Arms Control and World Order

Author(s): Hedley Bull

Source: International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer, 1976), pp. 3-16
Published by: The MIT Press
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 Arms Control HedleyBull
and WorldOrder

()ur presenttheoryand
practiceof armscontrolrestson a set of assumptions-sometimesexplicit,more
oftenimplicit-as to what kindof worldorderis desirableand feasible.It is in-
evitablethatthisshouldbe so, forto raisequestionsaboutthequalityand quantity
of armsthatshouldexistin international society,aboutwho shouldpossess them,
wheretheyshouldbe deployed,forwhatobjectivesand in whatways theyshould
be used, is to raise questionsabout the politicalstructureof the world and the
distributionof power withinit. But the set of assumptionsabout world order
whichat presentunderliestheenterprise of armscontrolcommandslittlesupport
outsidethecircleof theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion and theirclosestallies.
This is in itselfsufficient
reason forraisingthe questionswithwhichthis essay
is concerned, viz.
1. What assumptionsconcerninga desirableand feasibleworldorderare im-
plicitin ourpresenttheoryand practiceofarmscontrol?
2. What assumptionsabout worldordershould informour approachto arms
control?
3. Given answersto the above questions,what consequencesfollowforarms
controlpolicy?

PresentTheoryand Practice

By "our presenttheoryand practice"I mean the body of theoreticalwritings

about armscontrolthatarose in theWest in the late 1950s and early1960s and
thebodyofunilateralpolicies,tacitunderstandings and formalagreements,chief-
ly involvingthe UnitedStates and the Soviet Union, thathave grownup about
armscontrolsincethattime.What we shouldnoticeabout thistheoryand prac-
ticeis theextentto whichit assumesor impliesthatworldordercan and should
be foundedupon thepresentpoliticalstructure of theworldand the existingdis-
tributionofpowerwithinit.
First,thereis thedefinition
of armscontrolitself:"Armscontrolin its broadest
sense comprisesall thoseacts of militarypolicyin whichantagonisticstatesco-
operatein thepursuitof commonpurposeseven whiletheyare strugglingin the
pursuitof conflictingones."1When two antagonisticstatespursuecommonpur-

1. Hedley Bull, "Introductionto the Second Edition," The Controlof the Arms Race (New York:
Praeger,1965), p. xiv.

Hedley Bull is Professorof InternationalRelations, Australian National University,Canberra,

and VisitingFellow 1975-1976 All Souls College, Oxford.

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 International
Security|4

poses in theirmilitarypolicy-as the United States and the Soviet Union have
sometimesdone-these purposesmay be universalones, acceptedas valid by
international societyas a whole,but theymay also be purelybilateralones, the
special purposesof the cooperatingpowersthemselves."If two states,"I wrote
in 1964, "were to achievetheircommongoals in thisfieldby bringingabout the
ruinof othernationstherewould seem no reason to deny thatwhat theywere
engagedin was arms control,exceptforthe commonbut quite unnecessaryas-
sumptionthatarmscontrolhas about it an aura of spiritualrectitude, insteadof
beinga temporalprocesslikeanyother."2
Our presentdefinition of armscontroldoes not in itselfentailany bias either
foror againstthepresentpoliticalstructure of theworld.But thereis a tendency
in present-daythinkingto regardcooperationbetweentheUnitedStates and the
SovietUnion as thechiefembodiment of armscontrol,to see in the fieldof rela-
tions betweenthese two powers both the principaldangers with which arms
controlhas to contendand theprincipalmeans of copingwiththem.While (as I
shall argue) Soviet-Americancooperationin arms controlservesuniversalpur-
poses it inevitablyservesspecial or bilateralpurposesalso. These special or bi-
lateralpurposesreflectthepreference of thetwo greatpowersfora worldorderin
whichtheycontinueto enjoya privilegedposition.
Secondly,thereare theobjectivesproclaimedforarmscontrol.These are taken
to be primarily concernedwithsecurity:to makewar,and especiallynuclearwar,
less likely,and to make it less catastrophicin termsof death and destruction, if
it shouldoccur.A secondaryobjectiveis takento be to reducetheeconomiccosts
of militaryprograms.A tertiaryobjectivehas sometimesbeen added: the moral
and socialone ofcombating"themilitarization ofsociety."3
No doubttheseobjectivescommanda wide degreeof supportin international
society,but the concretemeaningtheyhave acquired serves to rationalizethe
existingdistribution of power.The list of objectivesdoes not includegoals such
as thepromotionof just international and internalchange,whichin theview of
a large sectionof international societyrequiresan assault on the prevailingdis-
tributionof power,and shouldbe pursuedeven at the priceof reducedsecurity,
an increasedeconomicburden of armamentsand a greater"militarizationof
society."Thereis a tendencyto confusethenationalsecurityof theUnitedStates
and the Soviet Union with internationalsecurity,the securityof international
societyas a whole; it is the latterobjective,not the former,that should be the

