VILLARAZA, LIZETTE

2016400083

Tupas vs. NHC

FACTS:
National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399,
otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated
January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent
(100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the
former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are
the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Petitioner
TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS
filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office of
the DOLE in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the
employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter
Jimenez holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to the Labor Code.

TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations which reversed the order of
dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was,
however, set aside by OIC Sy in his resolution upon a MR of respondent. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:
Can a certification election be held among the employees of NHC?

LAW:
Book V of the Labor Code.
1987 Constitution Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX.

CASE HISTORY:
Med Arbiter (November 7, 1977) – denied petition of TUPAS for the conduct of
certification election holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist
any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

BLR (Director Carmelo C. Noriel) – reversed the order of dismissal and ordered
the holding of a certification election.

BLR (Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy) – set aside order of Dir. Noriel.
SC (November 21, 1978) - ANNULLED and SET ASIDE the assailed resolution of
the Bureau of Labor Relations. The conduct of a certification election among the
affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance
with the rules therefor was granted.

RULING:

Yes. Under the present Constitution, the civil service now only covers
government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters,
that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those
incorporated pursuant to a general legislation. In the present case, since the
NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service
Law but by the Labor Code. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now
also explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental
and private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize may be

found in Section 2, Article IX-B which provides that the right to self-organization
shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale behind this is that
the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such
that it is also an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest
employer in the nation.

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the SC since we have to make a distinction with
regards to public employees of the government and their right to unionize or form
organizations. There was a reason why public sector workers were not entitled to
strike before. It was a recognition of the fact that private sector and public
sector employers are simply not the same animal. Governments exercise a
monopoly over the provision of many vital services in a way that virtually no
private sector employer ever can.
ARIZALA VS CA

FACTS:
Under the Industrial Peace Act, 1 government-owned or controlled corporations
had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations
and duties of employers in the private sector. 2 The Act also prohibited
supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations
composed of rank-and-file employees, 3 and prescribed criminal sanctions for
breach of the prohibition. 4 Under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short) became bound by a
collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization
representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The
agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause The petitioners
occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao
were, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the
Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the
GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant
Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the
Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance
Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same
Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of
them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their supervisory
positions. They refused to do so. Consequently, two (2) criminal cases for
violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of
Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribao 6 and the other, Joven and Bulandus.
Which resulted to their conviction. They argued that when the so called "1973
Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1104,
the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that
of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since the
provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated
(eff., November 1, 1974), repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of
all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction
within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their
employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants
ceased to fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no
longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation
thereof. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace
Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code

ISSUE:
Should the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial Peace Act
may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and
the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions?
LAW
The 1987 Constitution
RA 6715
Labor Code

CASE HISTORY
Crim. Case - two (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were
lodged against Arizala and Maribao

CA - denied their plea for reconsideration.

SC - judgments rendered by the trial court in the criminal case and the appeal,
are reversed and the accused-appellants acquitted of the charges against them.

RULING
YES. The right of self-organization and collective bargaining had been
withdrawn by the Labor Code from government employees including those in
government-owned and controlled corporations chiefly for the reason that the
terms and conditions of government employment, all embraced in civil service,
may not be modified by collective bargaining because it is set by law. It is
therefore immaterial, they say, whether supervisors are members of rank-and-file
unions or not; after all, the possibility of the employer's control of the members of
the union thru supervisors thus rendering collective bargaining illusory, which is
the main reason for the prohibition, is no longer of any consequence. The
disappearance from the law of the prohibition on supervisors being members of
labor organizations composed of employees under their supervision. The Labor
Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file
unions. And under the Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors who were
members of existing labor organizations upon the effectivity of said RA 6715
were explicitly authorized to "remain therein." that the maintenance by
supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the
enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only
not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law. The repeal of a penal law
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old penal law prior to its repeal

OPINION
I agree with the decision of the court. The CBA should be regarded as the law
between the employer and employees. Since it manifests the very intention of the
parties, It should not be affected even though subsequent laws may affect it. After
all, we have learned in our criminal law that as a general rule, laws must always
have prospective application.
REYES v. TRAJANO

FACTS:
Certification elections were authorized by the Bureau of Legal Relations (BLR)
among the employees of Tri-union Industries Corporation. Two labor
organizations – Tri-union Employees Union (TUEU-Olalia) and Trade Union of
the Philippines (TUPAS) were contesting the right to be the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. Of the 348 workers
qualified to vote in the election, only 240 voted. Of the 240 who took part, 141
were members of Iglesia ni Kristo (INK). After the votes were canvassed, TUEU-
Olalia had 95 votes and TUPAS had only 1 vote. Only one employee voted for
'NO UNION.” 141 votes were, however, challenged, and these were the votes of
the INK workers. It appears that the INK members also voted for 'NO UNION'
because INK prohibits its followers from affiliating themselves with labor
organizations. The INK workers' votes were excluded by virtue of an agreement
between the competing unions at a pre-election conference that INK members
should not be allowed to vote because they are not members of any union and
because the refused to participate in previous certification elections.

