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Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391

DOI 10.1007/s12124-016-9353-7
R E G U L A R A RT I C L E

Activity Theory: Quest for the Unattainable and Hope


for the Future (Reply to Commentaries)

Irina A. Mironenko 1,2

Published online: 10 June 2016


# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract In reference to commentaries on the paper (Mammen and Mironenko,


Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 49(4):681–713, 2015) some clarifi-
cations are introduced concerning the general landmarks and objectives in the devel-
opment of psychological science, in respect to which activity theories (AT) can be
assessed and evaluated. Contemporary psychological science is developing
along the path of integration, as part of the emerging global world. AT has
some special value and importance in this respect. It can contribute to the
development of the emerging multi-paradigmatic system of the global psycho-
logical science because it combines two aspirations, which are rarely combined
in psychological theories: a) consistent focus on scientific method, objectivity
and conclusiveness; b) the pursuit of a holistic and complete, not simplified and
not one-sided comprehension of the subject. The former provides good bases
for dialogue with Bobjective^ psychological approaches, close to natural sci-
ences. The latter is suggesting dialogue with teleological humanitarian psychol-
ogies. Therefore, AT can engage in networking with a wide range of theories,
facilitating the integration of psychological knowledge. It can contribute to
resolve the much discussed collision of reductionist Bscientific^ theoretical
models and loose Bcomprehensive^ descriptions in contemporary psychological
science. Developing dialogue and cooperation with other schools is of special
importance for the RAT, which should return to the international science, where
it was rooted, overcoming the language and conceptual barriers. Some new
considerations are suggested regarding the theory of the two types of categories
of Jens Mammen.

* Irina A. Mironenko
mironenko_i@mail.ru

1
Department of Social Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg, Russian
Federation
2
Niels Bohr Professorship Centre of Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391 383

Keywords Activity theory . Multiparadigmality of science . Criteria of scientific


knowledge . Systemic approach . Methodological crisis in psychology . Fantasy . Choice
and sense categories

Working on my reply to commentaries on our paper (Mammen and Mironenko 2015)


made me bring to the light issues that did not get much coverage in the latter, because
these were not precisely, what the paper focused on. However, considering commen-
taries revealed the richness of multiplicity of interpretations and disclosed some
differences of our positions in issues closely related to the subject of the article.
Discussing those has broadened my understanding of the potential of the AT and
highlighted new prospects for future cooperation of the DAT and the RAT.
The Mammen and Mironenko (2015) paper was focused on the AT own potential for
further development, the essence and inner structure of this potential, i.e. the develop-
ment of the AT was mainly reflected there in the internal perspective, as an inside view.
Unfortunately, as commentaries have revealed, this has led to misunderstanding of my
position on some very important for me aspects of the AT co-existence and interaction
with other approaches, i.e. aspects, relevant to reflecting AT development in the
external perspective.
In this respect, I must reveal my primal concern with problems of the contemporary
polycentric global science development. Russian psychology (and RAT as part of it) is
now in the boiling cattle of Bperipheral^ national schools, seeking their way to self-
identity and self-affirmation. The global psychological science is now the one with very
heterogeneous and even incommensurable conceptual frames. These issues are much
discussed in the literature now, but they were not in the focus of the Mammen and
Mironenko (2015) paper and did not get much coverage there. Thus, now I would like
to introduce some clarifications concerning my understanding of the general landmarks
and objectives of the development of psychological science, in respect to which we can
assess and evaluate the contribution and prospects of the Activity theory (AT), as well
as those of any other theories. Clarifying these, I hope to promote further mutual
understanding.
Neumann (2016) and Wieser (2016) comments bring to the light several critical
remarks on general methodological issues. I admit that I fully agree with a substantial
part of this critique. First, with regard to the Bcrisis^ of psychology, I absolutely agree
with Weiser that the crisis is not uninterrupted and continuous. This point is very
important for me, and my assessment of the issue has been presented in detail in a
number of my earlier works (Mironenko 2013a; Mironenko and Sorokin 2015). I want
to emphasize that I fully agree with Wieser in relation to this matter and offer some
comments.
In the literature the idea of a permanent methodological crisis in psychology, lasting
since 1890s, is widespread. It has been noted many times that assessments of method-
ological crises in psychology given by William James, Karl Bühler, Lev Vygotsky and
others, do not differ much from modern assessments. However, I believe this view
should hardly be accepted. The world has changed and psychology is not what it was a
hundred years ago (Valsiner 2010). New schools appeared; the norms and ideals of
science changed in the course of transformation of classical science into non-classical
and post-non-classical; psychology became a mass profession, which significantly
384 Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391