2. Bull, The Controlof theArmsRace, p. xxxv.

3. Bull, The Controlof the Arms Race, p. 3-4.

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder 1 5

cardinalone in assessingarms controlpolicies.4In some respectsSoviet-Amer-

ican cooperationin arms controlpromotesthe national securityof the United
States and the SovietUnion at the expenseof the securityof otherstates: it re-
sults,for example,in understandings about spheresof influencewithinwhich
local statesare leftvulnerableto coercionby one or theotherof thegreatpowers,
in the redirection of conflictbetweenthe greatpowersto "gray areas" in which
wars are fought"by proxy,"and in attemptsto deny thirdpartiesarms which
theyregardas necessaryfortheirsecurity.Where Soviet-American cooperation
evidentlypromotesinternational securityand not merelythenationalsecurityof
the greatpowers-for example,contributing to the avoidance of global nuclear
war-it does so in ways thatleave the existingpoliticalstructureof the world
intact.
Thirdly,thereis thenotionthatthechiefproximategoal of armscontrolis to
stabilizethe relationshipof mutualnucleardeterrence betweentheUnitedStates
and theSovietUnion.This is a notionthatis basic to mostcontemporary think-
ing about armscontrol,whetherwe envisagethe stabilizationof mutualnuclear
deterrence as achievedthrough"high" Soviet and United States arms levels or
"low," as implyingacceptanceof "mutual assureddestruction"or not implying
it, as accompaniedby "parity"or by some formof "superiority"forone side, as
boundup withsomepoliticalprogramforthepromotionof "detente"or as inde-
pendentof it,as a "firststep" towardsnucleardisarmament or as a goal sufficient
in itself.Whateverthe meritsor demeritsof this goal mightbe, we should rec-
ognize thattheattemptto stabilizethe relationshipof mutualnucleardeterrence
betweenthe UnitedStates and the Soviet Union, while it is logicallyconsistent
witha varietyof patternsof powerinternational politics,confinesour attention
to measureswhichallow the two superpowersto retainarmslevels sufficient for
mutualnucleardeterrence, and excludesmeasures(such as nucleardisarmament,
or generaland completedisarmament)whichcarrythe riskof radicalchangein
thedistribution of poweras betweenthe superpowersand the rest.Moreover,in
practiceSoviet-American cooperationin thisfieldhas been accompaniedby the
attemptto legitimizeveryhigh ceilingsof strategicarms,by politicalcoopera-
tion directedagainst thirdpartiesand by enunciationof a principleof parity
whose effectis to formalizethe claims of these two statesto a special position
in thehierarchy ofmilitarypower.
Fourthly, thereis theidea thatit shouldbe a proximategoal of armscontrolto

4. Bull, The Controlof theArmsRace, p. 28-29.

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 International
Security | 6

stopor to containthegeographicalor horizontaldiffusion of militarypower.This

is an idea whose mostnotableexpressionis theattemptto combatnuclearprolif-
eration,but it may be seen also in theconcernthathas been expressedabout the
proliferation of chemicaland biologicalweapons and of conventionalarms,es-
peciallythroughthearmstrade.Whatevervaliditytheremay be in theargument
that internationalsecurityis endangeredby the spread of nuclear weapons,
chemicaland biologicalweapons and conventionalarmsamong a widercircleof
states,it is an argumentwhichservesto rationalizethe existingdistribution of
power.Whenwe decidethatit is thehorizontalspreadof nuclearweaponsrather
thantheirverticalspreadthatcalls forurgentpreventative action,thatbiological
weaponsshouldbe foregoneby therichpowersbecause theyare "the poor man's
atombomb,"or thatthereshouldbe measuresto stoppoor countriesfrombuying
conventionalarms fromrichcountries,but not measuresto stop richcountries
fromproducingthesearmsforthemselves, we are choosingarmscontrolarrange-
mentswhich leave those countrieswhich now possess preponderantmilitary
powersecurein theenjoyment oftheirposition.
Fifthly, thereis theidea thatthe UnitedStatesand the Soviet Union,so as to
minimizetheriskof generalnuclearwar,shouldobservea seriesof tacitrulesfor
the avoidance and controlof crisesarisingout of theirconflicting objectivesin
manypartsof theworld.This is theidea thatlies behindtheattemptsof thetwo
greatpowersto restrainallies and clientsthatmightembroilthemon opposite
sides in local conflicts,
to disengagefromsuch allies and clientsin cases where
theycannotbe adequatelyrestrained, to demarcatespheresof influencein which
each can intervenewithoutfearof counter-intervention by the other.Whatever
meritswe may findin thisidea, we shouldrecognizethatwhatit impliesin prac-
ticeis themaintenanceof a politicalstructure in whichthe two greatpowersco-
operateto frustrate the objectivesof others:of allied stateswhichseek to divest
themselvesof greatpowerrestraints, of clientstateswhichseek to engage great
powersupportfortheirprivategoals,of fettered stateswhichseekto breakfreeof
the spheresof influenceto whichtheyhave been assigned,and of aspirantgreat
powerswhichseekto stakeoutnewspheresofinfluence oftheirown.
In the Westerncountriesat presentthereis some dispositionto questiones-
tablishedtheoriesand policies about arms control.Thus therehas been much
discussionof therelationship betweenSALT and politicaldetente,of thefeasibil-
ity of establishingSoviet-American strategicparityby agreement,of the impli-
cationsof studiesof "bureaucraticpolitics"forthe theoryof arms races,of the
bearingon armscontrolof thecruisemissile,and of therelativemeritsof negoti-

