ACCESS TO COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence
BODIES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL
TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN
NAVARRO, SR., respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it
is to be poor.
–– James Baldwin
The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the
courts; moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person
from having access to the courts.1 Accordingly, laws and rules must be
formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this
constitutional provision. As such, filing fees, though one of the essential
elements in court procedures, should not be an obstacle to poor litigants'
opportunity to seek redress for their grievances before the courts.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the September 11,
2001 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil
Case No. 99-4403 entitled Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura
v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al., dismissing the case for
failure of petitioners Algura spouses to pay the required filing fees.2 Since the
instant petition involves only a question of law based on facts established from
the pleadings and documents submitted by the parties,3 the Court gives due
course to the instant petition sanctioned under Section 2(c) of Rule 41 on Appeal
from the RTCs, and governed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Facts
On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura
filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 19994 for damages against the
Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition
of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived
from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent
Litigants,5 to which petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip No. 2457360 (Annex
"A" of motion) was appended, showing a gross monthly income of Ten
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a net pay of
Three Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP
3,616.99) for [the month of] July 1999.6 Also attached as Annex "B" to the
motion was a July 14, 1999 Certification7 issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared
in their name for taxation purposes.
Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious,
Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1,
1999 Order,8 granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.
Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Government's demolition of a
portion of petitioners' house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP
7,000.00 from their boarders' rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager
income from Lorencita Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio Algura's small take
home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their
six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling,
among others.
On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated
October 10, 1999,9 arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint
had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of
way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.
Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed,
petitioners then filed their Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting10
before the Naga City RTC on October 19, 1999. On February 3, 2000, a pre-
trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days within which to file a
Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants.
On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for
Non-Payment of Filing Fees dated March 10, 2000.11 They asserted that in
addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura,
Page 1 of 34
who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also
along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that
petitioners' second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house,
from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was
claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop
patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them.
Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.
On March 28, 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the
Motion12 to respondents' motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing
fees.
On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners
as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for
exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of
Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the
requisite filing fees.13
On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14,
2000 Order. On May 8, 2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections
to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order14 giving petitioners the
opportunity to comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for
them to qualify as indigent litigants.
On May 13, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance15 attaching the
affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura16 and Erlinda Bangate,17 to comply with
the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in
support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants.
In her May 13, 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the
demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting
to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their six (6) minor children had to rely
mainly on her husband's salary as a policeman which provided them a monthly
amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property
as certified by the assessor's office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the
meager net income from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some
boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to pay the family's
basic necessities.
To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also
submitted the affidavit of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she
personally knew spouses Antonio Algura and Lorencita Algura, who were her
neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their boarders; that they
lost said income from their boarders' rentals when the Local Government Unit
of the City of Naga, through its officers, demolished part of their house because
from that time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income
from the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura
were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and clothing, considering
that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that petitioners
did not own any real property.
Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr.
issued his July 17, 200018 Order denying the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that
the "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura [was]
₧10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above the amount mentioned in the
first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside
Metro Manila."19 Said rule provides that the gross income of the litigant should
not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate with an
assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial court found that, in Lorencita S.J.
Algura's May 13, 2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and her
immediate family did not earn a gross income of PhP 3,000.00.
The Issue
Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras instituted the instant petition raising
a solitary issue for the consideration of the Court: whether petitioners should be
considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper
litigant) is necessary before the Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses'
claim to exemption from paying filing fees.
When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper
litigants was found in Rule 3, Section 22 which provided that:
Section 22. Pauper litigant.—Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his
action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to
that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or
municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority[,] once given[,] shall include
an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed
record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered
in the case [favorable] to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.
From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did
not contain any provision on pauper litigants.
On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly
G.R. No. 64274), approved the recommendation of the Committee on the
Revision of Rates and Charges of Court Fees, through its Chairman, then
Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise the fees in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to
generate funds to effectively cover administrative costs for services rendered by
the courts.20 A provision on pauper litigants was inserted which reads:
Section 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.—Pauper-
litigants include wage earners whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a
month or P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila, and P1,500.00
a month or P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila, or those
who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than
P24,000.00, or not more than P18,000.00 as the case may be.
Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal
bond, printed record and printed brief.
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in
favor of the pauper-litigant.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute
an affidavit that he does not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own
any real property with the assessed value afore-mentioned [sic], supported by
a certification to that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer.
When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure (inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in
Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, which became effective on July 1, 1997,
Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was superseded by Rule 3,
Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
Section 21. Indigent party.—A party may be authorized to litigate his action,
claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and
hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other
lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order
to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the
indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in
the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after
hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed
and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed
by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.
At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar
Matter No. 803, however, there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section
16 on pauper litigants.
On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M.
No. 00-2-01-SC, whereby certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this
Resolution, the Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141, making it Section 18,
which now reads:
Section 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.—Pauper
litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not
exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila,
and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila,
and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value of more than fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to
the pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income
abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the assessed value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to
the truth of the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred.
It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141
without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the
exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing fees. Thus, on March 1,
2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section
21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in
Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on the same
date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:
Page 2 of 34
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– INDIGENT
LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE
FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM
WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY
WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL
FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to
the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that
party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18)
were made to implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing
fees. Specifically, in the August 16, 2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross
income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their immediate family was
increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a
month outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee; and the maximum value of the property owned by the applicant was
increased from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a maximum market
value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants and
promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake
of these new increases in filing fees.
Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was
still no amendment or recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.
With this historical backdrop, let us now move on to the sole issue—whether
petitioners are exempt from the payment of filing fees.
It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on
September 1, 1999. However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July
17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when
the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which
took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which
became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to
litigate as a pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a
gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for those
residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for
those residing outside Metro Manila or those who do not own real property with
an assessed value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP
18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two requirements: a) income
requirement—the applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more
than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they should not own property
with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio
F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00,21 and a
Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have
property declared in their names for taxation.22 Undoubtedly, petitioners do not
own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and
so the property requirement is met. However with respect to the income
requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura
when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold
prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement
was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners
Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should have applied Rule 141,
Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on
September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141,
Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could not have
been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond
the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income threshold.
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of
the April 14, 2000 Order disqualifying them as indigent litigants23 that the rules
have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court
is satisfied that the party is "one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." The
trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied
Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their
application to litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether
a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on
such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and
discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16
on Legal Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended
as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule
141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid
and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.
For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it
was not the intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which
took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by Rule
141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-
0. If that is the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the
Committee on the Revision on Rules, could have already deleted Section 22
from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to 71 and approved the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. The fact that Section 22 which
became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in the rules of
procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also
strengthened by the addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the
grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to
consider said rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March
1, 2000 and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two
amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This
clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent
litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.
It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been impliedly repealed by the
recent 2000 and 2004 amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is
bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the intent of the framers
of the rules is unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that:
(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is
but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not intended to
interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act
fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the
earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used
to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.24 (Emphasis
supplied).
Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly
amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that
the two rules can and should be harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19
because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two
provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, "every statute
[or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence."25
In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enunciated that in the
interpretation of seemingly conflicting laws, efforts must be made to first
harmonize them. This Court thus ruled:
Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will
harmonize it with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim
'interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi,' that is, to
interpret and to do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best
method of interpretation.26
In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand
together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as
an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies
with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of
Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross income and that of the applicant's
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage
of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market
value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the
trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements,
the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant
is a matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been
met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the
applicant has "no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family." In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented
by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending
on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that
the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the
court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful
fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of
Page 3 of 34
prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while
Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the
exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial
court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting
exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards
under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of
the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant
claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of
the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that
petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and
ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras
as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by
Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that
they didn't have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter,
and basic necessities for them and their family.27 In that hearing, the
respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the
allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate
as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand
the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as
indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for
exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when
the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application
should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency
test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the
merits of the prayer for exemption.
Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms
(APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed
prime importance on 'easy access to justice by the poor' as one of its six major
components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only
safeguard but also enhance the rights of individuals—which are considered
sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most precious
rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the
justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting
the disqualification of petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration, and the September 11, 2001 Order dismissing the
case in Civil Case No. RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC, Branch 27 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered to set
the "Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing and apply Rule
3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether
petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 11-10-03-O July 30, 2013
RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY
PERSIDA RUEDA-COSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE
PAYMENT OF SHERIFF'S EXPENSES
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter1 of Attorney Persida V.
Rueda-Acosta (Atty. Acosta), Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter,
Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO's clients from the
payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in its Regional Office
in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses in the
amount of ₱1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed that
sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 94062 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and
other quasi-judicial bodies.
In its letter3 dated March 23, 2011 to Atty. Acosta, the OCA clarified that PAO’s
clients, notwithstanding their exemption under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 from
payment of "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court,"
are not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained
that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered as "legal fees"
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they are not payable to the
government; they are payable to the sheriff/process server to defray his travel
expenses in serving court processes in relation to the litigant’s case.
In her letter4 dated April 18, 2011 to the OCA, Atty. Acosta maintained that,
while sheriff’s expenses may not be strictly considered as a legal fee, they are
nevertheless considered as a fee which is incidental to the filing of an action in
court and, hence, should not be exacted from PAO’s clients. She pointed out
that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on PAO’s clients would render the
latter’s exemption from payment of docket and other fees under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9406 nugatory. Considering that the matter involves an interpretation
of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested that the same be referred to the Court
en banc for resolution.
In its report and recommendation5 dated September 14, 2011, the OCA
maintained its position that PAO’s clients are not exempted from the payment
of sheriff’s expenses; it stressed that the ₱1,000.00 sheriff’s expenses are not
the same as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
and, hence, not covered by the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under R.A.
No. 9406. The OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAO’s clients
from the payment of sheriff’s expenses amounts to disbursement of public funds
for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that
Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of sheriff’s
expenses be denied.
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc issued
Resolution6 dated November 22, 2011 which denied Atty. Acosta’s request for
exemption from the payment of sheriff’s expenses.
On January 2, 2012, Atty. Acosta sought a reconsideration7 of the Court’s
Resolution dated November 22, 2011, which the Court en banc referred to the
OCA for appropriate action. In its report and recommendation8 dated March 22,
2012, the OCA averred that the exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of
legal fees is not an absolute rule and that the Court is not precluded from
providing limitations thereto. Thus, the OCA recommended the denial of Atty.
Acosta’s motion for reconsideration.
On April 24, 2012, the Court en banc issued a Resolution9 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Acosta.
Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration10 and a Second Motion for Reconsideration11 of the Court’s
Resolution dated April 24, 2012, alleging that the imposition of sheriff’s
expenses on PAO’s clients is contrary to the language, intent and spirit of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 since sheriff’s expenses are considered as fees
"incidental to instituting an action in court." Further, she claimed that the said
imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to
the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
After a conscientious review of the contrasting legal disquisitions set forth in this
case, the Court still finds the instant petition devoid of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that this is already the third attempt of Atty.
Acosta to obtain from this Court a declaration exempting PAO’s clients from the
payment of sheriff’s fees – the initial request therefor and the subsequent motion
for reconsideration having been denied by this Court.
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.12 This
rule, however, is not cast in stone. A second motion for reconsideration may be
allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon
express leave of court first obtained.13
Ordinarily, the Court would have dismissed outright Atty. Acosta’s second
motion for reconsideration. However, for reasons to be discussed at length later,
there is a need to give due course to the instant petition in order to reassess
and clarify the Court’s pronouncement in our Resolutions dated November 22,
2011 and April 24, 2012.
In any case, it bears stressing that what is involved in this case is the Court’s
administrative power to determine its policy vis-à-vis the exaction of legal fees
from the litigants. The Court’s policy determination respecting administrative
matters must not be unnecessarily bound by procedural considerations. Surely,
a rule of procedure may not debilitate the Court and render inutile its power of
administration and supervision over court procedures.
At the core of this case is the proper interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
which, in part, reads:
Sec. 6. New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, to read as follows:
xxxx
Sec. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit – The clients of PAO
shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting
an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or
on appeal.
The costs of the suit, attorney’s fees and contingent fees imposed upon the
adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in
Page 4 of 34
the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special
allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. (Emphasis ours)
The OCA maintains that sheriff’s expenses are not covered by the exemption
granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No. 9406 since the same are not considered
as a legal fee under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the OCA
asserts that the exemption provided for under R.A. No. 9406 only covers the
legal fees enumerated under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
The court agrees.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers–who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers–to use statutory phraseology in such
a manner is always presumed.14
That Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of
"docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-
judicial bodies" is beyond cavil. However, contrary to Atty. Acosta’s claim, a
plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption granted to
PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s expenses; the
exemption is specifically limited to the payment of fees, i.e., docket and other
fees incidental to instituting an action.
The term "fees" is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain
privileges or services.15 Viewed from this context, the phrase "docket and other
fees incidental to instituting an action" refers to the totality of the legal fees
imposed under Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing
or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation
fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees.17 These are
the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection
with the action instituted before it.
Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a "fee" within the purview
of the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406.
Sheriff’s expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons serving processes.–
xxxx
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the amount of ONE THOUSAND
(₱1,000.00) PESOS shall be deposited with the Clerk of Court upon filing of the
complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or
other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other
court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. In case the
initial deposit of ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) PESOS is not sufficient, then
the plaintiff or petitioner shall be required to make an additional deposit. The
sheriff, process server or other court authorized person shall submit to the court
for its approval a statement of the estimated travel expenses for service of
summons and court processes. Once approved, the Clerk of Court shall release
the money to said sheriff or process server. After service, a statement of
liquidation shall be submitted to the court for approval. After rendition of
judgment by the court, any excess from the deposit shall be returned to the party
who made the deposit. x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they
are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to
defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the same
as sheriff’s fees under Section 10,18 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which
refers to those imposed by the court for services rendered to a party incident to
the proceedings before it.
Thus, in In Re: Exemption of Cooperatives from Payment of Court and Sheriff’s
Fees Payable to the Government in Actions Brought Under R.A. 6938,19 the
Court clarified that sheriff’s expenses are not considered as legal fees,
ratiocinating that:
The difference in the treatment between the sheriff’s fees and the sheriff’s
expenses in relation with the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives is further
demonstrated by the wording of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses "fees" in
delineating the enumeration in the first paragraph, and "expenses" in qualifying
the subsequent paragraphs of this provision. The intention to make a distinction
between the two charges is clear; otherwise, the Rules would not have used
different designations. Likewise, the difference between the two terms is
highlighted by a consideration of the phraseology in the first sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses the clause "in addition
to the fees hereinabove fixed," thereby unequivocally indicating that sheriff’s
expenses are separate charges on top of the sheriff’s fees. (Italics supplied)
The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In
exempting PAO’s clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406
intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have
the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason
of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite
their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would effectly
fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.

Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the
fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus,
Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty." The Constitution affords litigants—
moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides
that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts.
Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented
pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision.20
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our
society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law.21
Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and
secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the
underprivileged and the marginalized.22
Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the constitutional
mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance to
the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and
employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes
pursuant to Section 3,23 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given
herein by the Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only
to cases involving their client.1âwphi1
Authorizing the officials and employees of P AO to serve the summons,
subpoenas and other court processes in behalf of their clients would relieve the
latter from the burden of paying for the sheriff's expenses despite their non-
exemption from the payment thereof under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The
amount to be defrayed in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
processes in behalf of its clients would consequently have to be taken from the
operating expenses of P AO. In turn, the amount advanced by PAO as actual
travel expenses may be taken from the amount recovered from the adversaries
of PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the
deposit thereof in the National Treasury.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Second
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta is DENIED.
The Court's Resolutions dated November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The request of Atty. Persida V. RuedaAcosta for the
exemption of the clients of the Public Attorney's Office from the payment of
sheriff's expenses is DENIED.
Nevertheless, the officials and employees of the Public Attorney's Office are
hereby AUTHORIZED to serve summons, subpoenas and other court
processes in behalf of their clients pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, in coordination with the concerned court. The amount to be defrayed
in serving the summons, subpoenas and other court processes could
be taken from the operating expenses of the Public Attorney's Office which, in
turn, may be taken from the amount recovered by it from the adversaries of
PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the
deposit thereof in the National Treasury, or damages that said clients may be
decreed as entitled to in case of the success of P AO' s indigent clients.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated
October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated
August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503,
an entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974,
Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department
of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security
Page 5 of 34
Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the
Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently,
no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that
petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and
two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the
petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office
as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges
embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint
of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-
finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of
the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with
the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min.
TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the
other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019,"
and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982
and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan
for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution,
dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon,
recommending that the following informations be filed against petitioner before
the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest partiality
and evident bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad
with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information,
did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for
Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of
P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had
to intervene under the law in the release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of
Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and
file with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his
assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year (1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and
unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the
transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia
Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose
organization and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the
Department of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research,
projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds
advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof
by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of
Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and
file with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets
and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts
of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year (1976), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of
Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and
file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his
assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion
to quash the informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law
and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting
to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and
10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an
offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
Page 6 of 34
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's
consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only
two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have
already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 —
For failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not
constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court
of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or
denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the
above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980
and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974
and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court
only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same,
it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed.
Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution,
unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required
pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the
former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of
P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "...
regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government
employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence,
the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct from each other.
Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render
said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law
which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a
period of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary
investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's
"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of
merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one
which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to
amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of the
offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of
August 8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case
No. 10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to September
30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence,
petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion
to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition,
resolved to require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a
temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further
orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said resolution, the
respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their
comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that
had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
insofar far as the Public respondents were concerned, which requires the
successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action or position
taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan
manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have no
political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases
against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any
event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under
the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the
Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27,
1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed
a motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21,
1986, praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations
be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken
thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the
aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing
insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition
is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:

1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with
the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due
process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of
amnesty raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-
existence of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies
the quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional
mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly
prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the
corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged
commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction
and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed
petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him
to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to
grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding;
that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance
thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged
procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or
administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or
abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's
claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could
be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of
the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not
appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate
upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a
painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former
high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion
that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the
resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from
termination of the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view
of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in
concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court
prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of
its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its
discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the
dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply
with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented
during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully
threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have
the Court grant such a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which
precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in
support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the
cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich
like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings
and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense
of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of
law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying
that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are
largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what
he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command
(PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act
No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The
"report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when
it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12,
1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed
with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two
months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by
referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was
Page 7 of 34
approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding
criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing
from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and
report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious,
but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution
was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office
is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only
by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of
the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation
can not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a provision
that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay
may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such
a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery
and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period
of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but
the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In
view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised
by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant
the same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501,
10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad"
are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22,
1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-
Aquino, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 107211 June 28, 1996
FRANCISCO GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former Special Seventh Division),
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALABON, BRANCH 72, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
"Does the constitutional right to a speedy trial include the right to a prompt
disposition and judgment?" This is the question posed before this Court in the
instant petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to set aside (a) the Decision 1
of the Court of Appeals 2 promulgated on February 18, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
23737; and (b) the Resolution promulgated on September 10, 1992 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
By a resolution dated November 13, 1935, the First Division of this Court
transferred this case, along with several others, to the Third. After careful
deliberation and consultation on the petition, comment, reply, memoranda and
other submissions of the parties, this Court assigned the writing of this Decision
to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The antecedents are not disputed. As summarized by the Solicitor General in
his memorandum, they are as follows: 3
On November 16, 1971, an Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against petitioner before the Court of First Instance,
Branch XXXV, Caloocan City, presided by Judge Manuel A. Argel, and docketed
as Criminal Case No. C-2073. which reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May, 1969, in the Municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, type
Camanche PA-24-250 with registration marking PI-C515, then in-charge of, and
has complete responsibility for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft,
without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries
to persons, and without ascertaining as to whether the quantity of fuel in the
tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the flight from Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija to
MIA, Parañaque, Rizal, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from the
airport at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on board, and while the
said aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the engine quitted twice
indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an
emergency manner landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless,
negligent and imprudent manner in the Piper Camanche Owner's handbook,
and as a result of the improper execution of said emergency landing, the
aircraft's landing gear collided with a dike and trees near the fishpond in
Malabon, Rizal, resulting to the fatal injuries in three (3) passengers, namely,
Cpl. Teodoro Neric, Jose Mari Garcia and Lourdes Garcia which directly caused
their deaths.
Contrary to law.
Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was
finally able to start presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after
petitioner entered his plea of "Not Guilty".
On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally rested its case.
On February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case.
On March 16, 1978, the hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered
by Judge Argel to submit their respective memoranda.
On January 19, 1979, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over as
presiding judge vice Judge Argel, granted private prosecutor's omnibus motion
to file memorandum up to January 29, 1979.
On December 21, 1979, petitioner filed his memorandum.
It would appear that from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch XXXV, the case
was subsequently assigned to Branch CXXV presided over by Judge Alfredo
Gorgonio who apparently did not take action thereon.
On January 30, 1989, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the reraffling
of the case from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV to the RTC of
Navotas-Malabon which, under the provisions of B.P. 129, had jurisdiction over
the case.
The case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 7356-MN, was raffled to
presiding Judge Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas-Malabon, Branch 72.
Page 8 of 34
On March 14, 1990, Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete
the transcript of stenographic notes within 30 days considering that the same
was found to be incomplete.
On April 20, 1990, since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the
witnesses.
On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate
originals of the testimonies of Eusebio Garcia and Elena Obidosa (December
11, 1969), Celestino Nazareno (March 16, 1973), Cenen Miras (April 27, 1973),
Ariston Agustin (February 10, 1977) and Francisco Guerrero (December 5 and
19, 1977). The private prosecutor manifested that he had communicated with
one of the stenographers on record, Ms. Remedios S. Delfin, who promised to
look into her files and hopefully complete the transcription of her stenographic
notes.
On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses
testimony on October 24, 1990.
On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the testimonies was reset to November 9,
1990 due to petitioner's failure to appear on the scheduled hearing.
On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
his right to speedy trial has been violated.
On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge dented the motion to dismiss and reset
the retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990.
On November 16, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied oil November 21, 1990. The presiding Judge set anew the retaking of
the testimonies December 5, 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the
review of the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and
November 20, 1990 anent petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as his motion
for reconsideration. The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.
In its decision which was promulgated on February 18, 1992, the Honorable
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. In a resolution dated September 10,
1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Errors Assigned
Petitioner now assigns the following errors 4 against the respondent Court:
I.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the re-hearing of the
instant case will not suit the intended purpose and will only result in untold
prejudice to the petitioner.
II.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the petitioner is entitled
to a dismissal of the criminal case equivalent to an acquittal on the merits based
on the violation of his right to speedy trial resulting from the failure to render a
prompt disposition of judgment.
The First Issue: Untold Prejudice
Petitioner claims that through no fault of his, seven of the ten witnesses who
testified for the accused will no longer be able to testify anew.
So too, three witness for the prosecution have died and thus would not be able
to appear during the re-hearing. And even if all witnesses would be able to testify
again, "the passage of a long period of time spanning more than two decades
since the incident complained of will tend to confuse or hinder than aid the
accurate recall of the facts and circumstances of the case," as follows 5:
(a) Capt. Ricardo B. Stohner of the Civil Aeronautics Administration has
reportedly migrated to either the U.S.A. or Canada, after he retired from the CAA
about eight (8) years ago. Capt. Stohner's indispensable testimony as an expert
witness as well as to his personal knowledge of certain material facts as
described in Francisco Guerrero's Memorandum of 17 December 1979, crucial
to the defense, is now lost to the petitioner.
(b) Eduardo V. Guerrero, a son of Francisco Guerrero, has been
undergoing psychiatric treatment for more than two years now, as he is suffering
from chronic mental illness. He is in no condition to testify. Copies of medical
certificates on Eduardo's condition were submitted to the respondent courts as
annexes to various pleadings.
(c) Rosario V. Guerrero, wife of Francisco Guerrero. was operated on
last August for tumor of the colon and is still suffering a partial disability. She is
under medical advice to avoid activities which may cause her stress, including
testifying in court. Copies of medical certificates on Mrs. Guerrero's operation
and condition were submitted to the respondent courts as annexes to various
pleadings.
(d) The whereabouts of Alberto Atanacio, Rodolfo Fontanilla, Editha
Pangilinan, and Rizal and Belen Macabole, are unknown, and despite diligent
efforts exerted by petitioner, they have not been found up to the present.
At this point, this argument is premature and at best speculative. As to whether
the witnesses for the defense would be available at the trial, and if available,
whether they will still be in a position to recall the events that transpired in the
case more than twenty five years ago is a question of fact which cannot be
determined now. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his memorandum: 6
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the whereabouts of his witnesses (except
Rizal and Evelyn Macabole) are ascertainable should a diligent search be made
by him. This can be gleaned from the return of the subpoena dated October 1,
1990 which forms part of the record of the case. Eduardo Guerrero and Rosario
Guerrero were respectively served with subpoena and their alleged mental and
physical incapacity to testify should best be left to the assessment of respondent
trial court. Edith (sic) Pangilinan was notified of the retaking and is, thus,
available. Alberto Atanacio and Rodolfo Fontanilla, on the other hand, are in
Lucena City. The exact whereabouts of the last two witnesses can be
ascertained if diligent efforts were exerted to locate them.
The alleged unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution should not be the
concern of the petitioner at this time. The burden of proving his guilt rests upon
the prosecution. And if the prosecution fails for any reason to present evidence
sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he will be acquitted.
. . . The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State
succeeds in proving his guilt. the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused-appellant applies. The conscience must be satisfied that, on the
accused-appellant could be laid the responsibility of the offense charged. 7
. . . [C]ourts must exert utmost scrupulousness in evaluating the evidence of the
prosecution for it is elementary that the conviction of an accused must rest on
the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense (People
vs. Cruz, 215 SCRA 339 [1992]). The prosecution must overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence by proof beyond reasonable doubt;
otherwise, the acquittal of the accused is ineluctably demanded. . . . 8
. . . It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution
discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Acquittal then of the
accused-appellant is in order. 9
On this matter, the respondent Court, 10 citing the assailed order of the trial
court, argues that there are really only two witnesses of the prosecution whose
testimonies need to be retaken and the rehearing should not really present a
monumental problem:
With only two (2) witnesses of the prosecution to be presented, coupled with a
promise of expeditiousness by respondent Judge, the Court is of the view that
petitioner's misgivings are rather exaggerated. And as to his expressed fear that
his own witnesses for the defense can no longer testify "in the same manner as
before," the same Order well and truly states in adequate refutation that --
. . . the fear that the witnesses to the incident which occurred in 1969 may no
longer have the same perception of what they saw and, therefore, would not be
able to testify in Court in the same manner they originally testified is not the
concern of the defense but of the prosecution. If the prosecution witnesses
cannot give convincing testimony in the retaking of their testimony, that is the
worry of the prosecution. It is not even unfair to the accused if his witnesses
cannot testify in the same convincing manner that they testified before as long
as the prosecution witnesses are convincing. Everything in a criminal
prosecution should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state. . . .
Anent petitioner's contention that the re-hearing would place him in double
jeopardy, suffice it to say that there has been no termination of the criminal
prosecution -- i.e. of that "first jeopardy." For double jeopardy to attach, the
following elements must concur:
. . . It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt, to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (emphasis omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment: (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused (emphasis omitted).
In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth
element -- dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of
the accused -- is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted
standard, the re-taking of testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second
jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy
is utterly without basis.
The Second Issue: Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition
Page 9 of 34
True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speedy trial
but also to a speedy judgment after trial when in Section 16, Article III, it
provides:
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in
the disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in case of violations thereof
without the fault of the party concerned, not just the accused.
In the recent case of People vs. Leviste, 12 this Court citing Gonzales vs.
Sandiganbayan 13 and People vs. Tampal, 14 reiterated the ruling that the right
to speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay without the participation or fault of the accused, or when
unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable
lengths of time.
On the other hand, the case of Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., 15 laid down the
guidelines in determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula:
. . . (S)peedy disposition of cases' is a relative term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings,
"speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been
violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure
to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be
considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the "speedy disposition
of cases" guarantee.
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was
submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was
reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and
only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990
the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly,
it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to
November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting
on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of
safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
While it may be said that it was not petitioner's fault that the stenographic notes
of the testimonies of the witnesses were not transcribed, yet neither was it the
prosecution's. The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because
he could not have rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Let
it be remembered that he was not the judge who conducted the trial and hence
he would not have had sufficient basis to make a disposition in the absence of
the said transcripts. As respondent Court of Appeals noted:
Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case was assigned
to respondent Judge only in late 1989 or early 1990, and that he took prompt
action thereon by setting the case for retaking of testimonies, obviously as a
prelude to judgment. The case then was finally making progress toward
termination. For such dispatch and diligence, respondent Judge hardly deserves
condemnation. Petitioner also faults the prosecution for its failure to follow up
the status of the case.
As regards the other judge to whom the case was assigned prior to 1989, the
accused himself could not pinpoint the cause of the problem: 16
2) Reason for the delay No one knows why the Presiding Judge
(Manuel A. Argel) of the respondent court who heard the trial did not render a
decision during his tenure. No one knows either why another former Presiding
Judge (Alfredo Gorgonio) failed to turn over the case to the Malabon court during
the Judiciary Reorganization under B.P. Blg. 129.
It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and languished in
the court docket, Not surprisingly, since the risk of such loss through neglect
and other causes grew with each passing year, part of the records and several
transcripts were lost in the time the case lay unattended. Before being finally
assigned to the respondent trial court, the case was shuttled from court to court
through various indorsements of Executive Judges and the Court Administrator
of the Supreme Court as a result of the confusion as to which court had territorial
jurisdiction over it.
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation
against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge
reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just
continued to sleep on his right -- a situation amounting to laches -- had the
respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of
the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the
case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten
years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the
case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, 17 or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it
is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from
the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to
the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights
should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of
the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well.
Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and
inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case
on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable
to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense,
substantial justice in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The respondent trial court is directed to
proceed with judicious dispatch in the re-taking of testimonies and in concluding
the case in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122728 February 13, 1997
CASIANO A. ANGCHANGCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ZALDY TAMAYO, GILDA NAVARRA,
ODELIA LEGASPI, SALVADOR TAMAYO, GASPAR ABORQUE, ROEL
ABAS, REMEDIOS OLITA, ET AL., TEODORO TORREON, ET AL., JIMMY
MARTIN, MENRADO ALLAWAN, MARGARITO ESCORIAL, NORBERTO
OCAT and ALEJANDRO ERNA, respondents.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for mandamus seeking to: a) compel the Ombudsman to
dismiss Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133,
MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN- 90-0191, and
MIN-90-0192; and b) direct the Ombudsman to issue a clearance in favor of
petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco.
The facts are as follows:
Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff
IV in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X)
rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505. The
decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued directing the
Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same.
Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued,
caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections
from its various clients.
In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition
and damages against petitioner. The regional trial court initially issued a
temporary restraining order but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise fled before the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and
misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the
complaint, the Ombudsman, in a Memorandum dated July 31, 1992,
recommended its dismissal for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-
complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others
things, that petitioner illegally deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their
differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court
the administrative aspect of the complaints which was docketed hereat as A.M.
No. 93-10-385-OMB. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25,
1993 dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to
pursue their case.
Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been
dismissed, the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved,
prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution.
When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still
remained unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner's request for
clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was
denied.
Page 10 of 34
With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R.No.
72335-39, March 21, 1988). Sad to say, even this motion to dismiss, however,
has not been acted upon.
Hence, the instant petition.
Acting on the petition, the Court issued a resolution dated December 20, 1995
requiring respondents to comment thereon. In compliance therewith, the Office
of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (in lieu of Comment.),
which is its way of saying it agreed with the views of petitioner. On July 22, 1996,
we issued another resolution requiring the Ombudsman to file his own comment
on the petition if he so desires, otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted
for resolution without such comment. After several extensions, respondent
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a comment
dated October 7, 1996.
The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do
the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court).
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases
pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (159
SCRA 70 [1988]), wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Yap, said:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the board umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay
may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such
a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery
and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period
of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True--
but the absence of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge
its duty mandated by the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials and employees of the government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof."
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume III by
Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).
It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule
admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156
SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal
charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the
constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to
act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner
has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he
has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for
over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait
any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not
to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the
issuance of the writ prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and
to GRANT the same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132,
MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90 0190, MIN-
90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the
Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 130191 April 27, 1998
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right; it is a
substantive right. To deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of
due process.
In this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, petitioners
seek to set aside the Order of the Sandiganbayan dated 27 June 1997 denying
the Motion to Quash the information filed against them for violating Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioners similarly impugn the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 5
August 1997 which denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Pertinent to this case are the following facts:
In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city
government of Davao. The goal of said project was to make Davao City a
leading center for computer systems and technology development. It also aimed
to provide consultancy and training services and to assist all local government
units in Mindanao set up their respective computer systems.
To implement the project, a Computerization Program Committee, composed of
the following was formed:
Chairman : Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman, City Administrator
Members : Mr. Jorge Silvosa, Acting City Treasurer
Atty. Victorino Advincula, City Councilor
Mr. Alexis Almendras, City Councilor
Atty. Onofre Francisco, City Legal Officer
Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr., Chief of Internal Control Office
Atty. Mariano Kintanar, COA Resident Auditor. 1
The Committee's duty was to "conduct a thorough study of the different
computers in the market, taking into account the quality and acceptability of the
products, the reputation and track record of the manufacturers and/or their
Philippine distributors, the availability of the replacement parts and accessories
in the Philippines, the availability of service centers in the country that can
undertake preventive maintenance of the computer hardwares to ensure a long
and uninterrupted use and, last but not the least, the capability of the
manufacturers and/or Philippine distributors to design and put into place the
computer system — complete with the flow of paperwork, forms to be used and
personnel required."2
Following these guidelines, the Committee recommended the acquisition of
Goldstar computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication,
Ltd., South Korea and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus,
Inc. (SPI).
After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor Kintanar, the Committee
proceeded to negotiate with SPI, represented by its President Rodolfo V. Jao
and Executive Vice President Manuel T. Asis, for the acquisition and installation
of the computer hardware and the training of personnel for the Electronic Data-
Processing Center. The total contract cost amounted to P11,056,810.00.
On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao
unanimously passed Resolution No. 1402 and Ordinance No. 173 approving the
proposed contract for computerization between Davao City and SPI. The
Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the City Mayor (petitioner Duterte) to sign the
said contract for and in behalf of Davao City.3
Page 11 of 34
On the same day, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 1403 and Ordinance
No. 174, the General Fund Supplemental Budget No. 07 for CY 1990
appropriating P3,000,000.00 for the city's computerization project.
Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the parties thereto and on
8 November 1990, petitioner City Administrator de Guzman released to SPI
PNB Check No. 65521 in the amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 27 November 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao received a
letter-complaint from a "concerned citizen," stating that "some city officials are
going to make a killing" in the transaction.4 The complaint was docketed as
OMB-MIN-90-0425. However, no action was taken thereon.5
Thereafter, sometime in February 1991, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
20,550-91, was instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
12 by Dean Pilar Braga, Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw
Foundation, Inc. against the petitioners, the City Council, various city officials
and SPI for the judicial declaration of nullity of the aforestated resolutions and
ordinances and the computer contract executed pursuant thereto.
On 22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a proposal
to petitioner Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 449 and
Ordinance No. 53 accepting Goldstar's offer to cancel the computerization
contract provided the latter return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to the
City Treasurer's Office within a period of one month. Petitioner Duterte, as city
mayor, was thus authorized to take the proper steps for the mutual cancellation
of the said contract and to sign all documents relevant thereto.6
Pursuant to the aforestated authority, on 6 May 1991, petitioner Duterte, in
behalf of Davao City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the
downpayment was duly refunded.
In the meantime, a Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit was tasked
to conduct an audit of the Davao City Local Automation Project to determine if
said contract conformed to government laws and regulations.
On 31 May 1991, the team submitted its Special Audit Report (SAR) No. 91-05
recommending rescission of the subject contract. A copy of the report was sent
to petitioner Duterte by COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo on 7 June 1991. In
the latter's transmittal letter, Chairman Domingo summarized the findings of the
special audit team, thus:
1. The award of the contract for the "Davao City Local Automation
Project" to Systems Plus, Inc., for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated
contract rather than thru competitive public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and
8 of PD 526. Moreover, there was no sufficient appropriation for this particular
contract in violation of Sec. 85 of PD 1445.
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc.
covering 15% of the contract cost of P11.6M in violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477
and Sec. 88 of PD 1445.
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under contract with
"Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI)" differed from the team's canvass by as much as
1200% or a total of P1.8M.
4. The City had no Information Systems Plan (ISP) prior to the award
of the contract to SPI in direct violation of Malacañang Memo. Order No. 287
and NCC Memo. Circular 89-1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission resulted in
undue disadvantage to the City Government.
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team recommends that
the contract with Systems Plus, Inc. be rescinded in view of the questionable
validity due to insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of NCC-MC 89-1
dated June 22, 1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of computer
hardware/system should be strictly adhered to. 7
The city government, intent on pursuing its computerization plan, decided to
follow the audit team's recommendation and sought the assistance of the
National Computer Center (NCC). After conducting the necessary studies, the
NCC recommended the acquisition of Philips computers in the amount of
P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied with the NCC's advice and hence, was
finally able to obtain the needed computers.
Subsequently, on 1 August 1991, the Anti-Craft League-Davao City Chapter,
through one Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners, the City Treasurer, City Auditor, the
whole city government of Davao and SPI. The League alleged that the
respondents, in entering into the computerization contract, violated R.A. No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), PD No. 1445 (Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal
Code and other pertinent penal laws. The case was docketed as OMB-3-91-
1768.8
On 9 October 1991, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Pepito A. Manriquez of the
Office of the Ombudsman sent a letter9 to COA Chairman Domingo requesting
the Special Audit Team to submit their joint affidavit to substantiate the
complaint in compliance with Section 4, par. (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman (A.O. No. 07).
On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil
Case No. 20,550-91. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed on the
ground of prematurity and that it has become moot and academic with the
mutual cancellation of the contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby
denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
On 12 November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-
3-91-1768 directing petitioners, Jorge Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano
Kintanar (City Auditor) and Manuel T. Asis of SPI to:
. . . file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-point comment under
oath upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Davao City "Dean Pilar C. Braga, et al.
vs. Hon. Rodrigo Duterte," for Judicial Declaration of Nullity and Illegality of City
Council of Davao Resolutions and Ordinances, and the Computer Contract
executed Pursuant Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees
and Costs — with Injunctive Relief, including the Issuance of a Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction in which they filed a
motion to dismiss, not an answer and (2) the respective comments, also under
oath, on the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of which is attached. 11
On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the affidavits of the Special
Audit Team but failed to furnish petitioners copies thereof.
On 18 February 1992, petitioners submitted a manifestation adopting the
comments filed by their co-respondents Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar
dated 25 November 1991 and 17 January 1992, respectively.
Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, petitioners received a copy of a
Memorandum prepared by Special Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman
dated 8 February 1996 addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding
OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-91-1768. Prosecutor De Guzman
recommended that the charges of malversation, violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code against petitioners and their co-
