Double Sales: Art.

1544
Cases:
Tanglao v. Parungao 535 SCRA 123 ----
parungao won
In Occeña v. Esponilla, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno, laid down the
following rules in the application of Article 1544:
Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except when the second buyer first
registers in good faith the second sale; and
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith. Differently put, the act of registration by the second buyer must be coupled
with good faith, meaning, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not
have been aware of facts which should put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint
him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
At the time of the second sale to petitioners by Spring Homes, there were already occupants and improvements on the two lots in
question. These facts should have put petitioners on their guard. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property in possession of
persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession, for without such inquiry the
buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.
As the petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith, they cannot rely upon the indefeasibility of their TCTs in view of the
doctrine that the defense of indefeasibility of a torrens title does not extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad faith.

Bautista v. CA 322 SCRA 365------

Doctrine: Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that before the second buyer can obtain priority over
the first buyer, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale
and of the first buyer's rights)-from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by registration
or failing registration, by delivery of possession.

Mathay vs. CA 295 SCRA 556------

Doctrine: A purchaser in good faith and for value is defined as one who buys property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of
some other person in the property. As a rule, he who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and
for value, has the burden of proving such assertion. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere
invocation of the legal presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith.

Heirs of Gregorio Lopez vs. DBP 741 SCRA 153------

As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of the seller. He or she need not
look beyond what appears on the face [of the certificate of title]. However, the ordinary buyer will not be
considered an innocent purchaser for value if there is anything on the certificate of title that arouses suspicion,
and the buyer failed to inquire or take steps to ensure that there is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the
property being sold.

Mortgagee in good faith provides that “even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the
mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This
principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as
buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule
that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee
has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in
the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence,
even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the
mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection”.
if it’s unregistered, presumption of good faith is not there as it should actually keep the buyer
on their feet.

Bernardez v. CA 533 SCRA 451------

Registration
possession
oldest title
Primus tempore, potior jure. First in time, stronger in right. However, the act must be coupled
with good faith.

Rosaroso v. Soria 699 SCRA 231------

even if they registered it, if they have knowledge, second B is in BF

Bayoca v. Nogales 340 SCRA 154------

In Cruz vs. Cabaña (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit
the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale.

Cruz v. Cabana 129 SCRA 656------

Consolidated Rural Bank Inc. v. CA 448 scra 347-----
Solera v. Rodaje 530 SCRA 432------ (dad owned it, kid also sold it)
Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are
made by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold, and
even of the sale was made by the same person, if the second sale was made when such person
was no longer the owner of the property.

Carumba v. CA 31 SCRA 558------

While under the invoked Article 1544 registration in good faith prevails over possession in the event of a double sale by the
vendor of the same piece of land to different vendees, said article is of no application to the case at bar, even if Balbuena, the
later vendee, was ignorant of the prior sale made by his judgment debtor in favor of petitioner Carumba. The reason is that the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff's execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires
the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon

Hanopol vs. Pilapil 7 SCRA 452-----

However, there seems to be no clear evidence of Hanopol’s possession of the land in
controversy. Hanopol cannot have a better right than Pilapil who, according to the Trial Court
was not a purchaser in bad faith.

Dagupan v. Macam 14 SCRA 179-----

UNREGISTERED SALE CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY SUBSEQUENT EXECUTION SALE AND REGISTRATION OF
LATTER Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
Macam won The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in
favor Macam could not have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent
issuance of the Torrens title over the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon the execution of the
deed of sale in his favor by Sammy Maron, Macam had immediately taken possession of the
land conveyed as its new owner and introduced considerable improvements upon it himself. To
deprive him, therefore, of the same by sheer force of technicality would be against both justice
and equity.

Espiritu v. Valerio 9 SCRA 761----

Still RPT
also, second sales notarization appears to be forged

Quimson v. Roseta 87 Phil. 159-----

We are of the opinion that the possession mentioned in article 1473 (for determining who has better
right when the same piece of land has been sold several times by the same seller) includes not only the
material but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the execution of a public instrument.”

Radiowealth Finance Company v. Galileo 197 SCRA 245------

In the case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, the court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code
cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer
in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because
the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the
judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time
the property was levied upon.

Navera v. CA 184 SCRA 584-----

RPT
In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio Nares by means of a public
instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in the material and symbolic
possession thereof by the latter.

Aviles and Villafuerte v. Arcega and De Deon 44 Phil 924-----

At the time, therefore, of the execution of the deed in the favor of the plaintiff, the first purchaser, there
was no symbolic delivery because there was an express stipulation to the contrary. It cannot be said that
after the lapse of the four months which followed, during which the vendors were to continue in
possession of the house, according to the stipulation, any symbolic delivery subsisted.

Gaplao v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 731 SCRA 131-----

Obligations of the Buyer

Inspections & Acceptance Art. 1584
Mirror Doctrine
Cases:
Locsin v. Hizon 735 SCRA 547------
mirror doctrine, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. An exception to this rule is when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything
which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith
and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

Nobleza v. Nuega 752 SCRA 602------

To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and
foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of
his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for the
protection and defense of his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when
placed in such a situation.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller
while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The Court held in the Spouses Raymundo case that the buyer therein as the same in this case
could not hide behind the cloak of being an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on
the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the land purchased is the seller.