changed the ratio of academic and applied research and the structure of the professional
community. Can it still be the same crisis in psychology? It seems hardly possible.
Moreover, the discourse of the renowned crisis of the late 19th c – first third of the
20th c was and still is focused on the problem of the disunity of psychological science,
on the lack of mutual understanding and constructive cooperation between theoretical
schools. The key idea of the Bold crisis^ discourse is: various schools and traditions in
psychology lack cohesion and integrative efforts. Epistemological problems, although
discussed, were considered by most authors in the context of this disunity, understood
explicitly or implicitly as spawned by the latter. Meanwhile, I believe, that there is
every reason to assume, that the disunity is no longer the major problem for the
scientific psychology, and that the crisis of competing theories has been largely
overcome. Primarily this is a natural consequence of the fact, that in the second half
of the 20th c in developed countries, psychology became a mass profession, in a
globalizing world, which required the development of common standards for profes-
sional practice and education.
From time to time, a discourse of methodological crisis arises in literature, which
gives grounds to the idea of a permanent, on-going crisis. However, I believe that
regarding periods of that discourse arousal as several distinct crises is an approach more
meaningful and constructive. This allows us to pass from discussing perennial, intrac-
table ontological problems of psychology, to finding ways to overcome the contempo-
rary problems.
Valsiner and Toomela are good examples of such an approach, constructive and focused
on concrete contemporary problems (Toomela 2007, 2010; Toomela and Valsiner 2010;
Valsiner 2012). They suggest that the current crisis in psychology has begun in late 1940s.
According to these authors, the cause of the crisis is of historical nature and referres to the
fact that the psychological mainstream switched from the methodology of BGerman–
Austrian psychology^, domineering in Europe before the II WW, to the BNorth American
psychology^ style. Thus, as a way out of the crisis Ba new return to an updated version of
the German–Austrian methodological trajectory^ is suggested.
I fully agree with the assessment of the current state of psychological science as a
crisis, but I think that the current crisis does not cover the entire period of the 20th and I
would assert that it was not until 1980s that the first signs of the contemporary crisis
appeared. I have dwelled more on it in Mironenko and Sorokin (2015).
Second, I share also Weiser’s and Neuman’s position in respect to the multi-
paradigmatic nature of psychological science.
The issue I have extensively dwelled on in a number of my earlier works
(Mironenko 2004, 2006, 2007). Psychology has always been fragmented since it has
left the path of introspective associative paradigm of the 17th- 19th cc. Morbid
experiences of the schism of scientific schools permeate the entire history of our
science, engendering the endless Bcrisis^ discourse. Moreover, because of the position
of psychology at the intersection of natural sciences and humanities, which are different
in methods, the development of psychology has always been quite dramatic, replete
with methodological discussions. The new reality of the globalized world has exacer-
bated the problem with new challenges of ethical relativity and cultural diversity of
implicit foundations of psychological theories. The very ideal that there can be
theoretical or disciplinary unity in our science has been largely debated since the
foundations of psychology.
Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391 385