respondents be dismissed. He opined that any issue pertaining to unwarranted
benefits or injury to the government and malversation were rendered moot and
academic by the mutual rescission of the subject contract before the COA
submitted its findings (SAR No. 91-05) or before the disbursement was
disallowed. However, Prosecutor De Guzman recommended that petitioners be
charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 "for having entered into a contract
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the elements of
profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to government being immaterial."12
Accordingly, the following information dated 8 February 1996 was filed against
petitioners before the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Criminal Case No. 23193):
That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public
officers, accused Rodrigo R. Duterte being then the City Mayor and accused
Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of Davao City,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and
taking advantage of their official functions, and conspiring and confederating
with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into
a negotiated contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories
with the Systems Plus, Incorporated for and in consideration of the amount of
PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN (P11,656,810.00), which contract is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, said accused knowing fully-well that the
said acquisition cost has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred
(1200%) percent and without subjecting said acquisition to the required public
bidding.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
On 27 February 1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29
March 1996, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the following
grounds:
1. Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation,
due process and the speedy disposition of their case;
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with authority
to enter into the subject contract;
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government since the subject contract has been duly rescinded.
On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
On 18 June 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
It appears, however, that the accused were able to file motions for the
reconsideration of the Resolution authorizing the filing of the Information herein
with the Ombudsman in Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever
decision which might have occurred with respect to the preliminary investigation
would have been remedied by the motion for reconsideration in the sense that
Page 12 of 34
whatever the accused had to say in their behalf, they were able to do in that
motion for reconsideration.
Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does
not believe itself empowered to authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an
inadequacy of the basic preliminary investigation nor with respect to a dispute
as to the proper appreciation by the prosecution of the evidence at that time.
In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty. Medialdea that he
represents not only Mayor Duterte but City Administrator de Guzman as well,
upon his commitment, the arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at
8:00 o'clock in the morning. 14
On 15 July 1997, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above order but
the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit in its Resolution
dated 5 August 1997.15
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioners allege that:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
(1) PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR
RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4, RULE
II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07 (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); AND
(2) ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS
PROPERLY CONDUCTED, THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN
TERMINATING THE SAME THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.
B
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE
PETITIONERS DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF
R.A. 3019 IN THAT:
(1) PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS
CLOTHED WITH FULL LEGAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL TO
ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.;
(2) THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE SAME
HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY
GOVERNMENT;
(3) ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT RESCINDED, THE
SAME CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT. 16
On 4 September 1997, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
23193.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
I
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the
manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07.
In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners
were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the
allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and on SAR No. 91-05. The said order
was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of
any offense as required by law.17 They were just required to comment upon the
allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit Report.
Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary
investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary
investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended
merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special
Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in
question had been complied with) as his bases for criminal prosecution, then
the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence,
petitioners' constitutional right to due process was violated.
Sections (2) and (4), Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman) provide:
Sec. 2. Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether or not it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding
investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports,
the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to
execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer
shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other
supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof
of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits
within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating
officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the
complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on
record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.
Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent
desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the
particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in
the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in
paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the
complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence
on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting
evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer
may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which
the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the
appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory
questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and
served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in
writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his
resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the
written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other
cases.
In what passes off as application of the foregoing rules, all that petitioners were
asked to do was merely to file their comment upon every allegation of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and on
the COA Special Audit Report. The comment referred to in Section 2(b) Rule II,
of A.O. No. 07 is not part of or is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule II, of the same Administrative Order. A plain
reading of Sec. 2 would convey the idea that upon evaluation of the complaint,
the investigating officer may recommend its outright dismissal for palpable want
of merit; otherwise, or if the complaint appears to have some merit, the
investigator may recommend action under any of those enumerated from (b) to
(f), that is, the investigator may recommend that the complaint be: referred to
respondent for comment, or endorsed to the proper government office or agency
which has jurisdiction over the case; or forwarded to the appropriate office or
official for fact-finding investigation; or referred for administrative adjudication;
or subjected to preliminary investigation. Now, if the investigator opts to
recommend the filing of a comment by the respondent, it is presumably because
he needs more facts and information for further evaluation of the merits of the
complaint. That being done, the investigating officer shall again recommend any
one of the actions enumerated in Section 2, which include the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation, on the other hand, takes on an adversarial quality
and an entirely different procedure comes into play. This must be so because
the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind,
before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of
Page 13 of 34
public trial. 18 It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials.19 While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal
justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.20
Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is unverified or based only
on official reports (which is the situation obtaining in the case at bar), the
complainant is required to submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The
investigating officer, thereafter, shall issue an order, to which copies of the
complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavits. In the preliminary investigation, what the respondent is required to file
is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the respondent fails to file
a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer consider the respondent's
comment as the answer to the complaint. Against the foregoing backdrop, there
was a palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the
fundamental requirements of preliminary investigation.
Apparently, in the case at bar, the investigating officer considered the filing of
petitioner's comment as a substantial compliance with the requirements of a
preliminary investigation. Initially, Graft Investigator Manriquez directed the
members of the Special Audit Team on 9 October 1991 to submit their affidavits
relative to SAR No. 91-05. However, on 12 November 1991, before the affidavits
were submitted, Manriquez required petitioners to submit their respective
comments on the complaint in the civil case and on Special Audit Report (SAR)
91-05. Even when the required affidavits were filed by the audit team on 4
December 1991, petitioners were still not furnished copies thereof. The
Ombudsman contends that failure to provide petitioners the complaint-affidavits
is immaterial since petitioners were well aware of the existence of the civil
complaint and SAR No. 91-05. We find the Ombudsman's reasoning flawed.
The civil complaint and the COA Special Audit Report are not equivalent to the
complaint-affidavits required by the rules. Moreover, long before petitioners
were directed to file their comments, the civil complaint (Civil Case No. 20,550-
91) was rendered moot and academic and, accordingly, dismissed following the
mutual cancellation of the computerization contract. In SAR No. 91-05, on the
other hand, petitioners were merely advised to rescind the subject contract —
which was accomplished even before the audit report came out. In light of these
circumstances, the Court cannot blame petitioners for being unaware of the
proceedings conducted against them.
In Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman,21 this Court, speaking through Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, emphasized that it is mandatory requirement for the
complainant to submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses before the
respondent can be compelled to submit his counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. Thus:
Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party, Rule I, § 3 can only
apply to the general criminal investigation, which in the case at bar was already
conducted by the PCGG. But after the Ombudsman and his deputies have
gathered evidence and their investigation has ceased to be a general
exploratory one and they decide to bring the action against a party, their
proceedings become adversary and Rule II 4(a) then applies. This means that
before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents, the complaint must submit his affidavit and those of his
witnesses. This is true not only of prosecutions of graft cases under Rep. Act
No. 3019 but also of actions for the recovery of unexplained wealth under Rep.
Act No. 1379, because § 2 of this latter law requires that before a petition is filed
there must be a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal
cases."
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial,
only evidence may be considered. While reports and even raw information may
justify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can
be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated
warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court. As this Court held in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to
usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting
the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of
the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may
be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt
of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court
may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary
investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding.
An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereof.
II
Compounding the deprivation of petitioners of their right to a preliminary
investigation was the undue and unreasonable delay in the termination of the
irregularly conducted preliminary investigation. Petitioners' manifestation
adopting the comments of their co-respondents was filed on 18 February 1992.
However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or four (4) years later, that petitioners
received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996 submitted by Special
Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman recommending the filing of
information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the
"preliminary investigation" infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right
to a speedy disposition of their case.22 In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,23 we held
that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining in that case
warranted the dismissal of the case:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize
the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may
be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic
Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The
other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues,
certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True —
but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,24 the Court upheld
Angchangco's right to the speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a
sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In 1990
criminal complaints were filed against him which remained pending before the
Ombudsman even after his retirement in 1994. The Court thus ruled:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal
charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the
constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to
act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner
has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he
has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for
over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait
any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not
to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the
issuance of the writ prayed for. 25
We are not persuaded by the Ombudsman's argument that the Tatad ruling
does not apply to the present case which is not politically motivated unlike the
former, pointing out the following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing
from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation
and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious,
but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution
was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office
is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective
observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and
all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only
by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public's perception of
the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. 26
The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present suit from the
Angchangco case by arguing that in the latter, Angchangco filed several motions
for early resolution, implying that in the case at bar petitioners were not as
vigilant in asserting or protecting their rights.
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not
come into play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution
Page 14 of 34
makes no such distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may have been a
factor in the undue delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, the
particular facts of each case must be taken into consideration in the grant of the
relief sought. In the Tatad case, we are reminded:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical
relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a
full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law
or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that
in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to its case. 27
In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan,28 the Court observed that the concept of speedy
disposition of cases "is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept" and that the factors that may be considered and balanced are the
"length of the delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay."
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which
is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,
had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible,
special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in
terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of
review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail
— has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the
Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and
legal issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners' three motions for
extension of time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the
delay was not caused by the motions for extension. The delay occurred after
petitioners filed their comment. Between 1992 to 1996, petitioners were under
no obligation to make any move because there was no preliminary investigation
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the
first place.
III
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable
cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must
be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; and (3) the contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second
element of the crime — that the accused public officers entered into a contract
in behalf of the government — is absent. The computerization contract was
rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and
before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1
August 1991. Hence, at that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint
and the Ombudsman issued its Order on 12 November 1991, there was no
longer any contract to speak of. The contract, after 6 May 1991 became in
contemplation of law, non-existent, as if no contract was ever executed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and Criminal
Case No. 23193 is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued
on 4 September 1997 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1, 1999
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 128136 October 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG,
REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR
WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY
JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree
No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has undergone various
changes, 1 the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos.
7975 2 and 8249. 3 Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 4 and Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code 5 is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others,
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case
Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and
declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22,
1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996
which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No 23278 in deference to
whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.1âwphi1.nêt
The, facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay,
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, 6 and two for violation
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. 7 The informations, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these
crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of
Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contented that the
six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due
process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was
opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before
petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25,
1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety
days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for
suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of
the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 8 and the informations
containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution
denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied
due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite
before he could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to his motion for
reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution
dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other
things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioner's reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June
6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the
Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending
petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
took effect on May 16, 1995. 10
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer
his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the
two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court,
it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a
Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner's motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade "27" under
the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of
the commission of the offenses charged in the above-entitled cases, the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting
or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original
jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor
Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade "27",
because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a
Page 15 of 34
salary which merits a grade lower than Grade "27" does not hold water. In 1986
when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation &
Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very
definition of the very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had
been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether
at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his
classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989.
Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the
time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a
conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is
equivalent to Grade "28" under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the
said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary
grades of the Compensation & Position Classification system prepared by the
Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct
No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade "27."
11
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal
Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court
annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6,
1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to
quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating
the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC.
Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order
preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7,
1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the
introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against
him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the
informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there
was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay's co-
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San
Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C.
Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent
municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the
landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This case was docketed
in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A.
Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and
(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan.
Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C.
Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same.
The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with
the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation
of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court. 12
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) was
filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per
the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The
information was signed by Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation
Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San
Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners,
and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The
complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project
of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M.
Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with the proper
court." The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J.
Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in
OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e)of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the
landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was
subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime
was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts
as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were
charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The
Sandiganbayan denied the accused's motion to quash in a Resolution dated
June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until
the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
involved in the Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the
RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in
abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of
jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 21, 1996. On
August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order.
On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of
the Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of
municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the
filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial
Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or
waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan
after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating
it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated
the rule on duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall
not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double
jeopardy?
V (5)
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors
guilty of forum shopping? 13
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the
common question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
I Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July
7, 1994 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,14 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1861, 15 the pertinent provisions of which state:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
Page 16 of 34
or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not
yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975
was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was
filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx xxx xxx
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court.
This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days
after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya,
two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
now reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged,
petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section
4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal
mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor
Binay argues:
. . . The new law's consistent and repeated reference to salary grades show[s]
an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan
and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation.
The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.
16
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification 17 from the City Personnel Officer
of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only
P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was
supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification 18 from the
Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
Page 17 of 34
. . . that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay Municipal
Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of
November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Sec. 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary
constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th
day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or
purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify
Grades.
The Constitution 19 states that in providing for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take "into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions," thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 20 provides in Section 2 thereof that
differences in pay are to be based "upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." In short, the
nature of an official's position should be the determining factor in the fixing of
his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the
"grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 985 21 as including
. . . all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or
subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the
inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.
22
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position — the level of
difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof — relative to
that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines his or her salary,
not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that
prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial
capability of his or her respective local government unit. 23 Nevertheless, it is
the law which fixes the official's grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-
President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as
the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also
authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to "determine the
officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable"
and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of
guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the
DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the Benchmark
Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level
is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of
law, of which the Court must take judicial notice. 24
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor under Salary Grade
27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,"
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975. 25
B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est
expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed
excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive
original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is
clear and unambiguous. 26 The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier,
Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of
"[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989."
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain
meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners' argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is
exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity
of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does
not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive, 27 or where the enumeration is by way of example
only. 28 In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First
Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was "necessary
for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each
position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above." The
same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did
not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubt as to whether petitioner mayors are under the
category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the
matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No.
6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Court's Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the Salary
Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."
C Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills 29 in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal
officials from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these
officials, especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought
about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the
law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort
to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not
susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC,
110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same
as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general
rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the
latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). 30
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
. . . that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witnesses in their case would
come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to
petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the
convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to
implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has
willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional
will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the
present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who
are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry"
— the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks
and letter carriers and the like — who are involved with "nickel-and-dime" cases
and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. . .
.1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
such that only those occupying high positions in the Government and the military
fall under the jurisdiction of the court. 31
Page 18 of 34
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials
are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are
not bound by a legislator's opinion in congressional debates regarding the
interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of
the legislator. 32 Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire
Congress. 33
D
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay
cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which
provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the
guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction
over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as
to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case
that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the
rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's
intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is no
reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent
jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but
construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to
"regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the
intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to
the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or
"regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration. [emphasis supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of
the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the
approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then
the cases shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it,
the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of
the approval of R.A. No. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains
jurisdiction over said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249,
which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in
any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A.
No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., 36 the Court explained
the purpose of the foregoing provision.
. . . it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [the Sandiganbayan's]
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. . . . . The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
"any court." . . . . Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not
affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249).
[Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature.
Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the
crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or
lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. No.
8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already
devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other
hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to
apply to cases the trials of which have yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun
as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of
the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it,
