical institu-
tional arrangement for driving social change in any country (Sanyal,
2005). Faced with criticism from all fronts, planning has moved too far
away from its original concern and area of expertise in its search for
answers to these criticisms. As a result, urban planning left behind the
earlier concepts of civic designs and systems management, but, at the
same time, failed to develop a new basis for its existence (Sanyal, 2000).
In the process, Sanyal (2000) argues, planning “had lost the reputation
it once had as a force for progressive reform, and is now preoccupied
with creating various types of restrictions, which are at best a nuisance
for citizens” (p.327). Adams (1994) emphasized that these failures and
paradigm change in planning provided an opportunity for the gov-
ernments, in 1980s and 1990s, to use planning as a means to drive a
neoliberal agenda.
Sensing the opportunities available to cities at global level in the form
of comparative advantage for IT and other related service sectors, Indian
states positioned metropolitan cities as the focal points for economic
growth (Kennedy and Zerah, 2008) and prepared vision documents and
master plans that focused on reform strategies and development agen-
das around these planning failures. These vision documents and master
plans included the construction of various large-scale infrastructure and
real estate projects, and providing incentives to attract global capital.
Large transport projects such as new airports in Mumbai and Delhi,
urban transport projects such as Metro rail, and real estate projects
such as high-end gated communities and commercial complexes were
constructed (Mahadevia, 2008).
States like Andhra Pradesh have prepared Vision 2020 and initiated
reforms in industrial sectors and the IT sector which had significant
impact on the spatial structure of cities such as Hyderabad (Sanga, 2008).
A series of policies, starting with the Information Communication and
Technology (ICT) Policy 2002, and including the Industrial Policy 2005
and ICT Policy 2005–10, were formulated. State government announced
a plethora of “geobribes” (Roy, 2009) in the form of exemptions and
incentives for most of the sectors. The state depended on local-level
state institutions (such as Urban Development Authorities (UDAs)) and
their master plans for site accommodation and land conversion.9 While
the objective of creating urban development authorities is to control
the growth and sprawl of the city through a master plan, the specific
allowances and regulations revised in the master plan (which is argued
to be a statutory document) to accommodate and attract new develop-
ments question the legitimacy of planning in the state. Sanga (2008),
in the context of Hyderabad, shows that several provisions have been
made in the Revised Master Plan (2020) of Hyderabad, such as increasing
the limit on FSI (floor space index), easy land conversion process from
agricultural to other uses, provision of an additional 500km2 of indus-

trial and commercial zones, a half-kilometre high-rise zone on either
side of the Outer Ring Road.
This shift in planning paradigm in the liberalization period also
needed an institutional shift from traditional urban planning agencies
to state-level agencies which were intended to be more entrepreneurial
in driving economic growth through planning. Institutions such as
Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) were used
for land allocations and providing infrastructure for the new establish-
ments. A special authority called Cyberabad Development Authority
(CDA) was created to develop the entire region into a high-tech region
that attracts a large number of IT-based firms. A master plan was pre-
pared by the CDA to reflect this vision. All these new institutions
were, as expected, more efficient and flexible in nature; however, they
were not necessarily more accountable, democratic, and efficient than
the traditional planning institutions (Sanyal, 2005). In this context,
Balakrishnan (2013) argues that this hegemony of the regional state in
controlling urban space and planning through these parastatal agencies
was deemed crucial for managing national and transnational capital, as
the urban local bodies are too small to effectively deal with the global
capital.10 As a result, despite the decentralization efforts, the planning
and urban space structuring has largely remained with these parastatal
entities while urban local bodies were left with functions of “manag-
ing” day-to-day urban issues. In India, state-level entities, while they
prepared master plans, largely functioned as land development and
infrastructure project implementation agencies. The mandate of the
urban local bodies was limited to public health – that includes provision
of water, sewerage and collection of waste, and building regulations.
This shift has significantly weakened the power of the third tier to inter-
vene firmly in the socioeconomic and political processes influencing
the urban built environment. Sanyal (2005) argues that this shift was
justified by an increasing participation of non-political but powerful
interest groups such as business communities and community groups
in planning and development processes. This type of public participa-
tion and active involvement of civil societies was accepted as a norm.
Thus, there emerged curious urban regime politics that advocate for the
market and civil society. While these interest groups argued and differed
on many development issues, they “agreed on one: that public sector
planning should only function as a service to enable the market and
civil society to flourish” (Sanyal, 2005, p.231). These, in turn, on one
hand curbed the legitimacy of the third tier governments in planning
and other developmental activities in cities but, on the other, could not
come up with a comprehensive approach to address urban problems.11
The planning promoted by these new institutions, instead of promot-
ing economic efficiency, protecting the environment, and fulfilling the
needs of the community, has focused on only economic efficiency. The
vision of the Master Plan of CDA was oblivious to the basic character of
the region and ignored the social structure of the population. The pro-
posed land use plan of the CDA, Sanga (2008) argues, also “neglected”
the presence of the 17 villages and thereby censored their inhabitants
as part of the city. Sanga (2008) further argues that while Hyderabad
Urban Development Authority (HUDA) is being criticized for “neglect-
ing” the inhabitants and urban poor in the region, by aiming to create
more space for commercial and IT industries has, ironically, turned away
from the other needs (open spaces and environmental spaces) of the
very “social class” for which the urban spaces were restructured. There-
fore, she argues, these neoliberal urban plans have been “ignorant”
and “non-responsive” to social, environmental, and physical settings
of cities in general. Ramachandraiah and Prasad (2008) argued that the
knowledge economy that was encouraged by the state government with
all those “geobribes” has not benefited the majority of the city pop-
ulation. For the state, Thornley (1991, p.219) argues, in this context,
economic efficiency “has become paramount”, protecting the environ-
ment is “important only in specific geographical areas”, and addressing
the community needs “is no longer see[n] as the remit of planning”.
A similar ideological shift was facilitated in other Indian cities by
state-level visions which defined procedures that enabled politicians,
officials, and interest groups to fill the planning system with whatever
substance they deemed most important at that time (Healey, 1992b,
in Adams, 1994). These kind of large-scale urban development visions
and projects have increasingly been used by the states as a vehicle to
establish “exceptionality” measures in planning and policy measures.12
Planning was forced to adopt these new development agendas of the
states. Sandercock (1998) argues that “planning is becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant except in its role facilitating global economic integra-
tion” of metropolitan cities (p.2). Therefore, the physical city and its
built environment exist within the planning as “a series of unconnected
fragments rather than as a practical and theoretical synthesis of plan-
ning thought and actions” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p.112). In this
process, relations between state and market, and state and citizens, were
restructured, and new forms of governance, characterized by less demo-
cratic and more elite class-driven priorities, in the matters related to land
use and environmental change in cities were promoted (Swyngedouw

et al., 2002). To summarize, in Massey’s words, the neoliberal urban
planning model is “not simply an economic model of market rela-
tions, but a socioeconomic and political (and military) project pursued
by economic and class interests” (Massey, 2008, p.43). Understandably,
this neoliberal planning model has not been integrated into the wider
urban development process. As a consequence, its impact on a city as a
whole and places where these large urban projects are located remained
ambiguous (see Sanga, 2008, for a detailed discussion). As a result, these
mega urban vision projects, and urban planning thereof, accentuated
socioeconomic polarizations through real estate markets (demolition of
slums, displacement of peri-urban settlements) and changes in spatial
and sectoral priorities in public expenditures, which are redirected from
social and environmental sectors to investments in the land and built
environment (budget reallocations from basic services to roads, flyovers,
and parking lots).
Urban land policies and legislations
The term “urban development” invariably includes land and its utility.
Land being a finite resource, the question of effective utility becomes
of paramount importance in its management and supply. Also, the very
debate about land as a state property or an individual property ques-
tions the ethos within which the land market operates. In the earlier
chapters, we have looked at how India has switched between different
economic models and how its society and history continue to shape its
development trajectory. The deliberate shift to neoliberal development
in the early 1990s has had more impact on the urban rather than rural
areas, with the renewed discovery of the former as “engines of economic
growth”. While it is easy to look at the whole phenomenon in num-
bers and GDP, neoliberalism is more rooted spatially than the proverbial
“opening of markets” and “relaxation of economic norms and policies”.
Demand for land increased and, with an overarching agenda to ser-
vice entrepreneurism, the state governments and the local machinery
entered the bid to become the new “investment destinations”. This fray
influenced urban policies to be more accommodative but we will dis-
cuss how the historical reluctance in entrenched planning practices and
policies created unanticipated roadblocks and externalities. This section
therefore tries to discuss the resulting discord in economic priorities and
the ability/inability of the urban development processes and land supply
mechanisms to keep pace.
Land and urbanization

Growing urban centres mean expanding city limits and increase in con-
sumption of land. Local planning authorities and municipalities are
mandated to provide for the increasing demand for land by develop-
ing the infrastructure and charting out the land use plan. Activities that
regulate the supply of land for various uses through master plans and
zoning regulations also impact the use of land by different socioeco-
nomic groups through standards set for minimum lot size standards,
height, and density stipulations, and affect the quality of life of its res-
idents through provision of critical public facilities such as parks, open
spaces, major infrastructure, and urban services.
Though, on the face of it, the responsibilities seem largely limited
to those of the planning bodies and local governance structures, one
can unearth complex socio-political and administrative issues associated
with the land markets (Dowall and Clark, 1996). It is very significant to
note here that the most important factors affecting land supply – land
registration and valuation – are completely out of the purview of the
local authorities. The state government department whose organization
and structure date back to the colonial period – the land revenue depart-
ment – regulate them. One of the largest sources of revenue that accrues
to the state government is through the stamps and registration charges,
and understandably the state government retains full measure of con-
trol and coordination of the department and any activities that govern
its functioning, thereby impacting on the land supply and the dynam-
ics of land market. However, we realize that the intent on the part of
the state government or, for that matter, any government in attracting
business in the new open market is offset not just by their reluctance in
making progressive policies and making the necessary “structural adjust-
ments”, but by the fact that the very term “land” and the demand that
accompanies it, especially in a highly dense country, is mired in a mesh
of socio-political factors and actors.
Urban land policy

Land policy in India, as everywhere around the world, tended to centre
on agricultural land, be it land revenue related or, importantly, land
tenure and titling. Being a densely populated country with a long his-
tory of intermediary tenure, in India zamindari systems, redistribution
of land, and entitlement of land rights were the reigning policy causes
during the early independence era. With the turn of century, in India’s
neoliberal economy, rights over land became the centre of the new
political economy of urban development (Harvey, 2001). Keeping these

political economy imperatives of urban land policies, in this section
we review the urban land policy and land rights in terms of supply,
planning, and development.
One of the oldest and most powerful tools used for appropriating
land for specific purposes is the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894.
It has its genesis in the British government acquiring land for devel-
oping transport networks and irrigation channels. Touted as one of the
most draconian of laws, it effectively imposes the state’s sovereign power
of eminent domain to appropriate land from individual/group owners
for a specific purpose. India, after its independence, has also been using
this Act with no notable amendments as a means for acquiring land
in most of its development projects over the years. Declaration of the
cause for acquisition as “public” licenses the acquiring authority to affix
the land rates based on previous registration values with little consul-
tation and co-opting. Many legal experts claim that the hitch lies in
the interpretation of the Act and not necessarily in the construct of it.
This archaic legislation has been recently replaced by The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013. Industry experts and government officials
claim that this Act, in essence, would completely stall land acquisition
processes for any public purpose or industry. Instead of reforming the
process for land valuation and ensuring that there is no discord between
market prices and registered prices, the government mandated that com-
pensation be at least two to four times the average rate of sale in the
previous three years and that there has to be a buy-in of 80 per cent
of the project-affected landholders for the acquisition process to move
ahead (Ghatak and Ghosh, 2013). The implementation success or fail-
ure of the new Act is yet to be tested and therefore we will confine our
scope to the impact and role played by the 1894 LAA on urbanization
and development.
The Committee on Urban Land Policy made a first attempt at sepa-
rating “urban land” from the overall land policy rhetoric in 1965. The
four basic objectives of the Committee were: (i) optimum social use
of urban land, (ii) supply of adequate quantity of land at reasonable
prices, (iii) encouraging community effort for land development and
housing, and (iv) preventing concentration of landownership. It classi-
fied land into different categories – developed urban land, land within
urbanizable limits, land beyond urbanized limits, and land whose use is
frozen – and recommended certain measures to be taken in respect of
each category.
Despite the Urban Land Policy in 1965, fundamental land reforms in

landownership and distribution came only with the Urban Land Ceiling
and Regulation Act (ULCRA) in 1976. The measure to prevent concen-
tration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculations
and profiting by bringing about equitable distribution of land is the
main objective of ULCRA. While the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act was
largely understood to be a success, ULCRA was seen as a failure. Not
only was the process of ceiling excess landholdings unsuccessful, but
the redistribution of the surplus land for the stated objective of pro-
viding affordable housing was also a weak effort (GoI, 2007). Of the
166,162 hectares of surplus land identified only 8 per cent was acquired,
and possession was taken of only a quarter of that (Batra, 2009). Realiz-
ing the constraints imposed by ULCRA on the urban land markets, and
facing increased pressure from the donor group in relaxing these norms,
the central government repealed the Act in 1999 through an ordinance
and mandated the same of the states through JNNURM’s conditional
reforms.
The Task Force on Urban Development (1983), considering the gen-
eral pressure on land and rapid urban growth in the country and
ULCRA’s relative inability in addressing these issues as anticipated,
added two new objectives to the objectives of the Urban Land Policy
of 1965:
• to achieve an optimum social use of urban land;

• to make land available in adequate quantity, at the right time and at
reasonable prices to both the public authorities and the individuals;
• to encourage cooperative community effort and bona fide individual
builders in the field of land development, housing, and construction;
• to widen the base of landownership specially to safeguard the interest
of the poor and under-privileged sections of urban society;
• to encourage the socially and economically efficient allocation of
urban land such that land development is done in a resource-
conserving manner and that the magnitude of land used is optimal;
and
• to promote flexibility in land use in response to changes resulting
from a growing city.
However, what is interesting to note here is that this early recognition

for easing supply of land for urban development and its subsequent
management didn’t effectively translate into any major structural initia-
tive that percolated into the grassroots-level planning (Acharya, 1987).
On the other hand, several planning-related legislations at different

levels of government were passed between the 1950s and 1970s. These
ranged from Municipal Acts and Town Planning Acts, to Urban Develop-
ment Area/Authority Acts. These Acts introduced a number of planning
controls and regulatory mechanisms inherently related to land. Urban
development authorities during this time emerged as local organizations
responsible for land development and supply in urban centres. These
agencies continued to use the LAA 1894 for assembling land develop-
ment. Some other land assembly models emerged during the course of
time, like town planning schemes, land pooling, and readjustment and
cooperative development with an objective to deliver serviced land even
to the low income group.
An account of one of the first initiatives taken up by an urban devel-
opment authority in India to deliver the above objective would cast
light on the externalities associated with each of these processes and
the instruments. The DDA in 1961 adopted a “Scheme for Large-Scale
Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi” for the devel-
opment of housing and infrastructure (Kumar, 2011). The proposition
was that land would fund urban development for all economic sections
of Delhi. Land was acquired from the owners (farmers), invoking the
LAA 1894, and then was developed by providing critical infrastructure.
Notification of the intended land for acquisition at an early date was
thought to be able to prevent undesirable speculation in land deal-
ings, helping the public in general to benefit from an increase in land
prices. Developed land would then be subdivided, to be sold in the
form of plots or built apartments to higher and middle-income groups
at a (regulated) profit. This would help in subsidizing the housing for
the poor, who would be offered houses and plots at a cost less than
the production cost to the DDA. The first round of land development
and production of housing began with government-created “revolving
fund” of Rs 50 million, which was later increased to Rs 173.1 million.
One of the aims of the policy – to contain private speculation in land –
was thwarted by rampant speculation and by the government actively
perpetrating and reaping its benefits (more than a fortyfold increase in
DDA’s revolving fund by 1981) (Acharya, 1987). Farmers were deprived
of rightful prices as the time gap between first notification and actual
payment of compensation was almost 20 years. This meant stagger-
ing losses to farmers as they were paid at 1961 prices, in 1981, for
the land acquired. This led to widespread discontent and contradicted
the very objective of equity implicit in the policy statements (Acharya,
1987).
An excerpt synthesized from the Delhi Citizen Handbook, Centre for

Civil Society (2009, p.147) summarizes the land acquisition and housing
development process in Delhi:
Only an average of 777 hectares of land was acquired annually

instead of 1,372 hectares as intended to meet the targets of the
development set in the MPD-62 in the period of 1962–1981. Dur-
ing 1981–2001, against a planned acquisition of 24,000 hectares,
9,507 hectares were acquired by 2001, only 39.6 percent of the target.
Around 14,479 hectares of land was proposed to be developed in the
plan period 1961–81. However, by 1984 the land actually developed
for residential purpose was 7,316 hectares. In the various sub-cities
envisaged under MPD-2001, of the total 17,493.15 hectares proposed
to be developed; only 8,388.15 hectares (47.95) of serviced land was
made available by 2001.
The National Commission on Urbanization noted that ULCRA was

a classical case of a well-conceived legislation which had all the ele-
ments of progressive policy but failed to achieve its objective because
of the manner in which the policy was drafted and implemented in
states (NCU, 1987). A proper implementation of the policy could have
resulted in substantial surplus land becoming available for urban author-
ities for planned development and checking speculative behaviour in
land dealings (Ibid.). Mumbai is an example of the classical story of the
ULCRA implementation. With 55 per cent of the total vacant land in
the city owned by just 91 individuals (Abraham, 1982), Mumbai pre-
sented a perfect case study for using ULCRA as an effective tool for
socially just redistribution. It is largely felt that ULCRA implementa-
tion in Mumbai wasn’t just a failure, but that it increased the very
inequality it aimed at reducing. Whereas 17,000 acres were declared sur-
plus in Mumbai, 12,000 acres were exempted initially; of the remaining
5,945 acres, 1,827 acres were further exempted as of November 2007
(Kopikkar, 2007, as cited in Siddiqui, 2013). Of the 4,118 acres left, the
government ordered the acquisition of 3,500 acres, two thirds of which
was legally challenged, and within two years, ULCRA was repealed in
the state (Ibid.). ULCRA is guilty of not just its failure but for the prob-
lems it created by means of increasing private land speculation and land
mafia operations to levels unheard of even during an otherwise unstable
land market, which introduced ULCRA as a solution in the first place.13
Wadhwa (1988) discussed a similar pattern in Ahmedabad, where the
average price of land in the city area increased at an annual rate of
18.4 per cent during 1976 to 1981, while the fringe areas recorded a
steeper increase to the tune of 30–50 per cent per annum. Reduction in
the supply of urban land in Ahmedabad can also be noticed from the
fact that the total number of land transactions declined by 25.5 per cent
during the 1976–81 period as compared to the 1970–75 period (Ibid.).
There were three groups that benefited from ULCRA. Developers,
right after the implementation of the ULCRA, started buying land in
peri-urban areas at a cheaper rate and got it converted to urban use
(Wadhwa, 1988). As most development started concentrating outside
urban boundaries, property values rose in peri-urban areas. This process
also caused “leap-frog” development beyond the area of its coverage,
resulting in a more inefficient urban development pattern (USAID,
1991). Officials of local government and urban development authorities
also benefited as the act generated a great many transactions. Lawyers
and legal experts benefited as a result of litigations over compulsory
land acquisition. The urban poor benefited indirectly as they invaded
lands under litigation and were not evicted for years as the legal process
dragged on (Srinivas, 1991). Local politicians too used the ambiguities in
the act to favour urban poor sections through helping them in their land
invasion, thus creating vote banks for themselves. Srinivas (1991) argues
that this benefit was merely marginal if one considers the fact that the
Act was intended to redistribute the land in favour of these sections.
Apart from helping the urban poor to find space in the city, politicians
too reaped substantial benefits from this legislation. Srinivas (1991) pro-
vided evidence on the involvement of Chief Minister of Karnataka in
illegal land deals which earned him an estimated Rs 350 million. Many
of these deals were in gross violations to master plan provisions and
central government impositions on commercial real estate (Ibid.). The
net result of the legislation and these processes was that the housing
problem that was confined earlier to the urban poor was now extended
to two other societal classes – low income and lower middle income
groups.
As Solomon (2004) states, transformation of urban land develop-
ment is an intrinsic part of the local economic development process.
This assumes more importance in the post-liberalization era. Economic
reforms and liberalization, and the resultant surge in money flows,
have transformed both spatial and political space. Politicians and real
estate investors, impressed by the projections of continued high eco-
nomic growth, have acted on the development opportunities presented
by the reforms and manoeuvred capital into the real estate sector. The
legalization of foreign direct investments (FDI) in townships in 2002,
encouragement of venture capital fund investments in real estate in

2004, and legislation and policies for special economic zones in 2005
have encouraged and enabled developers to play a central role in urban
spatial developments. Developers have sought to build land banks in
major Indian metropolitan areas, hoping that these holdings would put
them in a position to deliver the kind of large-scale planned develop-
ments and industrial complexes that cities are anticipated to require in
order to respond to the projected demand for consuming housing and
for office and commercial space (Batra, 2009). By mid-2000s many large
developers that had remained confined to specific cities went national,
and DLF, Unitech, Sahara Group, Emaar MGF have competed to expand
land banks across many cities. For a period in the mid-2000s, as the
real estate sector was growing at more than 20 per cent per year, Indian
developers experienced massive increases in valuation – those valua-
tions being driven largely by landholdings (Gupta, 2006, in Shatkin and
Vidyarthi, 2014). However, these real estate reforms have better bene-
fited the private actors and did not result in the provision of housing to
Economically Weaker Sections (EWSs) and Low Income Groups (LIGs)
of the population. The launch of Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), for build-
ing houses for this section of the population, by same government that
introduced a slew of these reforms proves this.
One of the major economic policies in the free market economy
that impacted the geography of all major cities in the country is the
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act and the tax and planning policy relax-
ations instituted by different state and city governments in attracting
investments. The SEZ Act 2005 was a landmark legislation that actively
promoted a model for foreign investors to come establish themselves in
India. While the early 1990s eased a number of economic constraints for
investors to come in, the initial attempts at localizing these businesses
through EPZs (export processing zones) like those of China proved to be
unsuccessful. The SEZ Act of 2005 came to be revamped, with drastically
simplified procedures and single window approval processes.
One of the most foreseen but unprepared for externalities of the
setting up of SEZs is the spill of growth from the SEZ region where inter-
dependencies and economic chains have resulted in a different chain
of economies. Most important of these is the fact that there is no land
allocated for residential use within the SEZ zone (NIUA, n.d.). The Act
didn’t specifically outline any planning considerations, leaving different
state and city governments to plan (or not plan in most cases) for them
in their own ways. This, as one can anticipate, resulted in desultory
growth patterns that even the most effective of master plans couldn’t
manage to catch up with, let alone forecast (Devadas and Gupta, 2011).
As argued in the “Urban planning” section, urban plans have been most
unsuccessful in internalizing the dividends generated by the SEZ due to
a mismatch in the pace at which service networks were provided and
the growth rate demanded. This resulted in ad hoc patterns serviced, in
most cases, suboptimally by different players. The planning guidelines
for development of SEZs came much later in 2010 (GoI, 2010). Even
though the guidelines talk of integration with master plans where SEZs
fall under the purview of local authorities, they preclude active involve-
ment of local authorities and planners, referring planning matters to the
state government. This not only undermines the authority of the local
body, but, going through different state government machineries, also
creates undue process.
Another one of the criticisms heard of the SEZ Policy is the way
in which the announced projects (many of which either lapse or get
de-notified) create undue land market speculation, distorting the prices
and encouraging real estate windfalls. Such avenues present opportuni-
ties for extra-legal forces to utilize one of the most underregulated and
distorted sector in India – real estate.
While we have discussed the regulatory environment within which
SEZs function, the most important factor here is the land that is allotted
for such SEZs. As most land in India is with private owners, amalgama-
tion of disparate chunks of land from different landholders may be a
major deterrent to the investors. The government therefore formed spe-
cial purpose vehicles, or quasi-governmental corporations, tasked with
the process of acquiring land. While we have seen that the land acquisi-
tion process itself is wrought with several difficulties, it acquires a whole
new face when land is acquired for private purposes like SEZs. Some
argue that the dividends from the chain of economies generated from
the SEZ qualify it as a public purpose. But the common man’s perception
doesn’t extend that far, especially when no benefit sharing mechanisms
are considered (Apte, 2013). The fact that the government doesn’t have
a spelt-out policy where land acquired for de-notified SEZs is returned to
its rightful owners only adds fuel to the spark.
Roy (2009) succinctly captures this by citing the Nandigram inci-
dent, where severe public backlash and riots were witnessed when the
government tried to acquire land for industries:
Nandigram itself has become the lightning rod for what may yet
turn out to be a national movement against the spatial instru-
ments of neoliberal development: eminent domain, special economic
zones, land acquisition, displacement. . . . In India, “future-proofing”

has turned out to be a much more tricky enterprise than that
anticipated.
(Roy, 2009, p.79)
Having seen and discussed the main policy initiatives that played a
major role in land supply, it is imperative that we understand the reg-
ulatory functions and tools that directly impact urban land markets.
Though, at the outset, these tools are not spelt as functions impacting
land supply and urban space landscape, we will endeavour to treat some
of the following as planning and development functions dealing with or
impacting land: (i) master plans/ zonal plans, (ii) land use conversion,
(iii) land sale registration, stamp duty, (iv) property information system,
(v) property titling system, (vi) land reservation.
Master plans and zonal plans form the backbone of the Indian plan-
ning system. That said, it is necessary to point out that many experts
and researchers claim that it is the very process that is resulting in India’s
unplanned cities. While we will not venture into the reasons for master
plan failure in toto here, we shall briefly examine land-related issues.
One of the most common reasons for the failure of master plans is the
lack of current land use maps. In most cases the current land use maps,
on which future projections are made, are proposed maps from a mas-
ter plan prepared 20 to 30 years ago. This discounts any changes or
deviations (both formal and informal) from the proposed plan. There-
fore, interestingly, it follows that the longer the history of preparation of
master plans in a city, the faultier the city’s plans for the future. Other
land use regulations include those of layout regulations and building
regulations. These impact the quality of life in the urban spaces, making
reservations for parks, playgrounds, and other amenities for future use.
These rules are flouted regularly in Indian cities.
Designated land use by law is not convertible. This was done with
a view to ensure that conflicting land uses are not in close proxim-
ity, affecting the safety and well-being of people. Conversions are only
possible through official gazette notifications. Most of the state govern-
ments now publish their government orders (GOs) and gazettes online
and almost 90 per cent of the GOs published by an urban development
department in a state are land use conversions. The mechanism itself
makes it impossible for neighbouring property owners to be aware of
such a change in order to help them raise any objections. Further, as
explained earlier, these permitted conversions are not always updated
in the current land plans, making the maps, in essence, obsolete.
Non-confirmation to the master plans and regulations is so rampant

in Indian cities that formalization of deviations from building and lay-
out regulations and conversion of land use are seen as revenue resources
by local authorities. One of the major arguments that emerge from
the school of pro-poor activists is the fact that the government should
extend this “flexibility” in its implementation of planning norms to the
slum dwellers as well. At their core, these processes and phenomena
tend to incubate the idea that planning processes are entirely too easy
in nature, and that where high-value resources are involved (be they
land or votes), political and economic imperatives easily shape planning
regulations.
While we have been dealing with land use planning aspects, it is
important to also discuss land tenure arrangements and land manage-
ment practices at large in the Indian context. As mentioned earlier
in this section, the land revenue department is the custodian of all
public land in the state, and manages all the land records and trans-
actions. It is also the department that valuates land and regulates land
prices (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002). These departments are all
state-level institutions operating at local level, resulting in a visible dis-
cord in the matters of land use and management. The cadastral maps
that act as reference maps for determining ownership, relative location
of land, and assessing land fertility form the reference point for any
land-related issue. Most of these maps in India date back to the British
period, when extensive land surveys were conducted to evaluate revenue
that accrued from agricultural lands based on its productivity. Further
surveys were conducted with a view to arrange and settle tenures. There-
fore, it is important to note here that the cadastre and surveys process
has always catered to rural lands. There have been a handful of cases
where town surveys have been conducted. But recent cases have shown
that these surveys, instead of easing the registration and subdivision
processes, have complicated them further. The local authorities have no
jurisdiction over these processes and planned development suffers in
consequence.
The Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) across the country complain that
the revenue department never transfers their property, thereby limiting
effective management of their assets. In fact, this was noticed to be one
of the major hiccups in the implementation of the slum-free city plan-
ning initiative in India, as no ULB in the country was able to identify the
amount of vacant land they owned within the city limits. All this arbi-
trariness allows room for people to practise informality and extra-legal
practices and, if caught, they are not always judicially persecuted.
Land use conversion in Indian cities is a two-stage process when the

designated land use is “agriculture”. Agriculture land is actively pro-
tected against urbanization across the world; however, what takes the
case to an extreme is the fact that agricultural land, even within the plan
limits, needs clearance from the revenue authorities. Non-agricultural
land assessment tax is collected by most state governments for giving a
go-ahead to the developer who would then have to get the permission
of the local authority for land use conversion in the master plan. Early
2000s saw the loosening up of the strict regulation of conversion of
agricultural lands in tune with the economic policy of the national gov-
ernment; however, the intended benefit of hassle-free supply of urban
land didn’t materialize due to the multiple processes involved (Dowall
and Monkkonen, 2007).
As seen in the case of UCLRA and LAA, procedural problems in land
management practice are being responded to by the government with
ill-thought-out quick fixes that impact the system in the long run. This
is seen in the land valuation system as well. Realizing and accepting
that the market rates of property are much more than those quoted on
the sale deeds, different state governments have hiked the stamp duty
rates at steep rates over the years. All these solutions, which might seem
logical for a short duration, hurt the land management practice in the
long run.
We have discussed the fact that local authorities are not kept up to
date with information available at the revenue department. The reverse
practice also holds true when planning permissions like the subdivision
of plots for the construction of group housing is not reported to the rev-
enue department. This affects the quality of the cadastre available with
the revenue department, compromising the tenure rights. All this results
in a poor property titling system: the revenue department doesn’t talk
to the local authorities with regard to property information system. This
undermines the tax net of the ULB, which, when compromised, may
also lead to a questioning of the veracity of the titling system, which is
already fraught with deficiencies. All these informalities and loopholes
in the system might result in “multiple claims to land that now have to
be either compensated or rendered illegal through new tactics of power
and violence” (Roy, 2009).
It is seen that there is an essence of “casual” treatment of the plan-
ning rules and regulations by the general public and different actors
involved in land development and transactions. One might push aside
this fact as part and process of India’s burgeoning informality and as a
way of life. But serious contestations are also made on the role played by
land mafia, that manoeuvred and continues to toy with the faulty policy
and implementation scene in land supply and development. Weinstein
(2008) provides an account of the impact of political economic reforms
on property markets and politics of urban land development, and under-
scores the emergence of new actors, such as criminal syndicates, in land
property development in Mumbai. She argues that these new actors,
supported by a network of politicians, bureaucrats, and police, have
emerged as the cardinal players in urban land politics and develop-
ment. Many of these players do not want the government to make more
land available to the market, as there is much more and easier money
to be made out of the “scarcities”. Therefore, as Patel (2008) under-
scores, these powerful actors welcome every restriction that limits the
availability of land (coastal regulation zones, ULCRA, and other environ-
mental regulations), and blockade projects and programmes that plan to
connect the city with the hinterland.14
With the influx of national and global capital, there was a severe
shortage of serviced urban land. This shortage, especially after the lib-
eralization, has not only stalled industrialization and urbanization, but
also led to a proliferation of informal settlements (Balakrishnan, 2013).
As argued, with most of the urban land caught up in litigation and
disputes, many industries moved out from city centres to peri-urban
areas. The urban poor and informal activities too, in search for the
employment and to escape the eviction threats from city and state gov-
ernments, shifted to the “degenerated peripheries” of the cities. This
process, scholars like Kundu argue, has led to the expansion of the
boundaries of the cities and the annexation of old and new towns
with the core city (Sanga, 2008). The thrust towards commodification
of urban land of both slum areas and peripheral areas of the cities has
led to a great deal of contestations among various actors (Shatkin and
Vidyarthi, 2014). While the shortage of land supply made informal and
unauthorized land the only affordable option for the urban poor, many
other actors tried to take control of the value and rents generated by
the exorbitant land values (Balakrishnan, 2013). Cities, to cater to the
demands of both businesses and citizens, innovated with land develop-
ment models such as guided land development. In contrast to earlier
dependence on various regulations and the draconian power of emi-
nent domain to develop land, some cities began to experiment with
more market-friendly and socially equitable efforts (Sanyal and Deuskar,
2012). The rise in the use and popularity of town planning schemes
(TPS) was one of those experiments. TPS is a form of land readjustment
wherein the landowners in the city, largely fringe areas, are required
to give up a part of their land, for building infrastructure, to the gov-

ernment for compensation. The remaining land is reconstituted into
serviced plots and returned to the original owners. The landowners can
then sell these plots for a higher price or can build houses on them.
This model of land readjustment has been praised as a win-win situa-
tion for both government and landowners (Ibid.). Along with the land
development in a planned manner, TPS also allots land for housing the
urban poor, “more as a symbolic gesture than a central policy package”
(p.178). While the Act governing TPS calls for up to 10 per cent of land
for low income housing, less than 3 per cent has been allocated for this
purpose (Ibid.). More importantly, the utilization of that small amount
too has been dismal. Joshi and Sanga (2009) indicate that only 6 per
cent of the original allocated land was actually used for low income
housing. While TPS appears to be a market-driven approach, the plan-
ning processes and procedures that needed to be followed under the
overall master planning framework suggests otherwise. As a result, the
inherent structural exclusions of the master plans permeate the work-
ing of TPS and fail the urban poor in providing housing and urban
services.
Therefore, furthering Roy’s (2009) argument that India’s inability to
plan its cities is more entrenched in the socio-political forces that shape
these processes, we argue that the informality persists because of the way
in which these formal processes are built and implemented. They either
inherently allow the dividends accrued through informality as a norm
or continue the practice of short-term fixes over the long term, weaken-
ing the system as a whole. A quick example to posit our argument is the
way in which JNNURM is conceived. JNNURM has been successful as
a tool for consolidating and percolating neoliberalism at the city level.
It tries to address most of the land-based issues discussed during the
course of this chapter, ranging from stamp duty regulation and prop-
erty taxes to reservation of land for the poor. However, it is important
to note that while all these are important areas of concern, the policy
again tries to clamp down on the effects rather the causes. Reforming
the land management model and titling is a long-standing project and
much requires to be done in this area to help coordinated functioning of
ULBs and revenue departments. Other land development agencies, SEZ
development commissioners and any other players who impact the spa-
tial dynamics of a city are required to be addressed. Recent efforts by the
Department of Land Resources under the Ministry of Rural development
in the form of a draft bill for land titling, draft land reforms policy, and
draft land utilization policy, need more participation and inputs from
the urban departments at the apex level to ensure that urban concerns
are reflected in these important policies.
Housing and informal settlements
With the passage from a rural to an urban society, the Indian econ-
omy is undergoing a paradigm shift. Changing demographics and a
rising urban population suggest that there will be additional pressure
on the availability of affordable housing in Indian cities. However, an
archaic legal framework and draconian urban land policies continue to
challenge the policies and programmes trying to alleviate this hous-
ing problem. Buckley (1996) argues that governments can enable the
housing and urban land markets to function well by focusing on seven
operational instruments (Buckley 1996, p.178):
1. Three to stimulate housing demand – developing property rights,

developing mortgage finance, rationalizing subsidies.
2. Three to facilitate the process of housing supply – providing infras-
tructure for residential land development, regulating land and hous-
ing development, and organizing the building industry.
3. Final one to create an overall integrated institutional framework
for managing the housing sector and ensuring adequate access to
housing for the poor.
Within the purview of these instruments and political economy, the

following section discusses the policy prescriptions, instruments, and
resultant ambivalences in creating much required urban housing.
Urban housing policies and legislation

Since independence, the efforts for public intervention on housing
and slums were largely concentrated on replacing the “unacceptable”
and “substandard” living conditions with “acceptable” and “formally
planned” housing and infrastructure (Anand, 1992). The First Five Year
Plan recommended “clearance of slums to be an essential part of hous-
ing policy”. In 1956, the Slums Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act
was passed. The Act defined slums as:
any area (where) buildings . . . (a) are in any respect unfit for human
habitation, or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, over-crowding, faulty
arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty
arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation, or
any combination of these factors, are detrimental, to safety, health

or morals
(Batra, 2009, p.5)
Strengthening local authorities and mobilizing the support of enlight-

ened public opinion was recommended in enforcing the implementa-
tion of building codes and municipal bye-laws to prevent the growth of
slums. However, keeping up with the socialist rhetoric of national plan-
ning, it was also clearly stated that the resettlement of slum dwellers
is to be based on the principles of “minimum dislocation”, entailing
rehousing “as far as possible at or near the existing sites of slums,
so that they may not be uprooted from their field of employment”
and provision of only “minimum standards of environmental hygiene
and essential civic amenities” so as to “keep rents within the paying
capacity of the slum dwellers” (Ibid., p.6). Following the definition of
the Slums Act of 1956, Delhi Master Plan (1962) notified most of old
Delhi as slums. Accordingly, some of the stated objectives of the Master
Plans (1962 and 1990) were to eliminate slums and squatting and pro-
vide adequate housing and community facilities. However, neither the
provisions of the Slum Areas Act nor the master plan have been imple-
mented, as the city was overwhelmed with problems of migration and
further deterioration of living conditions in these areas (Chakrabarti,
2001).
The five-year plan further noted that “these [slum] conditions have
developed because of insufficient control over building activity by the
State or municipal authorities. Local authorities have been generally
indifferent to enforcing such bye-laws regarding building and sanitation
as have existed.” The resources of these local bodies were also too mea-
gre to permit any development work. It is noteworthy that the problem
of slums was seen as a result of poor enforcement of rules and not as
a need to expand urban land and services. So it was believed that the
task of the government was to decongest cities and to provide housing
for those who happened to remain in urban centres. For many years,
governments and policy analysts viewed these informal settlements as
slums that needed eradication (Dowall, 1992).
While there was no official housing policy till 1988, a statement on
housing policy was made by the then Minister for Works, Housing and
Supply in Parliament. Based on his recommendation, the government
started assisting state and local governments. While the implemen-
tation of schemes was devolved to state governments, states heavily
depended on the centre for funding (Hingorani, 2011). In the absence
of a national-level policy, housing programmes were implemented on

an ad hoc basis and targeted different income groups in a fragmented
way. The focus of the programme also increasingly started focusing on
the poor (Ibid.).
During the Second Five Year Plan, the government initiated a Slum
Clearance and Improvement Scheme in 1956. The scheme aimed at
clearing slums and rehabilitating households into the units constructed
by the government at a nominal rent (Wadhwa, 1988). The scheme
resulted in a net destruction of housing stock as construction could not
keep up with the number of demolitions. Only 20.6 per cent of pop-
ulation evicted was resettled by 1977 (Singh, 1992 cited in Hingorani,
2011). Moreover, despite the minimum dislocation recommendation of
plan, resettlement sites that were far away from people’s previous homes
were chosen. This has disrupted livelihoods and uprooted established
social networks. Understandably, many of the beneficiaries sold off their
homes and settled in new slums (Ibid.).
In 1961, the Rent Control Act was promulgated with a view to
reducing the cost of housing through direct price control (Wadhwa,
1988). The intention of the Act at the time was to protect the ten-
ants from eviction and rapid increases in rent. However, in the long
run, the frozen rents proved insufficient to compensate the property
owners. The landlords, who were unable to evict or replace tenants,
allowed their buildings to deteriorate or even collapse (Bertaud, 2002;
Wadhwa, 2009). The Act also had spill-over impacts on rental hous-
ing, labour mobility, and municipal finances. Rent control has been
a major deterrent for those who want to invest in rental housing, as
the Act provides for a very low rate of return as compared to other
assets. Rent control also reduced the mobility of labour and house-
holds living in rent-controlled buildings. Dev (2006) argues the rent
control subsidy acts as a strong incentive for tenants not leave the
rent-controlled premises. Municipal finances too took a hit, as prop-
erty taxes, the major source of revenue for urban local bodies, are
directly linked to the rent paid by the tenant in many Indian cities.
As a result of these laws, the centralized approach to housing provi-
sion proved to have limited success. The rate of housing construction
could not keep up with the rapidly growing demand (Hingorani, 2011).
In some cases, as the subsidy provided by the central government to
cover the affordability gap was found to be attractive, the beneficiaries
of the schemes sold their houses and moved back to slums (Wadhwa,
1998).15
Therefore, not only could the slums not be cleared but, gradually,
the number of people living there expanded, and, by the 1970s, most
large cities in India had a substantial population living in slums. Many
of these occupants built permanent to semi-permanent structures and
transformed their living environment. Despite the illegality associated
with them, these settlements continued to grow and contributed to the
total housing and to the economy (Shaw, 2012). With a huge infor-
mal economy of their own, they provided livelihoods to many migrants
who were largely unskilled or semi-skilled workers (Mahadevia, 2003,
2013; Shaw, 2012). These economies and settlements are supported by
politicians looking for easy vote banks. The middle-class households also
bought land, subdivided illegally, on the city periphery. Formal housing
developed on these illegal subdivisions of agricultural periphery land
defined urban areas in Indian cities during the 1970s and 1980s (Shaw,
2012). This process, in effect, created “shadow cities” that house any-
where between 40–70 per cent of the urban population and which fall
outside the purview of master planning and its planning institutions
(Ibid.).
The Government of India and states also, by early 1970s, realized
that, given the financial constraints, the high-level subsidies would
not be sustainable and public housing schemes would not be able to
solve the problem of slums (Mathur, 2009). Therefore, the focus turned
to upgrading and ameliorating the living conditions of slums through
in-situ upgrading and sites and services programmes. During the Fourth
Five Year Plan, the Government of India launched the Environmental
Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS) scheme in 1972–73 to provide a
minimum level of services, such as water supply, sewerage, drainage,
and pavements, in 11 cities with a population of 8 lakhs and above with
a view to ameliorate the living conditions through provision of basic
services and “reconditioning of slums”. The scheme was later extended
to nine more cities. In 1973, towards the end of the Fourth Plan, the
World Bank started its urban sector operations in India, with the launch
of the Calcutta Urban Development Project (Batra, 2009).
However, in contradiction to policy, a series of events during the
period (dubbed “the Emergency”) completely changed the urban land-
scape of informal settlements in India, especially in Delhi and Mumbai.
There was ambiguity in thinking and action with regards to urban hous-
ing in India – on the one hand there was recognition that low income
households needed support to build housing, on the other, there was a
drive to beautify the city through slum evictions and cleansing, which
implicitly dismissed the slum housing as a typology of housing. Indira

Gandhi wrote a letter in February 1975, with respect to Janata Colony
in Mumbai, to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, telling him that:
for the past 20 years, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation and the State Government, no final decision
has been taken regarding the slum known as “Janata Colony” situated
adjacent to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Deonar. I understand
the stalemate is mainly due to an inability to sustain firm decisions
taken from time to time to see the matter through to its logical
conclusion.
Clibbens (2014) argues that the Emergency provided an opportunity

for the authorities to sustain their firm decisions without reference
to courts. In fact, he argues, the Emergency cleared all the blockades
that had prevented “slum clearance policies” from reaching their “log-
ical conclusion”. So, the Government of Maharashtra enacted “the
Maharashtra Vacant Land (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation
and Summary Eviction) Ordinance, 1975”, which authorized the state
authorities to evict unauthorized colonies and blocked off the jurisdic-
tion of the civil courts over the removal of the slums and such colonies.
The state government swung into action in May 1976: the Janata Colony
was bulldozed and the population rehabilitated to a swampy area. Dur-
ing the Emergency, the state government had cleaned up 29,000m2
of land of slum settlements in Bandra East alone. In fact, the Shah
Commission of Inquiry (1978) and Clibbens (2014) forcefully argue that:
the “entire concept” of these evictions did not change on 26 June

