Memnon & Alexander @ Sea • Nigerian Civil War 1967 • Falling Waters

Manila
Number 246
1945

U.S. $23.99
With Complete
Historical Game

strategy & tactics 1

ST 246 Issue.indd 1 9/21/10 10:58:40 AM

 Decision Games…
Games
publisher of military history magazines & games

Nine Navies War

Nine Navies War begins at the start of 1915, after a victorious Germany has
overrun France the year before. (Perhaps the BEF didn’t land on time or at all,
or they got bottled up in Mons, or the Germans kept to their full-blown, keep
the right super-strong and pull back on the left Schlieffen Plan scheme, thereby
bagging two French armies in the Rhineland, etc.) Italy, seeing the German victory
train leaving the station, joins the Central Powers, as do Spain and Greece. All of
which makes for a dreadnought showdown in the Mediterranean, Atlantic Ocean
and North Seas, as the avidly Mahanist Kaiser Wilhelm seeks to finally defeat the
Royal Navy and thus make Germany into a true global power.
It will be the battleships of Britain, Russia and ‘Free France’ versus those of
Germany, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the captured portion of the divided
French fleet. (Each French ship is rolled for at the start of every game. Each can
be scuttled, go over to the British, or be captured by the Germans.) There will
also be the possibility of later US entry when/if the Japanese switch sides in the
Pacific and launch a dastardly surprise attack that finally draws in the Yanks.
Victory is determined on victory points awarded for controlling the various sea 3 *
10 *
10 *
10
zones around Europe. The geography thereby creates a kind of “two front war,” Barham C. Colombo Indiana Sachsen
one in the Mediterranean and one in the Atlantic. The Central Powers player is
also able to win a “sudden death” victory by controlling the waters immediately 6-7-6 6-7-5 7-9-5 6-8-5
Br
surrounding the British Isles for one full year (three turns). If he does so, the It US Ge
British have just been starved into submission.
All the battleships and battle cruisers afloat during that era, along with three 10 12
late-game British aircraft carriers, are represented in the various nations’ orders Tegetthof CV Vindictive
Borodino
of battle, as well as ships that were scheduled to be completed during 1919 if the
war had gone on that long. 6-5-7 3-3-4 5-5-4 1-0-1-8
AH Br
Random events account for the larger developments taking place in the ground RN SP
war still going on in Russia, the Middle East and colonial Africa, as well as
accounting for capital ship losses due to mines, unexplained internal explosions,
as well as submarine, coastal artillery and land based aircraft attack. Fried.
der Grosse Jean Bart
A top of the line German battleship like the Baden has factors (attack-defense-
maximum speed) of 6-8-5, while the British battle cruiser Tiger is a 4-4-7. Top- 4-8-5 2-2-3 5-5-5 4-5-6
down, full-color, historic ship icons identify every ship. Ge GK FG Tu
The game uses a derivation of the classic Avalon Hill War at Sea. 9NW is
simple two-player game with a short three-turn “1915” scenario, which can easily
be finished in one sitting, as well as a 12-turn “campaign game” that will require
about eight hours to play.
Contents: 1 22x34" map, 492 die-cut counters, rules book. $50.00
QTY Title Price Total
Nine Navies War $50
Land Without End $50
Luftwaffe $50
Storm of Steel (pg 60) $140

Shipping Charges
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$8 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
17 2 Canada
21 4 Europe, South America
22 5 Asia, Australia

2 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 2 9/21/10 10:58:46 AM

 Now Available

Land Without
End
Land Without End: The Barbarossa Campaign, 1941 is a
two-player, low-to-intermediate complexity, strategic-level
simulation of the German attempt to conquer the Soviet Union
in 1941. The German player is on the offensive, attempting to
win the game by rapidly seizing key cities. The Soviet player
is primarily on the defensive, but the situation also requires he
prosecute counterattacks throughout much of the game.
Game play encompasses the period that began with the
Germans launching their attack on 22 June 1941, and ends on 7
December of the same year. By that time it had become clear the
invaders had shot their bolt without achieving their objectives.
The game may end sooner than the historic termination time if
the German player is able to advance so quickly he causes the
overall political, socio-economic and military collapse of the
Soviet Union.
Each hexagon on the map represents approximately 20 miles
(32 km) from side to opposite side. The units of maneuver for
both sides are primarily divisions, along with Axis-satellite and Luftwaffe
Soviet corps (and one army) of various types. The effects of the
Luftwaffe is an update of the classic Avalon Hill game covering the US
general air superiority enjoyed by the Germans throughout the
strategic bombing campaign over Europe in World War II. As US com-
campaign are built into the movement and combat rules. Each
mander, your mission is to eliminate German industrial complexes. You
game turn represents one week.
select the targets, direct the bombers, and plan a strategy intended to defeat
Players familiar with other strategic-level east front designs
the Luftwaffe. As the German commander, the entire arsenal of Nazi aircraft
will note the unique aspects of LWE lie in its rules governing the
is at your disposal. Turns represent three months each, with German rein-
treatment of supply, the capture of Moscow, and the Stalin line.
forcements keyed to that player’s production choices. Units are wings and
Contents: 1 22x34" map, 700 die-cut counters, rules 2
squadrons, and they’re rated by type, sub-type, firepower, maneuverability
book. $50.00
XXX
CSIR

and endurance. There are rules for radar, electronic warfare, variable pro-
6-6 duction strategies, aces, target complexes, critical industries and diversion
of forces to support the ground war. The orders of battle are much the same
* XXX as in the original game, though the German player now has to plan ahead if
he wants to get jets.
HF

5-8 There are also other new targets on the map, such as the German electric
power grid. In the original game the US player had to bomb all the targets
on the map to win. Given the way the victory point system now works, the
XX
T

Americans need bomb about four out of the five major target systems to
5-10 win, thereby duplicating the historic result.
2 XXXX Contents: 1 22x34" map, 280 die-cut counters, rules and PACs. $50.00
ICA

6-
Name
XX

Address
3

6-10
City, State Zip

Phone email
VIII
VISA/Mc (ONLY)#

Expiration Date

Signature

strategy & tactics 3

ST 246 Issue.indd 3 9/21/10 10:58:50 AM

 contents

Editor-in-Chief: Joseph Miranda

FYI Editor: Ty Bomba
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins
Copy Editors: Ty Bomba, Jason Burnett, Martin
F E AT U R E S
Lyons, Kristen Scales and Dav Vandenbroucke.
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping 6 Manila 1945:The Stalingrad of the Pacific
Publisher: Christopher Cummins
Advertising: Rates and specifications available
House to house fighting as the US Army retakes the Philippine
on request. Write P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield CA capital from the Japanese.
93390.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES are: Six issues per year—
by Matt Brooks
the United States is $109.97. Non-U.S. addresses
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Strategy & Tactics (©2007) reserves all rights
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STRATEGY & TACTICS (ISSN 1040-886X) is published
bi-monthly by Decision Games, 1649 Elzworth St. #1, 22 Memnon Takes the War to Alexander:
Bakersfield CA 93312. Periodical Class postage paid
at Bakersfield, CA and additional mailing offices. Island Hopping in 333 BC
Address Corrections: Address change forms to
Strategy & Tactics, PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA Alexander the Great’s campaign of world conquest came close
93390. to being cut short by a wily Persian general who took to the
seas.
by Carl Otis Schuster
4 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 4 9/21/10 10:58:52 AM

 contents

Number 246
October/November 2007

F E AT U R E S

40 Biafran Sunset:The Nigerian Civil

departments
War, 1967-70
Civil war and insurgency as Biafra fights for its
independence in post-colonial Africa. 31 for your information
by John Barratt America’s Brown Water Navy
by Stephen Elliott
52 Data File: Armies of
the Biafran Civil War Oil on Troubled Waters
Building armies from the ground by David Lentini
up in Africa.
by John Barratt Rhode Island’s Gettysburg Gun
by Raymond Gagner

54 The Final Battle of Deborah Sampson: Warrior Maid

the Gettysburg by Kelly Bell

Campaign:
Falling Waters 37 The long tradition
Union cavalry clashes with General
Lee‚s rearguard in the aftermath of the
American Civil War‚s greatest battle. 38 Works in Progress
by George Franks

Rules

R1 Manila 45
On the cover: "The 37th Infantry Division in Manila"
by Joseph Miranda by artist James Dietz. Used with permission; American
Art & Antiques, Inc.

strategy & tactics 5

ST 246 Issue.indd 5 9/21/10 10:58:59 AM

 Manila 1945:
Stalingrad of the Pacific
By Matt Brooks
Filipinos celebrate as the US Army liberates Manila.
US units are in plain text; Japanese units are in italics.
On 9 January 1945 Douglas MacArthur
fulfilled his promise to return to the Philippines
as Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth Army, supported
by overwhelming naval and airpower, landed
at Lingayen Bay. American forces then rapidly
pushed inland against Japanese delaying forces,
reaching Clark Field on 23 January. Then,
starting on the 30th, US Eighth Army began
its landings outside Manila Bay. The stage was
set for one of the greatest battles in the Pacific
Theater of Operations, a battle that would see two
armies clash in fierce house-to-house fighting, a
fanatic last ditch defense, and the liberation of the
Philippine capital.
6 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 6
From the High Command
As the US Sixth Army approached Manila, MacAr-
thur’s headquarters had reasons to be optimistic. The
Americans believed Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, com-
manding the Japanese on Luzon, was going to evacu-
ate Manila and make his stand in the mountains to the
city’s east. There hadn’t been much intelligence on
Manila for the Americans to go on, and they expected
to clear it in a few days. MacArthur’s headquarters
even planned to throw a big victory parade once the
city fell.
The parade might have happened on schedule, but
Rear Adm. Mitsuji Iwabuchi had other ideas. Disobey-
ing Yamashita, Iwabuchi ordered his men to hold the
city to the death. When MacArthur realized the extent
to which the Japanese planned to defend Manila, he
had to rethink his approach. As the three US divi-
sions closed in, their commanders wanted airpower to
soften up the defenders, but MacArthur forbade any
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 strategy & tactics 7

ST 246 Issue.indd 7 9/21/10 10:59:02 AM

 airstrikes or heavy artillery bombardments within Ma-
nila’s city limits. He was concerned collateral damage
to the civilian populace would have disastrous effects
on long term Philippine-US cooperation. In 1945 the
Philippines were still an American colony. While the
US had promised the Philippines independence, it was
still necessary to maintain good relations to prevent a
postwar rift. Moreover, much of the American com-
bat effectiveness in the Philippine campaign was due
to friendly guerillas providing US forces with intel-
ligence. The destruction of Manila might alienate that
support, thereby undermining the rest of the campaign
in the islands.
Two objectives MacArthur stressed were the imme-
diate seizing of the city’s water facilities and electrical
power plants. Units from US XIV Corps, commanded
by Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, were supposed to se-
cure the Novaliches Dam, the Balera Water Filters, the
San Juan Reservoir, and the pipelines distributing that
water into Manila. The steam power plant on Provisor
Island in the center of the Pasig River would have to
be secured by XIV Corps to provide the city with elec-
tricity. Control of the utilities was vital if the city’s ci-
vilian population was to be maintained, and to prevent
the outbreak of disease, looting and insurrection. With
all that in mind, MacArthur positioned three veteran
American divisions for the assault into Manila.
Into the Tiger’s Den
The three divisions were the 1st Cavalry Division
(an old horse cavalry unit reconfigured as infantry),
the 37th “Buckeye” Division (Ohio National Guard),
and the 11th Airborne (the latter division was part of
Eighth Army). The 1st Cavalry and 37th Infantry were
to attack the city from the north, while the 11th Air-
borne was to move in from the south. The Cavalry’s
first objective was the Santo Tomas University. With
the attached Sherman M-4 tanks of the 44th Tank Bat-
talion blitzing at full speed, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cav-
alry Regiment sped through the city streets guided by
Philippine guerrillas. Many of the Japanese defenders
in northern Manila were caught by surprise at the speed
of the advance. They had not expected the Americans
to arrive for at least another week.
US intelligence had informed Brig. Gen. William
C. Chase, commanding the 1st Cavalry’s advance guard
“flying column,” that there were over 4,000 American
and Allied prisoners of war (POWs) and internees
under Japanese guard at Santo Tomas. A tank of the
flying column smashed through the university’s iron
gates and the cavalrymen quickly subdued most of the
guards. The liberated prisoners celebrated their new
freedom, but Lt. Col. Toshio Hayashi and 60 guards
held hostage a group of 200 or so civilians in the camp
headquarters. Hayashi told the Americans that if he
and his men were not guaranteed safe passage to Japa-
nese lines, the hostages would be executed to the last
child. Gen. Chase was on the scene by this time and
8 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 8
accepted Hayashi’s demands. The soldiers of the 2nd
Squadron 8th Cavalry escorted Hayashi’s men to the
Japanese lines in an uneasy truce. Taking hostages,
was a war crime, and Hayashi had clearly stepped
over a line that at the time was considered solid for
soldierly behavior.
With the situation at Santo Tomas cleaned up,
Chase had G Troop of the 2nd Squadron 8th Cavalry
perform a reconnaissance in force into the city proper.
As G Troop’s trucks rolled down Quezon Boulevard
the city at first seemed deserted. But then the Japa-
nese ambushed them from positions in the old Bilibid
prison and the adjacent Far Eastern University. Under
a hail of anti-tank and machinegun fire, G Troop and
their Filipino scouts beat a quick retreat back to Santo
Tomas. Despite the repulse, F Troop managed to slip
down some side streets and capture Malacanang Pal-
ace.
Gen. Chase was worried about a counterattack
from Col. Noguchi’s Northern Force the next day. The
Novaliches bridge had been destroyed and his lines
of communication were severed. Had Col. Noguchi’s
forces been better organized, this would have been his
best chance to counterattack, isolate and destroy the 8th
Cavalry Regiment. But he took no action, and by that
afternoon more cavalry units had arrived. Elements of
the 37th Infantry Division also rolled in. Chase ordered
several units to rush the Quezon Bridge in an attempt
to grab a span across the Pasig, but when the cavalry-
men and tankers were one block away, the defenders
blew the bridge.
The 148th Infantry, 5th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry Reg-
iments bypassed enemy minefields and roadblocks to
launch a night attack on Bilibid Prison and Far Eastern
University. The fighting for those two objectives raged
all night. The cavalry was busy clearing the university,
while the infantry pushed the defenders out of the pris-
on. At both locations, much to the soldiers’ surprise,
they found more POWs. They were survivors of the
1942 Bataan and Corregidor campaigns. The liberated
prisoners greeted MacArthur with cheers when he ar-
rived the next day.
Battle for the Utilities
On the other side, Japanese sailors and soldiers be-
gan to scorch the earth. They set fire to the port facili-
ties and warehouses north of the Pasig, where military
ordnance was stored. The fires quickly spread, send-
ing most of the Tondo District up in smoke and flame.
On the 5th the Japanese destroyed the remaining Pasig
bridges. That same evening the Buckeyes were fight-
ing fires raging all across northern Manila. Meanwhile,
the cavalrymen were clearing enemy resistance in the
city’s eastern suburbs. On the 7th, the 37th Infantry Di-
vision took over the sector west of the San Juan River
and north of the Pasig.
The 7th Cavalry Regiment (whose lineage went
back to the days of Indian warfare on the Plains) had
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 strategy & tactics 9

ST 246 Issue.indd 9 9/21/10 10:59:05 AM

 the mission of securing the water resources on the out-
skirts of the city. First, the 7th took the Novaliches Dam
before the Japanese could blow it up. The 7th moved
fast, overrunning the Japanese at the Balera water
filters before they could detonate their demolitions.
Then the cavalrymen pressed on to their last objective,
the San Juan Reservoir, quickly capturing it from the
stunned defenders.
In the New Manila subdivision, 8th Cavalry ran into
the toughest Japanese defense they had faced thus far
in the campaign. The Japanese 1st Independent Naval
Battalion had mined the streets, and those minefields
were covered by 20mm antiaircraft guns and 25mm
machine cannons. Rock walls were turned into min-
iature fortresses and houses into machinegun nests.
On top of it all, three 120mm dual-purpose naval guns
provided fire support for the battalion.
The intense Japanese firepower forced the 8th Cav-
alry to withdraw. On 8 February, the cavalry, this time
with tank and artillery support, hit the 1st Independent
Naval Battalion again. The defenders began to fold;
but the attacking troopers took heavy losses as they
cleared the enemy from New Manila. The 8th Cavalry
Regiment went on to secure the El Depositio district
and its artesian wells.
In the meantime, the 3rd Naval Defense Battalion
and supporting units had stopped the 11th Airborne
Division’s drive along the Genko line. Most of the
Japanese defensive positions in that area were well
established and constructed of reinforced concrete.
They were camouflaged so well that attackers had a
tough time even finding them. The 4th Naval Defense
Battalion held Fort McKinley, while Nicols Field was
defended by members of the Abe Battalion and several
well emplaced artillery and mortar batteries.
The hazards of mobile warfare: US Army jeep bogged down on the
road to Manila.
10 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 10
On 5 February the 511th Parachute Infantry Regi-
ment forced a crossing over the Paranaque River. They
fought all day, only extending their river crossing by
2,000 yards north of the Paranaque. Due to the heavy
enemy concentration of pillboxes and machinegun
nests, the paratroopers halted their advance to wait for
the gliderborne infantry.
The first assaults on Nichols Field by the 188th Gli-
derborne Infantry were repulsed, driven back by ex-
treme artillery, mortar, and machinegun fire. The 511th
Regiment was then brought into the attack. It made a
slow, methodical advance on Nichols Field, crushing
enemy defensive positions as it went. At the same time
other elements of the 511th pushed up Route 1, driving
the Paranque defenders north of Nichols Field. Four
days of A-20 ground support missions, artillery bom-
bardments and infantry assaults had done little to pen-
etrate the tough defenses around Nichols Field. One
rifle company commander told his superiors: “Tell
Halsey to stop looking for the Jap Fleet. It’s dug in on
Nichols Field.”
It was apparent the 11th Airborne needed heavier
artillery support, so on 10 February the division was
transferred to the operational control of XIV Corps.
Across the Pasig
Krueger directed XIV Corps to seize the electri-
cal power plant on Provisor Island. Artillery pounded
Provisor as the 129th Infantry Regiment got ready to
assault there on the 8th. Provisor Island is a small mass
about 400 meters long, and about 100 meters wide, in
the middle of the Pasig River. Dug in on it were ele-
ments of the 1st Naval Defense Battalion.
The first attack launched by the 129th was abortive.
More artillery was then used to soften up the defen-
sive positions. Crossing the Pasig in assault boats, the
infantrymen were hit with mortar, machinegun and
20mm antiaircraft fire. Three boats were lost in the at-
tack, but the majority of the soldiers made it to the
island.
On Provisor Island US infantrymen faced off with
Japanese sailors for three days of close combat. Dur-
ing this action, officers from XIV Corps called on
MacArthur to lift his artillery restrictions. On the 10th,
MacArthur reluctantly conceded, and tank, artillery,
tank destroyer and mortar support leveled the opposi-
tion. On 11 February the island was secured at the cost
of some 300 US casualties, but the assault had been in
vain. The power plant had been destroyed by artillery
fire and Manila would be without electricity for some
time.
The 148th Infantry Regiment amphibious assault-
ed across the Pasig via the 672nd Amphibian Tractor
Battalion’s vehicles and the assault boats of the 117th
Combat Engineer Battalion. The 148th had little trou-
ble clearing the Pandacan district, but the Japanese in
Paco put up a tough fight for the Railroad Station, Con-
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 strategy & tactics 11

ST 246 Issue.indd 11 9/21/10 10:59:08 AM

 cordia College, and Paco School. Only after intense
bombardment and an infantry assault did the Japanese
retreat from the rubbled buildings. The American in-
fantrymen pressed on, fighting house to house and
through minefields, roadblocks and barbed wire entan-
glements. After two days of rough and tumble urban
warfare and 500 casualties, the 148th Infantry managed
to push the battered 1st Naval Defense Battalion west
of Estero de Paco toward the Intramuros.
Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division was crossing
the Pasig to the east against very little opposition. The
cavalry troopers moved slow and steady due to many
minefields in the area. Still, the Santa Ana District was
theirs by noon; however, XIV Corps G-2 (Intelligence)
knew the toughest fighting was still ahead. Gen.Gris-
wold also believed it was time to completely surround
Manila’s defenders. Once Iwabuchi’s Manila Naval
Defense Force lost its line of communication and ac-
cess to outside reinforcement, the Japanese inside the
city would be doomed.
Trapping the Tigers
By 11 February the 511th Parachute Infantry Regi-
ment was using flame-throwers, satchel charges, gaso-
line attacks, and urban infantry tactics to eliminate the
tenacious Japanese. The Japanese were fighting to the
death; surrenders were few and far between. The 511th
Parachute infantry Regiment reached Libertad Avenue
less than a mile from Manila proper, but during their
fighting advance they lost their commander, Col. Hau-
gen.
Gen. Griswold halted the 511th Parachute Regi-
ment’s drive and established the 11th Airborne’s end
of operations boundary in order to keep the division
from running into the other American units fighting
their way in from the north. The 11th would concen-
trate an all-out attack on Nichols Field. Artillery and
mortar units pounded the Japanese defenses while the
“Diving Devildogs of Luzon” in their SBDs bombed
and strafed Japanese artillery emplacements. The 187th
and the 188th Regiments hit the defenders hard, and by
nightfall Nichols Field was in American hands. The
11th Airborne Division had captured most of its objec-
tives, killing an estimated 3,000 Japanese and isolating
the Abe Battalion at the cost of over 1,000 GI casual-
ties. The 11th Airborne’s remaining operations would
be maintaining a perimeter around Manila, supporting
attacks on Fort McKinley, destroying the Abe Battal-
ion, and seizing Cavite.
Meanwhile, 1st Cavalry was completing the envel-
opment. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, maintaining con-
tact with the 37th Infantry, reached Estero de Paco. The
5th Cavalry linked up with the 11th Airborne Division
and the next day they took Neilson Field, Culi-Culi
and Route 57, which was an extension of Libertad Av-
enue. Driving west, the 5th halted on Villaruel Street.
Krueger assigned the 112th Regimental Combat Team
(RCT) to the 1st Cavalry Division. The 112th moved
12 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 12
in and relieved the 12th Cavalry Regiment, which had
been securing US lines of communication. The 12th
raced into the city and reached Manila Bay where the
5th Cavalry Regiment was waiting. The Manila Naval
Defense Force was trapped. Death and surrender were
the only two options for the Japanese.
Yamashita Strikes
Upon hearing Adm. Iwabuchi’s Manila Naval De-
fense Force was surrounded, Gen. Yamashita went into
a rage, much of which was vented at Gen. Yokoyama
Shizuo, commander of Shimbu Group, which was fac-
ing the Manila sector. Yamashita demanded to know
how Gen. Yokoyama have left 20,000 valuable men to
defend Manila, contrary to his orders. The answer was
the Japanese Navy had wanted Manila held, present-
ing the Army with a fait accompli.
Yamashita ordered Gens. Yokoyama and Ko-
bayashi to launch counterattacks against Manila, break
through, and create gaps for the Naval Defense Force
to withdraw to the east and link up with rest of the
Japanese forces on Luzon. Yokoyama tried to inform
Adm. Iwabuchi of the counterattack, so the Manila de-
fenders would be prepared when the time came. But
Iwabuchi didn’t get that information until 17 February,
two days after the counterattack had begun.
Yokoyama’s counteroffensive was organized into
two groups: Shimbu Force and Kobayashi Force.
Shimbu Force was to attack southwest toward Novali-
ches Dam and then into Grace Park. Kobayashi Force
was to attack west across the Marikina River, objec-
tives being the Balera Water Filters and then Manila
itself. Shimbu Force kicked off its counterattack on 15
February, but the operation was disorganized from the
start and quickly bogged down. The 112th RCT drew
the task of engaging the Shimbu Force. Supported by
napalm airstrikes and heavy artillery bombardments,
the 112th RCT fought the Shimbu Force to a grinding
halt. By 18 February Shimbu Force was so shot up it
had no other option than to retreat back to its original
positions in the mountains east of Manila.
Kobayashi Force fared no better. Its attempts to
cross the Marikina River were thwarted as the 7th and
8th Cavalry Regiments kept the Japanese in check for
three days. Seeing the counteroffensive was wasting
troop strength, Yokoyama cancelled it on 19 Febru-
ary. He again ordered Adm. Iwabuchi to break out of
Manila with his remaining forces and join the Shimbu
Group. But the admiral ignored the general’s orders as
he and his men were preparing to fight and die to the
last man inside Manila.
Closing In
To the south of Manila, the 11th Airborne Division
encircled and destroyed the Abe Battalion on the high
ground of Mabato Point. The Japanese loss of the Abe
Battalion was a true waste and a symptom of poor
leadership. The battalion could have retreated into
9/21/10 10:59:09 AM
 Manila or reinforced the Shimbu Group, but instead
Capt. Abe Saburo chose to make a pointless stand. The
11th Airborne suffered only 60 casualties in the action
while the Japanese lost 750 men.
On the 19th the remnants of the 3rd and 4th Naval
Defense Battalions silently slipped out of Fort McKin-
ley and fled east. When the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regi-
ments entered the fort on 19 February, they found the
defenses deserted.
ST 246 Issue.indd 13
Inside Manila, the Naval Defense Force had been
reduced from 20,000 sailors and soldiers to 6,000 des-
perate but still fanatic survivors. Most of their heavy
weapons had been destroyed or captured. The Japa-
nese were surrounded and attacked from all sides with
their backs against Manila Bay. And their command
and control structure had largely disintegrated. With-
out leadership, many Japanese troops who knew they
were going to die went on frenzied rampages. They
strategy & tactics 13
9/21/10 10:59:09 AM
 Automatic response: US infantry waiting to go into action.