The INK employees filed a petition before the Med Arbiter to cancel the election.
TUEU-Olalia opposed the petition, contending that the INK employees have no
legal personality to sue for not being members of any legitimate labor union.
Med-Arbiter denied the petition and certified TUEU-Olalia as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees.

The INK employees appealed before the BLR, but Acting OIC Trajano denied the
appeal, declaring that the INK employees had no legal personality to sue, that
they refused to participate in the previous elections, and because their religious
beliefs do not allow them to join or form labor unions. Hence this petition.

Issue:
(1) Should the INK employees had the right to vote in the certification election
(2) Should employees also have the right NOT to vote for any contending union
in the certification elections?

LAW:
Book V of the Labor Code.

CASE HISTORY:
Med Arbiter (December 21, 1987) - certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.

Bureau of Labor Relations (July 22, 1988) - denied the appeal. opined that the
petitioners are bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged
disenfranchisement since they are not constituted into a duly organized labor
union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative.

CA - ANNULLED and SET ASIDE the decision of the BLR. Petitioners are
DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should
be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the
choices written therein.

RULING:
(1) YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organization of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Art 243 of the Labor Code and Sec 1, Rule II,
Book V of the Omnibus rules provide for this right. Art 248(a) makes it an Unfair
Labor Practice for the employer to interfere with the employees' right to self-
organization. Art 249(a) likewise prohibits labor organizations from restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of this right.

No law, administrative rule, or jurisprudence requires that only employees

affiliated with legitimate labor organizations may take part in certification
elections. The right to vote is granted to all bona fide employees in a bargaining
unit, whether probationary or permanent, and whether or not members of a labor
organization. Similarly, no law, administrative rule, or jurisprudence prescribes
the forfeiture of the right by reason of neglect to exercise the right in previous
certification elections.

(2) YES. The right of self-organization includes the right to organize with
labor unions or to determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to
join. It logically includes the right not to join, affiliate, or assist any union or to
disaffiliate or resign from the labor organization. Thus employees have the right
to refuse or to refrain from exercising their right to self-organization.

This is an acknowledgement of the alternative possibility that NO votes may

outnumber YES votes, indicating that the majority of the employees do not wish
to be represented. In such a case, no union can represent the employees in
collective bargaining. Whether or not the NO votes were inspired by religious
considerations should not even be inquired at all.

OPINION:
I agree with the ruling of the court since it is of basic knowledge and common
sense that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law,
so also, it is but just that no one should be compelled or coerced to exercise such
conferred right.
 ASSIGNED CASES TO ME:

MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC., vs. NLRC

FACTS:
The Med Arviter who supervised the certification election issued an order
certifying NLMSOI as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees of Stayfast. On appeal to the Secretary, it affirmed the MA’s decision.
The matter was elevated via petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Pending,
which when the company refused to bargain, it staged a strike which was
restrained. It then filed a Notice of Strike to the NCMB. The company opposed
and contended that the union lacked personality to file notice of strike. During the
conciliation mediation, the union withdrew its notice of strike. However, the
Union’s members staged a “sitdown strike” to dramatize their demand for a fair
and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to discriminate
against them. Respondent company issued a memorandum requiring the alleged
participants in the “sitdown strike” to explain withint 24 hours why they should not
be terminated or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and
regulations pertaining to unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to the
company’s interest, and disregard of instructions of the immediate supervisor to
perform assigned tasks. As no one complied with the memorandum within the
24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly terminated the service of the
participants in the “sit-down strike.”

Consequently, the day after, the union staged a strike and filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal lockout against respondent
company and its General Manager in the NLRC.

ISSUE:
(1) Was there ULP on the part of the management?
(2) Was the management obliged to bargain with NMSP?

LAW:
Book V, Labor Code
Book VI, Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:
Labor Arbiter (April 27, 1999) – said that the Union failed to prove any
discrimination and the MMSP case was dismissed for lack of merit.

NLRC (Jan. 31, 2000) – that the strike staged by MMSP was patently illegal and
the Arbiter’s decision was affirmed.

CA (July 1, 2002) – The MMP’s case was dismissed for lack of merit.

SC (Aug. 28, 2013) – The MMSP’s case was also dismissed.