1975, instead the government had been attempting to evict its de
facto tenants for several years. In Bombay, as in Delhi, and across
India, there was a basic continuity in urban policy, but the policy
was pursued at an accelerated pace.
At national level, Indira Gandhi, during her speech in October 1975,

stressed the need for a uniform urban policy to ensure the balanced
growth of cities. She believed that there were three priorities when
addressing the haphazard growth of towns – creation of infrastruc-
ture, schemes for “slum clearance”, and a plan to protect the suburbs
near cities. She indicated that her government would launch pro-
grammes to achieve these goals (Clibbens, 2014). Accordingly, Mrs
Gandhi announced a populist Twenty Point Programme. Her son,
Sanjay Gandhi, also came up with his own Five Point Programme,
which included family planning and slum clearance (Krishna, 2011).
The manner in which Sanjay Gandhi implemented these plans and
actions was more unbearable than Mrs Gandhi’s. Slum dwellings were
demolished without alternative housing. In Delhi, some of the Muslim
slum dwellers were shot and killed for offering resistance to slum demo-
litions (Vohra, 2001). In Delhi alone, Clibbens (2014) reports, about
100,000 houses were demolished, displacing around 700,000 people.
The Shah Commission (1978) emphasizes that Jagmohan, the head of
the Delhi Development Authority, and B. R. Tamta, the Commissioner
of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, had acted on the direction and
at the command of Sanjay Gandhi, and in fact Sanjay Gandhi was not
only the one ordering the demolitions but also the ideological source of
the bureaucrats (Clibbens, 2014). Even after the Emergency, the urban
policy at Delhi continued the same ideology of slum eviction and clear-
ance for city beautification. The immediate goal of these evictions was
to provide building facilities for the Asian Games, to be held in Delhi
in 1982.
However, between the Emergency and liberalization, the urban poor
and informal sector have enjoyed a sense of tenure security, albeit with
occasional evictions. The government too launched several sites and
services schemes in the 1980s. Although there were variations in the
schemes, where in some plots were given, while in others basic structural
elements were provided, basic infrastructure was provided to all. Benefi-
ciaries were charged less for the urban services which provided a de facto
tenure to these households (Wadhwa, 1998). Despite these attempts,
policy interventions were fragmented and overlapped in their strate-
gies. Urban poverty alleviation programmes too remained isolated from
other related urban sector programmes. The implementation modalities
have also undergone frequent changes. Together with limited commu-
nity participation in the design and implementation of programmes,
these factors contributed to poor outcomes (Mathur, 2009).
The Seventh Plan called for a “radical (re)orientation of all policies
related to housing” and entrusted the main responsibility of housing
construction to the private sector. The first ever National Housing Pol-
icy (NHP) was announced, with objectives of “removal of houseless,
improving conditions of inadequately housed and provision of mini-
mum level of basic services to all”. This policy looked at land, materials,
finance, and technology, and targeted poverty alleviation as part of an
integrated and comprehensive solution to the problem of housing. Fol-
lowing up the NHP, the Two Million Housing Programme was launched
in 1998–99 to construct 20 lakh additional housing in both urban and

rural areas. Out of this, Housing and Urban Development Corporation
Ltd (HUDCO) was to meet the target of 4 lakh dwelling units in urban
areas annually (Ibid.). However, none of these policies and programmes
could meet the urban housing demand. By 1991, the demand reached
8.3 million. The Tenth Five Year Plan observed that 90 per cent of
the housing shortage pertained to LIG and EWS households. The plan
observed that there were no specific provisions in municipal law for
dealing with the issues relating to slums and the urban poor. While the
ambiguity and fragmentation in the institutional framework for slum
improvement undermined the effectiveness of implementation, failure
to accommodate the poor in the urban planning process had led to poor
outcomes despite sustained investment (Mathur, 2009).
Recognizing the importance of urban regulations, JNNURM focused
on modifying the laws that have impeded or distorted the function-
ing of the land and housing markets and caused slum proliferation,
eliminating the pricing regime that has blocked investment in urban
infrastructure, and implementing tax reform, particularly in property
taxation to improve the fiscal situation of municipalities who now
shoulder greater responsibilities (Mathur, 2009). However, there is no
evidence on what reforms in fact took place in the cities that made
use of JNNURM funds. The international experience suggests that, in
the absence of reasonably functioning land and real estate markets, it
will be very difficult for any public programme to be able to leverage
sufficient private resources, as envisaged in JNNURM. However, as the
evidence suggests, the results of JNNURM have indeed been mixed. The
separation of JNNURM into two submissions implicitly failed to recog-
nize the urban poor as an integral part of the urban system and revived
the old mindset that the rich and elite need infrastructure and the urban
poor need amelioration (Mukhopadhyay, 2006). The uniform amount of
central funding to all cities regardless of their population composition
indicates a lack of thinking in addressing urban problems (Ibid.). Under
JNNURM and now under RAY, small and medium towns have been
excluded, despite the clear evidence that these have a high incidence
of urban poverty with serious service deficiencies. This neglect, Kundu
(2012) argues, is due to the fact that the political economy of India
necessitates improvements in the environmental conditions of large
cities. The bias towards large cities and neglect of small and medium
towns was also evident in the database collected by the Census of India
on slums until 2001 and the National Sample Survey. Kundu (2012) fur-
ther argues that this lack of information and data gaps in small towns
has often been used by politicians and policymakers to generalize that

these have no slums.
Urban regulations and building bye-laws

Urban regulations impact urban housing supply by reducing the scope
for substituting capital for land and imposing rigid bye-laws on the uti-
lization of land. We will discuss the impact of these regulations and
bye-laws on urban housing provision. First, countries that have suc-
ceeded in the large-scale private provision of formal low-cost housing
are countries where the productivity of low income urban households
have allowed them to earn or borrow the initial US$2,500 necessary
to be able to buy an apartment on the formal markets by substitut-
ing capital for land.16 When the increased productivity of low income
workers – as the rate of migration slows down – allows them to substi-
tute capital for land, the informal parallel market disappears, as shown
by Bertaud (2009) in Bangkok. However, Mathur (2009) analysed that,
in the case of Indian cities, there has been very limited reduction in
the numbers of families living in the informal slums.17 He presents evi-
dence that more than 60 per cent of slum dwellers have lived in their
houses for more than a decade. To overcome the fixed cost barrier to
move to more intensive land use (Buckley, 1996), India’s income growth
and level should be more than sufficient. The underlying motivation
for the JNNURM reforms was, in fact, to address housing market regula-
tions which prevented this evolution from taking place (Buckley et al.,
2009). However, the reluctance from the states and cities to revise to suit
the Indian context has undermined the efforts of JNNURM and RAY in
Indian cities.
Apart from land acts and regulations, subdivision regulations set
standards for roads, block length and width, and the proportion of
land reserved for open space. Similarly, zoning and master plans allo-
cate land for specific use. If, for example, the regulations require that
public land (roads and open space) be at least 40 per cent of the total,
the cost per square metre of saleable land will be 66 per cent higher
than the original cost of the site (Bertaud et al., 1988). Therefore, if the
quantity of land allocated for a specific use is insufficient (in the above
case, residential purpose), it creates a temporary shortage until the zon-
ing is amended. Over-allocation of land for a specific use has the same
effect – the land stays vacant until the zoning is amended, which may
take several years. The consequences of these stringent regulations is
that they organize city spaces on one hand, while being influenced by
the dictates of real estate speculations and rent-seeking behaviour of the
local bureaucracy on the other, thus playing a key role in institution-

alizing urban exclusions (UN-HABITAT, 2008; Mahadevia et al., 2009).
In the words of John Friedmann (2006), cities are designed and man-
aged according to the needs of only 15 per cent of their population; the
rest are deliberately ignored. The possibility is that those living in such
slum circumstances could comply with the designed zoning ordinances
is extremely unlikely.
In India, master plans and development plans, since independence,
prescribed high standards without really understanding the income pro-
file and the affordability of the city population. The idea behind these
regulations was also to control the urban growth and improve the envi-
ronment. However, these standards and regulations have not been able
to protect the physical environment and, in fact, may have led to its
depreciation (Bertaud et al., 1988). Bertaud and colleagues (1988) indi-
cate that 87 per cent of urban households would not be able to afford
the minimum plot size (100m2 ) in Uttar Pradesh as per 1982 regulations,
and 95 per cent, as per 1960 regulations (minimum plot size of 167m2 ),
would not be able to afford the minimum-sized plot in a land develop-
ment which meets all the land development and municipal engineering
regulations. They indicated that a revised 1982 regulation with a plot
size of 24m2 would enable 80 per cent of the households to afford a
house. The possible outcomes that are feasible in these circumstances
are: (i) the system is strongly enforced, and people who cannot afford
to comply with the zoning requirements are excluded to areas where
they can evade detection – which would usually be an illegal informal
settlement in the peri-urban areas; (ii) alternatively, the municipality
may not have the capacity to enforce the ordinance, in which case it
will be ignored as simply unachievable. The problem is an obsession
with the physical appearance of cities rather than valuing and building
on the social capital that is frequently created in poor or low income
communities (UN-HABITAT, 2008).
Bertaud and colleagues (1988) suggest that more efficient land use
would not only reduce the direct cost of land, but also provide and
maintain urban infrastructure. They argued that efficiency in urban land
use could help in reducing land use requirement by as much as 30 per
cent. Annez and colleagues (2010) suggest that revision and modifica-
tion in building bye-laws and zoning regulations could reduce the cost
of housing by as much as 25 per cent. In addition to these, regulations
also burden the urban authorities with large areas of public land which
need maintenance expenditure beyond their capacity.
The provision of shelter is affected by three types of policies: regu-

lations, finance, and subsidies. Low income housing in Indian context
suffers from these policy-related issues. Over the years the governments
have been using a number of draconian laws to regulate the urban land.
These laws have achieved neither their egalitarian nor their low density
objectives. In addition, these laws are partially responsible for very high
land prices and extreme low consumption of floor space (Buckley et al.,
2009). While these laws have been repealed under JNNURM reforms, the
constraint they have imposed on land supply is still having an impact
on the spatial structure of Indian cities.
Many city leaders and national governments assume that slum growth
is a natural consequence of urban growth – that as cities grow economi-
cally, and as incomes improve, slums will disappear naturally over time.
However, evidence indicates that innovative and inclusive policies and
institutions that are tailor-made to local needs have a key role to play in
determining whether slums will grow, whether they will be upgraded,
or whether they will be ignored in national development plans and
policies. Strategies that work not only improve the physical living con-
ditions of slum dwellers, but also preserve non-tangible assets, such as
a sense of place, sense of belonging, and culture of mutual solidarity.
Such strategies improve existing slums without disturbing social ties and
create conditions to prevent the formation of slums in the future.
Urban infrastructure
Indian cities have undergone profound changes as they have combined

interlinking processes of globalization, liberalization, and discourses of
environmentalism and sustainable development in recent years. Urban
infrastructure as a perspective provides us with an opportunity to
observe the widespread yet differentiated urban spatial changes in the
built environment. We offer, based on Coutard and Rutherford (2012),
at least three presumptions for the need to understand urban infras-
tructure networks in order to comprehend the built environment and
cities. First, infrastructure network development and transformations
help shape the socioeconomic and spatio-political processes in urban
environment. Second, infrastructure networks are a medium through
which the above mentioned processes are implemented, structured in
urban space. Third, development of infrastructure networks and access
to these networks constitute an indicator of quality of life in urban
environments (Coutard and Rutherford, 2012).
In this section, based on the above postulations, we examine the

changing dynamics of infrastructure in Indian cities and their implica-
tions for the socio-spatial development. We also propose two arguments
about the historical roots of the current infrastructure networks in
Indian cities. The first argument is that the current social and spa-
tial fragmentation of urban infrastructure building and provision has
deep historical roots, both in colonial anti-native and post-colonial anti-
urban ideologies. The second is that the “reluctance” policies of national
and subnational governments, and the “ambivalent” and “reactive”
policies of city governments, have exacerbated the inequalities in urban
services. To add this, the “modern infrastructure ideal” permeated post-
colonial urban discourse and has also effaced the pragmatic “native”
and “traditional” approaches of urban infrastructure service provision.
The third, a corollary to the second argument, is that the distributive
politics at the local level have consumed the limited infrastructure and
resources available in the city. While the marginalized groups negoti-
ated with local politicians for “access” to basic services, they have not
been able to “exercise their right” to access urban services. On the con-
trary, the emergence of a new middle class after the liberalization, which
has demanded a louder political voice, has led to a diminution of voice
for the marginal sections. Inspired by world city visions, the elite and
the other influential groups demanded clean environments and cities at
the cost of slums and informal settlements.18 All these processes have
resulted in the restructuring of the urban space in many ways – demo-
lition of slums and informal settlements, fragmented urban fabric, and
contestations over urban space (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008).
Planning and the modern infrastructure ideal

The environmental infrastructure problems that Indian cities are con-
fronting can be traced back to colonial city planning as well as post-
colonial state policies. The legacy of the colonial city was characterized
by inequitable access to urban services, a failure to manage urban
growth, the proliferation of slums, and inadequate funding of urban
governments. During the colonial period, networks and plans largely
focused on the needs of the colonizers and metropolitan elites. New
suburban cities were designed and laid out with modern infrastruc-
ture for British settlers, and the native towns – such as Shahjahanabad
(old Delhi) – were left intact and were neglected with regard to urban
sanitation and services. The idea of an orderly, sanitized city with
a modern networked infrastructure was used as a “system of spatial
apartheid” (Balbo, 1993) and to indicate the dominance of the coloniz-

ers on the “natives”, who were confined to informal, non-networked,
and traditional settlements (Graham and Marvin, 2001). The partial
completion of the modern infrastructure network was, therefore, an
intentional attempt to represent the dominance of colonial powers
(Balbo, 1993). Along with the construction of the invisible modern
infrastructure networks, Yeoh (1996) argues, the existing methods and
practices of the native population in urban services and waste manage-
ment were considered to be backward and disease-ridden. As a result,
even in the post-independence era, many of the innovative and prag-
matic approaches to environmental services were ignored or planners
seemed reluctant to acknowledge them as alternative approaches in
providing environmental services.
Urban planning, sanitation policies, and evolution of urban govern-
ments were deeply rooted in the revolt of 1857 and the subsequent
plague epidemic in Indian cities, starting in Bombay and Calcutta in
1896 (Chaplin, 2011). The first Improvement Trust was established in
Bombay in 1898 to address the three fundamental challenges: (i) the
calamitous poor sanitation; (ii) the overcrowding, which was considered
the breeding ground for the plague; and (iii) to address the challenge of
governance (Spodek, 2013). The Trusts were given the powers to demol-
ish slums and create new housing for workers and new arterial roads.
However, the Trusts, instead of using bye-laws and sanitary reforms,
sought to control land use and the overall management of cities (Yeoh,
1996). As a result, these Trusts ignored traditional and informal settle-
ments at best and, at worst, pronounced them to be illegal, destroying
them in the name of modernization and public health (Khilnani, 1997;
Graham and Marvin, 2001; Beattie, 2003).
Spodek (2013), in his assessment of city planning under British rule
in India, emphasized that urban planning professionals (mostly for-
eign trained), amazed at the sanitary revolution that been achieved in
European cities and sought similar approaches in Indian cities. They
had “cleared slums, built straight roads through them, filled up tanks
to get rid of mosquitoes; made sure civil lines were well taken care
of with water and sewerage services paid for by taxes on everyone”
(Spodek, 2013, p.57). The modern network city envisaged by these
planners, Balbo (1993) argues, was an approach to a “unitarian city”
through master planning. People who could not afford to have own
water connection, connection to underground sewerage systems, and
access to other integrated services were not acknowledged as citizens of
the city, even if they made up the majority of the population (Balbo,
1993, p.29). However, the fiscal and socio-political realities of the colo-
nial Indian cities worked against the comprehensive rational planning
model (Gandy, 2008). Along with the planning paradigm, two other
dynamics impacted the improvements of urban infrastructure. The first
was the “reluctance” of the British to invest in native colonies. Most
of the expenditure on sanitation and health went to military sanita-
tion and to protect the health of government personnel (Chaplin, 1999;
Gandy, 2008). Second, the colonial regime built inequalities in the pro-
vision of sanitation services as a way of reflecting the spatial domination
of the colonizer. Fiscal conservatism of the colonial municipalities also
led to intensified use of manual labour for scavenging among night soil
(Chaplin, 1999, 2011), a practice that still continues in India.
The planning ideas and infrastructure models of the colonial time
have naively been adopted into the modernization project of post-
independence India. This ideology (dominated by the comprehensive
rational planning) implicitly extended similar attitudes (that were once
shown to the native population) towards the urban poor in cities.
Two aspects of these attitudes particularly permeated urban devel-
opment and infrastructure planning paradigm in post-independence.
First, urban local bodies, constrained by financial resources, were quick
to use slum clearances as a method to improve urban environment
and “deodorize” settlements within the municipal boundaries, while
neglecting the suburban and peri-urban areas (Chaplin, 2011). Second
was the continuation of the integrated networked model of “bacterio-
logical city” (Gandy, 2004), which ignored the socioeconomic–political
realities in Indian cities (Gandy, 2008).19
Modernization projects considered city planning and infrastructure
development to be crucial elements, so the ideals of rationality, progress,
social justice, liberation, and reason were applied to all aspects of
social life (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Political class and policymak-
ers believed that progress and modernization could only be achieved
through infrastructure standardization led by ideologies of science,
technology, and urban planning. Therefore, a “modern infrastructure
ideal” was taken for granted in modern urban planning in Indian
cities. Consequently, urban local bodies and planning agencies in the
post-independence era embodied the ideal of infrastructure provision
through the monopolies within their jurisdictions (Ibid.). The objec-
tive of the government policies was to speed up the infrastructure
development in cities that were historically characterized by uneven
development of urban infrastructure networks. The expansion of these
infrastructure networks was seen as the “material representation of
modernization” and the “assertion of an embryonic national identity”

that would eliminate the spatio-socioeconomic polarizations of colonial
times and break away from the barriers of traditionalism (Graham and
Marvin, 2001, p.84).
The import substitution industrialization (ISI), as adopted by India,
was closely linked with the theory of modernization. ISI required the
availability of a skilled and semi-skilled labour pool, as well as a highly
concentrated internal consumer market for the goods produced. Cities
and urban centres with a concentration of middle and high income
populations make these capital-intensive investments attractive. Invest-
ments and improvements in urban infrastructure were part of this model
of industrialization (Robberts, 1978, in Graham and Marvin, 2001). The
infrastructure policies and programmes developed and implemented
had, in fact, promoted the interests and satisfied the material needs
of the local elites and other power groups. New industrial cities such
as Chandigarh, Gandhi Nagar, and others were planned and built in
subsequent years. Problems such as urban poverty and infrastructure
deficit were treated as transitional, and issues of rural urban migra-
tion were largely seen through the demographic lens. As a result,
with a view to “re-equilibrate the system”, planners and engineers in
1950s suggested measures for preventing further rural–urban migration
(Gandy, 2008). However, the insufficient capacity of the institutions
to manage and plan cities exacerbated the infrastructure deficits for
poor and marginal citizens (Chaplin, 1999, 2011; Graham and Marvin,
2001).
Also, India’s experiment with urban development and modernist
urbanism accentuated the gap between what India envisioned and
professed and what urban India has achieved, beginning with the
remainder that clean water, safe disposal of sewage and solid waste,
and basic housing are unreachable and unaffordable for bulk of soci-
ety. Rapid growth and peri-urban development in large cities, especially
Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi, led to a deterioration of infrastructure ser-
vices. Infrastructure that was built, albeit partially, during the British
era, crumbled and became disrupted under demographic pressure and
led to public health problems. The urgency for infrastructure plan-
ning was recognized after the disastrous cholera epidemic in 1958 in
Kolkata. Political leaders and citizens became much more worried about
the visible signs of decay and the media has also picked up on these
signs and dramatized these cases in news and print media (Graham and
Marvin, 2001). WHO called for immediate efforts for improve public
health in Kolkata. The worried Congress leader in West Bengal, B. C.
Roy, approached Nehru in 1961 with the signal that Congress would
lose the state elections to the Communist Party if the state govern-
ment did not solve Kolkata’s problems. Nehru had referred B. C. Roy
to the then Ford Foundation’s representative in India. To address the
problems on a priority basis, Ford Foundation prepared a comprehen-
sive plan for the city. Central to the debates among the policymakers
and politicians on Kolkata was the deterioration of network infras-
tructure, the lack of spending on new infrastructure, a huge backlog
in maintenance and operations, and the inability of service providers
to keep pace with the increasing demand for urban services. So, the
road network had become the city’s circulated system; the rationally
engineered sewerage systems became disposal “organs” of the cities;
the dedicated green spaces have become the “respiratory” system of
the city; the road and street system was envisaged to be the physical
framework for burying bundled water networks, drains, and sewers – a
situation so familiar today that we take it for granted. In every sense,
the networks were viewed as the coordinated allies in the effort to
rationalize, systematize, and control metropolitan space as a whole
(Graham and Marvin, 2001, p.55). In order to implement these ide-
ologies, the development and management of network infrastructure
was taken away from urban local bodies and given to newly established
parastatals.
The BDP focused on stopping the deterioration of civic services,
enhancing the use of existing capacity, and investing in future mas-
sive growth. Bagchi (1987) emphasized that infrastructure had received
a big push in the plan. The water and sewerage projects covered about
one half of the population – a large improvement in coverage of ser-
vices from the sixties. However, the rigid comprehensive approach to
infrastructure planning had pre-empted any scope for debate and dis-
cussion on low-cost alternatives for water and sewerage services. The
issues of mobility and public transportation too were largely ignored
(Bagchi, 1987). The BDP conceived under the ideology of comprehen-
sive “modern infrastructural ideal” required huge amounts of resources
which neither the local body nor the state government could mobilize.
Chaplin (1999) argues that spatial engineering approaches, dependent
on capital-intensive technologies, dominated the public health and
sanitation systems. Little attention was paid to issues such as “afford-
ability” and “suitability” of these technologies for Indian cities and
towns. Therefore, in due course, with limited resources available at
its disposal and in order to follow the urban reforms prescription of
the World Bank, the implementing agencies sought a more targeted
approach to plan implementation. As a result, infrastructure improve-

ment projects for slums and informal settlements were not implemented
and the majority of city and peri-urban areas ended up having no access
to services such as water, sewerage, drainage, and so on, as service
providers/governments could not lay down the network to cover the
entire planned area.
Infrastructure, public health, and reactionary planning

Thus, urban planning in Indian cities has not been able to pay atten-
tion to critical public health and environmental issues of inadequate
urban infrastructure. Planners and policymakers showed knee-jerk reac-
tions whenever there was a public health or environmental crisis in
Indian cities. Dunu Roy (2004) succinctly summarizes the reactionary
approach to public health issues and lack of proactive planning from
the policymakers in Delhi. After independence, the Ministry of Rehabil-
itation was given the responsibility to resettle and rehabilitate the huge
number of refugees in Delhi. The Ministry set up a circle of colonies
around the periphery of the city, mostly within the boundary set by
the present Inner Ring Road. By 1951, the massive process of resettling
was completed (Roy, 2004). However, planning for urban infrastructure
was largely ignored. As a result, an epidemic of jaundice in 1955 had
infected 700 people, and the subsequent investigation suggested that
the city’s water supply was contaminated by the untreated sewage that
was being discharged into the Najafgarh canal, which in turn joins the
River Yamuna. Instead of planning for sewage treatment and proper dis-
posal, a barrage was constructed across the river to separate the sewage
discharge from the water intake (Ibid.).
A new master plan was prepared with the help of Ford Foundation
for Delhi, which got sanctioned in 1962. The objective of the plan was
to achieve a “rational growth of Delhi”, as it was growing in haphazard
way. Ironically, the plan did not consider the infrastructure problems
of the city, let alone address them. Roy (2004) further emphasized that,
“the planners did not even understand the implication of what they
themselves have done” as the another epidemic in the form of cholera
out broke in 1988, infecting 1,500 people across 44 settlements that had
been planned in 1975. After a visit by the Prime Minister, an action plan
was prepared, with ad hoc measures such as cholera vaccinations and
garbage removal, drain-cleaning, and some street paving, which con-
tained the epidemic (Chaplin, 1999). While the investigation suggested
that the disease had spread through contamination of groundwater by
inadequate sanitation in these settlements, the Master Plan of 1962 and
subsequent plans did not tackle the problems, and in fact the authorities
did not incorporate their own analysis of the failures and weaknesses of
past planning in the new plan (Roy, 2004).
The response of municipal and state governments to the plague out-
break in Surat in 1994 was another example of such crisis management.
The officials had in fact ignored the early warnings about the possibility
of an outbreak in the city. Shah (1997), in this context, observed that
the performance of the municipal government “has been rather poor
(till 1995) . . . [and] has failed to take the initiatives in meeting new and
challenging demands” of the rapidly growing city (Shah, 1997, p.67).
The officials of the municipal government believed that the disease had
been carried to Surat by the large population of migrant workers from
Latur in Maharashtra, after an earthquake there killed about 10,000 peo-
ple. The other reason that was believed to have caused the epidemic
was the unusually heavy rains that caused widespread flooding in the
poorest sections of the city along the Tapi River. These floods worsened
poor sanitary conditions caused by littering heaps of uncollected solid
waste (Burns, 1994). There were not enough staff members available
to effectively carry out the collection of garbage and spray insecticides
(Chaplin, 1999). Many people fled the city, as the crisis was not in con-
trol. There were contrasting reports on the nature and impact of the
epidemic. While some officials claimed it was the plague, some others
denied this. While the commissioner claimed the death toll was eight,
the district collector declared it to be 17 (Ibid.). Such were the actions
and reactions from the state and municipal officials in tackling the pub-
lic health crises in urban India. However, the governance of the city
changed significantly after that incident in Surat. The municipal com-
missioner of the city, S. R. Rao, brought about drastic changes in public
health programmes.20 As a result, the city, which had been known as the
“dirtiest city”, was acclaimed as the second cleanest city of the country.
Notwithstanding the impressive performance of Surat, the systemic fail-
ure of planning and environmental policies – “crisis intervention rather
than institutionalising a system for infrastructure planning and main-
tenance” (Chaplin, 1999) – in addressing the infrastructure and public
health issues is inherent in other cities across the country even today
(Roy, 2004).
The environmental and health hazards caused by the unsanitary con-
ditions in the cities, epitomized by the episode of plague in Surat in
1994, have triggered public interest litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court
of India. Based on the recommendations of the committee set up by the
apex court in that PIL, the Government of India has framed Munic-
ipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 2000, under the
Environmental Protection Act, 1986. Mohan and Dasgupta (2004) argue
that urban environmental policy and policy for infrastructure services
in India have, thus, come into light as a result of judicial activism in the
form of PIL and, further, note that, “judicial criticism may be seem to
have become a proxy for urban policy making” (p.22). They also note
that the consequences of such judicial activism have been mixed. While
some of the actions have been instrumental in improving urban envi-
ronment in areas such as controlling pollution levels, some other actions
have, in fact, led to the demolition of informal settlements, and curbed
urban employment and hence the process of urbanization itself.
“Infrastructure turn” in urban policies and planning

While public health crises drew attention to the infrastructure problems,
cities did not have the resources to meet the infrastructure requirements.
The Government of India initiated programmes such as EIUS, the Inte-
grated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT), and the
Mega City Scheme in the 1970s and 1980s to address the infrastruc-
ture problems. These programmes in fact marked the “infrastructure
turn” in urban policies and urban development in India. While the
EIUS was launched to provide a minimum level of services in 20 cities,
IDSMT aimed to promote growth in towns with less than 100,000 popu-
lation through infrastructure provision. The Mega City Programme was
launched for five cities with the purpose of preparing municipalities to
use institutional finance and market instruments like municipal bonds
for capital investment requirements. However, the resources in all these
programmes were so thinly spread that none of them could actually
achieve the desired results (Chakravorty, 1996). In fact, the Ninth Five
Year Plan admitted that IDSMT had largely been a failure (Mahadevia,
2003; Batra, 2009). The plan had also cut down the budgetary alloca-
tions for urban infrastructure development with a view to making ULBs
and parastatal agencies “creditworthy” and “marketworthy”. The plan
also emphasized that:
while larger municipalities may be in a position to raise funds from

capital market and financial institutions directly, the smaller ULBs
simply do not have the financial and technical capability to do so.
It thus proposed to create an “Urban Development Fund” based
on the principle of “pooled finance” to help smaller towns realize

commercial borrowings.
(Batra, 2009, p.19)
However, in reality, the revenues generated by the cities could not even
meet their operation and maintenance expenditures, let alone con-
tribute towards capital expenditure. Excessive borrowing by national
and state governments also emptied the fiscal space available for cities
to borrow locally and invest in infrastructure. This pre-emption of avail-
able savings increased the borrowing costs for cities and, in extreme
cases, stimulated capital flight, thus making long-term money scarce
(Krishnaswamy, 2009). As a result, cities, despite generating a major por-
tion of economic growth, depended on state and central governments
for much required investments in urban infrastructure.
Followed by liberalization and economic reforms, development
authorities in cities struggled “entrepreneurially” to develop the net-
work infrastructure with the hope that this would attract foreign capital
into the cities. While the regional states have provided an enabling envi-
ronment for attracting capital, states have not provided the resources to
cities to cater to the resultant urban growth of these entrepreneurial
developments. Constraints on financial resources and a crisis of urban
planning led to the collapse of notions of comprehensive and rational
urban infrastructure planning (see Graham, 2000a, 2000b; Graham and
Marvin, 2001, for more discussion). City governments found it difficult
to meet and survive the demands of both global capital and citizens
driven by the political economy (Ibid.). Therefore, urban infrastructure
planning started to focus on projects rather than comprehensive and
strategic plans to address the infrastructure problems of the city. The
monopolistic and single infrastructure grids thus gave way to multi-
ple circuits of infrastructure, which were customized to the needs of
various powerful groups and users (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Infras-
tructure progressively centred on connecting high-value spaces with the
global networks through building expressways, airports, dedicated safe
water networks, and so on (Sanga, 2008), and tailored the urban ser-
vices and networks to the requirements of national and international
capital.21 This unbundled approach to urban infrastructure provision
has thus undermined, to an extent, the notion that infrastructure
should be provided through a single network by a public monopoly
organization (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Infrastructure networks and
provision are, therefore, no longer viewed as universal and spatially
homogenous. Infrastructure provision and choice was limited to certain
groups within the city, who could exercise control over local govern-
ment decisions. This “splintered” technocratic and politicized approach
to planning has paid insufficient attention to critical social and environ-
mental needs of the city. In the absence of a framework for evaluating
the broader impacts of the new infrastructure, urban planning and
policies have risked the reappearance of past failures. As attention was
paid only to building large-scale infrastructure for facilitating large-scale
functional movements, new spatial problems were created as a result
of the lack of strategic outlook (Dodson, 2009). For instance, transport
systems that matched the international standards of speed, efficiency,
and even cost were constructed (Harris, 1996, in Mahadevia, 2008).
The liberalization and push for rapid economic growth has also led to
the expansion of the automobile industry in cities. This has resulted
in pressure on the city governments for more roads and expressways
within cities to reduce travel time. However, despite the increased tax
revenues, authorities could not meet the insatiable hunger for more road
space. Roads clogged with vehicles and the productivity of the cities
suffered. Citizens, companies, and local action groups started demand-
ing action to resolve the infrastructure bottlenecks. The simultaneous
improvement in public transport systems was not even considered. Rao
(2007), in the context of Hyderabad, provides evidence on imbalance
between the residential development and infrastructure provision. She
shows that while Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, comprising of
53 per cent of the population of the metropolitan city (which has
a population coverage of 80 per cent), consumes 63 per cent of the
water supply, the surrounding ten municipalities consume the rest of
the 37 per cent, with population coverage of 40 per cent or less (Rao,
2007).
Reacting to the demands and recognizing these urban problems, the
Government of India once again responded, albeit through another
urban investment programme, to address the problems of cities in the
form of JNNURM in 2005. Together with the 74th Amendment to Con-
stitution, this programme set in motion a slew of transformations in
structures of governance and government and the processes to manage
cities (Maringanti, 2011). What is interesting to note is that despite the
criticism of Planning Commission (1983) on IDSMT and other schemes
for not being integrated, the Government of India still subsumed IDSMT
and the Mega City Scheme into the JNNURM design (Sivaramakrishnan,
2011). In coverage and substance both Urban Infrastructure Develop-
ment Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and Urban
Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) are no different from IDSMT and
the Mega City Scheme. In that sense, JNNURM has “reverted to the
Planning Commission’s time honoured stand that no metro or even
super metro could seek central assistance outside the state development
plan” (Ibid.). Sivaramakrishnan (2011) argues, further, that the cycle of
development of India suggest an inverse relationship between planning
and availability of resources. “When there is little money, planning is
pursued, policy pronouncements are made, and legal and other prescrip-
tions are formulated. But when money is available, projects take priority
and planning is forgotten” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011, p.1).
This “infrastructure turn” dominated by large-scale infrastructure
projects raised considerable questions about the capacity and legiti-
macy of urban planning as a tool and spatial strategy to drive urban
growth (Dodson, 2009). The hegemonic nature of urban policies and
infrastructure programmes initiated by the central and state govern-
ments have, in fact, undermined the role of master planning in city
development. As a result the intellectual and institutional capacity of
urban planning to drive positive urban change was weakened. Mar-
kets and private sector actors gained an increasing role in spatial and
land use coordination in cities. This was accompanied by a compara-
ble shift in which urban infrastructure provision, in many cities, was
progressively delegated to the private sector. While the infrastructure
problems of this shift were recognized and are being addressed through
an intense national programme, the fragmented approach to planning
has not received attention. While many cities prepared master plans
and regional plans, these have been relatively weak documents and do
not really address the core urban issues. State and central government’s
approach to urban infrastructure as a means of resolving urban prob-
lems also indicates their “reluctance” to confront the strategic urban
development problems.
This shift in urban development policies has distracted attention
from more effective institutional and governance means of achiev-
ing improved outcomes such as efficiency, equity, and productivity.
There is also documentation and research that suggests governance
arrangements, including those managing infrastructure, are inappropri-
ate for urban development and management in cities (Mukhopadhyay,
2006; Sivaramakrishnan, 2006, 2011, 2013; Dodson, 2009). “Infras-
tructure turn” also exacerbated the socioeconomic and environmental
“splintering” of cities and urban areas in an era of climate change
concerns, depleting natural resources and increasing energy insecurity
(Dodson, 2009). There is a huge body of research that suggests that
social polarization, marginalization, fragmentation, and exclusion have
increased over the last two decades in Indian cities (see Shaw, 1996,
2012; Kundu, 2003, 2009, 2011; Mahadevia, 2008; Roy, 2009, 2011). For
example, cities have not aligned their spatial and environmental strate-
gies with the investment plans prepared under JNNURM. The visioning
exercise of CDPs, too, was a half-hearted attempt. Otherwise, how do
we explain water and sewerage projects that do not talk about environ-
mental sustainability? How do we explain the short-sighted approach to
infrastructure projects that assume the unlimited availability of environ-
mental resources? The resultant splintering of urban space also reduced
the cohesiveness of cities.
As the first phase of the JNNURM nears completion, central govern-
ment and state governments will now face the critical task of ensuring
that the future programmes enforce a conceptual and empirical coher-
ence of cities to avoid the potential “splintering of the urbanism”
(Graham and Marvin, 2001), and act on key strategic threats such as cli-
mate change impacts and energy threats in cities (Dodson, 2009, p.11).
So, if urban planning and its core problems are not addressed under
the new phase of “infrastructure turn” (i.e. JNNURM-II or its equiva-
lent), the programme risks revisiting another long period of relegation
to more peripheral issues of urban development “behind more conven-
tional imperatives as efficiency and productivity and the promise that
infrastructure claims for improving these factors” (Dodson, 2009, p.10).
However, the current trends in infrastructure policies (see JNNURM-
II Report prepared by the Planning Commission) seems to be indicating
that the contemporary urban programmes and policies in Indian cities
have yet to pay attention to such concerns.
References
Abraham, A. (1982). “Bombay’s Promised Land”, Economic and Political Weekly,
17(11), 390–392.
Acharya, B. P. (1987). “Policy of Land Acquisition and Development: Analysis of
an Indian Experience”, Third World Planning Review, 9(2), 99–115.
Acharya, B. P. (1989). The Indian Urban Land Ceiling Act: A Critique of the
1976 Legislation and Policy of Land Acquisition: Analysis of an Indian Experience.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Adams, D. (1994). Urban Planning and the Development Process. Oxford: Routledge.
Aggrawal, A. (2005). Performance of Export Processing Zones: A Comparative
Analysis of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Working Paper No. 155, Indian
Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi.
Anand, P. B. (1992). “India’s Urban Housing: Theory and Policy”, Economic and
Annez, P. C., Bertaud, A., Patel, B., and Phatak, V. K. (2010). Working with the
Market: An Approach to Reducing Urban Slums in India. Policy Research Working
Paper 5475, The World Bank.
Apte, P. M. (2013). Urban Planning and Development: An Indian Perspective, New
Delhi: Zorba Publishers.
Awasthi, D. N. (1991). Regional Patterns of Industrial Growth in India. New Delhi:
Concept.
Bagchi, A. (1987). “Planning for Metropolitan Development: Calcutta’s Basic
Development Plan, 1966–86: A Post-Mortem”, Economic and Political Weekly,
22(14), 597–601.
Baken, R. J. (2003). Plotting, Squatting, Public Purpose, and Politics: Land Market
Development, Low Income Housing, and Public Intervention in India. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Balakrishnan, S. (2013). Land Conflicts and Cooperatives along Pune’s Highways:
Managing India’s Agrarian to Urban Transition. PhD Dissertation. Cambridge,
MA: The Department of Architecture, Landscape Architecture and Urban
Planning, Harvard University.
Balbo, M. (1993). “Urban Planning and the Fragmented City of Developing
Countries”, Third World Planning Review, 15(1), 23–35.
Banerjee, T. (2005). “Understanding Planning Cultures: The Kolkata Para-
dox”, In B. Sanyal (Ed.), Comparative Planning Cultures. New York: Routledge,
145–164.
Banarjee, T. and Chakravorty, S. (1994). “Transfer of Planning Technology and
Local Political Economy: A Retrospective Analysis of Calcutta’s Planning”,
Journal of the American Planning Association, 60(1), 71–82.
Bapat, M. (1990). “Allocation of Urban Space: Rhetoric and Reality: Evidence
from Recent Jurisprudence”, Economic and Political Weekly, 25(28), 1502–1507.
Bapat, M. (1987). New Palliatives for Old? Interim Report of National Commis-
sion on Urbanisation. Economic and Political Weekly, 22 (16), 689–691.
Bardhan, P. (1984). The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford and
New York: Basil Blackwell.
Bardhan, P. (1998). The Political Economy of Development in India: Expanded Edition
with an Epilogue on the Political Economy of Reform in India. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Bardhan, P. (2012). “Distributive Conflicts and Indian Economic Policy: Some
Notes on Political Economy”, In C. Ghate (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
Indian Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 581–590.
Batra, L. (2009). A Review of Urbanisation and Urban Policy in Post-Independent
India. CSLG Working Paper CSLG/WP/09/05. New Delhi: Centre for the Study of
Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Baviskar, A. (2002). The Politics of the City. Seminar, 516.
Beattie, M. (2003). “Colonial Space: Health and Modernity in Barabazaar,
Kolkata”, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, 14(2), 7–19.
Benjamin, S. (2004). “Urban Land Transformation for Pro-Poor Economies”,
Geoforum, 35(2), 177–187.
Benninger, C. C. (1971). Some Note on Cities and Urban Planning in India.
Masters Thesis Submitted to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston.
Bertaud, A. (2002). India: Urban Land Reform, http://alainbertaud.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/AB_-India_-Urban_Land_Reform.pdf (Retrieved on
17 March 2014).
Bertaud, A., Bertaud, M.-A., and Wright, J. J. (1988). Efficiency in Land Use
and Infrastructure Design: An Application of the Bertaud Model. World Bank
Discussion Paper No. 17, The World Bank.
Buckley, R. M. (1996). Housing Finance in Developing Countries. London:
Macmillan.
Burns, J. E. (1994). Thousands Flee Indian City in Deadly Plague Outbreak, New York
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/24/world/thousands-flee-indian-
city-in-deadly-plague-outbreak.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (Retrieved on
18 July 2013).
Chakrabarti, P. D. (2001). Delhi’s Ongoing Debate on Informal Settlements and
Work Places – Issues of Environmental Jurisprudence, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-
projects/drivers_urb_change/urb_infrastructure/pdf_land%20tenure/NAERUS_
ESF_chakrabarti_Delhi_Informal_Settlements.pdf (Retrieved on 11 May 2014).
Chakravorty, S. (1996). “Too Little in the Wrong Places? Mega City Programme
and Efficiency and Equity in Indian Urbanisation”, Economic and Political
Weekly, 31(35/37), 2566–2572.
Chakravorty, S. (2000). “How Does Structural Reform Affect Regional Develop-
ment? Resolving Contradictory Theory with Evidence from India”, Economic
Geography, 76(4), 367–394.
Chaplin, S. E. (1999). “Cities, Sewers and Poverty: India’s Politics of Sanitation”,
Environment and Urbanisation, 11(1), 145–158.
Chaplin, S. E. (2011). “Indian Cities, Sanitation and the State: The Politics of the
Failure to Provide”, Environment and Urbanisation, 23(1), 57–70.
Chatterjee, P. (2004). The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics
in Most of the World. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University
Press.
Clibbens, P. (2014). “ ‘The Destiny of This City Is to be the Spiritual Workshop of
the Nation’: Clearing Cities and Making Citizens During the Indian Emergency,
1975–1977”, Contemporary South Asia, 22(1), 51–66.
Colin, M. (2008). “Sanitation in Mumbai’s Informal Settlements: State, ‘Slum’
and Infrastructure”, Environment and Planning A, 40(1), 88–107.
Corbridge, S. (2009). The Political Economy of Development in India Since
Independence, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20381/1/The_political_economy_of_
development_in_India_since_independence_(author_final).pdf (Retrieved on
13 March 2013).
Corbridge, S. and Harriss, J. (2000). Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu
Nationalism and Popular Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Coutard, O. and Rutherford, J. (2012). From Networked to Post-Networked
Urbanism: New Infrastructure Configurations and Urban Transitions. Interna-
tional Roundtable Workshop, Autun (France), 17–20 July.
Dev, S. (2006). Rent Control Laws in India: A Critical Analysis, http://ccs.
in/internship_papers/2006/Rent%20Control%20Act%20-%20Satvik.pdf
(Retrieved on 12 May 2014).
Devadas, V. and Gupta, V. (2011). “Planning for Special Economic Zone:
A Regional Perspective”, Institute of Town Planners, India Journal, 8(2),
53–58.
Dodson, J. (2009). The “Infrastructure Turn” in Australian Metropolitan Spatial
Planning. Research Paper No. 25, Urban Research Program, Griffith University.
Dowall, D. E. (1992). “Benefits of Minimal Land-Use Regulations in Developing
Countries”, Cato Journal, 12(2), 413–423.
Dowall, D. E. and Clarke, G. (1996). A Framework for Reforming Urban Land Policies
in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Dowall, D. E. and Monkkonen, P. (2007). Dense and Expanding: Urban Develop-
ment and Land Markets in Chennai, India. Working Paper 2007–18, Institute of
Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley.
Durand-Lasserve, A. and Royston, L. (2002). “International Trends and Country
Contexts – From Tenure Regularization to Tenure Security”, In A. Durand-
Lasserve and L. Royston (Eds.), Holding their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the
Urban Poor in Developing Countries. London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications
Limited, 1–26.
Fernandes, L. (2004). “The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power and
the Restructuring of Urban Space in India”, Urban Studies, 41(12), 2415–2430.
Gandy, M. (2004). “Rethinking Urban Metabolism: Water, Space and the Modern
City”, City, 8(3), 363–379.
Gandy, M. (2008). “Landscapes of Disaster: Water, Modernity, and Urban Frag-
mentation in Mumbai”, Environment and Planning A, 40, 108–130.
Ganguly, S. and Mukherji, R. (2011). India Since 1980. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Gavsker, K. K. (2011). “Urban Restructuring and Change: Planning, Develop-
ment Practices and Impacts on the Urban Poor”, Institute of Town Planners, India
Journal, 8(2), 24–44.
Ghatak, M. and Ghosh, P. (2013). India’s New Land Acquisition Act: A Lost Opportu-
nity, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaatlse/2013/10/23/indias-new-land-acquisition-
act-a-lost-opportunity/ (Retrieved on 23 January 2014).
Ghertner, A. (2011). “Gentrifying the State, Gentrifying the Participation: Elite
Governance Programs in Delhi”, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, 35(3), 504–532.
Government of India (GoI) (2007). JNNURM Primer on Repeal of Urban Land Ceil-
ing and Regulation Act (ULCRA). New Delhi: Ministry of Urban Development,
Government of India.
Government of India (GoI) (2010). Guidelines for Development of Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) New Delhi: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India.
Graham, S. (2000a). “Introduction: Cities and Infrastructure Networks”, Interna-
tional Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(1), 114–119.
Graham, S. (2000b). “Constructing Premium Network Spaces: Reflections on
Infrastructure Networks and Contemporary Urban Development”, International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(1), 183–200.
Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures,
Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London and New York:
Routledge.
Guha, R. (2007). The Scottish Internationalist. The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.
com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/scottish-internationalist/
article2274865.ece (Retrieved on 4 November 2014).
Guha, R. (2007). India after Gandhi: The history of the world’s largest democracy.
London: Macmillan.
Handy, S. L., Boarnet, M. G., Ewing, R., and Killingworth, R. E. (2002). “How
the Built Environment Affects Physical Activity: Views from Urban Planning”.
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 23(2S), 64–73.
Harris, N. (1991). City, Class and Trade: Social and Economic Change in the Third
World. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
Harvey, D. (1985). The Urbanisation of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of
Capitalist Urbanisation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Hingorani, P. (2011). Revisiting Low Income Housing: A Review of Policies and
Perspectives. Paper Prepared for Indian Institute of Human Settlements (IIHS).
IIED (2012). BRICS Urbanisation Provides Lessons for Economic Growth and Social
Equity, http://www.iied.org/brics-urbanisation-provides-lessons-for-economic-
growth-social-equity (Retrieved on 11 September 2013).
Jauhiainen, J. S. (2006). “Urbanisation, Capita and Land-Use in Cities”, Place and
Location: Studies in Environmental Aesthetics and Semiotics, 5, 179–193.
Joshi, R. and Sanga, P. (2009). Land Reservations for the Urban Poor: The Case of
Town Planning Schemes in Ahmedabad. Working Paper No. 4, Centre for Urban
Equity, CEPT University.
Kalia, R. (2004). Gandhinagar: Building National Identity in Postcolonial India South
Carolina: University of South Carolina.
Kennedy, L. and Zerah, M.-H. (2008). “The Shift to City-Centric Growth Strate-
gies: Perspectives from Hyderabad and Mumbai”, Economic and Political Weekly,
43(39), 110–117.
Kennedy, L., Robin, K., and Zamuner, D. (2013). “Comparing State-Level Policy
Responses to Economic Reforms in India”. Revue de la régulation [Online], 13 |
1er semestre/Spring.
Khilnani, S. (1997). The Idea of India (2012 edn.). New Delhi: Penguin Books.
Kohli, A. (n.d.). State and Redistributive Development in India, http://www.
princeton.edu/∼kohli/docs/UNRISD.pdf (Retrieved on 8 July 2013).
Krishna, A. V. (2011). India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics. New
Delhi: Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt Ltd.
Kumar, A. (2011). “Land in the Neoliberal Times: A Commodity or a Social
Good?” Institute of Town Planners, India Journal, 8(2), 8–23.
Kundu, A. (2003). “Urbanisation and Urban Governance: Search for a Perspective
Beyond Neoliberalism”, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(29), 3079–3087.
Kundu, A. (2009). “Exclusionary Urbanisation in Asia: A Macro Overview”,
Kundu, A. (2011). Trends and Processes of Urbanisation in India. Urbanisation and
Emerging Population Issues-6, London and New York: IIED and UNFPA.
Kundu, A. (2012). Political Economy of Making Indian Cities Slum-Free, http://
indiancities.berkeley.edu/2012/presentations/Amitab%20Kundu%20Paper.pdf
Lahiri, N. (2011). Delhi’s Capital Century (1911–2011): Understanding the Trans-
formation of the City. Conference Program for Agrarian Studies, Yale University, 4th
March.
Lall, R. and Rastogi, A. (2007). The Political Economy of Infrastructure Devel-
opment in Post-Independence India. IDFC Occasional Paper Series 2007/01.
Mumbai: IDFC.
McFarlane, C. and Rutherford, J. (2008). “Political Infrastructures: Governing and
Experiencing the Fabric of the City”, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, 32(2), 363–374.
Mahadevia, D. (2003). Globalisation, Urban Reforms and Metropolitan Response in
India. Ahmedabad and Delhi: CEPT University and Manek Publications.
Mahadevia, D. (2008). “Inside Urbanising Asia”, In D. Mahadevia (Ed.), Inside

Transforming Urban Asia: Processes, Policies and Public Actions. New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company, 1–55.
Mahadevia, D. (2013). Urban Poverty in India and Post-MDG Framework. Oxfam
India Working Papers Series, OIWPS-XVII, OXFAM, India.
Maringanti, A. (2011). “New Cities for Old: Book Review of Re-Visioning Indian
Cities: The Urban Renewal Mission”, Economic and Political Weekly, XLVI(50),
30–31.
Massey, D. S. (2008). “Geography of High-Tech Spaces: Some Reflections”, In C.
Ramachandraiah, A. C. Westen, and S. Prasad (Eds.), High-Tech Urban Spaces:
Asian and European Perspectives. New Delhi: Manohar, 41–56.
Mathur, O. P. (1971). Urban Growth Policy for India: A Brief Statement of Issues.
Presentation to SPURS Fellows, Mimeographed. Boston: MIT.
Mathur, O. P. (2009). Slum Free Cities: A New Deal for the Urban Poor, http://
indiancities.berkeley.edu/2012/docs/Mathur-Final_Poverty_Rep.pdf (Retrieved
on 4 April 2013).
Mehrotra, R. (2008). “Negotiating the Static and Kinetic Cities: The Emergent
Urbanism of Mumbai”, In A. Huyssen (Ed.), Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban
Imaginaries in a Globalising Age. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University
Press, 205–214.
Menon, K. A. (1997). “Imagining the Indian City”, Economic and Political Weekly,
32(46), 2933–2936.
Ministry of Finance (2004). Central Government Subsidies in India. Department of
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
Mohan, A. K. and Rajagopal, C. (2010). Outsourcing Governance? Revising the
Master Plan of Bengaluru. 46th ISOCARP Congress.
Mohan, R. and Dasgupta, S. (2004). Urban Development in India in the 21st Cen-
tury: Policies for Accelerating Urban Growth. Working Paper No. 231, Stanford
Centre for International Development, Stanford University.
Nainan, N. (2008). “Building Boomers and Fragmentation of Space in Mumbai”,
NIUA. (n.d.). Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and their Implication on Urban Man-
agement and Regional Planning in India. New Delhi: National Institute of Urban
Affairs (NIUA).
Pal, A. (2006). “Scope for Bottom-up Planning in Kolkata: Rhetoric vs Reality”,
Environment and Urbanisation, 18(2), 501–521.
Patel, S. B. (2008). “Mumbai and Shanghai”, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(47),
4–5.
Patel, S. B. (2013). “Life Between Buildings: The Use and Abuse of FSI”, Economic
and Political Weekly, 48(6), 68–74.
Planning Commission (n.d.). 1st Five Year Plan, http://planningcommission.
nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/1st/1planch2.html (Retrieved on 4 November
2014).
Prakash, G. (2002). “The Urban Turn”, In R.Vasudevan et al. (Eds.), Sarai Reader
2002: The Cities of Everyday Life, Delhi: Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies, 2–7.
Prakash, G. (2010). Mumbai Fables. Mumbai: HarperCollins Publishers.
Ramachandran, R. (1989). Urbanisation and Urban Systems in India. New Delhi:

Oxford University Press.
Rao, N. (2007). Cities in Transition: Growth, Change and Governance in Six
Metropolitan Areas. Oxford: Routledge.
Roy, D. (2004). “From Home to Estate”, Seminar, 533, http://www.india-seminar.
com/2004/533/533%20dunu%20roy.htm (Retrieved on 4 November 2014).
Roy, A. (2009). “Why India Cannot Plan Its Cities: Informality,
Insurgence and the Idiom of Urbanization”, Planning Theory, 8(1),
76–87.
Roy, A. (2011). “The Blockade of the World-Class City: Dialectical Images of
Indian Urbanism”, In A. Roy and A. Ong (Eds.), Worlding Cities: Asian Exper-
iments and the Art of Being Global (1st edn.). Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell
Publishing Limited, 259–278.
Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H. (1987). In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political
Economy of the Indian State. New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited.
Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H. (2001). “Iconisation of Chandrababu: Sharing
Sovereignity in India’s Federal Market Economy”, Economic and Political Weekly,
XXXVI(18), 1541–1552.
Sami, N. (2014). “Power to the People? A Study of Bengaluru’s Urban
Task Forces”, In G. Shatkin (Ed.), Contesting the Indian City: Global Visions
and the Politics of the Local. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell,
121–144.
Sanga, N. (2008). Impact of Urban Entrepreneurial Development on Peri-Urban
Livelihoods. Masters Thesis submitted to Cardiff University.
Sanyal, B. (2000). “Planning’s Three Challenges”, In L. Rodwin and B. Sanyal
(Eds.), The Profession of City Planning: Changes, Images, and Challenges, 1950–
2000. Rutgers: Center for Urban Policy Research, The State University of New
Jersey, 312–336.
Sanyal, B. (2005a). “Hybrid Planning Cultures: The Search for the Global Cul-
tural Commons”, In B. Sanyal (Ed.), Comparative Planning Cultures. New York:
Routledge, 3–25.
Sanyal, B. (2005b). “Planning as Anticipation of Resistance”, Planning Theory,
4(3), 225–245.
Sanyal, B. and Deuskar, C. (2012). “A Better Way to Grow? Town Planning
Schemes as a Hybrid Land Readjustment Process in Ahmedabad, India”,
In G. K. Ingram and Y.-H. Hong (Eds.), Value Capture and Land Policies.
Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 149–182.
Sanyal, S. (2011). In Defence of Gurgaon. Business Standard.
Sanyal, S. (2013). The Ideology of Cities. Business Standard.
Shah, G. (1997). Public Health and Urban Development – the Plague in Surat. New
Delhi: Sage Publications.
Shatkin, G. and Vidyarthi, S. (2014). “Introduction: Contesting the Indian City:
Global Visions and the Politics of the Local”, In G. Shatkin (Ed.), Contesting the
Indian City: Global Visions and the Politics of the Local. Chichester, West Sussex:
Wiley-Blackwell, 1–39.
Shaw, A. (1996). “Urban Policy in Post-Independent India: An Appraisal”,
Shaw, A. (2004). The Making of Navi Mumbai. New Delhi: Orient Longman Private
Limited.
Shaw, A. (2009). “Town Planning in Postcolonial India, 1947–1965: Chandigarh

Reexamined”, Urban Geography, 30(8), 857–878.
Shaw, A. (2012). Indian Cities. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Siddiqi, F. J. (2012). Governing Urban Land: The Political Economy of ULCRA in
Mumbai. Masters Thesis submitted to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Occasional Paper No. 13, New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2011). Re-visioning Indian Cities: The Urban Renewal
Mission. New Delhi: Sage Publications Private Ltd.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2013). “Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment
for Better Metropolitan Governance”, Economic and Political Weekly 48(13),
86–94.
Spodek, H. (2013). “City Planning in India Under British Rule”, Economic and
Suri, S. (2011). Decentralising Urbanisation: Harnessing the Potential of Small
Cities in India. Master’s Thesis Submitted to Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), Boston.
Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A. (2002). “Neoliberal Urbaniza-
tion in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban
Policy”, Antipode, 34(3), 542–577.
TCPO (2013). Utilisation of Land Resources for Urban Sector in India, http://www.
landuseindia.in/live/hrdpmp/hrdpmaster/hrdp-asem/content/e48335/e48799/
e48940/e51439/e51483/8.UtilisationofLandResourceforUrbanSectorinIndia-
PolicyRequirements_KKJ.pdf (Retrieved on 11 May 2014).
Thornley, A. (1991). Urban Planning Under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market.
London: Routledge.
Toutain, O. and Gopiprasad, S. (2006). “Planning for Urban Infrastructure”, In A.
Rastogi (Ed.), India Infrastructure Report 2006. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 59–81.
USAID (1991). Constraints Affecting the Efficiency of Urban Land Markets in India.
New Delhi: USAID.
Varshney, A. (1984). Political Economy of Slow Industrial Growth in India.
Varshney, A. (1998). “Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic
Reforms in Comparative Perspective”, The Journal of Policy Reform, 2(4),
301–335.
Vohra, R. (2001). The Making of India: A Historical Survey (2nd edn.). New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
Wadhwa, K. (n.d.). Affordable Housing for Urban Poor, 2009, www.spa.ac.in/NRC/
ThemePaperAffordableHousing.pdf (Retrieved on 11 July 2013).
Wadhwa, K. (1988a). “An Evaluation of the Urban Land Ceiling Act (A Case Study
of Ahmedabad)”, In R. C. Sharma (Ed.), India’s Urban Land Policy and Develop-
ment Finance. New Delhi: Seema Publications, 195–211.
Wadhwa, K. (1988b). “Housing Programmes for Urban Poor: Shifting Priorities”,
Weinstein, L. (2008). “Mumbai’s Development Mafias: Globalisation, Organised
Crime and Land Development”, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, 32(1), 22–39.
Weinstein, L., Sami, N. and Shatkin, G. (2014). “Contested Developments: Endur-

ing Legacies and Emergent Political Actors in Contemporary Urban India”,
In G. Shatkin (Ed.), Contesting the Indian City: Global Visions and the Politics
of the Local. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 39–64.
Yeoh, B. S. (2003). Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the
Urban Environment. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
4
Productive Environment
Introduction
Productivity is crucial for firms’ and nations’ performances and it is

also linked with the living standards of citizens and the state’s ability
to enhance the welfare of its citizens. Productivity also implies how
efficiently firms and nations use resources. As discussed in Chapter 2,
and later in this chapter, cities have become engines of growth. Nearly
70 per cent of India’s GDP is produced in cities. Productive cities are also
competitive as they attract firms and people, who locate there and con-
tribute to the growth and development. In this context it is crucial to
understand how efficiently cities manage their resources and how they
compare with other cities in a competitive way. Government policies
and institutions play an important role in the productivity of cities. The
actors of economic activities (firms, households, government) that are
located in cities not only have an impact on the resources of cities but
also a profound impact on urban fringes and the rural hinterland due to
their demand on resources to sustain the urban economy.
This chapter is an enquiry into the variety of views, both outcomes
and processes, with regard to the urban growth dynamics of the post-
independence era, while keeping in mind the shadow of the colonial
period and the impact that it had on the post-independence outcomes
of institutions created during that period. The chapter will begin with
a short overview of the theoretical lenses that describe the advantages
cities bring that ensure economic activity in the post-modern world
economy is so overwhelmingly dominated by the urban. We present
an analysis on urban dynamics and their productivity in India. We then
provide an account of the regional and subregional dynamics that led to
the growth of atypical urbanization in Indian cities. We also discuss the
conflicts and contradictions that have arisen because of policy dilemmas
120
Productive Environment 121
in urban space (e.g. land, infrastructure, and governance), and look at

how cities are looking to reposition and reinvent themselves to compete
in the global era.
Despite the recent economic gloom surrounding the country, India
remains one of the fastest growing countries in today’s rapidly chang-
ing global economy, growing at an average rate of 6 per cent per annum
(Chapter 2). In 2014, India accounted for 6.4 per cent of global GDP
on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, making it the third largest
economy in the world, behind the US and China. A large share of the
economic output in India comes from the service sector, accounting for
approximately 62.5 per cent of total GDP, while the industrial output
accounts for 20 per cent of the total output (MPI, 2013). It is also worth
noting that the much of the country’s economic activity is “informal”
and poses measurement challenges. Mishra and Shankar (2013) estimate
that 50 per cent of India’s economy and 90 per cent of employment
is informal. The impact of informal economy is that the GDP is an
underestimate by about 15 per cent (Ibid.). Along with the informal
economy there is also an entrepreneurial component that contributes
significantly to the economy. India is further experiencing an expansion
of the middle class as economic activity in the service sector grows. Dur-
ing the 2013–23 period, India is likely to add about 205 million people
in the age bracket of 14–44 years in urban areas. According to a BRICS
report (2013), there are more than 45 million individual entrepreneurs
contributing significantly to the Indian economy. While these changes
together present a picture of a post-industrial economy, there are numer-
ous challenges that need to be addressed to completely harness and
benefit from the economic potential and promote prosperity. One such
challenge is to leverage and manage the potential of Indian cities to
work for growth.
Historically India has undergone an atypical process of industri-
alization and urbanization when compared to many other develop-
ing economies. Despite the rapid economic growth during the three
decades, the official urbanization rate is only about 31.16 per cent,
according to the Census in 2011. Much of India still remains rural. How-
ever, the dominance of agriculture in economy has reduced to 13.7 per
cent in 2012–13 from 51.9 per cent in 1950–51 (Chapter 2). More than
70 per cent of agriculture employment is comprised of labourers and cul-
tivators. A naïve argument that has often been proposed in development
discourse is that a large workforce engaged in an inefficient sector of
the economy presents an opportunity to transfer many of these workers
into an urban-based manufacturing sector, which, in turn, creates more
employment opportunities through a multiplier effect. However, as dis-

cussed later, Sala-i-Martin (2013) argues that the competitiveness of
cities (which leads to growth) is dependent on the education level (not
primary but higher) and training of the workforce, which, as discussed
in Chapter 2, is quite low among rural workers. Moreover, if the urban-
ization rate, as argued by proponents of subaltern urbanization such as
Denis and colleagues (2012) is 51 per cent, then the rate of possible divi-
dend from urbanization will decline further. Physical infrastructure and
technology deficits continued to limit the ability of the manufacturing
sector to deliver the much required fillip to employment opportunities
and thereby impeding inclusive urban development (MPI, 2013).
The concentration of the majority of population in rural areas has,
historically, contributed to the development of policies largely focused
on rural areas and largely ignored urban areas (see Chapter 3 on these
policies). Despite the structural limitations and policy gap in hampering
urban growth, India’s cities have been incredibly productive, producing
more than 65 per cent of the national GDP (HPEC, 2011; Planning Com-
mission, 2011). Even though the Government of India has initiated a
host of programmes (e.g. JNNURM, RAY, NUHM, and NULM) and poli-
cies for urban development in recent years, urbanization in India still
occupies a vexed and poorly understood position (Mukhopadhyay and
Revi, 2009). There are two fundamental governance dilemmas that India
faces today. Agglomeration and other economies of large-scale demand-
ing economic concentration in a few cities, which requires policies to
focus on these, on one hand, and the aspirations for social welfare and
justice incorporate in broad-based participatory development, on the
other, which requires a focus on inclusive urban growth and a wider
policy focus encompassing urban fringes and small and medium towns,
demand the attention of the policymakers (Bardhan, 2011).1 Which
path Indian policymakers choose to follow will determine the costs and
benefits of the development discourse of India.
What constitutes a productive environment?
Cities and urban areas are centres for employment, education, culture,
commerce, and a range of other activities. During the last three decades
these activities have become inextricably linked to the processes of glob-
alization of economies. Internally, cities provide economies of scale,
agglomeration, and localization benefits. They are clusters of compet-
itive advantage (Porter, 1990, 2000); centres of the information age
(Castells, 1996); facilitators of accumulation of knowledge spill-overs
(Lucas, 1988); powers of proximity in a world of flows (Sassen, 1994);
melting pots of diversity and innovation (Jacobs, 1984; Florida, 2002;

Glaeser, 2011). Cities matter because most of the new economic activi-
ties driven by knowledge and innovation are located and concentrated
in cities, more so in the wake of globalization. In fact, “there is not a
single function performed in the city that cannot be performed” (Mumford,
1937, p.34). Concomitantly, the economic activities in cities and urban
areas account for a large share of the economic growth and productiv-
ity of a country. It is also no exaggeration that the characteristics of a
national economy are closely reflected in the sum of urban economies.
Jacobs (1984) goes a step further and argues that cities, not countries,
are the basic units of economic growth and development.
The forces that make city economies successful are highly complex.
Successful city economies are those that lead their regional and national
economies. These cities are competitive, productive, and innovative.
In fact, according to Simmie and colleagues (2006), such cities have:
the ability to continually upgrade the business environment, skill base, and
physical, social and cultural infrastructures, so as to attract and retain
high-growth, innovative and profitable firms, and an educated, creative and
entrepreneurial workforce, thereby enabling them to achieve a high rate of
productivity, high employment rate, high wages, high GDP per capita, and
low levels of income inequality and social exclusion
Many scholars have attempted to identify the mechanisms that

influence city economy and its success and have identified three mech-
anisms that are generally acknowledged to have a positive influence –
agglomeration economies, innovation, competition and diversity (see
Glaeser et al., 1992, for more details). Analysing the examples of success-
ful cities, researchers have theorized how cities have achieved economic
success through different mechanisms. Largely, these theories focus
on an economic/export base, increasing returns and agglomeration
economies, knowledge and innovation, clusters and cultural economic
aspects of the cities. According to tradable economic base of cities
theory, the trade balance of a city is a telling indicator of that city’s com-
petitiveness. Rising international market shares and improving trade
balance are certain indicators of increasing urban competitiveness.
Porter (1990, 1998, 2000), in his competitiveness theory, argues that
local economic success is determined by the presence of export-oriented
specialized industrial clusters. A number of variations of this theory of
urban competitiveness (conventional trade theory, Keynesian models
of urban multiplier effects, Keldor’s cumulative causation models, etc.)
have been presented by Simmie and colleagues (2006).
The five theoretical perspectives that have been propounded for urban
growth, and that focus on productivity, are briefly reviewed here. The
first theoretical perspective is based on agglomeration economies as
the basis for enhancing productivity. The proponents of agglomeration
economies theory argue that spatial concentration of firms and indus-
tries is important for increasing returns in the form of localization and
urbanization economies (Simmie et al., 2006). Most of the theories of
new economic geography (see Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse,
2002), which draw largely on Marshall’s triad of localization economies,
are concerned about demonstrating how self-reinforcing development
of external economies (through knowledge spill-overs and technological
transfers) can be set off by spatial agglomeration of economic activities.
The success of a city’s increasing returns and economic performance
depends on the level of attractiveness of the human and financial
capital.
The second theoretical perspective on urban growth relates to knowl-
edge and innovation and argues that cities are hubs of these. These
theories attempt to explain the total factor productivity component
in terms of the factors (educated labour, R&D) rendering technological
progress. These models suggest that the success of a city and its produc-
tivity depends on the educational quality of its workforce and on the
incentives for firms to undertake R&D activities. This requires continued
investments in human capital and training facilities for the enterprise’s
workforce, and production structures for the diffusion of technology.
The third and most widely used theory is about city competitiveness,
revolving around Porter’s Competitiveness of Nations Theory. In his
seminal paper, Porter (1990) argues that the most important defini-
tion of the competitiveness of nations is “national productivity”. Porter
proposed that the competitiveness of nations depends on four broad
attributes (which he called four diamonds) of the national location,
namely, factor conditions; demand conditions; related and supporting
industries and firms; strategy and rivalry.
Porter’s factor conditions require that a nation have an appropri-
ate supply of factors to be successful. These factors are land, labour,
and capital. Distinctions are drawn between basic factors, such as
climate and unskilled labour, and advanced factors, such as highly
skilled labour and infrastructure. Basic factors are not sufficient for
competitiveness, and the nation has to create advanced factors. Simi-
larly, there is a distinction between generalized factors and specialized
factors. Generalized factors can be deployed in a wide range of industries
while specialized factors are industry-specific. Abundance of a factor
supply does help in building a competitive industry, as in the case of

Denmark’s success in furniture due to the availability of a pool of trained
graduate furniture designers (Porter, 1990, p.78; Davies and Ellis, 2000).
The lack of availability of factors could also prove to be a boon in
disguise by creating an environment for innovation if a nation wants
to achieve competitiveness. Italy’s high cost of capital and energy and
shortages of basic raw materials led its steel producers to develop mini-
steel mill technology, in which Italy is the world leader (Porter, 1990,
p.82; Davies and Ellis, 2000).
Porter offers three demand conditions for a nation’s competitiveness.
He suggests that a country would be competitive in an industry which
is more important at home than anywhere else. An example is Swedish
industries, which are highly competitive in high voltage electricity dis-
tribution over long distances. The reason for their competitiveness is
their experience in the home market in supplying electricity to distant
and remote locations where energy-intensive paper and steel industries
are located. The second condition is that demanding home consumers
force companies to meet high standards. Americans’ desire for conve-
nience led to a fast food revolution, which has spread to other countries
as well (Davies and Ellis, 2000). The third condition is that firms in
the home market anticipate the needs of consumers in other countries.
Japanese consumers and government forced firms to produce energy-
saving products even before energy costs became important (Davies and
Ellis, 2000). These three conditions are not necessarily dependent on
the size of the domestic market, but force industries to innovate, giving
them an edge over others in international competition; though a large
domestic market which supported the above three demand conditions
would be highly supportive of international competitiveness.
Porter argues that a nation’s industries will be better able to compete
in the international market if there are clusters of industries in the home
economy, which are linked vertically and horizontally through demand,
supply, technology, distribution, and consumer networks. California has
an IT and ITES cluster, which has helped firms located there become
internationally competitive.
The fourth attribute for the competitiveness of nations proposed by
Porter is concerned with the strategies and structures of domestic firms
and the extent of the rivalry between them. If the business environment
favours family-run firms, the nation will specialize in industries that
do not experience economies of scale, as in Italy. If the executives are
dominated by engineers, the nation will have competitive advantage in
those sectors that require high technology content, as in Germany. If the
institutional structures for raising capital favour returns in the short

term, the nation will be successful in industries which offer short-term
returns. In addition to strategies and structures, Porter argues for the
importance of rivalry of firms in domestic markets. This is key for inno-
vation and leads to competitiveness internationally. In addition to these
four attributes, two other factors, chance and government, also play a
very important role (Davies and Ellis, 2000). Chance refers to events,
such as war, which offer opportunities to firms. Government plays a
role through policies. Proactive government policies in Dubai have con-
tributed to the business competitiveness of Dubai in the world market.
The fourth theoretical perspective is about city cultures. Cultural
economy models of urban competitiveness argue that part of the
economic performance of successful cities and regions is built on
social, cultural, and institutional arrangements which accommodate
and encourage changes, innovation, and creativity (Simmie et al., 2006).
Cities that are successful will possess a large concentration of creative
workers. Creativity thus becomes the backbone of the city’s economy
and forms the basis of competitive advantages (Florida, 2002).
Interestingly, while these theories provide an account of urban com-
petitive advantage, they fall short of analysing changes over time
(Simmie et al., 2006). Simmie and colleagues (2006) discuss, from an
evolutionary theoretical perspective that explains the path dependency
of economic development, changes in the dynamic competitiveness
of cities over time – the adaptation of cities to changing economic,
technological, and institutional environment drive urban growth. They
argue that the most important policies that affect local economies are
macroeconomic, industrial, and fiscal policies made by central and state
governments. At the local level, areas that have significant impact on
city economies are institutional change and local economic policies.
Along with the generation of positive externalities through com-
petition and agglomeration, cities also generate diseconomies of
agglomeration. The high concentration of jobs and people increase con-
gestion, pollution, and the competition for space in the central area of
cities. Cities are also marked by social differentiation, poverty, conflict,
and environmental degradation. These issues not only matter to cities
but impact on the sustainable development of the world (Beall et al.,
2010), and form the crux of the development policies of nations.
The subsequent sections of this chapter analyse the policies at various
levels of governments in India through the five theoretical approaches
described above. In doing so, we will evaluate the competitiveness and
productivity of Indian cities and also the effectiveness of policies in
giving a fillip to the agglomeration and competitiveness in cities. Schol-

ars have characterized the urban economy outcomes of various policies
and the processes that created them in different ways. This character-
ization is understandable given that the complex history of economic
thought and policy in India is largely of an activist, idealistic, and federal
post-independence state (Srinivasan and Wallack, 2009).
Economic productivity in urban India
Economic productivity of cities is impacted by three dimensions of

policies. First is national economic and industrial policies that have
intended and unintended effects on the urban economy through trade
protection and industrial incentives. Second, are state-level policies,
related industry and allocation of resources, public investment, and
diversification of activities. Third, are regional and city growth strate-
gies that have a significant impact on the city’s economic growth and
employment opportunities (Renaud, 1987). These three kinds of policies
determine where people work and live and why a particular city flour-
ishes and while another declines. While we know that cities can provide
a much required fillip for social, political, and economic opportunities,
why is it difficult to put together a strong development policy for cities?
Another question is, if agglomeration is beneficial and been recognized
by the institutions, then why have the institutions failed to promote the
strategy? Beall and colleagues (2009) argue that when cities and nations
tried to promote agglomeration strategy, they generally failed to achieve
urban concentration.
Historically, in India, the central government has been instrumental
in shaping the economic geography of the country through different
policies, incentives, and restrictions. Spatial considerations have never
been given due attention in Indian policies. Planners thought that
spatial inequalities could be mitigated through targeted interventions,
and devised policies to encourage the growth of new urban centres
and, through industrial decentralization through incentives, to relo-
cate businesses away from large urban centres. The approach of the
Government of India was to create new capital cities such as Gandhi
Nagar and Chandigarh. In a way, early development planning in inde-
pendent India did not, relatively speaking, have an explicit spatial
perspective. The “explicit spatial” nature of economic policies in India,
such as restrictions on industrial location, incentives for industry to
locate in backward areas, infrastructure investments in particular towns
and cities, and so on, have altered the spatial and hierarchical patterns
of urban areas. Most of these policies have been half-hearted, loosely

coordinated, and even counterproductive (Chakravorty, 2000; Planning
Commission, 1983). The establishment of “growth poles” and new eco-
nomic city centres have fallen into disfavour as a result of various
reasons, including the selection of the growth poles in depressed areas
with low levels of infrastructure and poor fiscal bases; this selection of
the centre was made for political reasons rather than economic ratio-
nale. To add to this, the implementation failure has made these centres
sour fruits of the policy (Parr, 1999a, in Beall et al., 2009).
Awasthi (1991) points out that Indian planning has been limited to
the allocation of investment in time, sectors, and subsectors. The policy-
makers, led by the Planning Commission, concentrated on the factors of
production and excluded spatial context. Lewis (1995) argued that two
particular factors are important in understanding the logic behind these
policies. One is that any implementation of a positive spatial strategy
would cost a lot of money, and the other is that the spatial dimension
of development was obviously political (Chakravorty, 2000). There was
also poor recognition of the inherent spatial nature of all development.
The policymakers, in an unexpressed manner, understood that indus-
trialization would lead to metropolitanization. However, that was not
considered to be an inseparable part of development (Beall et al., 2009).
Impact of industrial policies on urban economics and city growth

Post-independence, most of the national plan documents and poli-
cies aimed at correcting regional imbalances in the spatial pattern of
industrial location. The First Year Plan states that “if industrial develop-
ment in the country is to proceed rapidly and in a balanced manner,
greater attention will have to be paid to the development of those
states and regions which have so far remained backward”. Industrial
Policy Resolution 1956 made a direct reference to the problem of lack
of industrial development in backward areas and ensuing regional dis-
parities, with the objective of promoting balanced regional growth.
But, contrary to the objective, the actual operation of policy resulted
in increased regional inequalities. The Dutt Committee Report noted
that the industrially advanced states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and
West Bengal benefited most from the operation of this policy (Thakur
et al., 2012). Over time, many economic and industrial policies were
conceived without recognizing the untended impact that they would
have on the spatial structure and built environment of cities. The indus-
trial licensing system was used to direct investment into lagging areas
and heavy industries were discouraged from locating in metropolitan
cities. Large public sector projects such as steel plants were located in
backward states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa. Growth centres
or industrial estates were identified and received some investment in
infrastructure. Financial incentives were provided for private industrial
investment in lagging districts. The Freight Equalisation Policy of 1956
was used to equalize the prices of items such as coal, steel, and cement.
Despite all these measures, however, large metropolitan cities contin-
ued to receive large shares of private investment as these benefited from
various aspects of agglomeration economies (large labour pool, better
education and training, medical facilities, access to market, spill-over
from innovative activities of firms, diversification of industries).
Almost 55 per cent of capital subsidies went to only 25 of the 296
eligible lagging districts, which were in industrially advanced states
(Chakravorty, 2000). Another key element of industrial policy post-
independence has been its textile policy. A combination comprising
licensing control, excise duty policy, and trade policy favoured hand-
looms over power looms, with a view to protecting the employment
potential of a decentralized handloom industry. This restricted the
expansion of textile mills. As a result, some of the mill-based cities have
grown slower than they otherwise would have (Planning Commission,
1983). While trade policies have been beneficial for some urban centres,
they have also contributed to the stagnation of the port cities of Kolkata
and Chennai (Ibid.). All these policies were supposed to encourage dis-
persal of industrial activity. But, in effect, industries were denied the
economic benefits of urban agglomeration effects, thus rendering the
policies inefficient (Mohan and Dasgupta, 2005). The National Commis-
sion on Urbanisation (1988) argued that “instead of forcefully inducing
investments in areas which are backward and have little infrastructure and
in which the concessions are likely to be misused, the identified existing and
potential urban centres at intermediate levels could be developed to attract the
migrants as they are located in closely related regions”. The Commission also
recommended the discontinuation of most of these policies, except the
growth centre policy.
Take, for example, Kolkata. Its decline is one of the telling stories in
the history of urban economic policy and the impact that it can have
on metropolitan cities in India. The decline of the city had started with
the shift of the British imperial capital from Calcutta to Delhi in 1912.
The Great Bengal Famine of 1943 severely weakened the rural hinter-
lands of Calcutta for several years. To add to that, after the Partition of
India Kolkata lost its supplies of raw jute from East Bengal, which had a
severe impact on jute mills and led to their eventual closure. Communal
riots and tensions led to the swelling of slums with refugees. Along with
social and economic trauma of Partition, the independent government’s
freight price equalization policy completely wiped out any comparative
advantage of coal, iron, and steel industries in Bihar and Bengal. One
after another these industries became economically unviable. The clo-
sure of the jute and engineering industries and subsequent painful birth
of Bangladesh and a wave of refugees had become the final nail in the
coffin of the city economy (Acharya, 2013).
While the Government of India and state government’s sensible poli-
cies could have led to recovery, central governments were busy enacting
rigid policies (labour laws and Permit-License Raj) on industry and
trade, and the Left Front failed to stop the decline, with the inten-
tion of encouraging the dispersal of industrial activity which denied
urban agglomeration effects, thus making industry inefficient (Mohan
and Dasgupta, 2005). Inflexible laws and political patronage for labour
unions killed competitiveness. As the efficiency and economy of Kolkata
declined, skilled and unskilled people migrated to other parts of the
country. The city has registered negative growth in population dur-
ing the last three decades, at a time when most Indian cities have
grown rapidly. This has also led to the decline of the vibrant “creative
class” for which the city was known. Kolkata had a history of produc-
ing titans such as Rabindranath Tagore (the first Asian to win a Nobel
Prize), Satyajit Ray (India’s most renowned film-maker and Oscar win-
ner), Satyendranath Bose and Jagadish Chandra Bose (made seminal
contributions to quantum physics). Despite being the home for Indian
Institute of Management and Indian Statistical Institute and having
first Indian Institute of Technology in its vicinity, the city could not
hold on to the “vibrant” middle class that once spearheaded its creative
economy.
The state of West Bengal’s manufacturing output reduced to 7 per cent
in 2000 from 25 per cent during the 1950s, largely due to the decline
of Kolkata. At the time of independence, the corporate tax collections
from Kolkata were comparable to those of Bombay. But the contribution
of Kolkata has declined so much that the taxes were barely a tenth of
the collections in Mumbai by 2000. Even with regard to foreign direct
investments (FDIs) the city and the state together could only attract
2 per cent of the total inflows. The city has also not been able to find a
place in the recent Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) study on top ten
cities for business infrastructure.
After economic reforms in 1991, as License Raj was dismantled and
private capital was encouraged, all investment decisions – including
ownership and location – were determined on the basis of commercial

considerations rather than government mandates. States have started
competing with each other to attract investments into their regions
through a mechanism of incentives, such as offers of developed land
parcels (or by assisting in acquisition of land) and infrastructure.
Approval authorities have been eliminated or restructured with new
mandates (Chakravarthy, 2000). The Industrial Policy of 1991 mini-
mized the restriction of industrial location in metropolitan cities.2 The
policy also talked about using appropriate incentives and design of
investment in infrastructure development to promote the dispersal of
industry, particularly to rural and backward areas, and to reduce con-
gestion in cities. The chief ministers of all major states have actively
pursued investments and led delegations overseas to advertise the merits
of locating in their states (Ibid.).
SEZ policies
After the economic reforms, there has been a twofold decentralization –
investment decisions by private business entities and economic devel-
opment initiatives by state governments (Kennedy, 2009). The federal
relations, including decentralization of power from the centre to states,
also got redefined, though decentralization is often accompanied by
directives and other instruments for control and to provide an overview.
This has been one of the defining features of the politics of economic
reforms in India. The central government often diffused opposition by
delegating the management of reforms to the states (Ibid.). States have
also selectively pursued those reforms that are most compatible with
their own objectives, motivations, and electoral compulsions. Selec-
tive decisions made at the state level have further exacerbated regional
inequalities. Economic growth has been more uneven across the country
in the post-reform period (Kennedy and Zerah, 2008; Kennedy, 2009),
and has led to a “top-heavy” urbanization pattern, which is skewed in
favour of large cities and their fringes (Kundu, 2011).
In the last decade, metropolitan regions formed the crux of state
industrial policies. Growing incomes in cities raised demands for infras-
tructure and led to rapid growth in commercial and real estate activities.
This concentration of wealth and opportunity for capital accumulation
placed India’s largest cities at the core of its political economy. The
major shift has been in the perception of political parties towards the
urban, which, despite promoting the continued political importance of
rural areas, are gaining direct stakes in the economy of cities through
politicians’ forays into real estate ventures. An explicit manifestation
of the nexus between economic and political elites, within the context
of large-scale infrastructure projects, is obvious in modern India. The
political elite, realizing the importance of cities as the main hubs of
growth and investment, has promoted urban regions as strategic assets,
instituted spatial policies that are compatible with a neoliberal agenda,
created an Enterprise Parks Policy or Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Pol-
icy, and simplified investment procedures, along with these policies, to
make cities more efficient and more attractive to transnational invest-
ments. This has also resulted in a rescaling of urban and peri-urban
land in cities (Kennedy, 2009). However, significantly in the entire pro-
cess, local governments – both Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) and rural
local bodies – have been bypassed by higher levels of governments in
decision-making.
The history of SEZ policies in India dates back to the 1960s, when
the Government of India established seven SEZs in coastal areas and in
Delhi. This number had grown to more than 576 by May 2014. India’s
export-oriented units (EOUs) today account for more than 8 per cent
of national exports while SEZs’ contribution to exports is between 2 to
3 per cent (Cheesman, 2012). The policy recommends that locations
of new SEZs should be selectively chosen so that they spread develop-
ment and address existing regional imbalances. However, the experience
on the ground indicates that SEZs are not proceeding in the manner
expected in the policy document. They are neither manufacturing nor
are they mitigating regional imbalances (Mukhopadhyay and Pradhan,
2009). Mukhopadhyay (2009) noted that SEZs are concentrated in a few
districts within a few states, most of which had an above average rate
of industrialization. Also, almost all of the notified and approved SEZs
were in the vicinity of large towns and cities. Further, Mukhopadhyay
and Pradhan (2009) argue that the SEZ policy is not likely to create new
infrastructure as most SEZs are small in size (less than one km2 ) and
are located in and around industrialized areas and especially around
existing megacities. The process of SEZ development has led to the sus-
picion that they may free-ride on existing infrastructure, rather than
upgrade it or create new infrastructure. The concentration of the SEZs
in urban areas also led to the hypothesis that SEZs are motivated to
acquire land for real estate projects, thereby leading to “accumulation by
dispossession” (Ibid.) as eminent domain has often been used to acquire
land for SEZs (Figure 4.1).
SEZs have caused substantial demands on existing large cities and
their infrastructure by not only consuming the resources of these cities
but also enhancing their rate of urbanization, thereby burdening cities
350,000 200
Rupees in crore
300,000
250,000 150
Per cent
200,000
100
150,000
100,000 50
50,000
0 0
4
1
–0
–0
–0
–0
–0
–0
–1
–1
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Value of exports (Rupees in crore)
Growth rate (Y-O-Y) in per cent
Figure 4.1 Performance of SEZs

Source: http://sezindia.nic.in/about-osi.asp, accessed on 23 August 2013.
by requiring more infrastructure and other facilities. As the size of these

entities prevent them from functioning as self-sufficient areas, these tiny
SEZs will also draw physical infrastructure and social resources from the
existing cities and congest the infrastructure there. Problems that persist
with the SEZ policy and its implementation on the ground are seriously
compromising the viability of SEZs and also destroying the competi-
tiveness and attractiveness of the cities in which they are located. The
success of the SEZs and the cities in which they are located will depend
on planning for the area around the SEZs and providing resources for
infrastructure planning and management.
Cities and economies in India

Indian cities, despite their structural limitations and historical burdens,
have performed reasonably well in producing much required growth for
the country. Even though the structural changes in the economy have
accelerated the process of urbanization, the urbanization rate is below
other rapidly growing countries. However, while the official estimates of
the urbanization levels are lower than other developing countries, other
estimates suggest that the urbanization rate is much higher than the
official figure if computed based on the agglomeration index (see, for
more detail, Denis et al., 2012; World Bank, 2013).
As discussed in Chapter 2, the contribution of industry in GDP has
increased over time, albeit not to the extent one would expect for a
developing country. The agriculture and allied industries’ contribution
has declined. The service sector has produced about two-third of total
GDP. The industry and service sectors are largely located in cities. The
top ten cities in India produce about 15 per cent of the GDP, with their
8 per cent of the population occupying just 0.1 per cent of the land area
(IIHS, 2011). Similarly, the 53 million-plus cities produce about 32 per
cent of the GDP, with 13.3 per cent of the population and about 0.2 per
cent of the land area. And, the top 100 cities are estimated to produce
about 43 per cent of the GDP with 16 per cent of the population and
about 0.24 per cent of the land area (Ibid.).
For many, the growth story of Indian economy without significant
urbanization is a major puzzle. An assessment made by the World Bank
(2013) suggests that India’s urbanization in metropolitan cities during
the last three or four decades has stagnated in terms of people and
employment. While the metropolitan cities have the highest concen-
trations of information and high-tech manufacturing industries, which
have earlier benefited from agglomeration economies, even these sec-
tors have declined during the last 15 to 20 years. The level of per
capita income in India is still far below the critical levels at which the
concentration of activities in cities start to taper off (World Bank, 2013).
Scholars have offered various explanations for the high economic
growth but low urbanization levels in India. Mohan and Dasgupta
(2005) attribute this slow urban growth to inadequate increase in rural
productivity, which locked labour into the agriculture sector; inappro-
priate technology choice in industry, which led to lower absorption of
labour in urban areas; rigid labour legislation and small industries reser-
vations; and restrictions on the location of industries, which, from the
1970s, inhibited them from being set up in urban areas. The World Bank
(2013) suggests that policy distortions and infrastructure shortfalls have
undermined the probability of urbanization and agglomeration.
With a view to dispersing industrial activity, industries were not per-
mitted to locate within any urban areas until the industrial policy
reform of 1991. Location restrictions were lifted except in million-plus
cities in 1991. As a result of earlier restrictive policies on locations, indus-
tries have become capital intensive, as the availability of skilled labour
was difficult outside urban areas. As a result, industrial employment
growth has declined, particularly in cities (Mohan and Dasgupta, 2005).
Economic liberalization in the 1990s started the process of clustering
business in metropolitan areas. It has also led to the identification of
new locations for both foreign and domestic investments. Metropolitan
areas and coastal cities are favoured over non-metropolitan and hin-
terland cities. Cities such as Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Pune,
Chennai and National Capital Region (NCR), and corridors such as
Ahmedabad to Pune corridor, southern urban corridor of Bengaluru are
favoured over other areas. Given the trends of globalization and nature
of the macro economy and its critical components, the bulk of the
industrial and infrastructure development is likely to be concentrated
in and around the large cities (Kundu, 2007). Though there have been
substantive spill-overs to areas around the metro cities, this pattern of
economic development has increased interregional income inequalities
in India, as 75 per cent of the urban population and 95 per cent of the
rural population live outside metropolitan cities (World Bank, 2013).
Within the large cities, industrial units and jobs are concentrated in
the suburbs. The industrial location policies and land and urban plan-
ning policies have contributed to the pattern of industrialization in
cities. High technology and export-oriented manufacturing jobs have
located in the periphery of the largest metropolises. These suburbs are
driving the agglomeration and specialization in Indian cities. Because
of the lack of regional planning framework in Indian cities, peri-urban
areas are not integrated with the mother city, so it is impossible to drive
positive external economies across the region (World Bank, 2013). Non-
availability of land in core city areas has pushed industries further away,
to non-urban areas. Availability of unorganized labour and less strin-
gent environmental regulations in peripheral areas also have played a
role in locating industries in these areas (Kundu, 2003, 2007, 2011).
These peri-urban areas have experienced rapid economic growth and
have attracted large number of migrants. Urban poor residing in exist-
ing cities are attracted to these peripheries as employment opportunities
emerge or due to high land prices in core city areas (Figure 4.2).
Ghani and colleagues (2012) also indicate that there is flight of formal
businesses away from the urban areas to peri-urban and rural areas. The
20
Growth rate (%)
15
10
5
0
–5 <50 km 50–100 km 100–200 km 200–300 km 300–450 km >450 km
Distance from seven largest cities
Manufacturing employment growth (1998–2005)
Figure 4.2 Manufacturing employment growth (1998–2005)

Source: The World Bank (2013).
evidence also suggests that there has been a formalization of existing

informal activities in cities to take advantage of global markets. This has
led entities to standardize their products to meet the requirements of
customers, nationally and globally. Mishra and Shankar (2013) present
some interesting statistics: that 75 per cent of gross fixed capital forma-
tion in India in 2005 happened in informal sector and trade comprises
39 per cent of total enterprises. Of the total workforce, 52 per cent are
self-employed (Ibid.). The informal GDP in retail and real estate services
is about 80 per cent and in transport services and hotel about 55 per
cent (Ibid.). As most business entities in cities are engaged in small-
scale manufacturing, trade, commerce and finance, and hotels, these
activities are increasing being confronted by the global processes of stan-
dardization of goods and materials. Recent debate and protests against
FDI in retail in India was an outcome of clash between the informal
and the formal economies. This process of “formal informalization” is
excluding the rural migrants, who lack the basic level of education and
communication skills needed to get a foothold in the more demanding
employment markets. As a result, Kundu (2007) explains “urban India
faces a paradox. Despite unprecedented growth in employment, it will con-
tinue to experience high levels of unemployment in the future especially at the
heart of its cities.”
Agglomeration diseconomies in Indian cities

Indian cities, like elsewhere, have shown an agglomeration pattern over
the years. Desmet and colleagues (2012) point out that the manufactur-
ing sector in India is younger than that of Europe and the United States.
Singh (2005) further argued that the industrial sector has lagged behind
since economic reforms during the 1990s. He ascribes the slow pace
of industrial development to the impediments to internal trade, labour
market rigidities, and barriers in doing business. The sector also suffered
from lack of technology, non-availability of skilled labour, and poor
infrastructure in cities. As a result, the manufacturing industry has not
been able to increase its output (the output remained at 16 per cent of
GDP during the 1980 and 2002 periods). The congestion in Indian cities,
due to the lack of a transport infrastructure, imposed an enormous cost
on industry and made it impossible for it to benefit from agglomeration.
Consequently, manufacturing has moved away from high-density clus-
ters to areas that are less congested, on urban fringes around large cities
or to Tier 2 and Tier 3 towns. Over time, industrial activity seems to be
spreading more equally across spaces (Desmet et al., 2012).
At city level, three significant contributors to agglomeration

diseconomies are poor transport, concerns about safety and security, and
high land and house prices. Poor transport infrastructure is an enormous
cost on the economy through the delays and uncertainty faced in trans-
porting goods. Congestion, crawling traffic, and high pollution levels
have entailed significant costs on the urban economy. Congestion in
Indian cities costs about Rs 3,000–4,000 crores every year (Ankinapalli
and Sanga, 2010). Similarly, Indian cities are facing major environ-
mental problems in the form of high air pollutions. The seven largest
metro cities in India – Bombay, Kolkata, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bengaluru,
Hyderabad, and Chennai – have severe air pollution problems, with
per capita emission levels at least three times as high as the World
Health Organization (WHO) standard (Palanivel, 2001; CSE, 2009, in
Ankinapalli and Sanga, 2010). About 40,000 premature deaths could be
avoided – 7,500 (19 per cent) in Delhi, 5,700 (14 per cent) in Kolkata,
and 4,500 (11 per cent) in Mumbai – if the air pollution levels were
reduced to WHO standards (Palanivel, 2001). An economic valuation
of these premature deaths suggests a monetary estimate of the loss of
between $170 and $1,615 million. The estimates showed that reduced
pollution levels in Indian cities would reduce new cases of chronic lung
disease and reduce respiratory tract infections, especially in children.
Using cost-of-treatment approach, the estimates showed that the lower
estimate of the social value of these impacts is $350–490 million per
year (Palanivel, 2001, in Ankinapalli and Sanga, 2010). Road accidents
too have risen to an alarming proportion in Indian cities. About 80,000
persons were killed and 382,700 injured in India in the year 2001. While
four Indian megacities constituted 4.4 per cent of Indian population,
these constituted about 5.4 per cent of all road-accident-related fatali-
ties, suggesting the serious road safety problems in Indian cities (Singh,
2005).
The second factor that affects city competiveness is security and pro-
tection of social capital. The burden of poor security weighs high on
the image of a city in the eyes of the external world. When some
localities become disconnected from the city proper, they becomes
subject to progressive deterioration of services, damage to the social
fabric, and, thereby, declining social capital in the city. Safety concerns
related to women and foreigners have made the capital city of Delhi
less favourable in the location decisions of businesses. Fear of travel
to unsafe cities by foreigners also constrains the knowledge exchange.
A survey undertaken by Assocham’s Social Development Foundation
(ASDF) reveals that the high rate of Delhi rape incidents has impacted
the productivity of information technology-enabled services (ITeS) and
business process outsourcing (BPO) companies in all large cities. Simi-
larly, another survey carried out by Delhi-based Associated Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (Assocham) indicated that tourism and other
related businesses were heavily impacted by the “Nirbhaya” incident
in Delhi. The survey results suggest that foreign tourist arrivals have
dropped by 25 per cent since December and the number of female
travellers dropped by 35 per cent.
The third factor is housing and land. The failure of housing and land
markets to cater to all sections of the population is grimly apparent
in Indian cities. High housing costs, limited affordable housing sup-
ply, and possible uncontrolled spread of the built-up area subsequently
increases the cost of the infrastructure services, thereby reducing the
benefits of agglomeration economies. As we argued in Chapter 3, plan-
ning policies and regulations in Indian cities have explicitly aimed
at containing urban areas since independence. These rigid restrictions
imposed by the planning institutions have increased the cost of space
in all categories of development. Cheshire and colleagues (2012), in fact,
estimated that planning policies such as Town Centre First (TCF) in the
UK have caused a significant reduction in both total factor productiv-
ity and labour productivity in retailing. Their estimates suggest that the
loss of total factor productivity stands at around 9.6 per cent, with an
additional 2.6 per cent loss of labour productivity in the UK. In the
Indian context, Reddy (2013a) argues that economic, regulatory, and
urban development instruments have led to a reduction in productivity
in cities. He estimates that productivity loss due to higher land costs and
spatial expansion of cities was about US$7.9 billion in 2012. He further
estimates that the loss would be likely to reach US$31 billion by 2015,
if the issues related to planning regulations are not addressed.
Competitiveness of Indian cities
Porter’s idea has been explored further in some measures of compet-

itiveness. The World Economic Forum (WEF) computes an index of
competitiveness of nations. WEF defines competitiveness as the set of
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productiv-
ity of a country for the purposes of developing a Global Competitiveness
Index (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2013). Productivity determines the level of
prosperity a country can achieve and also the rates of returns obtained
by investments in an economy (Ibid.). Rates of return on investment
are fundamental drivers of growth of an economy. More competitive

economies are those more likely to sustain economic growth.
Sala-i-Martin and colleagues (2013) identify 12 pillars of competi-
tiveness. The first pillar is institutions. Institutions go beyond legal
framework to include government and private sectors’ attitude towards
markets and freedom and their operation. Factors such as exces-
sive bureaucracy, red tape, corruption, lack of transparency, political
dependence on the judicial system, unethical practices of corporate
managers in dealing with government or the public, and so on can
hinder growth. The second pillar is infrastructure, as extensive and
efficient infrastructure is important factor in determining the loca-
tion of economic activity, and the kind of activities and sectors that
can develop. The third pillar is stability of macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Instability of the economy, high governmental debt, and
running a fiscal deficit limits government responsiveness to business
cycles and investment in competition-enhancing sectors. High infla-
tion poses constraints for operations of companies as the risk to capital
investment is high. The fourth pillar is health and primary educa-
tion. A healthy workforce increases competitiveness and productivity.
Quality and quantity of basic education enhances efficiency. The fifth
pillar is higher education and training. For competitiveness in today’s
economy, a workforce that is able to perform complex tasks and
is able to adapt to new environments and the needs of the econ-
omy is required. Higher education and training play crucial roles in
competitiveness.
The sixth pillar is goods market efficiency. According to Sala-i-Martin
and colleagues (2013):
Countries with efficient goods markets are well positioned to pro-

duce the right mix of products and services given their particular
supply-and-demand conditions, as well as to ensure that these goods
can be most effectively traded in the economy. Healthy market com-
petition, both domestic and foreign, is important in driving market
efficiency and thus business productivity by ensuring that the most
efficient firms, producing goods demanded by the market, are those
that thrive.
The seventh pillar is labour market efficiency, which indicates how

efficiently and flexibly labour can be allocated to the most effective use
in the economy. Efficient labour market also ensures a link between
compensation and meritocracy and gender equality in the business
environment. The eighth pillar is financial market development. An effi-

cient financial market ensures efficient allocation of resources saved by
a nation’s residents and foreigners investing the nations’ assets to pro-
ductive uses. Economies require sophisticated financial markets that can
make capital available for private-sector investment from such sources as
loans from a sound banking sector, well-regulated securities exchanges,
venture capital, and other financial products. To perform these func-
tions, the banking sector needs to be trustworthy and transparent, and
financial markets need appropriate regulation to protect investors and
other actors in the economy at large (Ibid.).
The ninth pillar is technological readiness – the agility of an economy
to respond to technologies to enhance productivity of its industries. The
tenth pillar is market size. The larger the size of market, the greater
the competitive advantage. The 11th pillar is business environment.
Sophisticated business practices are conducive to higher efficiency in
the production of goods and services. According to Sala-i-Martin and
colleagues (2013), “Business sophistication concerns two elements that
are intricately linked: the quality of a country’s overall business net-
works and the quality of individual firms’ operations and strategies.”
The 12th pillar is technological innovation. Though there are substan-
tial gains from improving institutions, building infrastructure, reducing
macroeconomic instability, or improving human capital, all these fac-
tors eventually seem to run into diminishing returns (Ibid.). The same is
true for the efficiency of the labour, financial, and goods markets. In the
long run, standards of living can be largely enhanced by technological
innovation.
Roles of cities in competitiveness