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder 17

ationand unilateralactionas meansof advancingtheobjectivesof armscontrol.5

But therehas been littlediscussionof the question whetherthe assumptions
aboutworldorderthatare so centralto ourpresentapproachto armscontrol,and
are so decisivelyrejectedby China and the aspirantpowers of the thirdworld,
arevalid.6

An Approachto WorldOrder

If ourpresenttheoryand practiceof armscontrolproceedon theassumptionthat

worldordercan and should be foundedon the presentpoliticalstructureof the
worldand distribution of power withinit we should not leap to the conclusion
thatitis an undefendable assumption.Our presenttheoryand practicehave arisen
in responseto the perceptionof overwhelming dangersof nuclearwar between
thetwo greatpowers,and of a need to curbthesedangersas a matterof urgent
priority.Those who tell us that some different orderof prioritiesshould have
been followedmustask themselveswhetheran approachto world orderwhich
did not beginwiththe attemptto findcommongroundbetweenthe two powers
withthe capacityto destroythe worldas we know it was ever a possible or an
honorableone.
If the search for commongroundbetweenthe United States and the Soviet
Union has resultedin arrangements which confirmtheirprivilegedpositionin
thehierarchy of powerwe may also pointout thatthedangersof nuclearwar be-
tweenthemthreatennot onlythetwo greatpowersbut international societyas a
whole; thatthesearrangements have in factservedto reducethedangers,however
inadequatelyand imperfectly; and that it is not immediatelyobvious how the
UnitedStates and the Soviet Union could have drawn togetherin arms control
arrangements withoutalso involvingthemselvesin politicalcooperationagainst
thirdparties.If the internationalorderconfirmed by our presentarms control
arrangements is one in whichcertainpowersclaimspecialprivilegesand responsi-
bilitiesthe questionmay be asked whetherany internationalorderhas ever ex-
istedin whichthiswas not so; and whether,if the UnitedStates and the Soviet

5. See, forexample,"Arms,Defense Policy and Arms Control",Daedalus, 104, 3, Summer1975.

6. An exceptionis ProfessorRichardA. Falk who, while in otherrespectshe has falleninto error,
correctlyperceivesthat "Arms controlmeasures have served mainly to ratifythe bipolar domi-
nance of internationalpolitics and to maximizethe stabilityof this dominancefroma managerial
standpoint."See his "Arms Control,Global Policy and Global Reform",Daehalus, 104, 3 Summer
1975, p. 40.