brutalized and killed innocent Filipino civilians and The 82nd Field Artillery pounded the five-story hotel
committed acts of arson across the city. for three days with 105mm guns. Armor support was
But the cavalry was coming to the rescue. The also sent in with self-propelled guns to reduce enemy
troopers of the 1st Cavalry fought their way into the positions to rubble. Cavalrymen attacked the building,
Pasay City District then battled through La Salle Uni- clearing it room by room over the next two days. As
versity and the Japanese club. After several failed at- the troopers neared MacArthur’s old penthouse, the
tempts to clear Rizal Stadium, 5th Cavalry called in Japanese became suicidal. Finally, MacArthur entered
tank support. The Shermans rolled up and blasted the his old home with a squad of cavalrymen, only to find
Japanese bunkers. By dusk of the 16th, the cavalry- it littered with the bodies of dead Japanese sailors.
men had cleared the baseball field. By now, 5th and City of Death
12th Cavalry Regiments had destroyed most of the 2nd
The New Police Station was one of the toughest
Naval Defense Battalion, but not without suffering
obstacles the 129th Regiment encountered during the
heavy losses of their own. Every building was becom-
entire war. It had to clear the police station before the
ing a Japanese fortress. The cavalrymen continued to
148th Infantry Regiment could advance with its flanks
overrun Japanese positions as they captured the High
unexposed. Artillery and point blank tank fire had
Commissioner’s house and the Elk’s Club.
little effect on the building. The riflemen of the 129th
The infantrymen drew the toughest assignments attacked and were thrown back for three days until fi-
and suffered the highest casualty rates fighting street nally relieved by the 145th.
to street, house to house, and room by room. Com-
On 19 February, Gen. Griswold ordered his big
mon practice was for units to get on the roof of enemy
guns to train their barrels on the New Police Station.
occupied buildings. The infantry would work their
They didn’t cease firing until the station’s walls started
way down, clearing buildings floor by floor, driv-
collapsing. That afternoon the 145th Infantry Regiment
ing the defenders out into the street. Grenades, flame
went in. They wiped out a couple machinegun nests
throwers and demolitions were the best weapons for
in San Pablo Church, but they were driven out of the
this kind of fighting. The American soldiers had enor-
police station once again. On the eighth day the New
mous amounts of heavy support available. Needless to
Police Station fell; all that was left was debris.
say, civilians also suffered incredible casualties in the
fighting. The fights to secure City Hall and the General Post
Office were similar to the New Police Station battle.
By this time, the Americans were free to move
Both buildings took three days of infantry attacks and
along Manila Bay and Dewey Boulevard toward the
heavy shelling before they fell. Like the New Police
Intramuros walled city. Overlooking Manila Bay was
Station, City Hall and the Post Office were piles of
the Manila Hotel, and the fight for it had symbolic
pulverized rubble in the end.
importance for both sides. The Hotel had been Mac-
Arthur’s former residence in Manila. The Japanese
defended their positions there to the death, while the
Americans fought relentlessly to seize the place.
14 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 14 9/21/10 10:59:10 AM

 3
129 GENERA L
Pa sig Riv er POST
OFFIC E
2
145
1 1
12 145

37
INTRAMUR OS
SOUTH CITY HALL
PO RT 1
AREA 148
SAN TA
TERESIT A
COLLEGE
CUS TO MS
HOUS E
2
5 MANILLA CLUB
FINANCE
BUILDIN G
NEW POLIC E
STAT ION
AG RICUL TURE
Manila Ba y BUILDIN G
XX
MANILA .
St
HO TE L Luis .
San al S
t
Pe r UNIVERSITY OF
Capture of Manila 12
THE PHILIPPINES

23 February – 3 March 1945 ELK’S 1

CLUB 5(-) t.
aS

III
0 2 00 400 600 ya rd s ARMY -N AV Y F au
r
re
CLUB P ad ni a
f or
Cali
Allied occupied terr itor y Fe b. 23 Japanese stronghold area Allied attac ks Fe b. 23 - 25
Allied occupied terr itor y Fe b. 23 - 25 Intramuros wa ll Allied attac ks Fe b. 26 - Ma r. 3
Allied occupied terr itor y Fe b. 26 - Ma r. 3 I mpor tant bu ildin g

Last Line of Defense

As their defenses crumbled under the weight of the
American offensive, the Japanese retreated into the In-
tramuros walled city. Griswold and Krueger wanted
to use air strikes and napalm to finish them off. Mac-
Arthur refused their request on the grounds too many
civilians were trapped within the walled city. So Gris-
wold began to build up a huge array of field artillery,
howitzers, mortars, tank destroyers, tanks and anti-tank
weapons to bombard the Intramuros. He positioned his
regiments for the assault and even planned an amphib-
ious attack crossing the Pasig. Griswold pleaded with
the Japanese to surrender or release Filipino prisoners,
but none of the enemy were taking either option.
US artillery started to bombard the Intramuros as
early as 17 February and continued until 23 February.
The final barrage lasted an hour, with devastating di-
rect fire attacks that cut gaping holes into the district’s
four-foot thick walls. At the north wall the 129th Infan-
try moved across the Pasig in assault boats. Hitting the
shores at the north wall, the infantrymen charged into
the district. From the east the 145th Infantry Regiment
stormed past Quezon Gate. Japanese resistance was
scattered but desperate, and the Buckeyes had to fight
enemy soldiers and sailors hand to hand. The remain-
ing Japanese retreated into Fort Santiago, where they
were finally wiped out. The big guns: US artillery pounds Japanese positions.
continues on page 18
strategy & tactics 15

ST 246 Issue.indd 15 9/21/10 10:59:11 AM

 Japanese Strategy
As the American Army began to close on the city of Ma-
nila in late January 1945, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, com-
mander of the Japanese 14th Area Army, had no intention of
engaging in a fight to hold the Philippine capital. He had sev-
eral reasons for that decision. One was because Manila was
on flat terrain without major geographic obstacles to impair
the attackers’ maneuvers. (Apparently he underestimated the
value of the city’s buildings as defensive positions.) He also
thought it would be impossible to feed and supply Manila’s
1 million residents. Lastly, he considered most of Manila a
fire hazard due to the many flammable buildings in it. The
city could become a deathtrap for its defenders.
Yamashita therefore ordered the withdrawal of all troops
and supplies from the city in order to make a stand else-
where in more defensible terrain. The only force he planned
to leave behind was a small detachment from the Army. That
detachment would maintain order within Manila, keep sup-
ply routes open, and in the end would blow all the bridges
spanning the Pasig and Marikina Rivers to slow the Ameri-
can advance. While Yamashita did not plan to declare Ma-
nila an “open city,” neither did he plan to fight a true battle
there.
But Yamashita saw his plans frustrated. He had both
Army and Navy echelons under his command. The Army
and Navy had been rivals prior to the war for resources and
budgets, and during the war itself often did not cooperate on
strategic matters. So while Yamashita did not want to fight
for Manila, the Navy decided to do so anyway, and that deci-
sion hurt the 14th Area Army’s plans for the general defense
of Luzon. The whole problem came about from a lack of
communication between the Navy and Army leaders in the
Manila area.
Manila had been occupied by the equivalent of two Japa-
nese regimental combat teams under the command of Maj.
Gen. Takashi Kobayashi. He was commander of the Manila
Defense Force until 27 December 1944, when he was or-
dered by Yamashita to join the Shimbu Group to the east.
Kobayashi’s Manila Defense Force was then placed under
the command of Gen. Yokoyama, commander of the Shimbu
Japanese officers study a map.
16 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 16
Group and 8th Infantry Division. Yokoyama ordered Maj.
Gen. Kobayashi to link up with his forces in the mountains
to the east of Manila. Yokoyama had Kobayashi leave two
units in the city to help with the evacuation of Japanese forc-
es and to destroy the Pasig River bridges.
One of the units was a reinforced battalion under the
command of Capt. Saburo Abe of the Navy. That unit was
positioned to the south of the city in fortified positions called
the Genko Line. The Abe Battalion was to block any move-
ment along the Hagonoy Isthmus. The second force was po-
sitioned in the northern part of Manila. That unit was called
the Noguchi Detachment and was commanded by Col. Kat-
suzo Noguchi. The Noguchi Detachment consisted of two
provisional infantry battalions and supporting units. All of
them were Army units, and their orders from Yokoyama were
to withdraw east after blowing the Pasig River bridges.
During January, as the Army’s units were leaving, the
Navy was moving into Manila. Vice Adm. Denshichi
Okochi, commander of the Southwestern Area Fleet and the
highest-ranking naval officer in the Philippines, had decided
to reinforce Manila with a force of his own. Okochi sent a
new organization to defend Manila called the Manila Naval
Defense Force, not to be confused with Kobayashi’s Manila
Defense force. The Manila Naval Defense Force consisted
of 4,000 men and was commanded by Adm. Sanji Iwabu-
chi.
Okochi was going to send the rest of his men to defend
the Kembu area, but many of those naval troops got stuck in
or around Manila due to supply and transportation problems.
By mid-January, Iwabuchi had nearly 16,000 naval troops in
Manila and the surrounding areas. Okochi gave Iwabuchi an
extensive list of missions to accomplish before the Ameri-
cans took the city. His forces had to hold Nichols Field and
the Cavite Naval Base area, mine Manila Bay, conduct sui-
cide boat attacks against American shipping, evacuate the
31st Naval Special Base Forces ships, and destroy all Japa-
nese naval installations and supplies in the Manila and Cav-
ite areas of operation.
After Okochi departed for Baguio, he placed the Manila
Naval Defense Force under the operational command of
Gen. Yokoyama, commander of the Shimbu Group. Opera-
tional practices in the Japanese armed forces differed greatly
from those in the US military. The principal of unity of com-
mand took on different meanings for the Japanese Army
and Navy. Okochi’s transfer of authority to Iwabuchi ended
all lines of communication between the admiral and Gen.
Yokoyama. Iwabuchi felt his orders stated the Manila Na-
val Defense Force only fell under control of the Army when
they were operating in an area that was strictly under the
Army’s control. Before Iwabuchi would allow his command
to fall under the control of the Army, all missions Okochi as-
signed him would have to be completed. Iwabuchi believed
the directive Okochi had given him took precedence over
any directive Gen. Yokoyama might issue.
Yokoyama was unaware his control over the Manila Na-
val Defense Force would be limited such that he could not
interfere with Iwabuchi’s missions. He was also informed,
to his surprise, that Iwabuchi had 16,000 naval troops in and
around Manila, when he had been under the assumption the
number of naval troops there was only 4,000. Yokoyama
9/21/10 10:59:12 AM
 called a number of Manila Naval Defense Force and Shimbu
Group staff meetings between 8 and 13 January. During
those conferences, the naval officers made it clear, no matter
what the Shimbu Group did, they planned to defend Manila
to the death.
The naval officers’ reasoning was that any withdrawal
would prevent them from completing the missions Okochi
had assigned them. They also felt Manila was a natural for-
tress, with all the supplies and fortifications they would need
to inflict heavy losses on the Americans. Many staffers also
expressed dissatisfaction with the mountain positions east of
Manila that Gen. Yokoyama had assigned the Manila Naval
Defense Force. The naval officers also believed that to turn
the city over without a struggle would be bad for morale and
give the Americans a “free” victory.
Japanese Order of Battle
Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo GHQ
Southern Army Command in Saigon
Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Teraichi HQ
14th Area Army in Baguio
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita 8 ently, and thought Yokoyama would order the general with-
41st Area Army Shimbu Group
Lt. Gen. Shizmo Yokoyama
(80,000)
In the end, Iwabuchi declared he had no alternative but to
have the Manila Naval Defense Force carry out its primary
mission of defending the Manila naval facilities, which meant
defending Manila itself. Yokoyama had no choice but to give
into Iwabuchi’s plans, as he could not countermand Okochi’s
previous orders. He tried to work with Iwabuchi, and placed
all Army units in the city under naval command to unify the
defense.
Yokoyama did get some concessions out of Iwabuchi. The
admiral would establish his headquarters at Fort McKinley to
keep open lines of communications between the Manila Na-
val Defense Force and the Shimbu Group to the east. Iwabuchi
would send some naval troops to defend San Juan del Monte.
Yokoyama then issued new orders to Iwabuchi, which only
caused further confusion. The orders stated Manila and Fort
McKinley were to be firmly defended and the Manila defenders
were to sap the enemy’s fighting strength so the Shimbu Group
could counterattack when a favorable situation arose.
Yokoyama used the word koshu, which translates as “form
defense,” in regards to holding Manila. Koshu was a weak word
as far as the wording of Japanese orders go, and it does not
mean a fight to the death. Japanese orders never leaned toward
understatement, and the words used in the issued orders seemed
to have called for a limited holding action and then withdrawal.
But Iwabuchi’s operations officer interpreted the orders differ-
drawal of the Manila defenders, counteracting the naval chain
of command’s orders to hold the city. So Iwabuchi’s sailors felt
they were justified in fighting to the end.

31st Naval Special Base Force

Kobayashi Force 11 8 105 Rear Adm. Sanji Iwabuchi
(20,000)

Manilla Naval Defense Force Manilla Bay Entrance Force

Adm. Iwabuchi Capt. Akira Itagaki IJN
(16,000) (4,000)
Northern Force Central Force Southern Force
Col. Noguchi Forces Afloat Attached Units Adm. Iwabuki Capt. Furuse IJN
(4,500) Lt. Maeda (5,000) (5,000)

Northern Sector
Col. Noguchi HQ HQ HQ

2 3 37 3 SPB SPB SPB 1

Eastern Sector HQ 2

5 3

strategy & tactics 17

ST 246 Issue.indd 17 9/21/10 10:59:15 AM

 American Units Fighting in and Around Manila

General Headquarters
GHQ Southwest Pacific Area
General Douglas MacArthur

8 Lt. General 6 General

Robert L. Eichelberger Walter Krueger

XI Maj. General XIV Lt. General

Charles P. Hall Oscar W. Griswold

Maj. General Maj. General Maj. General

11 Joseph M. Swing 37 Robert S. Beightler 1 Verne D. Nudge
(15000)
(8000) (17500)

511 (2000) 188 (1500) 187 (1500) 1 (3500) 2 (3500) 112

1 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 12 (1750) 5 (1750) 7 (1750) 8 (1750) 1 2 3

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2

82 82 456 674
105mm 4.2î 155mm 75mm

44 117 37 302 456 544

105mm 240mm
howitzer howitzer
129 (3000) 145 (3000) 148 (3000)

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

672 637 754 136 6 756 135

155mm 105mm 155mm 105mm
howitzer howitzer howitzer howitzer

Once the Intramuros and Fort Santiago were tak- Conclusion

en, no real organized Japanese resistance remained. Once proud Manila had been turned into a city of
Iwabuchi and his diehards were holed up in the Leg- death by the warring Japanese and American armies.
islative building, the Agriculture building, and the Fi- Filipinos happily cheered and celebrated their libera-
nance building. The Americans simply moved in their tion, yet thousands of them had been killed in the fight-
artillery and began unrelenting bombardments on ing. Homes were no more, electricity was gone, water
those targets, then stormed them with infantry. Iwabu- was scarce, and most of the city was in ruins. Manila
chi ordered his last remaining troops to try escape to had been turned into the “Stalingrad of the Pacific.”
the mountains east of Manila. He assured his men he
The Japanese lost 16,000 men during the battle
would fight to the death in the city.
for Manila. That included 12,500 from the Manila
In his final radio conversation with the Impe- Naval Defense Force and the rest from Army forma-
rial General Headquarters in Tokyo, Iwabuchi was tions. Some Japanese managed to break through to the
praised for his heroic defense of Manila and told by Shimbu Group; however, the Shimbu Group lost 3,500
his superiors his actions had been in keeping with the men in its failed counterattack. Would the 16,000 sol-
highest traditions of the Imperial Japanese Navy. On diers and sailors lost in Manila have contributed to
25 February, Iwabuchi committed suicide, and the last Yamashita’s defense of Luzon elsewhere? Yes, but the
of the Manila defenders slipped away. The Finance outcome of the Philippines campaign would not have
building fell on 3 March and Gen. Griswold reported been any different. Iwabuchi’s plan was strategically
to Gen. Krueger the battle for Manila was over. sound for several reasons: he was denying the Allies a
major port city; he made the Americans pay for every
inch of Manila; and he tied up three US divisions for a
month.

18 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 18 9/21/10 10:59:17 AM

 US Airborne Division 1944/45

HQ

HHB OR

MP
US Infantry Division 1944ñ45
Parachute
Typical attachments maintenance

HHC

HHC HHB
105mm 155mm

MP

CIC

US Cavalry Division 1944ñ45 (Dismounted)

HQ
Maybe Yamashita was wrong after all. If he had
placed Gen. Yokoyama in command of Manila’s de- HHB
fense, and deployed a tank regiment and an infantry 105mm
division there with the Manila Naval Defense Force MP
instead of in the mountains, the city might have been
a tougher nut to crack. The US would have had to de- CIC
ploy at least six divisions against Manila, and it might
have taken many months and many more men before
the Allies seized the city.
The Americans paid a heavy price for Manila. Total
casualties were 6,575; of those 1,010 were killed in ac- Sources
tion and 5,565 were wounded. William B. Breur. Geronimo!, St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
The Americans worked well with their Filipino Rafael Steinburg. Return to the Philippines, World War II Time-Life Books,
1985.
allies. The Filipinos fought against the Japanese for Samuel Eliot Morison. History of the United States Naval Operations.
their homeland and assisted the liberating Americans Vol XIII The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, Visayas
on numerous occasions. The Filipinos also suffered 1944-1945, 1975.
the worst. They lost an estimated 100,000 civilians. Beth Day. Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City, National Media
Production Center, 1978.
Their capital lay in ruin, and it would take years and Pierre Comtois. Manila’s Bloody Liberation, World War II Magazine, Jan.
cost millions of dollars to rebuild the city. The effects 1996.
of the Battle of Manila would be felt long after the end Robert Ross Smith, U.S. Army in World War II: Triumph in the Philippines,
of the War in the Pacific. The War in the Pacific Center of Military History United States Army,
1991.
United States Army’s Center of Military History. U.S. Army in World War II
Atlas “The War in the Pacific”

strategy & tactics 19

ST 246 Issue.indd 19 9/21/10 10:59:18 AM

 Manila’s Defenders
Adm. Iwabuchi’s area of operational control covered
some 250 square miles. To defend that area he had around
20,000 men. Some 13,000 of them were naval troops; an-
other 4,000 sailors had been sent off to defend the islands in
Manila Bay, and some troops had gone to the east to assist
the Shimbu Group. The Army had roughly 3,000 to 4,000
men in the Manila area of operations. Iwabuchi divided his
20,000 men into five groups: three combat organizations
were stationed around Manila; the fourth group consisted of
forces afloat and based at the city’s waterfront or on the Ma-
nila bay islands; the fifth group consisted of medical units,
supply troops, clerks, cooks and so on.
The first combat organization was the Northern Force,
whose commander was Col. Katsuzo Noguchi. He was re-
sponsible for the entire area north of Pasig. Noguchi had
4,500 men. The next group was the Central Force, which
was directly commanded by Adm. Iwabuchi. The Central
Force was made up of 5,000 naval troops to defend the
southern part of the city, Cavite and Neilson Field. Cavite
was deserted on 2 February after the 5th Naval Defense Bat-
talion had completed its demolitions. Iwabuchi established
his headquarters in the walled fortress city of Intramuros
contrary to his promise to Gen. Yokoyama to place it at
Fort McKinley. The last group was the Southern Force. The
Southern Force was commanded by Capt. Takusue Furuse
of the Navy. Southern Force had over 5,000 men defending
Nichols Field, Fort McKinley, the Hagonoy Isthmus, and the
Genko Line. It included the Abe Battalion.
The defenses to the south of Manila were stronger than
those to the north. Japanese naval headquarters on Luzon had
intercepted Allied radio transmissions saying that US Eighth
Army was going invade south of Manila. Adm. Iwabuchi re-
acted to that intelligence by having his men fortify southern
Manila. But the admiral had fallen for an American decep-
tion operation. The main American attack was really coming
in from the north, consisting of the Sixth Army.
The Allied deception plan worked, with the result Jap-
anese defenses in northern Manila were meager. It wasn’t
until the last week of January that Iwabuchi finally realized
Sixth Army’s XIV Corps, sweeping down the central plains
from the north, was preparing to assault Manila. By that
Long way from Tokyo: Japanese infantry on the march.
20 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 20
Japanese 120mm gun.
time, of course, it was too late for the admiral to redeploy his
forces.
Cut off from the rest of the Japanese army in the Philip-
pines, Iwabuchi promised his men a suicidal fight to hold
Manila. He hoped to inflict heavy losses on the Sixth and
Eighth Armies while denying the Allies Manila and Manila
Bay for some time; however, his defensive preparations
were tactically unsound. His defensive lines generally had
no supporting positions or second line of prepared positions.
Many had no routes of withdrawal, and most positions were
not mutually supporting.
The strongest defenses existed in and around the walled
Intramuros district and the surrounding government build-
ings. The standard position was a reinforced concrete build-
ing that had its entrances sandbagged. Firing slits were cut
out for machineguns and rifles. Barricades were set up in
stairways and corridors to restrict the movement of any in-
truders. In some of the basements the Japanese dug tunnels
to connect different buildings. Defenders set up roadblocks
and minefields to obstruct movement down main avenues of
approach, but only some of those obstructions were covered
by fields of fire. Amazing as it may seem for a city fight, Jap-
anese snipers played no real part in the battle for Manila.
On the other hand, the Manila defenders had a huge arse-
nal at their disposal: 20mm antiaircraft guns and 25mm ma-
chine cannons were plentiful. There were also hundreds of
mortars varying in caliber from 50mm to 150mm. Iwabuchi
had emplaced over 60 120mm artillery pieces in and around
Manila, as well as many 75mm pieces. Anti-tank guns were
scattered throughout the city in fortified positions. Rocket
units were also positioned with projectiles varying in caliber
from 200mm to 450mm. And there was no shortage of am-
munition for those weapons.
One problem among the Manila defenders was that many
of them were sailors or second line troops, and most had no
infantry training and little experience with heavy weapons.
The Army’s infantry battalions were of a higher caliber than
the naval units, but those units had been filled with replace-
ments from other service branches who lacked the expe-
rience of the American veterans they were going to fight.
Naval units often consisted of airfield engineers, aircrews,
cooks, Korean laborers and even Japanese civilians pressed
into service. The Americans were pushing toward Manila,
and Iwabuchi had no time to finish his defenses or train his
command, but his men held strong positions and were ready
to fight to the death.
9/21/10 10:59:20 AM
 You can return to the Philippines

Manila ’45: Stalingrad of the Pacific

Manila ‘45: Stalingrad of the Pacific (M’45), is a two-play-
er, low-to-intermediate complexity wargame that simulates the
American liberation of the capital of the Philippines in World
War II, which took place from 3 February to 4 March 1945. To
control complexity and present an overall-force-commander’s-
view of the battle, the game uses a tactically scaled map and
where, the Japanese player is declared to have won the game. If there are
units of maneuver coupled with an operationally scaled game
no Japanese units left on the map at that time, the US player is declared
turn length. The American player is generally on the offensive,
to have won the game. Of course, if all Japanese units are wiped out
trying to clear the entire Japanese defending force from the city
prior to the end of the last game turn, play stops and the US player is
prior to the end of the game.
declared the victor. No draws are possible.
Each game turn of M’45 equals three days. Each hexagon
Tacticians will enjoy the fact there are 22 unit types in the game:
on the map represents 0.3 miles (0.5 km) from side to opposite
heavy artillery, heavy anti-aircraft, heavy mortar, heavy rocket artillery,
side. The units of maneuver in the game are companies, bat-
naval infantry (armed ship crews), regular infantry, combat engineers,
teries and battalions, representing anywhere from about 100 to
heavy weapons (machineguns), anti-aircraft, military police, anti-tank,
1,000 men and their equipment.
field artillery, rear echelon ad hoc infantry, glider infantry, paratroopers,
Historically the Japanese fought to the last man (literally, bridging engineers, mortars, armored cavalry, tanks, self-propelled artil-
not metaphorically), and the game’s victory conditions repre- lery, amphibious tractors, and self-propelled anti-tank.
sent that brutally absolute mindset. To determine the winner,
Playing time is about three to five hours. Designed by Joseph Miran-
both players examine the map at the end of Game Turn 10. If
da; developed by Ty Bomba.
at that time there’s one or more Japanese units still in play any-

To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in

this issue send your name and address along with:
$24 US Customers
$27 Canadian Customers All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$29 Overseas Customers CA residents add $1.09 sales tax. Send to:
Decision Games
ATTN: S&T Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
strategy & tactics 21

ST 246 Issue.indd 21 9/21/10 10:59:30 AM

 Memnon Takes the War to
Alexander:
Island Hopping in 333BC
By Carl Otis Schuster

I
n the winter of 334 BC, Alexander, King of Macedon and head of the Corinthian League, faced a strategic di-
lemma. He had defeated the Persian Empire’s armies at Granicus (May, 334 BC) and seized all of Ionia, as well
as most of Phrygia and the Cilician Coast. Asia Minor was all but his, though the bulk of the vast Persian Empire,
with its huge armies still was intact, lay to the east. Alexander’s hold on Greece was dependent on his continued
success. While later generations would give him the sobriquet of “The Great,” his Greek contemporaries saw him as
an uncultured barbarian who had subjugated their once proud city-states. He held the city-states’ loyalty only through
a combination of Macedonian garrisons, local loyalists, and the threat of severe retribution if a revolt broke out. Sparta,
the most militaristic of Greek cities, lay unconquered, seeking an opportunity to strike out and remove Macedon from
the picture. And Sparta’s King Agis was negotiating with Persia for subsidies to hire mercenaries to augment his own
armies in order to challenge Alexander’s Macedonians.

