DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,

the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.

Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.

The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return
the sum of P15,000.00 he received from complainant under the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase.” This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the
present administrative cases.

In Roa v. Moreno[12], the Court pronounced that “[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member
Our only concern is the determination of
of the Bar.
respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties
may choose to file against each other.” While the
respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the
same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities,
each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every
case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the
law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.
Section 5,[13] in relation to Sections 1[14] and 2[15] Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that
in administrative cases, such as the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion[16] .

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case
 When a criminal action is instituted, the
No. 3112-A, before the MTC.
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action[17]. Unless the complainant
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
estafa committed by respondent is deemed instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil
liability that complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution;
reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for consequential damages[18] ,
which may already cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the subject
property.

x x x."

EN BANC A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014, FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA,

COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.

Rule 139-B - Rules of Court

Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

DISBARMENT & DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

Rule 139-B

Section 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained
of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. chanrobles virtua law library
 .

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon

referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service; Provided,
however, that all charges against Justices of the Court of
Tax Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court
of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are
jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court; Provided, further, that charges filed against
Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed
prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall
immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its
chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to
the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended by Bar Matter No. 1960).

A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 2. National Grievance Investigator. - The Board of Governors

shall appoint from among IBP members an Investigator or, when
special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three(3)
investigators to investigate the complaint All Investigators
shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board
of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of
relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to any of the parties or their counsel, pecuniary
interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel for
either party, unless the parties sign and enter upon the
record their written consent to his acting as such
Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify
himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors,
 which by majority vote of the members present, there being
a quorum, may order his disqualification.
Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due
hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the IBP
Board Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in
all cases of disqualification or removal shall be final.

Sec. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. - The

National Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaint
against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the
IBP Board of Governors.
Sec. 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. - The proper IBP
Chapter may assist the complainant(s) in the preparation and
filing of his complaint(s). chanrobles virtua law library

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. - If the complaint appears to be

meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof
be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same
within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the
satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not
meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors
upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal
shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which
may review the case motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the
complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of
the complainant.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of

the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal
of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.

Sec. 6. Verification and service of answer. - The answer shall

be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the
answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of
service of a copy thereof on the complainant or his counsel.
Sec. 7. Administrative counsel. - The IBP Board of Governors
shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as counsel
to assist the complainant or the respondent during the
investigation in case of need for such assistance.
Sec. 8. Investigation. - Upon joinder of issues or upon failure
of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He
shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.
The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend
himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be heard by
himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three

(3) months from the date of its commencement unless extended for
good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.

Willfull failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other

lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as
for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall
be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors
which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may
thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with
the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall, as far as practicable, be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within like period
fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations, which `shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the
imposition of penalty.

Sec. 9. Depositions. - Depositions may be taken in accordance

with the Rules of Court with leave of the
investigator(s). chanrobles virtua law library

Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any

member of the Board of Governors, the President of any Chapter,
or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.

Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before a

diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine
Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or
designated by the Board of Governors.
Any suitable members of the Integrated Bar in the place where a
deposition shall be taken may be designated by the Investigator
to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a
deposition.

Sec. 10. Report of Investigator. - Not later than thirty (30)

days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator
shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the
stenographic notes and the transcripts thereof and all the
evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of
the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic
notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce
substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any
relevant and pertinent testimonies.

Sec. 11. Defects. - No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or

in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has
resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the Board shall take such remedial action as the
circumstance may warrant, including invalidation of the entire
proceedings. chanrobles virtua law library
Sec. 12. View and decision by the Board of Governors. -
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted
to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submittal of the Investigator's Report

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total

membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the

disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall
issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be

given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Sec. 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings

initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may
refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in
which case, the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review report
of the investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.chanrobles virtualawlibrary

Sec. 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court

designated investigator. - Based upon the evidence adduced at
the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a resolution containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together the record and all the evidence
presented in the investigation for the final action of the
Supreme Court.
C. COMMON PROVISIONS

Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. - After receipt

of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the
Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board
of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may
suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any
of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the
pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by
the Supreme Court. chanrobles virtua law library

Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or

Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of
the Supreme Court in the case.
Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of
the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or
disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.
Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall
be private and confidential. However, the final order of the
Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.
Sec. 19. Expenses. - All reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment proceedings
are lawful charges forthwith the parties may be taxed as
costs. chanrobles virtua law library

Sec. 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. - This Rule shall

take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule
139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All cases
pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General
shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided
in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed. (Bar Matter No. 356, Resolution dated April 13,
1988).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 1755 June 17, 2008

RE. CLARIFICATION ON RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON BAR

DISCIPLINE.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June
17, 2008 B.M. No. 1755 (Re. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline)

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governs the investigation of administrative complaints
against lawyers by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Section 12 of said rule
prescribes the procedure before the IBP, thus:

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of

Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall
be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction

imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties
through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court.

To implement Rule 139-B, the Court, in Bar Matter No. 1755, approved the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP on September 25, 2007.
The rules pertinent to pleadings, notices, and appearances are provided in Secs. 1 and 2
of Rule III which read:

RULE III

PLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES

SECTION 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer and verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution.
SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:

a. Motion to dismiss the complaint or petition

b. Motion for a bill of particulars

c. Motion for a new trial

d. Petition for relief from judgment

e. Motion for reconsideration

f. Supplemental pleadings

Upon query of IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the Court issued on February
12, 2008 a Resolution amending Sec. 1, Rule III of the same rules by deleting the phrase
"motion for reconsideration of a resolution," to resolve the conflicting provisions of Secs. 1
and 2 of said Rule III, thus:

Sec. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer and verified position papers.

Pursuant to the February 12, 2008 Resolution, a party cannot file a motion for
reconsideration of any order or resolution with the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD
hearing the case.

In the Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in A.C. No. 7055 entitled Ramientas v. Reyala, the
Court held that:

IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved the accordance with our ruling in Halimao v.
Villanueva, pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly
§1 and §2, are hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, §1 of said rules now reads
as follows:

SECTION 1. Pleadings. – The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint,

verified answer, verified position paper and motion for reconsideration of
resolution. x x x

And in §2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the
class of prohibited pleadings.

Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of

disciplinary cases against lawyers:

1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for
reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and recommendations
within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties thereon;
 2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party, the
IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this Court the subject
resolution together with the whole record of the case;

3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided for, the
IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final action, the subject
resolution together with the whole record of the case;

4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IPB may file a petition for
review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution
sought to be reviewed; and

5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist pending
motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the latter is directed to
withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with the whole records of
the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions with
reasonable dispatch.1

In view of the February 12, 2008 Resolution, the fallo of Ramientas amending Secs. 1 and
2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD is consequently repealed. At present, a
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in CBD proceedings before the
Investigating Commissioner. It has to be clarified further that said CBD rules of procedure
apply exclusively to proceedings before said CBD Commissioner and not proceedings
before the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) which are governed by Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court. As such, the other dispositions in Ramientas relative to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the IPB BOG are still valid and subsisting. In
fact, Ramientas has amplified the rules laid down in Rule 139-B by supplying the
procedure for the filing of motions for reconsiderations before the BOG.

Thus, in answer to the query of Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa dated March 17, 2008 on whether the February 12, 2008 Resolution in Bar Matter
No. 1755 has effectively superseded Ramientas, the Court resolved as follows:

1. On the amendment to Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III of the CBD Rules of Procedure,
the fallo in Ramientas is repealed and superseded by the February 12, 2008 Resolution. A
party can no longer file a motion for reconsideration of any order or resolution of the
Investigating Commissioner, such motion being a prohibited pleading.

2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution

of the BOG can be entertained, an aggrieved party can file said motion with the BOG
within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt thereof by said party.

In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party
can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for
reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said
decision shall be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved
party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate
the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-
day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG
shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case records for
appropriate action.