then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before
it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a
regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then
said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains
jurisdiction over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy
disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the
subject cases by the Ombudsman.
Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. 37 Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice. 38
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, 39 is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
40 Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of
a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons
for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
the prejudice caused by the delay. 41 The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 42
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. 43 In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. 44
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 45 the Court held that the length of delay and the
simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases
therein. The "unexplained inaction" 46 of the prosecutors called for the dismissal
of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 47 the Court also ruled that there was no violation
of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for
the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential
decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and
the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel,
preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies.
The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right,
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 48 the complexity of the issues and the failure of
the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time
spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
Page 19 of 34
In Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 49 the Court, considering also the
complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the
parties' lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated
therein.
In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the
disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office
of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately
explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos,
Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano
Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo
Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple
Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d)
Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillante's complaint was based on the initial findings and
observations of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts covering
transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected
Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati contained in
its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy
of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the
Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not
yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to
explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to change or modification
depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of
Makati. Because of this the information from the COA the preliminary
investigation was held in abeyance until the submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati
was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes
of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the
same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse
findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillante's complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and
analysis of its findings and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental
Report on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents
supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel
of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents
to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted
his counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor
Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo
Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon
submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on
September 27, 1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this
Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati
filed with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to
support Binay's stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit
containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit
of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30,
1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy
Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the
case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the
Special Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office
of the Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman
submitted to the latter its review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994; the Ombudsman approved some of the
recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing
of the informations. 50
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on
Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination
of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review
of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were
sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held
by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the
Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution,
unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports
caused the investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls,
and supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had
to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis
of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved
complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period
of time for preliminary investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close
to three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the
Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and
testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the preliminary
investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and
four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April 30,
1992. 51
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him
were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement
that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his
right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid
and petitioner's suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject
cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any
grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof. 52 Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the
part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now
dispose of the following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an
information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the
Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information
alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes
double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions
of duplicity of information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot
be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance." 53
They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan was a
"subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the
information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and,
under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined
by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. 54 As a
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals 55
that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no
jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint
later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply
because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a
situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a
party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or
even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases 56 that estoppel prevents a
party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked.
Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being
that jurisdiction is vested by law. 57 Even in those instances where the Court
applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the
court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction
only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC,
respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's jurisdiction. There were
Page 20 of 34
no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to
refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to
resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision,
much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not
themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the
plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the
complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of
the "People of the Philippines." 58 Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. 59 Violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, 60 is a public offense.
Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence,
criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less
barred by the rules of estoppel. 61
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in
double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the
information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first
place, the RTC not being not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can
be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. 62 The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the
quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of
double jeopardy. 63 Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information
pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 64
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated
the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule
presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one
offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. — A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one
offense but with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly
speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. 65 We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing
two informations in two different courts, to "gamble that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition."
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after
investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another
complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among
others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action,
charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first,
this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas,
respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Quizumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 126814 March 2, 2000
JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, RAFAEL T. FLORES, HERMINIO C. ELIZON,
ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. GIL P. FERNANDEZ, SR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 217 and Benigno S. Montera,
respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to enjoin
further proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66607-08, and to annul the
Order, dated August 27, 1996, of Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, which denied petitioners' Motion to Quash the Informations.
Petitioner Judy Carol L. Dansal was the Department Manager of the
Enforcement, Investigation, and Prosecution Department of the National Food
Authority ("NFA"), with office address at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioner Rafael T. Flores was the Assistant Manager of the said department of
NFA. Petitioner Herminio C. Elizon was the chief of the Security Division of the
same department of NFA, while Petitioner Arnulfo S. Soloria was a security
officer of the said department of NFA. Respondent Benigno S. Montera, on the
other hand, was employed with the Enforcement, Investigation, and Prosecution
Department of NFA.1
On December 16, 1991, respondent Montera filed an "Affidavit of Complaint"
with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging the herein petitioners and one
Ronaldo Vallada, a casual security guard of NFA, with the offense of estafa
through falsification of public document.
On January 14, 1992, petitioners were required by the Office of the Ombudsman
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence.
Petitioners complied. On April 1, 1992, respondent Montera sent in a reply-
affidavit.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner Dansal was directed to submit her verified answer
to respondent Montera's additional charge of violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.
On September 9, 1992, petitioner Dansal submitted her answer with a counter-
charge.
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Dansal filed her rejoinder to respondent
Montera's reply-affidavit, after which the cases were ripe for resolution.2
On May 30, 1994, or after one (1) year and four (4) months, the office of the
Ombudsman came out with its Resolution, copy of which petitioners allegedly
received on February 5, 1996.3 Said Resolution ruled:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondents Judy Carol Dansal, Rafael Flores, Herminio Elizon, Arnulfo Soloria,
Ronaldo Vallada be prosecuted for one count of estafa through falsification of
public document.
In addition thereto, a separate information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 be filed against respondent Judy Carol Dansal alone while the
additional charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the other
respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.4
On May 13, 1996, after the denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the
aforesaid cases were referred to the deputized prosecutor of Quezon City,
together with two Informations, dated October 20, 1995 and January 15, 1996,
respectively, accusing Judy Carol L. Dansal of estafa through falsification of
public document, and violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019;5 and the other
petitioners of estafa through falsification of public document.
On July 18, 1996, petitioners interposed a Motion to Quash, contending that the
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation violated their constitutional
rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of their cases.6
On August 27, 1996, the respondent court denied the said motion, ruling thus:
After careful evaluation of the grounds raised by the accused in their Motion to
Quash viz-à-viz the Opposition filed by the prosecution, finding no basis in fact
and in law to warrant the quashal of the two informations against the accused,
as there appears no unreasonable delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation amounting to violation of the accused's constitutional right to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases, the instant Motion is hereby
DENIED. Reset the arraignment and pre-trial anew on November 25, 1996 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning.7
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition
under Rule 65 with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, theorizing that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH, FINDING NO BASIS IN FACT
AND IN LAW TO WARRANT THE QUASHAL OF THE TWO (2)
INFORMATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHEN HE ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THERE
APPEARS NO UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASES.8
Page 21 of 34
On December 18, 1996, without giving due course to the Petition, the Court
required the respondents to comment and denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.9
In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, the Solicitor General
recommended the granting of the petition. 10
The accusation against the petitioners is based on the "Affidavit of Complaint"
alleging that petitioners falsified the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ronaldo
Vallada, by making it appear that the latter reported for work during the month
of July 1991 when, in truth and in fact, he did not so report, and that the
petitioners collected the amount of P2,244.04 paid on the basis of the falsified
DTR.
In their answer, petitioners countered that the imputation against them is a mere
harassment by complainant Benigno S. Montera, so as to silence, embarrass
and destroy their (petitioners') credibility, and that the complainant lodged the
complaint because prior to the filing thereof, petitioner Dansal initiated an
investigation of the complainant for alleged irregularities involving the latter's
daily time record, which investigation was set by petitioner Dansal after Ronaldo
Vallada admitted having illegally punched in the Bundy Clock the DTRs of
several employees and the complainant, who requested him to do so, and as a
result, an administrative case was instituted against the complainant before the
Director for Legal Affairs, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1-05-92 for
Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. 11
Placing reliance on the ruling in the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 12
petitioners seek redress for what they theorized upon as a violation of their right
to due process and speedy disposition of their cases by reason of the alleged
unreasonable delay of the preliminary investigation against them.
The petition is barren of merit.
To begin with, the petition is flawed by the failure of petitioners to move for
reconsideration of the assailed Order. Settled is the rule that, except in some
recognized exceptions, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari. 13 The rationale behind the
rule is to give the respondent court an opportunity to correct its supposed
mistake and to rectify its questioned Order.
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier
dispensation of justice. 14 It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy
disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before,
during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), 15
which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the
protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the
submission of the case. 16 The present constitutional provision applies to civil,
criminal and administrative cases. 17
Sec. 16 was first given flesh and blood in the Tatad case, which also involved a
petition seeking to reverse an order of the trial court denying a motion to quash
the Information. Applying Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the
Court opined in that case:
. . . We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. 18
But the concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative
term and a flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay. 19
In the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by
petitioners has been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the
duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it
and the prejudice caused by such delay. 20 The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of
a party's right to present evidence and either in a plaintiffs being non-suited or
the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. 21
The Court believes, and so holds, that the aforecited doctrine laid down in Tatad
vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable in light of the attendant facts and
circumstances in this case. Records disclose that the original complaint against
petitioners was brought before the Office of the Ombudsman on December 16,
1991. The same was deemed submitted for resolution on January 15, 1993. On
May 30, 1994, the investigator issued a Resolution finding a probable cause,
which finding was later approved by the Ombudsman. Petitioners were
furnished a copy of the said Resolution on February 5 and 6, 1996. On June 30,
1996 were filed the Information dated October 20, 1995, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-96-66607, and the other Information dated January 15, 1996,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608. 22
The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more
than one year and four months to finish. But such a happenstance alone, or any
like delay, for that matter, should not be cause for an unfettered abdication by
the court of its duty to try cases and to finally make a determination of the
controversy after the presentation of evidence. In Francisco Guerrero vs. Court
of Appeals, 23 et al., the Court had this to say:
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from
the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to
the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights
should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of
the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well.
Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and
inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case
on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable
to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense)
substantial justice in the premises.
The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not
operate as to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in prosecuting
criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice
be afforded a fair opportunity to present their side.
Contrary to the stance of the Solicitor General, the delay adverted to in the cases
under consideration does not measure up to the unreasonableness of the delay
of disposition in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, and other allied cases. It cannot be
said that the petitioners found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights
simply by reason of the delay and without more.
In Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan et al., 24 this Court ruled that:
. . . the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for
that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case.
From the facts and circumstances at bar, the Court cannot glean any grave
abuse of discretion tainting the denial by the respondent court of petitioners'
motion to quash.
The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him.
25 But such duty should not be of cases at the expense of thoroughness and
correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of the
Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient
governments service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of
government personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the
Office of the Ombudsman.
As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman 26 do not specifically prescribe a period within which a criminal
complaint may be investigated and decided. But the same Rules adopt the
Rules of Court on Preliminary Investigation, as modified by the Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman. Under the Rules of Court, 27 the Investigating
Officer has ten (10) days from submission of the case to come out with the
resolution.1âwphi1
But it bears stressing that the period fixed by law is merely "directory", although
it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. 28 The
records of the case do not show any such complete disregard. In like manner,
the circumstances averred in the petition do not suffice to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance by the Ombudsman of his
functions, especially those involving the review of numerous resolutions and
recommendations of his investigating officers.
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical
relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a
full blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law
and/or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. 29 But here, the Court finds
none.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the respondent Regional Trial Court
is hereby ordered to attend with dispatch to the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-96-
66607, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal, Rafael T.
Page 22 of 34
Flores, Herminio T. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria", and Criminal Case No. Q-96-
66608, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal". No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-93-986 September 26, 2000
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE WILLIAM LAYAGUE, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On March 11, 1993, Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera of Davao City filed a sworn letter-
complaint to the Court Administrator against William Layague, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14,1 alleging that the latter
failed to decide or resolve the following cases and incidents for an unreasonable
length of time:
(1) Civil Case No. 18,636-87 entitled "Joaquin Reyes, Plaintiff, versus
Development Bank of the Philippines, Defendant; Development Bank of the
Philippines, Third-Party Plaintiff, versus Spouses Oscar Mercado and Leah
Mercado, et al., Third-Party Defendants," wherein trial was terminated on
December 12, 1991;
(2) Civil Case No. 19,794-89 entitled "Edgar Jamisola, Plaintiff, versus DSG
Sons Group, et al., Defendants," which was submitted for decision in January
1992;
(3) Civil Case No. 17,215 entitled "Rosario Peñalosa Mercado, Plaintiff, versus
Jesus K. Mercado, et al., Defendants," which had already been terminated but
complainant lawyer filed a "Petition for Intervention" and "Motion Re-Open Case
for the Sole Purpose of Determining and Resolving Amount of Attorney’s Fees
for Plaintiff’s Former Counsel" which remained unresolved since September 22,
1989, or for more than three years;
(4) Criminal Cases Nos. 20,612-90 and 21,882-90, both entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Joey Herbolingo, et al., Accused," for violation of P.D. 1866
qualified by death and for murder, in which it took respondent judge one year,
more or less, to resolve the motion to recall warrant of arrest of one of the
accused; AND
(5) Criminal Case No. 24,413-91 entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Ronan Dulanas," for murder, where respondent judge hastily granted bail to the
accused notwithstanding that the evidence of guilt was strong.
On May 31, 1993, this Court required respondent to comment within ten days.2
Respondent filed three motions for extension of time, all of which were granted.3
However, he still failed to file his comment, for which reason this Court, on
August 22, 1994, issued a Resolution requiring respondent to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of court.4 Again,
respondent sought extensions of time to comply with the show-cause order,
citing health reasons. On November 16, 1994, this Court imposed on
respondent a fine in the amount of P500.00 or imprisonment of five (5) days if
such fine is not paid, and directed him to file his comment on the administrative
complaint.5 Respondent paid the fine by postal money order, which was
received by this Court on January 20, 1995.6
Also on January 20, 1995, respondent filed a Compliance containing his
comments on the administrative complaint.7 He alleges that Civil Case No.
18,636-87 had already been decided on November 18, 1994; Civil Case No.
19,794-89 had been decided on March 2, 1994; and the incident in Civil Case
No. 17,215 had been resolved on October 3, 1994. With respect to Criminal
Cases Nos. 20,612-90 and 21,882-90, respondent states that he had already
resolved the motion to recall warrant of arrest but admits that there was delay
therein. As to Criminal Case No. 24,413-91, respondent merely states that
complainant’s claim of his hasty grant of bail has no basis in the record of that
case. Respondent attributes the delay in his resolution and decision of these
cases to his poor health, and submitted medical certificates dated July 26, 1993
and September 29, 1994.
This Court required complainant to reply.8 On January 31, 1995, complainant
filed his Reply to Compliance,9 wherein he highlighted the number of years or
months of delay during which the cases complained of remained pending even
before the alleged sickness adverted to in his medical certificates. Further,
complainant charged respondent judge of falsifying his monthly reports of
cases. Anent Criminal Case No. 24,413-91, complainant avers that although
respondent’s order granting the accused provisional liberty states that the bail
bond was executed by Dominion Insurance Corporation, the Bail Bond
appearing in the record was issued under the name of The First Continental
Assurance Company, Inc., thus indicating that respondent approved the
application for bail without having first seen the bail bond posted by the accused.
Finally, complainant cites another case, Criminal Cases Nos. 15,027-87 and
15,033-87 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Petronila Abellana" for
violation of B.P. 22, in which a motion for reconsideration was submitted for
resolution as early as January 19, 1993 but remained unresolved.
In a Resolution dated March 8, 1995, respondent judge was required to file his
rejoinder.10 Again, respondent filed successive motions for extension of time,
on the ground that he was suffering from acute erosive and atropic gastritis and
emphysema. These motions for extension were all granted by this Court on May
15, 1995.11 On August 30, 1995, respondent still has not filed his rejoinder; thus
prompting this Court to issue another Resolution requiring him to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.12 Without any
compliance from respondent, this Court, on July 10, 1996, again imposed on
respondent a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment.13
Respondent paid the fine14 and submitted his rejoinder15 on September 18,
1996. He denies that he was hasty in the grant of bail in Criminal Case No.
24,413-91. According to respondent, the motion for bail was filed on November
6, 1991. On January 24, 1992, the motion was duly heard and deemed
submitted for resolution. The order granting bail to the accused was issued on
February 21, 1992, and a copy thereof was served on defense counsel on
February 24, 1992. The accused submitted to the court his bail bond issued by
Dominion Insurance Corporation, formerly known as The First Continental
Assurance Company, Inc., which respondent approved also on February 24,
1992.
Countering complainant’s charge that he did not suffer any illness prior to the
resolution or decision of the cases, respondent states that way back in 1974, he
had his gall bladder surgically removed; in 1976, he developed duodenal ulcer
for which he underwent treatment for three months; in 1988, he was hospitalized
for vertigo (Menier’s Syndrome); in January 1995, he was diagnosed with
emphysema and since then had been suffering from numbness in the lower
extremities, and acute erosive and atroptic gastritis. Finally, he denies the
imputation of falsification, pointing out that he brought to the attention of this
Court En Banc his frail health and lack of support staff which rendered it difficult
for him to resolve cases within the required period, and he had been adequately
punished for this by this Court with a fine of P25,000.00 in A.M. No. 94-5-178-
RTC.16
In a Resolution dated November 11, 1996, this Court referred the administrative
complaint to Court of Appeals Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. for investigation,
report and recommendation.17 On motion by both complainant and respondent,
this Court transferred the venue of the investigation to Davao City and
designated Judge Gregorio A. Palabrica, Sr., Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, to receive the parties’ evidence and thereafter forward
the record of his investigation to Justice Martin.18
After submission by Judge Palabrica of the evidence received in this
administrative matter, Justice Martin filed his report with this Court, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, recommending that for his gross inefficiency,
respondent judge be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) with a stern warning that the commission of the same or
similar act in the future will subject him to a more severe penalty.19
On October 27, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted to this
Court its own evaluation, report and recommendation.20 The Court
Administrator observed, first, that Civil Case No. 18,636-87 had already been
included in the audit conducted on March 21 to 30, 1994 of Branches 8 to 17 of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, and for which this Court already fined
respondent in the sum of P25,000.00. Thus, he recommended that respondent
not be fined a second time for delay in deciding that case. Secondly, the Court
Administrator noted that Civil Case No. 17,215 was filed last September 27,
1984, before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Based on this, respondent
should not be considered as having been in delay. Besides, according to the
Court Administrator, that case had already been decided; it was only the motion
for determining the amount of attorney’s fees that was not acted upon
immediately. Withal, the Court Administrator found that there was only one civil
case, i.e., Civil Case No. 19,794-89, where the decision was delayed. Hence,
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be fined in the amount
of P5,000.00. Thus:
In view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Judge William
Layague:
[1] be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 for the delay in the rendition of the
decision in Civil Case No. 19,794;
[2] be DECLARED not to have incurred in delay in the resolution of the pending
incident in Civil Case No. 17,215;
[3] NOT be FINED for the delay in the rendition of the decision of Civil Case No.
18,636, he having been already fined for the delay in the rendition of the decision
in said case in A.M. No. 94-5-178-RTC; and
[4] be DECLARED not to have been hasty in granting bail to the accused in
Criminal Case No. 24,413, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ronan
Dulane," but to have observed procedural due process in the granting of the
same.21
In absolving respondent judge from the charge of hastily granting bail in Criminal
Case No. 24,413-91, the Court Administrator sustained Justice Martin’s
recommendation as follows:
Page 23 of 34
Anent the respondent judge’s grant of bail to the accused and his subsequent
approval of the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 24,413-91 entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Ronan Dulane, Accused," we are not persuaded by the
complainant’s accusation that there was undue haste in allowing bail and
improper approval of the bail bond filed. The respondent judge conducted a full-
blown hearing in the accused’s application for bail where the prosecution
presented its evidence. The Order admitting the evidence adduced and
declaring the petition for bail submitted for resolution was issued on January 24,
1992. The Order granting bail to the accused was handed down on February
21, 1992, or almost a month later (pp. 102-103, Rollo). The bail bond furnished
by the Dominion Insurance Corporation, formerly known as the First Continental
Assurance Company, Inc., complete with all the requisite attachments, was
approved apparently two (2) days later, February 24, 1992 (pp. 110-112, Rollo).
The charges that there was undue haste in grant of bail, and that the bail bond
was irregularly approved, are belied by the evidence on record. We hold,
therefore, that the respondent judge’s explanation on the point is satisfactory.22
Finding the foregoing recommendation to be well-taken and supported by the
record, we adopt the same and, accordingly, dismiss the complaint insofar as it
charges respondent judge of hastily granting bail in Criminal Case No. 24,413-
91.
Likewise, we sustain the Court Administrator’s finding that in our Resolution in
A.M. 94-5-178-RTC, Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Cases Conducted in the Regional Trial Courts of Davao City, dated August 7,
1996, respondent has already been fined for delaying the resolution of Civil
Case No. 18,636-87. Hence, respondent judge should no longer be punished a
second time for exactly the same infraction. While double jeopardy does not lie
in administrative cases,23 it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice
to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already
answered for.
The Court Administrator was correct in his recommendation of a fine for
respondent’s delay in deciding Civil Case No. 19,794-89. We do not, however,
agree with his recommendation that respondent judge be excused from his
delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 17,215 for the mere reason that it was
filed before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Even under the 1973
Constitution, deadlines were imposed on the decision or resolution of cases or
matters by all courts, to wit:
Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case
or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be
eighteen months for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all
other inferior courts.24
As can be clearly seen, the directive to the courts to speedily decide or resolve
cases or matters was not a new provision in the 1987 Constitution. It has been
there since the previous Constitution. In a case decided under the 1973
Constitution, this Court reprimanded and admonished a municipal judge for
deciding a criminal case beyond the ninety-day period required in Article X,
Section 15 of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Judiciary Act.25
The deadline within which cases or matters pending before 1987 should be
decided or resolved was expressly recognized and re-imposed in the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which states, among others:26
SEC. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this
Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the
effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
SEC. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution,
of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters
submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme
Court as soon as practicable.
SEC. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of
this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of
this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification.
In turn, Article VIII, Section 15, paragraphs (3) and (4), which are adverted to in
the transitory provisions, read:
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice of the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence
thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.27
Accordingly, we issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1,
providing for the guidelines for the implementation of Article XVIII, Section 12 of
the Constitution, mandating the adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court and
lower courts prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Among them, the
more pertinent state:

1. Effective Docket Control:
xxx xxx x x x.
1.4. Preference in Disposition. --- All cases or matters submitted for decision or
resolution before the effectivity of the Constitution shall be given preference by
the presiding judge in his disposition of his docket.
xxx xxx x x x.
5. Decision-Writing:
5.1. All Presiding Judges must observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in
Art. VIII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.
xxx xxx x x x.
6. Motions and Other Interlocutory Matters:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
xxx xxx x x x.
10. Maintaining Public Confidence in the Courts:
xxx xxx x x x.
10.3. The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious design to strengthen
public confidence in the Courts.1âwphi1 All efforts should be exerted so that
case disposals should exceed case inputs. Whenever obstacles present
themselves which delay case disposition, the Presiding Judge should
immediately call the attention of the Supreme Court through the Court
Administrator when the situation requires remedies beyond the control or
capability of the judges.
The constitutional mandate to promptly dispose of cases does not only refer to
the decision of cases on their merits, but also to the resolution of motions and
other interlocutory matters, as the constitutional provisions explicitly mention
"cases" and "matters". Therefore, respondent judge must not be excused for his
delay in resolving the incident in Civil Case No. 17,215.
Finally, the Court Administrator omitted to mention Criminal Cases Nos. 20,612-
90 and 21,882-90, wherein respondent admittedly resolved the motion to recall
warrant of arrest after a delay of one (1) year. This, too, must be taken into
consideration in the imposition of sanctions on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge William Layague is FINED in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for delay in the decision of Civil Case
No. 19,794 and in the resolution of the incidents in Civil Case No. 17,215,
Criminal Case No. 20,612-90 and Criminal Case No. 21,882-90. The complaints
against him, of delay in deciding Civil Case No. 18,636-87 and for hastily
granting bail in Criminal Case No. 24,413-91, are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001
ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP.,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated November 21, 19961 and of January 7, 1997,2 in CA-G.R. No.
SP-42312, which denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon. Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and
the People of the Philippines.3 Involved in said petition were the orders of Judge
Jaime D. Discaya and Judge Tuason dated October 25, 19954 and April 11,
1996,5 respectively, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62 which petitioner
claimed were violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy but
which respondent appellate court upheld.1âwphi1.nêt
The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
Page 24 of 34
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru
falsification of public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with
respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases.
The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment
on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21,
1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December
1994, and in January and February 1993, but the hearings were cancelled
because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial
judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to
all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request
of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel,
postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon
petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise
cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice.
Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued the
following order:
When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in Court
despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved
that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and
considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby dismissed.
With respect to accused Spouses Susensio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante
Duldulao, 1st warrant be issued for their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner,
respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order
of September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:
In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the
Supreme Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried. At least this right
is relative, taking into (the) account the circumstances of each case.
There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified
postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case,
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the
accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October
25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence
of the proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective
counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did not interpose objection
to private prosecutor's motion to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July
24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases,
the three other accused were not present. There were only three settings from
the date of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence
and the same were postponed with valid reasons.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the
acquittal of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not
been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the
accused there is no double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1995
dismissing the charge/case against the accused Roberto Almario is
reconsidered and set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his
assailed Order of April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 9
November 1995 is hereby denied for lack of merit considering that, based on
the foregoing facts, the proceedings in this case have not been prolonged
unreasonably nor were there oppressive delays and unjustified postponements
in violation of the Accused's constitutional right to speedy trial.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, RCBC and the People of the Philippines. In a resolution dated November
21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied the petition due course and
dismissed it for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion to reconsider it was likewise
denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 7, 1997.
Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the
trial court which, in turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the order which dismissed the criminal cases
against him. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine
of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged
violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.7
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had
set in so that petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been
violated.
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had leaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
x x x
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.8
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to
speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial
court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with
his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy
trial.9 Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged
unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.10
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of
the trial so that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein
petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application of the
constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.11 Both the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of
petitioner's case was terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set
in the months of December 1994, and January and February of 1995. The
scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was
promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not
immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala.1âwphi1.nêt
Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof
of notice to the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was
postponed upon motion of the private prosecutor without objection from
petitioner's counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset, despite the
presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service of
notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma
Cruz.12
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to
circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. The first
and third postponements were clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to
accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another was made without objection from
petitioner's counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel for petitioner
moved for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private
prosecutor due to a severe attack of gout and arthritis, although he had sent his
associate lawyer acceptable to the court.13 All in all, there were only three re-
setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive
events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for
valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the
cases against petitioner,14 which order the appellate court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the
chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or
transfers. Petitioner could not refute the appellate court's findings that
petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and
appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable,
vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of
petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements
which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.15
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements
unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the
right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason
to support the initial order of dismissal.
Page 25 of 34
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double
jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably.16 For as petitioner's
right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of
double jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused - was not met. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon
motion of petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express consent of
petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double
jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal,
(244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,17 where we overturned an
order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial -
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of
the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has
not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot
invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they
allowed reinstatement of the cases against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-
42312, dated November 21, 1996 and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140529 September 6, 2001
JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO and HON.
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. in their official capacities as Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respectively, and the
Sandiganbayan, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus seeking: 1) the dismissal of Ombudsman
Case No. OMB-3-93-2793 (now Criminal Cases Nos. 25247-25226); and 2) the
issuance of a clearance in favor of petitioner Jose P. Lopez, Jr.
The facts as narrated in the memorandum of petitioner are:
"1. The petitioner is presently the Administrative Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII, Cotabato City.
Because of the exigency of the service, the petitioner temporarily stays in
Cotabato City although he is a resident of Parañaque City.
2. On June 30, 1959, the petitioner started working with the DECS as a
classroom teacher. Through hard work, exemplary performance and continuous
studies, he was promoted and assigned to different positions such as Special
Education Teacher; Child and Youth Specialist; 2nd Lt., 36 Battalion Combat
Team, Philippine Army (Reserved Force); Asst. Director and concurrent
Director, Child and Youth Research Center (now a defunct office); and finally,
he was appointed as Administrative Officer V, DECS-Region XII, Cotabato City.
3. Among the tasks of the petitioner as Administrative Officer V is to determine
whether certain expenses are necessary in the attainment of the objectives of
the DECS-Region XII and to pass upon, review and evaluate documents and
other supporting papers submitted to him in relation to his duties.
4. Between 1992 and 1993, DECS-Region XII ordered several pieces of
laboratory equipment and apparati requested by different school divisions of the
region.
5. The concerned officers of DECS-Region XII submitted to the petitioner the
documents covering the transactions.
6. After careful scrutiny of the documents submitted to him, the petitioner affixed
his signature on the disbursements vouchers that were accompanied by
Purchase Orders, Sales Invoices, Delivery/Memorandum Receipts and proof
that the transactions were post audited by the COA Resident Auditor who found
them in order.
7. Disregarding the findings of the COA Resident Auditor - DECS Region XII,
Cotabato City, who post audited the transactions and found them in order, for
reasons of his own, the COA Regional Director formed a Special Audit Team to
investigate and audit the transactions.

