Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, v. VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one�s person and one�s effects through Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail
themselves of their right to privacy.� The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous
drugs is more apparent than real.� Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers
neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those
who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest.� The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that
were not based on their personal knowledge.� The information as to the accused�s
whereabouts was sent through a text message.� The accused who never acted suspicious was
identified by a driver.� The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be
opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of
his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution.� There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate �stop and frisk� action.� The alleged
waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper
pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article
III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.� There being no possible admissible evidence,
the accused should be acquitted.
I Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36� These facts were corroborated
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union,
�received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer�2 that one Marvin Buya (also
known as Marvin Bugat) �[would] be transporting marijuana�3 from Barangay Lun-Oy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4cralawred
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order �to intercept the suspect.�5� PSI Bayan ordered
SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando
City.6cralawred
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac�s checkpoint.7� The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers
who were carrying marijuana.8� SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who
were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9� Cogaed was
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10cralawred
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11� Cogaed and
favor for their barriomate named Marvin.12� After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag,
revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13� Cogaed then muttered, �nagloko
daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,� which translates to �Marvin is a fool,
this is what [is] contained in the bag.�14� �SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao
and brought them to the police station.�15� Cogaed and Dayao �were still carrying their
respective bags�16 inside the station.17cralawred
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3
Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18� Inside Cogaed�s sack was
�four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,�19 and inside Dayao�s yellow
bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20cralawred
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22� Forensic Chemical Officer
Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects
obtained were indeed marijuana.23� The marijuana collected from Cogaed�s blue bag had a
total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24� The marijuana from Cogaed�s sack weighed 4,246.1
grams.25� The marijuana collected from Dayao�s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26� A total of
17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed�s and Dayao�s bags.27cralawred
According to Cogaed�s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, �waiting for
a jeepney to take him�28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29� He
boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother�s friend.30� Upon arrival at the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. 31� Dayao allegedly
�asked for [Cogaed�s] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
sack.�32� Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33� This was when
SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside
the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34� SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao,
however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35� Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested
by an eyewitness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed
was apprehended.37cralawred
At the police station, Cogaed said that �SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head.�38� The bags
were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39cralawred
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 40� The information
against them states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province
of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who
acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being
authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous
drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand, four hundred twenty-nine and six-tenths (17,
429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No.
9165 (otherwise known as the �Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002�).41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43� The case was dismissed against Dayao
because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44� Trial against Cogaed
ensued.� In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty.�
The dispositive portion of the decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
�Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002�) and sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46chanrobleslaw
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed�s arrest illegal considering that �Cogaed at that
time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about
to do so or that had just done so.� He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest.�47� Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless
search should also be considered illegal.48� However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed �waived his right to object to such
irregularity� 49 when �he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself,
asked him to open his bag.�50cralawred
Cogaed appealed51 the trial court�s decision.� However, the Court of Appeals denied
his appeal and affirmed the trial court�s decision.52� The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when �[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag.�53� Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant�s
brief:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE
RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER�S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER�S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY
AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure
of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search
should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of
the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements
on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55cralawred
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution.� It
has many dimensions.� One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are �reasonable.�� As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets
all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.� This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56� The existence of probable cause
must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and answers.57� Probable
cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed.� Also, the
warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers.� There must be a particular description
of the place and the things to be searched.58cralawred
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59� In the
Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant.60� This court has taken into account the �uniqueness of circumstances involved
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character
of the articles procured.�61� The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . .
;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Seizure of evidence in �plain view,� . . . ;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle�s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. Consented warrantless search;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5. Customs search;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6. Stop and frisk; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is �stop and frisk�.� �Stop and
frisk� searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.63� Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is
done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. 64cralawred
On the other hand, �stop and frisk� searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime.� For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar �to a �stop
and frisk� situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information.�66� This court stated that the �stop and frisk� search should be used �[w]hen
dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.�67cralawred
The search involved in this case was initially a �stop and frisk� search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
�Stop and frisk� searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches68) are necessary for law
enforcement.� That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses.� However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of �suspiciousness� present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in.� This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer.� Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior.� Hence, they should have the ability to discern � based on facts that
they themselves observe � whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.� Clearly,
a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place
frequented by people abusing drugs.70� When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with �reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner.�71� The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police officers.72� These observations led the police
officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.73� These were sufficient facts observed
by the police officers �to stop [the] petitioner [and] investigate.�74cralawred
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76� This man was
also �wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.�77� Upon seeing the police, the man
fled.78� His flight added to the suspicion.79� After stopping him, the police officers found an
unlicensed �homemade firearm�80 in his possession.81� This court ruled that �[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant
first.�82� This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion.�
Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is
indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs.� A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear
is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different.� He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney.� There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney
or carrying a bag.� The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver.� It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was �suspicious.�
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:
Q So you don�t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in
the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to
believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed.� He would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person.� The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person.� This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85� Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one�s basic right to
security of one�s person and effects.
IV
Normally, �stop and frisk� searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer
with a judge to determine probable cause.� In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the
earliest cases adopting the �stop and frisk� doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable
cause:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it
was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. 87(Emphasis
supplied)chanrobleslaw
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as �a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.�88cralawred
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further.� It does not have to be
probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a �genuine reason�91to serve
the purposes of the �stop and frisk� exception:92cralawred
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a �stop
and frisk,� it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a �stop and
frisk.� A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer�s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95� There should be �presence of more than
one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity.�96� The Constitution prohibits �unreasonable searches and seizures.�97�
Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98cralawred
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.� The person searched was not even the
person mentioned by the informant.� The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed.� Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that
he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.�
This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid
search warrant.
V when the police apprehended him and ruled that �[t]here was no valid �stop-and-
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there
is compliance with the �genuine reason� requirement and that the search serves the purpose
of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] �stop-and-frisk� serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 99 (Emphasis supplied)
The �stop and frisk� search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.100� As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows �stop and
frisk� for casesinvolving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta.102� In that case, an informant
told the police that a certain �Aling Rosa� would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by
bus.103� At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104� The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as �Aling Rosa.�106� The police
apprehended �Aling Rosa,� and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her
bag.107� The bag contained marijuana leaves.108cralawred
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109� There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta�s arrest and the subsequent search and
seizure.110� It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. 111� The
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search.112� Consequently, Aruta
was acquitted.113cralawred
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police�s
informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was �suspicious.�
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114� Here, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing
drugs.115� The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was
disembarking from a boat.116� Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin�s bag
and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves. 117� The court declared that the
search and seizure was illegal.118� Aminnudin was acquitted.119cralawred
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances.� In this case, the police had
been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in �different karaoke bars
in Angeles City.�121� One night, the police received information that this drug dealer would
be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122� A car �arrived
and parked�123 at the hotel.124� The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel
was dealing drugs.125� The man alighted from his car.126� He was carrying a juice box.127�
The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his
person and in the juice box he was holding.128cralawred
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua�s situation
frisk�.�129cralawred
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.� The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.�
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. � A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest.� None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made.
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about
to commit a crime.� As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be
affected, �two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.�130�
Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested.131� There were no overt acts within
plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that
time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed�s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags.� As this court previously VIII
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Appellant�s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied The Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132 (Citations
omitted)chanrobleslaw Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136� This rule prohibits the
Cogaed�s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.�
environment brought about by the police officer�s excessive intrusion into his private space.� Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is �the
The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.� In all cases, such and seizures.�137� It ensures that the fundamental rights to one�s person, houses, papers, and
waivers are not to be presumed. effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again
from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their
bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, ma�am.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma�am.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, ma�am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents
of the bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, ma�am.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the
bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma�am but when I went near them it seems that they were
surprised.133(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society.� In the fight to eradicate this menace,
law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.�
However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society�s fundamental values enshrined in
our Constitution.� Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of
the society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La
Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.� For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.� No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac�s responses to Judge
Florendo�s questions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was
somewhat frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping
down and he put down the bag I asked him, �what�s that,� and he answered, �I
don�t know because Marvin only asked me to carry.�134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.� The police officer
must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a
waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search.� The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the
person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.� There must be an assurance
given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights.� The
fundamental nature of a person�s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
 During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