Let this Resolution be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

Very truly yours,

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA (sgd.)

Clerk of Court

Footnote

1 497 SCRA 130, 137-138

CHECK IF THESE CASES ARE CORRECT

EN BANC

OLGA M. SAMSON, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,
CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 5, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
 This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a
public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.

In her complaint,[1] complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent

Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for
lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity
and independence[2], and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a
pending administrative case.[3]

According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews,

deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges
against him.

She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva

Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of
authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.

At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain

improprieties[4] and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in
a reinvestigation he conducted.
 On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges.[5] It also
denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.[6]

Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review[7] on October 28,

2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision[8]dated November 25, 2005, the
appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges
against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme
Court by way of a petition for certiorari.[9] As to the administrative aspect, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing
the charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and
prosecute the administrative charges against respondent.

While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was
interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the
position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC, Branch
30, CabanatuanCity, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged that respondent never
informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to
be nominated and, subsequently, appointed.

In his comment,[10] respondent admitted that complainant had lodged

criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however,
insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective
and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were
actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from
February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his
nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that
he informed the JBC of the said cases.

The complainant filed a reply,[11] stating that the March 24, 2004 decision of
the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory as it was timely appealed by way
of a petition for review filed on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition
was even granted.

To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent,

complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent
on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court
Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.[12] According to her,
respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any
infraction.

On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties,

the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification
of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended
respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service.

We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of

dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the
JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with
concrete evidence.[13] Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges
or to the defenses.

However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing

alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews,
the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box
indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged? in his March
21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.[14]

Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was

reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he
answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly
what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an
act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even
sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges
against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS.
However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial,
given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged?,
meaning, charged at anytime in the past or present.

In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held that the making of untruthful

statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.

Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the
making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court
will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former
public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and
rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more
unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental
qualification of a member of the judiciary.

Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself
in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times,
for he is the visible representation of the law.[16] Regrettably, we are convinced of
respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled the JBC
and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for
what he did as he sees nothing wrong with it.

He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service.

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a

disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.[17] This resolution, entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are
Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as
Members of the Philippine Bar, provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals

and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds
for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also

be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith
be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member
of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision
or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment

cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were
treated separately.[18] However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case
against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the
disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered
as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[19]
 This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of
the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):[20]

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful act.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in

the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a
lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his
oath as a lawyer.[21] In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against
the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section

27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing
acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in
a plethora of cases.[22] Of particular importance to this case is our decision
in Caada v. Suerte[23] where we applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic
disbarment.

In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with

grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty,
harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among others, that
respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car to
complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when they
failed to reach an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed to
receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainants beach lot. The
complainant voiced out his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to
persecute him for what respondent may have perceived as complainants
infractions against him.

In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to

complainant since, according to him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up
truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998.

However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for

the years 1998-2001 revealed that among his personal properties were a Daewoo
car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we
found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely denied that he ever
owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction, respondent judge was
fined in the amount of P40,000. He would have been dismissed from the service
were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed therefrom because of
an earlier case.[24]

Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent

Judge Suertes administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as
well, and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
 Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment
on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule
does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member
of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he
should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for
him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a
member of the bench.[25] In other words, an order to comment on the complaint
is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively
liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is
the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases
against justices and judges[26] to disciplinary proceedings against them as
lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative
complaint filed against a member of the bench[27] also as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary
proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and
Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.[28]

It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the
image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and
rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.[29] If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.[30]

A parting word.

The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts

relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and
personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges.
The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and
students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be
higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the
right to judge.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City,GUILTY of dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and
Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the

Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
-----

CASE2

SECOND DIVISION

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298

Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,

 Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 25, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule

19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand
letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal
cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
 Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.
Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O.
Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a
claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant
rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to
Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to
this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating
his clients claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat
to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the

government.

2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion

3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]
 Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical
standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed
an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)[3] claiming that
Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important
part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him.
Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against
forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending
before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages
and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse
the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions[4] and for
violation of the Notarial Law.[5]

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent

failed to appear.[6] Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position
papers.

The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros

V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply
with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum
shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the
notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.[9]Thereafter, on 18 August
2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10]reiterating his claim of damages against complainant
in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent
in dollars, for filing the false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal
fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false
suit.[11]

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)[12]alleging that he personally submitted and
filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent
by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due
process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position
paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.

Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26
May 2006 Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition
on the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed

his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to
respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was
received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the
same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on
the same date. [14]

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition

before this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in
his complaint against respondent.

The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally

required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for
every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular
No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and
(2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
of the party concerned.[16]

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took

against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping
to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of

disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement, and
the merit of complainants complaint against respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character
of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
 interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against

forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such
proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary
proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or
action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum

shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim
involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and
thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or
complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,[19] which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[20] Furthermore,
the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency
among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon
the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent
the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering
conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[21]

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a

certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem
that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints
considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme
Court motuproprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person.[22] Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case
fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another
disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with
ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[23]

At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement

cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that
complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6
December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents Motion to
Dismiss the present petition.

Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies

the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the
letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer

shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[24] In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case
or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers
client.[25]

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter
fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to
operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating
Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation

or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as
a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an
injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats,
or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers
to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.[26]

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for
blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated,
would entail not only respondents disbarment from the practice of law, but also a
possible criminal prosecution.[28] While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated
for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case
for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing
the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the
other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under obligation to tell
the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the
State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of
disputes.

Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious

that respondents threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to
secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his clients demands. It was
not respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep
silent about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in

this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of
his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients claim and to take
all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory
charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his clients claim for
separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel
complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged

communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter
was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from
the latter compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his
clients interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May

2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CASE 3:

THIRD DIVISION

TOMAS G. TAN & CST ENTER- G.R. No. 173940

PRISES INC., represented by (Formerly CBD Case No. 02-967)

NELSON G. TAN,

Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

IBP COMMISSION ON BAR

DISCIPLINE and ATTY. JAIME Promulgated:

N. SORIANO,

Respondents. September 5, 2006

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
This petition stemmed from a pending disbarment case before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

Sometime in January of 2002, petitioner Tomas G. Tan (petitioner Tan),

stockholder and director of co-petitioner CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), discovered
that two parcels of land owned by the corporation were used to obtain loans
from Philippine Business Bank (PBB), with the real estate mortgage annotated at
the back of the titles covering the properties. Upon verification, he learned that a
certain John Dennis Chua, representing CST, mortgaged the properties. Chua was
purportedly authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation as shown by
the Corporate Secretarys Certificate dated 04 April 2001 signed by Atty. Jaime N.
Soriano (respondent).
On 28 May 2002, petitioner Tan filed in his personal capacity and as
minority stockholder of CST under a derivative action, a letter-complaint with the
IBP charging respondent of deceit, malpractice, falsification of public documents,
gross misconduct and violation of oath of office.[1] According to petitioners,
respondent has never been elected as corporate secretary nor acted as such for
CST, and in fact no board meeting was held on 30 March 2001 to so authorize
John Dennis Chua because on the said date two of three directors, petitioner Tan
and Felipe Chua, were out of the country. Furthermore, John Dennis Chua has
never been connected in any capacity with CST, petitioners aver.[2]

Petitioners also filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a civil
case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-299 and captioned as one for Declaration of
Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys
Certificate, Injunction, Damages, etc. with Prayer for Issuance of TRO/ Preliminary
Injunction, against respondent, Atty. Stephen Z. Taala and PBB, along with other
persons.[3]