Perhaps the most wonderful thing is that psychology, thus torn apart, still maintains
the identity of Ba science^. However, if in the dispute on whether psychology should
stay Ba science^ or rather be divided into a bunch of Bpsychological sciences^ the
former point of view prevails, a cure for the disease of fragmented identity of our
science should be hunt after. I like the metaphor BPsychology as a symphony orchestra^
proposed by Henrik Poulsen, which Neuman cites, and I would like to add, that I
consider the very idea of an Ball in one solution^ for psychological science as truly
reductionist, but, luckily, unrealizable. It is like the idea to get reed of the multiplicity of
human languages by constructing some sort of an artificial language. Every language is
an embodiment of a unique human culture, and the way to mutual understanding is the
art of translation, not unification. In the same way, every school in psychological
science contributes to understanding of psyche, and its contribution is unique. The
way to integration leads through dialogue and efforts for mutual understanding, and I
believe that Activity Theory can make a good contribution to these processes, but in no
way I see it as an Ball in one solution^, which would mean a castration of psychological
science.
Smedslund’s critique (Smedslund 2016) addresses the belief, which we build on,
that psychology is a science, in the sense of claims to scientific method; that it can, and
should be a science in this sense. His criticisms imply that Ban objective, accumulative,
empirical and theoretical science of psychology is an impossible project^ (Smedslund
2016, p. 185). Not only Smedslund thinks so nowadays. Perhaps, the mainstream
psychology of the last decades was too much obsessed with the purity of the method,
and the losses in compliance of the proposed theoretic models with the reality of
psychic processes have become too obvious.
The discourse of the Bunderstanding^ (humanitarian, teleological) psychology ver-
sus the Bexplanatory^ (clinging to natural sciences, causal) is entailed with endless
debate over the criteria for obtaining, verification, and the adequacy of knowledge. As
they say, B…either the objectivity of the method is achieved at the cost of giving up
comprehension of the psychic reality, or comprehension of the latter is achieved at the
cost of cancelling the objectivity of the analysis^ (Zinchenko and Mamardashvili 2005,
p. 62). Nevertheless, I firmly believe in the necessity for psychology to sustain the
dynamic tension of this antinomy and to keep on trying to be scientific (i.e., logical and
deterministic), at the same time trying to comprehend the psyche, though it is charac-
terized by Birreversibility, infinite numbers of determinants, the pseudoempirical, and
the social interactivity^ (Smedslund 2016, p. 186).
What is a science, if not just an everlasting quest for the unattainable ideal of purely
logical and rational knowledge? Scientific criteria should be applied more to the
direction and the method of search, than to the products. No science is perfect, ideally
logical and deterministic, no science possesses absolute truth, and all sciences deal with
relative truths, gradually, step by step, approaching to the unattainable ideal. Is it not a
beautiful and glorious venture? In addition, for pragmatics I would like to add, that
every step along this path contributes to the development of human civilization. Thanks
to the development of science, humanity in the past few centuries achieved a tremen-
dous increase in number and in the duration of individual’s life, defeated deadly
diseases and substantially expanded the areal of habitat. I would like to remind those
who say that evils of science exceed benefits of its fruits for humanity, and preach
turning back to Bnature^, that in the course of 16–18 centuries, number of humankind
386 Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391

grew four times, and in the course of the 19–20 centuries it has grown sevenfold.
Average life expectancy in Europe in the 19th c did not exceed 40 years.
Psychology is a necessary and an essential part of the Science in general, demanded
by other sciences, which turn to psychology with their appropriate problems. The
borders between psychology and other forms of psychological knowledge, − which
are valuable, important, mighty, but not scientific - these borders should be transparent
and permeable, but they should be preserved (Mironenko 2006, 2008)! Blurring of
these boundaries would mean the loss of the status of science for psychology, and thus,
a lacuna in the general system of human science, the destruction of the integrity of the
latter. BSalt is good, but if it loses its saltedness, there is no way to make it salty again^.
Psychological scientific knowledge is not all psychological knowledge humanity
owns. There are arts, literature, religion, common sense, lay knowledge, etc. Scientific
psychology can neither substitute the other types of psychological knowledge, nor
pretend for superiority. Let psychological practices scoop from all sources. However,
psychological science has its own value, its field and domain, and it cannot be denied
that it contributes to psychological practices also.
These general methodological issues are of great currency for contemporary global
and psychological science development, and very relevant to contemporary develop-
ment of psychology in Russia. The theoretical problem mainly discussed in Russian
psychology in post-Soviet time is the multiplicity of approaches. After many years of a
paradigm, we found ourselves in the unbounded sea of possibilities and that’s a matter
of great concern (Mironenko 2014). There are three basic points of view on paradig-
matic status of psychology:

1. It’s non-paradigmatic. This means psychology is not really a science and should
not be limited to any rules and any borders. I ague against this when I plea for
scientific criteria. This is an urgent problem for the contemporary Russian and
global discourses.
2. It’s pre-paradigmatic. This means an idea which I ague against when I speak about
impossibility of Bthe all-in-one solution^. Some theorists claim to invent a new
paradigm (like Esperanto for languages. Then psychology would be a real science,
they say…
3. It’s a multipadarigmatic science. I share this position. I believe in the natural
development of psychological science and it is multiparadigmatic now and was
such from the very beginning. I see no reason to say now that it can be the other
way.

In sum, I believe that contemporary international psychological science should


develop along the path of integration, required by the logic of the contemporary global
culture development. This integration can be built only through the dialogue, increasing
mutual understanding between schools, whose developments should find their place in
the emerging multi-dimensional system of the global science, multiparadigmatic, but
preserving the criteria of scientific knowledge. From this point of view, I consider the
value and the perspectives of the AT and I perceive that the latter is in good position to
contribute.
AT methodology bases on dialectics and on the systemic approach, which is
contradictory to the atomistic conception of the individual and the environment as
Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391 387

relatively independent entities. The very phenomenon of biological life assumes the
indissoluble unity of living being and its habitat through assimilation and dissimilation.
Life is the systemic unity of individual and environment, which interpenetrate, modify
and generate each other in the new quality. The material substrate of psyche since the
earliest stages of its formation in the process of biological evolution is a systemic unity
of the living organism and its environment. Psyche is the generation of this unity; it is a
dynamic phenomenon. Separation of the organism means death, which is the loss of
animation, the lack of psychic processes.
Culture as a specifically human phenomenon, assuming a special kind of activity,
based on the indissoluble systemic unity of intrapsychic processes and interpsychic
interactions. Veresov’s comments (Veresov 2016) shed further light on these aspects of
the AT. The concept of internalization, which is the essence of Vygotsky’s theory,
means an assumption that the internal mental structures are created from the external.
Just as the body is built from the matter absorbed from the outer world, the inner world
is built from the processes of human existence in the social environment and cultural
interactions. Culture as a psychological phenomenon manifests itself in artifacts, but
exists as a dynamic state of the joint human experiences and reflections of life.
Formation of the human consciousness is only possible in the process of socialization,
when, just as the body grows absorbing and assimilating the matter in the form of food,
the human mind is growing under the process of internalization of culture.
Here I would like to add some words referring to Peter Krojgaard’s comment
(Krojgaard 2016). Krojgaard’s comment mainly addresses the theory of my esteemed
co-author of the two types of categories, which I generally avoid discussing here,
suggesting that Jens Mammen will answer the opponents better than me. However, I
would like to share some thoughts.
Peter Krojgaard interprets the theory of the two types of categories in terms of
Bfeatural^ (enabling to classify objects as belonging to a certain class, according to
Krojgaard) versus Bspatiotemporal^ information. To my mind, the idea of Jens Mammen
of a type of categories special only for humans is not confined to the individual’s ability
to identify the uniqueness and singularity of objects in terms of Bspatiotemporal^
characteristics. Krojgaard^s comment convincingly shows that this ability is inherent
to infants at an early stage of their development. I’d like to add that there are substantial
grounds to believe that this ability is inherent also to animals, and even that is based on a
certain brain mechanism, common to humans and animals, holistic and alternative to
feature detection (Nevskaya and Leushina 1990; Glezer 2000; Glezer et al. 2003).
I believe the theory of Jens Mammen implies the ability for a human to perceive not
only spatial and temporal characteristics of objects and other characteristics (features)
that objectively exist, but also the characteristics of the other kind, inherent to the
objects in the field of culture. In this field, objects are endowed with common
meanings, rooted in the language, and individual values (senses), (Bsmysly^ and
Bznachenia^, according to Alexey Leontiev). These both exist as mental phenomena.
They do not have spatial characteristics (leaving aside the question of the temporal
characteristics). Humans master language in the course of socialization, entering the
culture. Thus, meanings are formed. The individual values (senses) are formed in the
course of life, and are also determined by the culture, but unlike meanings, values
(senses) to a greatest extent conjugate with the human ability to endow and to disendow
objects with subjective values (senses), by a kind of a movement of free will.
388 Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391