[G.R. No. 188611 : June 16, 2010] On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. BELEN transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at
MARIACOS, APPELLANT. the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police,
and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of
DECISION Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance
operation (sic).
NACHURA, J.:
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been
CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking
and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of knew.
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney.
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue
grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women
government agency or office. and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the
women got away.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre- Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted
trial, the following were stipulated upon: the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about
fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos; newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops,
all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found
jeepney; in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) When it was accused-appellant's turn to present evidence, she testified that:
bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still
positive result for the presence of marijuana; at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested
her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags.
examination weighed 7,030.3 grams; When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station.
When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry.
Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino." She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were
contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]
 was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states: Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless
sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. arrest of accused-appellant.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug x x x x
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is
SO ORDERED.[4] misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags,
there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled
the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against thereto at that time.
an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been
her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc's purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when
was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2
that there was no probable cause for her arrest.[6] Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the
contents of the bags.
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in
custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney.
to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already
representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with left the locality.[13]
this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly
confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over
the same. Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State's agents to conduct
searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which
the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and are not.
legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based Appellant's main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used
on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly
and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now violated by the apprehending officer.
estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not
guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable
brushed aside appellant's argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that
physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11] Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
RTC decisionin toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught i>in flagrante delicto of "carrying and searched and the persons or things to be seized.
conveying" the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant's warrantless
arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated: Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he are:
was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be
13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable
cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.[18]
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
present in the pursuit of their official duties; sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
are; that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant making the arrest.[20]
committed a criminal activity;
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever
4. Consented warrantless search; a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
5. Customs search; described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible
in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another
6. Stop and Frisk;and with impunity.[21]