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 International
Security | 8

Union were to foregotheirclaims to a special positionso as to make room for

others,thereis any reasonto supposethattheseotherswould be morewillingor
able to take on the responsibilitiesof such a privilegedpositionthan theyhave
beenin thepast.
But thevisionof worldorderthatis projectedby our presentarmscontrolar-
rangements is one againstwhichthemajorityof statesare in revolt.It is truethat
among countriessuch as China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Brazil,Argentina,Nigeria,one findsdifferent degreesof oppositionto
thesearrangements, deep mutualdivisionswithoutany agreementabout an al-
ternativeconceptionofworldorder.However,theyall see theemphasison Soviet-
Americanbilateralgoals-in arms control,in the treatmentof securityas the
commandingvalue, in the preoccupationwith stabilizationof the great power
balance,in theefforts to controlproliferation,and in the networkof tacitunder-
standingsbetweenthegreatpowers-as partofa systemofhegemonywhichthey
wish to breakdown in spite of the facttheyhave nothingin mind withwhich
to replaceit.
It is sometimesarguedthatthedissentof China and thethirdworldstatesfrom
the existinginternational orderneed not be fatal to it; thatthesestatesare too
weak and dividedamongthemselvesto provideany seriouschallenge;thatpar-
ticularrecalcitrant powersamong themcan be boughtoffwith favorsconferred
by one or anotherof thegreatpowersor theirallies-as even India's opposition
to theexistingorderhas been moderatedby its dependenceon the Soviet Union,
and China's by its sense of strategicinterestssharedwiththe UnitedStates.But
theshiftin thedistribution of powertowardthecountriesof the thirdworldhas
alreadybegun,and its impacthas alreadybeen dramatic.China is a nuclearpow-
er, India has conducteda nuclearexplosionand half a dozen more thirdworld
stateshave thepotentialto developa nuclearcapability.The oil-producingcoun-
trieshave not only broughtabout a shiftof wealthin theirfavorand a global
realignmenton the Arab-Israelidispute;more importantly, perhaps,theyhave
demonstrated by theirexamplewhat dividendsare to be reapedby overcoming
internecine disputesin theinterestsof a unitedfront,and by abandoninga posi-
tion of conciliationforone of confrontation. At the presenttime the levers of
poweravailableevento thestrongestof thirdworldcountriesare onlysuchas are
conferred by rudimentary militarypower,theprestigeofnumbers,thepossession
of raw materialswhichothersneed,and the appeal of ideology.In the long run
we mustexpectthatsome of themwill also have at theirdisposalthe leverscon-
ferredby advanced technologyand high industrialcapacity,whichwill not re-
mainpermanently themonopolyoftheso-callednorthern countries.

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder 1 9

The idea of thedisunityof thethirdworld,that"thereis no such thingas the

thirdworld,"overlooksthefactthaton certainbasic issues thisramshacklecoali-
tionofstateshas heldtogetherto a remarkable degree,and thatin thelast 30 years
(as relatingto the legitimacyof colonialistand whitesupremacistgovernments,
the legalityof "wars of national liberation,"the duty to transferwealth from
richcountriesto poor,therightto expropriateforeignassets,the law of the sea)
it has drasticallychangedtheprevailingnormsin international society.In much
of thisendeavorthethirdworldcountrieshave been powerfullysupportedby the
Soviet Union. This should remindus thatthe Soviet Union's own commitment
to the existinginternationalorderis a half-heartedand perhapsmerelytactical
one; thatthe Soviet Union,while on some issues (nuclearproliferation, the law
of thesea) it standsarrayedwiththe'North'againstthe'South',on others("wars
of nationalliberation"against colonialistand white supremacistgovernments)
itis theallyofthethirdworldagainsttheWesternpowers.
The conceptionof worldorderimplicitin our presentapproachto armscontrol
is based too narrowlyupon theelementsof consensusbetweenthe UnitedStates
and the SovietUnion and theirallies. At the same timethisconceptionof world
orderembodiestoo narrowa rangeof goals: it treatsthesecurityof thetwo great
powersas priorto thatofinternational societyas a whole,and it failsto recognize
goals ofjustinternational and internalchange.
What conceptionof worldorder,then,shouldwe put in its place? Not, I think,
one whichproclaimsthata viableworldordercan be constructed onlyifwe move
"beyondthe statessystem."Thereis no convincingevidencethatthe systemof
statesis in declineand about to give place to some different formof universal
politicalorganization;nor, I believe,should we be impressedby the argument
thatthestatessystemhas become"obsolete" in thesense of being dysfunctional
in relationto basic goals such as peace and security,eocnomicand social justice
and thecontrolof the humanenvironment. It is only in the Westernworldthat
thecryis heardthatwe shouldtranscendthestatessystem;thesocialistand third
worldcountriesclearlyseek to workwithinits framework. The problemof world
orderis not thatof how to move beyondthe statessystem,but thatof how to
makeitwork.7
Makingthestatessystemworkmustinvolvetheattemptto preserveand ulti-
matelyto extendtheelementof consensusamongstatesabout commoninterests,

7. I have spelt out this argumentin "Models ;f FutureWorld Order", India Quarterly,January-
March 1975; and morefullyin The AnarchicalSociety.A Study of Orderin World Politics,(Mac-
millan,forthcoming).