Cities are crucibles of human energy and the lifeblood of the global
economy, accounting for about 80 per cent of GDP. The competitiveness
of cities is increasingly determining the wealth of nations, regions, and
the whole world. Sally (2013) argues that:
throughout history the most intensive cross-border economic trans-

actions have been between cities – most of them on the coastline.
Today, the bulk of international trade by volume is still ocean-going
trade between coastal cities, only now it is conveyed by huge con-
tainer ships. So think of a different map of the global economy:
one of cities connected across land borders, seas and oceans through
the exchange of goods and services, foreign investment, migrants
and short-term workers, and border-hopping technology. Given the
enduring importance of national competitiveness, such a map is a

complement – not an alternative – to an inter-national map of the
global economy.
Sally (2013) lists some of the ingredients that make cities more pro-
ductive. According to the author, while some vital policies are parochial:
urban planning and zoning, housing, water, sanitation, policing, and
so on, the most successful cities, like the most successful nations,
also have the following: stable and solid public finances; low, simple,
and competitive taxation; simple and transparent business regulation;
strong and impartial rule of law; openness to international trade and
foreign investment; a welcoming environment for “foreign talent”;
good “hard connectivity” – roads, transit systems, ports, airports; and
good “soft connectivity” – education, skills, and technology diffusion.
Like nations, cities with limited – but effective – government and
competitive markets do better than cities with big, inefficient govern-
ment and distorted markets. This reinforces the message that there
is a good deal of overlap between city competitiveness and national
competitiveness.
The two types of competitiveness – nation and cities – are inter-
linked. Cities need to be understood as part of wider economic systems,
networks, and resource flows, rather than as self-contained units. This
means that the strength of external business connections and the effi-
ciency of external communications and transport links are important, as
well as national and international policies and the changing structure
of external markets. In addition, cities appear to obtain a competitive
advantage from the size and diversity of concentrated economic activ-
ity, which improves access to markets, suppliers, collaborators, and a
large labour pool. Localized business networks may be most important
for certain kinds of innovative and emerging functions. These advan-
tages cannot be taken for granted since cities – especially older ones –
also tend to have higher costs, more congestion, and inferior access
to the motorway network compared with surrounding areas and some
smaller towns. Consequently, an efficient transport system and an effec-
tive supply of development land and property are important to avoid
cities being disadvantaged (Turok, 2004).
India’s and its cities’ in world competitiveness

In an index with 148 countries, computed by WEF, India ranked 60th
in 2013–14. India’s status is affected by poor performance in the basic
drivers underpinning competitiveness, particularly those that matter
the most, given its stage of development. India’s supply of transport,

information and communications technology (ICTs), and energy infras-
tructure remains largely insufficient and ill-adapted to the needs of
the economy. The business community in India repeatedly cites infras-
tructure as the single biggest hindrance to doing business, ahead of
corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy. Notwithstanding improve-
ments across the board over the past few years, very poor public
health and education levels remain a prime cause of India’s low pro-
ductivity. The quality of higher education is better, but enrolment
rates at that level remain very low, even by developing country stan-
dards. Turning to the country’s institutions, discontent within the
business community remains high about the lack of reforms and the
perceived inability of the government to push them through. Public
trust in politicians has been eroding over time, while bribery remains
deeply rooted. The situation has deteriorated further on the macroe-
conomic front, with an inflation rate and public deficit-to-GDP ratio
dangerously close to double digits in 2012, and a debt-to-GDP ratio
that is the second highest among the BRICS. Another major concern
is the country’s low level of technological readiness. Although busi-
nesses adopt new technologies relatively promptly, penetration rates
of fixed and mobile Internet and telephony among the population
remain among the lowest in developing Asia. Furthermore, the situa-
tion has worsened in terms of labour market efficiency, where the most
salient problem remains the dismally low participation of women in the
workforce.
The Economic Intelligence Unit (2012) prepared a global cities com-
petitiveness index for 120 cities around the world, selected on the
basis of size and regional importance. The factors used for computing
the index were economic strength, physical capital, financial maturity,
institutional effectiveness, social and cultural character, human capital,
environmental and natural hazards, and global appeal. The variables
underlying these factors measure the quantity and quality of these fac-
tors. Indian cities were ranked in the bottom half of the list, with Delhi
ranked 68, Mumbai ranked 70, and Bengaluru ranked 79. Indian cities
were among bottom half in most factors and were in lower third in
financial maturity.
Examining Indian cities from competitiveness lenses

The discussion above clearly indicates that, for competitiveness, nations
and cities should create advantages in either basic factors (institutions,
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and education of
workforce), or in efficiency enhancers (higher education and train-

ing, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, and market size), or in factors
associated with innovation and sophistication (business sophistication
and innovation), or a combination of these. It may be emphasized here
that these three are not totally independent of each other. In fact, many
of these factors are interrelated, with some serving as pre-conditions for
others.
Several types of advantages exist in Indian cities. Cities like Delhi and
Mumbai, being the largest metropolitan cities, the primate cities, attract
disproportionately higher shares of investment per capita than other
cities (Choe and Roberts, 2011). Cities like Bengaluru and Hyderabad
have grown rapidly, with specialized sectors such as IT, tourism,
advanced manufacturing, trade, and transport logistics. These cities
have invested in human capital and put in place processes for reducing
transaction costs to promote the competitiveness of industry clusters.
Bengaluru established itself as the first “technopolis” of India during
the 1990s. A number of factors have contributed to the growth of the
IT sector in the city. These include widespread communication skills,
the sheer number of lower-wage skilled labourers, know-how in manag-
ing services projects, and connections with Silicon Valley in California.
The presence of the country’s leading research institutes and other state-
run high technology sectors such as aeronautics have helped in the
development of the city’s IT sector.
Many factors have contributed to Bengaluru’s present-day IT-led glob-
alization (Narayana, 2011). First, the city has been a hub for electronic
and electrical industries. These industries have supplied low-cost com-
ponents to major industries and, therefore, provide “a major comparative
and competitive advantage for IT manufacturing in the state” (Narayana,
2011, p.1293). The second factor is the promotion of the IT sector
through various state-level policies. Karnataka announced the Infor-
mation Technology Policy in 1997, which was the first separate policy
for the promotion and development of information technology. Fur-
ther to this, the state had announced its Millennium IT Policy in
2000. These policies have filliped the use of IT in education insti-
tutions and other sectors and also provided incentives for attracting
investments into the city. The Comprehensive Development Plan of
Bengaluru Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA)
has earmarked land for creating new IT jobs by 2015 (Ibid.). The
third factor is the locational advantages of the city, having better
facilities and an environment that is conducive to competitiveness.
Lower infrastructure deficit and constraints and favourable business

environment through easy approval and permissions for starting busi-
nesses have played a critical role in attracting new business to the
city.
Apart from these factors, growth coalitions also have played signif-
icant role in driving the economic agenda of the cities. Bengaluru
initiated the Bengaluru Agenda Task Force (BATF), as a partnership
between the citizens, corporates, and administrative agencies to bring
together the key stakeholders and stimulate citizen participation in
urban issues. Though BATF became unsustainable after few years and
lost its relevance, it did contribute by bringing citizens’ viewpoints on
matters related to public services to urban governance. On the other
hand, the failure of BATF also highlights the challenges that cities face
in implementing reform agendas due to the multiplicity of institutions
and the political coordination failure that arises due to this.
The growth in gross district income (GDI) of Bengaluru has remained
higher than those of Karnataka state and the Central during 1980–81
to 2004–05 (Narayana, 2011). Though the contribution of industry in
Bengaluru reduced from 42 per cent in 1980–81 to 35 per cent in
2004–05, the contribution of the service sector has increased from 47 per
cent in 1980–81 to 63 per cent in 2004–05. Total exports of Bengaluru
have increased from Rs 21 billion in 1993–94 to Rs 432 billion in
2004–05. The share of the city exports in national exports has increased
from 2 per cent in 1993–94 to 12 per cent in 2004–05. The annual inflow
of FDI in Bengaluru has been about 86 per cent of the FDI inflow in
the state from 1995 to 2005. The share of city’s FDI in total country’s
FDI reached a high of 43 per cent in 1998/99, though it levelled to about
2 per cent in 2003–04. This reduction in the share is due the emergence
of other cities, such as Hyderabad, Pune, Ahmedabad, and NCR, on the
global scene, which have also become competitive in attracting capital.
Crumbling urban infrastructure services in Bengaluru are causing the
out-migration of firms to other cities.
The historical course of development policies in Karnataka state and
Bengaluru illustrate that little attention was paid to urban built environ-
ment and urban infrastructure facilities as the city was developing and
expanding. Complexities in dealing with land and spatial dimension,
as they are too local and contentious issues to be dealt by the state
or centre, left these out of policies. The city now is characterized by
a crumbling infrastructure, long traffic jams, air pollution, and power
shortages: a typical mess that characterizes many Indian cities. The
infrastructure deficits have reached such a level that Azim Premji, the
chairman of one of the largest IT companies in India, threatened to

pulling his offices out of Bengaluru. The protests from IT employees for
better urban roads also summarize the problems with Bengaluru’s urban
infrastructure.
Dynamism, specialization, and single industry towns

Let’s start by looking at Detroit, an industrial town in the US that has
recently filed for bankruptcy. The story of Detroit suggests that single
industry towns may not be sustainable for a city economy. The eco-
nomic base theory (Andrews, 1953; Tiebout, 1956a, 1956b) also argues
that a resilient city is one whose economic base is diversified. There
are many cities in India that are dependent on a single industry. The
economy and employment of cities such as Jamshedpur, Bengaluru, and
Kanpur depend on a single industry. If there is one thing that the rise
and fall of Detroit can teach Indian cities, it would be that no indus-
try is safe. Detroit had depended on the automobile industry, which
was largely dependent on three big manufacturers who had a belief that
“whatever happens to the world, people will keep on buying cars”. The
world was hit by a series of recessions, a rise in oil prices, and stag-
nation in incomes, particularly since the global financial crisis in 2007.
Globalization also played a role, with emergence of Japanese and Korean
car manufacturers, who started producing cars at much cheaper costs.
Detroit, which was rich, famous, and a hub for employment, has now
become no more than a haunted shanty town. The city is being engulfed
by the disastrous fate of the very industry that brought it riches.
There are a few similarities between Detroit and Bengaluru. Like
the automobile industry for Detroit, IT has become backbone for
Bengaluru’s economy. Almost 35 per cent of India’s IT exports are based
out of Bengaluru and it is not wrong to say IT is the city’s backbone. The
competitiveness of the IT industry and its location would determine the
future growth and sustainability of Bengaluru. There is already a trend
suggesting that, in the future, IT industries will locate in Tier 2 and Tier
3 cities. The heavy engineering industries of the 1980s have already
declined and locations such as those occupied by Hindustan Machine
Tools (HMT) Limited and old airports are looking for alternative usages.
There are other industries in the city, but they would need some fillip to
help them become a major part of the city’s economy.
Another American city, Pittsburgh, is a classical example of diversi-
fication of economy. The city had relied on steel industry for employ-
ment and growth until the 1980s. When the steel industry collapsed,
the region lost about half of its manufacturing jobs. More than
50,000 people left the city every year. The city administration has
concentrated on technological and biotech innovation for the economy.
They have encouraged health-care and education sectors in the city.
Dennis Yablonsky, CEO of the Allegheny Conference and the Pittsburgh
Regional Alliance, both local economic development agencies, says, “in
30 years we went from an economy where 50% of employment was
depending on one sector, to an economy where we have five main
industries, of which none represents more than 23% [of the total]”
(Kaczmarski, 2012). As of 2013, the proportion of Pittsburgh’s workforce
in manufacturing is now actually lower than the national average, a
major shift from the seventies or early eighties (Popper, 2013).
Urban footprint
An important dimension of the productive environment in cities is

how they consume and manage resources, not only their own but from
the hinterland as well. The footprint of Indian cities when it comes
to consumption of food, energy, water, and construction material is
quite large, often at the cost of deprivation in areas which supply these
resources. Reddy (2013b) analyses the resource flows in Mumbai, a city
of 18 million inhabitants, the transformations that take place, and the
resulting products and wastes. The author estimates that Mumbai uses
17.4 million tons of construction materials amounting to a per capita
annual consumption of one ton. Aggregates that are used in concrete
and mortar account for 60 per cent of total construction materials con-
sumed and are derived from riverbeds and rocky outcrops. This imposes
a significant environmental price on aggregates, which is usually not
accounted for (Ibid.).
Reddy (2013b) also estimates the consumption of food in Mumbai.
Consumption of cereals, vegetables, and dairy products constitutes
about 50 per cent of food consumption. The per capita food consump-
tion is about 43 kg/month (cereals (8.27 kg), meat (3.3 kg), and fruits
(4.8 kg)). On an average, Mumbai consumes 26,185 tons of food materi-
als per day and generates 8,815 tons of waste (Ibid.), implying that about
30 per cent of the food brought into the city does not find its way into
human stomachs but ends up as garbage in landfills.
For water supply, Mumbai depends on lakes around it. Reddy (2013b)
found that, of the total 200 litre per capita per day consumption of
water, nearly 50 per cent is used for bathing and washing purposes.
An additional 25 per cent of water is used in toilets. Water from lakes,
which is supplied by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC),
does not suffice to meet this requirement, and has to be supplemented

by groundwater extracted from rural areas and supplied in tankers.
With regard to energy consumption, as estimated by Reddy (2013b),
during 2010, the household sector in Mumbai consumed 74.2 TJ of
energy. A significant quantity of energy consumption (30 per cent) is for
thermal use, predominantly for cooking and space cooling. Electricity
accounts for all non-thermal uses, including lighting, domestic/kitchen
appliances, TV, and other household goods, as well as for some space
cooling and water heating. There is also considerable non-thermal
electrical consumption for lighting, office equipment space cooling,
cooking/hot-water generation purposes. When looking at the useful
energy, the per capita energy is only half of the primary energy, which
indicates that about half of the final energy that enters into the system
goes out as waste heat and emissions (Reddy, 2013b).
These estimates indicate that Indian cities at present are inefficient
consumers of resources – and usually at the cost of hinterland. Many of
these resources are procured from areas outside cities, and on favourable
basis to cities, leading to conflicts.
Sustaining a productive environment
Evidence suggests that India has largely depended on large cities for its
economic growth. The high growth rates targeted for the future and the
policies of the governments suggest that urbanization and economic
growth will largely depend on these large and poor cities. However,
as Mukhopadhyay (2006) argues, managing these large cities would be
resource intensive, “as all big metropolises are, but even more so since they
will lack the ameliorative concerns for environment that tend to appear only at
higher levels of income” (p.879).3 Others argued that small and medium
towns languished, in need of attention from government for growth and
urbanization. So, the policy dilemma on urbanization currently revolves
around on whether India should invest in infrastructure in big cities to
reduce externalities or invest in small and medium cities to facilitate
the emergence of the new cities (Desmet et al., 2012). While one may
not disagree that the metro cities, which support about 9 per cent of
the country’s population and provide 18 per cent of employment on
1 per cent of its land area, needs attention, care must be taken of the
development of small and medium cities for inclusive economic growth.
As the World Bank’s study (2013) indicates, much of the urban popula-
tion is living in proximity to the metropolitan cities. And only a third
of the India’s new census towns are 50km from the metropolitan cities.
Developing and planning for the towns outside the influence sphere of
metro cities is crucial for managing the urbanization process and reap-
ing the benefits of it without losing much to congestion economies in
large cities.
While, during the last two decades, Indian cities have been able to
attract investments and induce economic growth, basic infrastructure
barely managed to keep pace with population growth and demands
of the industry. On the other hand, structural impediments in urban
regulations (for both formal and informal) have not been addressed
by the state and central governments. The resultant urban system is
one that discourages agglomeration (formal and informal activities) and
employment-generating manufacturing industries in cities on the one
hand, and, on the other, uproots the existing livelihood opportunities
for informal sectors in the process of creating a formal city for large-
scale knowledge-based economic activities which do not create jobs.
Understandably, the structure of employment in India has not kept pace
with the country’s GDP structure. While the contribution of agricul-
ture to GDP is declining, it continued to absorb a very large proportion
of the country’s workers (Choe and Roberts, 2011). Agriculture, while
contributing about 45 per cent of the GDP in 2009, accounted for 70
per cent of the employment. Urban formal sector accounts for 25 per
cent of the GDP, but only accounts for 5 per cent of the employment.
The urban informal sector, with a quarter of the total employment, pro-
duces a quarter of the GDP, suggesting a more secular and inclusive
trend in job and economic growth (NCEUS, 2009). Ghani and colleagues
(2011) further argue that jobs and job growth is highly correlated with
new and young establishments. In India, most of the growth of these
new establishments is happening in the informal sector. However, fail-
ing to recognize the fact that the informal sector is part of the inclusive
urbanization process, urban policies and urban master plans at best
ignored the needs of the informal sectors and, at worst, in an effort
to implement formal regulations, tried to uproot the sector. As India
gears up for rapid growth and plans for creation of almost 500 mil-
lion jobs in the next ten years, cities need to be more inclusive and
more competitive in accommodating the employment-generating and
entrepreneurial sectors. To make this reality, urban India needs to be
more tolerant towards informal activities and understand this major
process towards creating inclusive cities.
Secondly, economic growth, while creating wealth in Indian cities,
has not resulted in efficient and equitable development and living stan-
dards for all citizens and industry. Rapid economic growth in the last
two decades in cities has tested the capacity of the economic insti-
tutions, but cities and their institutions lacked the capacity to cope
with the growth (Rajan, 2013). The rapid increase in population and
industries has put tremendous pressure on urban infrastructure and
other resources. As firms and industries mushroomed in cities, there
was no concurrent capacity development of the institutions and plan-
ning processes that govern the city, which would have ensured land,
infrastructure, and other urban services for both the industry and habi-
tants in a peaceful manner. Laws governing urban land and the process
of rezoning land for industrial development have been opaque. Urban
policies and governments, too, neglected the infrastructure needs of the
cities. However, while cities generated almost two thirds of the GDP and
80 per cent of the tax revenue of India (Bardhan, 2011), there has not
been an automatic process to ensure the finances are in place to manage
the costs of infrastructures, an aspect that has been “neglected” by the
centre and state governments. Therefore, despite the impressive produc-
tivity of its cities, their potential has not been tapped as such because
of these impediments. An understanding and incorporation of these
dynamics while formulating urban and industrial policies and other reg-
ulations will encourage a clustering of economic activities and generate
the jobs that would provide the benefits of the demographic dividend.
References
Acharya, S. (2013). Rise and Fall of Kolkata. The Economic Times, 17 April.
Andrews, R. B. (1953). “Mechanics of the Urban Economic Base: Historical
Development of the Base Concept”, Land Economics, 29, 161–167.
Ankinapalli, P. K. and Sanga, N. (2010). Making Cities of Tomorrow: An Urban
Transport Perspective. Paper Prepared for High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC)
on Urban Infrastructure, Government of India.
Awasthi, D. N. (1991). Regional Patterns of Industrial Growth in India. New Delhi:
Concept.
Bardhan, P. (2011). Indian Urbanization Problems in Comparative Context, http://
indiancities.berkeley.edu/2011/speaker_content/panel_docs/Panel%201-
Pranab%20Bardhan.pdf (Retrieved on 23 July 2012).
Beall, J., Guha-Khasnobis, B. and Kanbur, R. (2010). “Beyond the Tipping Point:
A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Urbanisation and Development”, In J. Beall,
B. Guha-Khasnobis and R. Kanbur (Eds.), Urbanization and Development: A Mul-
tidisciplinary Perspectives. UK: Oxford University Press, 3–16.
Castells, M. (1996). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 1, The
Rise of the Network Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
Chakravorty, S. (2000). “How does Structural Reform Affect Regional Develop-
ment? Resolving Contradictory Theory with Evidence from India”, Economic
Geography, 76(4), 367–394.
Cheesman, A. (2012). Special Economic Zones and Development: Geography and

Linkages in the Indian EOU Scheme. DPU Working Paper No. 145. University
College of London.
Choe, K. and Roberts, B. (2011). Competitive Cities in the 21st Century: Cluster-Based
Local Economic Development. Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Davies, H. and Ellis, P. D. (2000), “Porter’s ‘Competitive Advantage of Nations’:
Time for a Final Judgment?”, Journal of Management Studies, 37(8): 1189–1213.
Denis, E., Mukhopadhyay, P., and Zerah, M.-H. (2012). “Subaltern Urbanisation
in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, 47(30), 52–62.
Desmet, K., Ghani, E., O’Connell, S. D. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2012). Spatial
Disparities in India: Have Mumbai and Chennai Become Too Congested?, http://
www.voxeu.org/article/spatial-disparities-india-have-mumbai-and-chennai-
become-too-congested (Retrieved on 2 October 2013).
Florida, R. (2002). The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books.
Fujita, M. and Thisse, J.-F. (2002). Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial
Location and Regional Growth. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1999). The Spatial Economy: Cities,
Regions and International Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ghani, E., Goswami, A. G. and Kerr, W. R. (2012). Is India’s Manufacturing Sector
Moving Away from Cities? NBER Working Paper No. 17992.
Ghani, E., Kerr, W. R. and O’Connell, S. D. (2011). “Promoting Entrepreneurship,
Growth and Job Creation”, In E. Ghani (Ed.), Reshaping Tomorrow. UK: Oxford
University Press, 168–201.
Glaeser, E. (2011). Triumph of the City. Australia: Pan Macmillan.
Glaeser, E. L., Kallal, H. D., Scheinkman, J. A. and Shleifer, A. (1992). “Growth in
Cities”, Journal of Political Economy, 100(6), 1126–1153.
The Hindu Business Line (2013, 3 January). Delhi Rape Incident Hits Productivity at
ITeS. BPO Firms: Assocham.
HPEC (2011). Report on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services. Ministry of Urban
Development, Government of India.
IIHS (2011). Urban India: Evidence 2011. Bengaluru: Indian Institute for Human
Settlements (IIHS).
Jacobs, J. (1984). Cities and the Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House.
Kaczmarski, M. (2012). Tech Focus Drive Pittsburgh Revival, http://www.
fdiintelligence.com/Special-Reports/Tech-focus-drives-Pittsburgh-revival?
ct=true (Retrieved on 21 November 2013).
Kennedy, L. (2009). Large-Scale Economic and Infrastructure Projects in India’s
Metropolitan Cities: New Policies and Practices among Competing Subnational
States. Amsterdam/Delft, The New Urban Question – Urbanism beyond
Neo-Liberalism: The 4th International Conference of the International Forum
on Urbanism (IFoU) 2009.
Kennedy, L. and Zerah, M.-H. (2008). “The Shift to City-Centric Growth Strate-
gies: Perspectives from Hyderabad and Mumbai”, Economic and Political Weekly,
43(39), 110–117.
Kundu, A. (2003). “Urbanisation and Urban Governance: Search for a Per-
spective beyond Neo-Liberalism”, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(29),
3079–3087.
Kundu, A. (2007). “The Future of Indian Cities”, In LSE (Ed.), Urban India: Under-
standing the Maximum City. London: Cities Programme, London School of
Economics (LSE), 5–6.
Kundu, A. (2011). Trends and Processes of Urbanisation in India. London

and New York: Urbanisation and Emerging Population Issues 6, IIED and
UNFPA.
Kundu, A. and Saraswati, L. R. (2012). “Migration and Exclusionary Urbanisation
in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, 47(26–27), 219–227.
Lewis, J. P. (1995). India’s political economy: Governance and reform. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22(1), 3–42.
Mahadevia, D. (2008). “Inside Urbanising Asia”, In D. Mahadevia (Ed.), Inside
Transforming Urban Asia: Processes, Policies and Public Actions. New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company.
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (n.d.). Special Economic Zones in India, http://
sezindia.nic.in/about-osi.asp (Retrieved on 23 August 2013).
Mishra, N. and Shankar, R. (2013). India Market Strategy. Asia/Pacific Indian Equity
Research, Asia Pacific/India: Credit Suisse.
MPI (Martin Prosperity Institute) (2013). Understanding the Creative Economy of
India. Toronto, Canada: Martin Prosperity Institute.
Mukhopadhyay, P. (2006). “Whither Urban Renewal?” Economic and Political
Weekly, 41(10), 879–884.
Mukhopadhyay, P. (2009). The promised land of SEZs. CPR Occasional Paper No.
17, Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi.
Mukhopadhyay, P. and Pradhan, K. C. (2009). Location of SEZs and Policy Benefits:
What Does the Data Say?, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24333/1/MPRA_
paper_24333.pdf (Retrieved on 23 August 2013).
Mukhopadhyay, P. and Revi, A. (2009). “Keeping India’s Economic Engine Going:
Climate Change and the Urbanisation Question”, Economic and Political Weekly,
44(31), 59–70.
Mumford, L. (1937). “What Is a City”, In R. Le Gales and F. Stout (Eds.), The City
Reader (3rd edn.). London: Routledge, 93–96.
Narayana, M. R. (2011). “Globalization and Urban Economic Growth: Evidence
for Bengaluru, India”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(6),
1284–1301.
NDTV (2013). Sexual Attacks Impact India Tourism Business, http://www.ndtv.com/
article/india/sexual-attacks-impact-india-tourism-business-349901 (Retrieved
on 11 March 2014).
Planning Commission (2011). Midterm Appraisal for Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007–
2012. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Planning Commission (1983). Report of the Task Forces on Housing and Urban
Development, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.
Popper, N. (2013). Pittsburgh’s Time of Transition, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/02/14/pittsburghs-time-of-transition/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
Porter, M. (1990). “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”. Harvard Business
Review, March–April, 73–91.
Porter, M. (1998). On Competition. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Porter, M. (2000). “Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local
Clusters in the Global Economy”, Economic Development Quarterly, 14(1), 15–31.
Rajan, R. (2013). Why India Slowed, http://www.project-syndicate.org/

commentary/the-democratic-roots-of-india-s-economic-slowdown-by-
raghuram-rajan (Retrieved on 13 July 2013).
Reddy, S. (2013a). Affordable Housing Projects in India: Productivity Loss Centres?
http://www.joneslanglasalleblog.com/APResearch/india/affordable-housing-
projects-in-india-productivity-loss-centres (Retrieved on 3 May 2014).
Reddy, S. (2013b). Metabolism of Mumbai – Expectations, Impasse, and the Need
for New Beginning. Working Paper 2013–002. Mumbai: Indira Gandhi Institute
of Development Research.
Renaud, B. (1987). “Urban Development Policies in Developing Countries”,
In G. S. Tolley and V. Thomas (Eds.), The Economics of Urbanisation and Urban
Policies in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 60–72.
Sala-i-Martin, X., Bilbao-Osorio, B., Blanke, J., Crotti, R., Hanouz, M. D., Geiger,
T., et al. (2013). “The Global Competitiveness Index 2012–13: Strength-
ening Recovery by Raising Productivity”, In K. Schwab (Ed.), The Global
Competitiveness Report 2012–13. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 3–48.
Sally, R. (2013). Why Cities Hold the Key to a Nation’s Competitive-
ness, http://forumblog.org/2013/09/why-cities-hold-the-key-to-a-nations-
competitiveness/ (Retrieved on 5 March 2014).
Sassen, S. (1994). Cities in a World Economy. LA: Pine Forge Press.
Simmie, J., Carpenter, J., Chadwick, A., Martin, R., and Wood, P. (2006). State
of the English Cities: The Competitive Economic Performance of English Cities.
London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
Singh, S. K. (2005). “Review of Urban Transportation in India”, Journal of Public
Transportation, 8(1), 79–97.
Srinivasan, T. N. and Wallack, J. S. (2009). What Is Indian Political Econ-
omy of Economic Reform?, http://scid.stanford.edu/system/files/shared/Wallack-
Srinivasan_9-28-09.pdf (Retrieved on 15 April 2013).
Thakur, B., Singh, R. and Singh, R. (2012). “Changing Face of India’s Indus-
trial Policies: A Look”, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications,
2(12), 1–7.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956a). “Exports and Regional Growth”, Journal of Political
Economy, 64, 160–164.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956b). “The Urban Economic Base Reconsidered”, Land Eco-
nomics, 31, 95–99.
Turok, I. (2004). “Cities, Regions and Competitiveness”, Regional Studies, 38(9),
1069–1083.
The World Bank (2013). Urbanization Beyond Municipal Boundaries: Nurturing
Metropolitan Economies and Connecting Peri-Urban Areas in India. Washington,
DC: The World Bank.
5
Living Environment
Introduction
The living environment is defined here as an assembly of the natural and

built environment which is offered to the inhabitants of the place who
perform various kinds of social, cultural, religious, economic, and polit-
ical activities which induce peculiarities in the character of the living
environment. Hence, “living environment” is created by combining the
influence of these activities and is constantly undergoing change due to
the continual evolution of these interlinked activities happening over
time and space. It is worth noting that changes in the living environ-
ment of metropolitan cities happen due to a rapidly evolving economic
environment, which is followed by influx of population, hybridiza-
tion of culture, and change in the social and political environment as
well. Various chapters in this book discuss aspects of the physical built
environment, the natural environment, the productive or economic
environment, and the governing environment, which together consti-
tute the living environment. In addition to that, this chapter covers the
qualitative aspects associated with the “livability” and “quality of life”
of urban areas.
The transition from an agrarian to a non-agrarian economy also
brings about a transformation from rural to urban built environment.
With growth in economy there is the emergence of urban centres that
open doors to many new economic opportunities and catalyse com-
mercial, industrial, and technological advances. Urban centres generate
wealth and utilize resources in a way that improves the conditions
in which people live and work. The phenomenon of urbanization is
therefore often associated with an upgrade in living standards, even in
153
urban fringes and rural areas, seen in the form of improved housing
conditions, better amenities, and basic services such as education,
health care, water and sanitation, increased awareness of health-related
issues, and reduced inequality. Urbanization is also often associated
with gender-related transformations, such as the greater engagement of
women in paid employment, linked to a wider range of opportunities
than can be found in rural areas.
Though urbanization is mostly looked upon as providing a stimu-
lus to growth and development, if not adhered to properly it often
gets associated with a congested living environment, income dispar-
ity, social inequality, inadequate social and physical infrastructure, and
deplorable housing conditions. Urbanization in India has been accom-
panied by the growth of environmental and physical hazards such as,
inter alia, increasing urban poverty, homelessness, ill-health, pollution,
appalling conditions of congestion, and crime. At the same time, spa-
tially proximate socioeconomic inequities are only adding to the tussle
between the majorities (in caste or religious terms) and minorities, and
the “haves” and “have nots”, thus hampering social harmony. These
challenges threaten all urban societies in India, poor and affluent alike.
Considering the current scale of urbanization – where the country is
only 31 per cent urbanized, in regard to population, and where the phys-
ical imprint of urbanization is concentrated in only 2.34 per cent of the
total land area (Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India,
2001) – it can be stated that urbanization (and its associated problems)
has yet to arrive and therefore that it should be well planned. Expecting
that the pace of urbanization will continue to grow, it is important to
analyse the existing living environment of Indian cities so as to be able
to derive a more balanced equation for the formulation of new urban
centres and for the improvement of existing ones, to offer suitable living
and working conditions.
Factors influencing the living environment
The “livability” of an environment is a relative term and is a reflec-

tion of people’s perception of the suitability of the place where they
live (Pandey, 2013). As interpreted by the Institute of Competitiveness
(2012), the “livability” of an urban system can be judged by the extent
that it contributes to the physical, social, and mental well-being and
personal development of all its inhabitants, by promoting equity, dig-
nity, accessibility, conviviality, participation, and empowerment. The
indicators which are considered to be important constituents of the
Living Environment 155
“livability” of a place include: (i) demography, (ii) education, (iii) health

and medical standards, (iv) safety, (v) housing options, (vi) sociocultural
natural environment, (vii) economic environment, and (viii) planned
environment. However, as per the study conducted by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2005), the first and most important indicator
of “quality of life” is material well-being; other parameters, including
health, political stability, family life, community life, climate and geog-
raphy, job security, political freedom, and gender equality are considered
less important. The discussion on factors influencing the quality of life
and on the quantification of qualitative aspects of these indicators con-
tinues: there is neither a standard definition, nor is there any standard
set of indicators used to anticipate the “livability” of a place. Consider-
ing the chaos of urbanization currently existing in Indian cities and the
poor living environment which these cities offer, it will be important
to view the living environment through physical, economic, and social
lenses. These are discussed in the upcoming sections in detail.
Material well-being and the living environment
Considering GDP per capita as a measure of material well-being, it is

shocking to realize that India is currently at US$1,502 GDP per capita,
which is approximately one fourth of China and is the lowest among all
BRIC countries. China and India shared a similar status until 1971, after
which the growth rate of China has been increasing consistently, and so
has the gap in per capita GDP between India and China (Figure 5.1).
As mentioned earlier, material well-being is only one of the indi-
cators of livability, therefore it cannot be confirmed that the quality
of the living environment in China is better than in India; however,
with international ranking of 60, China is definitely 13 positions above
India in the “quality of life” standards derived by the EIU (2005). This
can be linked with lack of efficiency and responsiveness of economic
policies in India, which, despite the fact that it is a developing econ-
omy mainly constituted of an uneducated, unskilled population, have
not been acknowledging and addressing the informality at the scale it
deserves. This lack of responsiveness is leading to an increase in unem-
ployment and poverty, especially in urban areas which are continuously
receiving the rural migratory population, less because of urban pull and
more because of rural push factors (Institute for Competitiveness, 2012).
Therefore, one of the most staggering consequences of urbanization in
India and the way in which it has spread out is urban poverty and
unemployment.
16,000
GDP per capita (in US dollar)
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
19 9
19 0
19 1
19 2
19 3
19 4
19 5
19 6
19 7
19 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
20 2
20 3
20 4
20 5
20 6
20 7
20 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
12
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
19
Year
Russian Federation Brazil China India
Figure 5.1 Trend of GDP per capita in current US dollar (1989–2012) across BRIC
countries1
Source: World Bank Organization (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD;
retrieved on 23 May 2014).
There are a number of ways to define and measure poverty. Poverty

can be defined as a condition where income and resources are so inade-
quate as to preclude people from having a standard of living considered
acceptable in the society in which they live (European Commission);
the number of people whose income level falls below some minimum
level, called the poverty line, necessary to meet basic needs (the World
Bank); or as a condition associated with the undermining of a range of
key human attributes, including health (World Health Organization).
In India, the generally accepted definition of poverty is the inability of
an individual to satisfy certain basic minimum needs. This inability is
expressed in terms of a level of expenditure or income that is consid-
ered necessary to satisfy those minimum needs: those who are not able
to attain that level are counted as poor and others as non-poor (Mathur,
2009). Trends indicate that, although the proportion of the poor in the
total population is falling both in urban and rural areas, the absolute
number of urban poor is increasing (see Figure 5.2).
More specifically, the percentage of the urban population below the
poverty line has dropped from 49 per cent in 1973–74 to 25.7 per
cent in 2004–05. But the absolute number of people living below the
20
15
Percentage decadal change
10
0
Combined Rural Urban
–5
–10
–15
Region
1974–1984 1984–1994 1994–2004
Figure 5.2 Decadal change in number of poor (1974–2004)

Source: Compiled by authors based on Planning Commission (2011).
poverty line in urban areas has climbed from 60.5 million in 1973–74 to
80.7 million in 2004–05 (Planning Commission, 2011). It is estimated
that this number was as high as 97 million in 2011; an increase of 60 per
cent over 1973–74. At the same time, the share of urban poor in the total
number of poor has gone up from 19 per cent in 1973–74 to 27 per cent
in 2004–05 (Ibid.). In addition, it is estimated that there were between
40–45 million people who subsisted on the periphery of the poverty line
in urban areas. Clearly, the poor comprise a sizeable proportion of the
population in India’s cities and towns.
As noted by the Planning Commission (2011), while the headcount
ratio of poverty (number of people below poverty line/total population)
has declined between 1974 and 2005, the rate of decline in poverty
slowed down after 1990 – a period when the economic reforms were
initiated and when economic growth in India increased substantially.
Moreover, the rate of decline in poverty in urban areas has been far
slower than rural areas since 1990 (Ibid.) (Figure 5.3).
A concerning feature of urbanization in India has been increasing
inequality. The Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality on a scale
between 0 and 100, 0 as equal society and 100 per cent as absolute
inequality) in urban areas has increased from 33.9 per cent in 1983
to 37.6 per cent in 2004–05. In contrast, the rural Gini coefficient has
3.0
2.5
Percent annual change
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Combined Urban Rural
1974–1983 1983–1994 1994–2005
Figure 5.3 Annual rate of decline in headcount ratio of poor

Source: Compiled by authors based on Planning Commission (2011).
remained at about 30.4–30.5 per cent during this period (Planning Com-
mission, 2011). In terms of increase in monthly per capita expenditure,
the bottom third of income groups saw an increase of less than 10 per
cent while the top third of income groups saw an increase of 20 per cent
or more during the 1994–2005 period (Ibid.).
In an already fragmented society, huge income disparity is contribut-
ing significantly to the increasing inequality. Issues of social discrimina-
tion based on class, race, religion, gender are hampering the harmony
of the living environment of urban areas. The challenges faced by urban
poor are immense and the cycle of de-growth has a good hold on
the poor. The Planning Commission (2011) estimates that, in 2004–05,
between 72 and 82 per cent of usually employed male and between
78 and 80 per cent of usually employed female urban poor were either
self-employed or casually employed.
The spatial distribution of poverty in urban areas has an inequitable
pattern. As indicated by Planning Commission (2011), nearly one fourth
of the population in cities over 4 million population lives in slums, as do
more than a third of the population in cities with 100,000–500,000 peo-
ple. Cities that are between 500,000 to 4 million have about 10 per cent
of their population living in slums. The pattern indicates that poverty
and slums have appeared in small cities due to blight caused by decline
in economic activities in these cities, while big cities have seen slums
grow due to the informality of economic activities, exclusion, and the

high cost of housing.
Addressing the affordability of housing in cities has been a weak
agenda. While the recent programme of the national government aimed
at affordable housing, Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), does not explicitly
define affordable housing, we can assume that the Ministry of Hous-
ing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MHUPA) definition is applicable
to this scheme. A government-organized task force, “Affordable Hous-
ing for All”, assembled to advise MHUPA on solutions for promoting
equitable housing, revised the official definition by suggesting that the
carpet area for economically weaker section (EWS) and lower income
group (LIG) housing should be 300ft2 and 600ft2 respectively, and the
price of housing for EWS and LIG should “not exceed 4 times the house-
hold gross annual income” (Parekh, 2008). State government definitions
of affordable housing tend to differ marginally from the national def-
inition. The Rajasthan Housing Board defines housing as flats with a
ceiling cost of Rs 0.2 million and a super-built-up area of 325ft2 (with
two rooms, a kitchen, and bathroom) for EWS households, and flats
with a ceiling cost of Rs 0.33 million with a super-built-up area of 500ft2
(with three rooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and balcony). Furthermore, the
Development Control Regulations, largely implemented in the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region (MMR), narrow the size criterion to 225–270ft2 for
affordable housing units.
Similarly, independent advisory organizations have established their
own definitions of affordable housing in India. The McKinsey Global
Institute states that affordable housing should be defined based on vary-
ing incomes and sizes, rather than the concept of “one size fits all”;
they define the market for affordable housing to be households earning
less than Rs 90,000 (EWS) and those earning between Rs 90,000 and Rs
200,000 (LIG) annually. Based on its lending practices, the largest private
sector mortgage lender in India, HDFC, maintains that the maximum
purchasing affordability is 5.1 times the annual income of a house-
hold. KPMG’s report on affordable housing in India stratifies housing
size according to income levels and construction plans; for EWS and
LIG households, with annual incomes of less than Rs 150,000, housing
units should be less than or equal to 300 ft2 , will have few ameni-
ties, be located on city peripheries (though rarely within the city), and
be financed by micro-finance institutions (MFIs), while for LIG house-
holds with annual incomes between Rs 150,000 and Rs 300,000, housing
would have basic amenities, be between 300–1200ft2 , located within the
city, and financed by the formal banking sector.
Using data from the National Sample Survey (Round 64, Year
2007–08) adjusted to 2010–11, we estimate the segments of the urban
population that, at current market-rate housing prices, cannot afford to
buy a house even in non-prime areas of the cities (Table 5.1).
In the absence of employment opportunities and residential options
in the formal sector, the poor seek out informal methods of earning
and living so as to fulfil their basic needs of money, food, and shel-
ter. Though such informal derivations expose the poor to financial
insecurity, exploitation, insecure and unhygienic living conditions, and
other stronger discomforts, the existence of “informality” relieves urban
authorities from catering to their needs. The latent intention behind an
allowance for the existence of informality is to shake off any sense of
responsibility, which will otherwise be heavy as the size of the urban
poor population is significantly high. This ignorance is very possible
given the lack of accountability of governing authorities towards locals,
and the lack of representation of elected members in authoritative posi-
tions in urban local bodies. While summarizing the “livability” with
regard to condition of housing, health, safety, and security in urban
areas, the upcoming sections will also discuss the negative impact this
has on the urban living environment due to the prevalence of strong
income disparity and the social and physical fragmentation of the rich
and the poor.
Social fragmentation
Diversity in caste, culture, colour, religion, dialect, food, and living stan-
dards can either be a point of discrimination or else it can be celebrated.
Where positivity of diversity may be encouraged and utilized for bene-
fit, it can be very well criticized for hampering the local tradition and
culture of the place often celebrated as something “pure”, “original”,
and “authentic” belonging originally to the place and local people.
While cities are pretending to accommodate and absorb changes, they
still retain latent possessiveness towards “original” factors (cast, cul-
ture, religion, dialect, food, etc.), which is expressed at times through
political and social attempts to establish the dominance of majoritar-
ian religious-, linguistic-, ethnic-, or caste-based communities over civil
societies (Banerjee, 2012). For example, the violence against migrants
from North India, particularly from the states of Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, was supported by the political group Maharashtra Navnirman
Sena (MNS) in Mumbai, which created a fearful environment so as
to encourage the establishment of Maharashtrians (local inhabitants
Table 5.1 Housing affordability across fractile classes
City Annual consumer expenditure, family Ratio: house price/annual

of five (2010–2011) consumption expenditure
Fractile 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 80–100 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 80–100
Mumbai 47,082 73,754 98,584 134,908 275,416 41 26 20 14 7

Delhi 57,618 82,743 105,215 138,666 288,973 28 20 15 12 6
Kolkata 40,377 59,976 81,711 116,709 235,481 24 16 12 8 4
Hyderabad 42,366 63,365 84,585 120,835 259,427 23 15 11 8 4
Chennai 42,292 61,596 80,164 111,773 223,398 31 21 16 12 6
Bengaluru 42,734 66,901 92,174 134,834 277,626 24 16 11 8 4
Source: National Statistics Sample Survey (Round 64, Year 2007–2008).
161
of Maharashtra state) in the physical and professional landscape of

Mumbai (DNA, 2008). Such incidences raise questions over the qual-
ity of the living environment which Indian cities are offering to their
inhabitants including the native people of the place and migrants.
It is observed that, among higher segments, the social ties of caste,
culture, region, religion, and so on have loosened and there is a visible
standardization in the type of economic activities, recreational activi-
ties, and social activities, as well as in the general pattern of living. The
dependency on social capital has been continuously reducing, and so
have the reasons for establishing and maintaining social bonds. Though
this is dissolving the barriers of caste, race, and community, at the
same time it is constructing two strong segments of the “rich” and the
“poor”. This segmentation is not only leading to social dissociation but
is also causing a visible division of physical space. The richer segments
of society, are opting for highly priced private amenities, for example:
housing in privately guarded gated communities providing 24/7 water,
power, security; prioritization of personalized modes of transportation
over public modes which are mostly overcrowded, insecure, and also
lack efficiency with regard to the comfort; use of recreational places
which are controlled by memberships, like sports clubs and golf courses.
A mushrooming of privatized gated communities and slums is happen-
ing at an equal pace and this is fuelling the tussle between two strong
claimants of the city – one by majority that is the poor and the other by
power that is the rich. This is a direct translation of income differences
into physical space where the spaces for rich are clearly guarded from
the reach of ills associated with the poor and poverty, like theft, inse-
curity, health and hygiene, and so on. Public places and amenities are
usually affordable but are often unmaintained and do not offer comfort
and safety. This is becoming a reason for the mass boycott by the rich,
who chose to pay and privately own alternates available in the market.
The choice of private alternates is not only proving financially expensive
for those who are availing themselves of these privatized opportunities
but is also disseminating environmental and social negativities in soci-
ety. Considering the above situation, it will not be incorrect to state that
privatization of resources by the rich is not only leading to unregulated
exploitation of the city’s resources but is also indirectly leading to the
marginalization of the poor.
As the popularity of use of public spaces and amenities is reducing
among the richer segments, their involvement and attempts to improve
the living environment of cities is also decreasing. This is reflective in
the lack of willingness to pay taxes, which are, firstly, not trusted to
be utilized for service building and, secondly, are considered an extra

expense as the dependency on public service is almost nil. Another
major disconnect is seen in the lack of participation of the elite crowd in
any democratic expression of dissatisfaction, as discussed in Chapter 2.
This disenchantment of the elite with urban politics is leading to the
selection of non-deserving representatives who use unethical means to
influence the remaining “non-elite” voters, who commit to vote over
pity gains of free lunches and alcohol. The proscription of use of pub-
lic amenities by the rich leads to their speedy deterioration as there are
fewer, less influential, less aware voices which are raised in request or
protest for service improvement. The accountability and answerability
of local representatives is reduced further by a lack of involvement from
the intellectually elite crowd in urban politics.
Physical fragmentation
“Reluctant” urbanization and a lack of preparedness of cities towards

rising demands for basic amenities is posing various problems for the
economic, social, political, physical, and natural environment of urban
centres in India. With a total population of around 1.22 billion (Census
of India, 2011), India is the second most populous country, consti-
tuting approximately 18 per cent of the total population and 11 per
cent of the urban population of the world (World Bank Organization,
2011). Being home to such a large population, the responsibility of
developing healthy livable urban centres should be taken more seri-
ously as it will influence the quality of life of existing and prospective
city dwellers – the absolute number of both of which is substantially
high. On one hand, cities can serve as engines of economic growth
if facilitated with the necessary infrastructure required for financial
and social development, but, on the other hand, if cities fail to meet
requirements emerging from a growing economy and demography, they
deteriorate swiftly to convert into congested, unclean, unsafe, polluted
islands. As they are selectively proactive with regard to physical plan-
ning and development, Indian cities show huge diversity in the quality
of living environment of various locations even within the city, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. For example, there are “posh locations”, like Lodhi
Estate in Delhi, which are associated with images of wide roads, green
parks, shopping centres, and so on, whereas there are poor locations
like Seelampur in Delhi, which are congested, unclean, insecure, and
face problems related to water supply, power cuts, and so on. Physical
fragmentation is a simultaneous phenomenon occurring with income
disparity, thus leading to the social isolation of various income groups

who otherwise have a symbiotic relationship and prefer to live in
the vicinity, but not in the immediate neighbourhood, of each other.
Imbalanced spatial development across cities and within cities is an
outcome of the concentration of investment into prioritized locations
which are considered relatively more important due to their higher eco-
nomic potential or also due to higher income groups and potentially
influential citizens residing there.
Considering the challenge of availability and affordability of hous-
ing stock, the existing shortage for satisfactory quality of housing is
observed to be as high as 49 million (Tiwari and Parikh, 2013), within
which urban areas fall short by 21 million housing units. With an
increase in population and number of households, the demand for
affordable housing is also increasing. As shown in Figure 5.4, the num-
ber of households in India has grown from 100 million in 1971 to
246 million in 2011, and during this period, the growth in the number
of urban households has been faster than that of rural households.
The supply of housing in urban centres has been primarily catered
for by private players, who are now responding to the emerging
demand for secured, gated communities offering an unhindered supply
300
250
Household (million)
200
150
100
50
0
1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
Total Rural Urban
Figure 5.4 Number of households in India

Source: Tiwari and Parikh, 2013.
of good-quality water and power and a healthy, safe, green environment

for living and working. Gated communities may be defined as a form of
residential complex which are sometimes characterized by high walls
and fences. They boast controlled entrances for pedestrians and cars,
surveillance of those entering the premises, clean streets, and amenities
on a par with a luxury resort. “The concept, already popular abroad, is
making a foray into the country as NRIs returning to their roots are look-
ing for the security and amenities of gated communities found abroad”,
says Manoj Namburu, CMD of Alliance Group. These communities offer
the perfect getaway from everyday civic problems, ranging from water
cuts and pebble-strewn streets to living with the stench of uncollected
rubbish bins.
The emergence of gated communities is an explicit reflection of the
incapacity of city managers in improving the overall living environment
of the city, making it a safe, secure, and healthy living place. As a result,
isolated developments of individual townships are attracting clientele
and catching the interest of those who can afford to pay for a customized
superior living environment. The quality of infrastructure services can
be gauged from the fact that no Indian city is in a state to provide ade-
quate water to its dwellers; though some cities have recently piloted a
24/7 piped water supply in part of their cities, though coverage area is
small, and most cities still only supply water for few hours a day. The
condition of power supply is much worse and power cuts for few hours
are common, even in the prime National Capital Region (NCR).
The plight of poor can be understood from their dilapidated living
conditions where severe compromises on basic infrastructure require-
ments are made. The difference in quality of living environments is
increasing with greater income disparity in cities. This is not only lead-
ing to social and physical segregation but is also becoming a major
reason for increasing crime in urban areas, as will be discussed later in
this chapter.
Urban lifestyle: work and home imbalances
Urban India has undergone dramatic social and economic changes.