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search
was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. [15]
In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld
in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle
to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement
of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search
is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain
a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.[22]
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle
that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a
quick decisionand act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the
vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant's arrest, the police
received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had
set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2
Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that
a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion.
Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.--A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]
 intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without
warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]
wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private person may, without Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of
a warrant, arrest a person: convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
attempting to commit an offense; behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order. [29]

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."[30] There is
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
and establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should
be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.[32]
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Moreover, appellant's possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.[34] Appellant
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24] prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]
Given that the search was valid, appellant's arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.
Appellant's narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely
asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the
packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang
ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have
ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey
without knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In
particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous
drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that
crime.[35]

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to
a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no
consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana
is not necessary.[26]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

Appellant's alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
 SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary. [39]
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant's guilt. Thus, her conviction must be
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following affirmed.
manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the
police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags
seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the
other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper,
while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same.
Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not
fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant's arrest, she was immediately brought
to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened
the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police
crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellant's claim, the
prosecution's evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellant's arrest
until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant's arrest was illegal or
that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because
appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the
trial.[38] Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should
have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the
information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any
objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846,
which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was
charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there
willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
[METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing
0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions
of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela
Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo
Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony
of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after
petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
G.R. No. 176077 On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The
Present: testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their
PERALTA, testimonies were corroborative in nature.
ABAD, Evidence for the Prosecution
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ. First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla
Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-
Promulgated: CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his
own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and
August 31, 2011 D-2) that per qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted,
the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram,
and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to
the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan
Police Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the
prosecution further endeavored to establish the following:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002,
P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called
upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from
Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities
being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City
involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-
1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five
(5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3
Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3
Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented
passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said
informant and/or memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring
II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at]
once led by their informant to the house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio
then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening
in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a
distance of 1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic
sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative
inched his way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood
covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith
introduced himself as a police officer while Abe, on the other hand, after
being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the
four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3
Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and
the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
 to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for
proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo
a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident
of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]
Evidence for the Defense
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the
incident completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the
witness stand, he alleged that at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon
of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father, were at
the upper level of their house watching the television soap Cindy, they
suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to
go down. There already inside were several male individuals in civilian
clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police operatives from the
SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner]
and his father tried to plead his case to these officers, but to no avail. Instead,
one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when he tried to
resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with
his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to
the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner]
a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances
allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their house. At
around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the
Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained. That upon
[petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his father was
ordered to go home.[5]
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the
elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting petitioner of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the
accused ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and
penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating circumstances. The
Court likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned over
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.
On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the decision of
the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was
established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the
CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements
necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
Hence, the petition raising the following errors:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO
DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF
A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF SHABU TRADING
ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH CONVERTED
THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A RAIDING TEAM,
CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A
VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED
WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE
FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING
ARRANGED BY PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS
ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT
ANY WARRANT.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED
(SIC) OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT
OF THE PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND
ARREST, IS CORRECT.[10]