22 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 22 9/21/10 10:59:33 AM

 New Persian Commander
It was in that atmosphere Darius, Persia’s king of
kings, appointed an ethnic Greek from Rhodes, Mem-
non, as commander of the Persian Fleet and gave him
the gold and authority to take the war to Alexander and
the Greeks. In modern terms, Memnon wanted to take
the war into Alexander’s strategic center of gravity.
Memnon was ideally qualified for the task. A
Greek himself, he understood the political atmosphere
of mainland Greece’s city-states, as well as the aspi-
rations of their peoples. There were in fact numerous
Greeks serving the Persians. They included several
thousand mercenary hoplites, heavy infantry who pro-
vided a base of maneuver for the lighter Persian caval-
ry and archers. Some Greeks served for money, others
because they saw Alexander as a usurper of traditional
Greek liberties. And there were numerous Greek colo-
ST 246 Issue.indd 23
nies along the Ionian coast in Asia Minor, some going
back centuries, all part of the Persian Empire, though
some within them saw Alexander as their liberator.
Memnon had served as an officer in the Persian
army before Granicus. At the start of Alexander’s inva-
sion, he had recommended a strategy of scorched earth
and retreat. Alexander’s forces were better equipped
and better disciplined than their Persian counterparts,
and so open battles would not defeat the invaders, irre-
spective of Persian numbers. Instead, Memnon argued
that destroying crops and retreating into the region’s
most heavily fortified cities would deny Alexander the
supplies and resources he needed to sustain his army.
Denied such supplies, the Macedonian-Greek army
could not long remain on Persian soil. In addition,
Memnon believed a delaying action would buy time
strategy & tactics 23
9/21/10 10:59:36 AM

Bronze armor, stone relief: Greek hoplites clash in battle.
for Persia to foment rebellion in Greece and thereby
force Alexander to return home to deal with it. He had
initiated contact with Sparta’s King Agis that sum-
mer.
But Memnon’s advice was rejected. Factions in the
Persian court did not want to give too much credence
to a Greek. More, the satraps were not willing to risk
devastating their own provinces and discomfiting their
own people. The result was the western Persian sa-
trapies took the field, met Alexander at Granicus—and
were defeated by the Macedonians.
Memnon had joined the general rout after Granicus
and spent three weeks putting down a rebellion that
followed the Persian defeat. He then joined the Persian
general Oronbates at Halicarnassus, which Alexander
besieged and captured later in 334 BC. Memnon then
took his contingent of Greek mercenaries and the Per-
sian fleet to the island of Kos. While there, he made
contact with spies and anti-Alexander elements on the
islands of Chios and Lesbos, and in mainland Greece,
including possibly several Athenian leaders as well
as the aforementioned King Agis. As the negotiations
and bribe money flowed, Memnon gathered 300 ships,
approximately 10,000 Greek mercenary infantry, and
an unknown number of archers from Crete. Another
100 ships were to harass Macedonian forces along the
Phrygian coast and supply Persian coastal garrisons so
they could resist the invaders.
To understand Memnon’s strategy, one must under-
stand the limitations of naval technology at that time.
Warships, especially triremes, were tightly packed
with rowing benches and rowers (who also doubled
as combatants), leaving no room for the crew and any
marines to sleep. Moreover, the hulls became water-
logged if they spent too much time in the water. So
warships pulled into shore every night, posting only
one or two ships of each squadron at anchor to prevent
surprise attacks. With Alexander controlling the Cili-
cian coast (southern Asia Minor) and both banks of the
Hellespont (the straits connecting Europe to Asia, the
24 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 24
modern Dardanelles), Memnon had no choice but to
conduct an island hopping campaign if he wanted to
attack Greece.
Most of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean
remained loyal to Persia, so they could be used as a
chain of bases. Memnon took his fleet to sea, sailing
past Kalymnos, Leros and Patmos islands to invade
the north Aegean island group. The Persian Empire
was striking back.
Across the Aegean
At Chios, Memnon found a sympathetic populace.
He bribed several key community leaders, who seized
power and switched the island’s allegiance back to
Persia. With the port city’s gates opened and most of
the pro-Alexander forces isolated, he quickly took
control of the harbor and surrounding countryside.
Memnon spent a couple weeks consolidating his posi-
tion on Chios before setting off for his next target, the
island of Lesvos (better known as Lesbos).
Lesvos and its key port of Mytilene had rebelled
against Persia almost immediately upon hearing of
Alexander’s victory at Granicus. A valuable trading
center for commerce between Greece and Asia Minor,
the island had switched hands several times among
Athens, Sparta and Persia over the previous 400 years.
Initially loyal to Athens during the early years of the
Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), it had joined Sparta
after Athens’ defeat in Sicily, and rejoined Athens af-
ter Sparta signed an alliance with Persia in 412 BC. It
had fallen to Persia after the Peace of Antalcides, or
“King’s Peace,” in 386 BC and had since been seeking
an opportunity to declare its independence.
Landing on the southern part of the island, Mem-
non captured the cities of Pyhrra, Arissa and Meth-
ymna; however, his allies in Mytilene failed to seize
the city and turn it over to him. He knew he could not
leave the island while its largest port remained loyal to
Alexander, particularly since it contained 1,000 mer-
cenaries the Macedonian king had dispatched there.
To cut off Mytilene from external support, Mem-
non blockaded the harbor’s mouth and built two forts
equipped with archers and artillery (probably early
catapults). He also established over a dozen block-
houses dominating the landward routes into the city
from the island’s other ports and beaches. Fortunately
for Alexander, Memnon took sick and died before the
city fell. On his deathbed, he transferred command to
his nephew Pharnabazos.
Continuing the Campaign
Pharnabazos negotiated a peace agreement with
Mytilene’s leaders, who recognized they had little
hope of assistance from Alexander while the Persians
controlled the sea. They agreed to rescind their alli-
ance with Alexander and instead support Darius under
the terms of the Treaty of Antalkidios. They would
accept the return of pro-Persian exiles, allowing them
9/21/10 10:59:37 AM
 to regain their property and political position, expel (and lose) at the Battle of Issus in 333 BC. So Pharna-
Alexander’s mercenaries, and accept a garrison from bazos lacked the forces to take any additional islands.
Rhodes (who were ethnic Greeks). Thus Memnon’s offensive was over.
An exile named Diogenese was put in charge of What If?
the city, which paid a heavy tribute to Persia. With For his part, Alexander had not remained idle while
Lesvos secured, Pharnabazos wanted to press on with Memnon besieged Mytilene. In response to events on
the campaign. He took a squadron of ships to Tene- Chios, he reactivated the naval squadrons he had left
dos, southeast of Lemnos Island and southwest of the behind in the Hellespont and ordered his governor
Hellespont. Landing outside the north harbor, he de- general in Greece, Antipater, to concentrate as many
manded the island renounce its alliance with Alexan- ships as he could find to protect the Greek coast. An-
der. Lacking any military forces of their own, Lemnos’ tipater had gathered almost 50 ships from Euboea and
populace surrendered, but managed to send a messen- other city-states by the time Tenedos fell. Fifteen of
ger to the nearest Macedonian garrison in Troad. those ships were near the island of Andros when they
Fortunately for Alexander, Pharnabazos command-
ed only 30 ships and had no army to land. Once in-
formed of Memnon’s death, Darius had detached the
Greek mercenaries from the fleet and ordered them to
rejoin the main army. He also sent most of the fleet
back to Kos. Only a handful of ships and their crews
were left to continue operations against the Greek
mainland. Darius probably felt Memnon’s operations
had produced a sufficient threat to force Alexander to
dispatch troops home, and that probes into Greece’s
coastal islands would be enough to sustain that threat.
Meanwhile, the Greek mercenaries were the empire’s
best infantry and he needed them to fight Alexander.
The mercenaries joined Darius just in time to fight
The other side: frieze of Persian soldiers.
strategy & tactics 25

ST 246 Issue.indd 25 9/21/10 10:59:39 AM


Meanwhile, Alexander
Alexander wasn’t idle while Memnon was pursuing his
drive up the Aegean Island chain. The Macedonian King had
followed his victory at Halicarnassus by continuing his ad-
vance along Asia Minor’s southwestern coast. He secured the
coastal cities, established a secure base for his army to prepare
for the next stage of the campaign. Alexander deployed Par-
menio and most of the cavalry north into Gordium to secure
the Macedonian northern flank and gain that region’s rich ag-
ricultural stores for his army while he conquered the coast.
Alexander also sent a significant contingent of his army home
on compassionate leave, primarily those who had married just
before the campaign’s start. He dispatched a recruiting team
to the Peloponnese, and disbanded his navy to free up funds
to hire new soldiers.
Most of the coastal cities simply surrendered to him after
hearing of his hard-fought victory at Halicarnassus and his
generosity toward those cities that welcomed his authority.
By the summer of 333 BC, Asia Minor’s coast had been se-
cured. Alexander decided to assemble his army at Gordium
in central Phrygia. That was a good staging point. The city
enjoyed significant water and food stores, was the capital of
one of Asia Minor’s richest provinces, and was located in a
region noted for its cattle herds and produce. Additionally, it
was a crossroads that connected Asia Minor’s coast to north-
ern Syria and the most direct routes into Persia. Accordingly,
he ordered his new recruits and returning soldiers to join him
there.
Alexander also had good psychological reasons to be in
Gordium. While there, he attempted to solve the Gordian
Knot, which secured a cart to a post in the temple there. Ac-
cording to legend, he who solved the knot would conquer
Asia. Alexander probably hoped to establish “the favor of the
Gods” or establish the certainty of his coming conquest in the
minds of his troops and the region’s population by untying
the knot. Alexander’s chroniclers record he gave up on unty-
ing the knot and simply cut through it with his sword. It isn’t
known if his troops believed his action constituted the solu-
tion required by legend.
More importantly, it was in Gordium Alexander first re-
ceived word Chios had fallen, and it was also where he learned
of Memnon’s death. Assured of the security of Macedon and
Greece, he departed Gordium for the coast, seizing Tarsus in
what became the opening moves that led to the Battle of Issus
in November.
26 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 26
received word a Persian squadron of 10 Phoenician
ships had reached the island of Siphnos in the Cycla-
des chain southeast of Athens.
The nearest Macedonian naval commander, Pho-
ceas, led his 15 ship squadron to Cythnos (west of
Paros). He anchored overnight and sent out scouts
to determine the Persians’ strength. Once assured of
their location and numbers, he set out before dawn and
launched a surprise attack just as the Phoenicians were
manning their ships. Only two of the Persian ships es-
caped, fleeing all the way back to Kos. The Persian
fleet never again played a major role in the war.
Memnon’s full campaign plans and objectives are
lost to history; however, the operations he completed
provide a hint of what he may have planned. If it had
been successful, his northward island-hopping cam-
paign offered him three options for follow-on opera-
tions:
• Landing mercenary troops in Thessaly backed up
by Persian gold to foment rebellion and possibly
threaten Macedonia itself.
• Block Alexander from returning his army to Greece
by sea across the Aegean while Memnon subsidized
a Spartan assault into Attica.
• Establish a naval presence in the Hellespont by
seizing the Greek cities of Elaseus and Sestus to
hinder Alexander’s ability to return to Greece by
the same route.
Memnon may well have envisaged a two-pronged
offensive against Alexander’s forces and his support-
ers in Greece, supplemented by a rebellion in some of
the Greek city states. Of those options, the first two are
the most likely, but the third can’t be ignored.
First, Alexander was deeply resented in Thessaly.
A rebellion there might cost Alexander his Thessalian
cavalry as well as block Antipater’s ability to reinforce
his garrisons in Boetia and Attica. The regional’s of-
fered a natural invasion route into Macedonia. Mem-
non’s mercenary infantry force was of sufficient size to
seize and hold any cities that might rebel. It could also
provide the core of an invasion force that might have
forced Antipater into some hard choices: either block
an invasion of Macedonia or quell an uprising in Thes-
saly and the surrounding region. With Sparta waiting
in the wings to strike out at any weakened Macedonian
garrisons opposite the Peloponnesus, Antipater faced
difficult options indeed. Alexander probably wouldn’t
have gambled his kingdom by staying in Persia, and
might have instead brought his army home as rapidly
as possible upon hearing of the enemy force landing
on Greek territory.
If successful, Memnon could both force Alexander
to cross at the Hellespont if he had to return to Greece,
and complicate Antipater’s efforts to deliver replace-
ments and money to sustain Alexander if he chose to
remain in Asia. However, Greek triremes were heavi-
9/21/10 10:59:42 AM
 er than Phoenician ones and the Hellespont’s south-
westerly current gave Alexander’s 100-160 ship force
there an advantage against a force moving up from the
Aegean. Though Memnon had a 300-ship force, the
Macedonian’s advantages in the Hellespont all but ne-
gated his numerical advantage, and he would have to
win every naval engagement to be successful. Alex-
ander’s forces controlled both sides of the Hellespont
and most of Thrace was loyal to Alexander. So, un-
less Memnon defeated the Greek naval squadrons and
kept the mercenary troops with his fleet, he could not
risk beaching it (see sidebar on naval operations), not
even on the European shore. Memnon’s fleet could,
however, safely beach on the Aegean islands and deny
Alexander’s use of those islands to deliver his army by
the more direct and potentially faster sea route across
the Aegean Sea.
Alternatively, Memnon might have intended his
northward drive as the first phase of a campaign that
would have preceded a similar move up the Cyclades
Islands to deliver troops and gold to Sparta and there-
fore ensure the temperamental kingdom’s participation
in the war against Alexander. Sparta’s King Agis was
actively negotiating with Memnon for terms to sup-
port such military action. The Persian court was also,
in contact with elements of Alexander’s Thessalian
cavalry contingent.
As mentioned earlier, Memnon was in contact with
anti-Alexander factions in Athens and other Greek
city-states. It is apparent that he intended to foment re-
bellion in occupied Greece and hoped to bring Sparta
and its allies into the conflict. Memnon had conducted
a brilliant campaign that alarmed Alexander. Fortu-
nately for the Macedonian king, neither Darius nor his
key advisors shared Memnon’s vision. The Persians
thought only of defeating Alexander in a direct con-
frontation on land. As a result, Persia would never
again threaten the Greek homeland.
Though Memnon’s death ended his influence on
Persian strategic thinking, he clearly shaped Alexan-
der’s. His first priority after Issus was to secure the
Mediterranean coast, eliminating Persia’s naval su-
premacy by seizing its bases and warships. That cam-
paign led to the famous Siege of Tyre, brought Egypt
into the Macedonian Empire, and secured Alexander’s
rear area before he embarked on the march of conquest
against the Persian homeland.
The Aftermath
With Memnon gone, Persia lost the one command-
er who had both the vision and drive to take the war
to Alexander. Darius ignored the advice of his remain-
ing Greek advisors and chose to engage Alexander
directly in the field. That decision led to the Battle of
Issus in late 333 BC (most historians believe the battle
occurred in November), which Alexander won hand-
ily. However, it did not end Persia’s attempt to foment
rebellion in Greece nor convince Sparta’s King Agis to
ST 246 Issue.indd 27
The Fleets: Persian versus Greek
Though the Persian Fleet was larger than its Greek counterparts, Per-
sian naval victories were more the exception than the rule. The contending
fleets’ differing structures and compositions were the predominant factors.
Greek naval operations and doctrine had been honed by constant warfare
in which fleet tactics and collective discipline determined the victor. Their
ships were designed for fleet combat in which ramming was the primary
tactic, placing a premium on ships and crews withstanding the resulting
shock. The Greeks’ tactical focus was on sinking the enemy’s ships while
their operational thinking was directed at gaining a tactical advantage. Most
Greek city-states maintained standing fleets, with their squadrons struc-
tured in groupings of ships of similar age and handling characteristics. The
crews and squadrons, usually of six to 10 ships each, trained regularly.
The Phoenician contingents that constituted the bulk of the Persian fleet
came from city-states that did not maintain large standing navies. Typically,
each Phoenician city-state’s fleet consisted of a handful of ships provided
and funded by the leading merchant families. Paying to build and maintain
warships came at the expense of family fortunes, so those leading families
sought to provide the minimum required to meet the threat of piracy. More-
over, after nearly 300 years of Persian rule, the Phoenicians built fleets and
fought in large numbers only when directed by the Persian king of kings.
Since ships needed to be preserved, ramming was seen as a last resort.
The primary tactic was to conduct a running engagement with ships’ ar-
chers and javelin men attacking the enemy’s oarsmen. The objective was
to slow enemy ships so they could be boarded and, hopefully, captured
intact. Individually, the Phoenicians’ regular naval crews probably were
better trained than the Greek. Their lighter ships were faster and their ships’
broader beams made them more stable fighting platforms for their marines;
however, gathering disparate contingents and combining them into a single
fighting force was time consuming. The majority of the Phoenician fleet
consisted of recently mobilized ships and units. That complicated training
since no one was used to working together.
The other advantage the Greeks enjoyed was all of their crews spoke
the same language, while the Persian fleet was divided among Phoenician,
ethnic-Greek and Egyptian elements. The Greek fleets followed a standard
squadron organization, while the Persians had nothing approaching a for-
mal naval structure. Each Persian contingent was organized along lines
determined by its sponsors. A far higher proportion of a typical Greek fleet
would have trained and fought together prior to a naval war, while the vast
majority of a Persian fleet would have met for their first time when they
rendezvoused at a rally point. As a result, the Persian navy relied on simpli-
fied mass tactics.
As a further result, Greek fleets were more responsive to battle condi-
tions, more cohesive and more attuned to the requirements of naval en-
gagement than their Persian foes. The Persians preferred to seek battle in
open waters where their greater speed, better individual maneuverability,
and superior numbers could provide advantages. Unfortunately for the
Persians, the bulk of fleet battles with the Greeks occurred in constricted
waters not far from shore, and ramming, not a running engagement, was
the decisive tactic.
strategy & tactics 27
9/21/10 10:59:42 AM
 Naval Technology & Tactics in Ancient Greece

The Trireme was the capital ship of the classical age

and the ram in its bow was its primary weapon. However,
naval battles frequently turned into infantry clashes at sea
with sailors and marines employing javelins, arrows and
slinger-thrown rocks and then closing for boarding. The tri-
reme acquired its name from its use of three banks of oars-
men who sat in staggered “banks” along the ship’s beam. A
well trained crew could make up to 14 knots and maintain a
steady speed of 5-8 knots for several hours, however, these
ships had little room for supplies such as food and water.
Nor did they have room for living space for the crew. There-
fore, they rarely spent the night at sea and generally beached
at mid-day for meals. Moreover, because the hulls were
not tarred, Triremes became waterlogged over time. Crews
beached their ships to dry out as often as practical and mili-
tary fleets generally stood down over the winter, housing the
ships in covered stone ramps the Greeks called neosoikoi. In
fact, Alexander has disbanded his fleet in the winter of 334
BC, sending the crews home in order to save money and
preserve the ships’ hulls.
The trireme was first developed by the Phoenicians in
the late sixth century BC, and that class of ship was the
centerpiece of every major fleet by the 5th century. Triremes
generally had approximately 170 rowers, five officers, 15-20
other crewmen and 10-14 “marines” (two to four archers or
slingers and six to eight spearmen). Greek and Phoenician
oarsmen were freemen paid a daily wage for their services.
They might be called on to fight in a boarding action or to
protect their ships when beached or as the ship pulled away.
The table below provides the titles of some of the various
crew positions on a Greek trireme.
Ship’s Captain Trierarch
Helmsman (XO) Kybernetes
Lookout (in Bow) Proreus
Purser/Ship’s Secretary Penteconarchos
Piper to keep rowers in rhythm Auletes
Oarsman – Top Row Thranites
Oarsman – Middle Row Zygites
Oarsman – Lowest Row Thalamites
Each fleet modified the basic design to meet its mission
requirements. Phoenician triremes and those of Cyprus and
Rhodes tended to be lighter and more agile than those of Ath-
ens and most mainland Greek city-states. They also had wid-
er beams, a lighter, pointed ram, and a fighting platform that
ran the full length of the ship. That made them more stable
platforms, enabling them to sustain higher speeds and em-
ploy their marines more effectively in an engagement. They
also carried more water and more marines, usually slingers
or archers, than did Greek triremes. That was because piracy,
not fleet warfare, was the most serious challenge the Phoeni-
cians, Cypriots and Rhodians faced along the North African,
Phrygian and western Italian coasts where their merchant
fleets plied their trade.
Their focus was on running down pirates, harassing and
killing their oarsmen and then boarding to capture the ships.
They also operated in open water where choppy seas were
common. With piracy less of a problem than fleet combat in
the constricted waters around mainland Greece, Athens and
most of its mainland competitors built their triremes heavier

Naval Tactics
Deikplous Periplous Kuklos

Agg resiv e head-on attac k

fa vo red by the Athenians .
Required intense tr aining & Flanking maneuv er fa vo re d Def ensiv e Circle
discipline — dangerous to by Phoenicians . Difficult to
ex ecute in open w ater . ex ecute in constr icted w ater .