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 International
Security I 10

commonrules and commoninstitutions the consensuswhose existencein the

past has entitledus to say thatstatesformnot only an international systembut
also an internationalsociety.It is sometimesarguedthatas a consequenceof the
technologicalunification of the world,or the growthof economic"interdepend-
ence" or themultiplication of transnationalsocial ties consensusin our timeshas
been growing.Thus international lawyerstellus withsatisfactionthatit is now
widelyagreedthatrightsand dutiesin international law are enjoyednot onlyby
statesbut by individualhumanbeings,that the scope of internationallaw has
widened beyond a rudimentary "internationallaw of coexistence"to become
an "internationallaw of cooperation,"and that the sourceof internationallaw
is no longerthe consentof statesbut the consensusor generalwill of the inter-
nationalcommunityas a whole. But thereare stronggroundsforthinkingthat
at the global or universallevel consensusabout the basic framework of orderly
internationalcoexistencehas not been growingbut shrinking-as the conse-
quenceof ideologicaldivisions,therevoltof subjectpeoplesand thegeographical
expansionof the statessystembeyondits originallyEuropeanconfines.Making
thestatessystemworkis a matterof preservingand nurturing what remainsof a
rudimentary consensusabout "minimumorder,"not of advancingtowardssome
"optimumorder" about which,at the global level, no consensusexistsor is in
prospect.
The consensuswhichhas to be nurturedis not one simplybetweentheUnited
States and the Soviet Union, or these two plus China, or a wider consortthat
would includeJapanand WesternEuropeif and whentheydemonstrate thatthey
are greatpowers.No consensusis likelyto be adequatefora viable statessystem
thatdoes notembracethecountrieswhichnow formthethirdworld.These coun-
triesrepresent a majorityof statesand of theworld'spopulationand are too large
and potentiallypowerfula segmentof internationalsocietyto be assigned the
statusmerelyof an objector seriesof objectsof its governingrules.
It followsfromthisthatour conceptionof worldordershouldnotbe shapedby
prescriptions fora more centralizedsystem,expressedin an expandingUnited
Nations or upon "non-territorial centralizeddirection."8The thirdworld coun-
tries are opposed to centralizingtendenciesin world politics,perceivingcor-
rectlythatif morepowerfulcentralizedinstitutions were to be establishednow,
they would probablybe controlled by thepresentgreatpowersand would reflect
theirspecialinterests.It is morelikelythatworldorderwill continueto restupon

8. A mystifying
phraseof ProfessorFalk's.

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder I 11

a decentralized system,and thatif a greaterrole is to be playedby international

institutions thesewill be regionalratherthan global ones. The questionof the
establishmentof more powerfulinstitutionsat the global level remains,as it
were,on theagenda of worldpolitics:butit is notlikelyto be discussedseriously
by the thirdworld or indeed by the socialiststatesuntil therehas firstbeen a
shiftofpowerin theirfavor.
Whatevernotionswe entertainabouta desirableand feasibleworldorder,they
have to take account the thirdworld's alienationfromthe arrangementsfor
world orderthatexist now. This alienationis rootednot merelyin grievances
about colonialismor racismor the distributionof wealth,consumergoods or
technology:it is rootedalso in thethirdworld'slack of power,includingmilitary
power-its senseof impotenceand vulnerability in relationto theWesterncoun-
triesand theSovietUnion.It maybe one of theconditionsof a moreviable world
orderthat the shiftof power towardsthe thirdworld, whose beginningswe
notedabove,shouldfirstbe expanded.
It is truethat the thirdworld countriesat presentare preoccupiednot with
orderbut with change; that as theybecome more powerfulthey are likely to
createdisorderin thecourseofbringingthischangeabout; and thepresentframe-
workof worldorder,reflecting as it does thepreferred values of theWest and of
theSovietUnion,will notbe strengthened butis boundto be weakenedby a shift
in the distribution of militarypower towardsthe thirdworld countries.But the
objectionof thethirdworldcountriesis not to thequalityof orderin thepresent
international arrangements; it is ratherto theway in whichthesearrangements
discriminate againstthem.Once thechangestheyare seekinghave been effected,
and new arrangements have replacedthe old ones, it is possible that theywill
cometo sensea stakein them.
The taskofcarryingout thisredistribution ofpowermustfallto thethirdworld
countriesthemselves:it is too much to expectthat the greatpowers and their
allies will be willingto carryout this task forthem,or even thattheycould if
theywished to do so. It is for the thirdworld countriesto mobilizetheirre-
sources,to combinewithone anotherand to challengetheelementsof discrimina-
tionin thepresentsystem.But theWesternpowersand the Soviet Union should
recognizethatsuch a challengeis naturaland inevitable.They should also rec-
ognize thatwhile some of the presentperceivedinterestswill be injuredin the
process,theythemselveshave a stakein theemergenceof a worldorderof which
themajorityofstatesand oftheworld'spopulationfeelthemselves tobe a part.
There are difficultiesand risksin this approach.It is truethat as the major
countriesof thethirdworldacquiremoremilitarypowertheyare likelyto seek to