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent
seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner
insists that he was just watching television with his father and sister when police operatives
suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets
inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not
sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant
and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself
is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his
house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly
issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be
contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest
unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was
highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the
arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his detention. Hence,
for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished accordingly.
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. [12]
In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection
raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest
and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate,
the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused.[13]
True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is
that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously
issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;[14]
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15]
In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in flagrante
delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established
facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU)
of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of
Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which
included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, saw
petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living
room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the
view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner was
seated.PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining
entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily
handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under
arrest and, contrary to petitioners contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional
rights.[16] PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their
headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC
1-4, the initials of the name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing
white crystalline substance were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination,
which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the
petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the
established exceptions.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent
seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [17] The
right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.[19]
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic
sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning
that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the
petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of
the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be
in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioners guilt of the offense charged.
As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure
in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this
too deserves scant consideration.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
x x x x.
Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
x x x x.[21]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly
with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced
against him inadmissible.[22]What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity
of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of
custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The
factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic
sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized
from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned
over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked.The turn-over of
the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official
blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia,
endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime
Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie
Dela Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by
the latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. [25]
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by
the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic
chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also
the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. [26] Based on the evidence
submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present
case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge
or animus possidendi.[27]
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. [28] Although not constrained to
blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts
were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open court.
In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to
recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward
assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain
degree, truth from untruth.[29]
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the
trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the
prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a
careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to
disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged against him.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the
accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and frame-
up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is
a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence.[30]
As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence
imposed should, however, be modified.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any
dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of
purity thereof:
x x x x.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
x x x x.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5)
grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and
those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and
their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value
or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.[31]
From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to
Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or
less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable
penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not
exceed the maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be
within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 71410. November 25, 1986.]
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH
XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL
COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AGAINST
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF SEARCH
WARRANT. — To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of
the warrant. Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff as
referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF PROBING AND EXHAUSTIVE EXAMINATION OF
APPLICANT. — The applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis
of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by
settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establish the applicant’s claims. Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the
depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of
the sufficiency of their depositions. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or proforms, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFFECTS RENDERED SEARCH WARRANT INVALID. — A
study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") did not excite the respondent
judge’s own suspicion. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the
witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them. The respondent judge
almost unquestioningly received the witnesses’ statement that they saw eight men deliver arms
to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. This was supposedly done overtly in the full
view of the witnesses. The declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search
warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search
warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was
waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity
in writing. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities,
who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a
possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the
armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner
had no choice but to submit.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITED ARTICLES SEIZED WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. — The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum
pistol and the eighteen live bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore
could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the
said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence,
the illegal articles could be taken even without a warrant. Prohibited articles may be seized but
only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search
warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by
the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right
to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets. It does not follow
that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE MADE
WITHOUT WARRANT: CASE AT BAR. — It is true that there are certain instances when a
search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of
that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as
when the person being arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against
the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens
and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft
are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and
their relative ease in fleeing the state’s jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited
articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer
comes upon them inadvertently. Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of
the accepted exceptions. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally
and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURAL FLAW DISREGARDED DUE TO URGENCY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. — It is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to
this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in
accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional issues raised."
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law,
we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history
to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his
own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which
he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
"SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and
seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be
used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their
admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2
The petitioner’s house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant
was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of
the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.
5 "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate
Vicente J. Francisco in the 1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening
of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not
appear in the corresponding provision of the federal Constitution of the United States which
served as our model, it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of
that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate,
approved by the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule
126:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance
with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of
the complainant’s two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to
say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quillosa personally filed his application for a
search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-
INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and
sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before me." 10
By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit
only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have
asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to
him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the
contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant’s deposition in writing and attach them
to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.chanrobles law library : red
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