If we assume this hypothesis, may be, we would rather consider the existence not of
the two, but of four kinds of categories, which can be classified on two grounds:

& Common to both humans and animals and applicable to the objective reality –
specific only for humans, applicable to the mental reality;
& Individual – shared and based on general criteria.

Humans, as well as animals, share the objective reality of the material world, the
physical reality existing in space and time, where locomotion is possible, actively
carried out by the individuals to provide for their living. For humans another reality
is also available: culture - the different reality, which still has the shared and objective
nature because it is objectified and crystallized in language. In this reality, human
obtains new capability – to fantasize, to transform reality in his fantasies, subsequently
embodying the fantasy into the reality of the material world, thus, changing this world.
In the reality of culture, the human gets the support Archimedes was talking about,
promising to move the Earth (Dos moipu sto, kai tan gan kinaso). The ability to
manipulate, which is only pawned in the animal world in its primitive forms, for
humans, thus, becomes the leading form of interaction with the material world,
providing the transformation of the latter. Thus, I believe that the spacio-temporal
parameters available both for humans and for animals are not enough for comprehen-
sion of the distinction between the two types of categories proposed by Jens Mammen.
Claiming that international psychological science is now under the process of
integration as part of the emerging global world (Valsiner 2010; Sorokin 2016), I
believe it is necessary to consider the development of the AT reflecting this in the
Bexternal perspective^, not limiting our analysis to the Binternal perspective^. I believe
that AT has some special value and importance in this respect. It can contribute to the
development of the emerging multi-dimensional system of the global psychological
science, multiparadigmatic, but preserving the criteria of scientific knowledge, because
it combines two aspirations, which are rarely combined in psychological theories:

& Consistent focus on scientific method, objectivity and conclusiveness, which forms
a good bases for dialogue with Bobjective^ psychological approaches, close to
natural sciences;
& The pursuit of a holistic and complete, not simplified and not one-sided compre-
hension of the subject. Focus on holistic complex objects, which are developing
because of dialectical internal contradictions. This is suggesting dialogue with
teleological humanitarian psychologies.

Therefore, AT has the potential for development in a wide specter of directions and
can engage in networking with a wide range of theories, facilitating the integration of
psychological knowledge. It can contribute to resolve the much discussed by theorists
collision of reductionist Bscientific^ theoretical models and loose Bcomprehensive^
descriptions in contemporary psychological science. Stating this, in no way I pretend
for an BUmbrella^ approach status or the status of a BDirector^ conducting an orchestra
– just an active agent, networking with distant and close neighbors, whose work
manifests his creativeness and productivity. I would like to stress, that I appreciate
the AT very high, but considering the problem of the integration of global
Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391 389