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 International
Security 1 12

exploitit in relationto one anotherand notmerelyin relationto thepresentgreat

powers.It is truethatthereis no agreementamong the thirdworld statesas to
whichof themare to be the beneficiaries of the processof redistribution.
It is
truethatworldorderrequiresthatwe attemptto limitand containmilitarypower;
thecreationof new centersof militarypoweris boundto makethatattemptmore
difficult.

ConsequencesforArmsControl

I shouldnot arguethatour approachto armscontrolshouldbe determined in de-

tailby someprecisevisionof a desirableor feasibleworldorder.To do thiswould
be to treatvisionsof worldordermoreseriouslythantheydeserve;we cannotbe
sureenoughabout the desirabilityor feasibilityof any one of themto regardit
as thelegislatorof policyhereand now. It does appear to me, however,thatwe
shouldtryto severtheclose connectionwhichnow existsbetweenthetheoryand
practiceof arms controland attemptsto preservethe existingdistributionof
power.Not only does thisconnectionmake armscontrolan obstacleto changes
whichmay be necessaryif a moreviable worldorderis to be evolved,but it also
servesto discreditarmscontrol,and to obscurethe role whichit has to play in
promotingthepurposesof thoseseekingto challengethe presentdistribution of
power.
First,we shouldmaintainthatthecooperationinvolvedin armscontrolshould
promoteuniversalpurposesand not merelybilateralones. Cooperationthatpro-
motesspecialor bilateralpurposesmay countas armscontrol,but we shouldbe
clearthattheproperpurposeof armscontrolis to advanceobjectivesendorsedby
international societyas a whole. In the case of UnitedStates-Sovietcooperation
we should distinguishbetweenthe purposeof avoiding nuclearwar, which is
generallyendorsed,and the purposeof preservingUnitedStates and Soviet as-
cendancy,whichis not. The measuresthatlead to the one are not always easily
distinguishable fromthosethatlead to the other,and it would be naive to sup-
pose thatthe two greatpowerscould pursuethe formerwhilewhollyabstaining
fromthelatter.But at least we can distinguishthesepurposesin our minds,and
considerhow far in practicethe politicalstructureof Americanand Soviet as-
cendancyis essentialto thepoliticalstructureofpeace.
Secondly,while recognizingthatsecurityagainstwar, and especiallynuclear
war,is theprimegoal of armscontrol,we shoulddistinguish betweenthenational
securityof the UnitedStatesand the Soviet Union, and the securityof interna-
tionalsocietyas a whole; and we shouldinsistthatit is thelatterthatis theover-

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder | 13

ridingtest.It is clearthatthenationalsecurityof the two greatpowersis served

by arrangements, like thetacitunderstanding aboutspheresof influence,thathas
leftEasternEuropeand CentralAmericavulnerableto greatpowerintervention;
by theexportof conflictsto SoutheastAsia or the PersianGulfor Africa;or by
theiroppositionto nuclearproliferation in China and India and elsewhere.But
it is also clearthatthesearrangements do notpromotethenationalsecurityof the
othercountriesconcerned.Whetherthesecurityofinternational societyas a whole
is morehelpedthanhinderedby thesearrangements is a mootpoint.But even if
we wereto concludethatit is morehelpedthanhinderedby themwe shouldstill
need to distinguishbetweenthe securityof international societyas a whole and
thatof its two most powerfulmembers,and we should still need to insistthat
theremay be otheravenues to the formerbesides thosethathave been ordained
bytheUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion.
At the same timewe should take accountof the factthatthe goal of security
comes into conflictwith that of the promotionof internationaland internal
changeverywidelyregardedas just. I do not mean that arms controlarrange-
mentsshouldbe designedso as to promoteblackliberationin southernAfrica,or
revolutionin Chile or the establishmentof a state of Palestine.It is betterto
recognizethatarmscontrolis concernedchieflywithonlyone dimensionof world
order,viz. peace and security,and more particularlywith its militaryaspects,
than to saddle it with responsibility for every dimension.But we need to be
aware, in pursuingarms control,of the existenceof otherdimensionsof world
order,and particularly of the role of militaryforcein effectingchangesthatex-
pressemerging principlesofinternational legitimacy.
Thirdly,we should note the extentto whichthe processof negotiationabout
the great power strategicbalance promotesobjectivesthat are bilateralrather
thanuniversal.In the shortrunthe attemptto stabilizethe Soviet-American re-
lationshipof mutualnucleardeterrenceis necessaryforthe securityof interna-
tional societyas a whole. That this relationshipis more or less stable,and that
the two greatpowersare formallycommittedto a process'ofnegotiationaimed
at makingit morestable at lower levels of strategicarms,is the chiefconcrete
achievementof arms controland the chiefbasis forwhateverclaim the United
Statesand theSovietUnioncan maketobeingtrusteesformankind.
But even if therewere signsthatthestrategicarmslimitationtalkswere lead-
ing in the directionof a more stable relationshipof mutual nucleardeterrence
and of lower levels of strategicarm*this goal would be an insufficient one in
relationto the widerconsiderationsof world ordersketchedout above: it does
nottakeaccountof thedemandfora widerdistribution ofmilitarynuclearpower.