RULING:
(1) No. The SC ruled that while the union may file a notice of strike on behalf of
its members, petitioner failed to cite any instance of discrimination or harassment
when it filed its notice of strike and the incidents mentioned as discriminatory
occurred after the filing of said notice. Moreover, assuming that the strike was
legal at the beginning, it became illegal when petitioner committed acts prohibited
under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as acts of violence, coercion and
intimidation and obstruction of the free ingress to and egress from respondent’s
company premises. Also, petitioner was supposed to have made a self-imposed
prohibition to stage a strike when it submitted its labor dispute with respondent
company for compulsory arbitration.

(2) No. Because petitioner was not the certified bargaining agent and therefore
lacked personality to file a notice of strike.

OPINION
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court because our Labor laws
should not only seek to protect the rights of laborers but should also protect the
employers as well from abusive unions. After all, the Labor Code of the
Philippines was enacted to meet the needs of socio-economic development and
social justice.
DHL-URFA-FFW vs. BUKLOD

FACTS:
A certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file
employees in the main office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines
Corporation. The contending choices were petitioner and “no union.” On the basis
of the results of the certification election, with petitioner receiving 546 votes and
“no union” garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the
corporation. Thereafter, Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines
Corporation (BUKLOD) filed with the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE a
Petition for the nullification of the certification election. The officers
of petitioner were charged with committing fraud and deceit in the election
proceedings, particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was
an independent union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW).

This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their selection of petitioner
in the certification election. Allegedly supporting this claim was the fact that
those whom it had misled allegedly withdrew their membership from it and
subsequently formed themselves into an independent union. The latter union,
BUKLOD, was issued a Certificate of Registration by DOLE.

ISSUE: Was the certification election valid?

LAW:
Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor Code,

CASE HISTORY:
Med Arbiter (May 18, 1998) - nullified the certification election and ordered the
holding of another

DOLE Undersecretary - held on appeal that the issue of representation had

already been settled with finality in favor of petitioner, and that no petitions for
certification election would be entertained within one year from the time the
election officer had issued the Certification Order

CA (January 30, 2002) – set aside the decision of the Undersecretary of Labor, in
behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, that the withdrawal of a great
majority of the members of petitioner -- 704 out of 894 of them -- provided a
compelling reason to conduct a certification election anew in order to determine,
once and for all, which union reflected their choice. Under the circumstances, the
issue of representation was not put to rest by the mere issuance of a Certification
Order by the election officer.
SC – affirmed CA. The bargaining agent must be truly representative of the
employees

RULING:
No. Another election should be made. Under the Labor Code, the election
officer’s authority to certify the results of the election is limited to situations in
which there has been no protest filed or if there has been any, it hasn’t been
perfected or formalized within five days from the closure of the election
proceedings. The circumstances in the present case shows that the employees
didn’t sleep on their rights. Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural
technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest should not be taken
against them. Mere technicalities shouldn’t be allowed to prevail over the welfare
of the works. What’s essential is that they be accorded an opportunity to
determine freely and intelligently which labor organization shall act on their
behalf.

The making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free
choice of the employees is a valid ground for protest. A certification election may
be set aside for misstatements made during the campaign if (1) a material fact
has been misrepresented in the campaign; 2) an opportunity for reply has been
lacking; 3) the misrepresentation has had

Section 14 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor

Code provides that when a protest has been perfected, only the med-arbiter can
proclaim and certify the winner. Clearly, this rule is based on the election officer’s
function, which is merely to conduct and supervise certification elections. It is the
med-arbiter who is authorized to hear and decide representation cases.
Consequently, the decision whether to certify the results of an election or to set
them aside due to incidents occurring during the campaign is within the med-
arbiter’s discretion.

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the SC. The purpose of a certification election is
precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees choice of an appropriate
bargaining unit -- to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, in
the affirmative case, by which one. The present case certainly manifests a
situation where the employees were lured by the false statements made by the
petitioners that greatly interfered or made an impact in the exercise of their free
choice to choose their bargaining agent.
Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Calleja, et. al. November 29, 1988
FACTS:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-
TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, filed a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of
Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and existing corporation,
employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers. Respondent
employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others, (1) that
of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported
the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4
resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union
(d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious
insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their
work or stopped working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for holding a
certification election has not been complied with by the union.

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union
in his order dated August 18, 1986.

ISSUE:
Has the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the proposed
bargaining unit, asking for a certification election been strictly complied with?

LAW:
Book V of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:
BLR (Nov. 24, 1986) – affirmed the Order and denied the appeal.

BLR (January 13, 1987) - Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Belyca
was dismissed for lack of merit

SC – dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the resolution of the
BLR.

RULING:
Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro
Division) employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees
and workers. It is significant to note that 124 employees out of such number have
expressed their written consent to the certification election; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive
Order No. 111.

More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for
holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted. In fact, once
the required percentage requirement has been reached, even the employees’
withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for
certification election will not affect said petition. Also, until a decision, final in
character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or
retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification
election.

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. This is because the petitioners’
has sufficiently complied with the requirements set forth by law.