Alam nya eh, sinabihan sya. Also malapit sya sa bahay.

Caram, Jr. v. Laureta 103 SCRA 7-----

They knew na may prob, bad faith

La Fuerza v. CA 23 SCRA 1217-----

Since the delivery of the subject matter of the sale is an obligation on part of the Seller, the
acceptance thereof by the buyer is not condition for the completeness of delivery.
Article 1497 provides that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in
the control and possession of the vendee.
wine

Gil vs. CA 411 SCRA 18------

Article 1191 in tandem with Article 1592 of the New Civil Code are central to the issues at bar.
Under the last paragraph of Article 1169 of the New Civil Code, in reciprocal obligations, neither
party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner
with what is incumbent upon him

Vda de Laig v. CA -do-

Dir of Lands vs. Ababa -do-

Sale of Immovables Arts. 1592, 1560

Cases:
Pangilinan v. CA 179 SCRA 590-----
Entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation
even without court intervention. Nevertheless, in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
, requiring demand by suit or by notarial act in case the vendor of realty wants to rescind does not apply
to a contract to sell but only to contract of sale. In contracts to sell, where ownership is retained by the
seller and is not to pass until the full payment, such payment, as we said, is a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. To argue that there was only a
casual breach is to proceed from the assumption that the contract is one of absolute sale, where non-
payment is a resolutory condition, which is not the case.

Reyes v. Tuparan 650 SCRA 283-----

The title and ownership of the subject properties remains with the seller until the buyer fully pays the
balance of the purchase price and the assumed mortgage obligation. A vendor’s obligation to sell the
subject properties becomes demandable only upon the happening of the positive suspensive condition,
which is the vendee’s full payment of the purchase price.
Unless the parties stipulated it, rescission is allowed only when the breach of the contract is substantial
and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.

Maceda Law RA 6552

Gatchalian Realty, Inc. v. Angeles 711 SCRA 163-------
A valid and effective cancellation under Maceda Law must comply with the mandatory twin
requirements of a notarized notice of cancellation and a refund of the cash surrender value.

d pa valid ung pag tanggal

Pagtalunan v. Dela Cruz vda de Manzano 533 SCRA 242-----

The demand letter sent by petitioner to the respondent dated February 24, 1997 does not
conform to the requirement set by the law that it must be a notice of cancellation or demand
for rescission of the contract by a notarial act. The case of unlawful detainer filed by the
petitioner does not exempt him from complying with the said requirement. There being no
cancellation by Patricio or petitioner, the respondent has the right to continue occupying the
property.

Optimum Dev. Bank v. Jovellanos 711 SCRA 548-----

sumunod sila ginawa lang nila notice of delinquency and cancellation

RILLO V. CA 274 SCRA 461-----

Pasok si condo sa maceda

Fabrigas v. San Franciso Del Monte, Inc. 476 SCRA 247------

The cancellation of the contract under Section 4 is a two-step process. First, the seller should extend
the buyer a grace period of at least (60) days from the due date of the installment. Second, at the
end of the grace period, the seller shall furnish the buyer with a notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission through a notarial act, effective thirty (30) days from the buyers receipt thereof. It is worth
mentioning, of course, that a mere notice or letter, short of a notarial act, would not suffice.
It is now estopped from questioning the validity of the cancellation of the contracts. An
unopposed rescission of a contract has legal effects.

layug v IAC
standard

Recto 1484
Nonato v. IAC GR No. 67181
Indeed, the acts performed by the corporation are wholly consistent with the conclusion that it had
opted to cancel the contract of sale of the vehicle. It is thus barred from exacting payment from
petitioners of the balance of the price of the vehicle which it had already repossessed. It cannot have
its cake and eat it too. Alternative not cululative

Ridad v. Filipina Investment 120 SCRA 246

My case, if he already went for one mortgage, he can’t go for the other.

Leovillo Agustiin vs. CA GR No. 107846 April 18, 1997

The Court had already recognized an exception to the rule stated under Art. 1484(3) upon which
petitioner relies. Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of the mortgage
upon his failure to pay two or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the
reach of the mortgagee, what then is the mortgagee expected to do? It logically follows as a matter
of common sense, that the necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the
action for replevin so that he can regain possession of the chattel, should be borne by the
mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our view, include expenses properly incurred in
effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for replevin.

People’s Industrial and Com’l Corp vs. CA G.R. NO. 112733

. Extrajudicial rescission, after all, has legal effect where the other party does not oppose it. Where it is
objected to, a judicial determination of the issue is still necessary. In other words resolutions of
reciprocal contracts maybe made extra-judicially unless successfully impugned in court. If the debtor
impugns the declaration it shall be subject to judicial determination

Republic Act No. 6552 was approved on August 26, 1972, long after provision No. 9 of the
contracts to sell had become automatically operational. Republic act No. 6552 does not
expressly provide for its retroactive application and, therefore, it could not have encompassed
the cancellation of the contracts to sell in this case.

It is now estopped from questioning the validity of the cancellation of the contracts. An
unopposed rescission of a contract has legal effects.