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 International
Security | 14

In factofcourse,withthepossibleexceptionof the1972 ABM Treatythestrategic

armslimitationtalkshave not increasedthestabilityof thestrategicrelationship,
nor can it verywell be arguedthattheyhave reducedthelevel of strategicarms.
What theyhave done is to ratifya principleof parityor equalitywhich,however
necessaryit may be as a benchmarkin discussion,does not expressany known
goal of armscontrol;to contribute to a widerprocessof politicalcooperationbe-
tweenthegreatpowers,now underthreat;and to providea meansof rationalizing
the retentionof the presenthigh levels of armamentsby pointingto ongoing
negotiationsaimed at theirreduction.Whatevermay be said forthese achieve-
mentstheydo not offermuch to those who threatenhorizontalproliferation in
returnforvertical.
Fourthly,in our attitudetowardsthe controlof the horizontaldiffusionof
militarypower we should seek to distinguishbetween the universal and the
special interestswhichit serves,and to take accountof its bearingon the wider
issue of worldorder.What is at stakein theattemptto controlhorizontalnuclear
proliferationis a universalinterestin the securityof internationalsocietyas a
whole,whichis likelyto be jeopardizedas the numberof nuclearweapon states
increases,and even more than jeopardizedif proliferation proceedsbeyond the
sovereignstateand nuclearweaponsbecometheinstrument of non-stategroups.9
This proposition,indeed,is not denied even by those stateswhich,like China,
Franceand India, are opposed to theNon-Proliferation Treaty:even if,as in the
case of China,theirstatementssometimesimplythatthe nuclearclub shouldbe
expandedto includenot only themselvesbut othersas well, theydo not seek to
make out a case in favor of general or universalproliferation. The argument
betweenthesupportersand theopponentsof theNon-Proliferation Treatyis not
about whetheror not nuclearproliferation endangersinternationalsecurity,but
about whereto draw theline. Nor is our propositionin any way underminedby
the factthattherehas been some proliferation or the likelihoodthat therewill
be somemore.
But we must recognizethat the controlof horizontalproliferation cannotbe
separatedfromthe controlof vertical.If among the potentialnuclear-weapon
statesthe idea is to be combatedthatnuclearweapons are effective instruments
ofpolicyand sourcesofprestigethiscan onlybe theconsequenceof a demonstra-
tionby the actual nuclear-weaponstatesthattheythemselvesare ceasing to re-

9. This propositionis not self-evident,

but I have argued it in The Controlof the Arms Race, op.
cit.; and in "RethinkingNon-Proliferation", InternationalAffairs,Vol. 51, No. 2, April 1975, pp.
175-189.

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 ArmsControland WorldOrder | 15