In the course of the proceedings in the said civil case, petitioners claim to
have gathered more information and seen the extent of the plot or machinations
of respondent and the participation of other individuals, including Atty. Taala who
was the Assistant Vice President for Legal Services of PBB.[4] Atty. Taala had
testified in Civil Case No. 02-299 that Felipe Chua personally delivered to him CSTs
titles to the mortgaged lots and that Felipe Chua assured him that respondent is
the Corporate Secretary of CST.[5] Thus, CSTs loan application was recommended
for favorable consideration.
 On 16 June 2003, petitioners filed with the IBP, Commission on Bar
Discipline (Commission) a Motion to Amend/Supplement the Complaint with
Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental Complaint,[6] claiming that respondent
and Atty. Taala had facilitated and recommended the approval of the allegedly
spurious loans and mortgage entered into by John Dennis Chua. The Commission,
however, denied the motion on 28 December 2003 on the ground that the
amendments/supplements involve proceedings pending before the trial courts
and that the determination of the matters presented belong to said courts which
have already acquired jurisdiction over them.[7]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the order, but the Commission denied

the motion, ruling that the Commission cannot make a premature finding on
and/or investigation of the alleged acts of Atty. Taala since the same are the
subject of a pending civil case. Anent the alleged untruthful statements of
respondent, the Commission ruled that there is no need to amend the complaint
since the said statements may be refuted in the ensuing proceedings in the
case.[8]

Assailing the denial of the motion for the admission of the

Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein they impute grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Commission. Petitioners submit that respondent and Atty. Taala
through false testimonies intend to bind CST to the spurious loans and real estate
mortgage to its damage and prejudice.[9] They claim that the denial to admit the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint would have the effect of preventing
petitioners from filing a new complaint against respondent along with Atty. Taala
for their conspiratorial illegal acts involving the same loan transactions, as any
judgment of the Commission on the original complaint may serve as res
judicata to bar judgment on the other acts complained of in the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint.[10] Likewise, limiting the facts and issues to
those defined in the original complaint would make respondent answerable only
for the less serious charges subject of the original complaint but not for the
graver charges in the Amended/Supplemental Complaint regarding respondents
untruthful allegations.[11]

In addition, petitioners claim that respondents allegations in his Verified Answer

are untruthful and perjurious as he knowingly cited untruthful testimonies and
affidavits from the records of the civil case with the RTC of Makati. One such
untruthful testimony is that of Atty. Taala to the effect that Felipe Chua personally
delivered the original titles of the Muntinlupa properties to PBB in compliance
with the loan requirements.[12] According to petitioners, Atty. Taalas twin claims
that he met with Felipe Chua on 05 April 2001 and that Felipe Chua submitted the
Secretarys Certificate on the same date are untruthful since Felipe was out of the
country on the said date. Likewise, Felipe Chua could not have attended the
meeting with respondent in January 2001 because he was also abroad at that
time.[13]

Finally, petitioners aver that the proceeds of the spurious loans amounting
to P91.1 Million Pesos covered by the real estate mortgage on CSTs real estate
properties were funneled to the Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., a corporation
where respondent is the incorporator, stockholder and President.[14]

Petitioners thus pray of this Court to set aside the Commissions order
denying admission of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint, or in the
alternative, allow petitioner to file a new complaint against respondent and Atty.
Taala based on the same loan transactions.[15]

In his Comment[16] before the Court, respondent claims that petitioners

breached the rule that proceedings against attorneys should be kept private and
confidential, when the latter disclosed in Civil Case No. 02-299 the contents of his
Verified Answer filed before the Commission, quoting almost verbatim said
contents. This had the effect of announcing to the whole world the pending
disbarment case, respondent stresses, and is meant to harass and vex him, as well
as to damage his reputation even before a final verdict is reached by the
Commission. Respondent questions petitioners motive in not filing a separate
case before the IBP against Atty. Taala and accordingly having him tried
separately. Finally, respondent posits that the Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to amend its complaint since
the nullity or regularity of the mortgage loan in CSTs name is not an issue in the
administrative case against him.

The crux of the petition is whether the Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

The Commission did not. The petition must be dismissed.