28 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 28 9/21/10 10:59:44 AM


Typical Navy Camp
Tw o ships anchored
to pr ev ent su rp rise attac k
S a i l o r s’ C a m p
M arin
P i
e/Naval Infan try
k e
c
c
t s P i
to deliver a more powerful shock when ramming and to better
withstand damage in a fleet engagement.
Greek marines were more heavily equipped than their Phoe-
nician counterparts. Phoenician marines wore no armor, and
carried a javelin or bow and a short dagger. Their Greek coun-
terparts wore quilted armor, a helmet and sandals. They carried
either a stabbing spear, javelin or bow, a heavy sword and a
wooden shield. Greek triremes occasionally carried hoplites for
heavy fighting.
As with the ships’ designs, the marines’ equipment was
dictated by different missions. Greek naval infantry might find
themselves fighting a heavily armed opponent ashore or at sea,
while the Phoenicians mostly fought pirates who wore little if
any armor. Marines had to fight in a unique fashion. Because of
the trireme’s relatively narrow beam and limited displacement,
movements along the deck shifted the ship’s motion and affected
the rowing. As a result, the marines remained in fixed positions
until boarding was required and generally threw their javelins or
fired arrows from a kneeling or sitting position.
The Phoenicians preferred to fight in open waters where their
superior speed, stability, maneuverability, and generally great-
er numbers could be employed to advantage. Given a choice,
the Phoenicians preferred to conduct a flanking maneuver the
Greeks called the periplous. It consisted of a ship or squadron
of ships pulling out of the back of the fleet and rowing around to
attack the enemy from his flank (see diagram).
Athens and the mainland Greek states, including Macedonia
and Sparta, preferred to fight in constricted waterways where
they couldn’t be outflanked or outmaneuvered. The mainland
Greeks’ heavier construction gave their triremes an advantage in
head-on engagements. Their highly disciplined crews mastered
a maneuver called the deikplous, in which a ship rowed directly
at an opponent and then veered away slightly and conducted a
tight turn to ram its quarter (see diagram). Also, boarding actions
generally favored the Greeks because their marines had heavier
weapons and armor.
ST 246 Issue.indd 29
drop his plans to lead such a rebellion.
The Persian Adms. Pharnabazus and Auto-
phradates tried to continue Memnon’s cam-
paign without the troops. They made Chios
their primary operating base but, fortunately
for Alexander, they divided the fleet into too
many small contingents, conducting raids along
the Greek seaboard. One of their squadrons, a
force of 10 ships, was surprised and defeated at
Seriphos in September 333 BC. Their later at-
tempt to secure the Hellespont in early 332 BC
was also defeated, largely because they didn’t
t s
e launch the incursion with the full fleet. The rest
k of the fleet was scattered across the Aegean.
The much smaller Macedonian navy was able
to defeat them in detail.
Meanwhile, King Agis continued his efforts to sub-
orn key leaders in each of mainland Greece’s occupied
cities. In December 333 BC, he took a single trireme to
the island of Siphnos to discuss the coming campaign
into Alexander’s empire. Adm. Pharnabazus came, re-
portedly bringing a sufficient amount of gold to sup-
port Agis’s plans; however, while they were meeting
a messenger delivered the news of Darius’s defeat
at Issus. Suddenly Pharnabazus was more concerned
with retaining the loyalty of the Phoenicians that sup-
plied his ships and crews than he was with inciting a
rebellion in Greece, since Phoenicia was now exposed
to Alexander’s army. He departed after giving Agis a
squadron of only 10 ships plus 30 talents of silver.
That wasn’t enough, but didn’t deter King Agis. He
returned to Sparta and continued his efforts. Muster-
ing a handful of allies, including the surviving Greek
mercenaries in Persian service who had escaped from
Issus, he invaded Alexander’s empire in the spring of
332 BC with an 8,000 man army. He died before the
wall of Megalopolis when he engaged Antipater’s re-
lief force of 16,000 men.
King Agis was an almost tragic figure. He knew
the majority of Greek leaders and citizens resented
Macedonian rule; however, the Sparta he led was but
a shadow of its former self. He lacked the military and
strategy & tactics 29
9/21/10 10:59:47 AM
 financial resources to make a convincing challenge to
Macedonian power. Where 100 years earlier Sparta
had fielded an army of nearly 20 regiments, or about
20,000 hoplites, it could only muster about four regi-
ments, or 4,000 men, when Agis ascended the throne.
His kingdom also lacked the money and other fi-
nancial resources to hire mercenaries. That’s what
made Persian gold so critical to his plans. Neither Ath-
ens nor many of Sparta’s traditional allies would join
Agis. The odds of victory were too small and the con-
sequences of failure too high. By April 332 BC, Agis
was dead and the Macedonian Fleet had retaken Chios
and most of the Aegean Islands. The remnants of the
Persian Fleet fled back to their home cities.
In 331BC, Alexander would defeat Darius at the
epic Battle of Arbela, securing the Persian Empire for
Macedon.

Statue known as “lion of Chaeronea.”

Sources:
Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, Penguin Books, New York,
1958.
Cassel, Lionel, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1995.
Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: Failure of Persia, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
Engels, Donald W., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the
Macedonian Army, University of California Press, Berkeley,
1978.
Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars, University of California
Press, 1998.
Morrison, J.S., et al The Athenian Trireme: The History and Recon-
struction of an Ancient Greek Warships, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2000.
30 #246
Plutarch, The Age of Alexander, Penguin Books, New York, 1973.
Rogers, William L., Greek and Naval Warfare: A Study in Strategy,
Tactics and Ship Design From Salamis to Actium, U.S. Naval
Institute, Annapolis, 1964.
Rufus, Quintus Curtius, The History of Alexander, Penguin Books,
New York, 1984.
Shepard, Arthur McCartney, Seapower in Ancient History, Little
Brown and Company, Boston, 1924.
Siculus, Diodorus, Library of History, Books XVI – XVII, Harvard
University, Cambridge, 1963.
Starr, Chester G., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History,
Oxford University Press, 1989.

ST 246 Issue.indd 30 9/21/10 10:59:50 AM

 For Your Information
Did You Know?
• Historians today are in gen-
eral agreement the legacy of
the French revolutionary and
Napoleonic eras can be sum-
marized into six main develop-
ments, none of which came to
fruition until the 20th century.
Those developments were, in no
particular order: 1) the glorifi-
cation of force and war; 2) the
birth of all-powerful, centralized,
authoritarian states; 3) the use of
mass propaganda to apotheosize
a dictator; 4) the marshaling
of entire peoples in the pursuit
of victory in total war; 5) the
beginnings of large-scale, fully
professional secret police and
espionage bureaucracies; and 6)
the faking of supposedly demo-
cratic elections and plebiscites.
• During his military career, Napo-
leon had 19 horses shot out from
under him in battle. Though no
exact count appears to have been
kept, during that same period of
his life he also spurred to death
an even larger number of the
beasts.
• Charles Lightoller was sec-
ond officer aboard the Titanic
when it sank in April 1912. As
is well known, on that occa-
sion some 900 of the ocean
liner’s passengers were lost due
to exposure and drowning in
the frigid waters of the North
Atlantic. Less well know is the
fact Lightoller, who survived the
Titanic’s destruction, later par-
ticipated in Operation Dynamo,
the successful 1940 British effort
to evacuate their forces from
the coast of France. At that time
66-years-old and retired, he
managed to pluck from the water
some 120 soldiers and take them
safely back to England aboard
his own yacht.
• During World War I the British
military executed 269 of its sol-
diers for the offense of desertion.
The corresponding figure for the
German military in that same
war was only 18.
ST 246 Issue.indd 31
• Between now and 2015, Peking
plans to add 32 conventionally
powered submarines and 11
nuclear powered submarines
to its navy. One of the latter is
designed to carry and launch
ICBMs.
• The US military consumes about
133 million barrels of oil per
year. In comparison, the nation
as a whole, minus the military
consumption, daily uses about
21 million barrels.
• The US Air Force burns about
2.6 billion gallons of aviation
fuel each year. They’re presently
trying to cut that consumption by
10 percent, mostly through the
increased use of simulators in
place of some actual flight time
for pilots and aircrew.
• There are presently 25 AC-130
“Spooky” and “Spectre” gun-
ships in service with the US Air
Force. Prior to the start of the
War on Terror, each one of them
averaged 35 hours flying time
per month. Since 9/11 that num-
ber has climbed to 137 hours per
month.
• Since the mid-1990s, the powers
that be in and around the Pen-
tagon have waged intense and
costly institutional battles over
what new “universal” tactical
communications system to adopt
for all the US armed services.
The issue has not yet been re-
solved due to conflicting techni-
cal and budgetary requirements
among the services. Inside Iraq
and Afghanistan, meanwhile, an
informal—but by most accounts
highly successful—communi-
cations and intelligence sharing
system has grown up among the
servicemen themselves. It con-
Attention S&T readers: We’re always
looking for authors for FYI. If you’d like
to try your hand at writing short (under
2,000 words), pithy articles for this col-
umn, on virtually any aspect of military
history, contact Ty Bomba, FYI editor,
at: WhiteRook02@netzero.net.
sists of them using their own cell
phones to send text messages
and phone-camera photographs
to one another while on patrol in
the field.
• The US Navy has recently
completed a 157,000 square-
foot virtual replica of a guided-
missile destroyer, christened the
USS Trayer, at its Great Lakes
training facility in Illinois. As the
last step prior to graduating from
basic training, the sailors passing
through the facility spend 12
hours in an exercise intended to
evaluate the skills they learned
in boot camp. During the exer-
cise they take the virtual ship to
virtual sea and undergo various
kinds of virtual attack.
America’s Brown Water
Navy
In March 2007 Riverine Squadron
One (RIVRON), headquartered at
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek
in Norfolk, Virginia, deployed to
Iraq. This unit of 12 boats and over
100 sailors is the first of three new
squadrons that will relieve the current
Marine riverine force. The Marine
riverines were part of the 2nd Marine
Division, assigned to the 24th Marine
Expeditionary Unit. It consisted of
fewer than 20 boats and 100 reserv-
ists. The replacement squadron is the
first “brown-water” unit deployed by
the USN since the Vietnam War. [See
S&T 243 for the Vietnam SEALORDS
campaign. ed.]
The current riverine mission be-
gan in November 2004, when US op-
erations started forcing insurgent cells
out of Iraqi cities. Those insurgents
sought haven in Sunni towns along
strategy & tactics 31
9/21/10 10:59:51 AM
 “This is a classic, global, heavily mechanized and highly mobile company.
You are not going to be able to conduct a modern war without them.”
the Euphrates River between Baghdad
and the Syrian border and along the
Tigris from Baghdad to Mosul. To
thwart that move, Marine units were
deployed to cut escape routes. Since
then, insurgents have been using
shallow inland waterways to infiltrate
arms and men from Syria, and the
US has been increasingly relying on
riverine forces for interdiction. Due
to budgetary restraints, however, the
Marines recently began planning to
disband their riverine force.
The Navy’s new brown water
force was officially established in Oc-
tober 2005 as the Naval Expedition-
ary Combat Command (NECC). The
NECC’s mission is to manage coastal
and riverine warfare, harbor security,
shipboard security, expeditionary
logistics and construction operations.
The command, when fully “stood up,”
will have between 40,000 and 50,000
sailors and a fleet of small boats.
The Navy high command considers
the NECC a linchpin in its quest for
relevance in the War on Terror.
One of the forces the NECC
will command is the riverine fleet.
RIVRON will consist of three squad-
rons, each of 221 sailors equipped
with 12 boats. The total force, with
headquarters and support personnel,
32 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 32
—Defense analyst Daniel Goure, discussing
Halliburton Corporation, March 2007
will consist of about 900 men and 36
boats. That force will conduct arms
and terrorist interdiction, armed escort,
commando raids, security patrols,
show-of-force, troop transport, non-
combatant evacuation, reconnaissance
and surveillance operations, as well as
training Iraqi riverine forces.
“It’s not any different if you take a
look at what we do in the littoral.
We’re just extending those normal,
long-time naval capabilities from the
littoral and into the inland waterway,”
said Rear Adm. Donald K. Bullard,
commander of NECC.
The Navy is currently using two
types of boats for its riverine squad-
rons, the Riverine Assault Craft (RAC)
and the Small Unit Riverine Craft
(SURC). The RAC is a 38-knot, 35-
foot aluminum-hulled craft powered
by two 300 horsepower Cummins
turbo-diesel engines first built for
the Marines in the 1980s. The boats’
shallow draft allows them to operate
in water as shallow as 30 inches. Each
can carry a combat-equipped squad of
10-15 troops and has a crew of four.
The boats are also equipped with vari-
ous combinations of 7.62 mm medium
machineguns, M2 50-caliber heavy
machineguns, and Mk19 automatic
grenade launchers.
The SURC is a newer riverine
craft, intended as the replacement
for the Marines’ older Rigid Raiding
Craft. The SURC is a 40-knot, 39-foot
aluminum-hulled craft powered by
two 440 horsepower diesel engines,
which can operate in water as shal-
low as 24 inches. Each has a crew of
three and can carry a squad of 13-15
combat-equipped troops. They have
fore and aft gun tubs for 7.62 mm or
50 caliber machineguns or automatic
grenade launchers, as well as a side
gun mount. Their acceleration rate of
zero to 25 knots in 15 seconds, and
their top speed of 40 knots, allows
them to move quickly in and out of
kill-zones. So, even though the RACs
carry more weapons, the SURCs’
speed and maneuverability give them
better survivability.
To man the new command the
Navy has created a “naval infantry”
force, which is currently being trained
by the Marines they’re replacing.
While that approach isn’t new—the
Navy created the SEALs to carry out
sea-borne special operations in the
1960s—the Marine high command
has expressed mixed feelings about
the development. In times past the
Marine Corps served as the Navy’s
infantry. Though still organization-
ally part of the Navy Department, the
Marines have recently become more
of a separate branch of service, over
which some in the Navy high com-
mand feel they have too little control.
While many in the Marines like to
think they’ve always been a separate
service, it just isn’t so. Marine were
originally trained and equipped as
infantry to fight aboard sailing ships
in the 18th century. During the age of
sail, hostile combatant ships often
attempted to board one another.
Thus the Marines were part of the
ship’s crew and served as snipers and
boarding parties as well as infantry
for shore parties. They also performed
police duties and onboard security.
That changed with the develop-
ment of iron ships and rifled guns
in the latter part of the 19th century.
9/21/10 10:59:52 AM
 For Your Information
With no further need for on-board
infantry, there was talk of disbanding
the Corps. At about that same time,
though, the United States became
more involved in Latin American
affairs. The Marine Corps therefore
came to take on the role of being the
State Department’s troops, provid-
ing landing parties and security for
US interests throughout the early 20th
century. They also became involved
in running counterinsurgencies in
various Caribbean and Central Ameri-
can countries.
With the approach of the Second
World War, the Marines changed
roles again. They developed amphibi-
ous assault operations to a science.
During World War II the Marine
Corps also created its first divisions,
which the Navy used to invade enemy
held islands in the Pacific. By war’s
end there were six Marine divisions,
though the postwar drawdown result-
ed in the Marines eventually having
only three active duty divisions.
With today’s threat of terrorism,
the Navy is seeing a renewed need for
security aboard its ships, especially
Oil on Troubled Waters
The continuing insurgency in Iraq,
the rise of Iran’s nuclear program, and
the threat of “jihadist” movements
across the Middle East have creat-
ed new concerns over the safe transit
of oil from the Persian Gulf. The
US gets 95 percent of its imported
oil (currently about 60 percent of its
total consumption) via ocean-going
tanker ships. Japan gets 100 percent
of its total consumption, India 68
percent, and China 46 percent also
by tanker. Those figures are expected
to rise in the next decades, so any
disruption in maritime oil transport is
a threat to the industrialized powers.
On 12 May 2007, US Vice President
Richard Cheney underscored that fear
in a speech delivered from the deck
of USS John C Stennis: “With two
ST 246 Issue.indd 33
when in port or close to shore. This
time, though, the Navy hasn’t turned
to the Marines. Instead, its begun
creating new units of “Masters at
Arms,” which previously had been
a job classification but not a type of
security force.
The Navy has also begun return-
ing to another old tradition: giving its
sailors infantry training. (The Navy
had provided infantry training for its
sailors for shore party duties, up until
the 1930s, and it maintained infantry
field manuals up until the 1960s.) The
new naval infantry force will consist
of sailors trained to fight on both land
and water, in both coastal and riverine
environments. In addition, the new
units will have some individuals
competent in foreign languages in
order to better be able to train sailors
from allied navies in the same types
of operations.
After Vietnam, US strategists
emphasized the threat from the Soviet
Union and de-emphasized the threat
of small wars. Few in the Pentagon
thought major brown water forces
would ever be needed. Thus, after
carrier strike groups in the gulf, we’re
sending clear messages to friends and
adversaries alike: we’ll keep the sea
lanes open.”
But how vulnerable are the sea
lanes used by oil tankers? Surpris-
ingly, the answer appears to be
they’re safe. At least that’s the answer
according to a former US head of the
Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Adm.
Dennis Blair, who wrote on the topic
with Kenneth Liberthal, former Se-
nior Director for Asia on the National
Security Counsel, in the May/June
2007 issue of Foreign Affairs. In their
article, they noted both geography
and technology, as well as the lack of
any real challenger to the US Navy,
will keep the oil moving across the
globe.
1973 the Navy’s Vietnam-era riverine
patrol boats were quickly decommis-
sioned or reassigned to the reserves.
The suicide attack on the USS
Cole changed that thinking, as it
exposed the vulnerability of ocean-
going ships to unconventional attack.
The Navy command has since come
to understand the best defense against
attacks by little boats was one con-
ducted by other little boats. While the
largest part of the Navy’s budget will
still go to preparing against rival blue-
water fleets, the new riverine force
will give the US another capability in
fighting in protracted unconventional
conflicts around the world.
The development of RIVRON
therefore represents an important
departure from the Navy’s traditional
emphasis on ocean-going blue water
ships that prepare for trans-oceanic
wars waged by aircraft carriers, cruis-
ers and submarines. The NECC will
specialize in fighting with boats in
waters where ships can’t go: coastal
areas, harbors and inland waters—all
areas sailors call “brown water.”
 Stephen A. Elliott
All oil supplied by ship from the
Middle East must be carried through
three choke points: the Straits of
Hormuz, Malacca and Singapore.
Elsewhere such shipping has open
transit across the seas. Each choke
point has been cited as a particular
concern by those who fear terrorist
acts or regional wars could lead to
mining, surface actions, submarine or
land-based attacks.
Iran certainly can attack ship-
ping in the Strait of Hormuz using its
land-based missiles, surface craft and
aircraft. But such an attack would not
fully block the strait, which is over
35 miles across at its narrowest point.
Any such attack would prompt the
kind of economic and collective secu-
rity response that occurred during the
strategy & tactics 33
9/21/10 10:59:52 AM
 For Your Information
“Tanker War” phase of the Iran-Iraq
War in the 1980s. Tankers would be
escorted by naval units of the major
powers to deter attacks and fight off
interlopers.
It’s also important to note no
sustained disruption of oil sup-
plies occurred during the Tanker War.
Despite over 544 attacks and the
deaths of over 400 sailors, the volume
of oil transited from the Persian Gulf
decreased by only about two percent.
The Strait of Malacca is three
miles wide at its narrowest point, so
the sinking or disabling of a tanker
wouldn’t create any real disruption of
shipping traffic. Blair and Liberthal
also pointed out that Singapore’s navy
is expected to be effective in patrol-
ling those waters. Further, shipping
Rhode Island’s Gettysburg Gun
In August 1962, Maj. Gen.
Leonard M. Holland, commanding
the Rhode Island National Guard,
received startling information that one
of his state’s proudest treasures was
in danger of exploding. Conclusive
evidence showed a cannon sitting in
honor in the lobby of the state capitol
was, in fact, loaded with a round of
12 lb. solid shot and a full charge of
volatile black powder.
The gun, a brass smoothbore
Napoleon, with a cannon ball pictur-
esquely jammed in its muzzle, had
been disabled at the Battle of Get-
tysburg and placed athwart the main
entrance of the capitol in 1904. Every
workday for 48 years, hundreds of
legislators, state workers, tourists and
school children had passed in front of
the gun, never suspecting the weapon
could explode. To understand how a
loaded cannon could sit for decades in
a crowded public building, we must
go back to Pennsylvania in the bloody
summer of 1863.
The 1st Rhode Island Light Artil-
34 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 34
can also be routed around both the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Modern tankers are far stronger
than their predecessors of 20 years
ago. Today’s ships have double hulls
and are much larger. Since oil is
now stored in airless holds on the
ships, and their architecture has been
designed so the weight of the oil actu-
ally works to hold the hulls together,
even modern surface-to-surface and
air-to-surface missiles would be un-
likely to cause much damage to them.
Most missiles that hit a tanker would
likely explode on the deck, causing
only minor damage. A coordinated
salvo of eight to 10 missiles carrying
conventional warheads would prob-
ably be necessary to sink one of the
behemoths.
lery was a hard fighting unit that
served with the Army of the Potomac
from Bull Run to Appomattox. At
Gettysburg its A and B Batteries were
part of the artillery element of Gen.
Hancock’s II Corps. They saw hot ac-
tion on 2 July and in the massive artil-
lery duel that accompanied Pickett’s
Charge on 3 July.
Under command of Lt. T. Fred
Brown, Battery B moved into position
on Cemetery Ridge mid-morning
on 2 July, on the extreme left of the
II Corps line at its juncture with III
Corps. When Union Gen. Sickles
made his famous, unauthorized and
ill-advised advance to the Peach
Orchard, Battery B was left exposed
on its flank, unsupported by infantry.
Despite its vulnerable position the
unit advanced forward and to its right,
to a new position in front of Gen.
Gibbons’ division. There it was nearly
overrun by Confederate infantry who
punched through the Peach Orchard
and drove toward Cemetery Ridge.
As the Rebels came on, the Rhode
Finally, the authors noted that,
historically, successful maritime inter-
diction operations have required naval
and air forces to dominate large areas
of the seas for protracted periods of
time. In short, only a true blue-water
navy can conduct effective interdic-
tion or blockade operations.
At present, only the US Navy has
the wherewithal for such operations.
The other four contenders likely to
appear in the future (Russia, China,
India and Japan) won’t have the ca-
pacity for that kind of long-endurance
open-water operations for years to
come. So, while it’s possible for at-
tacks on oil shipping to cause short
term price spikes, there’s actually
little reason to fear major disruption
in transoceanic oil shipping any time
soon.
 David Lentini
Islanders were forced to reduce their
case shot fuses to one second, and
eventually to firing double-shot canis-
ter pointblank. Still the Confederates
advanced, and the artillerists were
forced back to the main Federal line,
leaving behind two cannon until a
counterattack by Pennsylvania infan-
try retook them. The fighting of 2 July
left three men dead, one captured, and
Lt. Brown and 17 enlisted wounded.
On 3 July, 1st Lt. Walter S. Perrin
replaced Brown in command of the
battery that, reduced to four guns,
resumed its position on the front line
at Cemetery Ridge. Opposite them,
1,400 yards away on Seminary Ridge,
the divisions of Pickett and Pettigrew,
totaling nearly 13,000 infantry, were
massed for an assault on the Union
center. If Lee’s desperate push was
to succeed, the Union artillery had
to be suppressed. So Lee ordered a
concentrated battery of 138 cannon to
pound the Union line. The positions
on Cemetery Ridge were the objec-
tive of the Rebel push, and batteries
9/21/10 10:59:53 AM
 For Your Information
from Lee’s right, center, and even
his far-left north of Gettysburg, were
focused on Hancock’s corps and the
Rhode Island batteries.
Pounded by the Rebel guns, the
men of Battery B fought back sav-
agely. Suddenly one of the four guns
was hit directly on its muzzle by a
Confederate shell. Pvt. William Jones,
standing at the gun’s right wheel,
was decapitated, and Pvt. Alfred
Gardner, his right arm and shoulder
mangled by the same blast, lay dying.
Leaving his fallen comrades, Sgt.
Albert Straight, the gun’s commander,
tried to complete its loading. It was a
hopeless task. A 12 lb. round shot was
jammed in the mouth of the gun, and
frantic efforts with axe and hammer
could neither drive it home nor pry it
loose. Then the gun was hit again by a
rebel shell that exploded near its trail,
killing Pvt. John Breen. The three
remaining guns of Battery B were
running out of ammunition and, as the
last rounds of the Rebel cannonade
were fired and Pickets skirmishers
appeared before the Union lines, the
battery was ordered to the rear. They
would not be there to help smash the
final rebel advance, but they had done
enough.
In two days of fighting the battery
lost 40 men, including seven killed,
31 wounded, one deserted and one
captured. Twenty-nine of the battery’s
horses were also killed, while 17 oth-
ers were so seriously wounded they
could no longer serve. So severe were
the losses of men and animals the unit
was temporally consolidated with
Battery A. It wasn’t until 17 August
that Battery B was reconstituted as a
separate unit that would serve until
Appomattox.
After the battle, careful inspec-
tion revealed Battery B’s disabled gun
had been hit by no fewer than three
artillery rounds and 47 musket balls.
The piece could not be repaired and
ended the war on display in Wash-
ington, where the round lodged in its
muzzle made it a curiosity. The gun
was returned to Rhode Island with
appropriate ceremony in 1874 and
placed outside the old State House
in Providence. When Rhode Island
dedicated its new capitol in 1904, the
ST 246 Issue.indd 35
gun was installed in the rotunda of the
State House.
In 1962, while researching the his-
torical record of Battery B at Gettys-
burg, Dr. Wilfred E. Warren of New-
port, Rhode Island, became convinced
the gun was still loaded with powder.
He tried to warn state officials of the
potential danger, but no one accepted
his claim. In August 1962, however,
Mrs. Robert E. Dunne, a descendent
of one of the battery’s gunners, pro-
duced clear documentary evidence the
gun was indeed loaded.
In 1908, her great uncle, George
R. Matteson, last surviving member
eliminated that possibility. Writing in
of the gun crew, had been asked by
1892, John H. Rhodes, a private in the
the Grand Army of the Republic vet-
battery and subsequently its historian,
erans organization to make a sworn
cited the testimony of Sgt. Straight
statement describing the circum-
that the gun had definitely been hit
stances under which the cannon ball
by an exploding shell, not solid shot,
became lodged in the gun. He stated
at the very instant Pvt. Gardner was
the gun had been struck by a Confed-
inserting a powder charge into it.
erate shell killing two crew members.
More significantly, Rhodes, citing
Shortly thereafter one of the surviving
Straight’s account, makes it clear the
crewmen rammed a 2.5 lb. powder
crew attempted to load the piece with
bag into the barrel and followed that
powder and shot after it had been hit.
with a 12 lb. round shot. According to
Matteson, that shot became jammed While Rhodes wrote in 1892, the
due to damage to the gun barrel. De- Gettysburg Gun was sitting in front of
spite efforts to dislodge the ball using the old State House on Benefit Street
an axe, a hammer and chisel, the shot in Providence. Even so, it appar-
remained in place until the gun was ently didn’t occur to him to ask what
hauled from the field at the end of the had happened to the powder charges
battle. Straight and Gardner had attempted to
load. Decades passed, and Rhodes’s
With hindsight it seems obvious
analysis, along with the first person
a muzzle-loading cannon with a ball
accounts of Matteson and Straight,
in the barrel would also contain a
gathered proverbial dust. Which can
powder charge. In the confusion of
only prompt the historian’s perennial
that great and bloody battle, however,
question: “Does anybody actually
the ordnance men at Gettysburg may
read this stuff?”
be forgiven their oversight. But what
of the authorities in Washington who The story only finally came back
displayed the trophy from 1863 to into the light when Warren’s theory,
1874? And what of the Rhode Island bolstered by Mrs. Dunne’s evidence,
officials who petitioned Washington led to a new examination of the gun.
to give them the gun, and who placed On 27 August 1962, nearly a cen-
it in a crowded public building and tury after Gettysburg, Rhode Island
left it there for decades, ignoring National Guardsmen and ordnance
sworn testimony it was loaded? specialists from the Navy transported
the gun barrel to a secure facility,
Some had always maintained the
submerged it in water, drilled out the
shot in the gun’s muzzle was actually
original touch hole and removed more
a Confederate ball. If true, that would
than two pounds of black powder. The
open the possibility no Union powder
powder was found to be chemically
charge had been inserted. Even if
intact and capable of exploding.
one were to accept the improbability
of such a “hole in one,” eyewitness  Raymond L. Gagner
accounts of the disabling of the gun
strategy & tactics 35
9/21/10 10:59:53 AM
 For Your Information
Deborah Sampson: War-
rior Maid
Several American women
disguised themselves as men and
bore arms in the Continental Army
during the Revolutionary War. One in
particular was notable. Shedding her
waist-length blonde hair and feminine
attire, she put on men’s clothing and
toted a musket into combat. Her name
was Deborah Sampson. Born in 1760,
she was 15-years-old when the Revo-
lution erupted not far from her home
in Middleborough, Massachusetts.
At that time she supported herself
by teaching school and sewing for
local families. At age 22 she heard of
Gen. George Washington’s 1782 call
for 20,000 more volunteers for the
Continental Army; so she forsook her
spinning wheel for a musket.
She cut her hair to shoulder-
length, bound her breasts to give
herself a masculine appearance, and
donned men’s clothes. Her naturally
deep voice would arouse no suspi-
cions; so it was with confidence she
set out on foot toward Boston to
enlist. She made it as far as Worces-
ter, where she signed up using the
name “Robert Shurtliff,” the first and
middle names of an older brother
who’d died before she was born. She
penned that alias to the articles of en-
listment on 20 May 1782. As part of a
group of new recruits, she marched to
the fort at West Point where she was
issued soldier’s gear and drilled in its
use. Her superiors noted her agility
and marksmanship, and assigned her
to the crack Light Infantry Division.
That division was ordered on an
armed reconnaissance toward British-
controlled Harlem. En route they
were attacked by a loyalist regiment
called DeLancy’s Raiders, who were
notorious for taking no prisoners.
Bolstered by the timely arrival of a
second patriot unit, the light troops
repulsed the attack. Pvt. Shurtliff had
received her baptism of fire.
In a subsequent engagement with
the loyalists, Sampson came away
with a saber-slashed forehead and
a musket ball in her left thigh. Her
comrades carried her to a nearby
36 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 36
French Army field hospital. Fearful
her sex would be discovered, she
tended her own wounds using a pair
of tweezers to agonizingly pull the
ball from her leg. Three days later she
stole away, hobbled several miles to
the river and boarded a boat to West
Point.
Soon after her return, she was as-
signed to a contingent sent to contest
the British for a town called Colle-
barak. There her unit surrounded and
captured a 20-man troop of Tory cav-
alry in a mansion they were using as
headquarters. Still weak from loss of
blood, she nonetheless led the charge
and later helped march the prisoners
to West Point.
While on a scouting mission on
1 December, she and her patrol were
trapped between a numerically supe-
rior cavalry force and the fast-flowing
Croton River outside Peekskill
Hollow, New York. The Continentals
managed to ford the cold river and
then found an open general store for
shelter.
Several days later she was part of
a 1,000-man (and one woman) puni-
tive mission against the Iroquois Con-
federation. Loyal to the British crown,
the Mohawk tribe was engaged in a
campaign of raiding against the fron-
tier in northwest New York state. For
the next several weeks the expedition
ignored freezing weather to decimate
several war parties and capture nu-
merous Mohawk raiders, before being
ordered to report to New Windsor late
in January 1783. With more than 500
warriors dead or captured, the frontier
had become a much safer place.
Spending the next several weeks
at West Point gave Sampson time to
heal and recover her strength. On 18
April, eight years after the opening
battles of Lexington and Concord, the
West Point garrison received word of
the preliminary articles of peace be-
tween England and the United States.
The Revolutionary War was over, and
Sampson had proven (albeit secretly)
a woman’s place was not always in
the home.
Soon after word of the peace
accord reached West Point, Sampson
was assigned to a force of 1,500 sent
to Philadelphia to quell a mutiny there
by some Continentals who’d become
incensed at not having been paid for
months. The insurrection was ended
before her column reached Philadel-
phia, but during her stay in the city
she contracted a fever. While she
was in the hospital a stunned doctor
named Barnabus Binney discovered
her true sex. He had her taken to his
home, where he could treat her as-
sisted by a nurse he swore to secrecy.
Unable to find her in the hospital,
those in her unit assumed she’d died.
They returned to West Point without
her.
Binney arranged for Sampson
to be part of an armed guard who
would accompany Col. Benjamin
Tupper on a geological survey into
the still unsettled and unmapped
parts of western Virginia. Tupper had
prudently asked for an escort squad
in case of encounters with hostile
tribesmen. Sampson did shoot dead
one murderous warrior, but otherwise
the expedition was almost idyllic. The
explorers visited and mapped numer-
ous areas of virginal wilderness and
made friends with many tribes.
While staying at a village called
Medikar, she suffered a relapse of her
fever (apparently malaria), and had
to be left there to convalesce. Upon
recovering she set out to rejoin her
comrades, but soon became lost. After
wandering aimlessly for two days, she
stumbled across a hunting party of
warriors from the Detroit tribe, who
set her on the correct route home.
Sampson even managed to barter the
release of a young white girl who
was with those Detroits as a slave.
She made it back to Philadelphia and,
after spending a final night at Dr.
Binney’s, she set out via stagecoach
for West Point. On her arrival she
learned the Treaty of Paris had gone
into effect, ending the war. She was
officially part of a peacetime army.
Dr. Binney had given her a letter
9/21/10 10:59:54 AM
 The Long Tradition:
for her commander, Gen. John Paterson. Fearing it would
betray her secret and she would be court-martialed,
Sampson delayed delivering it until November. The letter
did indeed reveal she was a woman, but also commended
her bravery and recommended she be treated as a hero-
ine. The general proved of the same mind as Binney, and
not only assured her there would be no charges against
her, but made immediate arrangements for her honorable
discharge and return to her family.
The news “Robert Shurtliff” was a woman spread
faster than the fever that had almost killed her. Her
comrades-in-arms mostly seemed delighted with the situ-
ation, giving her a boisterous send-off as she prepared to
depart on a packet boat. She returned to Middleborough
and was reunited with her mother and community. A
young man named Benjamin Gannett, Jr. who, like her,
counted Mayflower arrivals among his ancestors, eagerly
married her. The couple raised a son named Earl, who
followed in his mother’s boot prints by fighting the Brit-
ish as an army captain in the War of 1812. They also had
two daughters, Mary and Patience. When the remarkable
Deborah Sampson Gannett passed away at age 68, on 29
April 1827, she was matriarch of a flock of 12 grandchil-
dren.
 Kelly Bell
Next Issue
Holy Roman Empire: two/three/four player struggle
for Europe during the Renaissance and Reformation.
Tercios and mercenaries march while great captains do
battle with the new gunpowder weapons.
Future articles: Alexander the Great takes on Af-
ghanistan, the Luftwaffe plans to bomb New York City,
and the Ethiopians defeat Al Qaeda.
ST 246 Issue.indd 37
50 issues ago, S&T 196:
Vietnam Battles. Joseph Miranda did the lead
wargame and article covering two of the major
battles of 1968’s Tet Offensive: Hue and Khe
Sanh. They included everything from Viet Cong
sappers to US helicopter battalions. Elsewhere
in Vietnam, John Burtt wrote about the forgotten
siege of Kham Duc, a minor but significant Free
World tactical defeat. Carl Schuster gave us a new
look at the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe, while
Jim Yates re-appraised one of history’s greatest
generals, Hannibal.
100 Issues Ago, S&T 146:
Sicily. John Schettler’s opening game in his Italian
Campaign series with Patton and Montgomery
racing for Messina. Joseph Miranda marched on
with the strategy and stratagems in the Roman
era, a follow-up to Trajan. Al Nofi edited FYI,
which included a piece on Pugachev’s rebellion
in 18th century Russia, a topic we would cover
in more detail in the later Catherine the Great
issue (#232).
150 Issues Ago, S&T 96:
Singapore. Charles Kamps, Jon Pickens and John
Prados took on the 1941-42 Malay-Singapore
campaign. That operation saw the end of the Brit-
ish Empire in the Far East and is still considered
a masterpiece of maneuver. Charles also did a
variant for his Nordkapp game, World War III
in the Far North. Dave Cook polished bayonets
with a strategy article on TSR’s new Civil War
game, while Richard Berg helmed the Review
of Games, and also did a commentary about the
wargame design process. Among other things,
Richard assured us he actually plays the games
he reviews.
200 Issues Ago, S&T 46:
Combined Arms. This was something of a
tactical issue, with Jim Dunnigan and Redmond
Simonsen designing Combined Arms, covering
several decades of modern warfare. Stephen B.
Patrick did the accompanying article. Elsewhere,
Dave Isby penned a piece on patrolling and modern
infantry tactics. There were also some variants
for SPI’s East Is Red (modifying the effects of
nuclear weapons, putting nukes into a wargame
always sells more copies) and design notes for
Starforce (peace through superior psionic power).
The back cover had an advertisement for MOVES
magazine (circulation 6,000) personally signed by
Redmond Simonsen.
strategy & tactics 37
9/21/10 10:59:56 AM
 Works In Progress
First Blood: Second Marne, 15 July 1918