"We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa’s
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had
already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by
settled jurisprudence. 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for
a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establish the applicant’s claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses
and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the
respondent judge’s own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations
of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses’ statement that they saw
eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly
done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while
he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were .45 caliber
pistols and two were .38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all,
or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that
these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed
presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no
choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely
of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive
atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that
the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen live bullets seized
from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military
authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of
P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the illegal articles could be taken even
without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered
the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the
pistol and bullets.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind
of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant
is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just
entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that
they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons
the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant
and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search
may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person being arrested is frished for
weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be
inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior
upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from
the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state’s
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an
illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without
warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is
that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken.
Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that
the petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973
Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed
that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand’s justification
that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."cralaw virtua1aw library

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case,
however, the said articles must remain in custodia legis.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion
for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal
procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised." 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,
1985, is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158467 : October 16, 2009]
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles
City, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to
annul the Order1 dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City,
Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla's Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized, and the Order 2 dated April 21, 2003
denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized
Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking
permission to search: (1) petitioners' house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad,
Angeles City3 and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac,
Pampanga,4 both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca's request for the issuance of
the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland
D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy
made at petitioners' house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize the
following articles/items:
Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "SHABU,"
"MARIJUANA," weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and
paraphernalia, all of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of
Republic Act 6425 as amended, and are hidden or being kept in said house/premises.5
Executive Judge Mario Guari�a III (Judge Guari�a III) examined in writing and under oath
SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that
based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their
possession and control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad,
Angeles City, an undetermined amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu
and marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guari�a III issued a search warrant docketed
as Search Warrant No. 02-2677, which commanded any peace officer "to make immediate
search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises
above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the properties subject of the
offense and bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law directs."6
On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, namely,
SI Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten Hernaez, and Ritche N.
Oblanca, in coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City,
searched petitioners' house on February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in the morning. 7 They were
able to seize cash in the amount of P15,200.008 and the following items:
1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape marked "RCL-1-2677,"
(net weight - 915.7 grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-2-2677"
(net weight - 491.5 grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags, altogether
wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-3-2677" (net weight - 127.9 grams); andcralawlibrary
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a
yellow plastic bag marked "RCL-4-2677" (net weight - 18.2736 grams).9
On February 20, 2002, an Information10 for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 57, presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.
On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized11 on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant
was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged
crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a
search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search warrant is void ab
initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Documentary
Evidence,12 asking the court to admit the following documents: (1) application for Search
Warrant No. 02-2677; (2) authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the signature of
NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco (Director Wycoco); (3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor
Emmanuel G. Lansang with the Signature of Director Wycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter
(A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127,
Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677
was "defective considering the application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco,"
and that the latter's signature in the authorization letter is different from that as appearing in
the identification card, and therefore it is "not the true and genuine signature of [Dir.]
Wycoco."13
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,14 the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Angeles City claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of
Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-
SC,15 which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous
drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. 16 He avers that Judge Guari�a III
issued Search Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-9717 issued on
February 12, 1997. He also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation
Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to
apply for a search warrant in the house/premises of petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City and Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for
violation of R.A. No. 6425.??