Some of these changes are the result of long-term fermentation, others
reflect reactive responses to situations of urbanization. These changes
have had, and continue to have, a profound impact on the culture and
lifestyle in urban India. The concept of culture goes beyond literature
and art, and encompasses a way of life, either in the professional or
leisure capacity, and the existence of a national or community iden-

tity. It also includes the inculcation of modern ideas and patterns of
thought. Urbanization has led to a new and widening range of occupa-
tional patterns, rising incomes as well as the heterogeneity inherent in
urban housing, and diluted the traditional barriers of caste and creed.
Additionally, urbanization has been accompanied by high levels of
proliferation of innovation, technology, and higher education. In that
sense, urbanization has led to a positive change in social mobility and
acceptance as well as in mindsets. Despite these positive interactions,
it has also led to undesirable changes in cultural and social values and
lifestyles which are discussed below.
First, the nuclear family structure is becoming more popular in urban
areas as the younger members are moving out to other locations for
professional benefits whereas the elder members usually prefer to stay
back and continue with the professional and social life. Unlike the
general notion that the joint family structure was more popular and
better bonded, Niranjan et al. (2005) note that some researchers have
negated these views and stated that the joint family was never a domi-
nant form and that all types of families (joint, nuclear, single, and other
relationships) have existed in India. They also note that sociologists and
anthropologists have argued the nuclear family type is functionally con-
sistent with a modern, urban industrial economy. Further, the nuclear
family system offers advantages such as increased personal freedom and
space to grow, self-expression and exploration, much needed privacy for
the couples and avoidance of unnecessary meddling by others, finan-
cial stability, and ease of adjusting to work or educational demands, and
thus reduction in levels of stress and dependence. The existing pattern
of life of city dwellers is burdening them with higher cost of living and
therefore more time is being spent on work and related travel which
leaves little time to be spent with family and friends and on health,
entertainment, and leisure. Nuclear family institutions may therefore
be seen as an outcome of increased cost of living and the need to earn
more to be able to maintain a decent quality of life. This may be seen
as a negative outcome of concentration of economy in primate cities
which are facing severe load on physical, social, and economic ameni-
ties/resources. Second, the lifestyles of urban residents are changing very
rapidly as the traditional ethos and values are replaced by modern ones.
Material values and leisure form the bigger part of their interests. These
dramatic changes in lifestyle have also led to huge income disparity.
The contemporary urban society facilitates the lifestyle of large apart-
ment complexes, gated housing societies, private shopping malls, and
sports clubs (with restricted access). This is spatial expression of econom-

ically and socially fragmented urban society. There is little tolerance for
spatially proximate socioeconomic inequities. This breeds the “not in
my backyard” syndrome and supports slum demolition drives that tend
to move the low income settlements to the peripheral areas of cities,
alienating these income groups and making them more deprived.
Third, sprawling cities, together with the relocations of workplaces,
schools, and other urban amenities, have led to increased travel and
longer distances. At the same time, with increasing congestion in cities
and the high costs of living in city centres, people are choosing to live
away from centres and even on outside cities. The choice for them is to
benefit from affordable house and land prices, and escape from the con-
gestion inside city. But inefficient public transportation and increasing
traffic congestion on the roads has meant that there is an overwhelming
impact on traveling time, which in turn affects family life and health.
Users of public transport and car owners make extraordinary arrange-
ments to cope at the great expense of their well-being. Residents leave
home early to ensure a seat on public transport or to avoid traffic con-
gestion and even secure a parking space. The car is now considered as
a necessity, in order to avoid the uncomfortable and inefficient pub-
lic transport, and the sense of control over timing, route, and personal
environment are deemed very important. Consequently, urban living
is characterized by little rest, lack of time to spend with family, and
limited social interaction and recreational activities. This has led to dete-
riorating family and community cohesion. Growing impersonal nature
of urban residents has led to a decline in social solidarity.
Fourth, urbanization has not resulted in an equitable distribution of
the wealth it generates. Inequalities are growing: not only in terms of
income but also in terms of quality of life. The disparities in the provi-
sion and quality of housing for the lower income groups have already
been discussed. Whatever housing they can get, even if inadequate and
overcrowded, it takes up a disproportionate part of their incomes. The
relocation of low income groups to the peripheral areas of cities is not
commensurate with the development of employment opportunities,
and health and education services, particularly if the shifted settlements
were illegal in the first place. This results in long travel times and high
transport costs to reach workplaces, schools, and health-care facilities.
Overall, work and family life appears to be imbalanced due to long
travel times, a bigger workload, and stronger ambitions to fit into the
material city life. The lifestyle imbibed by the affluent and upper classes
is adding to the aspirations of the middle and lower income groups, and
is at times causing mental and emotional unrest among the middle and
lower income classes, especially the younger crowd. This pressure adds
undue financial and mental stress to these income groups.
Health and nutrition
Urbanization has led to contrasting outcomes in health and nutri-

tion for different income groups in urban India. For the affluent and
middle-class urban residents, urbanization and lifestyle changes have
been associated with shifts in the structure of diet, physical activity
patterns, obesity patterns, and nutritional changes. For this group, tra-
ditional diets have given way to “Western diets” dominated by more
refined foods and higher fat. Research (Wasir and Misra, 2004) shows
that diets in the urban and semi-urban areas in India are full of saturated
fats, sugar, and calories, and include less fibre as compared to traditional
diets. In addition, mechanization and technological advances accom-
panying urbanization have resulted in more sedentary lifestyles and
rising obesity in children and adolescents, who are highly susceptible
to such unhealthy lifestyle changes. Not surprisingly, lifestyle-related
diseases and illness are on the rise for this group. These include obe-
sity, metabolic syndrome, diabetes, and hypertension. While obesity
and metabolic syndromes are direct consequences of changing diets and
are becoming increasingly prevalent in adults as well as in children and
adolescents in urban areas (Wasir and Misra, 2004), diabetes is in the
genetic predisposition of Indians and becomes manifest on exposure to
a richer diet and consequent increase in body weight (Nongkynrih et al.,
2004). Further, it has been established that these increases in the rates
of obesity, central adiposity, and waist–hip ratio are seen in every urban
region in the country and are highest among those with the highest
levels of education (Shetty, 2002) and income (Gopalan, 2001).
Studies have documented the increasing overall prevalence of hyper-
tension in urban India – from 6.64 per cent in 1988 to 36.4 per cent
in 2003 – and the prevalence of diabetes amongst urban Indians –
2.1 per cent in the 1970s to between 12–16 per cent in 2002 (Mohan,
2004). Studies also establish that the incidence of diabetes among urban
residents is higher than that in their rural counterparts. A study con-
ducted by Ramachandran and colleagues (2008) clearly brings out the
effect of urbanization and socioeconomic factors on the occurrence
of diabetes in India. The erosion of traditional support systems, lim-
ited social interactions and close relationships, and increased stress
and pressure on nuclearized families has also increased vulnerability
to emotional problems and disorders which are indirect causes of most

“urban diseases”, or rather, “luxury diseases”.
The story of the urban poor is very different. Though urbanization
is generally associated with improved health-care facilities and better
health practices, the scenario is exactly opposite as far as the health
and nutrition of the urban poor is concerned. The vulnerability of the
urban poor to health risks has increased despite physical proximity to
health care. Urban poor children do not receive all childhood vacci-
nations, leaving them vulnerable to vaccine-preventable diseases. The
Third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), conducted in 2005–06,
found that only 40 per cent of children from urban poor households
received all the recommended vaccinations. Consequently, these chil-
dren are more vulnerable to the threat of disease and ill-health. This
initiates the vicious cycle of malnutrition and infection. An equally dis-
comforting picture emerges with regard to the level of undernutrition
of this group, raising serious concerns about the disparities in health
among different population groups in urban India. The 66th Round of
National Sample Survey (NSS) concluded that the proportion of urban
households with a calorie intake below 80 per cent of the level of 2,700
kcal per consumer unit per day (a level used in NSS tabulation for com-
parisons) is 63 per cent for the poorest 10 per cent of population ranked
by per capita expenditure level, falls to 42–45 per cent for the next 10 per
cent, and progressively declines until it drops to only about 2.5 per cent
for the top 10 per cent of population. The worst affected are the children
of the urban poor whose nutritional status has worsened over the years.
Forty-nine per cent of such children below the age of three were under-
weight as per the Third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3). This
level was not only higher than that among children in rural areas but
showed deterioration since the NFHS-2 conducted in 1998–99. More-
over, the growth of every fourth child from the urban poor segment is
stunted.
This clearly highlights the vulnerability of poor women and chil-
dren to malnutrition and ill-health, reflecting the incapacity of poor
to negotiate for and demand basic services, and the absence of a dedi-
cated primary health infrastructure for this group. Also, considering the
lack of affordability and accessibility to trained medical professionals,
a dependency on informal means of treatment is further weakening
the health condition. Lack of affordability of correct treatment and
lack of professionalism in doctors in government hospitals is leading
to a persistence of beliefs in black magic and other superficial causes of
health problems. This then leads to the adoption of magical therapies
or natural medicines recommended by unprofessional untrained local

“vaids” and “hakeems” (local terms for practitioners in Ayurveda and
natural medicines).
Busy lifestyles are posing challenges for the adoption of a healthy
lifestyle. Most important, demand for fresh food is not getting ful-
filled and there is heavy dependency on ready-to-eat preserved food,
the industry for which is neither very developed in India nor even able
to offer equal nutritional value as that obtained from freshly prepared
food. The growing urge to earn enough to afford the best is definitely
causing some compromise on time spent on health and nutrition and
on the quality of the “health environment” in urban India.
Urban security and living environment
Increasing income disparity, poverty, and unemployment is leading to

rising occurrences of crime such as theft, robbery, rape, and murder,
especially in urban areas. According to a report of the National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB) for 2011, the average rate of crime in urban
agglomeration centres has been much higher than the national aver-
age. This indicates that cities are much less safe than villages, providing
cases in villages are getting reported. The insecurities associated with
the increase in income level among the rich and the increase in popula-
tion and unemployment among the poor, especially among the younger
age groups, run very deep. A rising concern in the context of crime in
urban areas is juvenile delinquency. Deviant behaviour includes theft,
violence, burglary, illegal wine trafficking, and even riots; though thefts
make up the highest rate of offence. The delinquency rate tends to be
highest during early adolescence (12–16 years old) and children below
12 years generally participate in petty inchoate crimes. It may be useful
to note here that, at the All-India level, the bulk of juveniles (65 per cent)
arrested fall within the age group 16–18 years. An area that requires spe-
cial attention though is the increasing involvement of girls in juvenile
delinquency and the high gambling rates among juveniles in all cities of
the state. The lack of recreational facilities and open spaces are among
the contributing factors to youth deviance. Congested neighbourhoods
with inadequate educational and recreation facilities deny the natural
learning and play impulse of children and encourage the involvement
of young bored groups of children in delinquent activities.
The light-filled urban environment is not appearing to be bright and
secure for women, who are highly vulnerable to regular incidences of
chain snatching, verbal abuse, and so on; even more severe cases of rape,
forced prostitution, and trafficking are not very uncommon. The urban
environment in big cities like Delhi and Bengaluru is considered unsafe
for women to the extent that, as a safety measure, women have incul-
cated a stand-offish approach towards strangers so as to avoid inviting
any unwanted trouble, especially if they are alone in a public place or
are travelling alone on public transport. Free access to public places and
social life is constrained by cautiousness towards the mode of travel,
time of access, the type of dominant users at the venue, and many other
such issues A recent case of brutal rape and murder (the Nirbhaya case in
Delhi) in a moving bus drew national attention, not only because it was
an example of increasing levels of insecurity and intensity of crime but
also because of the way the case was handled. There was a mass protest,
which mainly involved youths, demanding legal amendments in the
dealing of rape cases such as an increase in the severity of punishment.
The incidence also revealed the real face of democracy in the NCR of
Delhi, as the ruling government imposed strict security and used police
action to stop the public’s protest, which took place at a “public place”,
that is, by India Gate. This not only raised questions over the security
of ordinary members of the public in the NCR but also over the “pub-
licness” of public places and individual freedom in the world’s biggest
democracy. An increasing openness of crime and lack of fear in crim-
inals has been observed due to a lack of severity in punishment, long
delays in court decisions, and, most importantly, low chances of being
caught. This is causing a serious impact on the security of the general
public, including women, children, and tourists.
Conclusion
The living environment of selective prioritized locations of most liv-

able parts of cities cannot be used as a blueprint for a generic urban
picture of India. There exists huge disparity in the quality of life and liv-
ing environment which cities are subscribing to various diverse groups
of citizens. Lack of investment in infrastructure, constrained econ-
omy, lack of employment opportunities, increasing crime rate, insecure
living environments, lack of accountability of governing authorities,
lack of public representation in decision-making bodies responsible
for city operations and maintenance, disenchantment of elite with
city-level politics are interrelated entangled cords which are neither
disentangling nor producing a clear urban fabric. While this chapter
discussed the existing general scene of the living environment in urban
India, upcoming chapters will present more focused discussions on the
built environment, the productive environment, the natural environ-

ment, and, most importantly, the governing environment of urban
India.
References
Banerjee, S. (2012). India’s “Revanchist” Cities, Economic & Political Weekly,
XLVII(51).
DNA (2008). http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-thackeray-continues-
tirade-against-north-indians-1151247 (Retrieved on 31 October 2014).
Census of India (2001). (Provisional) Slum Population in Million Plus
Cities, http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/Admin_Units/Admin_links/
slum1_m_plus.html (Retrieved on 31 October 2014).
Census of India (2011). http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/population_
enumeration.html (Retrieved on 31 October 2014).
EIU (2005). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Quality of Life Index, http://www.
economist.com/media/pdf/Quality_of_Life.pdf (Retrieved on 14 May 2014).
Gopalan, C. (2001). “Rising Incidence of Obesity, Coronary Heart Disease
and Diabetes in the Indian Urban Middle Class: Possible Role of Genetic
and Environmental Factors”, World Review of Nutrition & Dietetics, 90,
127–143.
Government of India (2001). Press Information Bureau. Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation. Population in Slum Area, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
erelease.aspx?relid=71733 (Retrieved on 31 October 2014).
Mathur, O. P. (2009). National Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy. National Institute
of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), 03.
Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India (2001). Area, Population
and Density of Cities and Towns of India–2001, New Delhi: Ministry of Urban
Development, Government of India.
Mohan, V. (2004). Why Are Indians More Prone to Diabetes?, http://www.japi.
org/june2004/R-468.pdf (Retrieved on 1 November 2014).
Niranjan, S., Saritha Nair, and Roy, T. K. (2005). “A Socio-Demographic Analysis
of the Size and Structure of the Family in India”, Journal of Comparative Family
Studies, 623–651.
Nongkynrih, B., Patro, B. K. and Pandav, C. S. (2004). http://japi.org/
february2004/R-118.pdf (Retrieved on 1 November 2014).
Pandey, R., Garg, Y. and Bharat, A. (2013). “Understanding Qualitative Concep-
tions of Livability: An Indian Perspective”, International Journal on Research in
Engineering and Technology, 2(12), 374–380.
Parekh, D. (2008). “Report of the High Level Task Force on Affordable Housing
for All”, NAREDCO, December 2008, http://www.naredco.in/pdfs/report-high-
level-task.pdf (Retrieved on 1 November 2014).
Planning Commission (2011). Steering Committee on Urbanization, Report of
the Working Group on Urban Poverty, Slums, and Service Delivery System,
New Delhi.
Ramachandran, A., Mary, S., Yamuna, A., Murugesan, N. and Snehalatha, C.
(2008). “High Prevalence of Diabetes and Cardiovascular Risk Factors Associ-
ated with Urbanization in India”, Diabetes Care, 31(5), 893–898.
Shetty, P. S. (2002). “Nutrition Transition in India”, Public Health Nutrition, 5,

175–182.
Tiwari, P. and Parikh, J. (2012). “Global Housing Challenge: A Case Study of
CO2 Emissions in India”, School of Planning and Architecture, Delhi, Spandrel,
pp. 96–104.
Wasir, J. S. and Misra, A. (2004). “The Metabolic Syndrome in Asian Indians:
Impact of Nutritional and Socio-economic Transition in India”, Metabolic
Syndrome and Related Disorders, 2(1), 14–23.
World Bank Organization (2011). http://search.worldbank.org/quickview?name=
%3Cem%3EUrban%3C%2Fem%3E+%3Cem%3Epopulation%3C%2Fem%3E&
id=SP.URB.TOTL&type=Indicators&cube_no=2&qterm=urban+population+of+
the+world (Retrieved on 18 May 2014).
6
Natural Environment: Towards
(Re)Generative Cities
Urban sustainability
The imperative
Modern urban development in India has largely ignored the issue of the
natural environment. Indeed, the two are often perceived as existing in
separate silos – with the environment as an afterthought if that. Large
infrastructure projects, land reclamation, water delivery, and waste dis-
posal systems are planned with little thought to their impact on the
environment. Cities draw increasingly heavily on the natural resources
of their surroundings. For instance, almost every Indian city relies on
the surrounding rural areas for its water supply, and then pumps the
wastewater into neighbouring rivers, lakes, or the sea. The air pollution
generated by cities is not partially absorbed by greenery within the city,
but spreads to a wider area. Similarly, solid waste is often disposed of in
landfills around the city, polluting the earth and groundwater.
Most cities across the world exert an ecological footprint that expands
far beyond their boundaries. Yet, issues of high population density, poor
municipal capacity and planning, and staggering urban poverty and
informality have made the degradation of India’s natural environment
and stress on its ecosystems more dire than in most countries. At the
same time, increasing affluence is raising levels of consumption, with
corresponding demands on water and energy, and increased production
of waste. This massive urban footprint is unsustainable going forward.
Keeping in mind the scale of urbanization to come, Indians cannot
afford to exert this sort of pressure on their natural systems if they want
the country to be able to provide access to water, electricity, and safe
clean air, and ensure decent public health for all citizens.
For a long time, India has ignored the questions of climate change and
sustainability, focusing instead on alleviating poverty and tacking social
174
Natural Environment 175
development. While one cannot deny these imperatives, the myopia

in doing this to the exclusion of sustainability is that the effects can
undo many of the gains made in poverty alleviation. Climate change
most heavily impacts the poor and most vulnerable, who live in insecure
housing and have limited resources to deal with the displacement and
attendant shocks to livelihoods brought about by extreme weather con-
ditions. Across income spectrums, India’s neglect of the environment
poses a threat. India has 7,500km of low-lying coastline which is densely
populated. The expected extremes in precipitation and droughts will
particularly impact the western part of the country, which is the most
urbanized.
As India, like China in the 1990s, stands poised to invest heavily in
infrastructure, it is essential that this is done in a sustainable manner.
Infrastructure has a life of 50–150 years so the choice of technology
and design to best suit Indian conditions is critical at this stage. The
paradigm Indians need to move towards, in the context of growing and
equipping their cities, is not just to build more sustainable infrastructure
assets and systems but think how these projects might actually integrate
with the natural environment – by building into, or on, natural cycles or
harnessing the power of nature. This chapter is an exploration of the syn-
ergistic ways in which urban development and the natural environment
can be combined.
What is critical is this – as the country urbanizes, Indians need to
change the definition of cities from sites of resource degradation and
exploitation to sites of natural resource management. Integrating cities
with the natural environment involves recrafting the nature of the rela-
tionship between cities and their surroundings. In the current context,
as pressure on resources build, urban, peri-urban and rural neighbours
are locked into a zero-sum game for natural resources that is clearly not
sustainable going forward.
The challenge
We must look at this issue not only for the present, but in the context
of the massive change in settlement patterns that is expected over the
next 30–40 years. In India the challenge appears to be fourfold.
One, there is already a proliferation of smaller, fast-growing towns
and cities in addition to new planned cities to be built along infras-
tructure corridors like the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC).
New and expanding cities place strains on surrounding ecosystems and
the natural habitats that sustain them (Janakarjan, 2009, in Nagendra
et al., 2014; Narain, 2009). These cities, some currently under rural
administration, actually present a tremendous opportunity for early

interventions in building sustainable infrastructure. Yet most of them
suffer most acutely from issues of poor financial resources and adminis-
trative capacity.
Two, there is a pressing issue in terms of the huge, teeming
metropolises, the 50 million-plus cities, and the hundreds of urban
agglomerations that have already developed some urban form and
will need to be retrofitted and planned to fit this agenda. There are
already “three mega-urban regions” – Mumbai–Pune with 50 million,
the national capital region of Delhi (over 30 million), and Kolkata
(20 million) – which will be some of the largest concentrations of urban
populations in the world (Dyson and Visaria, 2004 in Revi, 2008). How
they share, manage, and recycle the resources available to them is a
major challenge going forward.
A third compelling part of the Indian experience, across city sizes, will
be dealing with the vast informal settlements that often must be formal-
ized before municipalities will extend formal, infrastructure to them.
Although recent government programmes such as Rajiv Awas Yojana
(RAY) guarantee basic services to slum households, mainstreaming
sustainability into these interventions will be critical.
A fourth challenge will be the pressure of climate change, which will
impose uncertainty and urgency on sustainability interventions. Sudden
influxes of climate change refugees from other parts of the country, or
even neighbouring countries, will put pressure on urban systems and
finances.
Cities, new and old, must begin to revisit their extractive relation-
ship with the countryside. Alongside rapid urbanization, demands and
conditions are changing in rural India as well. Villages are growing
in size, and although many are reluctant to become formally “urban”
because of the loss of benefits under rural schemes, occupational struc-
tures, incomes, and aspirations are changing. Revi, Mehrotra, and
Prakash, discuss the concept of “RUrbanism” or “keeping the balance
between rural and urban areas” as rural–urban, inter-urban resource, and
socioeconomic conflict becomes starker (Revi et al., 2006, in Revi 2008).
Responding to this process will require both massive investment and
an institutional revamp. How will Indian cities finance these interven-
tions? What modes of partnership or funding models might emerge to
supplement government resources? To date, the US$10 billion central
government programme for urban development, the Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), has not emphasized the
issue of sustainability. In particular, there is no component that directly
addresses assessing climate change risk/vulnerability or adaptation or

mitigation strategies. Moreover, the mission has funded piecemeal
projects – a large number in water supply and sanitation – that do little
to ensure water source sustainability or recycling of wastewater. With
JNNURM-II under discussion, it is hoped that the massive fund flow
from this programme will enable the creation of more sustainable assets
and a greater recognition that climate change and resource sustainability
is a crucial part of the urban planning process (Sharma and Tomar,
2010).
From an institutional perspective, there is a critical need to bring
about greater complementarity and coherence in efforts towards greater
sustainability. The key problem that will emerge across the sectors is the
lack of an overarching move to sustainability. The two key ministries
engaged in urban development are the Ministry of Urban Development
(MoUD) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation
(MoHUPA). Yet the issue of sustainability is handled across these and
other ministries and programmes such as the Ministry of Environment
and Forests, or the Central Pollution Control Board. However, water,
solid waste, and urban transport – all with crucial implications for the
environment – are headed by their individual ministries, and the tech-
nical solutions they choose have more to do with financing and budgets
than coherence with the sustainability strategy.
At the local level, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) continue to be weak.
Despite devolution of functions under the 74th Amendment Act, city
affairs are typically handled by state governments or parastatals, and
subject to bureaucratic interference. As a result, urban leadership has
not been encouraged. In most instances, the state and national agen-
cies which provide amenities to urban areas are not formally responsible
to those constituencies. Fixing the urban governance framework under
which cities and their services are planned and delivered is crucial to the
sustainability agenda.
∗ ∗ ∗
It is important to remember that cities in India were not always anti-

thetical to nature. The worshipping of local lake deities has long ensured
the protection of wetlands and lake ecosystems (Nagendra et al., 2014).
In many smaller towns and peri-urban areas, huge centuries-old trees
and groves have been preserved, even in the midst of bustling, growing
neighbourhoods (Gadgil, 1991, in Nagendra et al., 2014). Older Indian
cities often incorporated lakes, step wells, and other water bodies to
capture rainfall. Modern urbanization has typically excluded even these

basic sustainability measures. While growing populations and improved
technology for transporting water and so on necessitates a different
response, there may be lessons to learn from previous experience.
Indeed, it makes sense that the communities where, for millennia,
people have aggregated in search of more efficient commerce, sharing
of resources and social networks are really the environmental solution,
not the problem.
The opportunity: Are cities the environmental solution?

It is one thing to try to make the cities we live in more in tune with
natural systems. Yet, on a slightly larger scale, another question to ask is
whether the very nature of urbanization – that of hundreds of thousands
of people living close to one another in dense settlements – is, in itself,
more environmentally sustainable.
Of course, there are many different types of urban form, and theo-
ries underlying their merits and sustainability. Edward Glaeser helps us
understand these competing and evolving notions of environmental-
ism and sustainability. For instance, the more romantic notions of a
home amidst nature, as espoused by Henry David Thoreau (known as
the father of modern environmentalism), and introduced into urban
planning by the iconic planner Ebenezer Howard’s Garden in the City,
might actually cause more harm than good. This is because while every
home might have access to the natural environment, in order to deliver
this, there is a need for suburbanization. However, from the point of
view of delivery of urban services – water supply, sewerage networks,
rubbish collection, and so on – these spread-out suburban habitations
actually have a higher environmental and even financial cost. Water, for
instance, must be pumped over longer distances, thus requiring higher
energy use and greater capital investment in pipelines.
Cities themselves develop due to the benefits of agglomeration –
the proximity that allows an interchange of ideas, goods, services,
that in turn produces greater economic wealth. City residents, just like
their rural counterparts, require access to clean water, food, sanitation,
employment, and so on, to live happy, comfortable lives. Assuming that
individuals do not take responsibility for sourcing these amenities them-
selves, research has shown that it is more environmentally friendly –
or has a lower environmental cost – to deliver these services in more
compact urban settings. Therefore, the ecological footprint of a denser
city like Barcelona is much lower than that of a more spread-out city
like Atlanta. Suburban-style communities must also travel further for
employment, and it is cheaper to run public transport systems in areas

of higher density. This argument does not mean that cities have to be
large in population terms, as even small cities may be dense in their lay-
out. London’s Ken Livingstone, for instance, favours densification for
the very reason that it is “greener” to deliver municipal services, and to
push people to use public transport (Glaeser, 2011).
There is yet another scale at which these decisions become relevant –
and that is the level across more than one city. For instance, Glaeser
argues, environmentalists who oppose development in California’s Bay
Area to protect its green cover, effectively push development to areas
where the environment is less hospitable (and therefore warrants less
protection) but where the costs of heating and cooling, in environ-
mental terms, would be higher. Within a country then, decisions about
protecting the environment need to be evaluated in terms of their
impact on different scales. This logic holds some ideas for regional plan-
ning as well. In Denmark, for example, regional planning helps insure
that one industry’s waste is another’s input – decisions about where
what types of firms and industries locate are therefore made with envi-
ronmental considerations in mind. There is much that can be learnt
from this approach for India – for the development of new towns and
cities, for instance along the industrial corridor, or for special economic
zones (SEZs).
Despite the myriad issues so far, India is in a fortunate position in that
it has some time yet to think through and shape both its individual city
urban form as well as the portfolio of the cities Indians develop. Con-
structing urban sustainability requires working across the silos in which
urban services and assets are conceived and delivered – whether silos
of sectors or state or municipal boundaries. However, these silos are
often reinforced or made more complex due to institutional overlap, or
myopic, project-based interventions. The following sections look at the
key areas for intervention, in order to unpack the ways in which India’s
current neglect of the urban sector has spawned inefficient resource
management, and suggests some new paradigms going forward.
Building blocks of urban sustainability
Water and wastewater: Restoring the natural cycle

Water is critical for human survival yet its supply is increasingly under
threat due to mismanagement and conflict over water resources, and
due to climate change. Securing and managing our water resources
to meet the demands not only of urban users but also of agricultural
and industrial users is critical. Doing so requires taking an integrated

approach across water, sewage, wastewater, and stormwater run-off, and
respecting the hydrological cycle.
In terms of water availability, India faces several challenges. At the
macro level, climate change, and the attendant extremes of precipi-
tation and drought in different zones across the country, can wreak
havoc on existing patterns of agriculture and water supply. It is expected
that, on average, the number of rainy days will decrease by 5–15 days
across the country, while the number of heavy rainfall days will increase
(Rupa Kumar et al., 2006, in Revi, 2008). At the same time, episodes
of extreme rainfall as seen in Mumbai in 2005 (which resulted in
over a 1,000 deaths) are expected to be seen over much of western
and central India (Ibid.). Glacial melt and regression of the Himalayan
glaciers has changed river hydrology in the Indo–Gangetic plain and the
Brahmaputra valley (Tangri, 2003, in Revi, 2008). Equally, drought is a
serious concern. The Ganga, Narmada, Krishna, and Kaveri rivers are all
expected to undergo water stress in the coming years, which will affect
vast swathes of northern, western, and eastern India (Gosain et al., 2006,
in Revi, 2008). All these changes necessitate revisiting urban planning
and water management practices as well as disaster-response strategies
across cities and regions.
A still further threat is posed by the politics of sharing water with
our neighbours. Two-thirds of India’s total water resources fall in the
inter-country boundaries, and in almost every case India is the middle
riparian. China and India share the water of the Brahmaputra (Yarlung
Tsang-po) just as India and Pakistan share the water of the Indus. It is
critical to look at water in South Asia, particularly in the context of
changed climatic conditions, from a hydrological and not a cultural per-
spective. This will entail expanding the purview to look at China, who
is the upper riparian and therefore can impact India’s ability to fulfil its
responsibilities to its lower riparians. Yet, to create realistic treaties it is
important to know the exact amount and location of water resources in
the South Asia region, that is, peak and scarcity volumes in each river,
and so on. At the same time, great mistrust in the South Asia region
makes negotiations difficult and there is also great emotion attached to
water and rivers in each country’s history. Some of the largest cities and
urban regions depend on these shared rivers for their water, as do the
hundreds of smaller towns.
Poor management of water resources within and between sectors is a
very serious challenge. At present, agriculture is the largest user of water
in India, at over 80 per cent of water used (IDFC India Infrastructure
Report 2011). Industry and cities use the remainder, although the
demands from all sectors are increasing rapidly. Already there are ten-
sions between states, and between competing users for the use of water.
Historically, cities grew around a perennial water source. However, with
the advent of pumping technology, local water resources have been
neglected, even filled up, and are often heavily polluted. Megacities
like Mumbai and Delhi transport their water from 160–300 kilometres
away, depriving rural households in far-off areas of precious drinking
water. Another aspect of mismanagement has been disregarding the nat-
ural hydrological cycle. Cities like Mumbai have blocked the natural
drainage points of its rivers, upsetting natural hydrological cycles, which
can have disastrous effects, as seen in the floods of 2005 that killed 1,000
people. Most cities discharge their wastewater, untreated, into a nearby
surface water body, thus causing downstream pollution. Barely 20 per
cent of wastewater generated in cities is treated, down from 37 per cent
in 1999 (Lall, 2014). Barely 6 per cent of cities (excluding census towns)
even have a sewerage network. However, some cities, like Pune, have
made remarkable efforts to reverse this trend, and have worked to restore
local water bodies. Restoring local water bodies can not only reduce
pumping and distribution costs, but, even if they are not used as the
water source themselves, by storing rainwater and enabling groundwater
recharge they maintain the natural water tables and hydrology of cities.
Water bodies, like green cover, also help mitigate the urban heat island
effect in India’s cities.
In 2011, only 70.6 per cent of urban households had access to tap
water and only 60.6 per cent had access to tap water from treated sources
(ACCRN, 2013). Around 27 per cent of urban households depend on
sources like groundwater, through wells and bore wells, or other private
arrangements. Groundwater extraction, since it is unregulated, is drying
up the water table, and as people dig deeper and deeper for water, is lead-
ing to arsenic contamination and saltwater intrusion in different parts
of the country. A growing share of agriculture depends on groundwater,
as does industry – groundwater is preferred for its more uniform temper-
ature and reliability compared to surface water. In Mumbai, a thriving
tanker water mafia allegedly, works in collusion with the municipality to
limit water supply, and instead supply groundwater from neighbouring
rural areas, driven across tens of kilometres. This places urban drinking
water in direct conflict with water for rural households, agriculture, and
production. Despite growing pressures, most Indian cities continue to
pump their water over increasingly long distances, and then discharge
it, untreated, into nearby water bodies. Mumbai gets its water from
six water sources – Tulsi, Vihar, Tansa, Modak Sagar, Upper Vaitarna,
and Bhatsa. These sources are not sufficient to meet the city’s present
demand, and with population projected to grow from 13 million to
16 million in 2021, additional sources will have to be tapped. Delhi
is presently sourcing its water supply from 500 kilometres away, from
the Tehri dam. Mumbai has built pipelines to carry water around 160
kilometres from Upper Vaitarna. This implies massive energy usage in
pumping costs. Additionally, once this water is used in the city, it is dis-
charged untreated into the sea, or the Yamuna. As urbanization gathers
pace, a solution has to be found to provide drinking water in a manner
that is less wasteful, and more sustainable and equitable.
There are several critical areas where a shift in managing our water
resources is critical. To begin with, the existing water supply systems
need to address issues of leakages and non-revenue water. The response
to water woes has been to continually invest in more expensive capital
works, instead of fixing the huge leakage losses of the current system,
and gaining a more accurate picture of demand and supply in the
system.
Depending on geography and topography, cities must look at develop-
ing more local sources of water, whether lakes or underground aquifers.
This will help reduce the energy cost of sourcing water over long dis-
tances and also help reduce conflict with surrounding rural areas or
industries. Cities like Paris have successfully used underground aquifers
to store the city’s water, and actively promote groundwater recharge.
Typically, pumping and distribution are the largest components of cost
in water systems, being high energy and capital intensive. In the Indian
context, where water boards often choose not to even recover their oper-
ating and maintenance costs through water tariffs, these savings will be
significant.
Cities must move towards a paradigm that recognizes the natural, cir-
cular water cycle. A critical step in doing so is to recycle and treat the
wastewater generated by the city. In the current situation, pumping the
mix of residential, commercial, and other wastewater into water bodies
not only wastes a precious resource but also contaminates a potentially
potable source of water. The condition of the Yamuna is a clear example
of this. Some cities have taken strides to address this issue. Navi Mumbai
is one of a few municipalities to treat all of the sewage it discharges.
While it has been unable to find bulk users for this treated water, the
simple fact that they are now discharging treated rather than untreated
water into the nearby creek has helped restore the marine ecosystem
there. Chennai Metro Water stands out as another success story. The city
not only treats all the wastewater it produces but, by selling the water
to industries, they are able recover the cost of treatment. On the other
hand, cities like Delhi have allowed built sewage treatment infrastruc-
ture to lie unused, with disastrous consequences for the environment
and downstream users of the Yamuna.
For India, rainwater harvesting is a decentralized and effective way
to utilize water in the city. At present stormwater run-off goes into
sewers and gets contaminated. With barely any unpaved ground in
Indian cities, rainwater cannot percolate into the ground and instead
causes flooding. Particularly for coastal cities, there is a need to preserve
mangroves and other such natural barriers to flooding.
In addition to the more technical solutions, however, it will be crit-
ical to get the politics of water right – this involves streamlining the
institutional structure governing water and managing water between
competing uses.
Solid waste management: No more landfills

Cities produce huge volumes of waste every day. Recent estimates put
the total amount of solid waste generated in India at 42 million metric
tons every day, with an expected yearly increase of 5 per cent. Mumbai
alone is estimated to produce 8,000 tons of waste a day (ICOR, 2013).
Solid waste comprises not only household waste but also that from
medical facilities, small- to large-scale industries within urban limits,
commercial establishments, construction sites, butchers, and vegetable
vendors.
So who takes care of this waste? In India, municipal solid waste man-
agement (SWM) is the responsibility of urban local bodies. However,
with the exception of very few, all municipalities in India lack the
money and in-house capability to manage this important function. This
is compounded by institutional weakness and improper technology.
Critically, from an environmental standpoint, SWM to date focuses
largely on collection and transportation, with barely any emphasis on
the critical issue of disposal. At present, 60–70 per cent of what ULBs
spend on solid waste is on collection, and another 20–30 per cent on
transportation.
However, even these first two steps are not complete. In Mumbai, for
instance, of the 8,000 tons generated, only 2,500 are collected. There is a
bad supply chain, except for hospital waste. This is a particular problem
in slums where sewage and solid waste is either dumped into sewers or
water bodies, burnt, or allowed to decompose. This has huge ramifica-
tions for the natural environment – polluting the air, soil, groundwater
sources, marine and estuary ecologies, and endangering public health.

Rather than spend so much money on collection and transportation
there is a need for localized, community-driven strategies, and the involve-
ment of cost-recovery mechanisms, so that limited funds can be spent
on treatment that cannot be managed at a local level.
The waste collected typically makes its way to city landfills. How-
ever, this is not a sustainable solution. In Mumbai, the municipality
has already run out of land for more landfills. The majority of land-
fills are closed or are reaching capacity. Some efforts have been made
to capture methane from decomposing rubbish, but even this has been
below targets. Moreover, landfills are far from an environmental solu-
tion, polluting the land, environment, and water around them. Efforts
and money must therefore be especially focused on scientific disposal of
the waste. In choosing this strategy it is critical to take into account the
composition of waste. On average, Asian cities produce more organic
waste than developing countries, therefore recycling and reuse options
are different. This waste also has a low calorific value, making options
like incineration, as practised in countries like Sweden to generate heat,
a poor option for India.
So what path should India pursue?

Indian cities, like those in many other developing countries, produce far
less waste per capita than their developing country counterparts. There-
fore, the first step of the “holy stair” – reducing waste produced/waste
minimization – holds tremendous promise.
Holy Stair → Reduce/Reuse/Recycle/Energy recovery/Landfill
India can target the issue of waste management at three key levels:
Policy
At the national level, SWM falls under the purview of the Ministry
of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and the Central Pollution Con-
trol Board (CPCB) and state Pollution Control Board (PCB). In 2000,
the Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) guidelines were published, along
with accompanying rules that were to be adopted by municipalities by
December 2013. However, no municipality has adopted them to date.
Moreover, there is no way to enforce that these rules be met. At the
same time, there is a need to recognize SWM in the urban context and
bring it into the purview of the urban development department.
Classification and standard setting/regulation: Legislative/regulatory level

Countries like Sweden coordinate waste policy across scales by setting
waste reduction targets at the national, regional, and local level, and
then operationalizing them. They tie producers into waste manage-
ment – for instance, companies are held liable for the waste produced
by their packaging.
Regulatory definitions are important tools to use to set standards for
waste management practices. Treatment standards must be set for dif-
ferent types of waste, for example, medical versus household waste, and
might require different methods such as incineration versus compost-
ing. Understanding and setting standards depending on the compo-
sition of waste is an important regulatory/administrative aspect. This
includes banning certain plastics or other materials or bans on landfills
of combustible or organic waste.
Behaviour
Behaviour can play an important role in decentralized collection of
waste, for instance, through household-level segregation and compost-
ing. Recyclables can be deposited at points within each area – these can
then be collected by the municipality – or the private sector involved,
for instance, the role ragpickers play in most cities. There needs to be
strict penalties for violation of segregation norms, such as high charges
to collect non-segregated rubbish.
It will be crucial to bring informal settlements into this ambit. In
Curitiba, Brazil, households in informal settlements where the munic-
ipality did not collect rubbish, were rewarded with chocolates, food
coupons, and other items for bringing recyclable waste to a designated
collection point.
Urban transport: Moving people not cars

Urban transport systems play a crucial role in making cities safe, acces-
sible, livable, and, above all, productive. Badly planned urban transport
has a range of negative externalities. On the one hand, inadequate,
unsafe, or unaffordable urban transport limits equal participation of all
city residents. Women will be less likely to work if their transit is not
safe. Cities with poor public transport limit the mobility of poorer res-
idents who cannot afford a car. Poor traffic management and rules can
endanger pedestrians and make cities less walkable.
Transport systems have implications for energy use. Higher use
of public transport is undeniably less energy intensive than private
motorization, and must be promoted. Yet, at the same time, public trans-
port, as a huge consumer of fuel, also has implications for sustainability.
For instance, when Delhi switched all its buses to compressed natural gas
(CNG), this was responsible for a massive drop in air pollution levels.
Where private motorization is unavoidable, behavioural interventions
like carpooling might be encouraged.
Public transport also plays a huge role in determining city shape
and form – which areas of the cities are accessible and can grow, and
which languish. City shape and form in turn have further implica-
tions for energy consumption – as we saw in the case of Barcelona and
Atlanta, a more populous city can actually have a much lower ecologi-
cal footprint than a less populated one. For this reason, urban transport
systems should rest on a solid foundation of land use planning – which
ensures a fair amount of mixed use development, encourages density
and dissuades sprawl, and promotes walkability. Land use planning is
particularly important because, unlike fuel and mode choice, which can
be gradually changed, it actually plays a critical role in determining the
sustainability of a city. Land use planning necessitates taking a decision
on urban forms – whether compact, or more spread out. A number of
cities see transport and land use planning as two sides of the same coin –
a great example is Hong Kong, which, by the use of transit-oriented
development, has used transit networks to develop new parts of the city,
and, in doing so, built in a model to finance this expansion as well.
To date, most urban policies in India have encouraged sprawl. For a
sample of city centres in India, the average “floor space index (FSI)” was
only 1.6, compared to indices ranging from 5 to 15 in other Asian city
centres (Padam and Singh, 2001; Bertaud, 2002 in Pucher 2005). Despite
the huge populations living in urban centres, this low density persists,
resulting in hugely dense informal settlements – with formal housing
and land rendered too expensive by this artificial shortage. In suburban
areas, where higher FSI ratios are permitted, there has been increased
densification and relocation of firms (Pucher et al., 2005), as seen in
Bengaluru or Hyderabad, which have technology or commercial parks
on their peripheries. However, since jurisdiction in these areas is unclear,
or overlapping, development in these peri-urban areas is often ad hoc,
with little planned provision of roads, public transport, or basic social
services and amenities. To combat poor public transport connectivity
and haphazard planning, private motorization is on the rise, particu-
larly of two wheelers, which have seen massive double-digit growth.
This is unfortunate because more compact, transit-oriented develop-
ment would reduce the need for travel, and facilitate the use of public
transport, walking, and cycling for a larger percentage of whatever travel

is necessary.
This situation, while troubling, offers India huge potential to shape
its urban transport trajectory. India is in a unique position because the
vast majority of its transport infrastructure has not been built. Of a total
of 7,935 urban areas as per Census 2011, only about 500 have pub-
lic bus transport, and only the four metro cities have rail-based public
transport. Since 2008, the bus rapid transit system (BRTS) has made a
foray into six cities – Ahmedabad, Indore, Bhopal, Rajkot, Jaipur, and
Delhi (Ahluwalia, 2014). About six of the largest cities are also building
metro systems. Many of the public bus systems in cities are in fact run
by the state rather than ULBs, with the result that their routes are not
necessarily optimal for the city itself.
At present, the vast majority of the country relies on private
minibuses, rickshaws, taxis, and tempos – what is known as intermediate
public transport (IPT). IPT is mode of transport that fills the gap between
private transport and formal mass public transport services provided by
the local or state government – such as taxis, autos, or minibuses. IPT
fulfils trips that mass transit doesn’t serve – typically between a destina-
tion and a mass transit station or for shorter trips.1 IPT is currently the
main mode of transport in smaller Indian cities, and is often the only
means of “public” transport. While some IPT is regulated, a large section
of it operates informally.
A well-planned transport system will integrate mass public transport
(buses, metros, trains, etc.) and intermediate public transport. City gov-
ernments must work towards an integrated transportation plan. This
includes bringing together mass public transport with IPT, walking
paths, and major highways. At present there is a lack of vision and holis-
tic planning, and weak coordination between land use and transport
planning. Some important steps include identifying key corridor roads,
which then get priority for public transport, integrating feeder networks
of IPT (including non-motorized IPT) to mass transit stations, which
should be intermodal to minimize delays, having integrated fares and
ticketing, and so on.
One cannot ignore one key factor behind the increase in private
motorization – and that is rising aspirations. While, over time, it is
hoped that people will appreciate the value of public transport – as they
do in some of the richest cities in the world like New York, London, and
Paris – one must also understanding the sociological underpinnings of
choices that come with rising incomes. Yet, in the context of increased
vehicle use it is important to improve motor vehicle technology and
fuels in order to increase energy efficiency and safety while decreasing

noise and air pollution. While there are controls in place to regulate
pollution and vehicle emissions these need to be made more stringent.
Cities like Delhi have entirely switched to CNG in their public bus sys-
tem, which resulted in a significant drop in air pollution. More recently,
an expert committee has recommended that cities gradually adopt the
stricter Euro II, Euro III, and Euro IV emission standards for all new cars,
taxis, trucks, and buses, (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2002).
Another crucial issue is for cities to focus on their freight management
strategy, since freight is a major component of city traffic.
The key for India at this stage is to invest heavily in affordable,
clean, well-connected networks of public transport, along which its
future cities will grow. Yet, to date, little of the discourse on sustainable
urban transport has permeated Indian policymaking. However, the year
2014 also saw the publication of the India Transport Report, by the
National Transport Development Policy Committee (NTDPC), which
estimated that, under the business-as-usual scenario, urban transport
will require an investment of Rs 22.78 trillion over the next 20 years. The
report’s desired scenario, which incorporates sustainable urban trans-
port, drops this investment requirement to Rs 15 trillion. The report
recommended integration of land use and urban transport planning,
and lays emphasis on mixed land use, and high density and mixed
income neighbourhoods.
There is a desperate need for much better cooperation among differ-
ent transport agencies, departments, and ministries as well as better
overall coordination of transport and land use policies. The NTPDC
report emphasized that the primary responsibility for urban transport
should stay with the city, with the role of the state and centre gradu-
ally reducing. It recommended dedicated Metropolitan Urban Transport
Authorities (MUTA) be set up in each city with a population of over
1 million, and dedicated cells in smaller cities for integrated planning,
coordination, and delivery of urban transport services. Larger metropoli-
tan planning agencies also provide a platform where Indian cities can
integrate policies across sectors from land use to transport.
Urban energy, urban metabolism, and the built environment