First Blood: Second Marne, 15 July 1918 (FBSM), is a
two-player wargame of low-complexity that simulates the
final day on World War I’s western front during which it was
the Germans who held the strategic initiative. After that day
the German high command, though they didn’t yet under-
stand they were soon to be fully and finally defeated, knew
an offensive solution to the war was no longer available
to them. The German player is generally on the offensive,
trying to cross the Marne River, defeat the defending US
3rd Infantry Division, and exit units southward off the map
through the Surmelin River valley. Such an advance would
serve as the preliminary to follow-on efforts aimed at Paris
and Rheims.
The first turn represents roughly the first two hours of
operations after the Germans began crossing the Marne,
which were conducted in the slowing conditions of early
morning darkness. Every game turn after the first represents
from about 15 to 45 minutes, depending on the intensity of
tactical action that takes place within each turn as the day-
light battle unfolds. Each hexagon on the map represents 100
yards from side to opposite side.
On the US side the units of maneuver are infantry pla-
toons, along with static heavy weapons emplacements. The
latter represent one or two dug-in and pre-sited heavy ma-
chineguns or 37 mm guns (“one pounders”).
German units are organized so as to reflect the chaos cre-
ated among them by the intense US aerial and artillery bom-
bardment that was conducted against their north bank mar-
shalling areas and bridges. That is, German units represent
ad hoc, mixed tactical formations (primarily storm trooper
infantry), ranging in size from sections and squads up to al-
most full companies, which the Germans self-organized as
they left the complete chaos of the riverbank and moved into
the semi-chaos of the actual battlefield.
An unusual feature of the game is that the reverse sides
of the units show “carnage.” That is, they present a depic-
tion of the human wreckage remaining when units of these
small sizes are defeated in combat. Whenever a unit suffers
that fate, players simply turn it over in place, so its carnage
side shows. When flipped to their carnage sides, units per-
manently cease to be “units” for all game purposes, thereaf-
ter serving only as reminders of the horror that took place
in that location. If your tastes don’t run to an appreciation
of carnage, you may choose to ignore the reverse sides and
simply remove each unit to a traditional off-map “dead pile”
as they suffer elimination.
Another unusual feature of the game comes from the fact
players don’t track the number of game turns. Play simply
continues, turn after turn, until one player admits defeat,
a process that usually takes about two hours. The turn se-
quence is as follows.
I. Random Events Phase
II. German Reinforcement Phase
III. German First Bombardment Phase
IV. US First Bombardment Phase
V. German Movement Phase
VI. US First Fire Phase
VII. German First Fire Phase
VIII. US Movement Phase
IX. German Second Fire Phase
X. US Second Fire Phase
XI. German Second Bombardment Phase
XII. US Second Bombardment Phase

S&T Upcoming Features

#247 Holy Roman Empire: Wars of the Reformation, 1524-38. Two to four players battle it out across a square-
grid map of Central Europe during the Renaissance and Reformation.
#248 First Blood: Second Marne, 15 July 1918. Tactical level American Expeditionary Force against German
stosstruppen.
#249 Forgotten Napoleonic Campaigns: The Russo-Swedish War, 1808 & The Egyptian Campaign, 1798-99.
#250 Red Dragon Rising: The Coming War with China.
#251 Cobra: Double-sized wargame on Patton’s breakout from the Normandy beachhead, 1944.
#252 Civil War in the Far West: the Wild West gets wilder as Confederate & Union armies clash in the New
Mexico territory.
Visit www.strategyandtacticspress.com for previews of these issues.
38 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 38 9/21/10 10:59:57 AM

 The premier military history
magazine!

Each issue is packed full of:

• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle
Future issues will feature articles on:
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The Zulu War
Battle of Manzikert
The First Crusades
Operation Sea Lion
Alexander’s Army
Taranto Air Raid
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www.decisiongames.com
strategy & tactics 39

ST 246 Issue.indd 39 9/21/10 11:00:00 AM

 Biafran Sunset:
The Nigerian Civil War 1967-70
By John Barratt
Biafran rebel units are in italics; Nigerian Federal units are in
plain text.
In the spring of 1967 the Federal Republic of Nige-
ria was the largest and most populous country of Black
Africa. Equivalent in area to France, Italy, Belgium and
Holland combined, it had 50-56 million inhabitants. They
included some 200 tribes, of which the three largest (and
with about half of the total population) were the Hausa-
Fulani (predominantly Moslem, in the northern half of
the country), the Yoruba (mainly Christian, in the south-
west), and Ibo (in the east). Alas, the divisions among
them were too much for the new nation. This powder-keg
of unrest would explode into one of the most horrendous
civil wars of the 20th century—the Biafran War.
Countdown to Conflict
Nigeria owed its identity as a nation to its British co-
lonial rulers. The British occupied Lagos in 1861 and
then extended their territory northward. By the outbreak
of World War I, the numerous tribal subdivisions of the
colony known as Nigeria were loosely united under Brit-
ish control. Local rulers retained considerable autonomy,
40 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 40
the British often administering the colony through them.
But there were many differences between the autocratic
city-states of the north, the primarily agricultural areas of
the Yoruba southwest, and the industrious dynamic Ibos
of the forested eastern region. Those differences deepened
as demands for independence spread across Africa in the
wake of World War II.
After independence, Nigeria was to have a federal
system with a parliament. But the rival political parties
involved in the fight for Nigerian independence mirrored
the religious, ethnic and cultural divisions of the region.
The Nigerian Federation formed on the eve of indepen-
dence consisted of four states: the predominantly Muslim
Northern Region, the Western Region, mainly Yoruba;
the Eastern Region, dominated by its Ibo heartland with
a fringe of minor tribes on its eastern and southern edges;
and, lying uneasily between the Western and Eastern Re-
gions, the Mid-West with a mixed population of Ibos and
smaller tribes.
9/21/10 11:00:01 AM
 When independence was achieved in October
1960, the government became increasingly enmeshed
in corruption and regionally based division. Tensions
came to a head in January 1966 when junior Nigerian
Federal Army officers staged a coup.
The Nigerian Federal Army had its origins in the
West African Frontier Corps, raised by the British
in the 19th century. Nigerian troops had taken part in
the invasion of the German Cameroons during World
War I, and over 30,000 Nigerian troops had served in
ST 246 Issue.indd 41
a variety of theaters during World War II. The post-
independence Nigerian Army had gained operational
experience in various internal security operations and
as part of the UN peace-keeping force in the Congo
during the early 1960s. (The Congo would become
a crucible for Africa in the 1960s as civil wars, and
outside military intervention kept that country in a
continual state of unrest, as well as providing combat
experience for many peace-keepers.)
Organized along British lines, with the major-
strategy & tactics 41
9/21/10 11:00:03 AM
 ity of its officers educated
or trained in Britain, the
Army totalled about 9,000
men, with an additional
900 in the small Nigerian
Navy and about 700 in
the Air Force, which was
in the process of being
formed.
The Nigerian
armed forces reflected the
regional and tribal tensions
of the country. After inde-
pendence military service
had become increasingly
prestigious, with keen
competition for career
slots. As in other areas of
the government and civil
administration, the Ibos of
the Eastern Region, with their strong work
ethic and emphasis on education, became
increasingly prominent. Promotion prospects, initially
good, became more scarce after the process of “Nige-
riaisation” of the officer corps was completed, and the
frustrations caused among young officers played a part
in the military coup. Resentment at the advance of the
Ibos among the other tribal groups led to increasing
polarization of the Army, reflecting the situation in the
country as a whole.
The January 1966 coup was largely carried out by
Ibo officers and resulted in the removal of the North-
ern-dominated civilian government and its replace-
ment with military rule headed by the Ibo Army com-
mander, Maj. Gen. Johnson Ironsi. To many non-Ibos,
the coup seemed another step toward domination of
the entire country by the Easterners. In May 1966 this
led to a violent backlash in which several hundred Ibos
were massacred. In July a counter-coup headed by
non-Ibo army officers seized the government, killed
Ironsi, and placed as Head of State a Christian North-
erner, Lt. Col. Yakubu “Jack” Gowan.
Events moved rapidly. The growing ethnic tensions
within Nigeria were highlighted when the troops of the
Nigerian Army were re-deployed to their home tribal
regions. The Eastern Region, under its Ibo governor,
Lt. Col. Chukuemeka Ojukwu, began to be seen as
a safe haven by Ibos living in other parts of Nigeria.
Their fears of genocide seemed confirmed in October
1966, when widespread rioting and disorder resulted
in the deaths of between 6,000 and 10,000 Ibo. The
Eastern Region’s existing population of 13 million,
about 8 million of them Ibo, was swelled by an influx
of about 1.5 million Ibo refugees from other parts of
the country.
An increasingly vocal Ibo separatist movement,
with Ojukwu at its head, pressed for secession of
42 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 42
the Eastern Region. Desultory negotiations between
Gowan and Ojukwu took place during the winter and
spring, but the proposal for a federated state of 13 re-
gions was incompatible with Ibo demands. So on 30
May 1967, the Eastern Region, with Ojukwu appoint-
ed its first head of state, declared its independence as
the Republic of Biafra.
War Begins
Nigeria and Biafra were both unprepared for war.
The existing Nigerian Army had been shattered by the
ethnic conflict of the preceding months. Many of its
best officers had been Ibo and had fled to Biafra. It
was estimated that 184 of Nigeria’s pre-war officer
corps remained with the Federals, while 93 joined Bia-
fra. Both sides had to mobilize an army almost from
scratch based around such troops as remained in the
ranks, reinforced by ex-servicemen and police. Gowan
ordered the mobilisation of 8,000 recruits to form four
new battalions. Biafra formed its new army around its
1st Battalion, formerly the 1st Battalion of the Federal
Army, bolstered by other Ibo soldiers who had fled
east.
Gowan optimistically proclaimed the rebellion
would be crushed by a “police action,” though it was
five weeks before the newly formed Federal 1st Divi-
sion (initially termed 1 Area Command) under Col.
Mohammed Shiwa was mobilized. It had eight bat-
talions, including the bulk of the regular army. The
plan was for it to advance along two main routes
across Biafra’s northern frontier. Objectives were the
university town of Nsukka, viewed as the intellectual
powerhouse of the secessionist movement, and the
Biafran capital of Enugu. Gowan believed the capture
of these cities would be sufficient to end the rebellion.
Meanwhile, the security of the Mid-West Region with
its large Ibo population, was to be maintained by the
forming 2 Area Command. A third formation, initially
designated the Lagos Garrison Organization, was re-
sponsible for the security of the Federal capital.
The first shots of the war were fired on 6 July on
the northern front. The Biafran 1st and 7th Battalions,
each totalling about 600 men, were pushed back. Fed-
eral troops advanced with the deliberation that was to
become the hallmark of the 1st Division and took the
town of Ogoja (11 July) and then Nsukka itself (15
July). Resistance was light, most of the Ibo population
fleeing before the Federal troops arrived. On 26 July
an improvised amphibious landing by units of Col.
Benjamin Adekunie’s Lagos Garrison Organization,
supported by the small Nigerian Navy, took the Bia-
fran port of Bonny, closing the entrance to the harbour
of Port Harcourt, terminus for its oil exports. At the
same time the Nigerian Navy began a steadily tighten-
ing blockade of the Biafran coastline.
Biafra quickly struck back. Its one B-26 bomber,
piloted by “Kamikaze” Brown, a Czech or Pole, pro-
vided the main striking power of its air force, together
9/21/10 11:00:03 AM
 with a converted F-27 airliner. They dropped improvised
bombs and raided Federal cities, including Lagos, causing
widespread alarm. On the ground the Biafrans launched
the boldest operation of the war. Theater of Operations
Much of the area that formed the Republic of Biafra
“Benin Boomerang”
was densely forested. Though movement through it was
At 3:00 am on 9 August a hastily improvised
possible for infantry, it also provided ample opportunities
3,000-strong Biafran motorised column crossed the River
for ambush, much of the fighting that followed took place
Niger to invade the Mid-West Region. The Biafran objec-
in the vicinity of the road network. Most of the main routes
tive was to “liberate” the Mid-West and drive on Lagos
were well-maintained, and though their use was sometimes
and the major town of Ibadan to its northeast. The fall
inhibited by the rainy season, April to August, they were
of those cities, the Biafrans hoped, would break Federal
rarely impassable.
will to continue the war, or at least relieve pressure on
Biafra’s other hard-pressed fronts. At the start of the war, The southern coastal area of Biafra and the Mid-West
Ojukwu had publicly proclaimed that “we have no ter- was a maze of swamps and mangrove vegetation, criss-
ritorial ambitions…. We just want to be left alone.” More crossed by many streams and river mouths, which made
covertly, the Biafrans seem to have hoped to establish a ground operations and supply difficult for both sides.
puppet regime in the Mid-West, bringing the region ef-
fectively under their control. For political reasons the
invasion force was commanded by a Yoruban regular of-
ficer, Lt. Col. Victor Banjo. He would be more politically
acceptable to the people of the Yoruba West.
strategy & tactics 43