[G.R. No. 117412. December 8, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 27, 1994, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 301291. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the respondent courts Order of 25
January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition irregularly and
unreasonably seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are declared
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by
the respondent court pursuant to applicable law.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of the Office of the Solicitor
General, are as follows:
On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National Police- Special Investigation
Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing
activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their targeted
suspects was private respondent Valentino Toto Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his
Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket,[2] the police officers
immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber
Raven automatic pistol SN-930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber
ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of
methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu from the glove compartment. The police then took
private respondent into custody.
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent
for violation of P. D. 1866[3] with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Paraaque, Branch 77.
Supporting the application were the depositions of two police officers asserting that they had
personal knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street,
Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the following unlicensed firearms: Baby
armalite M-16;[4] Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with corresponding
ammunitions (sic)[5]
On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No. 92-94 commanding the PNP
officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s,
closed receptacles and premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession[6] the
personal property subject of the offense described in the warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special Investigation Group (SIG) team,
accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security officer, went to
private respondents residence in Paraaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same date to search said
premises. Private respondents wife and their childs nanny were both present during the search,
but neither consented to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizure of the
following unlicensed firearms and ammunition:
a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449
d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) live ammo for pistol cal. 9mm
f. Sixteen (16) live ammo. for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo. for pistol cal. 45
h. One (1) magazine for pistol cal. 9mm
i. One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle.[7]
Private respondents wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition.
On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed and filed by the police with
the issuing court.
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless
search of private respondents person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[8] However, the prosecutor found the search
conducted in Paraaque valid.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, in Criminal Case No.92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The
information alleged:
That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449
d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) rds ammo for pistol cal. 9mm
f. Sixteen (16) live ammos (sic). for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45
without lawful authority therefore.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging that the
dismissal of the charges against him arising from the illegal search and seizure in Makati also
applied to the search conducted in his house in Paraaque. The trial court denied the same. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were
likewise denied.
On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the search warrant on the
following grounds: (1) that he was not present when his house was searched since he was then
detained at Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3) that the
search was conducted in violation of the witness-to-search rule. The trial court denied the motion
to quash for lack of merit.
On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No.
30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying his motion to quash
search warrant.
On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its decision declaring as
inadmissible in evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to Search Warrant No.
92-94.
Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS
UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF
AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7
RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO
RETURN WAS PREPARED WHEN ANNEX G WAS PREPARED AND
SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER OF
SIG, CISC, CAMP CRAME.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION INVOKED A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY
LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Petitioners grounds for this petition may be reduced to one issue: Whether or not the
court a quo erred in holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from private respondents
house are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search.
The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for having been done at an
unreasonable time of the evening causing inconvenience to the occupants of private respondents
house, especially as there was no showing how long the nighttime search lasted. The court a
quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312
(1973), where we invalidated a nighttime search conducted on the basis of a warrant which did
not specify the time during which the search was to be made.
Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable since the search warrant
specified that the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or night.
The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 8. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless
the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the
rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the
application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the
instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and
his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondents residence.
Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly
satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of
a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the
warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement[10] fixing the maximum time for the
execution of a warrant.[11] We have examined the application for search warrant,[12] and the
deposition of the witnesses supporting said application,[13] and find that both satisfactorily
comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the We find merit in the petitioners argument that private respondents wife had no justifiable
judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper
reasonable hour of the day or night. Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any
where so allowed, is not improper.[14] member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence
of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. There was no
As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1985: irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque court and the barangay
security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches
e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.
must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the
warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the circumstances
served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place in this case. The unlicensed firearms and ammunition taken from private respondents residence
ordered to be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrants that it be served at any time pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94, are admissible in evidence against private respondent.
of the day or night; WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 24,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 30129 is REVERSED and NULLIFIED. The
But was the time during which the search was effected reasonable? firearms and ammunition seized from the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the
search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall
Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in be admissible as evidence in proceedings instituted by the State.
the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a
warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. [15] And in judging the SO ORDERED.
conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement,
but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30
P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-
and-about. To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper
law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal
activities by pursuing such activities only at night.[16]
The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial
authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions.[17] A nighttime
search is a serious violation of privacy.[18] In the instant case, there is no showing that the search
which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark [19] or
that it caused private respondents family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant
a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused inconvenience for
private respondents family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover,
no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a search. [20]
But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the
search notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members
of his household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:

Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the
searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after
respondents wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the
Certification of Orderly Search and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondents
wife.