Cities and urban areas account for two-thirds of the world’s energy con-
sumption, making their energy efficiency critical for sustainability and
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In the Indian context,
what is particularly troubling is that electricity generation is still heavily
coal-based; annual coal consumption has more than tripled since 1980
(Cstep). However, in planning energy efficiency one must cover other

sources of energy too, including smaller polluting fuels like kerosene or
diesel for generator sets.
Cities consume energy through one of four main avenues – buildings
(including construction, heating, and cooling); industry; transport; and
municipal services such as water supply and street lighting. These dif-
ferent avenues of use have different implications for how energy use
can be managed. For instance, at the building or household level, the
use of energy-saving appliances is important. Urban residents use more
energy, especially through their purchase of consumer durables, than
rural, although aspirations are rising in the latter. On the other hand,
with municipal services, which are the largest component of urban
energy use, it is the design of the infrastructure that might need to be tar-
geted. A particular city’s energy profile depends heavily on its economy,
its mix of energy sources, level of infrastructure provision, transport net-
works, and so on. Urban energy management is therefore intrinsically
tied to the issues of urban transport and urban form.
There are, therefore, several broad areas of intervention necessary at
the city level.
1. Retrofitting government facilities and operations
This spans intervention in water supply systems, in wastewater treat-

ment, lighting, and transportation. Some Indian cities have already been
successful in implementing energy-saving measures across these sectors.
In water-scarce Chennai for instance, the water board, Chennai Metro
Water (CMW), treats and reuses 100 per cent of its wastewater. In doing
so, it is cognizant of the energy implications. Between 2005 and 2006,
CMW built four additional conventional activated sludge process (ASP)
plants with funds from the Chennai City River Conservation Project
(CCRCP). These four new plants are completely powered by internally
generated biogas for nine months of the year, which reduces elec-
tricity costs significantly. In addition, cities like Navi Mumbai have
adopted more energy-efficient wastewater treatment technology, known
as sequential batch reactors, which use 35–45 per cent less energy than
traditional technologies.
2. Promoting energy conservation by individuals and households.
This is largely an issue of encouraging individuals and households to

change their behaviour and the choices they make. One of the most
obvious changes is transportation as discussed before, in particular the

move to public transport and to walking and bicycling. Bogota has been
successful in having a bicycle revolution despite many people thinking
that it wasn’t possible. This has been replicated in many cities across the
world – from Paris to South Korea.
Other interventions can help people make more informed choices
about the energy they consume. Ratings on appliances such as air con-
ditioners helps make people aware of the energy they are consuming,
especially in heating and cooling.
3. Promoting energy efficiency through building codes/regulations and

the built environment.
The choice of construction materials and methods has tremendous

implications for sustainability. Cities without adequate green space,
with concrete, glass, and chrome, create a heat island effect whereby
the temperature in the city is higher than the surrounding area, due
to stored heat and energy. These microclimates can actually change
weather patterns for the city.
Cities can address this through several avenues.
This includes encouraging construction of green buildings that gen-
erate energy, recycle water, and incorporate green space. At present the
real estate market is showing no premium in the valuation for green
buildings, but this could be achieved through power and water pricing
so that the savings from reduced water and energy use become more
significant.
At the same time, the construction of the built environment must also
be sustainable, through the use of low carbon materials, low energy use
in construction, insulation, natural day lighting, LED lighting, design-
ing buildings for future flexibility of use, and using local materials and
labour to reduce transport costs. Streets and paving are other avenues
that could both recharge groundwater through permeable paving and
reduce stormwater run-off. This also has the very important effect of
reducing the heat island effect. Most commercial buildings in India
today opt for glass and chrome. This is due to efficiency and speed of
construction but is also an aspirational aesthetic (Mukhopadhyay and
Ravi, 2009).
Most important is the natural infrastructure within a city – encourag-
ing carbon sinks within the city (green space) which not only regulate
the temperature within the city, mitigating the heat island effect, but
also serve as sinks for carbon emissions.
4. Efficient land use planning and development of mass public

transport.
Informality poses a significant challenge to sustainability, often

because informal settlements are located in ecologically sensitive areas,
or because they are not connected to a municipal waste collection.
Those who live in the many slums in India where rubbish is not col-
lected often burn their trash while sewage and other wastewater seeps
into the ground.
However, there are a number of ways in which this has been man-
aged. In Manizales, Colombia – people were moved off fragile areas and
rehoused close by. In Curitiba, people were relocated, then that land
was converted into eco parks. Such measures will require coordination
with housing ministries and can even be done as a sites and services
programme with community contributions.
However, More important are the broader issues of urban form –
density, and co-location of work and residence, that allow for shorter
commute times. This will involve a careful negotiation between master
planning versus setting guidelines, and must allow for organic growth
within them. Constructing urban sustainability requires not only piece-
meal interventions, but a change in ethos and co-ordination across
scales.
References
Ahluwalia, I. J., Kanbur, R. and Mohanty, P. K. (Eds.). (2014). Urbanisation in India:
Challenges, Opportunities and the Way Forward. SAGE Publications India.
Bertaud, A., (2002). “The Economic Impact of Land and Urban Planning
Regulations in India”, Unpublished Manuscript, http://www. alain-bertaud.
com/images/AB_% 20India_ 20 (Retrieved on April 2014).
Chakrabarti, P. G. D. (2001). “Urban Crisis in India: New Initiatives for
Sustainable Cities”, Development in Practice, 11(2–3), 260–272.
http://www.seachangecop.org/sites/default/files/documents/2009%2012%
20ISET-N%20Shifting%20the%20Response%20Terrain.pdf#page=45.
Glaeser, E. (2011). Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer,
Smarter, Greener, Healthier and Happier. London: Pan Macmillan.
IDFC India Infrastructure Report (2011). Water: Policy and Performance for
Sustainable Development, http://www.idfc.com/pdf/report/iir-2011.pdf.
Lall, Rajiv (2014). http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/rajiv-lall-
why-indian-urban-administrators-are-poor-service-providers-114022501235_
1.html.
Mukhopadhyay, P. and Ravi, A. (2009). “Keeping India’s Economic Engine Going:
Climate Change and the Urbanisation Question”, Economic and Political Weekly
44(31), 59–70.
Nagendra, H., Sudhira, H. S., Katti, M., Tengö, M. and Schewenius, M. (2014).
“Urbanization and its Impacts on Land Use, Biodiversity and Ecosystems in
India”, INTERdisciplina, 2(2), 305–313.
Pucher, J., Korattyswaroopam, N. and Ittyerah, N. (2004). “The Crisis of Pub-
lic Transport in India: Overwhelming Needs but Limited Resources”, Journal of
Public Transportation, 7, 95–113.
Pucher, J., Korattyswaropam, N., Mittal, N. and Ittyerah, N. (2005). “Urban
Transport Crisis in India”, Transport Policy, 12(3), 185–198.
Rajasekar, U., Bhat, G. K. and Karanth, A. (2012). “Tale of Two Cities: Develop-
ing City Resilience Strategies under Ultimate Change Scenarios for Indore and
Surat, India”.
Revi, A. (2008). “Climate Change Risk: An Adaptation and Mitigation Agenda for
Indian Cities”, Environment and Urbanization, 20(1), 207–229.
Sharma, D. and Tomar, S. (2010). “Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation in
Indian Cities”, Environment and Urbanization, 22(2), 451–465.
Sharma, D., Singh, R. and Singh, R. (2013). “Urban Climate Resilience: A Review
of the Methodologies Adopted under the ACCCRN Initiative in Indian Cities”.
7
Governing Environment
Democracy and urban governance
One of the greatest ironies of urban governance and its quest for a
participatory character is that while the foundations of democratic gov-
ernance that nations have adopted the world over trace back to the
experiments and innovations of city management in ancient cities, yet,
to date, we continue to search for answers to how cities need to be
managed.
The history of democracy can be traced back to Athens in around the
6th century BC. India’s very own version of “independent republics”
was evident in the sangas and ganas of the 6th century. “Democracy” is
derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (peo-
ple) and kratos (rule). If people rule, they must rule something. The only
possible object of rule is the people who form the state or political sys-
tem being considered. Hence, the rulers in a democracy, the people, are
also the ruled. So the meaning of “democracy” can be given most per-
spicuously as being that the people rule themselves. This gives three
terms to look at: people, ruling, and themselves. Each term has gen-
erated challenges, and the combination of the three generated some
more (Harrison, 1993), leading to deep-rooted conflicts within the his-
tory of democratic theory. These included whether democracy should
mean some kind of popular power where citizens are engaged in self-
government and self-regulation; or an aid to decision-making which is a
means of conferring authority to those periodically voted into office.
These conflicts have given rise to three basic variants or models of
democracy. First, there is direct or participatory democracy, a system
of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly
involved – the “original” type of democracy found in ancient Athens,
among other places. Second, there is liberal or representative democracy,
193
a system of rule embracing elected “officers” who undertake to “repre-

sent” the interests or views of citizens within the framework of the “rule
of law”. Third, is a variant of democracy based on a one party model
(although some may doubt whether this is a form of democracy at all).
We have, and continue to, witness nations adopting all these variants at
the national level, the principles of which trace back to city governance
in ancient civilizations.
Democracy is today a relative concept; it no longer means the same
thing to all peoples and cultures at all times. The ancient Romans took a
practical approach to everything, including the principle of democracy.
The social conditions and divisions that existed within their community
determined the political institutions they adopted and, therefore, they
“did not concern themselves with the construction of an ideal government, but
instead fashioned political institutions in response to problems as they arose”
(Nwauwa, n.d.).
Democracy by itself is no recipe for success, but it does provide the
enablers to prevent abuse of power. Nearly everyone in present-day soci-
ety pretends to be a democrat and political regimes of all kinds claim to
be democracies. Yet, what these regimes say and do is substantially dif-
ferent from one another. Democracy imparts an aura of legitimacy to
the modern life of any society, and laws, rules, and policies appear to
be justified when they are “democratic”. However, a great many politi-
cal thinkers have been critical of the theory and practice of democracy
(Held, 1993). In modern times, there is hardly an idea more fundamen-
tally contested than the idea of democracy (Baiocchi et al., 2011).
The emergence and success of Indian democracy defies many pre-
vailing theories that stipulate the preconditions for democracy (Kohli,
2001; Mehta, 2010). Elsewhere in the world, this democratic form of
government not only required but was generated by certain social and
economic requisites such as the French Revolution or the evolution
of democracy in the USA, none of which preceded the adoption of
democracy in India (Ganguly, 2007), unlike say India is neither industri-
alized nor developed; Indian businessmen and the Indian middle class
do not fully control the country’s politics; India is anything but ethni-
cally homogeneous; and India would probably rank low on a number of
attributes of “civic culture” (Kohli, 2001). Thus, democracy in India may
best be understood by focusing on how power distribution is negotiated
and renegotiated. The record of Indian democracy suggests that man-
aging the power conflicts during the negotiation process require two
related sets of political processes. First, is the delicate balance democracy
has managed to strike between centralization and decentralization. Sec-
ond, is about mastering the art of serving the interests of the powerful
Governing Environment 195
in the society without fully excluding the weaker sections. In India, this
record on both the fronts is far from perfect, and in fact the failures
have actually put a greater “burden” on “democracy”. Accommodat-
ing, nonetheless, those who overcome powerful challenges by granting
them greater autonomy and resources is central to the strengthening of
democracy.
Any analysis of government – national, state, or local – is incomplete
without a discussion on governance; which is about the mechanisms,
processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articu-
late their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and
mediate their differences. With India’s economic growth closely linked
with its urban centres, the capacity of a nation to pursue its economic
goals becomes contingent on its ability to govern its cities. Urban gov-
ernance has, therefore, assumed increasing importance as a means to
ensure that economic growth is equitable, sustainable, and improves
living conditions.
Governance is a vague and contested term. According to Stoker
(1998):
governance refers to a set of institutions and factors that are drawn

from but also beyond government. [It] identifies the blurring of
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic
issues . . . [and it] recognizes the capacity to get things done which
does not rest on the power of government to command or use its
authority. (p.18)
Since its emergence in the 1990s, the concept of governance expanded

into the international and national development areas and culmi-
nated in the idea of “good governance” as the defining principle for
a sustainable political process. The concept incorporates the aggregate
array of actors involved in decision-making and decision-taking. Accord-
ing to Bevir (2010), governance is less focused on state institutions, and
more focused on the processes and interactions that tie the state to civil
society.
In India, Mehta (2010) argues that a representative government which
is not always a responsive government is one of the big “governance”
puzzles of the last few decades. While democratic regimes derive their
legitimacy from electoral process, winning elections is not necessary to
respond to the requirements of the well-being of citizens:
the infirmities and weaknesses of democracy in India are a product

of the incompleteness of democracy. The design of state structures
and processes, the lack of inner party democracy, the need to mobi-
lize funds for political mobilization, and the availability of ethnic
divisions as a mobilization strategy all impede the emergence of
responsive government. (p.381)
Mehta’s view that “smart” authoritarian governments have been more

responsive to their citizens, at least as far as economic well-being is con-
cerned, because the only source of legitimacy they have is performance,
while may raise some purist eyebrows, does also raise some interesting
dimensions for urban governance. We draw on this perspective while
evaluating possible models of governance for India’s cities and towns in
the subsequent sections of this chapter.
The recent uprisings in various parts of the world, notably the Arab
Spring, are indications that governance mechanisms have to keep pace
with the time, adapt to a dynamic political and economic world order,
and, above all, stand the test of people’s expectations. Closer to India,
one should not brush aside the tide of people who took to the streets to
back the Anna Hazare movement and the subsequent success of the Aam
Aadmi Party in the Delhi elections. While not all of the tactics adopted
in the movement can be viewed within the prism of democratic func-
tioning, political parties must take note of the sentiments – world over,
history is ripe with instances of grassroots movements leading to fun-
damental structural changes in governance systems. And the fact that a
large section of India’s urban population is now raising its voice, both
in the form of street protests (e.g. the pressure of urban street protests
resulted in the passing of the anti-rape law following the “Nirbhaya”
incident) and through a strong social media presence, drives home
the importance and significance of putting in place sound governance
frameworks in cities and towns.
India’s attempts at managing its cities
If one were looking for answers to the teething governance problems

that Indian cities are facing today, one need only turn back the pages
of history. Examples abound of how Indian cities were run, many of
which are applicable to this day and age. Consider these. During the
post-Mauryan period, a chief executive officer was appointed to perform
various functions related to city administration. Subsequently, during
the Gupta period, towns were administered by a council and there
existed a provision to have elected administrative officers. During the
Mughal period, municipal administration was vested in a “Kotwal”, a
city governor, who possessed the powers and duties of the chief of the
city police, magistrate, and prefect of municipal administration. The dis-
integration of the Mughal empire saw the first signs of the weakening of
these local institutional structures.
The colonial period saw some attempts at putting in place local insti-
tutions. The first organized system of local governance during the colo-
nial period was the setting up of the Municipal Corporation of Madras
by the East India Company in 1688. Subsequently, mayor’s courts were
set up in the presidency towns of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta in
1720 through a royal charter. This followed the empowerment of the
Governor-General in Council to appoint Justices of Peace in the pres-
idency towns in 1793, mainly to levy taxes on houses and lands to
provide sanitation in the towns. During the same year, the British estab-
lished local institutions in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras through a
Charter Act. In 1850, an Act was passed to permit the formation of
local communities to make better provisions for public health and con-
venience. The Act also provided for the levy of indirect taxes. Efforts
were made to further strengthen the municipal functions through res-
olutions by Lord Mayo, then Governor-General of India, in 1870, and
by Lord Ripon in 1882, which approved non-official majorities in all
municipalities and replaced even the district collector by a non-official
chairman.
The Royal Commission on Decentralization (1907), the Government
of India Act, 1919, the Simon Commission Report, 1925, and the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935, replacing the Government of India Act,
1919, are a few important events during the British rule aimed at the
empowerment of local self-governments in India. The Government of
India Act, 1919, enlarged the scope of taxation by local self-governments
and introduced a dyarchical system of governance, empowering the
provincial governments to control the local institutions.
However, the laws governing the urban local bodies enacted during
the period 1917 to 1937 failed to prescribe an effective system for day-
to-day management of municipal affairs. The question of administrative
capacity and fixation of responsibility for the performance of municipal
functions were barely given attention, and several municipalities were
supplanted on charges of corruption and inefficiency as a result of power
transfer from official hands (Aijaz, 2007). After independence, consti-
tution placed urban local government within the legislative ambit of
the states. References to urban local government were observed in only
two entries of the Indian Constitution: Entry 5 List II of the Seventh
Schedule (the State List); and Entry 20 of List III (Concurrent List). The
result was the absence of constitutional recognition and clear statutory

delineation of the powers, functions, and resources, which led to severe
neglect of urban local governments.
Emerging from the “India lives in its villages” mantra, much of the
focus of the Government of India during the post-independent era was
on rural India. In 1954, the Central Council of Local Self-Government
was set up to examine the problems of urban local bodies. The responsi-
bility of the urban local governance at the central level, transferred from
one ministry to other, namely Ministry of Health; Ministry of Works,
Housing and Urban Development (1966); Ministry of Health, Family
Planning, Works, Housing and Urban Development (1967); Ministry
of Works and Housing (1973), finally settling with Ministry of Urban
Development in 1985. Today, there are two Ministries at the union level
handling urban affairs, the Ministry of Urban Development and the
Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation.
Over a period of time, the municipal institutions lost the credibility
to deliver services in an efficient manner and began to ostracize their
responsibility to service urban areas beyond their jurisdiction. This led
to the emergence of urban development authorities (UDAs) in India,
which spread rapidly during the 1980s, and which inevitably led to con-
frontation with the municipal authorities. The UDAs were created as
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) with a mandate to perform their given
function efficiently, but also ended up usurping the powers of munic-
ipal system and taking control of regional planning and development
issues.
Internationally, during the same time, the adoption of decentraliza-
tion of reforms was seen as central to ensure cities function in fulfilling
their roles as engines of economic growth. The emergence of this
consensus has led to the formulation of policies and visions for increas-
ing urban productivity and facilitates urban renewal (Lama-Rewal and
Zerah, 2011). Globally, this shift to a service-based and urban-based
economy has increased the “political centrality” of cities (Heller and
Evans, 2010).
In India too, in the late 1980s, an attempt was made to introduce pro-
visions for strengthening urban local bodies in the Constitution through
the 63rd Amendment. However, the bill was defeated in Parliament. The
74th Constitution Amendment Act (CAA), which was a watershed devel-
opment in urban governance in India, was enacted in 1992, providing
Constitutional Status to the third tier of government.1
Furthermore, the 12th Schedule of the 74th CAA provided munic-
ipalities with 18 functions. While many of these functions (such as
urban planning, water supply, sanitation, slum improvement, etc.) were

already listed in the Municipal Acts of most states, certain new func-
tions like planning for economic and social development, protection
of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects, safeguarding
the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped
and mentally retarded, and urban poverty alleviation were included.
It is understood that the listing of the 18 functions was done to ensure
that state governments took cognizance of all key functions that are of
importance to urban areas. In most state Municipal Acts, the list of 18
functions has since been inserted.
The enactment of the 74th CAA was indeed a victory for local
governance. However, the spirit of empowering local governments to
determine their future was far from realized through the passing of the
amendment. The “political centrality of cities” is not yet evident in
India. The contrasting pictures between their ability to act as sites of
capital accumulation (rich cities) and their weakness as the third tier
of governments (poor city governments) does not confirm the rise of
cities in the political space (Scott, 2001, in Lama-Rewal and Zerah, 2011).
Indian cities, notwithstanding their inability to drive urban change, are
governed by a variety of urban institutions that are less democratic but
which share complex and unique historical legacies (Sivaramakrishnan,
2006, 2007, 2011; Lama-Rewal and Zerah, 2011). “It is conveniently for-
gotten that the functional domain of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) have
been steadily undermined by the state governments by setting up paras-
tatals and diverting municipal functions and funds to them. Where the
domain itself is absent, where is the question of good or bad perfor-
mance?” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). State government, parastatals, and
UDAs continued to take over the functions that rightly belong to the
ULBs. And the argument that “ULBs are not yet in condition to take
on these responsibilities is no argument against making the necessary
transition” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011).2
In many ways, urban governance keeps finding reasons to get entan-
gled in multiple webs of complexities. The need to step up infrastructure
creation without going through the hassles of the local political system
makes parastatals an important instrument for state governments. The
pressure of implementing the 74th CAA and driving local governance
initiatives is not easy, and requires enormous political and bureaucratic
energy and patience – both of which act counter to the need to do things
on an urgent basis.
We have now come to a pass where Indian cities are confronted with
poor finances, poor governance, and multiplicity of agencies, often with
overlapping functional and geographical jurisdictions. As a result of gov-

ernance failure, most services have become private (schools, hospitals)
and affordable only by the ultra-rich. The government does not have
resources and corporates have no incentive. As a consequence, both the
poor and ultra-rich move away from the scope of cities. Middle income
people become disenchanted with the government and revolts happen.
So, what we see is that the dividend that had to be generated from cities
gets distributed in a lopsided manner.
Compounding the problem is the challenge of finance for urban
local bodies. While the Constitutional Amendment brought the topic
of functions to light, there continues to be ambiguity with regard to
the finances to deliver these functions. No instrument can substitute
for a predictable cash flow to the ULBs, and unless one can usher in
such a mechanism, either through another Constitutional Amendment
or through a Goods and Services Tax (GST)-type mechanism wherein
the higher tier of government share resources with ULB, the local
governments will continue to operate their finances in a suboptimal
manner.
So who is in charge of the city?
The million-dollar question on “who is in charge of the city”?

(Sivaramakrishnan, 2006) has received much attention in India in the
recent past. A three-tiered government layer and multiplicity of institu-
tions makes any attempt to answer this question an onerous task. There
is little doubt that state governments have not empowered ULBs to ful-
fil the responsibility of building and maintaining urban infrastructure
for service delivery. What Jones said in 1974 holds to this day “It is a
paradox of Indian life that cities are both profoundly influential and
politically weak. Urban forces pervade modern Indian politics, but cities
as corporate actors are not, as a rule, individually powerful.”
Even after the 74th CAA of 1992 for devolution of 18 functions under
the 12th Schedule to be passed to the ULBs, the state governments have
complied only partially. What is more important, devolution of func-
tions has not been accompanied by devolution of the other two “f”s,
that is, funds or functionaries. Without this, mere devolution of func-
tions is clearly ineffective. A combination of the “reluctance” of state
governments to cede the power of parastatals and the fact that new
market-based financing to ULBs is routed through parastatal entities
has entailed the deepening centralization of government power in a
supposed era of decentralization (Baindur and Kamath, 2009).
A product of the 1960s and 1970s, parastatals are interdisciplinary

bodies, responsible for planning, coordinating, implementing, funding,
and supervising urban development works. Many of them have made
major inroads into what was traditionally the municipal domain, par-
ticularly in the spheres of water supply, sewerage, and slum clearance
and improvement (Mathur, 1999). The creation of these parastatals has
been justified on the grounds that there are certain urban development
functions that require “depoliticized and non-bureaucratic responses”;
the relative “financial autonomy” of parastatals makes for increased effi-
ciency; and that parastatals have greater potential for achieving scale
economies which are not possible in the case of municipal bodies (Ibid.).
As a result of this “sharing” of services, there continues to be “an
intractable jigsaw puzzle because of the inherent fragmentation of urban
service delivery and the historical fragmentation of urban policy-making
process” (Yates, 1977).
Take urban transport, for example, where institutional fragmentation
is clearly evident. Roads and their maintenance is the responsibility
of the public works departments of the state though some roads are
looked after by the city government; the registration of motor vehicles,
licensing, and vehicle taxation are handled by regulatory authorities or
departments of the state; regulation of traffic and penalty for road vio-
lations is handled by the police, which in Indian cities is not under
the jurisdiction of city governments; traffic engineering, including sig-
nals, is shared between city governments and police. The operation of
transport vehicles such as buses, trains, or tramcars are the responsibil-
ity of individual utility companies, either private or owned by the state;
taxation on production, including excise duties, is the central govern-
ment’s prerogative; while registration and other user fees are state-level
responsibilities. Clearly, a case of responsibility falling between sev-
eral institutions. The story is no different for other urban services,
and for most citizens urbanization is a series of “irritants and deficien-
cies” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2006); there are endless cases of urban policies
where the norm is now for the overlapping funding and influence of
different levels of government to be for the better, that is, a more tar-
geted and coordinated effort, or the worse, more piecemeal, fragmented
actions (Borraz and Le Gales, 2010). Thus, urban governance in India
covers a wide range of actors from different sectors of societies, with dif-
ferent statuses, acting at different levels, with no one claiming “charge
of the city”. In this situation, “one wonders if (urban) governance is
more than the aggregation of various incremental choices, and random
developments” (Borraz and Le Gales, 2010).
As Sivaramakrishnan (2007) and Borraz and Le Gales (2010) argue,

what is governed and what is not governed should also be considered in
relation to the administrative boundaries of urban local bodies. The city
has become elusive, population is more diverse and governments are
being rescaled, and new models of governance are being structured. Set-
ting the physical limits to this dynamic urbanization pattern has always
been difficult and municipal limits rarely reflect the shape and size of
urbanization. What is municipal may be urban, what is urban is not
necessarily municipal.
Research on megacities or global urban regions (Scott, 2001) indi-
cate the rise of networks and governance failures related to obsolete
government boundaries. Another way of looking at the same issue is
the triumph of urban sprawl and peri-urbanization. In other words,
the dissolution of cities is taking place to create a large fragmented,
chaotic, unstable urban world which is not governed or rather does not
have anyone “in-charge”. The response to the 26/11 terrorist attack in
Mumbai puts this conundrum in perspective. So is the urban system
becoming ungovernable?
Successful international examples of metropolitan management indi-
cate that it is indeed possible to govern. No doubt, cities have expanded,
fragmented, and sometimes organized into networks and this has
rendered traditional urban governance models obsolete (Borraz and
Le Gales, 2010). There are processes of exclusion and strengthening
of inequalities. These processes have led to never-ending debates on
rethinking metropolitan governance and developing more collabora-
tive forms of governance. What is very evident is that the institutional
arrangements in Indian cities have not kept pace with the fast urban-
izing landscape. When jugaad and vaasta work, governance takes a
back seat.
Since there is little consensus about who is in charge of the city, the
next obvious question is who should in fact be in charge of the city. The
question is itself complex. When put to one senior official, the counter
question was – well, who is in charge of India? The PM, Cabinet, Parlia-
ment, chief ministers? So, if multiple actors can coexist at the national
level with clearly drawn out boundaries, why not at the city level?
Local governments have not had the capability or the space to drive
their ambitions and agenda. In some ways, Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was a result of both inactivity and
lack of capability at the local level – forcing the union government to
step in and lead the way. In all this, one wonders if the role of the state
government has been underplayed. After all, urban development is a
state subject. Striking a balance between providing the leadership man-

date of urban development to the states and pressing ahead with the
spirit of decentralization will be the tightrope that one will have to walk
to transform the governance landscape in India’s cities and towns. Here
again, there is no one size fits all. Governance models that one would
have to consider at the metropolitan level could be very different to the
models that may apply to smaller cities and towns.
Metro cities across the world seek out formal and informal arrange-
ments that best suit their problems in the context of the institu-
tional and legal structures they must work within. Thus, de facto,
what emerges is a blending of formal government structures and
informal governance arrangements (Phares, 2004). In a relative sense
there are far fewer examples of fully fledged, multifunctional regional
governments but countless examples of incremental moves involving
single purpose governments or myriad cooperative governance arrange-
ments – be it Greater London Authority or Metropolitan Toronto or
Metropolitan Regional Bodies for Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasilia
(Sivaramakrishnan, 2013).
Indian metro regions contain the major share of the country’s wealth,
economic activity, amenities, and population. But the urban metropo-
lis is a classic case of having one’s cake and eating it too. For these
cities are also major stakeholders in some of the major challenges that
India faces – poverty, slums, air pollution, congestion, health hazards.
This has often raised questions about trade-offs, assets, vision, future,
and outcomes. Yet despite all this, very little attention is paid to their
governance. This profound ambivalence emphasizes the questions that
we keep getting asked – who governs cities (Hall, 2004)? What is gov-
erned in cities (Borraz and Le Gales, 2010)? Who is in charge of the city
(Sivaramakrishnan, 2006, 2007, 2011)?
Indian policymakers have largely visualized urbanization as city
expansion and have been slow in responding to changing metropoli-
tan forms in India (Sivaramakrishnan, 2013). As a result, metropolitan
regions which are complex entities with multiple municipal and non-
municipal institutional arrangements have become “mere creatures of
state governments with neither the necessary strategic flexibility nor
political legitimacy” (Ibid., p.86). The reason attributed to this is the
inherent failure of the 74th CAA to visualize the dynamics of metropoli-
tan region formations. In the 20 years since the 74th Constitutional
Amendment Act came into effect, the measures for making Metropolitan
Planning Committees (MPCs) effective or the search for alternatives
have been marked by hesitancy, apprehension, and avoidance.
While the creation of UDAs was a result of the recognition of

the various dimensions of metropolitan development, carrying the
metropolitan label to help establish a metropolitan entity for planning
and governance has not happened. Even during the post-liberalization
era, the response to metropolitan-level problems has not been signif-
icant. But natural changes have occurred in these regions over the
last two decades. The number of actors involved in urban governance
has increased. Boundaries of municipal corporations and develop-
ment authorities/metropolitan development authorities have expanded
(Delhi has gone the other way and split into three municipal corpo-
rations). Irrespective of boundary expansion or consolidation in parts,
many of the large municipal corporations coexist within a metropoli-
tan region. Even together, they are not equal to the metropolitan-level
tasks and most of the responsibilities are fragmented among state-level
entities. In such a situation, the state government continues to exer-
cise its power over many of the functions which should be under the
jurisdiction of a metropolitan entity in an ideal scenario.
One suggestion to break the shackles of state interference has been
to create city states. Bahl (2012) proposes city states as an approach
to address fiscal problems of large cities, arguing that this move would
take away some of the roadblocks to increased revenue-raising power,
resolving much of the government fragmentation problems and restor-
ing fiscal autonomy to local governments. The success of city states
internationally, notably in Hong Kong and Singapore, reinforce the
point. Jakarta and Mexico are examples of provincial cities where the
metropolitan area local government has both provincial and local sta-
tus. In many countries, the capital city is treated as a special case and
its financing structure is different from other cities. If India were to go
down that route, there would indeed be a long list of potential candi-
date cities. However, Sivaramakrishnan (2013) argues that this approach
is not appropriate/possible to implement in metropolitan regions in
India, referring to the very strong reactions that would be likely if
Hyderabad were to be hived off from the state and made a union ter-
ritory as suggested by the Srikrishna Committee, and the violent protest
in Maharashtra to Nehru’s suggestion that Bombay be made a union ter-
ritory when Bombay state was divided into Maharashtra and Gujarat.
He argues that it, by their very natures, metropolitan territories and
economies straddle municipal and administrative boundaries. It will
also be not possible to define the boundaries of metropolitan provinces,
as this will stir up needless political and social controversies.
Under the present political climate, the city state option does not
appear to be a practical solution. What would Maharashtra be without
Mumbai or West Bengal without Kolkata? Metropolitan areas as city

states is indeed a novel idea, but in many ways runs counter to the con-
cept of boundaryless growth, and could take away from the inclusive
facet that urban development in India is aspiring to reach.
What then could be the way for governing India’s large cities? A
distinct entity of governance that partakes and shares some of the
functions presently discharged by the state government is required.
Sivaramakrishnan (2013) points to the Kasturi Rangan Committee
Report and Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority Act as pos-
sible starting points to think out evolving governance structures for
metropolitan regions.
While formal structures of the kind mentioned above must be
explored, it may be worthwhile to also look at some of the voluntary
participation measures that US cities adopt – not governed by man-
dates or driven by a federal structure – but measures that create win-win
situations for all and derive economies of scale.
There could be examples closer to India to start with. There is near
unanimity that the National Capital Regional Planning Board (NCRPB)
has not been able to achieve the ambitious goals it was envisaged to
accomplish when set up in 1985. If an NCRPB (or a similar entity than
even cuts across state boundaries) were provided with sufficient legal
teeth and financial clout, it could very well drive a regional agenda.
Giving it legal backing would require amendments to various state and
municipal Acts. But providing the finances, say through a JNNURM-
like mechanism, can immediately raise its stature and provide the
overarching planning frame for regional development.
We now turn to the smaller cities and towns. The need to focus on
the cities of tomorrow is driven by three primary imperatives: migration
patterns, regional growth concerns, and sustainable expansion of cities.
The approximately 4,000 municipalities and nagar panchayats and 3,894
census towns that constitute the universe of small and medium cities
(less than 1 million-plus cities) in India can be natural sinks to absorb
a substantial quantum of migration, thus easing the pressure on larger
cities. Governance of smaller cities and towns may possibly require a
completely different approach. If anything, these places provide the
platform to experiment with new ideas and drive the participatory
democracy agenda further, given the avenues for deeper engagement
with the local community.
The concepts of directly elected mayors and single point accountabil-
ity may work best in small towns. The close proximity to citizens creates
opportunities to drive initiatives that are on the priority list for people.
Discussions with K. Bharati, the former Mayor of Alandur, brought out
this point. The sewage project, the first underground networked project
of its kind in the country, saw support from the state government in the
form of Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund (TNUDF) and beneficiary
contribution from the people. That the project received its go-ahead
when K. Karunanidhi was the chief minister but was inaugurated by
Chief Minister Jayalalitha demonstrated that when there is strong buy-
in and leadership at the local level, political boundaries drawn from the
state capitals can be overcome. ULBs and their initiatives then become
avenues for state leadership to demonstrate vision for the larger cause of
development.
Most literature review and public discourses have dealt with the issues
of who should be delivering services in cities and towns. The arguments
put forth above have also largely attempted to address the “who does
what” of urban governance. It may also be worthwhile to step back
and really challenge ourselves on how relevant the question is. Does
it really matter who is delivering? Isn’t “what is being delivered” a
more pertinent question to answer? Should we shift the discourse to
accountabilities rather than mere responsibilities?
One may even go as far as to ask whether we need participative gov-
ernance or a governance system that delivers against set service-level
benchmarks. In such a scenario, it really would not matter whether
the state government, parastatal, or a local government authority was
delivering. What is needed in such a scenario is ensuring that whoever
is delivering the services is held accountable for achieving the bench-
marks, and that a transparent and impartial redress mechanism is in
place. That would even make the centralization versus decentralization
debates largely irrelevant, as the Russian and Chinese models show us.
The former kept all planning activities centralized while the latter decen-
tralized and put powers in the hands of mayors. If accountabilities are
defined, then we could possibly live the challenges that the multiplicity
of governance mechanisms presents.
JNNURM and urban governance
Launched in December 2005, and covering 65 cities over a seven-year

period with a combined allocation of about Rs 1 lakh crore, JNNURM
is India’s largest urban programme in response to the challenges facing
Indian cities and in recognition of the importance of cities to India’s
growth story. The message from the top while launching the Mission
was as clear and as candid as it could, as reflected in the Prime Minister’s
speech at the launch of the Mission in December 2005, that “cities . . . are
still being seen in many states as ‘wards’ of the state governments. This
should and this must change.”
The Mission brought with it a huge dose of governance prescriptions,
classified as mandatory and optional reforms. It was designed to link
municipal reforms with project delivery, with fund releases tied to suc-
cessful implementation of reforms outlined under the Mission. It was
also unique in that it involved a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)
between three parties – the centre, state, and the local government. The
reform agenda of JNNURM was certainly well intentioned. Its launch
was, in itself, the culmination of the efforts of people from many walks
of life, with the design team for JNNRUM comprising people from civil
society, academia, and government.
The Mission started off as being demand driven, which meant that
those cities (the larger ones) that had already begun to focus atten-
tion on the urban agenda were best able to utilize the funds available
from the centre. Later, as release of funds was tied to state plan
ceilings, the state size reflected the quantum released. So, in effect,
it became the larger cities in the larger states that benefited most.
JNNURM also gave some fillip to public–private partnerships (PPPs). The
private sector did not come with the funds to finance urban infrastruc-
ture projects, but the limited examples demonstrate, to some extent,
their utility more as a governance tool (through user charges, perfor-
mance monitoring, budgeting requirements, etc.) than as a financing
instrument.
Over the years there have been a number of reports evaluating and
commenting on the effectiveness of the Mission. The mid-year review of
the XI Plan by the Planning Commission, while highlighting the many
pluses of the Mission, was also critical in what needed to be done for
course correction, particularly about the ability of the local bodies to
absorb and put the funds to good use. The Ahluwalia Committee (2011)
highlights that, “JNNURM has been an experience in learning by doing
for the Government of India. States were expected to design reforms in
collaboration with cities, but the exercise often became one of satisfying
the technicalities of reform and drawing funds from the Government of
India.” Critiques of the Mission have warned about a possible “expendi-
ture bubble” in the offing, what with all the capex going into building
infrastructure, but no recourse to funding Operations and Maintenance
(O&M). JNNURM was never meant to be focused on projects, but many
argue that it is what it turned out to do. But, as one senior official
remarked, what’s a mission without projects – you need action on the
ground and you get them through projects.
JNNURM also attempted to provide some sense of empowerment to

citizens by developing the community participation law and initiatives
like city technical advisory groups. But sustaining these requires ULBs
to take the lead and demonstrate the bureaucratic energy and willing-
ness to keep engaging with civil society. Where JNNURM was not able
to make any dent was in altering the fundamental governance architec-
ture, like regional planning and mayoral systems, which call for urgent
structural changes.
Another criticism levelled against JNNURM is that the tripartite
arrangement signed between the Government of India, state, and ULB
was not really understood by the ULBs; almost akin to signing a car loan
agreement – who reads the fine print, what matters is that the loan is
sanctioned. To many ULBs, the reforms agenda remained just that – fine
print. JNNURM was also not able to leverage the funds available at its
disposal, and might well have crowded out other avenues of funding.
JNNURM was expected to break the conventional practice of state
government departments and parastatals bypassing the ULBs in project
implementation (and urban governance). But the choice of agencies for
the allocation of projects showed that was not the case. As a result,
preparation of City Development Plans (CDPs) and urban projects were
undertaken by UDAs or financial intermediaries.
The Ministry left the review of laws and Acts related to 74th CAA to
states on the ground that it was a state subject. But “such a conven-
tional and passive stand was inappropriate given the size and thrust of
the JNNURM as a central government intervention” (Sivaramakrishnan,
2011). Another glaring gap in JNNURM was the exclusion of peri-urban
areas in the Mission’s ambit, leading to unplanned growth around city
boundaries.
But, as K. C. Sivaramakrishnan put it, probably JNNURM “has done
no harm”. Well, if the PM’s message of changing cities being seen as
wards of the state government is anything to go by, maybe we’ve not
moved very far with the Mission. But that may be being too critical
about a Mission that probably attempted to achieve too much in its
first attempt. For all we know, rural programmes with similar objectives
have been conceived since independence, but even today do not meet
the stated objectives. For the urban sector, this has really been the first
of its kind.
The annual budget of the Ministry of Urban Development prior to
the launch of JNNURM was about Rs 700 crore. This increased to a
whopping Rs 10,000 crore per year since the inception of JNNURM.
For those who label JNNURM as a top-down approach, there were
many decentralization initiatives under the reform agenda, the most

prominent being the full implementation of the 74th. What could
the Government of India have done when property tax was being
repealed in states like Rajasthan and Punjab on the eve of the state
elections? Or with Mamata Banerjee starting off her innings in Writ-
ers Building by announcing the removal of user charges for water
for Kolkata? Cities as wards of state governments surely does ring a
bell.
There are more genuine and practical reasons too about how much
the Government of India could have done. What do you do when a
road or a water treatment plant under JNNURM is half done, reforms
have not been complied with, and the ULB goes to Delhi asking for the
next tranche of money? Wait endlessly for the reforms to be carried out
or release the money in the larger public interest of getting an infras-
tructure project completed on time? That dictates of reforms cannot be
run from Delhi only drives home the role of state governments in the
urban conundrum (covered in the subsequent section of this chapter).
There were other inefficiencies too, like running the Mission under two
separate ministries.
But if generating policy discourse is a critical aspect of governance,
then JNNURM more than played its part. It put the urban agenda at the
front and centre of the national policy discourse, and served as the cata-
lyst for some seminal policy documents. The National Urban Transport
Policy came into effect in 2006. JNNURM subsequently went on to sup-
port numerous public transport projects. The service-level benchmarks
in all key urban services were established around that time. Projects to
measure city performance were launched. Social audits were started. The
Government of India instituted awards to cities for service delivery. The
Ahluwalia Committee was set up to estimate the investment require-
ments for urban infrastructure services, the first time since the Zakaria
Committee in 1962. Another first – the National Development Coun-
cil, comprising of chief ministers, set up a subcommittee to discuss the
urban agenda.
There was action on the academic front as well. The Indian Institute
of Human Settlements was set up, and India now has a national uni-
versity in the offing dedicated to urban studies. Leading think tanks
like Centre for Policy Research (CPR) and Indian Council for Research
and International Economic Relations (ICRIER) set up dedicated urban
research units. Other players, like Financial Management and Research
(IFMR), launched small city initiatives, researching holistic development
in fringe towns.
For all the supposedly “project-centric” approach of JNNURM, one

might very well wonder if some of these policy-linked initiatives would
have happened without the carrot of financing and the space to delib-
erate urban issues at the apex level that JNNURM offered. JNNURM is
not an end in itself, rather a catalyst in a long journey. Could it have
done more to push the 74th CAA? Yes indeed. Could it have done more
to get finances of ULBs in better shape? Yes, it could have. But one has
to start somewhere, and JNNURM has to be viewed as no more than a
start in this journey. To have expected it to solve all the urban problems
that the nation faces in seven years was probably asking for too much
from the first urban Mission launched by the country. We will see in
the subsequent sections how things learnt from JNNURM can be put to
good use in designing the next wave of reforms.
The politics of urban governance
The Indian political scene has long been dominated by rural issues and
rural voters, and understandably so. The increasing urbanization trends
invariably mean that the urban will figure more prominently in the
agenda items of politicians and political parties. In fact, it is not that
the urban does not matter to politicians – it is in fact a “lucrative” sector
for politicians, but where there has been total neglect, this has been for
the urban voter and urban issues.
Even at the metropolitan level, political decisions are used to assert
dominance over opposition political parties and gain political power
at city level. Kennedy (2013) succinctly emphasizes this point in
the case of Hyderabad, with respect to the increased jurisdiction of
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. Along with the other reforms post-
liberalization, the state government created Greater Hyderabad as tech-
nical solution to urban problems – which did not involve a political
consultation or process. She argues, while the expansion of the munic-
ipal jurisdictions could be justified on the grounds of scale economies
and efficiency in urban services, the timing and the process of the imple-
mentation indicated political objectives. The expansion of municipal
boundaries had in fact eroded the dominance of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul
Muslimeen (MIM) Party in the city. In the first municipal elections after
the creation of Greater Hyderabad, MIM’s share in seats reduced from 37
per cent (first in number of seats, with 37 out of 100 before the expan-
sion) to 30 per cent after the expansion (MIM was third behind Congress
and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP)). A second motivation, she argues,
was that Greater Hyderabad would have the critical mass to become a
“Union Territory” if the demands for dividing Andhra Pradesh to create

Telangana State were fruitful.
Therefore, urban governance is a political problem, and so the solu-
tions that one comes up with should factor in the political dimensions at
play. Unless the political fraternity start to look at urbanization through
the lens of vote bank politics, we are unlikely to witness significant struc-
tural transformations. The increasing wallet size for urban development
now available from the Government of India is probably a good indi-
cation of the shift in trends. But, even so, a Rs 10,000 crore outlay for
the sector pales into insignificance compared to the over Rs 1 lakh crore
outlay for the Ministry of Rural Development.
One of the biggest challenges for urban politics is to be able to size
the urban vote bank. Apathy in voting is a stigma attached to the typ-
ical urban dweller. However, how much of this can be put down to
apathy versus some of the challenges of voter registration and the legal-
ity around it is yet to be ascertained. In a recent study conducted by
Janaagraha for a number of wards in Bengaluru, it was found that voter
roll error rates were in excess of 40 per cent. A large part of this challenge
can be attributed to a mobile urban workforce who may not have the
time or inclination to keep pace with voter registration processes each
time they have a shift of residence. Such a situation is unlikely in the
rural sector, where the error rates in voter rolls are much lower. This is
an issue that needs immediate attention. A proper voter roll system that
is robust enough to factor in urban trends like mobility and migration
is a critical first step to stepping up the urban voter base.
From the political side, political parties have to start looking at local
elections as a breeding ground for aspiring politicians. One need not go
very far in history for cues. Jawaharlal Nehru was Mayor of Allahabad
in 1923. In many parts of the world, the mayoral system throws up
presidential and prime ministerial candidates. The message is very clear.
Perform at the grassroots and work your way up the political ladder. This
would be a much needed incentive for councillors and local government
politicians to perform and get recognition.
In order to achieve this, one would have to work through the power
equations that various political posts have in local governments. How
does one get the councillor and mayor into the urban decision-making
fold? Performance-linked career paths, as highlighted above, could be a
consideration. This could even mean political parties having the vision
to send some of their top leaders to contest local elections. Imagine a
young prominent MP from a national party delivering results as a mayor
of a large city in India. That would be a game changer, and, indeed,
set a new trend. And all it requires is political vision and acceptance
of the importance of the urban sector to make important party leaders
available to transform city agendas.
There is now growing recognition of the importance of the urban
vote. As Ajay Maken, Minister for Housing and Urban Poverty Allevi-
ation, noted:
in India we have 147 cities which are 3 lakh plus, which have more
than 300,000 population, and it translates into 168 parliamentary
constituencies and in the last parliamentary elections in 2009 elec-
tions the present government setup, the UPA as we call, with the
pre-poll UPA alliances we won 92 out of these 168 parliamentary
constitutions, which means that we are in power today just because
of these urban voters, just because of these 92 parliamentary con-
stituencies out of 168 wherein we were able to win and form the
government here. So it is not only these urban voters who earlier on
used to play a very small part or negligible part or insignificant part
in terms of government formation, now these urban voters decide
which party should lead them, who should lead the country as far as
the governance is concerned.
(CPR, 2013)
Administering India’s urban areas has less to do with finances or

resourcing – it is a political problem that can only be addressed when
the urban votes become powerful enough. For the past several decades,
the urban voice in India has been electorally under-represented thanks
to the political establishment’s reluctance to update the geographical
boundaries of parliamentary and state assembly constituencies. A quick
analysis suggests that, after the latest delimitation exercise, though
about a third of the overall population is urban, of the 543 constituen-
cies for the Lok Sabha, only about 85, or under 15 per cent, have
a majority urban population. Unless India’s cities and towns, which
together contribute an estimated 70 per cent to the country’s GDP,
acquire a stronger political voice they will not get the resources, the
administrative capacity, or the governance autonomy they need to
thrive and grow.
In India, the usual way to the political top job (Prime Minister) has
been to be successful at the national level. However, now, Narendra
Modi was chosen on his record as Chief Minister of Gujarat. The
thumping win for the Bharatiya Janata Party suggests that the country
chose the leaders that showed results on ground, although one may
want to debate the model.
In future, maybe a political candidate will run for Prime Minister on
the basis of his performance in creating a model city with all urban
functions and a responsible and accountable administration. However,
in India, the current trends seem to be suggesting that Indians are far
from the path that catalyses this evolution.
Policy thrust and beyond
The recent initiatives and thrust in the urban sector has brought to
fore the urgent need to fix the glaring gaps in the governance machin-
ery. One could look at a twofold track in course correction. The first
revolves around the legal changes that need to be addressed. Second, is
the need to set a culture of good governance that transcends legalities
and jurisdictions.
If the 74th CAA was the game changer for local governments, it is
probably time for the next generation of legislative amendments in
local governance. The two areas that the 74th CAA did not address are
financial devolution and providing greater clarity on the mechanisms of
governance.
Unless ULBs are provided with the funds to discharge the functions
available to them, local governance will continue to be dictated by
state governments. The Ahluwalia Committee recommended financial
devolution directly from the centre to the ULBs, as has been success-
fully carried out in many other parts of the world, notably in Latin
America and South Africa. This is probably one instrument of gover-
nance that can address multiple issues – predictability of fund transfer,
better leverage of funds, easing the grip of state governments on ULBs.
The second area of legislative reform is around regional governance.
While the 74th CAA talked about the need to set up MPCs/DPCs (Dis-
trict Planning Committees), these have remained more a paper exercise.
Clarifying the roles of regional entities and providing them with the
statutory backing to drive a regional transformation agenda can go a
long way in removing the ambiguities around regional development.
Both these steps will not be easy to accomplish. They will require
significant time and effort from both the political and bureaucratic
machinery to see this through. But if they are indeed fundamental to
the transformation of our cities and towns, then one shouldn’t shy away
from making the investment and effort to realize it, even if it means
this would entail years of discussions and deliberations. Shying away

from addressing some of the root causes will surely not eliminate the
problems, if anything, they could manifest themselves in more severe
forms.
While efforts to address these at the constitutional level must be pur-
sued, one can very well use the instrument of JNNURM to move ahead
with the urban agenda. JNNURM I was a Government of India-driven
initiative with the aim of shaking up states and cities to try to get them
to get their act together. Despite its many failures, it served a purpose,
and an important one at that.
As the contours of JNNURM II are being drawn out, it may be worth-
while to make JNNURM II a state-led initiative. Just as the Government
of India drove JNNURM I, state governments should be charged with
leading the efforts of the next wave of policy initiatives, with Gov-
ernment of India playing the role of facilitator (with regard to both
funding and advice) to the state governments. For those who believe
state governments have been the bottlenecks to city autonomy, this
may not be the right thing to do. But what it does is put the pressure
clearly on the state government to act. So, a combination of carrots from
Government of India and people pressure from below might get state
governments to act with more urgency. If anything, some of the most
innovative urban initiatives in the country have had state backing –
Janmaarg in Ahmedabad, 24/7 water supply in the North Karnataka
districts, TNUDF’s funding of many projects in Tamil Nadu.
The other wave of governance changes revolves around creating a cul-
ture of accountability in the functioning of local governments. Data is
an important input to driving transparency in project planning, execu-
tion, and monitoring, and forms a critical link to realigning these with
service-level benchmarks. The Government of India has initiated a city-
level service benchmarking exercise. A number of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and think tanks have also carried out their own
exercises to compare city performance. These need to be encouraged
as they create pressure for local and state governments to then take
action. Initiatives like these are where the Government of India could
give a major thrust in the next wave of JNNURM. Data collation, anal-
ysis, and reporting should be ingrained as a core process of urban
management.
A great amount of transparency can be achieved through the appro-
priate use of technology. Computerization of urban services in a number
of areas and the setting up of citizen centres have demonstrated the
efficiency gains that technology can bring about. What we are also
witnessing is the pressure groups that are being created through social
media – an important medium for the urban middle class to voice their
opinion. The challenge would be to channel all these views and com-
ments into a common platform for analysis and action. The age-old
practice of town halls have their relevance, even in today’s context.
Media also have a role to play in bringing urban issues to the fore,
especially local TV channels and newspapers, and keeping topics in the
public eye. Initiatives like these may help answer Mehta’s question on
“Why is our infrastructure so badly under-designed?” The main interest
in infrastructure is not in its social utility but in the awarding of con-
tracts. Why would we rather transport water for hundreds of miles than
fix leaking pipes?
Transparency can go a long way in developing a performance-linked
culture of governance. For example, a mayor or councillor who per-
forms moves up the career ladder, a non-performing councillors does
not get re-elected and a non-performing commissioner is unlikely to get
a promotion transfer. Civic education also plays a big role in driving cul-
tural change, be it around driving awareness campaigns at school level
or corporate-led change. What is also lacking in the governance frame
today is to provide a platform for civil society – NGOs, businesses –
to have formal structural conversations on how their respective cities
should be developed.
Building this soft architecture of urban governance using trans-
parency and performance to untangle the urban governance web will
no doubt take time, and results may not be tangible immediately. Get-
ting all these components of the soft architecture – technology, data,
channels of communication, awareness, performance reporting – under
a common platform should form the agenda of forward-looking may-
ors and commissioners, and indeed of national and regional political
parties. Once this is accomplished, the subjectivity around decision-
making, award of projects, and interferences from the top will die
a natural death. And if the big ticket constitutional amendments, as
highlighted above, are also in place, then we could be looking at
pure results-based governance, removing the “who does it” from the
equation.
As mentioned earlier, ultimately urban governance is a political issue.
The likes of JNNURM helped place urban at the centre of public dis-
course for think tanks, NGOs, and civil servants, we now need the same
discourse to happen at the political level. Once there is political real-
ization of the need to address the matters of cities, that is, the urban
vote bank, we will begin to see transformational change. And part of
that process is to make state governments key to the city development

process. How chief ministers and state capitals contribute and partic-
ipate in the process of urban development in the years to come will,
to a large extent, determine the success and failure of Indian cities
and towns. Making city development an important agenda matter for
chief ministers can be influenced by the increasing number of urban
MLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly) in state assemblies, who should
ideally have honed their skills as councillors and mayors at some point
in time in their political career – thus linking political performance and
growth with a city’s development agenda.
References
Aijaz, R. (2007). Challenges for Urban Local Governments in India. Asia Research
Centre Working Paper 19.
Bahl, R. (2012). Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options for a New Fiscal
Architecture. Working Paper 12–33, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Georgia State University.
Baiocchi, G., Heller, P., and Silva, M. (2011). Bootstrapping Democracy: Transform-
ing Local Governance and Civil Society in Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Baindur, V., and Kamath, Lalitha (2009) “Reengineering Urban Infrastructure:
How the World Bank and Asian Development Bank Shape Urban Infrastructure
Finance and Governance in India.” South Asia.
Bardhan, P. (1998). The Political Economy of Development in India: Expanded Edition
with an Epilogue on the Political Economy of Reform in India. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Bevir, M. (2010). Democratic Governance. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Borraz, O. and Le Gales, P. (2010). Urban Governance in Europe: The Governance of
What? Métropoles [En ligne], http://metropoles.revues.org/4297 (Retrieved on
8 March 2014).
CPR (Centre for Policy Research) (2013). Report of the International Workshop on
Governance of Megacity Regions. New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.
Ganguly, S. (2007). “Introduction”, In S. Ganguly, L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner
(Eds.), The State of India’s Democracy. The John Hopkins University Press and
the National Endowment for Democracy.
Hall, J. S. (2004). “Who Will Govern American Metropolitan Regions?”, Governing
Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century (2009), 54–78.
Harrison, R. (1993). Democracy. New York: Routledge.
Held, David, ed. (1993). Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West. Stanford
University Press.
Heller, P. and Peter, E. (2010). “Taking Tilly South: Durable Inequalities, Demo-
cratic Contestation, and Citizenship in the Southern Metropolis”, Theory and
Society, 39, 433–450.
Kennedy, L. (2013). The Politics of Economic Restructuring in India: Economic