psychological science, I believe there is no sense for the AT in trying to build


relationship with other approaches with a position of strength, to force others to play
by our rules. These efforts would be in vain.
I praise researchers who develop AT and create new theoretical models, but I believe
significance also should be attached to problems of the place and importance of the AT
in the development of the international global science, which is now emerging.
Speaking about the Activity Theory (AT), primarily I keep in mind the Russian
Activity theory (RAT), in the bosom of which my professional formation began.
Soviet psychology was in no way a comprehensively developed trend. Psychology
in the USSR was, in a measure forcibly, kept within the framework of a mono-
methodological trend, oriented to the standards of natural sciences and based on
Marxist philosophy, with priority to fundamental research. Psychological practices
were restricted, and the impact of ideology was a strong distorting factor for research
in societal areas. However, there were original developments, mainly in the area of
fundamental research connected with biology, which still can contribute to international
science. Unfortunately, RAT is still not enough integrated and comprehended in the
international science because for the greater part of the XX c psychological science in
Russia was developing in relative isolation due to language and ideological barriers.
Interpretations of its content and essence in the international science are incomplete and
ambiguous (Mironenko 2013b).
Meanwhile RAT is going through hard times. Contemporary Russian professional
community is hardly in a position to promote RAT development. RAT is no longer a
domineering trend in psychological theory and practices. Since 1990s, most rapidly
developing areas of Russian psychology are those, which had been being virtually
abandoned during the Soviet period: counseling psychology, social psychology etc.
Thus, on the one hand, Western psychological theories are generally recognized and
widely employed, and on the other hand, we are witnessing a revival of Christian
Orthodox Psychology, which was flourishing before the Socialist Revolution and was
completely abandoned during the years of the Soviet power (Mironenko 2014, 2015).
My experience leads me to say bitterly that the main development of the AT in Russia is
over. To survive, RAT has to return to the international science, where it was rooted.
Much still has to be conveyed (Mironenko 2013b). I believe the most important
direction of development of the RAT is now its integration into the international science
and developing dialogue and cooperation with other schools, this I am trying to
promote.
A theory is alive as long as it undergoes changes, new developments and new
interpretations appear. DAT is a perspective way to AT future development. I am happy
if my modest efforts contributed to the development of the conception on the ontolog-
ical status of psychology in terms of the two types of categories by Jens Mammen. And
I am particularly glad to note that the concept of the two types of categories is
successfully developing both aspirations, characteristic for the AT: consistent focus
on scientific, even mathematical, conclusiveness of the method; and a romantic pursuit
of a holistic and dialectic comprehension of the subject.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.


390 Integr Psych Behav (2016) 50:382–391

Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed
by the author.

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Irina A. Mironenko is a Professor of Psychology at the St.Petersburg St. University, St.Petersburg, Russia.
She received her MD from the Leningrad St. University (now St.Petersburg St. University) in 1978. Then she
worked for 14 years at the State Optical Institute named after S.I. Vavilov in St.Petersburg, doing experimental
research on visual perception in complex systems of optical devices. Meanwhile in 1980-1984 she took a
Ph.D. course in Leningrad St. University and received her Ph.D. degree (Candidat of Science) in 1984,
defending a thesis on visual perception of three-dimensional shapes. When BPerestroika^ began, psychological
research at the State Optical Institute was cut off, and she began her carrier in education. Since 1992 and up to
2009 she worked at the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, beginning as a Docent
and gradually becoming a Professor and a Dean of the Faculty of Culture. Her professional interests in this
period turned to theoretical psychology and in 2005 she defended her Doctoral thesis on cultural determinants
of psychological theories and received her Doctoral degree (Doctor of Science, ‘Habilitated Doctor’) in
theoretical psychology. Since 2009 she is a Professor of Psychology at the Pushkin St. University, St.
Petersburg, and since 2014 a Professor of Psychology at the St.Petersburg St. University. ADDRESS: Irina
Mironenko, Saint Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab.,
St. Petersburg, 199034 Russia, e-mail: i.mironenko@spbu.ru.
Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights
Reserved.

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