ST 246 Issue.indd 43 9/21/10 11:00:06 AM

 The invasion force eventually adopted the title of
the Liberation Army of Nigeria. This grandiloquent
belied the reality of a three-battalion brigade group,
ill-disciplined, critically under-officered, transported
in a bewildering array of civilian vehicles, desperately
short of arms and equipment, and with troops in an ar-
ray of military and civilian clothing.
The invasion paid political dividends as the mainly
Ibo officers of the 1,000 strong Federal Mid-Western
Army mostly defected. The Biafrans, splitting into
three battalion-strength columns, overran the Mid-
West with scarcely a shot fired. The Mid-West capital,
Benin City, fell within hours. Two columns, consisting
of 13th and 18th Battalions, drove north to threaten the
communications of the Federal 1st Division with La-
gos, and south to overrun the oilfields around Warri.
The central column, 12th Battalion, which had
been intended to drive at full speed for Lagos, halted
at Benin for several critical days while Banjo argued
with Ojukwu over the political future of the region.
The time lost proved fatal, both for the invasion, and
eventually for Banjo, who would later be accused of
treachery by Ojukwu and executed.
In Lagos the Federals were scraping together ev-
ery available soldier, including rear-echelon forces
and the 500-strong Federal Guard, and dispatching
them to hold the key road junction of Ore, just over
100 miles east of Lagos. After three days at Benin the
Biafran advance was resumed, but the breathing space
afforded to the Federals had proved just enough. The
Biafrans, faced by two blown bridges, faltered at Ore.
44 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 44
After some indecisive skirmishing, the invaders, fear-
ing being outflanked and cut off, began to retire.
It was now the Federals turn to go over to the of-
fensive. Their 2 Area Sector (Col. Murtale Moham-
med), spearheaded by the newly formed 6th Brigade,
advanced steadily. The Biafran invasion of the Mid-
West collapsed as quickly as it had begun. Again fear-
ing being outflanked, and meeting with increasing
resistance from the non-Ibo population, the Biafrans
hastily pulled back toward the River Niger.
The Federals pursued but were delayed more by
broken bridges than sustained opposition. By early
October virtually all the Biafran forces had evaded
Mohammed’s fumbling attempts to trap them and
were back across the Niger.
For the Federals, the quick recovery of the Mid-
West was hailed as a triumph. The Federal press
awarded Mohammed the doubtful accolade of the
“Monty of the Mid-West” (referring, of course, to
British Field Marshal Montgomery). For the Biafrans
the results of their gamble was mixed. Though they
had seized much-needed supplies from Federal stock-
piles, the Mid-West invasion had weakened their other
fronts by drawing off troops. It also acted as a wake-up
call for the Federals.
Tightening the Screw
Gowan, faced with a much tougher fight than
originally anticipated, sought arms from abroad. The
British government, despite significant domestic and
international criticism, would be the Federals’ main
supplier of small arms, armored fighting vehicles and
9/21/10 11:00:08 AM
 anti-aircraft guns, while the Soviet Union, motivated
as much by hard-nosed financial reasons as ideology,
agreed to supply Nigeria with aircraft and heavy artil-
lery. The Nigerian Air Force, using at this stage mainly
Egyptian pilots for its MiGs and Illuyshins, began to
mount its own air raids on Biafran military and civil-
ian targets.
During the fall of 1967 the Nigerian Army launched
a three-pronged offensive on Biafra from the north,
south and west. Gowan’s aim was to grind Biafra into
submission through a war of attrition. The main drive
was to be on Enugu on the northern front. It continued
to be made by the 1st Division. Containing most of the
pre-war regular troops, 1st Division’s approach typified
the Nigerian conduct of operations. Its British-trained
officers adhered strictly to the text book. Advances
were methodical, preceded by a protracted build-up of
supplies and an often lengthy artillery bombardment.
Then, Federal troops, staying close to the road, would
lay down a heavy barrage of small arms and mortar
fire on enemy positions. Offensives were headed by a
squadron or two of British-supplied Ferret, Saladin and
Saracen armored fighting vehicles. They had a strong
psychological effect on the Biafrans, who lacked suf-
ficient anti-armor weapons.
The Biafrans, often with no more than five rounds
of rifle ammunition per soldier and few heavy weap-
ons, would pull back from their well-prepared defen-
sive positions to make another stand a few miles down
the road. At that stage of the war, Ojukwu took an ap-
proach as conservative as his opponents and made no
ST 246 Issue.indd 45
attempt to use guerrilla tactics. They would have been
better suited to his lightly armed forces, though they
would probably also have resulted in the immediate
loss of the major towns.
On 4 October, after light resistance, the 1st Brigade
(seven battalions totalling 7,000 men), entered Enu-
gu. The under-strength Biafran 51st and 53rd Brigades
pulled back a few miles south of the town. Ojukwu,
with his characteristic weakness for hastily raised
“special forces,” attempted to retake the Biafran capi-
tal (whose fall was never officially admitted) with his
newly-raised S-Brigade and a force of 10,000 civil-
ian volunteers, some armed only with machetes. That
scratch force dissolved when it came under fire. The
Biafran government was hastily shifted to what was
termed the “administrative center” of Umuahia.
In the south there was equally bad news for Biafra
when, in October Benjamin Adekunle’s deceptively
renamed 3rd Marine Commando Division took the port
of Calabar against weak resistance. The division then
swung northeast to link up with 1st Division at Ikom,
cutting off Biafra from Cameroon. Biafran forces in
the area fell back to hold the line of the Cross River,
where they were gradually reinforced and renamed the
56th Brigade.
By that time the small Biafran Air Force had been
destroyed through combat losses and lack of spare
parts. Nigerian air supremacy, though clumsily ex-
ploited, was complete.
Biafra seemed on the verge of defeat. Only in the
West had the rebels cause for optimism. There Col.
strategy & tactics 45
9/21/10 11:00:10 AM
 Mutale Mohammed’s hastily raised and poorly trained
2nd Division ran into serious trouble in its attempts to
cross the Niger and take the important commercial
centre of Onitsha. On 12 October, 2nd Division made
an amphibious assault using civilian craft. Mohammed
established a bridgehead in the town, but his troops be-
gan looting and lost cohesion. A spirited counterattack
by the combative Col. Joe “Hannibal” Achuzie and his
55th Brigade threw the Federals back into the river. In
the next few weeks two further assaults were repulsed
with heavy losses by Biafran troops, now armed with
rockets and the highly effective “Ojukwu’s Kettle”
mines.
With his troops dispirited and on the verge of mu-
tiny, Mohammed accepted the suggestion originally
made to him by the Nigerian High Command and
crossed the Niger farther north where there was little
opposition. He then advanced on Onitsha down the
eastern bank of the river. At the end of March 1968
Onitsha at last fell to a two-pronged assault, but Mo-
hammed found his hold precarious.
By the end of 1967 the overall Nigerian offensive
had stalled, partly through a desire to build up sup-
plies before making another “push,” and also because
of stiffening Biafran resistance as the war entered the
fringes of the Ibo heartland. In the north the pause
would last for over six months. Adekunle was the first
to resume the offensive, launching attacks to clear the
oilfields in the vicinity of Port Harcourt and take the
important oil town itself.
After some initial difficulty in establishing a
bridgehead over the Cross River, 3rd Marine Com-
mando Division made rapid progress. Ojukwu threw
all available troops into the defence of Port Harcourt.
That included Achuzie and his 55th Brigade, and the
recently-formed elite 4th Commando Brigade under
the mercenary Rolf Steiner. Battered by heavy Fed-
eral artillery bombardments and hindered by hordes of
Brothers in arms: Nigerian troop with journalist.
46 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 46
terrified refugees clogging the roads north out of Port
Harcourt, the Biafrans were unable to prevent the fall
of the town on 18 May.
Exploiting his victory, the charismatic Adekunle
drove his men up the road to the north. Biafran resis-
tance became increasingly fierce; 4th Commando Bri-
gade (soon expanded to a division), acted as a “fire
brigade,” rushed from one crisis point to another.
By the middle of September the important Ibo towns
of Owerri and Aba had been added to Adekunle’s tally
of conquests. His 3rd Marine Commando Division, oc-
cupying a 100-mile-wide front, from the Niger to east
of the Cross River, was threatening the de facto Biafran
capital of Umuahia, the last major town in rebel hands.
He was also only 10 miles from Uli airstrip, vital for
the delivery of munitions and relief aid to the Biafrans.
Meanwhile, the Federal 1st Division had resumed its
ponderous advance and taken the town of Okigwi.
Biafra Besieged
Biafra been now reduced to a quarter of its original
territorial extent. With both land and sea routes cut off,
the rebel nation could maintain only a tenuous air link
to the outside world through a few improvised airstrips
such as the famous “Uli Airport”(actually a specially
widened straight length of metalled road). Arms im-
ports, of varying quality, provided by a network of
weapons dealers across Europe, remained inadequate,
costly and uncertain.
Within Biafra, starvation was taking a steady toll,
eventually peaking at approximately 10,000 fatalities a
day. Skilful Biafran propaganda, coupled with report-
ing of the civilian death toll (especially through much
publicized photographs of starving children) gained the
republic a good deal of sympathy. But only a handful of
African countries had formally recognised Biafra as an
independent state. Many African governments feared
a successful Biafran secession would lead to the disin-
tegration of their own countries as other rebel groups
followed suit. In any event, Federal Nigeria, along with
the majority of world opinion, believed the war was
almost over. They were wrong.
The Biafrans, pushed back into their heartland and
believing they faced annihilation, fought with renewed
determination. The unfortunate Federal 2nd Division
was first to see evidence of this at Onitsha. Largely in-
active after his capture of the town, Mohammed was
increasingly harassed by Biafran guerrillas. Other in-
surgents renewed the fight in the Ibo areas of the Mid-
West, while communications with 1st Division, via
the road from Onitsha to Enugu, were under constant
threat. In one particularly effective ambush near the
village of Abagna, Biafran troops destroyed a convoy
of over 100 Federal trucks and gained control of a six-
mile stretch of the road, which they held for the re-
mainder of the war, forcing 2nd Division to bring all its
supplies through the Mid-West and across the Niger.
9/21/10 11:00:11 AM
 Despite the loss of so much territory and its
original capital, the Biafran administration con-
tinued to run surprisingly smoothly. Ojukwu and
his Consultative Assembly set up a number of di-
rectorates to run aspects of the administration such
as food production, supply and nursing, and Ibo
resourcefulness and resilience found solutions to
many of the pressing problems of the war.
Of key importance to Biafra’s ability to con-
tinue the fight was the decision, in the summer of
1969, by the French President Charles de Gaulle
to provide military supplies for Biafra. Motivated
by a desire to prevent the emergence of a strong
Nigeria, which might unduly influence the weaker
surrounding former French colonies, and also by
long-standing opposition to the influence of the
“Anglo-Saxon” British and Americans, de Gaulle
provided sufficient arms supplies for Biafra to pro-
long the war, though not win it.
By September 1968 an average of 20 tons of
munitions a night were flown in to Biafran airstrips
from former French possessions or Portuguese co-
lonial territory. Many of the munitions, which in-
cluded small arms and anti-tank weapons, were of
World War II German origin—a clumsy attempt to
conceal French involvement.
Ojukwu decided against reverting to guerrilla
tactics and instead resolved to continue the con-
ventional war. If the Biafrans could hold out long
enough, something might happen—international
recognition, collapse of the Federal government,
UN intervention.
The Federal advance was encountering increas-
ing difficulties. Reliance on the road network left
lengthening lines of communication vulnerable to
attacks by Biafran infiltrators who continued to
control large areas of the countryside.
In the south, where the most rapid advances
had been made, 3rd Marine Commando Division
was severely overstretched. Adekunle’s much
vaunted “O.A.U. [Organization of African Unity]
Offensive,” designed to break Biafran resistance
by taking Owerri, Aba and Umauhia, was stall-
ing. Though both Owerri and Aba were in Federal
hands, the drive on Umuahia received a bloody re-
pulse at the hands of determined Biafran troops in
well constructed defensive positions. Now armed
with anti-tank weapons they could counter the
hitherto dreaded Federal armor.
Siege of Owerri
Owerri had been taken as the result of a three-
pronged advance by Adekunie’s 14th, 15th and 16th
Brigades, with the latter occupying Owerri itself.
The Federals were faced by the Biafran 14th Divi-
sion, with 52nd, 60th and 63rd Brigades under com-
mand. By now the average Biafran brigade often

strategy & tactics 47

ST 246 Issue.indd 47 9/21/10 11:00:14 AM

 Personalities
Federal
Brig. Benjamin Adekunle—“Black Scorpion.” Born in 1937,
Benjamin Adekunle joined the Nigerian Army in 1958
and was trained by the British. In 1963 he served as a
captain with the Nigerian forces in the Congo, and in
1967 was a lieutenant-colonel commanding the Lagos
Garrison Organisation. During the civil war, his ruthless,
restless energy quickly made its mark in the capture of
Bonny and further amphibious operations, which led to
Adekunle, without official approval, re-designating his
command as 3rd Marine Commando Division. The di-
visional insignia chosen by Adekunle was an octopus,
which its commander claimed was mistaken by Western
journalists for a scorpion, hence his nick-name.
Adekunle’s dynamic personality and public-relations
skills, coupled with his well-publicized success, made
him an internationally known figure. Noted for his sup-
posed habit of personally leading his men into action and
beating the hesitant with a stick, he became an increasing
embarrassment to the moderate Gowan, both for his risk-
taking and some of his more unfortunate comments. Af-
ter the fall of Port Harcourt he said: “We shot at anything
that moves, and when our troops march into the center
of Ibo territory, we shoot at anything, even things that do
not move.”
In the reshuffle of commanders following the loss of
Owerri in 1969, Adekunle was removed from frontline
command to become director of training and planning.
Col. E. A. Etuk. Born in 1940, Etuk received officer training
in Lagos and the United States under the USAAF Officer
Leadership Program. He was commissioned 2nd lieuten-
ant in 1963 and commanded a battalion at Calabar, his
birthplace, and in the fighting at Ikot Ipene. He led the
16th Brigade from the capture of Port Harcourt. Etuk was
regarded by the Biafrans as the Federals’ best fighting
commander, and the 16th Brigade as their best formation.
Etuk led the re-constituted 16th Brigade in Operation Tail
Wind, the final Federal offensive of the war, and retired
in 1979.
Biafran
Gen. Chukuemeka Odemegwo Ojukwu. Born in 1933, son
of a successful businessman, Ojukwu joined the Nige-
rian Army in 1957 and was educated in Britain. Com-
missioned a lieutenant in 1957, he was a captain in the
Congo in 1961 and promoted to lieutenant colonel in
1964. As military governor of the Eastern Region in
1967, Ojukwu was a strong supporter of secession. He
became Biafra’s first (and only) head of state. A charis-
matic and autocratic figure, he concentrated control of
the government and military in his own hands, interven-
ing personally in command decisions on numerous occa-
sions. His intolerance of opposition and his support for
unpopular protégés, such as the mercenary Rolf Steiner,
led to discontent among Ojukwu’s senior commanders,
but he retained undisputed control in Biafra until the end
of the war. Afterward he went into exile on the Ivory
Coast, returning to Nigeria as a businessman after his
pardon in 1982.
Lt. Gen. Alexander Madiebo. Trained in Britain, Madiebo
was commissioned a lieutenant in the Nigerian Army
in 1956. He commanded a reconnaissance troop in the
48 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 48
Congo, and was a lieutenant colonel in 1966. Serving as
a battalion then brigade commander on Biafra’s northern
front in 1967, Madiebo succeeded the disgraced Brig.
Hillary Njoku as majoe general and general officer com-
manding the Biafran Army, a post he retained until the
end of the war. A competent and efficient soldier, with
distaste for some of the more unorthodox figures thrown
up by the war, Madiebo deserves the main credit for
the capture of Owerri in 1969. In 1970 he accompanied
Ojukwu into exile.
Col. Joe “Hannibal, Air Raid” Achuzia.
A controversial figure, Achuzia did
not serve in the Nigerian Army prior
to the war, although he claimed to
have fought in the British forces in
Korea. Joining the Biafran militia in
1967, Achuzia was active in the in-
vasion of the Mid-West, taking over
command of the Liberation Army
after the removal of Banjo. After
Achuzia had played a prominent
part in the defence of Onitsha in 1967, Madiebo com-
missioned him as a major in the Biafran Army, an action
Madiebo later described as “the greatest mistake of my
military career.”
A favorite of Ojukwu, Achuzia was given divisional com-
mand, and being a skilful self-publicist, became a popu-
lar figure in Biafra. Critics claimed his skills as a combat
leader were greater than his organizational abilities. He
was accused of claiming undue credit for a number of
successes, hence his tongue-in-cheek nickname of “Han-
nibal.” Achuzia became notorious for incurring heavy
casualties in ill-planned attacks. As a result, his troops
reportedly took cover when they saw him approaching,
and named him “Air Raid.”
Rolf Steiner. Best-known of the European mercenaries who
served with the Biafrans, Steiner was a German who had
served with the French Foreign Legion in Indochina and
Algeria, then with the OAS against De Gaulle. In 1967
Steiner stayed on in Biafra after the departure of most
of the mercenaries and, favored by Ojukwu, was tasked
with raising what became the 4th Commando Brigade
(later division).
Originally intended to fight as guerrillas, the commandos
were increasingly used in a fire brigade, being rushed to
the most critical sectors of the front. They consistently
suffered heavy losses. Steiner, who steadily expanded
his brigade into what effectively became an indepen-
dent self-sustaining private army, was regarded as ar-
rogant and overbearing by senior Biafran commanders.
Among other things, he named one of his battalions as
his “Guard.” In December 1968, following a brawl with
Ojukwu’s bodyguards after accusations of looting by
some of his officers, Steiner was dismissed and expelled
from Biafra. He was generally regarded as a capable
small-unit commander who was ill-suited for higher
command.
9/21/10 11:00:15 AM
 numbered no more than 1,000 effectives, but Ojukwu
and his army commander, Lt. Gen. Alexander Madie-
bo, felt the time had come to strike back. Stiffening
Biafran resistance halted further Federal advances
northward, and pushed back the 14th and 15th Brigades
on either flank of Owerri, leaving 16th Brigade (Col.
Etuk), about 3,000 strong, in an increasingly vulner-
able salient around the town itself.
Madiebo planned a three-phased operation to trap
and destroy 16th Brigade. The first phase was intended
to push the Federals back into the town itself. Then
60th Brigade, supported by 68th Battalion of “S” Di-
vision, was supposed to gain control of the northern
section of the Owerri-Port Harcourt road, cutting off
16th Brigade. In the third phase, two Biafran brigades
would assault Owerri and destroy the Federal troops
trapped there.
The plan, like so many that look good on paper,
ran into difficulties when executed. Shortfalls in sup-
ply, especially ammunition, limited Biafran firepower
and made the operation slow and deliberate. Col. Etuk,
whose abilities were respected by the Biafrans, put up Cycle of war: Troop using improvised transport.
a spirited defence against attacks on his outposts. But
the Biafrans gradually tightened the noose; by early
January 1969 60th Brigade controlled a 20 mile-long By now Etuk had only a few hundred effectives left
stretch of the Owerri-Port Harcourt road. The 16th in Owerri, and most of the town was in ruins. So he
Brigade was completely isolated. The Biafrans could made a unilateral decision to break out. On the night
hope the tide had turned. of 24-25 April, three days after the fall of Umuahia,
The Biafran assaults on Owerri itself, which be- Etuk’s formed his surviving men into a column headed
gan on 15 January, made slow progress. Etuk made by its AFVs and left the town by way of a little used
an active defense, launching counterattacks with his bush track. Madiebo claimed to have deliberately al-
armor. Even when the Biafrans brought in the redoubt- lowed the Federals to evacuate the town, and to have
able “Hannibal” Achuza with part of the “S” Division, severely mauled them in their retreat. The remnants
they were unable to break the defence of Owerri, de- of 16th Brigade, perhaps 300 men, linked up with
spite suffering heavy losses. Still, Owerri was under Adekunle. The Biafrans established their third and fi-
siege and could not be relieved by half-hearted ground nal capital in the ruins of Owerri.
drives. The Federals therefore concentrated on re-sup-
plying the garrison via airdrops. But they had only two
DC-3s available and they proved unable to provide
sufficient airlift.
“Ojukwu’s Kettle”
The war of attrition continued to grind on around To counter the lack of weapons and supplies caused by the Federal
Owerri into March. For reasons of prestige the Feder- blockade, the Biafrans formed a Research and Production Directorate.
als were unwilling to evacuate the town. The Biafrans Staffed by Ibo scientists and engineers, the directorate proved a vital
also refused to break off, even thought they were under part of the Biafran war effort. Among its inventions were portable oil
increasing pressure to bring the siege to a conclusion refineries that produced fuel using the heat generated by wood fires.
because of a renewed threat to Umuahia. Col. Shiwa’s Mortars were improvised from oil-drilling equipment, and rudimen-
1st Division was about to launch a major drive on the tary ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles were also devised,
new Biafran capital with two brigades supported by though they often proved unreliable and more dangerous to their users
than to the enemy.
armoured vehicles and air support. Though the Bia-
frans put up stiff resistance, it was clear by 14 April Best known and most effective of the directorate’s inventions was
the “Ogbunigwe” (“destroyer of all”), otherwise known as “Ojukwu’s
that Umuahia would soon fall.
Kettle.” This was a mine, often constructed from old cooking pots,
Ojukwu told Madiebo it was vital to retake Owerri filled with locally produced explosives and scrap metal of various
in order to counter the crippling blow to Biafran mo- kinds. The “kettles” were planted in roads or concealed in under-
rale the loss of Umuahia would entail. On 18 April the growth. Detonated electronically, they proved a major part of Biafran
Biafran assault was resumed on three sides. defensive tactics. Their sudden explosions were devastatingly effec-
tive and, even without the casualties they caused, their psychological
impact was often sufficient to rout Federal troops.
strategy & tactics 49