Governance and State Spatial Rescaling. Oxford: Routledge.
Kohli, A. (2001). “Introduction”, In A. Kohli (Ed.), The Success of India’s Democ-
racy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1–22.
Lall, R. (January 2014). AAP and the Politics of Urbanisation, Business Standard,
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/rajiv-lall-aap-and-the-
politics-of-urbanisation-114011501284_1.html (Retrieved on 12 March
2014).
Lama-Rewal, S. T. and Zerah, M.-H. (2011). “Introduction. Urban Democracy:
A South Asian Perspective”, South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, http://
samaj.revues.org/3188 (Retrieved on 21 March 2013).
Mathur, O. P., ed. (1999). India: The Challenge of Urban Governance. National
Institute of Public Finance & Policy.
Mathur, O. P. (2006). “Urban Finance”, In A. Rastogi (Ed.), India Infrastructure
Report 2006. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 82–105.
Mehta, P. B. (2010). “India: Governance and Growth in State Capacity”, Gover-
nance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 23(3),
381–384.
Mohanty, O. P. (2013). Municipal Finance Matters: India Municipal Finance Report
(IMFR). Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Mohanty, P. K., Misra, B. M., Goyal, R., and Jeromi, P. D. (2007). Municipal
Finance in India – An Assessment. Mumbai: Department of Economic Analysis
and Policy, Reserve Bank of India.
Nwauwa, A. O. (n.d.). Concepts of Democracy and Democratization in Africa
Revisited, http://upress.kent.edu/Nieman/Concepts_of_Democracy.htm.
Phares, D. (2004). “Governance or Government in Metro Areas – Introduction”,
In D. Phares (Ed.), Metropolitan Governance without Metropolitan Government?
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1–5.
Pierre, J. (1999). “Models of Urban Governance: The Institutional Dimension of
Urban Politics”, Urban Affairs Review, 34, 372–396.
Pithe, A. and Ghodke, M. (2002). “Funding Urban Infrastructure: From Govern-
ment to Markets”, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(25), 2467–2470.
Ranganathan, M. (2012). Financing Infrastructure in India’s Slums: RAY’s Prospects
and the Political Economy of Urban Reforms, http://indiancities.berkeley.
edu/2012/presentations/Malini%20Ranganathan%20Paper.pdf (Retrieved on
27 March 2013).
Ranganathan, M., Kamath, L. and Baindur, V. (2009). “Piped Water Supply to
Greater Bengaluru: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?”, Economic and Political
Weekly, 44(33), 53–62.
Scott, A. J. (Ed.). (2001). Global City-Regions: Trends, Policy, Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2000). Power to the People? The Politics and Progress of
Decentralisation. Delhi: Konark Publishers.
Occasional Paper No. 13. New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2007). Democracy in Urban India, http://lsecities.
net/media/objects/articles/democracy-in-urban-india/en-gb/ (Retrieved on
21 November 2013).
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2011). Re-visioning Indian Cities: The Urban Renewal

Mission. New Delhi: Sage Publications Private Ltd.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2013). “Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment
for Better Metropolitan Governance”, Economic and Political Weekly, 48(13),
86–94.
Stoker, G. (1998). “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions”, International Social
Sciences Journal, 55, 17–28.
Yates, D. (1977). The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy
Making. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8
Thinking Beyond
The canvas of urbanization is multi-dimensional and requires many

lenses to pierce it. When analysed carefully, the approach to urbaniza-
tion in India seems to have been “reluctant” in nature rather than proac-
tively embraced by policymakers, planners, society, and businesses.
In this book we have used many lenses, naming them as environments –
built, productive, living, natural, and governing – to see through the
physical, spatial, economic, and institutional aspects of urbanization.
As outlined in Chapter 1 and discussed in later chapters, despite being
lauded for providing a large share of the service sector in the economy,
increasing urbanization, a rising middle class, a demographic dividend,
an educated population, India, at the national level, has overlooked the
factors necessary for competitiveness, growth, and welfare of citizens
living in cities, causing Indian cities to rank amongst bottom half in the
world in terms of competitiveness and fare poorly in quality-of-life indi-
cators. Having described the outcomes that we see in Indian cities, it is
pertinent that we draw broader lessons from the nature of interventions
that have best worked in the past. In this chapter we therefore look at
examples of initiatives and interventions at the project level that have
produced better outcomes or have changed the state of the affairs in
those cities in which they were implemented. We fully recognize that
the local initial conditions and institutions play a major role in the suc-
cess or failure of initiatives and intervention, and hence we refrain from
making sweeping generalizations or conclusions, as these initial condi-
tions and the functioning of social, political, and economic institutions
at the micro level differ substantially from city to city and state to state.
Urban growth factors such as agglomeration economies, size of mid-
dle class, size of labour markets, and others, that neoclassists argue about
in urban discourse in India suffer from the assumption of neoclassical
219
economic theory, that is, every individual makes rational trade-offs

and every equilibrium is a Pareto optimal. Neoclassical models explain
output, growth, and various aspects of development by focusing on
resources, technology, and preferences. Sala-i-Martin and colleagues
(2013), as discussed in Chapter 4, argue, for example, that, for growth,
it is not education but the nature of education and training that mat-
ters. This then has implication for any education policies that the
government may institute. In reality, the divergence from outcomes as
expected from neoclassical theories occur because the trade-offs that
individuals make may not be right and these may produce very large
distortions. Under these circumstances there may be multiple equilib-
rium, and each of which may be inefficient (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001),
and so some of the economic benefits that are envisaged from urbaniza-
tion may never materialize. Earlier chapters in the book do illustrate the
point emphatically that, viewed from any lens, urbanization in India
may not provide the competitive edge in the business-as-usual scenario.
In order to investigate and draw out aspects of urbanization that may
be “green shoots” for urban development discourse in India, we delve
into development economics theories that depart from the neoclassical
approach. The objective of this conclusion chapter, however, is not
to describe these theories but to use them as a frame within which
select urban examples of institutions, policies, and projects, which have
worked, can be examined. We will rely on three broad theories: eco-
nomics of information, theory of coordination failure and institutional
economics. In an economic system with the possibility of multiple
equilibrium and despite the possibility of being able to achieve more
desired equilibrium, the failure to achieve desired equilibrium due to
non-coordination of decision-making between decision-making entities
(firms, households, policymakers) is coordination failure. The theory
suggests that coordination is necessary to achieve desired equilibrium.
Institutional economics moves away from assumptions of neoclassical
economic theory regarding stable preferences, rationality, and equilib-
rium, and focuses on learning, bounded rationality, and evolution in
order to explain market outcomes which may differ from the Pareto
optimal. Institutional economics highlights the role of institutions in
addressing market failures. Following Douglass North, institutions are
the “rules of the game”, consisting of both the formal legal rules
and the informal social norms that govern individual behaviour and
structure social interactions. The theory highlights the importance of
organization arrangements, property rights, and transaction costs in
achieving market outcomes. The third theory, information economics
Thinking Beyond 221
explains how information and information systems affect an economy

and economic decisions.
Besides relying on the market failures and consequent development
patterns, this book has also examined the influence of the following
four factors on urban outcomes in India: institutions, the distribution
of wealth, history, and behaviour of other agents in the economy that
have spill-over effects, Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) call this “ecology”.
Legally/culturally feasible and formally/informally

enforceable contracts
The lessons from cities in India regarding arrangements for the supply
of basic services or in procurement of land for industries, infrastructure,
or social projects indicates that the technical solution or institutions
on their own do not suffice. For example, the emergence of a private
water supply through tankers is a response to incomplete water sup-
ply provided by local governments in most cities and slums in India.
The problem, however, is that these informal institutions have further
weakened the municipal service provisioning and decreased social wel-
fare. Another example is the land procurement process in India. Weak
property titling system and associated transaction costs have led to the
increasing reliance of developers on eminent domain power of state.
This has, in turn, led to non-functional land markets. With endogenous
institutions, cities in India may be caught in a vicious circle in which low
levels of market development for various resources and services result in
high levels of information imperfections, and these information imper-
fections give rise to institutions – for example, growth policies such as
special economic zones (SEZs) or industrial parks, which rely on gov-
ernments’ eminent domain powers for land and other tax incentives
for price competitiveness – that impede the development of markets.
Effective market development requires institutions that secure prop-
erty rights, enforce contracts, and provide for disclosure of information
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). This requires a government that is neither
overbearing nor weak.
When we look at the literature in institutional economics, it clearly
demonstrates that though institutions (formal and informal) emerge
in response to incomplete markets and contracts and these institu-
tions have the intention of improving economic outcomes, there is
no assurance that they will (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). Institutions will
reflect prevailing power and (dominant) interests within society. Yet,
to be successful, institutions must be effective in generating “workable
mutuality” out of the formal and informal processes of conflict resolu-

tion from which they develop (Rutherford, 1994). In this context, what
is legally or culturally feasible may deserve as much attention as what is
technologically feasible (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999).
The importance of non-economic factors, like social networks, in eco-
nomic development is demonstrated in the case of the industrial town
of Tiruppur in Tamil Nadu (Coelho and Vijayabaskar, 2014), which is
known for production and export of cotton yarn and knitwear. Rely-
ing less on formal institutions and more on the community and family
network, the members from the Gounder caste have established domi-
nance in this capital-intensive knitted garment production business for
which the state banking institutions were not effective in converging
sufficient funds to efficient entrepreneurs (Ibid.). While acknowledging
the success of the industry in Tiruppur, the state government initiated
providing an industrial estate exclusively for the backward castes of
the region in order to improve their socioeconomic status. Despite the
fact that many of them had the required skill set, the venture proved
to be culturally and socially non-feasible for non-Gounder members,
mainly because of the prevailing dominance of Gounders in regard to
the social networks that were utilized to secure orders. The informal
institution created by a particular caste in Tiruppur emerged to sup-
port its members in establishing this capital-intensive industry, which
is adding significantly to the economic development of the place by
contributing approximately 15 per cent to the country’s cotton yarn
production; however, it is also hampering the entry of others.
Another important issue is how to enforce contracts between vari-
ous parties for a desired outcome. Mechanisms as suggested in literature
for enforcement of contracts are strong legal framework or even mar-
ket mechanisms by private parties if property rights are well defined.
However, when enforcement of private property rights is costly, a mar-
ket may or may not be the best allocation system (Coase, 1937). Greif
(1994) further argues that the relative efficiency of a particular system
of contract enforcement in an economy depends on economic, social,
political, and cultural factors, which in turn implies that there is path
dependency and there is no reason to expect that a particular system
be economically efficient. Social capital such as norms, information
networks, reputation mechanisms, and social sanctions can also some-
times serve as a substitute for formal enforcement mechanisms (Hoff
and Stiglitz, 2001).
One of the interesting examples is the land procurement through land
pooling schemes in Gujarat. Various land procurement methods have
Thinking Beyond 223
been used by state governments as development in cities has required

land. For example, in the state of Haryana, the developer, as a colonizer,
is permitted to pool the land of farmers and is supposed to develop it as
per norms. The state government authority plays the role of facilitator
(Kshirsagar, 2013) or sometimes acts as a developer in case of indus-
trial township development in Gurgaon (a fringe city around Delhi).
The process has not been successful and leads to long-lasting legal bat-
tles about compensation (Rao et al., 2014). The state of Uttar Pradesh,
in the case of Ghaziabad city, used equity sharing between the devel-
opment authority and the private developer to pool land (Kshirsagar,
2013), again with consequent dissatisfactions among those affected. The
state of Rajasthan acquires land through eminent domain paying the
compensation to affected parties as per the Land Acquisition Act.
Gujarat enacted a special Act (Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act) for land pooling in 1976 and has made several
amendments to it (in 1995, 1999, and 2001). Besides the statutory
backing, the core principles of land pooling in Gujarat are based on
cooperative participation, which distinguished it from other states. The
cooperative participation ensures that coordination failures don’t occur.
Here we will briefly review the land pooling and reconstitution (LPR)
process in Gujarat to illustrate the mechanism that has made this an
important tool for procuring land.
Simply put, LPR is a mechanism by which a number of small land-
holdings are pooled together, a part of the pooled land is taken for
the provisioning of infrastructure and public facilities, and the rest
is returned to original owners. The process is depicted in Figure 8.1.
The original plot (depicted in gray and without any road network) is
reconstituted as new (smaller) plots (identified as black) and returned
back to owners, with land for infrastructure (roads and other amenities)
carved out.
For an LPR scheme, a public agency (typically a development author-
ity or a municipal corporation) prepares a detailed plan for a sector of a
city. The plan identifies the location of major infrastructure (e.g. roads,
water, sewers, and street lighting) and services (e.g. schools, parks, and
housing for economically weaker sections – EWS), allocates land use,
reserves plots for future sale, and provides a financing plan. The plan
is consistent with the city’s master plan/development plan. The agency
pools the various owners’ landholdings and rationalizes the property
boundaries, and after deducting land for infrastructure and services,
replots the land and allocates it back to the landowners. The financ-
ing of the scheme is done by the agency through: (i) betterment charges
Figure 8.1 Section of LPR scheme depicting original and new plots
Source: TPS 50 Scheme, AUDA, IDFC Policy Quarterly.
paid by landowners for increase in their land value due to the provi-
sion of infrastructure; and (ii) revenues from the sale of reserved plots
(IDFC, 2010). The LPR scheme has been successful in Gujarat (Ibid.) for
a number of reasons. Early provision of infrastructure gets the buy-in
from participants as they see the impact of infrastructure on their prop-
erties in value appreciation. The scheme is unique as it does not attempt
to resolve property disputes that can cause delays, rather landownership
disputes are transferred to the new plot. The scale of LPR schemes is
such that they are manageable in size, which is large enough in area
for planning and small enough in number of plots to make the process
manageable (including public hearings and reconciliation of revenue
records with the site survey). The scheme successfully integrates devel-
opment authorities’ planning capacity to interconnect the physical,
Thinking Beyond 225
financial, and property rights dimensions of town planning schemes

(TPS). The scheme is self-financed as revenues from the sale of reserved
plots supplement betterment charges, and act as a hedge against increase
in construction cost. There is political acceptability because of the
self-financing nature of the scheme and a high degree of landowner sat-
isfaction, many of whom are also highly politically connected. The LPR
scheme indicates that the legal and cultural feasibility of the scheme
has helped in its success. Increase in value of land and better infrastruc-
ture have aided the acceptability of the scheme, and have also been
incentives for coordination among participants despite many of the
plots facing title disputes or being located in high density locations.
While the political process acts as a catalyst, the social network amongst
participants and the possibility of social sanctions on non-participants
facilitates coordination.
Many of the LPR schemes involve the conversion of agricultural land
to urban or are located in peri-urban areas, which are reasonably urban-
ized. However, as development proceeds there is a concern that social
norms and information networks weaken and social sanctions become
less effective. With huge development on the urban fringes of large
cities in India, there is a breakdown of traditional communities, with
widespread migration in and out of these areas. A consequence of this
is that implicit enforcement becomes difficult. Hoff and Stiglitz (2001)
view society as an organization in which “exchange and production are
mediated not just by markets but by an array of formal and informal
arrangements”. As development proceeds, it causes a decay of social
capital, though, to some extent, this is compensated by an increase
in physical and human capital. The consequence of losses is that the
overall gain in productivity is smaller than expected. Emergence of new
formal institutions take time and, in fact, as argued by Hoff and Stiglitz
(2001), the technical change that ensues further exacerbates informa-
tion problems to such an extent that any gain from technical change
dissipates. The pace and sequence of government-imposed reforms may
exacerbate disorganizational forces (Ibid.). The fear is that, with break-
ing social ties in peri-urban areas or in old city areas, it may become
difficult to coordinate actions and enforce contracts, which could pose
constraints on schemes like LPR.
Political accountability
Besides the prospect of loss of social capital in cities, India also lacks
effective mechanisms to restrain government to act within rule of law.
Though democracy is a check, it depends on the strength of democratic
forces to ensure government acts in the interest of development. The

voters in India, in the past, have been divided along caste lines, which
has impeded the ability of the state to act as a development state. Caste
became very important to Indian politics following the insights of Ram
Manohar Lohia about the centrality of caste in Indian life. The cliché
became that Indians do not cast their vote but vote their caste. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, moreover, the voter turnout in local government
elections is low, which further undermines the role of democracy as a
check on accountability.
Marred with numerous corruption scandals, the problem with disen-
chantment with the political system in the last five years has been such
that there have been uprisings of a political nature instigated by non-
governmental organizations with a large base in metropolitan cities in
India. One such movement was the 2011 anti-corruption movement,
which culminated in a series of demonstration and protests for estab-
lishment of strong legislation and enforcement against corruption. Time
magazine names the movement as one of the top ten news stories of
2011. The movement was non-violent civil resistance in nature. Mass
protests were focused on legal and political issues, including political
corruption, kleptocracy, and other forms of corruption. The move-
ment was featured demonstrations, marches, acts of civil disobedience,
hunger strikes, and rallies, as well as the use of extensive social media
to organize, communicate, and raise awareness. The protests were non-
partisan and most protesters were hostile to attempts made by political
parties to use them to strengthen their own political agendas. The
movement got support from corporate leaders, youth, media, and inter-
national Indians. However, it remained confined to major cities. Later,
on getting less than a full response from government, some leaders of
the movement decided to take the fight to the political level and formed
a party, though others, including the main architect of the movement,
Anna Hazare, were against political participation. The political party
that emerged contested assembly elections in Delhi and became largest
party, but did not have the majority seats to form a government. They
got support from the party that they overthrew to form a government.
However, when, in government, they tried to get the anti-corruption
bill passed in the assembly they were not supported by their allies. The
chief minister resigned and the party decided to contest the poll at the
national level. However, the party lost the elections badly, winning only
4 seats out of 543.
Despite the loss in the national parliamentary election, which can be
attributed to political naïvity, the contribution of the movement has
Thinking Beyond 227
been that it shifted the agenda to issues such as economic growth, infla-
tion, corruption, and governance, rather than the traditional politics
based on caste loyalties. The consequence has been that the Bharatiya
Janata Party capitalized on a development agenda by putting forward
Narendra Modi (developmentist chief minister from Gujarat) as their
prime ministerial candidate, and won the election with a thumping
majority. This is the first time in 25 years that a single party has got
a majority and can form a government on its own. The hypothesis fits
in well with the emerging narrative that India is now a changed coun-
try. Voters in a young, aspirational, mobile, and urbanizing nation are
abandoning their old love of identity politics to embrace a new politics
of development.
Though the caste-based Lohiate parties of the Hindi heartland may be
losing ground, there is enough evidence that caste and other forms of
identity continue to matter in voting decisions, though in a more com-
plex manner than commonly assumed. A recent survey by the Centre
for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania
shows that there are clear caste-based preferences at the national level.
The Bharatiya Janata Party has its base among upper caste, middle
caste, and scheduled caste voters, while the Congress has strong sup-
port from scheduled tribes and Muslims. It is possible to argue that
such a division of votes could lead to a new class politics to the
extent that these social categories also reflect economic disparities, but
for now it seems that caste has a certain power even at the macro
level.
At the local level, the governance structure is weak as the elected
mayor has only notionally been able to exercise power. Largely cities
are governed by commissioners, who are bureaucrats with a state cadre
but employed by the central government.
Coordinating innovation
There are number of activities that are required for development –

innovation, honesty in trade, labour education and training, savings.
Economists such as Porter and Sala-i-Martin view these activities as fac-
tors of competitiveness. These activities can create externalities, which
in turn affect the reward structure for activities and result in mul-
tiple equilibria. The positive externalities of these activities facilitate
development. In their discussion on R&D spill-overs, Hoff and Stiglitz
(2001) argue that R&D is conducted by a firm to further the stock of
ideas that are in the public domain and increase its return. If a part
of private research done by a firm seeps into the public domain, it

enhances the base of ideas for all firms. With a richer stock of ideas,
firms’ incentive to undertake R&D increases (Ibid.). This means that
firms benefit by making complementary changes in their actions with
regard to coordination. If, however, agents in an economy fail to coor-
dinate complementary changes in their actions, it leads to a state of
affairs that is worse for everyone than some alternative state of affairs
that is also an equilibrium and better. The theory of coordination fail-
ure suggests that the obstacle to achieving a better state of affairs is not
a matter of technological opportunities (or a knowledge of these tech-
nological opportunities), or of resources, or of preferences, but only of
coordination (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001).
There are institutional and behavioural aspects that characterize econ-
omy and may cause coordination problems. Individuals in the economy
may choose to behave either bureaucratically or innovatively. The
bureaucratic behaviour will retard the long-term rate of technological
progress. If the economy has public institutions that cause rent-seeking
behaviour by government officials, this hampers innovative activities.
Public rent seeking attacks innovation as innovators need government-
supplied goods like licences, permits, import quotas, and so on (Murphy,
1993).
The most important set of institutions in economy are those that
provide for enforcement of contracts. Greif (1994) analyses individual
versus collective enforcement and argues that, in the short run, reliance
on individualist enforcement will be more costly, since it foregoes the
stronger, group-level punishment mechanism. However, in the long
run, individualist enforcement will strengthen the forces that contribute
to the emergence of formal, state-level mechanisms to enforce contracts.
These institutions tend to promote long-term growth.
The advent of the pharmaceutical industry in Andhra Pradesh was
initiated by the central government’s establishment of the Indian
Drugs and Pharmaceutical Limited (IDPL) in 1967, which is the largest
government-owned pharmaceutical company in India (Herve et al.,
2013). The location advantage of availability of physical infrastructure,
educated workforce, and institutions of life sciences in the state created
an economically conducive scenario which started the pharmaceutical
revolution in India, of which Andhra Pradesh was the epicentre. This
innovative idea was gradually materialized by private players and, as the
cluster grew, Andhra Pradesh emerged as one of the largest producers of
bulk drugs in the world.
Thinking Beyond 229
Information asymmetries and wealth inequalities
Information asymmetries amongst different agents in an economy as

well as inequalities in wealth can create multiple development out-
comes. The actions of people reveal information, not about themselves
but also about those who did not take action. Information can be used
by individuals to screen choices. Rational individuals will make efficient
choices over screening. However, because their choices create informa-
tion asymmetries, this need not be the case (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001).
If information symmetries cause screening, individuals with informa-
tion will be better off while those with no information will be worse off.
Compare this with a no screening case, where everybody will benefit.
Wealth inequalities in an economy also create multiple outcomes. As
discussed by Hoff and Sen (2000), even without any differences in abil-
ity or individual preferences, wealth inequalities can create pockets of
underdevelopment within an industrial country.
The Magarpatta Township (in Pune, Maharashtra) breaks through the
theory of coordination failure and reverses the vicious cycle of urban
poverty and wealth inequalities which is trapping small agricultural-
ists who are excluded from the development process and are suffering
from the ills of reduced land productivity and acquisition of agricultural
land for development purposes. The case demonstrates two major break-
throughs: (i) how an efficient inclusive development strategy eradicates
wealth inequalities even before the lapse of the first generation; and
(ii) how the disadvantage of weak financial background and incapacity
to support professional education is used as an advantage for an individ-
ual’s and company’s growth. The Magarpatta Township Development
and Construction Company Limited (MTDCCL) was formulated collec-
tively by a group of 120 local farming families, who decided to benefit
from “urbanization” instead of falling prey to it, unlike other agricul-
tural communities. Under the leadership of Satish Magar, who was also
the owner of 40 per cent of the land area, the land was converted into a
real estate asset and each family, as a stakeholder, is sharing revenue in
proportion to their share of land.
During this capital-intensive process of development, the company
faced financial challenges and derived various innovative strategies
to cut overheads, for example, the original landowner or farmer
was encouraged to contribute on the ground in construction activ-
ities, thus cutting costs and developing new skills while inculcating
entrepreneurial zeal; instead of recruiting trained professionals the
company chose to employ and train budding lawyers, chartered sur-

veyors, and engineers. This could be achieved by ensuring transparent
and unhindered flow of information amongst all stakeholders. These
strategies not only reduced cost but also assimilated a team of loyal and
dedicated personal with weaker financial backgrounds who could asso-
ciate their growth with company’s growth and gradually got trained and
promoted to form the top of the pyramid in the company (Gupta et al.,
2012).
While the first generation was busy contributing to change, the
second-generation landowners have begun to cash in on the opportu-
nities created and have undertaken entrepreneurial roles in MTDCCL’s
subsidiary companies, which are involved in broadband, cable TV,
the transportation system, the food supply, and landscaping in the
township.
Though communal association might have encouraged Satish Magar
to derive an equitable model of inclusive growth for the Magar com-
munity, the model of MTDCCL is definitely looked upon as an escape
route from prevailing ills of information concentration and profit
accumulation in hands of a few urban elites.
Transaction cost
Institutional economics can be divided into four main strands: trans-

actions cost theory, property rights theory, public choice theory, and
game theory. Here we focus on the first, transactions cost theory. In this
strand institutions develop in order to reduce the costs of exchange.
It is high transaction costs that lead to inefficient outcomes. Adams and
colleagues (2005, p.43) state that:
inefficiency rather than efficiency may well be embedded in the

economic system as a result of uncertainty, individual risk aversion
or moral hazard, all of which can be costly to reduce. Institu-
tional economics thus calls on governments to consider instead how
they might assign stronger rights of property to private decision-
makers and create or support institutional arrangements designed to
promote greater certainty within markets.
One notable transactions cost is the collection of information. Van der

Krabben and Lambooy (1993) highlight the importance of uncertainty
in explaining human behaviour and point out that, because the knowl-
edge of decision-makers is severely limited (based upon incomplete and
Thinking Beyond 231
asymmetric information), people are boundedly rational and, on occa-

sion, behave opportunistically. The consequence of huge transaction
costs is that they impede innovation and also lead to imperfect compe-
tition, which further affects decisions to innovate. Innovation being the
key driver of competitiveness of cities and growth, the transaction costs
pose significant barriers and lock the economy into a low growth path.
Information on which to base decisions is a big challenge in urban
India. The opacity in land markets, labour markets (with huge infor-
mal sector), planning, and political systems, particularly at city level,
despite being democratic, as well as local government decision-making
related to capital investments, private property markets, unclear prop-
erty rights, lack of property title security, have led to huge transaction
costs associated with decisions. This has also led to emergence of other
types of behaviour such as crony capitalism and nepotism, which have
led to inefficient societal outcomes. India is in the process of creating
institutions in cities such as Right to Information Act, eGovernance,
more data on public works in public domain, better reporting of gov-
ernment decisions, urban reforms under government programmes like
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) that are
helping reduce transaction costs.
Over the last decade, cities, states, and national governments have ini-
tiated e-Governance projects in three broad categories: (i) government
to citizen (G2C) initiatives; (ii) government to business (G2B) initiatives;
and (iii) government to government (G2G) initiatives. These initiatives
led to two types of economic benefits to the cities – static and dynamic
efficiency gains. Static gains are one-off gains, and come from a more
efficient use of urban resources, allowing higher consumption of urban
services. More efficient use of resources included improvements in oper-
ating efficiency as well as reduced transaction costs. Dynamic gains from
higher growth potentially raise the entire future stream of consumption.
Freeing up of current resources through reducing transaction costs leads
to higher growth and better governance (Singh, 2004).
E-Governance projects in cities have led to improvement in the shar-
ing of information between government, citizens, and the private sector,
and to improvements in urban services. Information goods typically
have the characteristic that one person’s use does not diminish the
availability of the good for others. Thus, for example, information on
public services and government initiatives can be accessed by all people,
either at the same time or sequentially. Therefore, the use of informa-
tion technology (IT) rapidly increases the sharing of information. For
example, Surat city government provided information on vaccinations
to new parents through personalized SMS alerts. The advantage of IT and

e-Governance projects are their potential for enabling two-way infor-
mation exchanges at a relatively low transaction cost (Singh, 2004).1
Citizens typically incur higher transaction costs in availing themselves
of government-provided services, in the absence of a reliable system to
provide information and services at a relatively lower cost. These costs
also include bribes demanded by the government officials. An impact
assessment study by Indian Institute of Management, Bengaluru, found
a 97.5 per cent reduction in corruption because of Bengaluru One and
its transparency measures (Ahluwalia, 2014).
E-Governance initiatives such as Mee-Seva centres in Andhra Pradesh,
Bengaluru One in Bengaluru, city civic centres in Ahmedabad and
Surat, and the city facilitation centres in Kalyan-Dombivli and Pimpri-
Chinchwad, have all established measures in delivering urban services
such as birth and death certificates, passport applications, and payment
of water, electricity bills, and property taxes. Accountability and trans-
parency measures such as grievance redressal mechanisms were also
established. The government of Karnataka has combined the admin-
istrative reforms and IT to set service-level benchmarks (SLBs) for all
urban local bodies (ULBs) in the state. The comparison of ULBs pro-
vided the basis for pushing individual cities towards benchmarks in
urban service provisions (Ahluwalia, 2014).2 Similarly, Kalyan-Dombivli
has refined administrative processes so that municipal employees
could perform their functions differently and realize the potential of
IT in delivering urban services. The city of Hyderabad used real-time
data, through camera-enabled mobiles, to implement accountability in
solid waste management. These initiatives also empowered citizens to
provide feedback to city authorities on issues of urban governance.
E-Governance projects have also enabled higher growth in Indian cities
through various measures. In Andhra Pradesh and in some other states,
e-procurement projects were launched to reduce the time and cost of
doing business in India for vendors and governments. Business vendors
have been able to realize better value for money spent through increased
competition (ARC, 2008).3 These initiatives, as Ahluwalia (2014) argues,
have freed up the resources of cities to concentrate on issues that have
so far been neglected.
However, these initiatives have also sparked significant debate on the
potential of these technologies on democratic governance. While the
reinforcement theories argue that IT and related initiatives enhanced
the political resources of the powerful elite and strengthened their influ-
ence on policy discourses (Weare et al., 1999),4 in contrast, mobilization
Thinking Beyond 233
theorists argued that these new initiatives have provided alternative

channels to the sections that are politically alienated in cities in
policymaking processes (Stanley and Weare, 2004; Scott, 2006).5
Gaps in knowledge
There is another stream of literature that argues that the gap in

knowledge between developed and developing countries, and between
advanced firms within a developing country and less advanced firms,
accounts for a lack of development. There are two issues: one is a bar-
rier to knowledge and the second is underinvestment in knowledge. The
barrier to knowledge arises in number of ways. If the domestic environ-
ment does not value knowledge-based skills, these will not be pursued.
An example is the real estate sector in India, which lacks professional
skills. Since the real estate sector has not demanded these skills in the
past, education in real estate (such as valuation, brokerage, quantity sur-
veying, etc.) has not been developed. The other barrier to knowledge
gap is that associated with the exchange of people between developing
and advanced countries. Here, the quality of life in cities in developing
countries, and the risks associated with living such cities play impor-
tant role for foreigners. Knowledge, even though it’s not a pure public
good, has public good properties. In his famous model on learning-by-
doing, Arrow (1962) hypothesized that each firm’s profitability depends
on accumulated experience in the industry.
Government intervention
Economic theories of development, discussed above, have implica-

tions for public policy. If the theories imply that the difference in
development among countries is due to differences in knowledge and
capital, the public policy response would be to invest in education, not
just primary but secondary and higher (World Bank, 1999). If geography
matters, policy would address constraints posed by geography, as in case
of Singapore policies related to land, urban development, and migra-
tion, which address the geographical constraints that this city-nation
faces.
The role of government in influencing development has been dis-
cussed in literature. There is one school of thought that, at its extremity,
argues that the role of government should be to define and enforce
property rights and to provide public goods, beyond that it will be
ineffective, unnecessary, or counterproductive. The reality, however, is
that most of success cases of economic growth have involved strong

government interventions (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). Government is
endowed with powers, which, by construct, the other economic agent,
the private sector, does not possess. These powers are necessary to
address public good and externality problems that are prevalent in an
economy. There are arguments against government intervention, which
claim that government is always captured by special interest groups.
However, this is too naïve an argument, as the outcome of a political
process is far more complex than a simple theory of capture.
Government intervention can solve a coordination problem, as dis-
cussed earlier. Adsera and Ray (1998) found that if positive externalities
from moving to a favourable set of activities (say, adoption of new
technology) appear with a time lag, then the final outcome depends
entirely on initial conditions unless there is some gain to being first to
switch. Under these conditions, everyone will wait and no one would
switch. This is precisely the situation of adoption of green buildings’
efficiency measures in India. The authors argue that, under these cir-
cumstances, there is a role for policy to enable the economy to break
free from history. A temporary subsidy can force equilibrium, and once
equilibrium is achieved subsidy is no longer required. The JNNURM pro-
gramme for urban renewal is aimed at forcing a new equilibrium in
provisioning of urban services and affordable housing in India.
The JNNURM focused on two aspects – reform of legal, institutional,
and financial constraints, and funding for urban infrastructure and
affordable housing. The urban housing policy regime in India is con-
trolled by the availability of urban land in the formal market. Over
the years, authorities have been using a number of draconian laws to
regulate the land. These laws often lead to protracted litigation and cre-
ate artificial scarcity of land by regulating housing and land markets,
thereby raising prices. These regulations also increased the minimal cap-
ital threshold for entering the formal housing market. Countries that
succeeded in the large-scale private provision of formal low-cost hous-
ing are the ones where the productivity of low income urban households
have allowed them to earn or borrow the initial US$2,500 necessary to
be able to buy an house in formal markets by substituting capital for
land.6 Bertaud and colleagues (2009) argue that India’s income growth
and level are more than sufficient to overcome this fixed cost barrier
to move into the formal housing system.7 However, as Mathur (2009)
emphasizes, there has been a limited reduction in the number of fami-
lies living in informal settlements. He presents evidence that more than
60 per cent of slum dwellers have lived at the same place for more than
Thinking Beyond 235
a decade.8 This indicates that there are other impediments that are pre-
venting the housing evolution from taking place in Indian cities, and
the underlying motivation for JNNURM and its reforms in fact was to
remove these impediments. JNNURM, through reforms in land markets
such as the Urban Land Ceiling Act and Rent Control Act, have tried to
remove some of the impediments in the functioning of housing mar-
kets. JNNURM also funded the housing projects under Basic Services for
Urban Poor (BSUP) and the Integrated Housing and Slum Development
Programme (IHSDP). The new housing programme, Rajiv Awas Yojana
(RAY), envisages a “slum-free India” through encouraging states/union
territories to tackle the problem of slums in a definitive manner. The
programme largely builds on the reforms initiated under JNNURM to
drive the initiatives. RAY envisages the continuation of three pro-poor
reforms of JNNURM – legislation for property rights to all slum dwellers;
reform to the rental and rent control laws regarding urban housing; and
the review and amendment to the legislation and regulations governing
urban planning.
With a view to correcting the market failures and addressing the coor-
dination failures in provision of affordable housing, these programmes
implicitly and explicitly have created a new equilibrium in cities. The
emphasis on the use of transferable development rights (TDRs) has led
to “spiked” development – high rise buildings located in the middle of
low rise and low density settlements, largely in suburbs, without any
increase in the capacity of the infrastructure servicing these develop-
ments. This has resulted in even longer commutes and a weakening of
the public transport systems, and has had a negative impact on the spa-
tial structure of the city. The expanded uses of TDRs are not free,9 even
if their costs do not appear on a public budget. The large infrastructure
projects, mostly unsustainable both financially and environmentally,
also burdened the city budgets with higher pumping and other oper-
ating costs. Moreover, some of the other pro-poor reforms, such as a
reservation of budget for EWS for basic services further impacted the
city finances.
Further to the programme reforms, JNNURM shifted urban equilib-
rium towards more resource-intensive urbanization, with more invest-
ments in urban infrastructure projects, and paid little attention to
the impacts these investments would create on urban structure, urban
growth, and urban environment. Beyond the superfluous nod to
sustainable development of the cities there was little mention of envi-
ronmental issues in JNNURM mission documents and city development
plans (CDPs). For example, water supply and sewerage project reports
did not talk about core issues of urbanization such as resource manage-
ment, environmental sustainability, and assumed unlimited availability
of environmental resources (e.g. water augmentation and production
projects; transport projects such as roads for personalized transport
that do not consider the issues of energy security). Such short-sighted
approaches have, in fact, undermined the relevance of cities as environ-
mentally sustainable habitats.
The programmes (e.g. JNNURM) heavily loaded with infrastructure
investments and one-size-fits-all reforms led to a weakening of institu-
tional capacity in urban governance. While JNNURM tried to implement
projects through networked, partnership-style decision-making and pro-
cesses involving coordination of various actors, it laid insufficient
emphasis on institutional reforms. In fact, contrary to the programme
objectives of decentralization, JNNURM led to an evolution of a new set
of institutions in urban systems.
As discussed earlier, education or wealth inequalities could create
differentiated outcomes, which could lock different individuals into dif-
ferent growth paths. The problem gets compounded if social agents (for
example, employers) start discriminating between individuals (poten-
tial candidates for employment) on the basis of their histories, as the
assumption behind this behaviour is that low income individuals may
not have means to achieve high skills. Government-affirmative action
programmes can help in changing the behaviour of agents.
Another example of government intervention is if social norms are
enacted as law. Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) discuss this by saying that
if someone who violates a social norm is punished by one person,
that person risks revenge being taken by the violator, but the risk
reduces substantially if more people are willing to punish. Taking it
further, if the government enacts a law, it reduces the private cost of
enforcement because it creates the possibility that the violators of social
norm will face civil punishment. The civil society movement in India for
passing the anti-corruption bill is based around the demand by a major-
ity of ordinary citizens, who collectively want to implement a strong
anti-corruption law.
Connecting the dots
In this chapter we reviewed theories of institutional economics, coordi-

nation failure, and information asymmetries. We also discussed theories
about government intervention as a mechanism to address coordination
problems. The question is, what does the future hold for urbanization in
Thinking Beyond 237
India? We have discussed various facets of reluctance to urbanization in

India. We have also looked at pockets of innovation across the country
which have broken the trend and seized the opportunity to capitalize
on the benefits of urbanization. For all the reluctance that we have spelt
out in the previous chapters of this book, there have been passion and
zeal demonstrated by bureaucrats, local staff, and civil society to posi-
tively impact the face of cities. A few swallows obviously do not make a
summer, but they provide a much needed reassurance to the public and
policymakers that it is indeed possible to make changes in urban India.
“Reluctance to reform to see big picture”, has been the obvious
challenge impeding the scaling up of these success stories.
One does have to step back and examine where the big picture view
should be emanating. There is a lot that New Delhi can do, like the
JNNURM, and much more support will have to be provided. But the
real vision and action will have to happen at the state and local level.
What this means is that one may not see broad strokes of change and
one may not see it all at the same time. But that is the reality of how
India has been evolving as a nation. For example, some states embraced
economic reforms and liberalization immediately after New Delhi did so
in the early 1990s, other have just commenced the journey.
The same would hold true for urbanization as well. Some states and
cities will continue to exhibit elements of reluctance, many others have
already embraced urbanization. If one were to look for a common strand
across the country, it would be the peer pressure of development and
success in parts of the country that will push others to change. The early
success of Bengaluru in attracting IT talent saw the emergence of cities
like Hyderabad and Pune as strong contenders to Bengaluru. With a very
vocal and vibrant media and technology at the disposal of the common
man, there will be a greater push to replicate successes achieved in other
parts of the country. This pressure to change will be bottom up and
people driven; asking fundamental questions of state governments and
local governments around performance and outcomes. Some of these
innovations do not require major institutional change, there are the low
hanging fruits of success that can be immediately actioned.
The verdict of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections has, in some measure,
done away with the politics of caste, while the emergence of the mid-
dle class and youth has seen a rise in using development and growth as
the yardsticks to measure the success of political entities. Hopefully the
trend will stay, and performance shall form the yardstick for measuring
government success. The electorate of the future will be less concerned
about what caste or religion works but ask if Maharashtra can provide
water why can’t the rest, if Gujarat can provide 24 hours of power,
why can’t we? If there is a newfound commonality in India’s history,
it is the common strand of problems that the nation faces, and the
desire for solutions and results to overcome them. These challenges and
success stories, as they emanate, will help connect the dots and break
away the shackles of reluctance that have historically plagued urban
India.
The political fraternity has an important role to play in coming
out of the reluctance mould. Just until a decade ago, urban hardly
figured in the scheme of things for policymakers and governments.
As the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government takes charge in
New Delhi, one of the first announcements that is expected to be
rolled out is the tentatively named “Mahatma Gandhi Clean India
Programme”, an ambitious multi-million dollar sanitation project that
seeks to clean up around 1,000 Indian cities and towns. Such a focus
on the urban would have been unheard of in the past. The point
here is not to make a case for urban versus rural; that would be the
continuation of an unfortunate debate that we have been having for
many decades now. There is now a realization that the ‘urban’ mat-
ters, and that political parties have no choice but to start addressing
the challenges that cities and towns face. And, in doing so, they need
to start unlocking the synergies that exist between urban India and the
hinterlands.
Admittedly, the realization from the political class has come from the
increasing urban vote bank and the power of the urban voters to influ-
ence the fate of election outcomes. So be it. The challenge would be
to streamline the energies of the political class to redefine the mecha-
nisms governing India’s cities and towns. This would require newfound
institutional capacity to address the 21st-century challenges of urban
India. Central government interventions like JNNURM can only achieve
so much unless they are supported by institutional reforms aimed at
enhancing the capacity of local governments. The state governments
also have a very important role to play, and the speed and timing of
their embrace of urbanization will largely determine the fate of their
respective cities and towns.
One can either wait for an unfortunate plague-like situation in Surat
to commence the journey of change or act to gain first mover advan-
tage. We believe the latter looks more likely, given the aspirational levels
of India’s youth and the role of media and technology in information
dissemination. The pockets of success that one sees today may appear
isolated but they find resonance across the country and among the
Thinking Beyond 239
urban citizenry. It is evident that Indian cities do not have adequate

infrastructure. That is merely the symptom. The disease is that they
do not have a government that can enable the citizens to decide to
provide the infrastructure they need themselves and the financial pow-
ers to pay for it, if they so decide. In an ideal situation, an elected
urban local body would base its investment programme on a data-rich
city development plan, work out the financing mix of taxes (including
statutory devolutions from the state finance commissions) and user fees
based on their citizens’ response and participation. They would be sup-
ported by a cadre of professional urban managers, who will be capable
of responding to the expressed wishes of the urban citizen. The role
of the state and central governments would be to provide additional
funds, especially for specific projects of regional or national importance,
and transitional support for the ULBs as they take on the move to full
self-governance.10
Such a scenario is indeed possible in the near future. India’s aspiration
levels have now reached its zenith, and cities provide the perfect foil and
outlet to unleash potential and help achieve those aspirations. With the
drive for change, one is already beginning to see the dilution of the pol-
itics of vote banks. Increasingly, it will be about who can deliver better
than the other. Such competition can bring in greater transparency and
drive away micro-level corruption. If the idea of India was historically
built around cultural and linguistic plurality, the future of the nation
will be about the plurality of development and economic models in
achieving success and progress in various development dimensions.
India needs the success stories to percolate across the length and
breadth of the country, and peer pressure from citizenry to force gov-
ernments to deliver. And, in parallel, a push for more systemic changes
in the federal polity, primarily around institution building, greater
empowerment, and providing a guaranteed revenue base for urban local
bodies needs to be made. Given where India’s urban trajectory is, there
is no time to first fix the structural inadequacies and then implement
projects. Systemic change and project innovations have to run hand
in hand. There is only so much that government can do – the pri-
vate sector and citizens can do more. And we need not get caught
in the public versus private debate – whoever is able to deliver bet-
ter results should take the lead. One size does not fit all, and the
success stories that we see substantiate this viewpoint. Unfortunately,
what has been happening is that goals are often cast in either/or terms,
implying a zero-sum situation: for example, either economic growth
or social redistribution; either encouragement of private investment or
enforcement of regulations; either enhancement of standards of service

provision or universal service delivery; either historical preservation or
modernization through urban renewal, and so on. Similarly, in stan-
dard accounts of how public policies are formulated, technical expertise
and “political interference” are viewed as diametrically opposite types of
input. Such orthodox assumptions do not allow creative thinking about
how to achieve dual-positive, rather than zero-sum, outcomes.
As the action shifts from New Delhi to state capitals to local munici-
palities, one will begin to see the emergence of a new breed of politicians
at the local level wanting to create their own success stories, because suc-
cess at the local level will catapult them to larger political roles in the
state and centre. We are convinced, from all the analytical lenses that
we have used in this book, that cities hold the best hope of finding rea-
sons to continue to celebrate the idea of India: cities as a platform for
youth to realize their aspirations, and for finding common ground with
millions of fellow citizens from across the country. And along that jour-
ney, the numerous success stories in each of the 8,000-plus cities and
towns of India will shape the economic trajectory of the nation, and,
indeed, create a new development paradigm for nations with similar
development challenges and aspirations.
The troika of an aspirational society, the technology and social plat-
forms available at the disposal of the youth, and an alert political class
that appreciates the value of nurturing this constituency of the aspira-
tional class will eventually lead to a full embrace of urbanization in the
country.
From one of reluctance to all-embracing, India’s urbanization trajec-
tory holds much promise and optimism for Indians and indeed for
similar developing economies around the world.
References
Adams, D., Dunse, N. and White, M. (2005). “Conceptualising State-Market Rela-
tions in Land and Property: The Mainstream Contribution of Neo-Classical and
Welfare Economics”, In D. Adams, Watkins, C. and White, M. (Eds.), Planning,
Public Policy and Property Markets. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 3, 37–55.
Adsera, A. and Ray, D. (1998). “History and Coordination Failure”, Journal of
Economic Studies, 64(2), 151–173.
Ahluwalia, I. J. (2014). Transforming Our Cities: Postcards of Change. Noida, India:
HarperCollins Publishers.
ARC (Administrative Reforms Commission) (2008). Promoting e-Governance:
The Smart Way Forward, Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), Govern-
ment of India.
Thinking Beyond 241
Arrow, K. (1962). “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion”, In Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research,
Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Economic Growth (Ed.)
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 609–625.
Bertaud, A., Buckley, R. and Madera, C. (2009). Shelter Policy in India: An Inter-
national Perspective on the Government’s New Program to Eliminate Slums,
Background Paper Prepared for HPEC.
Coase, R. H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4, 386–405.
Coelho, K. and Vijayabaskar, M. (2014), “On the Charts, Off the Tracks”, Economic
and Political Weekly, 49 (22).
Davis, R. (1999). The Web of Politics: The Internet’s Impact on the American Political
System. New York: Oxford University Press.
Greif, A. (1994). “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical
and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies”, Journal
of Political Economy, 102(5), 912–950.
Gupta, A., Dalal, S., Basu, D. and Joseph, A. (2012). “Magarpatta: Farmers Direct
Investment”, IIM Bengaluru Research Paper No. 384, Indian Institute of Man-
agement, Bengaluru, India, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2179495 (Retrieved on 2 November 2014).
Herve, H., Bhuti, L., Agarwal, S., Kushwaha, S. and Causer, A. (2013). “Phar-
maceutical Cluster in Andhra Pradesh”, Harvard Business School, http://
www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/
student-projects/India_Pharmaceuticals_2013.pdf (Retrieved on 2 November
2014).
Hoff, K. and Sen, A. (2000). Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segrega-
tion. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hoff, K. and Stiglitz J. (2001). “Modern Economic Theory and Development”,
In G. Meier and J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.), Frontiers of Development Economics. Oxford
University Press, NY, 389–459.
IDFC (2010), “Land Pooling and Reconstitution: A Self Financing Mecha-
nism for Urban Development”, Infrastructure Development Finance Com-
pany, India, http://www.idfc.com/pdf/publications/policy_group_quarterly_7.
pdf (Retrieved on 2 November 2014).
Keogh, G. and D’Arcy, E. (1999). “Property Market Efficiency: An Institutional
Economics Perspective”, Urban Studies, 36, 2401–2414.
Kshirsagar, J. B. (2013). “Land Pooling Policy of DDA”, Presentation at NAREDCO,
18 December 2013, http://www.naredco.in/pdfs/jb-kshirsagar.pdf (Retrieved on
2 November 2014).
Mathur, O. P. (2009). National Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy 2010–2020 A.D.
Slum Free Cities: A New Deal for the Urban Poor. New Delhi: National Institute of
Public Finance and Policy.
Murphy K. M. (1993). “Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?” American
Economic Literature, 84(2), 359–368.
Rao, J., Tiwari, P. and Hutchison, N. (2014), “The Measure of Compulsory Pur-
chase Compensation in India: Time to Rebalance the Equation?”, Presented at
30th American Real Estate Society Conference, 1–5 April 2014, San Diego.
Rutherford, M. (1994). Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New
Institutionalism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Sala-i-Martin, X., Bilbao-Osorio, B., Blanke, J., Crotti, R., Hanouz, M. D., Geiger,
T. and Ko, C. (2013). “The Global Competitiveness Index 2012–13: Strength-
ening Recovery by Raising Productivity”, In Schwab, K (Ed.), The Global
Competitiveness Report 2012–13. World Economic Forum, Geneva, 3–48.
Scott, J. K. (2006). “ ‘E’ the People: Do U.S. Municipal Government Websites
Support Public Involvement?” Public Administration Review, 66(3), 341–353.
Singh, N. (2004). Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development,
http://people.ucsc.edu/∼boxjenk/wp/Singh_IT_Bardhanconf_Oct04.pdf,
(Retrieved on 2 November 2014).
Stanley, W. J. and Weare, C. (2004). “The Effects of Internet Use on Political Par-
ticipation: Evidence from an Agency”, Online Discussion Forum Administration
& Society, 36(5), 503–527.
Van der Krabben, E. and Lambooy, J. G. (1993). “A Theoretical Framework for the
Functioning of the Dutch Property Market”, Urban Studies, 30, 1381–1397.
Weare, C., Musso, J. and Hale, M. L. (1999). “Electronic Democracy and the Dif-
fusion of Municipal Web Pages in California”, Administration & Society, 31(1),
3–27.
World Bank (1999), World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge for Development,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Notes
1 India’s Reluctant Urbanization: Setting the Stage