8. Without seeking the presence of the concerned officials and employees of
DECS – Region XII, the COA Special Audit Team conducted an audit of the
transactions.
9. On December 20, 1993, the members of the COA Special Audit Team
submitted to the COA Regional Director-Region XII, their Joint Affidavit claiming
alleged deficiencies in the transactions of DECS – Region XII implicating thereto
the petitioner and some concerned officials and employees of DECS-Region
XII.
10. Dispensing conducting an exit conference and inviting the petitioner to clarify
the allegations of the COA Special Audit Team in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint,
in post-haste the COA Regional Directors indorsed it to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao for preliminary investigation.
11. The Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao docketed the complaint as Case No.
3-93-27791, entitled "Commission on Audit vs. Makil Pundaodaya, et al.," for
Falsification of Documents by Public Officers."
12. In her Order dated March 1, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie
Dinah Tolentino directed the petitioner to submit a Counter-Affidavit without
informing him of his constitutional right to counsel.
13. On April 14, 1994, without the assistance of counsel, the petitioner wrote the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao requesting for an extension of ten (10)
days from April 19, 1994 to submit his Counter-Affidavit.
14. On April 19, 1994, Atty. Edgardo A. Camello, counsel for Makil Pundaodaya
and the other respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-8791 filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to submit their Counter-Affidavits.
15. On April 22, 1994, without the assistance of counsel, the petitioner submitted
to the Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao his Counter-Affidavit he personally
prepared denying specifically each and every criminal act attributed to him by
the Commission on Audit.
16. Although the petitioner did not submit any written statement authorizing Atty.
Camello to represent him in Case No. OMB 3-93-8791, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao erroneously assumed or deliberately made to appear
that he was represented by said attorney. As a consequence thereof, the Office
of Ombudsman-Mindanao did not notify him of the progress of the preliminary
investigation. In fact, it did not issue any order directing COA, Region XII to
furnish him with a copy of the latter’s Reply-Affidavit, which explained why
petitioner could not be expected to submit a Rejoinder to rebut the issues raised
in said Reply-Affidavit; to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify
before the Graft Investigation Officer or to bring books, documents and other
records relative to the transactions under their control and to secure the
attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness.
17. More than four (4) years after he submitted his Counter-Affidavit, the
petitioner was surprised that, without preliminary investigation and clarificatory
question asked, on July 17, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
terminated the preliminary investigation recommending that he, together with
the other respondents in Case No. OMB 3-93-9791, be prosecuted for violation
of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
18. Within the reglementary period, without the assistance of counsel, the
petitioner sent a letter to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 8,
1999 seeking the reconsideration of the Resolution in Case No. OMB 33-93-
2791 wherein he stressed that he was deprived of due process and that there
was inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation; and there
was no exit conference wherein he could have explained to the Graft
Investigation Officer his exculpatory participation in the transactions
investigated. In addition, he also submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao a Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation reiterating the
allegations mentioned in his letter dated June 8, 1999. Unfortunately, said
Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation was not acted upon by the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao by giving the excuse that its Resolution was
already forwarded to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto."1
On the other hand, the facts as narrated in the Memorandum of the Office of the
Ombudsman are as follows:
"Criminal Cases Nos. 25247 to 25276 stemmed from a special audit conducted
by the Commission on Audit (COA), Region XII relative to the purchase by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII Office,
Cotabato City of school equipment and laboratory apparati. The report on the
special audit was received by the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao on
December 22, 1993. Finding the audit report sufficient to conduct a preliminary
investigation the same was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-93-2791.
In an Order dated March 1, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah
Tolentino directed the concerned public officials, among whom was herein
petitioner, to submit their Counter-Affidavits and controverting evidences within
ten days from receipt of the Order and to furnish a copy of their counter-
Affidavits to the complainant. The latter was given the same period of ten (10)
days to file their reply to the Counter-Affidavits.
On April 19, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received a pleading
denominated as "APPEARANCE With Motion for Extension of Time to Submit
Counter-Affidavits" from Atty. Edgardo A. Camello, counsel for the respondents
in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791. The Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao granted
Page 26 of 34
the motion for extension and gave the respondents until May 4, 1994 within
which to submit their Counter-Affidavits.
On May 10, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received the
Counter-Affidavits of the respondents.
On August 2, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao was informed
through the letter of COA Director Eugenio G. Fernandez that the COA was not
furnished by the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791 of their Counter-
Affidavits.
Subsequently, GIO Tolentino issued an Order dropping Alimot Lao Arumpac
from the case in view of his death. The COA on the other hand was directed to
submit its Reply-Affidavit within ten days from receipt of the Order.
On January 11, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received a
telegram from COA, Region XII Office requesting that it be allowed until
February 29, 1995 within which to submit its Reply-Affidavit on the ground that
the audit team leader and members who conducted the special audit of DECS,
Region XII Office were preparing for their annual audit report.
On February 29, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received the
Reply-Affidavit of COA.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1998 GIO Rachelle L. Ladrera recommended the
filing of thirty (30) Informations against petitioner, Makil U. Pundaodaya, Jose T.
Navera, Rogelio de los Reyes, Daud M. Adiong, Napoleon O. Cedeno, Laga S.
Mangelen and Mama S. Macoming. The said recommendation was approved
by public respondents Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito P. Gervacio
on February 27, 1999, and by the Honorable Ombudsman on April 30, 1999.
The thirty Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25247 to 25276 were
filed with the Sandiganbayan and raffled to the respondent court on May 5,
1999.
On July 27, 1999 petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for the
reduction of the bail. The motion was approved by the respondent court in an
Order dated August 4, 1999."2
In his Memorandum, petitioner presents before this Court the sole issue of:
"Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the
Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against the petitioner which violated
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the Complaint against him; and
whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the Complaint
against the petitioner would warrant its dismissal."3 Petitioner’s main argument
is that the "complaint against petitioner, Case No. OMB 3-93-2793, was filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao on December 10, 1993 and was
resolved only on April 30, 1998,4 resulting in a delay of 4 years, 4 months and
10 days." In addition, petitioner argues that he was deprived of due process
because he did not engage a certain Atty. Edgardo Camello who filed an
"Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Counter-Affidavits" on
behalf of the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791; that he was not advised
by the Graft Investigation Officer of his right to attorney; and that he filed his
counter-affidavit without the assistance of counsel. On the other hand,
respondent Office of the Ombudsman argues that petitioners cannot, by this
special civil action for mandamus, compel the ombudsman to dismiss the
criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a
discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.
First, we shall discuss the propriety of mandamus as a remedy, an issue which
is not novel. This Court has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance
of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or
judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not apply in cases
where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess
of authority."5 Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman6 and Roque vs. Office
of the Ombudsman7 the writ was issued in said instances.
Second, we shall determine if the exceptions cited apply to this case. The Office
of the Ombudsman narrates that the verified audit report of the COA special
audit team was received on December 22, 1993, and finding the same sufficient
in form and substance was docketed as OMB Case No. 34-93-2791. On the
basis thereof, a preliminary investigation was conducted. On March 1, 1994, the
respondents were ordered to file their counter-affidavits. On May 10, 1994, the
Office of the Ombudsman received the counter-affidavits of respondents. On
February 29, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman received the reply-affidavit of
COA. In a Resolution dated July 17, 1998, graft investigation officer Rachelle L.
Ladrera recommended the filing of thirty (30) informations against petitioner,
Makil U. Pundaodaya, Jose T. Navera, Rogelio de los Reyes, Daud M. Adiong,
Napoleon O. Cedeno, Laga S. Mangelen and Mama S. Macoming. The said
recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito
P. Gervacio on February 27, 1999, and by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on
April 30, 1999. The informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 5,
1999. In its memorandum, the Office of the Ombudsman justified the delay in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation and subsequently, in the filing of the
informations by stating that:
"Records of Case No. OMB 3-93-2791 will show that petitioner, thru his counsel,
filed on April 19, 1994 with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao for an
extension of time to file his Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner submitted his Counter-
Affidavit only on May 11, 1994.
However, in a letter dated August 2, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao was informed by complainant COA that it was not furnished with a
copy of the Counter-Affidavits of the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791
in complete disregard of the Order of GIO Tolentino.
Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao furnished the COA with a copy
of the Counter-Affidavits and ordered the same office to submit its reply thereto
within ten (10) days. It filed its Reply-Affidavit on February 28, 1995.
It will be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao directed the COA
to furnish the respondents in Case No. OMB 3-93-2791 with a copy of their
Reply-Affidavit to afford the latter an opportunity to controvert the allegations
contained therein. Petitioner however, and his other co-respondents did not file
any pleading with, or notified the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao that they
were waiving their right to refute the contents of the Reply-Affidavit. Thus, it is
clear that petitioner’s averment that this case has been pending for more than
six (6) years has no basis.
It should also be considered that there were several transactions involved in
Case No. OMB 3-93-2791. This fact is proven by the thirty (30) Informations
filed before the respondent court. Added to this is the fact that from the time the
July 17, 1998 Resolution was approved by public respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Gervacio in his office in Mindanao the records of the case still has
to be sent to Manila for the review of the Ombudsman. The basic rule therefore
that in applying the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases particular regard must also be take on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case, finds meaning herein."8
We find for petitioner.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings."9 Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.10
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or even without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for
that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.11
In this case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four (4) years
from the time all the counter and reply affidavits were submitted to the Office of
the Ombudsman. After the last reply-affidavit was filed on February 28, 1995, it
was only on July 17, 1998 that a resolution was issued recommending the filing
of the corresponding criminal informations against the petitioner and the others.
It took eight months or on February 27, 1999 for Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same and close to another year or on April 30,
1999 for Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to approve the recommendation. During
this interval, no incidents presented themselves for resolution and the delay
could only be attributed to the inaction on the part of the investigating officials.
Indeed, we find that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
was allowed to elapse at the preliminary investigation stage before the
informations were filed.
True, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the COA and it must rely
on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause.12
However, we find that the cases are not sufficiently complex to justify the length
of time for their resolution. Neither can the long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the number of informations
filed before the Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions involved. The thirty
informations consist of sixteen (16) counts of violations of Section 3 (g) of RA
3019 relative to the overpricing and lack of public bidding of laboratory
apparatus and school equipment; while the fourteen (14) counts are for
violations of Section 3 (e) of the same law relative to the certification in the
inspection reports that the subject items have already been delivered and
received, when in fact they have not yet been actually delivered and received,
in order to facilitate payment to the suppliers. There is no statement that
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. On the
contrary, the Office Ombudsman itself claimed in its memorandum filed before
this Court that "the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavits submitted by the
complainant and the accused respectively, as well as the documents on hand"
were sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause for violation of
Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, a clarificatory hearing was no longer
conducted. Indeed, it appears that the COA special audit team had already
come up and provided the Office of the Ombudsman with the facts and figures
on the alleged overpricing, lack of public bidding and irregular inspection
reports, so much so that a delay of almost four years in terminating the
preliminary investigation is not justified.
Page 27 of 34
Verily, the delay in this case disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty, as mandated
by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal liability
of government officers or employees in every case where the evidence warrants
in order to promote efficient service to the people.13 The failure of said office to
resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost four years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the rights of petitioner as a public official. In such
event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him.
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,14 this Court dismissed the informations pending
before the Sandiganbayan, after finding the delay of three years in the
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan to be violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. It was
held therein:
"x x x. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are
not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay
by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of
a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic
Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The
other two charges relating to the alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which
it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case."
Similarly, we hold that the circumstances obtaining in the instant case do not
warrant or justify the length of time, that is four years, it took the Ombudsman to
resolve the preliminary investigation. What glares from the pleadings of both the
petitioner and the public respondent Ombudsman is that from the submission of
the last reply-affidavit, there was an unexplained interval or inactivity of close to
four years, prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause and
directing the filing of the corresponding informations.
Lastly, petitioner prays for the dismissal of Ombudsman Case No. OMB-3-93-
2791, and this Court, applying the ruling in the Roque case,15 citing Tatad,16
likewise resolves to directly dismiss the informations already filed before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner "in the interest of the speedy disposition of
cases" and considering that "the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of
the criminal complaints against petitioner was not corrected by the eventual
filing of the informations."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case
No. OMB-3-93-2791 is accordingly DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman
is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 145851 November 22, 2001
ABELARDO B. LICAROS, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The unreasonable delay of more, than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case,
without fault on the part of the accused and despite his earnest effort to have
his case decided, violates the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a
case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not
only during the trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted
for decision.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to compel the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 6672 against herein petitioner, who is charged as an accessory.
The Facts
Undisputed by the special prosecutor2 and the Sandiganbayan3 are the
material facts as narrated by petitioner in this wise:
"4.1 On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was
robbed and divested of cash in the amount of P19,731,320.00.
"4.2 In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to
herein petitioner), one of the principal accused, together with four companions,
delivered in sacks a substantial portion of the stolen money to the Concepcion
Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had its offices, of
which herein petitioner was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery
was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank
Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr., then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein
petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from some Chinese
businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; that Governor
Licaros left for the United States on May 28, 1982 for his periodic medical check-
up, so left to his son, herein petitioner, to attend to the proposed deposit.
"4.3 Even the prosecution admits in their Reply Memorandum that from
the evidence presented, that in the evening of June 8, 1982, herein petitioner
attempted to report the incident to General Fabian Ver but he could not get in
touch with him because the latter was then out of the country; that it was only
the following day, June 9, 1982, when herein petitioner was able to arrange a
meeting with then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior Deputy
Governor Gabriel Singson, and Central Bank Chief Security Officer, Rogelio
Navarete, to report his suspicion that the money being deposited by Modesto
Licaros may have been stolen money. With the report or information supplied
by herein petitioner, then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI Director Jolly
Bugarin and soon after the meeting, the NBI, Metrocom and [the] CB security
guards joined forces for the recovery of the money and the apprehension of the
principal accused.
"4.4 All the aforesaid Central Bank officials executed sworn statements
and testified for herein petitioner, particularly CB Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB
Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson and CB Director of [the] Security and
Transport Department Rogelio Navarette, and were one in saying that it was the
report of herein petitioner to the authorities that broke the case on 9 June 1982
and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and
the arrest of all the principal accused.
"4.5 On July 6, 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan
(now Special Prosecutor) filed an Information for robbery with the
Sandiganbayan docketed as Crim. Case No. 6672 against two groups of
accused:
Principals:
(1) Modesto Licaros y Lacson, [P]rivate [I]ndividual
(2) Leo Flores y Manlangit, CB [S]ecurity [G]uard
(3) Ramon Dolor y Ponce, CB Assistant Regional Cashier
(4) Glicerio Balansin y Elaurza, CB Security [G]uard
(5) Rolando Quejada y Redequillo, Private Individual
(6) Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres, Private Individual
(7) Mario Lopez Vito y Dayungan, Private Individual
(8) Rogelio De la Cruz y Bodegon, Private Individual
Accessory After the Fact:
(1) Abelardo B. Licaros, Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Home Savings
Bank and Trust Co. (HSBTC), Private Individual.
"The Tanodbayan did not adopt the recommendation of the NBI that Abelardo
B. Licaros be charged as principal apparently because no one of those whose
statements were taken including the above principal accused ever testified that
he participated in the planning or execution of the robbery so that he could be
held also in the conspiracy' as alleged by the NBI.
"4.6 On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended
Information naming the same persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz
who is now charged as an accessory, together with private respondent Abelardo
B. Licaros. De la Cruz died on November 6, 1987 as per manifestation by his
counsel dated and filed on November 17, 1987.
"4.7 On November 29, 1982, the accused were arraigned including
herein petitioner, who interposed the plea of not guilty.
"4.8 On January 7, 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan
a 'Motion for Discharge' of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness
which was granted in a Resolution dated February 11, 1983. The Supreme
Court, however, on petition for certiorari filed by accused Flores, Modesto
Licaros and Lopez Vito, annulled the discharge because it ruled that the
Sandiganbayan should have deferred its resolution on the motion to discharge
until after the prosecution has presented all its other evidence.
"4.9 At the close of its evidence, or on July 23, 1984, the prosecution
filed a second motion for discharge of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state
witness but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 13, 1984
denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does not furnish any cue
or suggestion on what petitioner will testify in the event he is discharged and
placed on the stand as state witness.
"4.10 Meanwhile, as of March 8, 1983, the prosecution has presented ten
(10) witnesses. Among those who testified were NBI Agents Victor Bessat and
Apollo Sayo, who took and identified the sworn statements of accused Leo
Flores, Ramon Dolor, Rogelio de la Cruz, Mario Lopez Vito and Modesto
Licaros; M/Sgt. Raynero Galarosa, who took and identified the sworn statement
of accused Pio Flores and the sworn supplemental statement of accused
Glicerio Balansin; Sgt. Eliseo Rioveros, who took and identified the sworn
statement of accused Glicerus Balansin; and CIS Agent Maria Corazon
Page 28 of 34
Pantorial, who took the sworn statement of accused Rolando Quejada. None of
these witnesses, nor any of the principal accused who executed the sworn
statements implicated herein petitioner to the crime of robbery directly or
indirectly.
"4.11 On September 17, 1984, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence. In a Resolution dated October 1, 1984, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence covered by said formal offer and the
prosecution [was] considered to have rested its case.
"4.12 In a Resolution dated June 25, 1985, the Sandiganbayan granted
the prosecution's motion to reopen the case to allow its witness Lamberto
Zuniga to testify on the conspiracy and to identify a sworn statement given
before the NBI on June 15, 1982. Having been established that petitioner was
not part of the conspiracy, the testimony had no materiality nor relevance to the
case insofar as petitioner is concerned.
"4.13 On January 14, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion for Separate Trial
contending that the prosecution already closed its evidence and that his defense
is separate and distinct from the other accused, he having been charged only
as accessory. The [Motion] was granted in an Order dated January 17, 1986.
"4.14 Thereafter, herein petitioner commenced the presentation of his
evidence. Aside from his testimony and that of his late father, former Central
Bank Governor-Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioner presented the top officials of the
Central Bank namely then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Senior
Deputy Governor Gabriel C. Singson, then Central Bank Security and Transport
Dept. Chief Rogelio M. Navarette who identified their sworn statements taken
before the investigators and who testified that it was the petitioner's report on
June 9, 1982 that broke the case and resulted in the recovery of the substantial
portion of the stolen money and the apprehension of the principal accused.
"4.15 On August 8, 1986, petitioner filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On
August 14, 1986, petitioner filed his Memorandum praying that judgment be
rendered acquitting him of the offense charged.
"4.16 In a Resolution dated August 26, 1986, the Sandiganbayan, through
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the EDSA
revolution), admitted all the exhibits covered by said Formal Offer of Exhibits at
the same time, ordering the prosecution to file its Reply Memorandum,
thereafter the case was deemed submitted for decision.
"4.17 On September 26, 1986, the prosecution filed its Reply
Memorandum. Petitioner also filed his Reply Memorandum on September 29,
1986 praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the offense charged.
"4.18 In a Resolution dated October 8, 1986 copy of which was received
by petitioner on October 15, 1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the decision of
the case regarding herein petitioner 'until after the submission of the case for
decision with respect to the other accused.'
"4.19 Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 1986,
but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated December 16, 1986 and
promulgated on January 6, 1987 denied the same, the dispositive portion of
which read(s):
'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
accused Abelardo B. Licaros is denied.
'The decision as to the accusation against him will be rendered together with the
accusation against the other accused without relating the evidence separately
presented at the separate proceeding held for the separate sets of accused one
way or the other.'
"4.20. As admitted by the prosecution in its Comment on the Omnibus
Motion dated March 31, 2000, the 'case was submitted for decision on June 20,
1990.'
"4.21 As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the case was
submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision.
"4.22 The Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision even while the
proceedings involving herein petitioner as an accessory in a separate trial were
terminated as early as October 8, 1986, while those against all the principal
accused were deemed submit[t]ed for decision on June 20, 1990.
"4.23 As early as October 16, 1986, herein petitioner already invoked his
constitutional right to speedy justice when he filed a Motion on said date praying
for, among other things, that the Sandiganbayan reconsider its Resolution dated
October 8, 1986 deferring the decision of the case against herein petitioner 'until
after the submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused'
and that a judgment of acquittal be rendered.
"4.24 The Honorable Sandiganbayan has not also rendered a resolution
on herein petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss filed on March 23, 2000 which
was deemed submitted for resolution on May 5, 2000, the last pleading having
been filed on said date. In the said Omnibus Motion, petitioner prays for the
dismissal of the case insofar as it involves herein petitioner for violation of his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case. Sad to say, even this
Motion to Dismiss has not been acted upon.
"4.25 On 15 August 2000, herein petitioner filed his Motion to Resolve.
This was followed by Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on September
21, 2000.
"4.26 Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten (10) years after the case
was deemed submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the
Decision. Hence, this petition."4
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
A that portion which pertained to petitioner Licaros;
"The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the decision for
more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed submitted for Decision is
tantamount to gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess
of authority.
B
"The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the Decision for
more than ten (10) years violated herein petitioner's constitutional right to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the case.
C
"Recent Decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court mandate the immediate
dismissal of the case against herein petitioner."5
In brief, the main issue is whether petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case has been violated. We shall also discuss, as a side issue,
the propriety of mandamus as a remedy under the circumstances in this case.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.6
Main Issue:
The Right to a Speedy Disposition
On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was deemed submitted for the
decision of the Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken by the
anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss, grounded on the violation of his right to a speedy disposition.
Unfortunately, even this Motion has not been ruled upon by public respondent.
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only
90 days to decide a case from the time it is deemed submitted for decision.
Considering that the subject criminal case was submitted for decision as early
as June 20, 1990, it is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the
case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we were to consider the period
provided under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12
months from the submission of the case for decision, the Sandiganbayan would
still have miserably failed to perform its mandated duty to render a decision on
the case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then, the decision in this
case is long overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long
expired.7
Even more important than the above periods within which the decision should
have been rendered is the right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition
of one's case before any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body.8 This
constitutionally guaranteed right finds greater significance in a criminal case
before a court of justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of
justice for the accused altogether. Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is
justice denied" is by no means a trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken
for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice.
Indubitably, there has been a transgression of the right of petitioner to a speedy
disposition of his case due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither
that court nor the special prosecutor contradicted his allegation of a ten-year
delay in the disposition of his case. The special prosecutor in its Comment9
even openly admitted the date when the case had been deemed submitted for
decision, as well as respondent court's failure to act on it despite petitioner's
several Motions to resolve the case. The special prosecutor stated as follows:
"With the termination of presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the
principal accused in this case, the same was deemed submitted for decision on
June 20, 1990.
"Alleging violation by respondent court of his right to speedy disposition of the
case, petitioner on March 23, 2000 filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. His
motion was deemed submitted for resolution by the respondent court on May 5,
2000.
"On August 15, 2000, petitioner filed before the respondent court a Motion to
Resolve and a month thereafter a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution. No
decision has yet been rendered by respondent court."10
For its part, the Sandiganbayan candidly admitted that the said criminal case
had not been ruled upon all this time, because it "was one of those cases that
got buried"11 in the archives during the reorganization in that court. Presiding
Page 29 of 34
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena's explanation (contained in his Comment) is
quoted in full hereunder:
"1. The factual narrative by the petitioner in the instant matter is
substantially correct;
"2. Indeed, originally petitioner Licaros had filed a Motion for Resolution
of his portion of the case after he submitted his evidence separately;
"3. Eventually, the instant case was submitted for decision;
"4. Indeed, it would have been ripe to resolve the instant case including
"5. The matter was duly assigned for drafting of the decision (not the
undersigned).
"6. Sometime in 1995, a draft of the Decision was submitted for
consideration by the other justices of the Division;
"7. In the meantime, movements took place in the composition of the
justices who constituted the First Division later.
"8. In 1997, the entire Court was re-organized with the addition of two
(2) new Divisions and six (6) new justices;
"9. At this time, the cases in the Sandiganbayan, whether in progress
or submitted were re-distributed from the original Divisions to which they had
been raffled to the new Divisions;
"10. The instant case remained with this Division;
"11. While the burden of each Division has considerably lightened, the
new justices had to undergo an orientation in this Court;
"12. Not all cases were immediately re-assigned to the different
members. The instant case was one of them;
"13. Then, this Court relocated to its present premises which required not
only packing and crating the records but the problem of not being able to unpack
them very easily due to the absence of an adequate number of shelves and
cabinets available;
"14. Due to the difficulty in funds, the Philippine Estate Authority which
was supposed to have provided new furniture including shelves and cabinets
out of the payments made to it, was unable to do so;
"15. To this date, the three original Divisions do not have all the needed
shelves and many records remain in cardboard boxes both in chambers and in
the offices of the Division Clerk of Court. (In the library and in the Archives, the
boxes for books and old records remained unopened.);
"16. In all this, the instant matter was one of those that got 'buried';
"17. Significantly, when the records of this case were returned to the
undersigned, the records of this case were not logged in the record book through
some oversight of his staff which the undersigned cannot explain so that it did
not appear in the tracking process of the records of this office;
"18. At this time, work is being done on the case for the preparation and
finalization of the decision which the undersigned has taken upon himself.
"19. Insofar as this Division is concerned, the responsibility for this
situation belongs exclusively to the undersigned, both in his capacity as
chairman and as Presiding Justice;
"The undersigned respectfully reiterates: there is indeed fault and the fault is
exclusively that of the undersigned — for which the undersigned begs for the
kindness of this Honorable Court and humbly submits to its wisdom and
judgment."12
Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,13 Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman14 and
Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,15 petitioner claims that he is entitled to a
dismissal of the criminal case against him. An unreasonable delay of three years
in the disposition of a case violates the accused's constitutional rights, as the
Court explained in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:
"Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of 'speedy disposition' of cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of
close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light
of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar."16
Because of an inordinate delay of more than six years in the disposition of
Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, the High Court ordered its dismissal, as
follows:
"After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutional guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the
cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant
to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan . x x x "17
More recently, in Roque et. al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court dismissed
the criminal cases against petitioner therein, on the following explanation:
"Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as
mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on
complaints before him. More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of cases filed against them. Although
respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman
Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no
explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the
Complaint."18
On the other hand, the special prosecutor contends that the above-cited rulings
of the Court should not apply to the present case, because what was involved
in those cases was a delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman or the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) with respect to the
holding of a preliminary investigation. He argues that the case against herein
petitioner has already been proven by the ombudsman with the filing of the
corresponding Information before respondent court. Moreover, the prosecution
has already fully discharged its mandated duty to present evidence against the
accused. In other words, the special prosecutor is of the view that the accused's
right to a speedy disposition of his case is not violated when the prosecution
aspect of the case has already been duly performed.
We cannot accept the special prosecutor's limited and constrained interpretation
of the constitutionally enshrined right to a speedy disposition of cases. It must
be understood that in the ordinary course of a criminal proceeding, a court is
responsible for the ultimate disposition of the case. This is true irrespective of
the prosecution's punctual performance of its duty. Hence, notwithstanding the
filing of the information, the presentation of evidence and the completion of the
trial proper, the eventual disposition of the case will still depend largely on the
timely rendition of judgment by a court. And where it does not act promptly on
the adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law, the
accused's right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced
as when the prosecution is prolonged or deferred indefinitely. Accordingly, with
all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be
looked upon with care and caution when that case has already been submitted
to the court for decision.
In Abadia v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court had the occasion to rule on the nature
and the extent as well as the broader protection afforded by the constitutional
right to the speedy disposition of a case, as compared with the right to a speedy
trial. Thus, it ratiocinated as follows:
"The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to
expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural
machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III
of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases
'before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.' This protection
extends to all citizens, x x x and covers the periods before, during and after the
trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely
the right to a speedy trial."20 (Emphasis supplied)
It has been held that a breach of the right of the accused to the speedy
disposition of a case may have consequential effects, but it is not enough that
there be some procrastination in the proceedings. In order to justify the
dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established that the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.21
In the case before us, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even
after the lapse of more than ten years after it was submitted for decision involves
more than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings. From the explanation
given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle slumber,
allegedly due to reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics and
facilities for case records. Had it not been for the filing of this Petition for
Mandamus, petitioner would not have seen any development in his case, much
less the eventual disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now,
with only respondent court's assurance that at this time "work is being done on
the case for the preparation and finalization of the decision."22
In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court denied a Petition seeking to
dismiss a criminal case grounded on an alleged violation of the accused's right
to a speedy disposition. However, the accused in the said case was deemed to
have slept on his rights by not asserting them at the earliest possible
opportunity. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:
"In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was
submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was
reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and
only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990
the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly,
it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to
November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting
on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of
safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 30 of 34
"In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation
against his own right to speedy disposition only when respondent trial judge
reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just
continued to sleep on his right — a situation amounting to laches — had the
respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of
the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the
case, The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten
years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the
case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe the stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it.
As it is, his, silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right."24
In the instant Petition, however, the accused had been assertively and
assiduously invoking his right to a speedy disposition even before the case was
submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.25 In fact, he has already filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss,26 a Motion to Resolve27 and a Reiterative Motion
for Early Resolution,28 all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, in the light of the foregoing circumstances, he cannot be
said to have slept on his rights, much less waived the assertion thereof. Quite
the contrary, he has been persistent in his demand for the eventual disposition
of the criminal case against him.
Indeed, petitioner has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case,
which was deemed submitted for decision more than ten years ago. And though
such failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended by respondent
court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused just as much vexation and
oppression, in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his
case. Hence, his reliance on the aforementioned cases for the dismissal of the
criminal case against him may be sustained, not so much on the basis of the
right to a speedy trial, but on the right to a speedy disposition of his case, which
is of broader and more appropriate application under the circumstances.
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,29 penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr., the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a
speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:
"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay."30
As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed since the subject case
has been deemed submitted for decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed
to petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor undertaken any
procedural device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been
continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even during the early stages
of the prosecution. Moreover, it is undeniable that such delay has caused much
prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner, whose career as bank
executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an
unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles' sword over
his head for more than a decade. We need not stress the consequences and
problems inherent in this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which
include the prospects of unrealized business transactions, stagnant
professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched
reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner has been charged
merely as an accessory after the fact due to his being a senior executive of the
bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly
then, the dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified under the
circumstances and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above-cited
case.
Procedural Issue:
Mandamus as an Appropriate Remedy
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated
by the Constitution.31 To reiterate, the right of the accused to the speedy
disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law.
Correlatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution,
to speedily dispose of the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand,
as a matter mandated by the Constitution, expeditious action from all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice.32
Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial
but not of a discretionary duty.33 More specifically, persons or public officials
may be directed to act with or to exercise discretion, but not as to how that
discretion should be exercised. However, our jurisprudence is replete with
exceptions in this matter. Thus, it has been held that in a case where there is
"gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority,"
the writ may be issued to control precisely the exercise of such discretion.34
As discussed above, the Sandiganbayan's inordinate delay in deciding the
subject criminal case prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of
his case. Such undue delay can be characterized as no less than a grave abuse
of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of petitioner. In view of
these circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and
will justify this Court's action of substituting the discretion of respondent with that
of its own.