ST 246 Issue.indd 49 9/21/10 11:00:16 AM

 The End of Biafra
The recapture of Owerri was Biafra’s final victory.
A renewed offensive petered out short of Aba and Port
Harcourt, while Gowan, in an attempt to improve co-
ordination amongst his troops, replaced all three of his
quarrelsome divisional commanders.
For several months an apparent stalemate followed,
enlivened mainly by the much-hyped activities of the
revived Biafran Air Force. Despite relief efforts easing
the worst effects of starvation, the situation in Biafra
remained grim. Corruption was rife, and few had any
hope of victory. Unofficial contacts between opposing
troops on the temporarily quiet frontlines resulted in
the bartering of goods and football matches. The front-
line camaraderie convinced many Ibo the tales of in-
tended genocide by the Federals was just propaganda
by their leaders. Biafran forces only held about 2,000
square miles of territory, and the Federal army was far
better equipped, and making increasingly effective air
attacks.
The end, when it came, was both swift and largely
unknown to the outside world until all was over. On
29 November 1969, Gowan ordered the Federal forces
“to liberate what was left of the Rebel-held areas.”
The Mercenaries
Both sides in the Biafran War were reluctant to employ mercenaries.
The recent experience of the Congo showed mercenary forces could get
out of hand and they tended to turn the country into a Cold War battle-
ground. But the technical expertise of the professional soldiers for hire
was needed in creating “modern” armed forces in Africa. On the Federal
side mercenaries were only employed in a combat role as pilots. The Bia-
frans used them both as pilots and in ground combat.
After initially employing mercenaries as pilots, Ojukwu was per-
suaded by the French to engage a number for the ground war. About 50
professional soldiers arrived late in 1967 to fight around Calabar. Several
were killed, and most of the remainder found the realities of war in Biafra
not to their taste. For the remainder of the war only a handful of foreign
mercenaries were employed in Biafra, the most important of them being
Rolf Steiner and a Welsh-born South African, Maj. “Taffy” Williams, who
seems to have developed a genuine commitment to the Biafran cause.
Most of the mercenaries served with the 4th Commando Division, but
failed on the whole to make any great impact. They were blamed for the
heavy losses suffered in 1968 in “Operation Hiroshima,” one of a number
of failed attempts to retake Onitsha. By the end of 1969, the last of them
apart from some pilots, had gone home.
One of the pilots was Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, a Swede. Rosen
had fought against the Italians in Ethiopia prior to World War II, and with
the Finns in the Winter War of 1939-40 against the Red Army. He was
moved by the plight of the Biafran civilian populace to assist in the re-
building of the rebel Air Force in 1969. His efforts proved successful, for
a while, at least. Rosen was no stranger to Africa, having been a pilot for
the UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis.
He later flew relief missions for refugees during the Ogaden War between
Ethiopia and Somalia, where he was killed by guerrillas.
50 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 50
At the end of December the Biafran 12th Division
near Aba unexpectedly collapsed under Federal attack.
Within two weeks, converging Federal thrusts from
north and south had broken what remained of Biafra
into fragments. They retook Owerri on 10 January.
The next day, as the remnants of his army dissolved
into the bush, Ojukwu and his chief associates flew
into exile from Uli. On 15 January the Biafran chief of
staff, Lt. Gen. Phillip Effiong, announced the uncondi-
tional surrender of his forces.
Black Africa’s first modern war was over. Biafra
had been overcome by superior numbers and firepow-
er, and by the effects of starvation. Gowan announced
a policy of reconciliation, which by and large was suc-
cessfully followed. One aspect of that was no medals
were awarded to the victorious troops in order to pre-
vent post-war vindictiveness.
Losses to both sides had been heavy. Some 2 mil-
lion people, mostly Ibo, were estimated to have died,
mainly from starvation. Ojukwu’s dream had cost his
people dearly, but Nigeria emerged to become one of
the strongest states in post-colonial Africa.
Bibliography
Cervenka, Zdenek, The Nigerian War 1967-70, 1971, Bernard and Graefe
Verlag fur Wehrwesen.
De St Jorre, John, The Nigerian Civil War, 1972, Hodder and Stoughton
(Published in USA as The Brothers’ War, 1972, Houghton Mifflin).
Forsyth, Frederick, The Biafra Story, 1969, Penguin.
Madiebo, Alexander A., The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War,
1980, Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Niven, Sir Rex, The War of Nigerian Unity, 1971, Rowman and Littl-
eford.
Omoigui, Nowa, Federal Army Blunders of the Nigerian Civil War, www.
Dawodu.com (in progress).
Oyewole, Fola, Reluctant Rebel, 1975, Rex Collings.
Stafford, Major Michael R. USA, Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Ni-
gerian Civil War, 1984, Marine Corps Command and Staff College
(available at www.globalsecurity.org).
Steiner, Rolf, The Last Adventurer, 1978, Little, Brown and Company.
The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies and Lessons (www.globalse-
curity.org).
www.brushfirewars.org (for information on aircraft and AFVs)
Thanks to Maj. Robert A. Lynn, USMCR, for help in tracing sources.
9/21/10 11:00:16 AM
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strategy & tactics 51

ST 246 Issue.indd 51 9/21/10 11:00:18 AM

 DATA FILE: Armies of the Biafran Civil War
By John Barratt
With virtually all of their officers trained in Britain, both
the Nigerian Federal and Biafran armies were organized, at
least theoretically, along British lines. Both sides tended to
stick rigidly to British doctrines in command and tactics, of-
ten without regard to their suitability for the particular situa-
tion facing them.
The opposing sides faced similar challenges in creating
and expanding their armed forces, and neither fully solved
the resulting problems during the course of the war. Short-
ages of trained officers and NCOs remained a problem, with
battalions on both sides often having no more than half a
dozen professionals among their commands and staff. As
a result leadership and initiative were often lacking, with a
tendency, emphasised by British doctrine, to stick to original
orders regardless of new developments.
Nigerian Federal Army
As with most statistics relating to the war, there is consid-
erable variation in the figures given for the total strength of
the Nigerian Federal Army. Estimates for its establishment
by the end of the war vary between 80,000 and 200,000.
The smaller figure is probably closer to the number actu-
ally on active service. The Federals, mainly because of the
high rates of pay offered in comparison to civilian life, never
had problems in obtaining recruits, and did not consider con-
scription until the closing stages of the fighting.
The command structure remained loose. Though Gowan
and the army high command were in nominal overall con-
trol, in practice most of the decisions regarding the day to
day conduct of operations were left to the divisional com-
manders who enjoyed considerable freedom of action. Lik-
ened to medieval robber barons, a good deal of their energy
was expended in vying with each other for men and supplies,
often shanghaiing recruits and hijacking materials intended
for rival divisions.
The Federal Army was organized into three over-sized
divisions: 1st and 2nd Divisions and 3rd Marine Commando.
By the end of the war each averaged about 20,000 men (large
for divisions). They normally totalled between six and nine
brigades, each brigade with a varying number of battalions,
plus support troops and artillery. A battalion would have 600
to1,000 men, including riflemen and supporting machinegun
and mortar sections. Attached to battalion or brigade would
be at least one armored squadron of three or more armored
fighting vehicles, usually the British Saladin armored car
(76mm gun, co-axial. 30 cal. mg., 3 crew, maximum speed
45 mph), the Ferret scout car (.30 cal. Browning mg, 2 crew,
maximum speed 60 mph), and the Saracen APC (.30 mg,
maximum speed approx 55 mph). Artillery consisted of So-
viet supplied 105 and 122mm guns.
With ammunition usually plentiful, Nigerian tactics
increasingly relied on a preliminary saturation artillery
bombardment of enemy positions, ideally with air support.
Infantry would then sometimes follow up, led by armored
vehicles, and again employing heavy saturation fire. Federal
52 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 52
troops generally fired off all the ammunition they had been
issued. Often the Biafrans would have pulled back before
contact was made, so Nigerian infantry were slow in gaining
combat experience. Discipline among an army consisting
largely of new recruits always remained a problem.
Biafran Army
Figures of the total strength of the Biafran Army again
vary considerably at between 40,000 to 90,000. The latter
figure probably includes the large numbers of ill-equipped
militia raised at the start of the war, most of whom were even-
tually disbanded or absorbed into the army. It also includes
the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF), the
guerrilla force raised in the later stages of the war which
operated with limited success in the Mid-West and behind
Federal lines. Volunteers were initially plentiful, though in
the later stages of the war conscription was introduced.
The Biafran Army operated under tight overall control
by the Biafran head of state, Gen. Ojukwu. Divisional com-
manders had much less freedom of action than their Federal
counterparts. Throughout the war, units were frequently dis-
banded, expanded and re-titled, incorporated into others, or
had their designations arbitrarily changed, so constructing a
complete Biafran Order of Battle is difficult. Ojukwu also
had a fondness for creating special forces and task groups
under his own control, such as the “S” Brigade (which later
expanded into a division) and the 4th Commando Battal-
ion (later a brigade, then division). Those units were given
priority in equipment and recruits over the “regular” Bia-
fran army, and their autonomy and favoured treatment was
a source of friction between their officers and senior army
commanders.
In 1969 the Biafran Army consisted of the 11th, 12th, 14th,
15th, Special Strike Force, 4th Commando and “S” Divisions,
which, in a typically cosmetic move, Ojukwu was in the
process of reorganising into the North and South Divisions
when the war ended. A Biafran regular division normally
included two or three brigades, each of about 1,000 men,
effectively making them reinforced and re-designated bat-
talions. Special divisions were generally larger.
A Biafran battalion might have 600 men; however such
was the shortage of equipment for much of the war only half
the men might be armed. The usual infantry weapon was
the British .303 Lee-Enfeld bolt-action rifle, but as the war
developed a variety of weapons were used, leading to prob-
lems in supply. It was often only when action was expected
that troops were issued with an average of five rounds of
ammunition per man. If fortunate, a battalion might have a
handful of automatic rifles of varying origin, and three or
four machineguns, often German World War II vintage MG-
34s.
Artillery and mortars were scarce, consisting of a hand-
ful of antiquated or captured pieces. Biafra never established
a significant armored force. At the beginning of the war a
few pre-World War II Bren gun carriers, possibly of French
9/21/10 11:00:18 AM
 origin, had been imported. They were strengthened with
improvised armor. A few other armored vehicles were lo-
cally manufactured from tractors or bulldozers fitted with
steel plates. Most quickly broke down and were abandoned.
Later, until they too were immobilized by lack of spares,
the Biafrans operated several captured Federal armored ve-
hicles. Still, despite the inadequacies of weapons, morale
was often good, and that made the difference in the fighting
around Owerii.
Air War
The Nigerian Federal Air Force was still in the early
stages of its formation at the start of the war, with a small
number of Jet Provost armed trainers whose pilots were be-
ing trained by a West German mission. As a result, the war
in the air was actually commenced by the Biafrans with their
B-26, B-25, and Fokker-27 aircraft, which, flown by merce-
naries and sometimes using improvised ordnance, launched
a series of raids on Nigerian cities in the summer of 1967.
In retrospect, the Biafran air raids rebounded on them,
spurring the Federal government into purchasing aircraft
from the Eastern Bloc. During the late summer of 1967,
Nigeria received a batch of LET-L-29 Delph armed trainers
via Czechoslovakia, followed by a batch of ten MiG 17-F
fighters, together with a couple MiG 15s. By the end of the
war the Soviet Union had supplied the Federal government
with 33 MiG 17Fs, and eight MiG 17As. Four Illuyshin-28
bombers were also supplied, with two others following later Watch the skies: antiaircraft gunners await intruders.
in 1969. Most of those aircraft came from Egyptian sources,
which were in turn replenished by the Soviets. In addition,
the Nigerian Air Force obtained two or three DC-3 trans- been closed and the war brought to a conclusion.
ports. The Biafrans had lost most of their initial aircraft by the
Though the Federals had the strongest air force in Black spring of 1968, after which they possessed no combat aircraft
Africa, they lacked trained pilots. Gowan was forced to for over a year. Then, in the spring of 1969, the mercenary
overcome his reluctance to employ mercenaries and hired Count Carl Gustav von Rosen organized a new Biafran Air
pilots from abroad. Initially Egyptians pilots were brought Force. He eventually obtained a total of about 19 Swedish-
in, but they proved unenthusiastic and poorly motivated, built single-engined MFI-9-B trainers, which were equipped
often not completing their missions or dropping bombs at in France with rocket firing racks. Over the next few months
random. Most of the Egyptians were eventually replaced by they were flown in small groups into Biafra from neighbor-
South African or British mercenaries, some of the latter con- ing Gabon. Piloted by a mixture of Swedish and Biafran pi-
veniently discharged ex-RAF personnel. By the end of the lots, the aircraft made a series of raids on Federal airfields
war the Federals had a mixture of mercenary and Nigerian and installations, including power stations and oil terminals.
pilots. Much hyped by the media and Biafran propaganda, the
Though the Federals never faced opposition in the air, “MiniCOINs” [Mini-COunter–Insurgency aircraft.] were
many Federal pilots proved unduly wary in the face of credited with the destruction of a number of Federal aircraft
ground fire, and never developed sufficiently reliable com- on the ground, though reliable evidence only confirms the
munications to co-operate fully with ground forces. The Il- loss of one MiG-17. Still, their attacks provided a welcome
luyshins, potentially devastating as ground attack aircraft, boost to Biafran morale and some alarm to the Federals.
were never employed in sufficient numbers but diluted their The low-level, radar-dodging attacks mounted by von
effects in uncoordinated individual raids. Rosen’s pilots from improvised and easily transferable bush
The greatest failure of the Nigerian Air force was in not airstrips proved difficult for the Federals to counter. If the
halting the nightly stream of supply flights into Uli and other war had continued into 1970, it is likely the Federals would
improvised Biafran airstrips. The Federals were hindered by have obtained Soviet shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles
the MiG’s unsuitability for night operations and by the Bia- that would have posed a serious threat to the MiniCOIN.
fran practice of mixing flights carrying munitions in among
the relief aid organized by the World Council of Churches
and the Red Cross. The Federals feared the diplomatic reper-
cussions of shooting down a plane full of aid workers.
The majority of planes used in the relief flights were also
piloted by mercenaries, and there are good reasons to believe
the Federal mercenary pilots deliberately avoided attacking
them. That was partly out of support for their fellow merce-
naries, and also to ensure their own continued employment,
which might have been jeopardised had the air supply route
strategy & tactics 53

ST 246 Issue.indd 53 9/21/10 11:00:19 AM

 The Final Battle of the Gettysburg
Campaign: Falling Waters, Maryland,
14 July, 1863
By George F. Franks, III
Confederate units are in italics. Union units are in plain
text.
The Gettysburg campaign did not end with the battle
fought in the environs of that town on 1-3 July 1863. The
final fight between Lee and Meade was at Falling Waters,
Maryland, on 14 July 1863. Though not the climactic battle
of the war anticipated by Abraham Lincoln, it is a story of
miscalculation, bravery and tragedy.
Morning of 14 July:
Disposition of Lee’s Rear Guard
Following the defeat of the Confederates at Gettysburg,
Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia
to fall back to Virginia. Union Army of the Potomac com-
mander George Meade carefully pursued the Confederates.
Lee ordered Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s division to act as
rear guard. (Confederate divisions were usually known by
their commander’s name.) Lee’s men crossed the Potomac
River on their way back to Virginia by way of a pontoon
bridge at Falling Waters. During the night and early morn-
ing of 13 July, Heth’s soldiers struggled through the mud,
moving slowly down Falling Waters Road toward the river
crossing. Approximately two miles from the pontoon bridge,
members of Heth’s command positioned themselves perpen-
dicular to the road, with the center of their line on a rise
where they could defend against pursuing Union troops.
Army of Northern Virginia engineers constructed six earthen
gun emplacements to further strengthen the position. Heth’s
54 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 54
rear guard stretched from the C&O Canal, by the Potomac
River, to the left of the rise and off to the right of Falling Wa-
ters Road. His line extended across fields for nearly a mile.
The emplacements on the ridge were slightly to the front and
left of a two story brick farm house. The farm house itself
was surrounded by a plank fence. The remnants of an old
barn stood to the left-rear of a two story brick farm house
—the Daniel Donnelly house (sometimes mistakenly identi-
fied as the Downey house). Brig. Gen. James Henry Lane’s
division (Pender’s) found themselves between Heth’s men
and the pontoon crossing. On the morning of 14 July they
waited to cross into Virginia.
After struggling through the mud-choked country roads
to their positions on both sides of Falling Waters Road,
Heth’s wet, tired and hungry men collapsed. The officers
believed the horsemen of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry
division was screening them from pursuing Union forces.
Heth and his staff officers waited on the rise at the rear of
the Donnelly house for orders to withdraw and cross the Po-
tomac over the pontoon bridge and return to Virginia. In his
report, Heth noted:
On reaching an elevated and commanding ridge of hills
one mile and a half (possibly a little less) from Falling Wa-
ters, I was ordered by Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill to put my division
in line of battle on either side of the road, and, extending
along the crest of this hill, facing toward Hagerstown. On
the left of the road and on the crest of this hill our engineers
had thrown up some half dozen epaulements for artillery,
the spaces between the epaulements being open. In our
front was an open space, with the view unobstructed for
half to three-quarters of a mile; then came a heavy piece of
9/21/10 11:00:22 AM
 Falling Waters XX
Bu fo rd

Pontoon
Br idge POTOMAC RIVER

X
XX
Lane (P ender ) Pe ttigr ew
X

XX Archer W eber
Heth X

Broc kenbrough
X XX
Ch
esa Da vi s Kilpat rick
pe
ak
e
&
Oh
ioC
ana
l

0 1 mile

Op
timber some three-fourths
eq
uo
of a mile in width. I was directed,
at the same time thatn C I received the order to place my divi-
sion in line of battle ras
. described, to put Pender’s division
in the rear of my own, in column of brigades. At this point
we halted, to allow the wagons and artillery to get over the
river. We remained in this position awaiting their crossing
for several hours.
Morning of 14 July:
Disposition of Army of the Potomac
Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George G.
Meade ordered a reconnaissance in force of Lee’s positions
to begin at 7:00 A.M. on 14 July. Word reached the Federals
Lee’s army had vacated their positions overnight and were
crossing the Potomac. Before daylight on 14 July, much of
the Army of Northern Virginia was already across the river.
Lt. Gen. Richard Stoddert Ewell’s 2nd Army Corps forded at
Williamsport. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet 1st Army Corps and
Lt. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill’s 3rd Corps plus the artillery,
crossed the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Lee ordered
Stuart’s cavalry to occupy the entrenchments that surround-
ed Williamsport, as well as the crossings from north of Hag-
erstown to near Sharpsburg, while the infantry and artillery
withdrew to the two Potomac River crossings.
Meade, meanwhile, was ordering the Army of the Po-
tomac to pursue. When Brig. Gen. Hugh Judson “Kill-
Cavalry” Kilpatrick, commander of the 3rd Division of the
Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps, learned of Lee’s
withdrawal, he ordered his horsemen to leave their encamp-
ment and dash toward the Confederate positions. His troop-
ers found the area vacated. The Union troopers next galloped
towards the town of Williamsport. There they discovered
some stragglers. They also found the rearguard of Early’s
command fording the Potomac River just above the C&O
Canal aqueduct over Conococheague Creek. Having missed
the opportunity to cut off the Confederate crossing at Wil-
liamsport, the cavalrymen spurred their mounts again, this
time towards the Falling Waters crossing. Brig. Gen. John
Buford, in command of the 1st Division of the Army of the
Potomac’s Cavalry Corps, approached from the east. Kilpat-
rick’s command pushed on through the mud toward Falling
Waters from the town of Williamsport to the north.
Kilpatrick’s troopers galloped down Falling Waters Road
toward the river crossing. There they encountered numer-
ous Confederate stragglers along with discarded rebel arms,
equipment and wagons. Much of the gear had been aban-
doned when it became stuck in the thick mud. Kilpatrick’s
command formed up near a tree line with a field to their
front. On a rise to his front right Kilpatrick could see the
Donnelly house with trees to the side and rear of it. The
Federal horsemen also noted that to the right and behind the
house were six artillery lunettes. Confederate officers and
men were visible along the length of the rise. No artillery
pieces or caissons were visible. The opportunity to strike the
rebels before they escaped across the Potomac appeared to
be Kilpatrick’s good fortune, even though Buford’s troopers
had yet to arrive. Buford had taken the route along the C&O
Canal along the river and to the right in hopes of cutting
off the remaining Confederates in a pincer-like movement.
Kilpatrick decided there was no time to waste. His horsemen
must attack immediately. Kilpatrick stated in his official re-
port:

strategy & tactics 55

ST 246 Issue.indd 55 9/21/10 11:00:26 AM

 Harper’s Weekly illustration of the 14 July, 1863 battle of Falling Waters based on sketch by Edwin Forbes. Note the artillery
lunettes (left) at the top of the ridge. Pettigrew was mortally wounded between the brick Daniel Donnelly house (center) and the
stripped remnants of the barn (right). (Author’s collection)
Having been previously ordered to attack at 7 a.m., I was
ready to move at once. At daylight I had reached the crest
of the hills occupied by the enemy an hour before, and at a
few moments before 6 o’clock Gen. Custer [Yes, that Gen.
Custer. ed.] drove the rear guard of the enemy into the river
at Williamsport. Learning from citizens that a portion of
the enemy had retreated in the direction of Falling Waters,
I at once moved rapidly for that point, and came up with
the rear guard of the enemy at 7:30 a.m., at a point 2 miles
distant from Falling Waters. We pressed on, driving them
before us, capturing many prisoners and one gun. When
within a mile and a half of Falling Waters the enemy was
found in large force, drawn up in line of battle, on the crest
of a hill commanding the road on which I was advancing.
His left was protected by earthworks, and his right extended
to the woods far on my left. The enemy was, when first seen,
in two lines of battle, with arms stacked.
Attack by the Michigan Cavalry
Kilpatrick ordered newly promoted Brig. Gen. George A.
Custer, in command of the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Di-
vision (the 1st, 5th, 6th and 7th Michigan Cavalry Regiments),
to prepare for an immediate attack the Confederates to their
front. Custer ordered Maj. Peter A. Weber of the 6th Michi-
gan Cavalry to lead the attack. Custer directed Weber’s men
to dismount and advance toward the Confederate position,
exploiting the firepower of their Spencer rifles. Custer’s tac-
tics enraged “Kill-Cavalry” Kilpatrick, and he immediately
countermanded his subordinate’s orders. He instead ordered
Maj. Weber to lead approximately 100 men from Companies
B and F of the 6th Michigan Cavalry in a mounted attack
against the Confederate position on the rise.
The field and road ahead of Weber and his troopers were
quagmires from heavy rain. The rise ahead was sure to chal-
lenge the already exhausted mounts. Heth’s Division held a
strong defensive position and possessed a panoramic view of
the woodline, the field and Falling Waters Road. Maj. Weber
saluted, mounted and then passed commands to the officers
and troopers of Companies B and F. Buford recorded in his
report what happened next:
56 #246
ST 246 Issue.indd 56
A portion of the Sixth Michigan Cavalry, seeing only that
portion of the enemy behind the earthworks, charged. This
charge, led by Major Weber, was the most gallant ever
made. At a trot he passed up the hill, received the fire from
the whole line, and the next moment rode through and over
the earthworks; passed to the right, sabering rebels along
the entire line…
Heth’s Division Upon Seeing Federal Cavalry
On the rise and to the rear of the Donnelly house, Heth
and Pettigrew spotted the approaching horsemen as they
moved from the wood line, across the field and then down
Falling Waters Road. Peering through their field glasses to-
ward the approaching horsemen, what they saw both baffled
and angered them. A squadron of Union cavalry was drawn
up in formation and advancing rapidly, the horsemen and
their mounts coated with Maryland mud, making uniform
recognition difficult. At the head of the formation, a Union
cavalry pennant could be seen flying. Heth and Pettigrew be-
lieved the horsemen to be Stuart’s displaying a battle trophy.
(What they did not know was, contrary to orders, Stuart’s
men crossed into Virginia earlier that morning at William-
sport.) Pettigrew ordered his men to assemble with arms and
prepare to fire. But Heth, confident the advancing cavalry
was Stuart’s, promptly countermanded Pettigrew’s order.
The Federal horsemen, with sabers glittering, closed on
the Confederate line at a gallop. Now the situation became
clear to Heth. He elaborated in his report:
About 11 o’clock, I received orders from Gen. Hill to move
Pender’s division across the river, following Gen. Ander-
son’s division, and, after leaving one brigade of my divi-
sion in line, to follow up the movement of the corps as
speedily as possible. About 15 or 20 minutes after receiv-
ing these orders, and while they were in progress of execu-
tion, a small body of cavalry, numbering not more than
40 or 45 men, made their appearance in our front, where
the road debouched from the woods previously described.
I will here remark, that when on the road, and some 2 or 3
miles from the position I now occupied, a large body of our
cavalry passed by my command, going to our rear. When
9/21/10 11:00:28 AM
 the cavalry alluded to make its appearance, it was at once
observed by myself, Gen. Pettigrew, and several members
of my staff, as well as many others. On emerging from the
woods, the party faced about, apparently acting on the de-
fensive. Suddenly facing my position, the galloped up the
road, and halted some 175 yards from my line of battle.
From their maneuvering and the smallness of numbers, I
concluded it was a party of our own cavalry pursued by the
enemy. In this opinion I was sustained by all present. It was
not until I examined them critically with my glasses at a
distance of not more than 175 yards that I discovered they
were Federal troops. The men had been restrained from
firing up to this time by Gen. Pettigrew and myself. The
command was now given to fire.
According to Maj. J. Jones of the 26th North Carolina
Infantry:
After traveling all night in mud and rain, about 8 o’clock
on the morning of the 14th we took position in a wheat-field
as a portion of the rear guard, while the rest of the troops
crossed the river at the pontoon bridge (about 1 ½ miles)
at Falling Waters. The men stacked arms, and most of them
were asleep, feeling perfectly secure, as our cavalry were
out in front. We had been here probably two hours when the
enemy’s cavalry dashed in upon us, causing some confu-
sion, as the men were just aroused from sleep…
The two companies of Michigan Wolverines led by Maj.
Weber rode in, sabers unsheathed, across the muddy field,
down the road and up the rise into the teeth of the Rebel
defenses. As Weber’s men cleared the emplacements, they
were engaged in a brutal hand to hand fight. Heth’s hardened
veterans clubbed muskets, swung fence rails, threw stones
and wielded axes against men and horses. Weber’s two com-
panies rode through the Confederate position and to the right
along Heth’s line. Those Wolverines who were not killed,
wounded or captured returned to the tree line, some minus
their horses. Weber’s command was decimated with a loss
of 30 killed, wounded, and missing, including the gallant
Weber who ended up dead.
Weber’s two companies were not the only ones to suf-
fer during the charge. Pettigrew directed the defense from
astride his horse near the garden behind the Donnelly house.
There he was thrown by his horse. Accounts of what hap-
pened next vary, but there are some facts that are consistent.
Pettigrew had been wounded at Gettysburg in one hand and
his other arm was still weak from an earlier wound. After
being thrown, he struggled to his feet and reached for his
pistol. The Confederate general saw a Union trooper on foot
near the barn firing into the mass of Confederates. Pettigrew
ordered his men to cut down the man. But the noise and con-
fusion of battle drowned out Pettigrew’s orders, so he moved
toward the Yankee cavalryman who fired in return. Pettigrew
was struck and went down. By that time, Union horsemen
were galloping back to the tree line. The Confederates,
buoyed at their success in repelling the horsemen, discov-
ered Pettigrew lay on the ground with a grievous wound.
Heth recounted in his report:
At the same time, the Federal officer in command gave the
command to charge. The squadron passed through the in-
tervals separating the epaulements, and fired several shots.
In less than three minutes all were killed or captured save
two or three, who are said to have escaped. Gen. Petti-
grew received a wound in one of his hands at Gettysburg, in
consequence of which he was unable to manage his horse,
which reared and fell with him. It is probable when in the
act of rising from the ground that he was struck by a pistol-
ball in the left side, which, unfortunately for himself and his
country, proved mortal.
strategy & tactics 57