1. 1 lakh = 0.1 million.
2. Roy (2011), against the popular apocalyptic and dystopian narratives of the
slum, further argues the slum is a terrain of habitation, livelihood, and poli-
tics. She argues that this formulation, what she calls it “subaltern urbanism”,
is a vital and even radical challenge to dominant narratives of the megacity
(p.224). She understands “subaltern urbanism” as an important paradigm that
recognizes spaces of poverty and forms of popular agency that “often remain
invisible and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory” (p.224).
3. While Mehta and Mehta (2010) argued that urban development had not
received serious attention and funding until the launch of JNNURM,
Mukhopadhyay (2006) argued that the core deficit is not the infrastructure
or its finance but the lack of self-governance which JNNURM could not
recognize.
2 Drivers of Emerging Urban Landscape

1. Cities with a population over 10 million.
2. Class I groups cities with at least 100,000 inhabitants; class II, towns with
more than 50,000 inhabitants; class III, towns with more than 20,000 inhab-
itants; class IV, towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants; class V, towns with
more than 5,000 inhabitants; and class VI, tiny towns with fewer than 5,000
inhabitants.
3. In an effort to maximize tax amount and for efficient collection of land
tax across the nation, the British experimented three major land assess-
ment and settlement formats in India, of which the “Zamindari” system
was most efficient and widely used. Under this format of “permanent set-
tlement”, Zamindars were recognized as owners of the soil with rights of
free hereditary succession, sale, and mortgage, but subject to the loss of their
property on failure to pay tax on a fixed date. Tax on land or land revenue
was imposed indirectly – through agreements made with Zamindars. The sys-
tem stipulated that the Zamindar should safeguard the rights of their tenants
by granting pattas (lease documents stating the area and rent of their respec-
tive holdings). The Zamindars were subject to such rules as might be enacted
by the government for securing the rights and privileges of the tenants in
their respective tenures and for protecting them against undue oppression.
All taxes levied by the Zamindars in addition to the rent were abolished. The
transit duties and road and ferry tolls were taken over by the government,
but the market tools and profits from fisheries, trees, and waste land were
left entirely to the Zamindars (Sarwar, 2012).
243
244 Notes
4. Census 2011 adopted the following definition for an urban area (town and
city), following the pattern of Census 1961:
(a) all places with a municipality, corporation, or cantonment or notified
town area
(b) all other places that satisfied the following criteria:
(i) a minimum population of 5,000.

(ii) at least 75 per cent of the male working population was nonagri-
cultural.
(iii) a density of population of at least 400 per square-kilometre (i.e.,
1,000 per square-mile)
5. Percentage of literate persons aged seven and above to the total population
aged seven or above (effective literacy rate) (Census, 2001).
6. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or con-
sumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumu-
lative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number
of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini
index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line
of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under
the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index
of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank Organization, c).
7. Definition of “informal sector” as per 15th International Conference of
Labour Statisticians (ICLS) (January 1993) and “informal employment” as
per 17th ICLS (November–December 2003): The informal sector is regarded
as a group of production units which, according to the definitions and clas-
sifications provided in the United Nations System of National Accounts
(Rev. 4), form part of the household sector as household enterprises or,
equivalently, unincorporated enterprises owned by households. The scope
of the informal sector may be limited to household enterprises engaged in
nonagricultural activities.
Informal employment comprises the total number of informal jobs,
whether carried out in formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises,
or households, during a given reference period. Broadly, the following can
be treated as having informal employment:
(i) own-account workers employed in their own informal sector enter-
prises;
(ii) employers employed in their own informal sector enterprises;
(iii) contributing family workers, irrespective of whether they work in
formal or informal sector enterprises;
(iv) members of informal producers’ cooperatives;
(v) employees holding informal jobs in formal sector enterprises, infor-
mal sector enterprises, or as paid domestic workers employed by
households.
(vi) Own-account workers engaged in the production of goods exclusively
for own final use by their household.
8. The land earmarked for residential settlement, or “abadi”, and the agri-
cultural land of the village were duly demarcated in the land settlement
Notes 245
proposed by the British in 1908–09, and the “abadi” site was circumscribed in
the village map in red ink. That is how it came to be commonly known as Lal
Dora, literally “red thread”. The land falling within Lal Dora was not assessed
to land tax. Those falling outside it are meant for the purpose connected with
agriculture and were subject to land tax (Report of Expert Committee on Lal
Dora, p.15).
9. A slum, for the purpose of Indian Census, has been defined as a residential
area where dwellings are unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilap-
idation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such buildings,
narrowness or faulty arrangement of street, lack of ventilation, light, or san-
itation facilities or any combination of these factors that are detrimental to
safety and health.
10. Unauthorized colonies are illegal land subdivisions on private land (Rishbud,
2009).
11. A rural area close to an urban area is often categorized as “semiurban” of
“rurban” (Dewaelheyns and Gulinck, 2008). Rurban defines a rural area that
has partially adopted the physical and economic characteristics of “urban”
area but is still not fully eligible to be addressed as “urban”. As per Census
2011, the definition of urban area adopted here is as follows: (a) All statu-
tory places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board, or notified
town area committee, etc. (b) A place satisfying the following three criteria
simultaneously:
(i) a minimum population of 5,000;

(ii) at least 75 per cent of male working population engaged in nonagricul-
tural pursuits; and
(iii) a density of population of at least 400 per square-kilometre (1,000 per
square-mile).
Rurban areas are transitioning rural areas, predominantly at urban fringes,

which are officially governed by “village panchayats” (rural local bodies) and
are, therefore, still “rural” in records, but unlike other villages, rurban areas
witness speedy development and often form a part of urban agglomeration
or serve as a satellite town for the primate urban centre in the vicinity.
3 Built Environment
1. Indira Gandhi’s era has also marked the decimation of three essential pillars –
economic growth, democratic legitimacy, and fiscal management – that were
maintained moderately during Nehru’s era (see Khilnani, 1997, for in-depth
discussion).
2. Lall and Rastogi (2007) also argue that little attention was paid to the devel-
opment of Indian cities by Indira Gandhi. Some of the seeds of urban
degradation, in fact, were sown during her era, such as the introduction of
the Urban Land Ceiling and Rent Control Acts to control the opposition,
mainly Jan Sangh.
3. Turkman Gate, which is situated on the southern part of the Walled City of
Delhi, experienced inhuman and ruthless urban planning policies during the
Emergency of the 1970s. The residents of Turkman Gate, mostly Muslims,
246 Notes
refused to move and resisted the slum demolition drive of Sanjay Gandhi to
cleanse Delhi of slums and force poor residents to remote distant settlements.
As the demolitions continued, the inhabitants resorted to demonstrations,
and more than 150 people died during the subsequent police retaliation
(Krishna, 2011, p.171).
4. Bardhan (1998) argues the success of economic policies depends on their
correlation with the dominant interest groups – big business houses, large
farmers, and professional classes. He ascribes the fragmentation in the coali-
tion of dominant interest groups to the success of the economic reforms
in India, as these interest groups have diversified their investments and
interests. Many rich farmer families and elite groups have branched into
trade, transport, small industry, and real estate. This diversification of
interests and investments also led to increased focus on cities and urban
areas, which have become the conduits of capital accumulation in later
periods.
5. Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014) argue that urban policy, despite the attention
on cities, has been experimental and has sought to encourage the decentral-
izing of institutional power and the commodification of urban land through
state and corporate actors. The 74th Constitutional Amendment, JNNURM,
and RAY are the reflective efforts to overcome the impediments, created
by street politics, to market-driven urban development and implement a
post-liberalization reform agenda.
6. Ramachandran (1989), examining the long coexistence of anti-urban and
pro-urban attitudes in Indian thought, argued, on the contrary, that a pro-
urban bias dominated.
7. It was also argued, along with the inadequacy of the planning strategies,
that the long time taken for plan preparation and approval have severely
impeded the limited “effectiveness” of the plans.
8. The BDP was also criticized for not considering the participation of other
urban agencies working in Kolkata, such as Calcutta Improvement Trust
or municipal corporations and municipalities with the metropole (Pal,
2006).
9. In fact, a quick glance through the GOs in Andhra Pradesh underscore
the active role of state government in issuing orders to the Hyderabad
Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA), erstwhile HUDA, for allot-
ting land for various initiatives by the state governments. There are very
few instances where the proposals are mooted by the local governments to
attract international or national capital.
10. Supporters of “centralized” governments also argued that local governments
are fragmented and narrowly restricted in outlook and scope, and therefore
work against regional interests. They argue that centralized planning and
governance are desirable for regional equity, as the centralized state captures
most of the costs and benefits associated with land use decisions. On the
other hand, proponents of decentralized local governance criticize state
governments for being unresponsive to local public interests and demands.
Attempts have been made, including in Indian cities, to create regional insti-
tutions (such as development authorities) to allow for the autonomy of
urban local bodies and also achieve the scale of operations (Balakrishnan,
2013).
Notes 247
11. Intrinsically, centralized urban planning has had no place for urban local
bodies. Local bodies were treated as “enemies of development, rather than
looking at them as legitimate participants in the process development”. One
can clearly see the conflicts between the goals of decentralizing and the
strengthening of state-level institutions of planning such as metropolitan
development authorities and industrial development boards. All this while,
the role of corporate actors is being strengthened (Sanyal, 2003, 2005).
12. These “exceptionality” measures, as argued, include the freezing of con-
ventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutional
bodies, creation of special agencies with exceptional powers, and change in
state regulations.
13. Wright et al. (1984), cited in Dowall (1992), showed that real estate prices
were inflated by 720 per cent between 1996 and 1981 as a result of the
ULCRA failure.
14. Patel (2008) further argues that if there is one thing that Mumbai needs to
learn from Shanghai it is to enlarge its city area by creating a new transporta-
tion system to access an enlarged area. The much touted Mumbai–Worli Sea
has also not been able to enlarge land availability.
15. In some other cases, slum dwellers could not pay even the subsidized rent in
relocated housing and moved back to the slums.
16. Low income households would need an income of about US$1,000 per year
to be able to afford the minimum cost threshold for a 16m2 dwelling in a
multi-storey structure.
17. See Mathur (2009) for a detailed discussion.
18. McFarlane (2008), in the context of Mumbai, argues that while the “con-
taminated city” of the colonial period was constructed, restructured, and
connected to infrastructure through medical and political fear, the “con-
temporary city” in India is driven by “bourgeois environmentalism” that
desires deodorized urban environments. He further argues that the “discur-
sive and material domain of sanitation remains as fragmented, unequal and
politicized as it was one and a half centuries ago” (McFarlane, 2008, p.432).
19. Gandy (2008) further argues that the planning model in India inherently
adopted a universal water and sewerage system that assumes urban space as
both homogenous and spatially coherent. Therefore, the model is in contra-
diction with the spatial fragmentation and social polarization that exists in
cities of the global south.
20. Dr S. R. Rao was awarded Padma Shree for the efforts. In the history of Indian
administrative service, Dr Rao holds the distinction of being only the second
person to receive the national honour while in service.
21. Linking with this paradigm are the widespread “restructuring”, “infrastruc-
turing”, and “reinfrastructuring” of urban and peri-urban areas in the form
of SEZs, knowledge parks, dedicated industrial corridors, export processing
zones, etc.
4 Productive Environment
1. Scholars such as Kundu and Saraswati (2012), Mahadevia (2008),
Mukhopadhyay (2006), and Bardhan (2011) argue that the policies and
thinking on urban issues is often dominated by the large metropolitan cities.
248 Notes
2. The Industrial Policy of 1991 states that:
In locations other than cities of more than 1 million population, there will be
no requirement of obtaining industrial approvals from the Central Government
except for industries subject to compulsory licensing. In respect of cities with
population greater than 1 million, industries other than those of a non-polluting
nature such as electronics, computer software and printing will be located outside
25 kms of the periphery, except in prior designated industrial areas. A flexible
location policy would be adopted in respect of such cities (with population greater
than 1 million) which require industrial re-generation. Zoning and Land Use
Regulation and Environmental Legislation will continue to regulate industrial
locations.
3. Mukhopadhyay (2006) further argues that Indian cities have been able to
drive growth in an inexpensive manner because the informal sector and urban
poor keep the city manageable, an aspect that neglected by the policymakers
in India.
5 Living Environment
1. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP
is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is calculated without making deductions for the depreciation of
fabricated assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Data are in current US dollars (Source: World Bank Organization (http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD, retrieved on 23 May 2014).
6 Natural Environment: Towards (Re)Generative Cities

1. IPT is regulated by government but is not directly provided by them. IPT
vehicles range from commercially available autos to improvised tractors or
other vehicles. Their choice of fuel too can range from CNG to more pollut-
ing diesel. IPT may also be non-motorized, as in the case of cycle rickshaws.
Government can play a critical role in regulating IPT – the choice of fuel, the
number of licences, the routes on which they ply their business. Yet, to date,
regulation has been very poor and the vast majority of IPT are informal.
7 Governing Environment
1. The Act contains provisions for: constitution of a uniform typology of munic-
ipalities, composition of municipalities, constitution and composition of
wards committees, elections and reservation of seats, powers, authority and
responsibilities of municipalities, constitution of state finance commissions,
committees for district planning and metropolitan planning.
2. Many other scholars also made similar arguments on implementation of the
74th CAA, urban politics and public participation, and urban democracy. The
Notes 249
studies on decentralization policies revealed the discrepancy between func-

tions delegated to urban local bodies and other two “F”s (Functions, Funds,
and Functionaries). A central theme of these studies is the financial crunch of
urban local bodies (see Mathur, 2006, 2013; Mohanty, 2007). Some other stud-
ies focused on the tensions between the financial resources and cities’ role in
delivering urban services (see Pethe and Ghodke, 2002; Mohanty, 2007). Most
of these studies sized up the financial transfers to urban local bodies with
reference to the functions devolved to them and agreed that there is a gross
inadequacy of funds for urban functions.
8 Thinking Beyond
1. Singh (2004).
2. Ahluwalia (2014).
3. ARC (2008).
4. Davis (1999); Weare et al. (1999).
5. Scott (2006); Stanley and Weare (2004).
6. Low income households would need an income of about US$1,000 per year
to be able to afford the minimum cost threshold for a 16m2 dwelling in a
multi-storey structure.
7. Bertaud et al. (2009).
8. Mathur (2009).
9. The current Floor Space Index (FSI) and Transferable Development Right
(TDR) policy disperse commercial and business activities across the
metropolitan area, making increased use of motorization unavoidable.
In addition, TDRs cannot be used in the suburbs along the rail corridors, fur-
ther compounding the dispersion of people and business away from transit
routes.
10. Mukhopadhyay (2006).
Index
abolition of zamindaris, 69 Bangalore Master Plan, 70

access to basic services, 99, 100, Bangalore Metropolitan Regional
101, 105 Development Authority
access to safe water, 2 (BMRDA), 143
access to sanitation, 2 Bangalore One, 232
see also right to basic services Bangkok, 13
administrative capacity, 197, 212 Bangladesh, 130
affordable housing (definition), 159 Banking, 140
agglomeration, 59, 122, 123, 124, 126, Barabazar, Kolkata, 66
127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136, Basic Development Plan (BDP),
137, 138 70–2, 104
diseconomies, 136–8 Basic Services for Urban Poor
economies, 123, 124, 129, (BSUP), 235
134, 138 Beijing, 28
index, 133 Bengaluru, 2, 36–7, 42, 137, 142–5,
urban, 32, 40, 41 171, 237
agrarian economy, 37, 153 Bertaud, 234
agricultural economy, 44 betterment charges, 223–5
agriculture, 121, 134, 148
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre,
Ahmedabad, 8, 46
Deonar, 94
airports, 73, 108
Bharat Earth Movers Limited, 12
see also transport infrastructure
Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, 12
Ambedkar, 53
Bhartiya Janta Party, 227
Ambivalence in treating urban issues,
Bhubaneswar, 58
63–4
Bihar, 160
American cities, 2
Board for Industrial and Financial
Andhra Pradesh, 73, 228, 232
Reconstruction, 9
Andhra Pradesh Industrial
Infrastructure Corporation Bombay Town Planning Act, 70
(APIIC), 74 Bose, Jagadish Chandra, 130
Anna Hazare, 46, 226 Bose, Satyendranath, 130
anti-urban stances, 59 bourgeois environmentalism, 69
appeasement of demands, 57 bourgeoisie environmentalism, 3
Arthur Lewis, 4 Brazil, 33
Asian Games, Delhi, 95 Bretton Woods, 16
autarkic industrialization, 60 BRICS, 64, 142
British
bacteriological city, 102 planning ideas of, 52
Bandra East, Mumbai, 94 town/city planning of, 69, 101
Bandra-Kurla complex, 10 British Raj, 52
Bangalore, see Bengaluru building bye-laws, 2, 45, 63,
Bangalore Agenda Task Force 97–9
(BATF), 144 built-up area, 28, 47, 138
250
Index 251
Burnham, 69 colonial city

see also City Beautiful Movement of the British, 52
dualistic nature of, 52
cadastral maps, 86 planning in, 100
Calcutta, 32, 51, 66, 101, 129, 130, colonial policy of industrialization, 52
137 command and control planning, 56
see also Kolkata command politics, 5, 58
Calcutta Metropolitan Development see also demand politics
Authority (CDMA), 71 committee on urban land policy, 78
see also Kolkata Metropolitan competitiveness theory, 123
Development Authority competitive advantage, 4, 122,
(KDMA) 125–6, 140, 141
Calcutta Urban Development Project, competitiveness of nations theory,
72, 93 124
California, 125 congestion in Indian cities, 136–7
see also Silicon Valley Congress Party, 5, 57–9, 71, 103–4,
cantonment cities, 52 227
capacity of economic institutions, 149 connectivity, 141
cardon sanitaire, 13 constitution of India, 7
Census of India, 96 coordination failure, 220, 223, 228–9,
central business centre 235, 236
locations of business, 43 corbridge, 7
locations of capital, 43 corruption and cumbersome
centralized planner, 7 bureaucracy, 142
Centre for the Advanced Study of creative class, 130
India, University of Pennsylvania, Cyberabad Development Authority
227 (CDA), 74–5
Centre for Civil Society, 81
Chandigarh, 58, 67–8, 103, 127 Dalits, 15
chawls, 43 Deaton and Dreze, 6
Chennai, 37, 46 decentralization, 10, 54, 62, 74, 194,
Chief Minister of Karnataka, 82 197–8, 200, 203, 206, 209
Chief Minister of Maharashtra, 94 Delhi, 2, 28, 29, 31, 32, 44, 45, 46, 65,
China, 1, 5, 9, 27, 32, 33, 39, 121, 67–9, 73, 80–2, 91, 93–5, 100,
155–6 103, 105, 171, 223, 226
cholera epidemic, 70, 103, 105 National Capital Region (NCR),
cities as engines of economic growth, 165, 171
54, 63, 76 see also New Delhi
cities as evil, anti-social, 52–3 Delhi Citizen Handbook, 81
citizen participation, 62, 66, 72, 95 Delhi Development Authority (DDA),
City Beautiful Movement, 69 17, 68–9, 72, 80
City Civic Centres, 232 Delhi Master Plan (1962), 105
City Facilitation Centre, 232 demand politics, 5, 57–9
city governments, 54, 83, 100, 108–9 democracy, 58, 66, 193–6, 205
civil society, 3, 62, 74 Democratic regime, 57
Class I cities, 29, 30, 41 demographic dividend, 35, 37–8, 40,
climate change, 174–7, 179–80, 190 46, 149
coastal regulation zones (CRZ), 88 Denmark’s success in furniture, 125
Cohen, 15 density, 174, 179, 186, 188, 191
252 Index
Department of Land Resources, employable workforce; skilled

Ministry of Rural workforce; capable workforce,
Development, 89 36, 38–9, 44
Detroit, 145 enclaves, 2
Devanga community in Bangalore, 70 energy, efficiency, 188–90
developing economies, 121 energy policies, 21, 188
development authority, 223 environment, 174–5, 177–9, 181,
development economics, 220 183–5, 187, 189
development planning, 51, 56 Environmental Improvement of
development state model, 4 Urban Slums (EIUS), 93, 107
discourse Environmental Protection Act
colonial, 100 1986, 107
development, 54 Export-oriented manufacturing
Indian policy, 53 jobs, 135
polemical, 51
urban, 51, 54, 56 failure of housing and land
disempowerment of urban local markets, 138
bodies, 63 fertilizer subsidies, 60
DLF, 83 financial market, 140, 143
dominance of colonial powers, 101 see also banking
Douglas North, 220 fiscal conservatism of the colonial
draft bill for land titling, 89 municipalities, 102
drug addiction, 14 fiscal crisis, 60–1
Durban, 43 fiscal situation of municipalities,
96, 102
Dutt Committee Report, 128
fiscal space, 108
Five Point Programme, 95
earthquake, 106 see also Gandhi, Sanjay
East Bengal, 3 Five Year Plan, 4, 56–9, 63, 90–3,
Economically Weaker Section (EWS), 96, 107
83, 96, 159, 223, 235 Floor Area ratio, 11
economic liberalization, 32, 134 Floor space index (FSI), 73
economic performance, 59 food subsidies, 60
economic productivity, 127 Ford Foundation, 69–70, 104, 105
economic reforms, 61, 82, 88, 108 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 6, 82,
economic surplus, 51 130, 136, 144
economies of scale, 122, 125 formal city, 148
Economist Intelligent Unit, 155 formal informalization, 136
education, 122, 129, 136, 139, 141–3, formal sector, 44–5
146 formally employable workforce, 44
efficient transport system, 141 formal urban economy, 52
e-Governance, 231–2 nonprimary fields, 44
Electronic City, 12 Freight Equalisation Policy, 129
elite reforms, 61 French and Japan models, 56
emergency and urban policy, 93–5
Emmar MGF, 83 Gandhi, 53, 65
employability, 35, 38, 44 Gandhian philosophy, 53
employable, 36–8, 44 Gandhi, Indira, 5, 57, 58–60, 94
employable population, 37–8 Gandhi Nagar, 58, 103, 127–8
Index 253
Gandhi, Rajiv, 6, 57, 60 Hong Kong, 9

Gandhi, Sanjay, 95 housing demand, 65, 90, 96
garibi hatao, 6 Housing and Urban Development
gated communities, 162, 164–5 Corporation (HUDCO), 96
gated residential enclaves, 13 Hyderabad, 42, 43, 46, 73–5, 109, 137,
Geddes, Patrick, 66 144, 232
geobribes, 73–5 Hyderabad Metropolitan
Germany, 125 Development Authority, 17
Ghaziabad, 223 Hyderabad Urban Development
ghettos, 2 Authority (HUDA), 75
Gini coefficient, 43, 157
see also Gini index ICT Policy 2002, 73
global cities competitiveness see also ICT Policy 2005–10
index, 142 ICT Policy 2005–10, 73
Gounder caste, 222
illegal, 69, 101
governance, 3
land claims, 87
Government of India, 63, 71, 93,
land deals, 82, see also Chief
107, 109
Minister of Karnataka
Government of Maharashtra, 94
land subdivisions, 93
Government Orders (GOs), 85
illiteracy, 14
government policies in Dubai, 126
import substitution industrialization
grassroots-level planning, 79
(ISI), 4, 103
green politics, 53
improvement trusts in indian cities,
greif, 222, 228
66, 68, 71, 101
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 155–6
see also specific trusts
in cities, 120, 134, 140, 149
income inequality, 1
contribution of agriculture to, 148
formal sector, 148 India gate, 171
global, 121 Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical
informal sector, 121, 136 Limited (IDPL), 228
national, 122 Indian Institute of Management, 130
per capita, 123 Indian Institute of Management,
groundwater, 174, 181–3, 190 Bangalore, 232
Gujarat, 222–4, 227, 238 Indian Institute of Technology, 130
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Indian planning, 128
Development Act, 223 Indian Statistical Institute, 130
Gurgaon, 223 Indian Telephone Industries, 12
Indian urban forms, 66
hakeem, 170 indicative planner, 7
Harriss, 19 industrial employment, 134
Haryana, 223 Industrial Location Policy, 10
Haussmannian approach, 70 industrial policies, 21, 128–9
HDFC, 159 Industrial Policy of 1991, 131, 134
Heavy Engineering Corporation, 11 Industrial Policy Resolution 1956,
high-rise zone, 74 128
Hindi, 227 inefficient consumption of resources,
Hindustan Aeronautical Limited, 12 147
Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) inequalities in urban services, 100–2
Limited, 11, 145 inflation, 139, 142
254 Index
informal sector, 1, 45–6 Kolkata Metropolitan Development

informal economic activities, 45 Authority (KDMA), 71–2
informal economy, 44–6, 121 KPMG, 159
informal employment, 121 Kuala Lumpur, 13
informal workers, 44
informal settlements, 69, 88, 90–7, labour laws, 7
100, 101, 105, 107 Lal Dora, 44–5
Information Technology (IT) Policy, land acquisition, 7, 31, 45, 131
143 eminent domain, 8, 132, 221, 223
infrastructure, 122, 123, 124 Land Acquisition Act (LAA), 78–80,
infrastructure projects, 56, 110–11 87, 223
infrastructure turn, 107–11 Right to Fair Compensation and
Institute of Competitiveness, 154 Transparency in Land
institutional economics, 220, 221, Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
230, 236 Resettlement Act, 78
transaction cost theory; property Scheme for Large-Scale Acquisition,
rights theory; public choice Development and Disposal of
theory; game theory, 230 Land in Delhi, 80
institutional finance, 107 land and housing prices, 138
Integrated Development of Small and land mafia, 81, 88
Medium Towns (IDSMT), 107–9 land markets, 76, 81
Integrated Housing and Slum commodification of, 54
Development Programme dynamics of, 77
(IHSDP), 235 speculation, 84, 97
Investment per capita, 143 land pooling scheme, 222
Italy, 125 land pooling and reconstitution
see also mini-steel mill technology (LPR), 223–5
IT and ITES Cluster, 125 land readjustment, 88–9
town planning scheme (TPS), 88–9,
225
Jagmohan, 95
land prices, 135
Janata Colony, 94
see also land and housing prices
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban land registration and valuation, 77
Reform Mission (JNNURM), 19, landscape pluralism, 1
47, 56, 71, 89, 96–9, 109–11, 202, land supply, 76–7, 85, 88, 99
205–10, 214–15, 231, 234–8 land survey, 86
joint family, 166 land title, 31, 44
judicial activism, 3, 21, 107 ownership, 31
jute economy, 3 property rights, 31, 220–2, 225,
230–1, 233, 235
Kalyan-Dombivli, 232 property title, 31, 45
Kanpur, 11 Tenure security, 95
Karachi, 3 land use, 31, 42, 223
Karl Marx, 38 conversion, 85–7
Karnataka, 232 maps, 85
kinetic city, 15 mixed, 69
knowledge and innovation, 123, 124 plans, 2, 75–7
Kolkata, 32, 66, 70, 103–4, 129–30, regulations, 85
137, 176, 205, 209 rigid functional zones of, 69
Index 255
and transportation system, 55 city development plan (CDP), 71,

zoning, 10, 67 111, 235, 239
zoning regulations, 63, 77, 97–8 development plan, 70, 98, 99, 110,
Latin American cities, 1 223
Latur, Maharasthra, 106 mayor, 197, 205–6, 208, 211–12,
Leap-frog development, 82 215–16
Le Corbusier, 67–8 Mee Seva, 232
Lewis Mumford, 16 megacities, 28, 32, 42
License Raj, 60, 69, 130 Mega City Programme, 107
literacy rate, 35–6 Mehrotra, 4
Local planning culture, 67 metropolis, 43
Lodhi Estate, 163 metropolitan area, 47
Lohiate, 227 metropolitan cities, 153, 226
Lok Pal Bill, 46 metropolitan, 202–5, 210
Los Angeles, 13 cities, 51, 73, 75
lot size standards, 77 in India, 130
Lower Income Group (LIG), 83, 96, industrial location in, 131
159, 167 proximity to the, 147
Lucknow, 11 urbanization in, 13, 134
Mexico, 33
MacKinsey Global Institute, 159 micro finance institution (MFI), 159
Madras, 51 middle class, 60, 62, 93, 100, 121, 130
Magar community, 230 migration, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37, 42
Magarpatta township, 229 mill-based cities, 129
Magarpatta Township Development Millennium IT Policy, 143
and Construction Company million-plus cities, 29, 32, 134
Limited (MTDCCL), 229–30 minimum dislocation, 91
Maharashtra, 46, 229, 237 minimum-lot sizes, 98
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena mini-steel mill technology, 125
(MNS), 160 Minister of Works, Housing and
Maharashtra State Textile Supply, 68, 91
Corporation, 9 Ministry of Housing and Urban
Maharashtra Vacant Land (Prohibition Poverty Alleviation (MHUPA), 159
of Unauthorised Occupation and Ministry of Rehabilitation, 105
Summary Eviction) Ordinance, 94 mobilization theorists, 232–3
Maharashtrians, 160 model of economic development, 4
Mahatma Gandhi Clean India modern infrastructure ideal, 100–5
Programme, 238 modernization, 56, 58, 66, 67, 101–2,
Manoj Namburu, 165 103
Margaret Thatcher, 6 modification to building bye-laws and
marginalization, 62, 110 zoning regulations, 98
see also social polarization; urban monocentric, primate cities, 27, 29, 48
exclusion Monopolies Restrictive Trade
market efficiency, 139, 142, 143 Practices, 6
Marxist forces, 71 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
mass politics, 61 Practices Act (MRTP), 59
master plan, 16, 17, 66–7, 69–71, Monthly Per Capita Expenditure
73–4, 77, 83, 84–6, 89, 91, 97, 98, (MPCE), 158
110, 148, 223 Morphology of Indian cities, 69
256 Index
mortality, 14 Nationalization of commercial

Mukhopadhyay, 13 banks, 59
Mumbai, 2, 3, 8, 9, 28, 29, 32, 43, 46, National Planning Commission,
73, 93–4, 103, 130, 137, 142, 143, 56, 110
146, 147, 160–2 National Sample Survey, 36, 96,
Bombay, 51, 94, 101, 130, 137 160, 169
consumption of food in, 146 National Skill Development Policy, 35
resource flows in, 146 National Textile Corporation, 9
ULCRA implementation in, 81 National urbanization strategy, 56
Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR), Navi Mumbai, 10
10, 159 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3, 5, 53, 65
Municipal Acts, 80 era of, 57–8
municipal bonds, 107 planning under, 66–8
municipal commissioner, 106 neoclassical economic theory, 219–20
municipal corporation, 46 neoliberal
Bombay Municipal Corporation, 94 development, 76, 84
Brihanmumbai Municipal economy, 77
Corporation (BMC), 146 urban planning, 75, 76
Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 66 network infrastructure, 99, 104–8
district municipalities: network infrastructure as material
Johannesburg; Cape Town ; representation of modernization,
Durban, 47, 223 102–3
Greater Bangalore Metropolitan network of patronage and
Corporation (BBMP), 46 subsidies, 60
Greater Chennai Corporation, 46 new cities, 147
Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 95 New Delhi, 4, 237, 238, 240
Municipal Corporation of new economic geography, 124
Hyderabad, 109 new integrated twonships, 18
municipal finance, 92, 200 New York, 28
municipal governance, 197–8, 201, Nirbhaya case, 138, 171
203–5 North India, 160
Municipal Sold Waste (Management not in my backyard, 167
and Handling) Rules 2000, 107 NRI, 165
Muslim areas, 65 nuclear family, 166
see also Muslim zones
Muslim slum dwellers, 95 Octroi, 9
Muslim zones, 65 official estimates of the
urbanization, 133
Najafgarh canal, 105 over-urbanization, 54
Nandigram incident, 84–5
Narendra Modi, 227 Pakistan, 9
National Aerospace Laboratories, 12 panchayati raj, 19
National Commission on parastatals, 2, 74, 107, 199–201, 208
Urbanisation (NCU), 64, 129 Pareto optimal, 220
National Crime Records Bureau pariah edge, 18
(NCRB), 170 partition, 57, 58, 65
National Family Health Survey per capita income, 134
(NFHS), 169 peri-urban, 2, 17, 76, 82, 88, 98, 102,
National Housing Policy, 95 103, 105, 132, 135
Index 257
Permit-License-Quota Raj, 5 Ranchi, 11

pillars of competitiveness, 139–40 Rao, S.R, 106
Pimpri-Chinchwad, 232 reactive policies, 100
Pittsburgh, 145–6 refugees, 58, 65, 68, 105
plague epidemic in 1896, 52, 101 refugee colonies; refugeeistan, 65
plague out-break in Surat, 106 regional growth, 205
Planning Commission, 4, 110, 128, regional parties, 61
157–8 regional planning, 179, 198, 205, 208
policy of urban neglect, 51 Regional Plan, 9, 10
political economy, 55, 56, 62, 78, 90, regional planning framework, 135
96, 108 Registration Act 1908, 31
pooled finance, 108 reinforcement theories, 232
porter, 227 reluctant urbanization, 20
post-colonial reluctant urban paradigm, 62–4
anti-urban ideologies, 63–4 Rent Control Act, 92, 235
urban development in India, 63–4 rent-seeking behaviour, 97
post-liberalization, 54, 61, 82 revenue department, 77, 86–7
poverty (definition), 156 Revolt of 1857, 52, 101
poverty line, 156–7 revolving fund, 80
Premji, Azim, 144 Ricardo, 4
primate cities, 143 Right to basic services, 100
Prime Minister of India, 105 Right To Information (RTI) Act, 231
productivity, 120, 123, 138, 139, 140, rigid policies, 130
142, 149 Ring Road, 68, 74, 105
of cities, 120 Ronald Reagan, 6
of a country, 123 Roy, B.C, 104
in India, 120 rual aquifers, 2
of Indian cities, 126–7 rural poverty, 5
production potential of the rural productivity, 134
cities, 57 rural-urban migration, 103
productive cities, 120 rurban, 45
see also total factor productivity
protectionist barriers, 5 Sahara Group, 83
protests from IT employees, 145 Sala-i-Martin, 220, 227
public health, 74, 101, 103–4, 105–7 Satish Magar, 229–30
public housing schemes, 93 Satyajit Ray, 130
public interest litigation (PIL), 3, Seelampur, 163
106–7 service entrepreneurism, 76
Pune, 229, 237 Service Level Benchmarks (SLB), 232
73rd amendment, 19
quality of life (definition), 1, 153 74th Constitutional Amendment,
livability, 154 18, 109
living environment (definition), 153 sewage, 180, 182–3, 191
shadow cities, 93
Raigarh, 8 Shahjahanabad, Delhi, 100
Rajasthan Housing Board, 159 shock therapy, 61
Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), 83, 96–7, Silicon Valley, 143
159, 176 Singh, Charan, 59
Ram Manohar Lohia, 226 Singh, Swaran, 68
258 Index
single industry, 145 Swedish industries, 125

slum, 2, 13, 29, 39–40, 45, 158, 162, system of spatial apartheid, 100–1
167
Dayalpur, Takmirpur and Tagore, 53
Khajuri, 45 Tamta, B.R, 95
Dharavi, 15 Tapi river, 106
illegal settlement; informal tax revenues, 109
settlements, 69, 93, 98, 101 technological innovation, 140
unauthorized colony, 45 technopolis, 143
slum clearance and improvement textile mills, 8
programme, 72, 92 textile policy, 129
see also EIUS Thane, 8
slum clearance policies, 94 theoretical perspectives on urban
Slums Areas (Improvement and growth, 124–7
Clerance) Act, 90 Tiruppur, 222
small and medium towns, 96,
top-heavy urbanization, 131
122, 147
total factor productivity, 124, 138
social capital, 137, 138
Town Centre First (TCF), 138
social and economic contradictions, 2
town and country planning
social fragmentation, 42
legislations, 69
social mobility, 68
see also specific acts
social polarization, 76, 103, 110
township, 165
socioeconomic potential, 64
town surveys, 86
South Africa, 47
traditional approaches to urban
spatial, 124, 127, 128, 132, 138, 144
service provision, 100
spatial context of industries, 53–4
Transferable Development Rights
spatial engineering approaches, 104
(TDRs), 235
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 7, 44,
transport infrastructure, 55, 67
47, 83–4, 89, 131–3
Twenty Point Programme, 94
Enterprise Park Policy, 83, 132
industrial parks, 221 see also emergency and urban policy
speculation, 66, 80–1, 84 Two Million Housing Programme,
splinted approach to planning, 109 95–6
splintering of urbanism, 18, 111
sprawl, 186, 202 UK, 6
stamps and registration charges, 77 ULBs, 177, 183, 187, 197–200, 202
state-level visions, 75 unbundling of infrastructure, 108
structural quality of housing, 2 unemployment, 14
stubborn reality, 13, 14 Unitarian city, 101
subdivision of land, 86–7 Unitech, 83
subjugation and uneven exploitation, United Nations Human Settlement
51–2 Programme, 14
see also surplus expropriation urban bias, 4, 59
sub-Saharan Africa, 1 urban built environment, 52, 54, 57,
Supreme Court of India, 106 63, 74
Surat, 231–2, 238 urban centres, 127, 129
surplus expropriation, 52 urban corridor, 134
sustainability, 52, 174–80, 186, urban development, 174–5,
188–91 176–7, 184
Index 259
Urban Development Fund, 107 urban poor, 51, 60, 68, 75, 82, 88–9,
see also Mega city Programme 95–6, 102, 135
urban dynamics, 120 urban poverty alleviation
urban economy, 120, 127, 137 programmes, 95
urban environment, 51, 99, 102, 107 urban society, 62, 67, 79, 90
urban exclusion, 64, 98, 110 urban transport, 177, 185–9, 201, 209
urban fabric, 70, 100 US, 6, 121, 145
urban footprint, 146–7 USSR, 6
urban form, 2, 176, 178–9, 189, 191 Utopian city, 69
urban, governance, 193, 196, 198–9, Uttar Pradesh, 98, 160, 223
201–2, 204, 206, 208, 211, 215
urban growth control, 63 vaid, 170
village panchayats, 69
urban hierarchy, 53
Vision 2020, 73
urban infrastructure, 57–8, 61, 62, 67,
V.P.Singh, 6
71, 73, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 94,
95–6, 98, 99–111
waste, solid, 174, 177, 183, 184
see also JNNURM
water, 180–3, 189–90
Urban Infrastructure Development
management, 180
Scheme for Small and Medium
politics, 180
Towns (UIDSSMT), 109
supply, 70, 93, 105, 109
Urban Infrastructure and Governance
water, 174, 177, 180–1, 183, 189–91
(UIG), 109
West Bengal, 59, 70–2, 103
urbanization rate, 121–2, 133 West Bengal Town and Country
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Planning Act, 72
Act (ULCRA), 11, 79–82, 88, 235 Western standards, 69
Urban Land Policy, 76–90, 78–9 Western style of planning, 66
urban land supply in Ahmedabad, 82 Whitefield, 12
urban land values, 54, 88 working age group, 33–5, 44
Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), 19, 63, 86, World Bank, 72, 93, 104
89, 107, 132, 160, 232 World city visions, 100
see also city governments World Economic Forum (WEF),
urban planning, 2, 55, 63, 64–76, 96, 138, 141
101–2, 105, 108–11 World Health Organisation (WHO),
in India, 64–76 70, 103, 137
urban policy, 54, 56, 63, 94, 95, 107
urban politics, 200, 210–11 Yablonsky, Dennis, 146

India's Reluctant Urbanization - Thinking Beyond-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2015)

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

India's Reluctant Urbanization - Thinking Beyond-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2015)

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

India’s Reluctant Urbanization

This page intentionally left blank

Piyush Tiwari, Ranesh Nair, Pavan Ankinapalli, Jyoti Rao,

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

List of Figures and Tables vi

1 India’s Reluctant Urbanization: Setting the Stage 1

2 Drivers of Emerging Urban Landscape 27

4 Productive Environment 120

5 Living Environment 153

6 Natural Environment: Towards (Re)Generative Cities 174

7 Governing Environment 193

8 Thinking Beyond 219

2.1 Share of urban population across different classes of cities

2.1 Trends of urbanization in India (1951–2011) 32

We would like to thank Pushpa and Anushka, Subha, Bhavani, and

India has been reluctantly urbanizing. The caricature of “urban” in India

this contest is far from harmonious. The governance structure of cities is

Political economy of development in India

When India got independence, two in three Indians lived in absolute

actions emanating from New Delhi. Earlier paradigms for economic

three-quarters of the population lived in rural areas and agriculture pro-

What is now evident in India, even more so than previously, is a

A major impact of advances in capitalism has been that it is sweep-

Role and position of cities: Lessons from Mumbai

Cities acquired an important position in the post-independence devel-

industry, realized through establishing public sector enterprises, was to

cause of Mumbai’s problems. The plan recommended a poly-nucleated

in Mumbai Island were frozen. Reclamation of land at Backbay was

Cities: Fragmentation in time and space

At the same time, upmarket service complexes, self-contained apart-

Emerging scepticism about ‘Urban’ in India

various policies and programmes. Each of the processes and paradigms

Urban space: Slums and informality

Oft understood conceptualization of slums is that these are neglected

Urban development strategies: Peri-urban

In “What is a city?”, Lewis Mumford, America’s most proliﬁc, popularly

new integrated townships, on the fringes of large urban centres, have

Due to fragmented forms of governance and landownership patterns

The governance of cities in India presents a picture of contradictions.

most recent urban programme of the central government, Jawaharlal

“Reluctant urbanization”: Relevance and objective

Oxford Advanced Dictionary deﬁnes reluctant as “hesitating before

ideologies, urban development practices, in management of slums,

“India’s reluctant urbanization: thinking beyond” is an enquiry into

Structure of the book: An analytic lens using ﬁve distinct yet

Five dimensions – referred to as environments – have been used as the

Mumford, L. (1937), “What Is a City”, reprinted in R.T. LeGates, and F. Stout

Is India actually “shining” or is it a mirage preserved intentionally? India

Scale of urbanization in India

With a total geographical area of approximately 3 million square kilo-

Class VI Class V Class IV Class III Class II Class I

economic evolution. This reactionary approach to urbanization is lead-

of the country’s population account for 43 per cent of total economic

Urban demography of India

Table 2.1 Trends of urbanization in India (1951–2011)

Year Total No. of towns Urban4 Share in total

1951 36.11 2,843 6.24 17.30 82.70

Note: Population in 10 million.

1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

Urban 96.16 251.15 29.79

Rural 257.54 508.41 67.51

–100 100 300 500 700 900

Figure 2.3 Distribution of population by age groups as per place of residence