Petitioners have filed Civil Case No. 02-299, seeking the declaration of
unenforceability of promissory notes and mortgage, nullity of secretarys
certificate, injunction, damages, and the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. In the said case, petitioners allege that the loans
contracted by CST from PBB were not sanctioned nor ratified by the CST Board of
Directors and/ or stockholders, but were only facilitated by respondent and Atty.
Taala, as well as by other persons through the use of the spurious Secretarys
Certificate. Likewise pending is another case against respondent and John Dennis
Chua, et al. for estafa through falsification of public documents, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 04-3776 of the RTC of Makati which appears to involve the
same allegedly unauthorized mortgage.[17]

The Court notes that petitioners are seeking similar, if not identical, reliefs
from the regular courts and the Commission. Thus, in addition to the prayer to
disbar respondent and Atty. Taala, petitioners implore the Commission to make a
finding that respondent lawyers be found liable for using untruthful statements
under oath, conspiracy to commit estafa, employing deceit and other
manipulative acts as well as fraud, and falsification of public documents ─charges
which are included in his allegations in the civil and criminal cases.

Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to resolve matters which are

pending resolution by the regular courts to which jurisdiction properly
pertains. The IBP, particularly the Commission on Bar Discipline, is merely tasked
to investigate and make recommendations on complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular court and thus is not
endowed with the power to investigate and resolve judicial matters pending
before the regular courts.

To cite a specific vital aspect. In the proposed Amended/Supplemental

Complaint, petitioners seek to hold respondent administratively liable for his
untruthful and perjurious statements in his Verified Answer in the administrative
case. Precisely, however, the truth or falsity of said statements are still to be
litigated in the civil case.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their own,
and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions.[18] To be sure, a finding of
liability in a civil case or a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding
a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. However, in the
instant case, the civil and criminal cases involving the acts referred to in the
proposed amended/supplemental complaint are still pending adjudication before
the regular courts. Prudence dictates that the action of the Commission related to
the proposed amended/supplemental complaint in the administrative case be
sustained in order to avoid contradictory findings in that case and in the court
cases.[19]
 The call for judiciousness stems from the need to ensure the smooth and
orderly disposition of the related cases pending before the courts and the
Commission and avert conflict in the rulings in the bar discipline case and in the
judicial cases. Preemption of the regular courts by an administrative case is a
worrisome spectacle.
Now we turn to a significant sidelight.

Respondent charges petitioners with divulging what is essentially confidential

information, which is a violation of Section 18,[20]Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. He alleges that petitioners even made the basis of his amended complaint
in the civil case the allegations contained in respondents Verified Answer before
the Commission.

A review of the records disclose that petitioners lifted and cited most of the
amendatory averments in respondents Verified Answer in the administrative case
as the core of their Amended Complaint in the civil case. In fact, petitioners even
identified the Verified Answer and the disbarment proceedings itself as the
sources of the averments in the Amended Complaint before the trial court, thus:

47. On May 28, 2002, disbarment/disciplinary proceedings were filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against
Defendant Soriano for having executed such null and void secretarys certificate,
among others. This disbarment case was docketed as CBD Case No. 02-967.

48. The averments of Defendant Soriano in his Verified Answer (Soriano Verified
Answer for brevity) dated September 27, 2002 filed in said disbarment case, as
well as the pertinent papers and earlier testimonies in this case and the results of
the ongoing investigation and inquiries of Plaintiff Tan, further reveal: x x x.[21]
Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its final
determination.[22] The confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold
purpose, to wit: (i) to enable the court and the investigator to make the
investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect
the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the
publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii) to deter the press
from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon.[23]

Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case
against respondent. Not only did they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also
divulged most, if not all of the contents of respondents Verified Answer. Clearly,
petitioners acts impinged on the confidential nature of the disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Soriano.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners are REMINDED to

preserve the confidentiality of the administrative proceedings. The IBP is ordered
to resume its hearings in CBD No. 02-267 consistently with this resolution. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.