ST 246 Issue.indd 57 9/21/10 11:00:29 AM

 Army of Maj. Gen.
the Potomac George G. Meade

Maj. Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton

1st 3rd
Brig. Gen. Brig. Gen.
John Buford Hugh Kilpatrick

1st 2nd 1st 2nd

Gamble Devin Richmond Custer

8th IL 8th NY 5th NY 1st MI

12th IL 9th NY 18th PA 5th MI
3rd IN 17th PA 1st VT 6th MI
8th NY 3rd WV 1st WV 7thMI

Subsequent Attacks
Kilpatrick directed arriving elements of the 3rd Cavalry Division
against Heth’s line. Custer himself mounted and led another attack, sa-
ber drawn while another element of Kilpatrick’s command advanced
on foot as skirmishers. Buford finally arrived, wheeling the troopers of
his division into position. His division followed along the C&O Canal
by the Potomac River in preparation for an attack on Heth’s flank, but
Kilpatrick’s and Buford’s attacks were again repulsed.
Increasingly concerned about his ability to hold his position, Heth
requested the artillery across the Potomac River in Virginia be recalled.
Lane, his command still not across the pontoon bridge, was ordered to
support Heth’s Division. Col. John Mercer Brockenbrough’s Brigade,
which included the 22nd, 40th, 47th and 55th Virginia Infantry, advanced
with their colors in the lead from their position to the right of Falling
Waters Road only to find their effort unsupported. Many of Brocken-
brough’s officers and men, including Col. William Steptoe Christian of
the 55th Virginia were captured along with their colors and arms.
Rather than risk the loss of additional men and materiel, Hill ordered
Heth to withdraw across the Potomac into Virginia. Heth’s regiments
fixed bayonets and formed successive lines of battle behind those of
Lane’s Division. Lane’s men then reformed behind Heth’s Division un-
til they reached the ramp over the C&O Canal and finally the pontoon
bridge. During the movement to the crossing, Kilpatrick and Buford’s
horsemen continued to attack the front and flanks of the withdrawing
Confederates. Some Confederate stragglers and wounded were cap-
tured, but the majority of the troops withdrew without much loss. Pet-
tigrew’s men carried their wounded commander on a litter down the
road and across the bridge.
Falling Waters, Maryland, was the last battle for the well-regarded
general. He died from his wound the morning of 17 July in Bunker
Hill, Virginia. The last men to cross the pontoon bridge were from the
26th North Carolina of Pettigrew’s Brigade around noon of 14 July. The
bridge was cut free from the Maryland shore. Federal horsemen stood
by the river, under sniper and artillery fire from the Virginia shore,
overcome by exhaustion and frustration mixed with relief. For the of-
ficers and men in wet, muddy uniforms on both sides of the Potomac,
the pontoon bridge swinging in the rushing brown current symbolized
the end of the Gettysburg Campaign.
58 #246
Sources
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies.
Garry L. Bush, The Sixth Michigan Cavalry at Falling Waters:
The End of the Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Historical
Articles of Lasting Interest, July 1993, Issue #9, Morningside
House, Dayton, OH.
Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Com-
mand, Touchstone, New York, NY, 1997.
Clifford Dowdey & Louis H. Manarin, Editors, The Wartime Papers
of R. E. Lee, Bramhall House, New York, NY, 1961.
Bradley M. Gottfried, To Fail Twice: Brockenbrough’s Brigade at
Gettysburg, Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Historical Ar-
ticles of Lasting Interest, 2000, Issue #23, Morningside House,
Dayton, OH.
Earl J. Hess, Lee’s Tar Heels, The Pettigrew-Kirkland-MacRae Bri-
gade, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC,
2002.
Karla Jean Husby (Compiler) & Eric J. Wittenberg (Editor), Under
Custer’s Command, The Civil War Journal of James Henry Av-
ery, Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002.
S. Roger Keller, Crossroads of War, Washington, County, Maryland
in the Civil War, Burd Street Press, Shippensburg, PA, 1997.
Edward G. Longacre, Custer and His Wolverines, The Michigan
Brigade, 1861-1865, De Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.
Edward G. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, A Tactical Study of
Mounted Operations during the Civil War’s Pivotal Campaign,
9 June–14 July 1863, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln,
NE, 1986.
Harry W. Pfanz, The Gettysburg Campaign After Pickett’s Charge,
Gettysburg, Historical Articles of Lasting Interest, July 1989,
Issue #1, Morningside House, Dayton, OH.
Walter H. Taylor, General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-
1865, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 1994.
Gregory J. W. Urwin, Custer Victorious, The Civil War Battle of
General George Armstrong Custer, The Blue & Grey Press,
Edison, NJ, 1983.
Peter C. Vermilyea, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick and the Pursuit of
Lee’s Army After Gettysburg, Gettysburg, Historical Articles of
Lasting Interest, 2000, Issue # 22, Morningside House, Dayton,
OH.
Jeffrey D. Wert, Custer, The Controversial Life of George Armstrong
Custer, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 1996.
Eric J. Wittenberg, John Buford and the Gettysburg Campaign, Get-
tysburg, Historical Articles of Lasting Interest, July 1994, Issue
# 11, Morningside House, Dayton, OH.

ST 246 Issue.indd 58 9/21/10 11:00:30 AM

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strategy & tactics 59

ST 246 Issue.indd 59 9/21/10 11:00:36 AM

 Available Now

Storm of Steel
Storm of Steel (SoS) is a simulation of World War I. Its three
34x22” maps cover Europe from the Pyrenees to the Urals
plus the Mid-East. The maps can be combined for one grand
game of the Great War, or they may be used separately for
campaigns of the eastern, western and Mid-East. The rules use
an approach that allows players to play using the level of com-
plexity they desire. Turns represent three months. There are
scenarios for each year and each front of the war, as well as a
“what if” scenario for 1919.
Units represent land, naval and air forces. Ground forces are at
corps-level. Corps include infantry, shock, mountain infantry
and cavalry. There are also specialized armored car and tank
brigades, as well as tank corps for 1919, plus the planned-for
American airborne division. Each country has its own unique
order of battle. Land combat uses three different combat re-
sults tables to model different tactics.
Naval units are at the squadron level for capital ships, and flo-
tillas for cruisers and destroyers. There’s also a complete sub-
marine warfare module. Air warfare is represented by strategic
and tactical wings. Players can improve their aerial warfare ca-
pabilities by increasing their air doctrine level. As air doctrine
improves, players can employ interception, aerial supply and
aircraft carrier operations. On the political side, players can
utilize agents to conduct propaganda and sabotage operations.
An industrial production module gives players the capability
to produce different types of forces. Production is tied to mo-
rale, and winning great battles will enhance your side’s out-
put, while a disastrous defeat may lead to strikes on the home
front.
SoS uses cards to recreate major operations by granting ad-
ditional move-fight impulses, combat bonuses and extra rein-
forcements. Players choose which campaigns they will imple-
ment because some cards will provide for more maneuver,
while others will enhance combat.
Contents: 3 22x34" maps, world display, 1400 die-cut counters,
14 asstd displays/charts, 32 page Rules, 22 Scenarios. Ships as
4 units. Order form on page 2. $140.00

1 2 Q 1 2 14 Res 2
XXX X XXX XXX

10-3-2 1-1-3 2-1-3 8-2-2

A 4 3 4
g X X
e 1
n
t 1-3-4 1-3-1 1-3-2

USMC 2 23 2 BMB
XXX XXX
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390 14-4-2 8-3-2 1-3-10
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
60 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 60 9/21/10 11:00:43 AM

 Another Classic Game from Decision Games

War in the Pacific

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, the US naval
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was attacked by
Japanese aircraft. For the next four years, Allied
task forces engaged elements of the Imperial
Japanese fleet throughout the ocean. Marines
and army units began their program of island-
hopping, wresting from the Japanese the empire
that they had expanded in every direction.

War in the Pacific is a multi-level simula-

tion of the Pacific theater of operations during
World War II. The game enables players to rec-
reate the entire course of the war, form the open-
ing Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941 to the
climatic Allied assaults in the closing days of 1945. Representing some 30%
of the globe, the strategic maps let players move and engage in combat on all
levels: air, ground and naval. War in the Pacific is the most detailed board
game of the Pacific Theater ever created. There are a number of rules and
concepts that will, at first, be unfamiliar to a majority of players. But play-
ing through smaller map sections and scenarios enables the player to become
familiar with the mechanincs of the game.

Components: 7 full size strategic maps in full color, new tactical maps with
nearly 340 individual islands for new ground units to fight over, 32 die-cut
counter sheets, nearly 9,000 counters showing all types of units from the
Pacific Theater, rule books and assorted displays and player aid charts. Ships
as 10 units.
$420.00

Name
PO Box 21598
Address Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
City, State Zip
Shipping Charges
Phone email
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
VISA/Mc (ONLY)# $8 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
17 2 Canada
Expiration Date
21 4 Europe, South America
Signature 22 5 Asia, Australia

strategy & tactics 61

ST 246 Issue.indd 61 9/21/10 11:00:47 AM

 A Place to Start
Rebels & Redcoats, Battle Cry of Freedom
This two-player card game represents the American Civil War, 1861-
Complete Set of 65, in the theaters of war east of the Mississippi River. Each player
has his own Play Deck that he will use to draw
vol. 1, 2 and 3 from in order to play cards. In the game, each
American Revolutionary battles. The player will go through his Play Deck twice, with
game system simply but accurately recre- each deck representing roughly two years of the
ates the battlefield conditions with a move- war. Command Points in the game represent the
fight-rally play sequence to simulate the grand tactics of the American economic, military, political and social factors
Revolution. Additional rules cover command control, morale, artillery, that influenced the campaigns of the war.
light infantry and dragoons. Each battle is represented by its own units and Components: 300 full color playing cards,
map along with exclusive rules to recreate the unique conditions of each
battle. Units are generally regiments rated for combat strength, morale and $39.95
player aid card, rule book.
march capabilities.
The Sun Never Sets
Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. I
The Sun Never Sets covers the campaigns of March to Peking,
Battles of Bunker Hill, Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth. Zulu War and Sudan: The River War. Players can march to the far flung
Components: 440 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 2 player aid cards, frontiers of British civilization, engage vast WOLSELEY EMPEROR HSIEN
16-page rule book.
KHARTOUM

hordes of “natives,” and plant the British 32 10

FENG
0 R
0 10
flag in Khartoum, Peking and Ulundi. The
(4)N - 4
Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. II
Battles of Bennington, Freeman’s Farm, Bemis Heights, Camdn, Cowpens, game emphasizes leadership, with com- C HUNAN 1/CC
Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk’s Hill and Eutaw Springs. Components: 360 manders having a major role in marches V L L

counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 2 player aid cards, 16-page rule book. and battles (Gordon, Kitchener, Wolseley, 1 F - 6 4 M -6 1 F -10

Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. III and the Mahdi are included). Battles are ANSAR USMC CETSHWAYO
resolved through a multi-phase system with F L
1
Battles from the New York Campaign: Brooklyn, Harlem Heights and White units (regiment/battalion/battery) rated for 10 S - 6 3R-6 2 8
Plains; from the New Jersey campaign: Trenton, Princeton plus two bonus strength, type of weapon and elan. Leader
scenarios, Stony Point and King's Mountain. Components: 560 counters, counters will influence tactical and strategic situations. There V are rules
NGWEKWE

(2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, player aid cards, 16-page rule book. $80. for relief forces being dispatched, riverine gunboats and 5 S the- 8 building
00
of railroads.
Components: 620 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 16-page rule
book, and player aid cards. $40.00
The Alamo
This two-player tactical game simulates the assault made at
dawn, 6 March 1836, by 2,200 Mexican soldiers against a garrison
of 183 frontiersmen inside the Alamo mission in what is now San
Antonio, Texas. Each Fire Strength Point of a Texas unit represents
one man, and each Mexican battalion represents between 45 and 55
men. A hexagon represents 10 yards from hexside to hexside, and
each game turn represents five minutes. In the game, the players
QTY Title Price Total take turn moving their forces and conducting attacks. The game
ends when the Texas player has eliminated a decisive number of
Mexican troops or when the Mexicans have eliminated the entire
Texan force. Components: 100 counters, 22" x 34" mapsheet,
8-page rule book. $15.00
SUB Total

Shipping Charges Magazines count as 2 for 1 for shipping. TAX (CA. RES.)
$
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
S&H
$8 $2 UPS Ground/US Mail Domestic Priority
$
15(20) 4 UPS 2nd Day Air (Metro AK & HI)
TOTAL ORDER
14(10) 2(7) Canada, Mexico (Express)
$ PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598
17(25) 7(10) Europe (Express)
(661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031
20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
www.decisiongames.com
62 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 62 9/21/10 11:00:49 AM

 3 (3) 6
III
22 18

II 2 (6) 7
20

25 (4) 6 5th Air Grp

An Evening of Fun! 1

USAAF

Napoleon’s Last Battles Over The Top! 2

XX
June 1815 finds a triumphant, but be- Over The Top! includes four great battles
HQ 1 (Brusilov Offensive, 1916;
leaguered Napoleon again on the throne. Riga 1917; St. Mihiel, 1918 and Damascus,
5 (4) 12 1918) from the FirstI I World
Napoleon is outnumbered and virtually War. These battles simulate WW1 warfare from attritional trench fighting
surrounded; his only chance to maintain the
1A 1
to maneuver, tank assaults, and infiltration tactics. Units are regimental-
throne and the position of France is to gain 2 (3) 10
brigade level with corps level headquarters and support. Rules account for
a significant military victory. To succeed
1 Mar
command control, air support, poison gas, fog of war, and much more.
against these overwhelming odds, Napoleon Components: 560 counters, (2) 34" x 22"
boldly decides on an offensive designed to 3 mapsheets, 16-page rule book
destroy two of his opponents and drive the and player aid cards. $38.00
212
English from the continent. The games include Ligny, Quatre Bras, Wavre,
and La Belle Alliance. The game system uses leaders and brigade level
Pacific Battles, volume 1:
MAW
1
units, with cavalry, infantry and artillery. There are three new scenarios The Rising Sun 3 (3) 0
III
21 21
in addition to the four scenarios and the campaign game published in the
SPI original. Components: 340 counters, 24-page rule book, (2) 22" x Pacific Battles is a wargame series covering the great land 2 (3) 6
battles of the Pacific theater in WWII. Units are battalions,
34" mapsheets. $35.00 with companies and regiments. Most games in the series II
have players commanding anywhere from a division to a 92
Emperor’s First Battles & corps worth of forces, and employment of combined arms 38 (3) 8
CA

Napoleon’s First Battles tactics becomes critical. The system showsXX the evolution
of tactical doctrine in both the Japanese HQ
and21Allied armies
Includes Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt, in which the French Emperor,
with Banzai charges, superior U.S. fire2coordination,
(2) 6 naval SPA I I
Napoleon Bonaparte, won smashing victories against the armies of the
bombardment, airpower, amphibious landings, and engineer B
old regime of Europe. Emperor’s First Battles game system is based on
operations. Games in this volume include: The Fall of Sin- 37 (4) 12
the Decision Games’ release Napo-
gapore, Struggle for Bataan and Guadalcanal.
leon’s First Battles which is now
0411 0611 0811 1011 1211 1411
Lambert

Components: 2 22 x 34 inch mapsheet, 460 die cut counters, rules booklet,

Bruckman
5-4

included in this special combo pack.

X

0312 0512 0712 0912 1112 1312

2-4
X

6
Les Mesnu 6

0412 0612 0812 1012 1212 1412

Mont St Jean

It includes rules for elan, command $48.00

0313 0513 0713 0913 1113 1313

player aid cards, storage bags and 1 die.

Merbe
Braine
0413 Mahn
0613 0813 1013 1213 1413

control, and functional differences

2-4
X

B 2nd Hussar Merlen Trip Vandeleur

0314 0514 0714 0914 Ghingy 1114 1314
1-7

Fraser
2-7

1-7
2-6

d'Aubrme 1st
X
X

1-7

X
X

Halkett
X

4-6

B Arntschlt NC
1-7

NC C
3-4

Vincke

Battles for the Ardennes

2-4

NC
X
X

between infantry, cavalry, artillery

X

0414 0614 0814 1014 1214 C 1414

1-7

N3 du Platt C
2-4
X

2
Braine-l'Alleud Ponsonby
X

Somerset Best
Papelotte
5-4

C 5
X

4-6
5-6

4-4
X

Buttler Pack
X

0315 0515 2 0715 0915 1115 1315

C NC 6
4-4

Heisse
4-4
X

Kempt

and field engineers. The game also

2-4

Specht B 5
X
3-4

Battles for the Ardennes simulates the

1015 1215 1415
X

0415 0615 0815Williams 5

3-4

Dornberg
X

5
2-4
2-7

Kruse B
X
X

Bijlandt
Adye Kielmmsg 3
Fichermont
3-4

0316 Adam
0516 C 0716 0916 1116 1316
X

includes updated cavalry rules,

2-4
2-4

X
4-4
5-4

6 Omptede
X

X
X

Gold N2

campaigns that marked the first breath and last

Halkett 1 3
5-4

2 Grant
X
2-4

0416 0616 0816

La1016Haye Sainte 1216 1416
4-4
X

3
X
2-7

XX
Jacquinot
X

2 3
I

allowing it to perform historical

0317 0517 Maitland 0717 0917 1117 1317X 3-7

gasp of the Nazi war machine in the west on four

6-4

4/I Pegot

4/I
X

Mitchell
Byng
1 X 4-4
4-4

X
1017 X
1217 1417
Brue

0417 0617 0817

X

Nogues

4-4
Quiot
6-4

3/I
1/I

screening functions. Units are

4
Hougomont
X

1 4-4 4-4
X

comprehensively illustrated maps, used separately

0318 0518 0718 0918 X 1118 1318
Bourgeois

2/I Desales

I
1/I

X
La Belle Alliance 4-4 6-4
Schmitz

X
2/I

X
Aulard

X
XX 5-4
Husson

regiments and brigades, with his-

0418 0618 0818 1018 1218
XX 1418
Grenier
5/II

4-4
4/I
Domon

St Alph

IVC

3-4
Suberviw III

1-7
XX 4-4

for individual battles, or linked together to re-enact

X X 3-6
Delort IC

XX
Campi

X0519
5/II

1-7
0719 0919
19/VI

0319 1119 1319

Bellair

IVC
Baudin

3-4
6/II

XX
7-4
X X 4-4 4-6
Gauthier

torical leaders. Napoleon’s First

9/II
Jamin

9/II
II

X X X
4-7 0419 0619 4-4 5-4 0819 1019 1219 1419
19/VI

Duchet

IVC
Jamin
6/II

the entire campaigns of 1940 to 1944. Colorful

Soye

6-4 X
X 4-4 3-6
Noury

X
Pelletier

VI

0320 0520 XX 0920

20/VI

0720
4-4
1120 1320
L'Hertier
II

Bony
IIIC

6-4

Battles covers four of Napoleon’s

XX
4-6 3-4
d'Hurbal

IIIC

cardboard playing pieces accurately reflect the size

X X
3-6 XX X
JTromelln

Chas/Gd Chas/Gd
Marcillac

0420 0620 X
0820 1020 1220 1420
20/VI

Morand
Gren/Gd Gren/Gd
IIIC
Guyot

Placenoit
Gd

Roguet

6-6 2-6 3-4 7-4

X 7-4 X0921 X

earliest battles—Montenotte, The

X
Chartrand

Yng/Gd
Duchand

0321 0521 0721 1121 1321

Michel
Gd

Friant

Mon Plaisir 4-6 5-4 6-4

and strength of military units actually involved

4-4
X
Yng/Gd

0421 0621 0821 1021 1221 1421

X
Guye

Young

5-4
Gd

Pyramids, Arcola, and Marengo.

X 6-4
Lallemand

0922
0322
Neuve 0522 0722 1122 1322

in these battles. These counters also represent

Gd

Court 6-4

Advanced rules include Command, Friction, and Fog of War. march modes, blown bridges, improved positions,
Components EFB: 480 counters, 16-page rule book, 1 player aid card, air power and supply. Their movement, positioning and engagement for
(2) 22" x 34" mapsheets. battle are regulated by a superimposed hexagonal grid. These four games
Components NFB: 400 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, player aid (St. Vith, Clervaux, Celles and Sedan 1940) can be played individually or
as two campaign games (1940 Blitzkrieg to the Meuse and 1944 Battle of
card, 16-page rule book. $40.00 the Bulge).Components: 600 counters, (4) 17" x 22" mapsheets, player aid
card, 32-page rule book. $38.00
Name
Drive on Stalingrad
This two-player strategic-level simula-
Address tion of Fall Blau (Operation Blue), the
German attempt to conquer Stalingrad
City, State Zip and the Caucasus area of the southwest
Soviet Union in 1942. Each hex repre-
Phone email sents approximately 16 miles and units
are primarily division along with Soviet
VISA/Mc (ONLY)# tank and mechanized corps. Each game
turn represents one week.
Expiration Date Components: 420 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, rule book, die and

Signature storage bags. $48.00

strategy & tactics 63

ST 246 Issue.indd 63 9/21/10 11:00:57 AM

 64 #246

ST 246 Issue.indd 64 9/21/10 11:01:01 AM