In the very recent case Lopez Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman et al.,35 the Court
deemed it appropriate to dismiss directly the criminal suit before the
Sandiganbayan in the interest of the speedy disposition thereof. Thus, it ruled
as follows:
"x x x [T]his Court applying the ruling in the Roque case, citing Tatad, likewise
resolves to directly dismiss the informations already filed before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner 'in the interest of the speedy disposition of
case' "
We find that the circumstances obtaining in the action cited above are similar to
those in the instant Petition and thus warrant the same course of action; namely,
dismissal of the case against herein petitioner. However, no administrative
sanction against respondent court or its members can be meted out in the
present proceedings. Due process requires that before such penalty can be
imposed, the proper administrative proceedings must be conducted, as in fact
one is already being undertaken in AM No. 00-8-05-SC entitled "Re: Problem of
Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan."
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for
violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case is justified by the
following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the resolution of the case is
inordinately long; (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by reason
of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently
asserted it, (4) he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the
resolution of his case, (5) he did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies
during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6)
the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay
and even admitted that the case was one of those that got "buried" during its
reorganization, and (7) petitioner was merely charged as an accessory after the
fact.
For too long, petitioner has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the
ultimate resolution of his case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is
completely attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be
ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his constitutional
right to speedy disposition and to grant him speedy justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and, as against petitioner,
Criminal Case No. 6672 pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Carpio, JJ ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 146368-69 October 18, 2004
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this Motion for Reconsideration,1 petitioner Madeleine Mendoza-Ong seeks
a reversal of this Court’s October 23, 2003, Resolution dismissing her petition
for certiorari and upholding the Sandiganbayan’s denial of her motion to quash.
She contends that the Court erred in:
I because the original handling prosecutor was appointed Resident Ombudsman
…holding that the information filed against [her] in Criminal Case No. 23848 has
alleged the essential ingredients of the offense charged [and in]
II
…failing to resolve the fundamental issue of whether the excessive or inordinate
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and filing of the informations
after three (3) years had deprived [her] of her Constitutional and statutory right
to due process and speedy determinations and disposition of the cases against
her warranting dismissal thereof.2
Concerning the first ground abovecited, the Court notes that the motion contains
merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to the Court and
found to be without merit. Petitioner fails to raise any new and substantial
arguments, and no cogent reason exists to warrant a reconsideration of the
Court’s Resolution. It would be a useless ritual for the Court to reiterate itself.3
Page 31 of 34
As to the second ground, we find it raises arguments that have already been
passed upon. Reconsideration on that ground may also be denied summarily.
Nevertheless, we shall take time to explain why her motion must be set aside
for lack of merit, if only to clear any lingering doubt on the matter.
Petitioner laments that although the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas as early as December 13, 1994, the
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on August 1, 1997, and the
amended informations, on October 27, 1998. According to her, the delay of
nearly three years to finish the preliminary investigation violated her
constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. The
established facts of this case, however, show no such violation.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.4 In the determination of whether said right has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case.5 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors
to consider and balance.6 A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved
would not be sufficient.7
In this case, the Graft Investigation Officer released his resolution finding
probable cause against petitioner on August 16, 1995, less than six months from
the time petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-affidavits. On
October 30, 1995, only two and a half months later, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had reviewed the case and had approved the resolution. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the lapse of only ten months from the filing of the
complaint on December 13, 1994, to the approval of the resolution on October
30, 1995, is by no means oppressive. "Speedy disposition of cases" is
consistent with reasonable delays. 8 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who
clamor for efficient government service to lodge freely their complaints against
alleged wrongdoing of government personnel.9 A steady stream of cases
reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results.10 Naturally, disposition of those
cases would take some time. Moreover, petitioner herself had contributed to the
alleged delay when she asked for extension of time to file her counter-affidavit.
That the informations were filed only on August 1, 1997, also did not violate
petitioner’s constitutional rights. The delay was not without valid reasons. The
Special Prosecutor in charge of preparing the informations felt a genuine need
to specify in the informations (1) the value of the five drums of fuel petitioner
received as gift in violation of the anti-graft law and (2) the amount of the
subsistence allowance of heavy-equipment operators that the municipality of
Laoang, Northern Samar, paid for when petitioner used heavy equipment rented
by the municipality to develop her private property. The recommendation to
specify these two amounts then had to undergo levels of review and was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto only on January 29, 1996. Unfortunately,
the needed information was not in the records, so the Deputy Special
Prosecutor sought it from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
As that office also did not possess the needed information, it issued an Order
on June 10, 1996, directing petitioner to supply the needed information.
When petitioner received a copy of the Order, however, she sought additional
time to comply with the Order. She waited for two months before filing on August
23, 1996, a verified statement supplying none of the information required of her.
She claimed that the five drums of fuel were merely donated to her and that she
did not know their value. She also alleged that it was she and her husband, and
not the government, who spent for the subsistence allowance of the heavy-
equipment operator in the development of her private property. She did not
object to the delay in the termination of the proceedings against her, nor did she
seek at that time to expedite its resolution.
Petitioner’s refusal to supply the information prompted the handling investigator
at the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas to recommend on
August 28, 1996, that the price of the five drums of fuel be estimated instead.
Notably, the Office of the Special Prosecutor could have filed the informations
then, but petitioner had filed with the said office a motion for reassessment of
evidence on June 25, 1996, and a supplemental motion on August 20, 1996.
These motions, which incidentally also failed to raise the issue of delay,
effectively suspended the filing of the informations.
Subsequently, the case had to be reassigned to another Special Prosecutor
for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Petitioner’s motion for reassessment was
resolved only on June 27, 1997. The resolution again went up for further review.
Considering the number of times that the case had to be reviewed, the levels of
review that the case had to undergo, and petitioner’s own motions for additional
time, the period that lapsed -- roughly two years and five months (from the time
petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-affidavits on March 29,
1995, to the time the informations were filed on August 1, 1997) to terminate the
proceedings against petitioner -- could not be considered vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delay. They were necessitated by exigency of the actions taken
on the case. The period to terminate the proceedings, in our view, had not
violated petitioner’s constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process and to a
speedy disposition of cases.11
Neither could the delay be said to have been prejudicial to her considering that
she herself is guilty of delay.12 The Court has held that if the long delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation was not solely the prosecution’s
fault, but was also due to incidents attributable to the accused and his counsel,
the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases is not violated.13
Petitioner cannot now seek the protection of the law to benefit from what she
now considers the adverse effects of her own conduct in this case.
Petitioner’s reliance on the doctrines in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,14 Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan,15 and Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman16 is misplaced.
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the cases against petitioner remained dormant for
almost three years. In ruling that the long delay violated not only Tatad’s
constitutional right to due process but also his right to speedy disposition of the
cases against him, the Court considered three factors. First, political motivation
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process. Second,
there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law
for the conduct of a preliminary investigation. And third, the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the
records.17
Worth noting, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, petitioners were denied the right to
a preliminary investigation altogether. They were not served copies of the
complaint-affidavits and were not given the chance to file counter-affidavits. The
Graft Investigator merely required them to comment on a civil complaint against
them and on a Special Audit Report of the Commission on Audit, both of which
were not equivalent to the complaint-affidavits required by the applicable
administrative rules. In fact, the petitioners were unaware and were never
informed that a preliminary investigation was being conducted against them.
The recommendations in the COA Special Audit Report were already accepted
even before the report came out, and the civil complaint had already long been
dismissed before the Graft Investigator required petitioner’s comment on it.
Additionally, in Duterte, although the petitioners had filed the manifestation in
lieu of the required comment on February 18, 1992, it was only on February 22,
1996, or four years later, that they received the resolution recommending the
filing of informations against them. Then, also, informations were filed against
petitioners in that case even in the absence of sufficient ground to hold them
liable for the crime charged.
In Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, the delay lasted for six years despite the
fact that Angchangco, Jr., had filed several omnibus motions for early resolution.
Angchangco, Jr., even filed a motion to dismiss. Sadly, however, the Office of
the Ombudsman failed to act on said motion.18
Unlike in the Tatad, Duterte, and Angchangco, Jr., cases where the delays were
manifestly oppressive, the facts of this case do not evince vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. There
appears, therefore, no persuasive much less compelling reason to grant in this
case the same radical relief granted in those three cases that petitioner cited.19
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna*, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 191871
EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.
AMUGOD, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the October 6, 20092
and February 10, 20103 Resolutions of public respondent First Division of
Sandiganbayan (SB), denying the Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by
petitioner Rafael L. Coscolluela (Coscolluela). The said motion was adopted by
petitioners Edwin N. Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas (Malvas),
and Jose Ma. G. Amugod (Amugod), praying for the dismissal of Crim. Case
No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The Facts
Page 32 of 34
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province)
for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure,
Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as
Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of
the Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from
People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous
purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount
of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before
Coscolluela stepped down from office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the
Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final
Evaluation Report7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a
criminal case against petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.9
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares
(Cañares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable
cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the
Information10 was prepared and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro
recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the
final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only
on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the
SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing
with the SB.11
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others,
that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the
criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years
since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later
adopted Coscolluela’s motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash13 dated
August 7, 2009, explaining that although the Information was originally dated
March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its
final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections
regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.14
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In a Resolution15 dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied petitioners’ Motion to
Quash for lack of merit. It held that the preliminary investigation against
petitioners was actually resolved by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year
and four (4) months from the date the complaint was filed, or in November 9,
2001. Complying with internal procedure, Cañares then prepared the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information for the recommendation of the Miro and
eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro. As these issuances had to
undergo careful review and revision through the various levels of the said office,
the period of delay – i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or roughly over
six (6) years – cannot be deemed as inordinate16 and as such, petitioners’
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.17
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration18
dated November 9, 2009 and November 6, 2009, similarly arguing that the SB
erred in making a distinction between two time periods, namely: (a) from the
filing of the complaint up to the time Cañares prepared the resolution finding
probable cause against petitioners; and (b) from the submission of the said
resolution to the Acting Ombudsman for review and approval up to the filing of
the Information with the SB. In this regard, petitioners averred that the
aforementioned periods should not be compartmentalized and thus, treated as
a single period. Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant case
should be deemed prejudicial to their right to speedy disposition of cases.19
The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution20 dated
February 10, 2010 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB gravely
abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of
cases was not violated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which
provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well
as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.21
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should
be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.22 Jurisprudence dictates
that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and
balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’
right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a
protracted amount of time to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the
conduct of preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003,
or the time when Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of
the Information. This is belied by Section 4,
Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known
as the "Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted
in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject
to the following provisions:
xxxx
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the
written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all
other cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of
a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the
investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB
or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary
investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon
Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but
rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB.
In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost
eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case
largely remains unjustified.
To this end, the Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that the delay in
proceedings could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful
review and revision through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman
before it is finally approved, in addition to the steady stream of cases which it
had to resolve.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the
Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required
to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, in order to promote efficient service."25 This great responsibility cannot
be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman
has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but
also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance
should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the
reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary
complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the
case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work
activity – any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in
the case at bar – there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of
the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation
proceedings against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure
to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009.26 In
this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against
Page 33 of 34
them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to
why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this
point is the Court’s observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which
is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,
had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible,
special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in
terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of
review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail
— has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the
Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and
legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not
the petitioners’ duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it
was the Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within
the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on
all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:28
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well
as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by
the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice
but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to
speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.30 This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of
time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the
context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan31
(Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and
to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving
its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or
impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the
Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion
from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the
State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in
Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the
accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered
no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to
the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State
for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily
against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him.
On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness
should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview
of the entire proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-
discussed effects in Corpuz should equally apply to the case at bar. As held in
Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:32
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier
dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy
disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before,
during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the
protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the
submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil,
criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the
Ombudsman’s resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that
the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the
institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the
Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that
cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose
those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.

Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and
jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed
resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against petitioners be
dismissed.

While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the

acquittal of the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are
entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a
subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal
case does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil
case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33 As
explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,34 citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35

The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and
in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered."

xxxx

In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:

"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives

rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act
or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases as

herein discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either
the prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present any
evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to
whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil
liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is
not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only
to recover the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to
petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions

dated October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of
the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of petitioners Rafael L.
Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G.
Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which the Province of Negros
Occidental may file against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Page 34 of 34