gard nuclearweapons in thisway. So long as theyretaintheirnuclearweapons

and go on developingthemthenno matterwhatstatements theyput out theywill
notbe able to make sucha demonstration. The nuclear-weaponstateshave, how-
ever,had some successin thesense thatif theyhad not practicedthemeasureof
restraint theyhave in factobserved(if,forexample,theyhad actuallyused nuclear
weapons, or explicitlythreatenedtheiruse habituallyinstead of occasionally)
horizontalproliferation is likelyto haveproceededat a fasterrate.
We should also recognizethatthe attemptto draw the line betweennuclear-
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon statesat the pointat whichit lies now, in the
absenceof any convincingdemonstration thatnuclearweapons are of diminish-
ing politicaland strategicutility,must confirmthe privilegedposition of the
presentnuclear-weaponstates,and thatthisfliesin thefaceof theneed'on wider
groundsfora moreevendistribution ofpower.
It is truethatonce we admitthelegitimacyof thedemandfora more"just" or
"even" distribution of militarynuclearpowerwe are on dangerousground.We
do not escape fromthe chargethatwe are upholdingthe special privilegesof a
particulargroupof statesmerelyby substituting anotherline of divisionforthe
presentone; a nuclearclub of 10 or 20 or 50 stateswill be no less vulnerableto
thechargethatit is discriminatory thanis thepresentnuclearclub of fiveor six.
Perfectjusticein thissense can be achievedonlyby generalnucleardisarmament
or by universalnuclearproliferation; and to spell thisout is to providea reductio
ad absurdumof theidea thatjusticein relationto thepossessionof nuclearwea-
pons is identicalwithequalityin thedistribution of themto all states,neglecting
qualitativedifferences amongstates.
But whateverthe requirements of "justice,"therequirements of a worldorder
shouldlead us to doubtwhetherthepresentline of divisionis a viable one. World
orderwould best be servedby effortsto promote-immediatelythroughsteps
suchas a reductionin greatpowerstrategicarms,theadoptionof no firstuse posi-
tions by the nuclearpowers and theiracceptanceof a comprehensivenuclear
test ban-the idea of the diminishingpoliticaland strategicutilityof nuclear
weapons. But while such effortsare not made, the presentline of divisionnot
onlywill but shouldbe challengedin the interestsof reducingthe presentdom-
inanceoftheadvancedindustrialstates.
In the case of conventionalarmsthe processof diffusion, at least of the more
sophisticatedkindsof arms (tanks,destroyers, fighteraircraft,electronicequip-
ment)is theconsequenceof supplyby theadvancedcountries-not,as in thecase
of nuclearweapons,of the developmentof indigenouscapacities.The policy of
theadvancedcountriesis, of course,to supplysophisticatedconventionalarmsto

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 International
Security | 16

non-producingcountrieseitherso as to createrelationshipsof dependencethat

can be manipulatedforpoliticalpurposes,or forthe sake of economicgain. It is,
however,oftenargued,at leastin theWesterncountries,thatit wouldbe desirable
to restrictthe supplyof thesearms to non-producing countriesif thesecounter-
vailing considerationscould be overcome,and if generalagreementamong the
supplyingcountriescouldbe reached.
Here, broadlysimilarconsiderationsapply as those we noted in the case of
the diffusionof nuclearweapons. The horizontaldiffusionof conventionalarms
is, no doubt,injuriousto international security.But the interestof the recipient
countriesin acquiringthese arms for national defense,as symbolsof national
identity,to appease the demandsof theirarmedforcesor forotherreasons,will
scarcelyabate while the donorcountriesremainfreeto develop theirown arms
withoutrestriction. For so long as thereexist gross disparitiesbetweenthe ad-
vancedindustrialcountriesand the restof international societyin termsof their
capacityto producesophisticatedconventionalarmsit does not seem likelythat
attemptsto restrictthe internationaltrade in arms, while not restrictingthe
rightof countriesto producearms,will provefeasible.Nor, in termsof thepres-
entargumentswould such attemptsadvance theprospectsof worldorder,even if
theywerefeasible.
Fifthly,we need to distinguishthe universalfromthe merelyspecial interests
that are servedby the tacitrules evolved by the United States and the Soviet
Unionfortheavoidanceand controlof crises.Thereis no doubtthattheuniversal
interestin avertinga Soviet-American nuclearwar has been servedby theevolu-
tionof thissystemof tacitrules,whateverthecost in termsof the suppressionof
otherstatesand peoples. The maintenanceof orderin internationalsocietyhas
always requiredthatthesecurityof thewhole of international societybe treated
priorto thesecurityof its parts,themaintenanceof thegeneralbalance of power
priorto themaintenanceoflocal balances,theavoidanceof war betweenthegreat
powerspriorto theavoidanceof otherkindsof wars. For so long as international
societycontinuesto containa hierarchyof militarypower, the presentone or
some other,it does not seemlikelythatordercan be preservedwithoutrulesthat
reflectthesepriorities.
But we shouldbewareof assumingthatwheneveran ally of one of the great
powersseeks to breakfreeof restraints, whenevera clientgovernmentseeks to
dissuadeits greatpowerpatronfromdesertingit, or whenevera countrywithin
the sphere'of influenceof a great power seeks to change its internalpolitical
characteror to alterthedirectionof its foreignpolicy,it is thepeace of theworld
thatis at stakeratherthanmerelythe politicalconvenienceof the UnitedStates
or theSovietUnion.

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