[G.R. No. 125754. December 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA
Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO DELOS REYES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early
evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a
certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3
Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the
suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their
quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house
they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man and a woman repacking
suspected marijuana."[1] They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to
the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They
arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto
delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo
confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana.
Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art.
II, of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on
the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements.
According to Roberto delos Reyes, he and his wife were merely tenants in the house of
Zenaida Bolasa and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. Upon learning
that Zenaida was repacking marijuana inside their room, he immediately ordered her to
leave. Unfortunately however it was at that precise moment that police authorities entered and
announced their presence. He and Zenaida were then brought to the Valenzuela Police Station
for questioning and subsequently detained.
On the part of Zenaida Bolasa, she narrated that at 7:30 in the evening of 11 September
1995 she was on her way to 9th Avenue, Caloocan City, where she was working as a
waitress. As she was about to leave the house she met a certain "Rico" and conversed with him
for some time. She denied knowing PO3 Carizon and the fact that the latter saw her repacking
marijuana inside her house.
The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted
both accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each
of them not only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[2]
Both accused appealed, although separately, each one represented by a separate counsel.
Maintaining his innocence in this appeal, accused-appellant Roberto delos Reyes insists
he had just arrived from work and had, in fact, just entered his room when he was
arrested. Assuming he was indeed repacking marijuana when the police officers arrived, he
claims it would have been inconceivable for them to know what he was doing inside his room
considering the height of his window. Significantly, the police officers had to lean first on the
window in order to observe the activities inside the room.
Accused-appellant Zenaida Bolasa meanwhile asserts that the search in her residence was
likewise illegal as her arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized from
her could not be properly used as evidence against her. She insists that the trial court should not
have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Albert Carizon as the same was
hearsay. According to her and her co-accused delos Reyes, PO3 Carizon was not among the
arresting officers. As such, PO3 Carizon had no personal knowledge regarding the conduct of
the arrest and search thus making his testimony hearsay. Since the prosecution did not present
the two (2) arresting officers the version of the prosecution cannot stand on its own.
Bolasa likewise impugns the identity of the items confiscated from her person vis-a-
vis those which were submitted for laboratory examination and charges that the failure of the
prosecution to satisfactorily establish the chain of custody over the specimen is damaging to its
case.
We sustain the appeal. This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against
illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of
suspected drug offenders. Thus, after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court
finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the prosecution and
acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual
with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy
and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint,[3] and
prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives
of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable."[4]
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are
"unreasonable."[5] Thus, arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed
unreasonable and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant -
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-
appellants;[9] hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
WHEREFORE, the 12 July 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-
appellants Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes guilty of violating Sec. 8, Art.
II, of RA 6425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable
doubt; consequently, both are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from
confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
Their Jailers - the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for Zenaida
Bolasa y Nakoboan, and the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for Roberto delos Reyes
- are DIRECTED to implement this Decision immediately and to report to this Court within five
(5) days from receipt hereof their compliance herewith WITHOUT DELAY.
SO ORDERED.

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[6]

An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b)
when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.[7] A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. [8]
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the
above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs
search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for
the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause
for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise

[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y
GATDULA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22,
1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of
Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana
leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest.[1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty
from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held on scheduled
dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June
8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered
to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around
4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite
by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite
Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two
officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton
box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest
of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day
before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could
recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City
with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the
arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the
aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed
during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to
Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in
going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment
factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to
doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was
never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he
had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer
in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court
observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was
legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and
exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings
of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies
of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's
fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis
of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since
the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to
Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is
supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's
fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality
in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the
arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof,
as amended, is as follows:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some
of the various modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said
law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those
mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the
acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving
away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive
acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and
transported marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed
in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense
is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein.This is so as
allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the
ground of multifariousness.[7]In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly
establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of
transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the
statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should
have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court
was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These assertions are, however, much
too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-
presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of
the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies
are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such,
the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution,[8] more so where what
he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented
in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not
for the defense to dictate that course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the
coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below, [11] but
which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an
unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as
early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been
apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence
those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance
should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of
appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.[12] Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language
of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus,
(1) customs searches;[13] (2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[15] (4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6) "stop
and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even
assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under
these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of
the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom
the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such
delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the
same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the
courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open
by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no
evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not
only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should
be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and
to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day
notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2
Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the
time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he
would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as
both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past
operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by
these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely
packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes
successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be
of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic
appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them
from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates
the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting
police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. [19] On the
other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an
arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set
out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught
in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term
the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood
as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for
the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has
been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima
facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as
equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived
the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state
of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and
prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least
on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in
Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a
crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.[25] It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause
to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be
in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the
informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from
the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was
likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the
time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly
innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant,
introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of
the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1
Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they
brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton
box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is
normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported
are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could
reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side
and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have
been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to
adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior
to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant
was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause
and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting
prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite
warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To
repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they
asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal
effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably
or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal
activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same
conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived
either expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused
during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a
demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the law, [28] the case of herein
appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition
by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should
properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly
and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were
the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the
arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in
fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court
below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling
bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. The articles were properly marked as
confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over
to the chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same
drugs taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1
Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the
traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had
come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the
report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had
transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the
presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested
positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in
violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that
he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated
the provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines certain rights of persons arrested,
detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and
investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court
will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything
during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled
or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been
inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly
established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the
arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally
offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on
appellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous
Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In
said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion
perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently
provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable
penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the
legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in
Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is
there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary,
this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code,[31] the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that
case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where
the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4
whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited
drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[32] While the minority or the death of the victim
will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating
circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of
death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the
rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there
was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in
Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant
Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects,
the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182534, September 02, 2015
ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji
Homar (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
January 10, 2008, and its Resolutiondated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. These
assailed CA rulings affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Para�aque
City, Branch 259 in Criminal Case No. 02-0986 which convicted the petitioner for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165. The
Information states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.3
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in the RTC decision,
he testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt.
Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to
the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter,
they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They
immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on
the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected
as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.4
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.5 He testified that on August 20, 2002, he
was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at
the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped
and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being
a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which
he carried to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and
detained for one day. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Para�aque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually
acquitted.6
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to
have performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner.
The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did
not show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner.7
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial and ruled that it is a common
and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. This defense is
weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence as in this case. 8
The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA's ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's findings.
According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is legal, valid, and proper.
One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person. In the
present case, the petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A
Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful.9
Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner's body which
produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.10
The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan11 clearly showed that the petitioner was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA.13 Hence,
this appeal.
The Petitioner's Position
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as
evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioner has not committed, was not
committing and was not attempting to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no
report or criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged jaywalking. 14
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest, Section 13, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed only upon
dangerous weapons or "anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a warrant." In the present case, the offense, for which
the petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, is jaywalking. The alleged confiscated
drug has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking.15

Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered the shabu from
the petitioner, renders the prosecution's evidence weak and uncorroborated. Consequently, the
sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner's conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Respondent's Position
In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was conclusively
established beyond reasonable doubt.16 He reiterates that the warrantless frisking and search
on the petitioner's body was an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking.17 The
non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against the petitioner does not render his arrest
invalid.18
The respondent also assails the petitioner's defense that the shabu is inadmissible as evidence.
According to the respondent, the petitioner can no longer question his arrest after voluntarily
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea of not guilty
and when he testified in court.19
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted
on the petitioner's body.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of this
power and the implementation of the law should not violate the constitutional rights of the
citizens.20
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.21 There must be a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which
must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made � the process cannot be reversed.22
Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions
when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present case, the respondent
alleged that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in
flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
of or within the view of the arresting officer.24
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which
the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu - was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest,
the alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's
body is surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in
its decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements
for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed
to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.
Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place
not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that
the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking"
area. The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that
could have supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of
jaywalking and therefore, the subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a
valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution
is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest
preceding the warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the
prosecution's lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This presumption
cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused
the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution. 25cralawred
It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as regards the
findings of the RTC when it held, rather hastily, that in the process of accosting
the petitioner for jaywalking, Tangcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a small
plastic sachet containing shabu26 The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the
findings of the RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to
arrest the petitioner for jaywalking.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 27
The pertinent testimony28 of Tan, as quoted by the CA, is as follows:
Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior?
A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20, 2002, we saw a male person crossed the street of
Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing.
Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a
place not designated for crossing?
A: We accosted him.
Q: How did you accost that person?
A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. Pero napansin
namin siya na parang may kinukuha, so he was frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a
knife was recovered from his possession.
Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person who allegedly
crossed the wrong side of the street, what happened after that?
A: After recovering the knife, nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked again by
Tangcoy and a plastic sachet was recovered from his possession.
Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion recovered from
that person who crossed the wrong side of the street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the contents?
A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man, what did you do?
A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the Para�aque Community Hospital and the suspected shabu or
methylamphetamine was brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio.
Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the morning of
August 20, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar, sir.
Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy
allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed
to him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy
"immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated area."29
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty.
This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge
that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.
From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his constitutional
rights and brought him to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held that
the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the
police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to
the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for violating
an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent's argument that there was a lawful search
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to
justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of
the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the
alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery
of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person
of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's
right to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police
officers.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in
the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over
his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.32
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes
conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29364. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary