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G.R. Nos.

122250 & 122258 July 21, 1997

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and EDUARDO A.
ALARILLA, respondents.

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were
petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038
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votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.

On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:

4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own "private army" at his aforesaid resident, P/Insp.
Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police assigned with the Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and
was granted search warrant no. 95-147 by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May 1995. A copy of the said
search warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.

5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command, backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action
Force, accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of
respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.

7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco where they conducted a search of
the subject firearms and ammunition.

8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high powered firearms without any license
or authority to use or possess such long arms. These persons composing respondent's "private army," and the unlicensed
firearms are as follows:

A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama —


1 PYTHOM (sic) Cal . 347 SN 26946
with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
2 INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with
Suppressor SN: 45457 with two
(2) Mags and 54 Rounds of Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon —
1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2)
Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.
C. Roberto Santos y Sacris —
1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn:
522218 with six (6) Rounds of
Ammo.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil —
1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3)
Rounds of Ammo.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion —
1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6)
Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag —
1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869

Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.

9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass window, respondent's Galil assault rifle
on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite police-military team applied for the
issuance of a second search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.

11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco,
claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the
locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of
Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.

12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large
plastic bags from the vault.

13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out that each bag contained ten
(10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened
contained the amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted
to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.

14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's bribe money to the teachers of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the
teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity ever in the history of
Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso
denominations totalling one thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY."

This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization called "MTB" or "MOVEMENT
FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS." The chairman of this movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who
admitted to the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy
and return it to respondent's headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent
during the elections. The voter will initially be given a down-payment of 500.00.

16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F"
hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent
and his followers, to vote for other voters in the voter's list.

17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme as follows. Respondent's paid
voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.

Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26, Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote,
her name was already voted upon by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita
Artajo, — Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito — Poll Member.

18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good graces of the local Comelec
Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the people of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an
article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled "1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar."

19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition.
These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent's
massive vote buying and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the implementation of his
vote buying ballot box switching, impersonations, and other cheating schemes.

Attached as Annexes "I-1" to "I-2" are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized from respondent. Attached
as Annex "J" is a Certification to the same effect.

20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing
acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
the Election Code. There are only 97,000 registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at least
P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The COMELEC (First Division) granted the
motion after finding that there was a "probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the
provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed
the Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend
proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been resolved."

On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed
his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.

On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their position
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papers. Blanco even replied to the position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.

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On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-buying, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P.
Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section
261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein Respondent is now made
PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of
the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed. SO ORDERED.

Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the
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proceedings. He moved for reconsideration of that part of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was
finally disqualified. The motions were heard on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of
reply. On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.

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In this petition for certiorari, Blanco contends:

18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its own the majority decision of the First Division in that:

18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's
constitutional right to due process of law.

18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure for disposing of
disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution
this Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs.Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC) violated Blanco's right
to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case
were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their proclamation — an act
which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.

18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in violation of law and the precedents
which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election
protest where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary
proceeding;

18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTE-BUYING without that minimum
quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the
provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;

18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation
and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was
reiterated only recently in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.

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On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari that he should be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of
Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo
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vs. COMELEC.

We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.


Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his proclamation as mayor pending determination
of the petition for disqualification against him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's
proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so
warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.

In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995,
he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to
disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper.
The COMELEC considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule
is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to
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be heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.

Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC Resolution 2050 as amended, in
disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides:

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate the complaint shall,
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to
the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.

We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C,
section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an
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election . . . ." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. Our laws are no less explicit on
the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as
amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the
resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to
its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification
cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without
referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the COMELEC is in accord with
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:

Sec. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. — The presentation of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b)
of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by
or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall
be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized
legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot
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divest the Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." Clearly
too, Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not the object of any invidious discrimination.
COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of
disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.

Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC
action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be
heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender
should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character.

The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of Blanco.

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The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows:

Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the affidavits and sworn statements admitted
as evidence against him are products of hearsay; inadmissible because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res
Inter Alios Acta and the offense of vote-buying requires consummation.

We are not impressed.

A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the Respondent to the Position
Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that they are in the nature of general denials emanating from
individuals closely associated or related to respondent Blanco.

The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4].Said affidavits were
executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary.

On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the alleged vote-buying was
conducted.

Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in
the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to facilitate the vote-buying scheme.

There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent [Annexes "E-2", "E-3" , "E-4" ,
"E-5" ,"E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].

On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for Respondent when they allegedly are
not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr.
Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal
Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].

Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the suspected flying voters.

The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same [Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of
Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate
their names in the voter's list.

From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by Respondent. In People of
the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA 684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the
weakest defense" [page 692].

In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court
observed that,

We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution
witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. [page 754].
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that a
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included herein, may
be given in evidence against him [affiants who executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against Respondent.

There is no merit in this contention.

The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature of witnesses who have assumed the risk
of being subsequently charged with violating Section 261 [1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner
and not by any law enforcement agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position
Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons Who Executed
Exhibits E-1l to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they were the accused, why file the motion?
Would not this be redundant if not irrelevant?

xxx xxx xxx

Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a huge amount? Why should the
Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his own admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the
elections? What were the peso bills doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with
the word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof ?

There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards when one considers the testimony of
Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent to more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan; that under the law, a
candidate is allowed only one watcher per polling place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no explanation at all by
the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00 each.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be consummated.

Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money . . ." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states
that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of
section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: . . . .

While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in consideration for someone's vote
constitutes the offense of vote-buying.

In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said affiants is sufficient for a
finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying.

These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of Commissioner Maambong.

There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again,
our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially
where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of
reviewing decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of
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discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution."

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We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the event Blanco is finally disqualified. We sustain
the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor
or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall
be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or,
in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each distribution the
immediately preceding election.

In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Art. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. — (a) What constitutes permanent vacancy —A permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor —

(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor, vice governor,
mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall
be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined in this Article.

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case
Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case
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of Reyes v. COMELEC, viz:

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to
be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the
latest ruling on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for
the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under the circumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have
been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above doctrine, a
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descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of
suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Its free
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exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, "each
time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living
reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and
every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law,
the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that
petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46863 November 18, 1939

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,


vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.

Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.


Claro M. Recto for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled case declaring the respondent,
Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a
majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were
contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937,
the respondent field a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939
rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to
have been committed by the Court of Appeals:

1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of
this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."

Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots now to be mentioned. (1) With
reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent, such
inadvertence raises a question of fact which could have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a
position to determine in this proceeding for review bycertiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court of Appeals
consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same number corresponding to
precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is
"Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct
No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on the space for mayor being "G.T.
Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is
rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted for the respondent. As to this ballot, the contention
of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot
bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner
in this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly admitted for respondent. On this ballot the
elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's
name immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intention of
the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was
also properly counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but,
apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on
the left side of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of
proof showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for the respondent and the Court of
Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the
provincial board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by word
"consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor
being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the
respondent. On this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space for member of the provincial board,
but his surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector
being manifest, the same should be given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F.
Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name
as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and
"Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.

The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No.
2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as acceptable
for the respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding,
we do not feel justified in doing so after examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari.
The second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in adjudicating to
the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the opinion that the position
taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name
and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention of the voters in preparing the same was
undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for which he was a candidate.lawphi1.net

The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor, and it is the contention
of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For the identical
reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro"
which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the action of the Court of
Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the respondent.

With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined
to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons already given but also and principally for
the more fundamental reason now to be stated. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common
weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government
and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our
attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful
purpose for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no
two cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection
that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of
the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root
of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which
are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).

It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-assignment of errors of
the respondent.

With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is hereby dismissed, without
pronouncement regarding costs.
G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972

ABDULGAFAR PUNGUTAN, petitioner, vs.


BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
SULU. respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

1
The resolution of respondent Comelec now assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly motivated by the objective of insuring
2
free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. It excluded
from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured and therefore no returns at all.
Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for delegates
3
to the Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two delegates, would lose out to respondent
Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral
testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no
4
election in fact did take place. This contention is, however, unavailing, in the light of our holding last month in Usman v. Comelec. The
other principal question raised is whether the recognition of such prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would contravene
the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is likewise adverse to
petitioner. Hence, respondent Commission must be sustained.

5
The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16, 1970, by respondent Abubakar and the other candidates, superseding an
earlier one dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view
6
of massive violence, terrorism and fraud. The respondents named therein, including now petitioner Pungutan, answered on December
18, 1970 to the effect that the elections were duly held in the above-mentioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the
existence of massive fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was duly heard, with oral testimony from five chairmen of
certain precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and three teachers from Siasi, followed by an
examination of the precinct book of voters from said towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as shown at the
back of CE Form No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970 elections for the Constitutional Convention.

After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission came to this conclusion: "In the light of the foregoing findings of the
Commission with respect to the manner in which the elections were conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the Commission is of
the opinion that the elections in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte.
Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters while armed
men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were to be prepared. The same reasons
which compelled the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious or
manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint (again paraphrasing in the reverse the second Pacis case)
compel us with much greater justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or
7
manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said municipalities are sham." The above findings of fact found
support in the light of the competent and credible evidence sustaining that the most flagrant irregularities did attend the so-called
elections in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.

As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear that 20,970 had voted. However, the result of the
examination of the thumbmarks and signatures of those who voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered voters appearing in
their registration record, CE Form 1 showed that only 460 of the registered voters had been definitely established to have actually
voted, 131 identified through the thumbmarks and 329 by their signatures. The 11,154 of those who voted were found to be substitute
voters: 7,557 were discovered to be voters voting in substitution of the registered voters through their thumbmarks and 3,597 through
their signatures. No opinion was made with respect to the rest of the votes cast because not all of the 13,282 voters whose thumbprints
could not be analyzed were referred to the NBI for signature examination. Only 4,631 of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts
were referred to the NBI for signature examination. Examination of these 4,631 signatures revealed that 3,597 were by persons other
than the registered voters, only 329 were by the register voters and no opinion could be rendered with respect to 705 for lack of
sufficient basis of comparison. In 26 precincts of Siasi there was 100% voting but not necessarily by the registered voters. The overall
average for the whole town is 96.6% voting. There were 80 persons who were able to vote without any CE Form 1 or without voting in
8
the name of the voters registered in the precinct."

With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared that 11,575 votes were cast. 197 persons were
able to vote without CE Form No. 1 without using the names of registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints corresponding
to the 11,575 votes cast were examined by the Fingerprint Identification Division of the Commission, only 3 were found to be identical
with the thumbprints of the registered voters in their registration record: one each in Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A. 5,300 thumbmarks were
found to be not identical with the corresponding thumbmarks of the registered voters in their registration records, CE Form 1. 6,199
thumbmarks, however, could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. Of these 6,199 blurred thumbprints from 56
precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were referred to the NBI handwriting experts for signature examination. The result of said
examination by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures showed that only 13 were found to be identical with the signatures of the registered
voters in their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897 were those of persons other than the registered voters. No opinion could be
9
rendered on 1,277 signatures for lack of sufficient basis of comparison." Further: "It appeared, therefore, that in the whole town of
Tapul out of the 11,575 votes cast only 13 were definitely established as cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were definitely established
as cast by substitute voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to 1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not examined
anymore since these were in precincts where the number of substitute voting had been found to constitute a very high percentage. It
has been also established that on Election Day about one hundred men armed with long arms were seen going around from precinct to
precinct in Tapul driving away the voters and instructing the teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the election returns. Some of the
ballot boxes were seen to have been brought to the Municipal Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of Election Day hours before the
closing of voting. Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100% voting while the over-all percentage of voting in the whole municipality
10
was 94.5%."

Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67 precincts, it was made to appear that
11,083 votes were cast. 66 voters who were not registered in the precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names of
the registered voters therein. An examination of the thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE Form 39 or at the back of CE
Form 1 compared with the corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in their registration record in CE Form 1
showed that only 39 thumbprints of the registered voters in his CE Form 1, while 4,698 were different from those of the registered
voters. 6,539 thumbmarks could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. However, only 2,647 of these 6,539
smudged thumbprints were referred to the NBI for signature examination since the rest of said blurred thumbmarks were in precincts
where a high percentage of non-identical thumbmarks was already discovered. 1,573 signatures were found to be by persons other
than the registered voters and only 83 were found to be identical with those of the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered with
respect to 991 signatures for lack of sufficient basis. In 20 precincts it was made to appear that all the registered voters had voted. The
overall percentage for the whole town of Parang was 94%. The evidence also showed that in a number of precincts in Parang armed
11
men had entered the polling places and prepared the ballots. The registered voters were not able to vote." Lastly, as to Luuk: "In
Luuk where there were 13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes were cast. 281 persons who were not registered voters in this precinct
were able to vote illegally without even using the names of the registered voters. The thumbprints of those who voted appearing in their
voting record either in CE Form 1 or in CE Form 39 compared with the thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in the voter's
registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only 22 of the thumbmarks of those who voted were identical with the thumbmarks of the
registered voters, while 6,021 were found to be different from those of the registered voters. 6,134 thumbmarks could not, however, be
analyzed because they were found to be blurred, smudged or faint. However, the signatures of those who voted in 13 precincts were
examined by the NBI and it was found that the said signatures were written by just a few persons as explained with greater particularity
12
in the earlier pages of this resolution."

In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in fact conducted as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan,
Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao and Tandubas, it was the holding of the Commission in the resolution of May 14, 1971: "1.
To rule by unanimous vote that the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts of Luuk are spurious and/or manufactured returns or no returns at all and as such should be excluded from the canvass for
the election of delegates for the lone congressional district of the province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by unanimous vote that further
hearings on the petition of [Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the rejection or exclusion from the canvass of the returns from Indanan,
Panamao, Pata, Tandubas South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing would no longer be necessary, it appearing that the results of
the election would no longer be affected by the returns from said municipalities after the rejection of the returns from the four towns of
Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and, therefore, for the purpose of the completion of the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to
include the returns from said municipalities in the canvass; 3. By majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from said canvass the returns from
the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained
13
by the Supreme Court." On May 22, 1971, this petition for the review of the above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent
Commission was filed. Three days later, a resolution was adopted by this Court requiring respondents to file an answer not later than
June 4, 1971. Both respondent Commission on Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their answers on said date. Respondent
Commission took pains to explain with even more detail why such a resolution had to be issued considering the "massive voting
anomalies ranging from substitute voting to grabbing of ballots to preparation of election returns and other election documents at
gunpoint" thus justifying its conclusion that the elections in the four towns amounted to a sham. The case was heard on June 8, 1971
with petitioner Pungutan represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno. Respondent Abubakar, represented by Attorney Jovito R. Salonga,
sought permission to submit a memorandum, which was received by this Court on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given the opportunity
to reply thereto, and he did so in his memorandum filed with this Court on October 18, 1971. The case was deemed submitted on
December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court, as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the pleadings and in the light of our
14
decision last month in Usman v. Commission on Elections that the challenged resolution of respondent Commission of May 14, 1971
is in accordance with law. The petition must therefore fail.

1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to disregard and annul the alleged returns from
107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured. So
we have held on facts analogous in character in the above Usman decision rendered last month. Nor is it to be wondered at. Any other
view would indict itself for lack of fealty to reason and to the realities of the situation. It goes without saying that what is contemplated in
the law is that the electors in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of
inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to be
made. Where no such election was in fact held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only
justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value.
The words of Justice Castro, in the Usman decision, referring to the election returns from Karomatan, considered as likewise not
entitled to credit because of their lack of integrity and authenticity, are opposite: "These circumstances definitely point, not merely to a
few isolated instances of irregularities affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election returns, but to an organized, well-directed
large-scale operation to make a mockery of the elections in Karomatan. We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42
precincts in question were prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be
completely unworthy of inclusion in the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding that they are spurious and
15
manufactured." Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject returns of such a character has been exercised most judiciously.
Even a cursory perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the challenged resolution
should suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative. Clearly,
there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest"
be realized. If, under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly there is a frustration of such an
ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent
Commission in the discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The long
16
line of decisions especially so since Cauton v. Commission on Elections, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. Only thus may
there be an assurance that the canvassing and proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy the true results of an election, in fact
actually held. We do so again. As a matter of fact, such a sympathetic approach to the results arrived at in the discharge of its functions
17
started with the leading case of Sumulong v. Commission on Elections. As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad
Santos: "The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created -- free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion,
18
this court should not interfere." The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v. Dimaporo when as he
pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of administrative organs created by ordinary legislation will not be
disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings ...
there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the Commission on Elections — created and
19
explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself — on a lower level than said statutory administrative organs; ... ."

2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle of
20
sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. In the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every citizen to
participate in the process of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed. What was so eloquently
expressed by Justice Laurel comes to mind: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common
weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
21
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority."

22
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. Its enforcement under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in
respondent Commission. Such a power, however, is purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief Justice
23
in Abcede v. Imperial: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the
power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' ...."

It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in the judiciary as the guardian of constitutional
rights, is excluded from the authority vested in respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the four towns in Sulu
involved a question as to such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was beyond its competence. Such is not the case
however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded from
24
exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. As to whether or
not an election has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of respondent
Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did take place, considering the massive irregularities that attended it in the four
towns, then the exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second issue raised by petitioner that in so
acting the respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being
involved, is likewise to be resolved against him. At any rate, what was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v. Commission on
25
Elections would likewise dispose of such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded by respondents that the rejection of
the Sagada returns would result in the disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate voters. But such disfranchisement would only
be provisional, subject to the final determination of the validity of the votes at the protest that may be filed with the Constitutional
26
Convention."

3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged resolution of May 14, 1971 as to the power of
respondent Commission is sustained, a special election be called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four municipalities of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk, it suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v. Commission on Elections, where a similar point was raised without
27
success. So it should be in this case. We see no reason to order such a special election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The
Commission on Elections is directed to order the board of canvassers to convene without delay and forthwith proceed with and
complete the canvass of the election returns from all the precincts of Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk, and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate
for the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted to the said province. This decision is hereby declared immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-29333 February 27, 1969

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant, vs.


CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.

G.R. No. L-29334 February 27, 1969

BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILlO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants, vs.


FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P. CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-
appellees.

Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf.


Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio Español and Voltaire I. Roviro for protestees-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on the
allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were
dismissed in a single order by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag presiding. The cases
are now before us on appeal.

1
In one of them, the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, was contested by protestant, now
2
appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, the protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who
3
along with the five protestees were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of
Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth
and seventh places, respectively.

In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers were alleged in
the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of
the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the
protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a cause of action was rather evident.

Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the invocation of the doctrines that voters should
not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the
exercise of the right of suffrage and that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the voting should
be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be inquired into by us in this appeal.

In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next day by the Clerk of Court of the Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly
registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance
with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of Canvassers, on
November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee for having obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes.
Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of law relating
to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200 voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of
200 only and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day itself, enabling persons who
under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relation to or governing
elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.

It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right of suffrage in view of their failure,
without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated
further that even in the case of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names included in the list of voters, they
could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be found. Mention was also made of
the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election day
itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the excessive number of voters being
listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than the correct ones.

What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an
approximately equal number, who were duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the
above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the mayor elected,
as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.

The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for elective positions in the City of Iligan
being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law
and equity.
4
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against protestees was in substance similarly
worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and declaring null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants seeking such
other relief which should be theirs according to law and to equity.

In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That the protest was filed beyond the
reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2. That [the lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present case, the Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of
5
action." This very same grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the other suit.

As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were dismissed, the lower court being of the
opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the
effect that the protests in both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period was rejected. The claim as to lack of jurisdiction was
likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action.

The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no cause of action, proceeded along these
lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of
themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities
committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees.
There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters
who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities
committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that
6
they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City."

It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the election
officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the
election officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part for the purpose of
committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that because of the alleged irregularities
committed by the election officials in not following the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the
distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the protests that the
7
irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the election in favor of the protestees."

A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from asserting in an uncompromising tone the
absence of an allegation that the protestants in both cases failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the result
would not have been different. It is true the complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the absence of such
a claim could not be so confidently asserted.

To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility attaching to the line of reasoning thus
pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting
or precision in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely
and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such
allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause of
action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded. We cannot in law and in conscience then
sustain the order of dismissal.

Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass
upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.

8
Abes v. Commission on Elections points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious to its teaching. It may not be
controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would seem, though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and clear.

The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief, so their petition avers, is planted upon
the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest elections. Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts." Among those
mentioned were that blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register several weeks
before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling places by Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of
Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista
candidates; that voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the polling places;
that thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law;
that identification cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify their
preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards; that the precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline
fixed by law; and that the resulting effect of irregularities was to prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered voters from voting.

One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could annul the aforesaid election in
Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other illegal practices committed before and during the election. The
petition did not prosper; it was dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts of justice
in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by
jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal
practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
9
Elections, assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the
resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with
reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this express affirmation: "The
power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of
the contestants." .

As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat from the foregoing pronouncement."
After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and
other irregularities, before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able to vote, will not
carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof.
And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City,
100,382 voters actually cast their votes — about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as pointed out in City Board of Canvassers
vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal officials should be determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal
officers-elect to be filed before the Court of First Instance."

Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether irregularities or serious violations of the
electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the opinion
10
coming from Justice Makalintal. Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities
in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code,
and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates
for municipal offices."

It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election law, the
proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.

11
That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, we have stressed the importance of preserving
inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.

As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever
may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen
12
as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority."

A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently
arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established
authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means
for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be
permitted to taint the electoral process.

It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to observe the mandates of the Election
Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves
that purpose.lawphi1.nêt

It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from entirely satisfactory manner. Than itself is
no reason for the courts to slam the door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal
complained of were not set aside.

Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the
protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to
the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in
accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.

It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, of either protest. That would be
premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded to the lower court for proceeding
and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without costs.
G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993

PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs.


REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS,
PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as the "EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986,"
has dramatically changed the course of our nation's history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by it been left alone in their own
personal lives. One such case is that of the petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari.

The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with
1
his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house
therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential
2
Election, Romualdez acted as the Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted.

When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about to come to a close, some relatives and
associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez,
for one, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.)
3 4
government granted. While abroad, he took special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance.

In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March
5
1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted.

On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:

. . . Failure to depart on or before the specified date may result in the withdrawal of voluntary departure and action being taken
to effect your deportation. In accordance with a decision made to your case, you are required to depart from the United States
6
at your expense on or before 23 August 1992.

Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on December 1991 apparently without any
7
government document.

When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the
registration of voters conducted by the Commission on Election ("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National and
Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an elected
Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered.

Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein private respondent Donato Advincula
("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters
8
in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166. Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and
that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register
9
as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and
that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of
10
December 1991.

11
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision on 28 February 1992, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and
qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of
Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.

Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.

12
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and
hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is hereby ordered to delete and cancel the name of
respondent Philip G. Romualdez from the list of qualified voters registered February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte.

Hence, this recourse.

On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease
13
and desist from enforcing questioned decision.

The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the Solicitor General into —
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S. 1992 and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition
having been filed by one who did not allege to be himself a registered voter of the municipality concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence
in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the respondent Court and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in
taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of any allegation in the petition filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a
14
registered voter in Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code.

When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein petitioner Romualdez, the latter countered by
15
filing his answer and praying for the denial of the petition, without raising the issue of jurisdiction. But what can be telling is that when
the MTC decision, denying the petition for disqualification, went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum,
explicitly prayed that the MTC decision be affirmed. This unassailable incident leads us to reiterate that "while lack of jurisdiction may
be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from
16
assailing such lack of jurisdiction." Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent not
only by his active participation in the proceedings thereat but, more importantly, in having sought an affirmative relief himself when the
appeal was made to the latter court whose jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked. Furthermore, the question is not really as much the
jurisdiction of the courts below as merely the locus standi of the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that, at this stage, should be
considered foreclosed.

In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his
residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for the petitioner.

The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at this stance given by the Solicitor
17
General, respondent Advincula posits non sequitur argument in his comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If
it would have any value, at all, in disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio
vs. Sto. Tomas:
It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the Court the position that will legally uphold the best
interest of the government, although it may run counter to a client's position.

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election
law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
19
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
20
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during
the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice
of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
21
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the
Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until
conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country
cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the
concept of "domicile by choice."

We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his
residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and
requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power
23
solely from the consent of the governed. We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort even all
the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf
of those entitled and bound to exercise it.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the Decision of the respondent Regional
Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February
1992 is hereby REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly made
PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976

SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant, vs.


RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.

ANTONIO, J:

Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of Talisay Negros Occidental, is charged in a verified complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr.
with (a) ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c) violation of the Election Code of 1971.

The Executive Judge, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, found the charges of ignorance of
the law and partiality to be without factual basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge has failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which provides:

Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out from the permanent list of voters may at
any time except sixty (60) days before a regular election or twenty-five (25) days before a special election, apply to the proper
court for an order directing the election registration board or the board of inspectors as the case may be, to include or reinstate
his name in the permanent list of voters, attaching to his application for inclusion the certificate of the Electron registration
board or the board of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a copy of his application and of the notice of
hearing thereof upon a member of the said board (Emphasis supplied.)

In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating Judge stated:

Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion based on lack of forms contains the attached
certificate of the Chairman or any member of the Board of Inspectors of the precinct concerned to the effect that petitioner or
petitioners applied for registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused registration for lack of registration forms. While it may
be true that the various; petitions for inclusion contained the sworn statement of Eduardo Belbes that a copy of the petition had
been served on the members of the Board of Inspectors of the corresponding precinct, yet this notice applied to the original
dates of hearing stated in the Petition and it is reasonable to assume that on the dates at which the petitions were ordered
reset for hearing by respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the petitions filed on October 14; and on October 20 for the
petitions filed on October 19, the Board of Inspectors were not notified. This is impliedly admitted by respondent when he
expressed the belief that notice to the Election Registration Board alone was sufficient, and that the certificate of the Board of
Inspectors to the effect that the petitioners applied for registration in the corresponding precinct on October 9, 1971, but were
refused registration for lack of forms was not necessary inasmuch as he relied on the testimonies of the petitioners themselves
on that point. Also, even if respondent was motivated by a desire to adhere strictly to the requirement of Comelec Resolution
No. RR-938 that inclusion cases be decided within two (2) days from the filing of the petition, it would seem that respondent
acted rather hastily in resetting the inclusion cases filed in the afternoon of October 19, 1971 for hearing immediately the
following morning or on October 20, 1971. This is especially true of Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162 to
172 (Exhs. 8A to 8K inasmuch as Mrs. Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the cases right the same morning
of October 20. Hence it is not likely that the various members of the Board of Inspectors could have been notified to appear
and testify that petitioners in fact appeared before their respective precincts and were denied registration for lack of forms.
caution dictated that this requirement or this procedure be followed as this was one sure way of Identifying the petitioners and
ascertaining whether in fact they applied for and were refused registration for lack of forms. True, inclusion and exclusion
cases are summary in nature but the procedure adopted by respondent Judge provided no safeguard whatsoever against
indiscriminate inclusion. For he admitted that as long as the petitioners were present when he called the inclusion cases for
hearing and the respondent Election Registration Board or the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned
were not present he considered the latter in default and summarily granted the petition. This could be the only reason why
practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the issuance of orders directing the inclusion of the petitioners now marked as
Exhs 'B', 'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out, on appeal most of the petitions were dismissed either for failure of the petitioners
to appear or, as in Cases Nos. 136-153, because the Court found on the basis of the testimony of the Chairman of Precinct
1
No, 41 of Talisay that he even had a surplus of seventeen (17) application forms.
In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also that respondent, in his aforesaid actuations, did so without improper motive but in
good faith.

In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their right of suffrage is the expression of their sovereign will. It
is, therefore, absolutely essential that the free and voluntary use of this right be effectively protected by the law and by governmental
2
authority. As stated in an earlier case:

* * * The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in
that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be
exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent
zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the
inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but
the public in general.

In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the
electoral law becomes evident. His good faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act
alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants general amnesty under certain conditions to public school teachers, other
government officials and employees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines and other persons for violation of election laws
and other related statutes in connection with the elections of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.

There is no question that as a consequence of the general amnesty all persons who violated the election law on the dates and
3
occasions therein mentioned are relieved of their criminal liability. In the case at bar, respondent is relieved of any criminal liability for
his aforecited infraction; however, in the public interest he should be admonished.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished that he should exercise greater care in the observance of the provisions of existing
laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. L-47243 June 17, 1940

CIPRIANO ABAÑIL, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs.


JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

In the year 1937 the total number of registered voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938 the electoral
census of the place, after the registration on September 24 and October 1, 1938, showed that the number of registered voters had
increased to 18,288. A few days before the election for Assemblymen on November 8, 1938, or on October 18, 1938, 17,344 petitions
were filed in the justice of the peace court of Bacolod. Negros Occidental, for the exclusion of the names of an equal number of persons
from the permanent list of registered voters of Talisay, Negros Occidental, on the grounds that they were not residents of Talisay n
accordance with the Election Code, that they could not prepare their ballots themselves, and that their registration as voters was not
done in accordance with law. The hearing of the petitions for exclusion was held on October 28, 1938. After attorneys Hilado, Parreño,
Remitio and Severino entered their appearance for the challenged voters, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ascertained who of the
challenged voters were present in court and who were absent. Thereafter the said justice of the peace declared those who were absent
in default. Failing to obtain a reconsideration, the attorneys for the challenged voters moved that, since the presentation of evidence
had not yet commenced, all the petitions be forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which was then presided over
by two Judges. The attorneys for the petitioners in the said 17,344 exclusion cases objected on the ground that the aforesaid attorneys
had no authority to represent those who were absent. Whereupon the justice of the peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys could
represent only the 87 challenged voters who were present in the court room and accordingly remanded their cases to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. At the same time the justice of the peace dismissed 253 of the petitions upon motion of the petition
upon motion of the petitioners themselves. Although no evidence was presented by the petitioners in support of their petition against
those who, were declared in default, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of voters on the ground that
it was the duty of the challenged voters appear in court in order to be personally examined in accordance with section 118 (f) of the
Election Code, as one of the grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters was that they could not prepare their ballots themselves,
that is, that they could not read and write. The attorneys for the challenged voters received notice of the decision of the justice of the
peace of Bacolod on November 2, 1938, when the present petition for certiorari was instituted in the Court First Instance of Negros
Occidental by the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of the other challenged voters for the purpose of having the judgment of
the justice of the peace of Bacolod in the aforesaid exclusion proceedings set aside. After hearing, the Honorable Judge Sotero Rodas
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment setting aside the decision of the respondent justice of the peace
of Bacolod and ordering the restoration of the excluded voters in the permanent electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From
this judgment the instant appeal was brought, and the respondents-appellants make an elaborate assignment of nine errors. In view of
the result hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it necessary to consider seriatim these errors.

While the present controversy may seem academic because the 1938 election is over, we have nevertheless assumed the task of
deciding the same on its merits in view of the imperative necessity and importance of having a correct electoral census in the
municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any municipality or city in the Philippines, for use in future elections. In
the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed to have a voice therein through the instrumentality of
suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribe qualifications (Article V, Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and
94, Election Code). The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that
respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be exercised,
not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general
benefit of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion from the permanent electoral list of
any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general.

Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if the Judge of the Court of First Instance is in the province, the proceedings for the
inclusion from the list of voters shall, upon petition of any interested party filed before the presentation of evidence, be remanded to the
said Judge who shall hear and decide the same in the first and last instance. When, therefore, the attorneys for the challenged voters
moved the justice of the peace of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, then
presided over by two Judges, it was mandatory on said justice of the peace to grant the motion. Without deciding whether the attorneys
who appeared for the challenged voters were in fact authorized by all, it is our opinion that, in view of the extraordinary circumstance
that the challenged voters were more than seventeen thousand and a representative number thereof were present, and in view of the
nature of the proceedings which affect public interest, it was error for the aforesaid justice of the peace not to have remanded all the
petitions for exclusion to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, in the interest of prompt and economical
administration of justice the necessary arrangement could have been made to enable the corresponding judge of First Instance of the
province to proceed to Talisay and hear the cases there.

The judgment appealed from will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise of our discretionary power (Casonvs. Rickards, 5 Phil.,
611; Rementeria vs. Lara, 6 Phil., 532; Agonoy vs. Ruiz, 11 Phil, 204; Muerteguy & Aboitizvs. Delgado, 22 Phil., 109; Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Aldanese, 46 Phil., 713; Tinsay vs. Yusay, 47 Phil., 639; Singh vs. Tan Chay, 51 Phil., 259; Province
of Tayabas Perez, 56 Phil., 257), the case remanded to the Court First Instance of Negros Occidental with instruction to hear and
decide the petitions for exclusion of the merits, in the first and last instance (section 113, Electoral Code), giving the parties every
opportunity to present their respective evidence. so that it may thereafter make such corrections in the electoral census of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, as may be proper (section 90, Electoral Code), and to refer to the Solicitor-General such violations of the Election
Law as might have been committed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 139357 May 5, 2000

ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited pleading in an election protest pending before
the Regional Trial Court is the issue posed in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the Resolution
1
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999 dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.

The COMELEC's challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus:

1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and
voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist and a veteran politician;

2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot boxes were transmitted to the
Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automated counting of votes and canvass of
election returns were centralized;

3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at the instance of
petitioner or his followers in that votes actually casted (sic) for the private respondent were not counted and credited in his
favor thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer
and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;

4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115 official ballots were refused or rejected by the counting
machine which the private respondent's watchers or representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to the
automated machine for the second and third times pursuant to the provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their
requests were not heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad, who is a close kin of the
Petitioner, and instead considered the said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A, 23A1 and 6A, around 56
ballots were found therein which were not drawn from the official ballots and were included in the counting of votes over the
objection of the private respondent's watchers or representatives;

5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results, the machine operator and the Election
Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to the down town without the knowledge of
the private respondent's watchers or representatives;

6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner
because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of
only 20 votes;

7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded and
secured by military and PNP personnel together with the watchers/representatives of the petitioner and the private
respondent and other candidates or political parties until they were transported and delivered to the respondent court at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together with the duly authorized representatives
of both parties.

xxx xxx xxx

1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this
Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of
2
Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.

2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May 25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad
Cautelam" against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D.
Dimaporo vs. Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (Manual Judicial Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots)
3
docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.

3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest in Election Case No. 11-127 special
4
and affirmative defenses and counter-protest. In his answer petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since
the protest is ad cautelam or subject to the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.
4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable Commission, the private respondent as
petitioner therein, filed a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case was among those cases the
proceedings of which were ordered to be continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution No. 3049 promulgated
5
on June 29, 1998. . . . .

5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First Division) granting the private respondent's
6
motion to withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228 and considered the same withdrawn. . . . .

6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an urgent motion before the respondent
court on July 27, 1998, praying for the issuance of an order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to bring and
produce before said court the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counter-protest and to set the case for hearing as
7
mandated by law. . . . .

7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the public respondent issued an order,
dated August 17, 1998, setting Election Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation of the Committee on Revision and
appointment of the Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit and payment of the revisor's
8
compensation; (c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee was created and its membership were
duly appointed in open court which committee was directed by the respondent court to finish the revision of ballots, if
9
possible, within 20 days from the commencement of the revision. . . . .

9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner
Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes
containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots
does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary
dismissal of the petitioner of the protest.

10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally
argued that the motion is clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision Committee has been ordered to
commence the revision of ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not allowed in an
election protest; (2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest and counter-protest have been
preserved and never violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not preclude the filing of the election protest for the
judicial recount and revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not guilty of forum shopping because his petition of
protest is clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad Cautelam in view of the pendency of his petition before this Honorable
Commission which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it could be set for hearing or acted upon by this
Honorable Commission.

11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioner's counsel asked that he be given ample time to file a written
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and the respondent court thru then Acting Presiding Judge Rasad Balindong, issued an order
dated September 2, 1998, giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T. Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all
the oral motions he made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned counsel for the private respondent who was likewise
10
given an equal period of time to comment.

11
12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss and on September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed
12
a vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss.

13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner's counsel
requested for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss submitted by the private
1
respondent which was granted by the court and on September 28, 1998, petitioner filed his rejoinder and on October 5,
14
1998 private respondent filed his comment thereto and thereafter all incidents were submitted for resolution of the court.

14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued the
assailed order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering the Revision Committee to report to the
court on November 19, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for their oath taking and to receive the instruction of the court in
15
the revision of the ballots and other allied matters.

16
15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 10, 1998, and on
17
November 23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to motion] for reconsideration.

16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10, 1998, the respondent court issued the assailed
order dated December 1, 1998 which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In the same order, the
respondent court reiterated its previous order to the members of the Revision Committee to take their oaths before Atty.
Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil Laguindab and thereafter to convene and start the revision of ballots on December 14, 15,
18
16, 17 and 18, 1998, morning and afternoon.
17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more specifically the revision of ballots, the
petitioner filed on December 10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in
Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestee's petition forcertiorari and prohibition before this Honorable
Commission shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was served upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12,
19
1998, at 10:50 A.M. . . . .

18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion on December 14, 1998 and in the
absence of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by (the COMELEC), the respondent judge already
issued an order granting the same motion and ordering the Revision Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision
20
of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further order from the court . . . .

Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction
in —
1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.

In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:

1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding
that a motion to dismiss an election protest case in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding
that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest case in the Regional Trial court is not allowed; and
3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in failing to resolve the relevant
material and substantial issues raised in SPR No. 52-98.

the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the Constitution and the election laws." Such
abdication of duty, according to petitioner, amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of elections —

. . . [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The
purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by
constitutional mandate must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections.
In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly and honest elections.
The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of
21
discretion, should not be interfered with.

Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent
of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.

In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELEC's powers in conducting
22
elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC aptly points out that —

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge
derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions . . . . There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to
the conduct of election . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
2
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is
imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
24
imperative, much more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of the contested
election results.

The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in the filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing
of the answer because in effect he is merely insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus, he claims
that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

We disagree.

The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings in
Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the
25
revision ballots. These events, pointed out by private respondent and borne by the record, show
that —
1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision Committee and the appointment of its Chairman and
Members and after the said committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the revision and to render its report within
20 days that the petitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes subject of
the protest and counter — protest have been violated; (2) the automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual
recount of ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping warranting summary dismissal of the protest;

2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner requested for ample time within which to file an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and over the vigorous opposition of the private respondent the same was granted by the court and
the petitioner was given a period of ten (10) days to file the same and the private respondent was likewise given a period of
ten (10) days to file his comment;

26 27
3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss and during the hearing on the said motion and the opposition thereto on
September 21, 1998, the petitioner again asked for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to
dismiss which was again granted by the court and it was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;

28
4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
29
November 18, 1998;

30
5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998, petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the
Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the trial court
to defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his petition shall have been finally resolved which was granted
by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the
31
proceedings of the case held in abeyance;

6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon
32
motion of the private respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on February 8, 1999. On said day, neither the
petitioner's counsel nor his designated revisors appeared, instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men,
numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for
the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and the intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have
been bloodshed;

7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioner's counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance with the attached letter-request of the
petitioner asking for the deferment of the revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to enable him to engage the services of
another counsel. Considering that the incident was designed to delay the further the early disposition of the case which would
frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling on the withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioner's
3
counsel to handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel;

8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a petition for transfer of venue of the trial to from RTC,
Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur to Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the private respondent did not oppose so as not to
delay the early resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on the said petition;

9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the pendency of the said petition for transfer of venue;

10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this
Honorable Supreme Court with a prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;

11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed an urgent motion before
this Honorable Supreme Court praying for the immediate issuance of a TRO directing the Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III,
Iligan City to cease, desist and refrain from conducting any further proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant
case shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court, without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch
34
III, Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said election case until further order[s] from this most Honorable Court.

It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by
belatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of the
35
electorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999, petitioner only filed his motion to
36
dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him" or right after the creation of the Revision Committee had been
ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses as he
claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he
filed his answer. Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but before filing the answer. . ." pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can not be countenanced much more so in election
cases where time is of the essence in the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms that —

Sec. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their respective cases, shall give preference to election
contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from the
37
date of their submission for decision, but in every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the same. . . . (emphasis and
italics supplied).

Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or
ballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, are
enough grounds to dismiss the case.

We remain unconvinced.

As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are "evidentiary in nature and can be best ventilated
38
during the trial of the case." It needs be stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
39
candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. In an election contest where the
correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can
40
not be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. In this case, the counted official ballots are
available and there is no evidence, other than the bare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the
protest have been violated or the official ballots contained therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of
petitioner's claim is to open the ballot boxes in the protested precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and re-
appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can
only be done through a full-blown trial on the merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on the basis of the bare and
one-sided averments made therein.

41
Petitioner's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868 to support his restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballots manually
counted in case of failure of the automated counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just as unpersuasive.

There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an automated election system. However, while
42
conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from
conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:

. . . In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not
machine related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent
the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of
COMELEC in the conduct of our elections . . . In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not
only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes . . . The bottom line is that by means of the
manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not
work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC . . .

. . . Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not follow the
rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to
subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be
debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.

Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that
4
"clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy."
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioner's counter-protest and private respondent's protest already justified the
determination of the issues through a judicial revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that —

Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest. — Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or
whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot
boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined
and votes recounted. (Emphasis supplied)

So too must fall petitioner's procedural objection that private respondent should be faulted for forum-shopping vis-à-vis this Court's
44
pronouncement in Samad v. COMELEC which states in no uncertain terms that —

As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to
inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to
be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC is no longer viable.

The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) quo
warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a
petition to annul a proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void.

Petitioner's argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is
45
well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC:

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a prohibited
pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said provision refers to proceedings filed
before the COMELEC. The applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure titled
"PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated inAruelo
46
v. Court of Appeals

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss
and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a certain pleading in the regular
courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the
47
Supreme Court.

The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his predicament because the denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a
prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in
dismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence to resolve the factual
issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the —

. . . Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original and
exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial court should be
allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioner as his
defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still
appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.

Moreover —

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply the laws
relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voter's obvious
choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
48
little understood legalisms.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123037 March 21, 1997

TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner, vs.


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ALFREDO E. ABUEG JR., respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

1
Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the
Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private
respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of
Palawan.

Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12,
1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the
winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:

7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-
buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and
during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the
results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters,
disenfranchisement of petitioner's known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters,
allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading
of protestant's ballots and other irregularities.

8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes,
while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is
attached hereto as Annex "B".

9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed,
the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have been different and the protestant
would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office of Member of the House of Representatives in the
Second District of Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.

10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was
allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to
2
law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.

3
Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and Counter-Protest on June 5, 1995, to
4
which Peña filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance.
In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive
fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of
the same.

5
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts, naming
700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred.

In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the said petition,
however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

The HRET states pertinently:

There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto Princesa City
and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brooke's Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance
appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743
precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are
located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in
the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he has to meet and make it
virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.
The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et al. (No. 46099, 66
Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, "[w]hile the election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred
from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes
received, the motion of protest should state in what precincts such irregularities occurred, . . . The specification in the
motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to
apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. . . .

In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987,
150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein "could have been dismissed outright as deficient in
form and substance, being couched in general terms only, without precise indication of the time, place and manner of
the commission of the alleged irregularities."

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in general language, "impugns,
contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent electoral practices, acts and deeds" of the protestee and
"impugns and contests all the election returns in the lone district of Catanduanes." The tribunal held that this
scattershot allegation is not allowed in election contests and that "it is necessary to make a precise indication of the
precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties." (Alberto vs.
Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)

While Protestant has attached as Annex "A" to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a
Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted
only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the attached Summary do not amend the original
Petition. There is not even a prayer in the Opposition suggesting such amendment.

Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections en banc(COMELEC)


dismissed herein Petitioner's Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of elections in the second district of
Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peña through registered mail and was received by him on 28
June 1995. Since Petitioner did not appeal from the Resolution, it became final on 3 July 1995 pursuant to Section 13
(b), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Even assuming that SPA Case No. 95-258 had tolled the running
of the period to file a protest and Protestant Peña's Petition Ad Cautelam was thus converted into a regular protest
(not Ad Cautelam) effective upon the finality of the official COMELEC resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity
to amend it to cure the defects cited above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.

Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts he contests in his
Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders Protestee's Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in form and
substance and for failure to state a cause of action. It does not cure the fatal defects in Protestant's Petition.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the Petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it is fatally insufficient in form
and substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestee's Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it hereby
DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logical consequence thereof and also for the same reason,
6
Protestee's Counter-Protest is DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on November 14, 1995.

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner considering that:

I. THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE
CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED
PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.

It is the Petitioner's view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even while failing to specify the precincts
where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that
must be complied with in order that an election protest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the
cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating
that:

From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities and violations of the law are
alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the protestant after the judicial counting
is not specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect of the
protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest,
without thereby adding new grounds for those already alleged by the protestant.

Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the defect in the petition should have been cured by the
opposition to the private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required the private respondent
Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior determination that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.

We do not agree,

In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive
sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
HRET, it is provided that:

RULE 22. Summons. — Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.

As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same.

A perusal of the Petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election,
fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate
dismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical.
If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other
course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions
of this sort by the losing candidate.

Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the number of votes which
would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast,
as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to
allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities", without specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition. We
cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into
an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water.

7
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET, that
substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16
of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.

While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the
protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory
8
period for filing of the protest.

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the
free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the
fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to
9
take any other step. . . . This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.

In sum, this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
electoral tribunal's judgment. There is no such showing in the present petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of merit. The Resolution of the
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED,
G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF
CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND EMILIANO MICU,respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of
May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District.

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it
contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21,
1
1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.

On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:

Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by
candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member
of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality
of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows:

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of
San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu
obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of
petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the
2
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan.

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private respondent
Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for correction of
the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof.

In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become final, the
PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution
and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the
private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed winner because of the
absence of authority from the COMELEC.

Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.

3
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the
provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other
4
candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed as of that date.

In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by
private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities of
Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the corrected
5
documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.

On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.

On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to
reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992
affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and
Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner
and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear
6
directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" averring that "there were corrections already made
in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which
corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other
7
hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. On even date, the COMELEC
promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the municipalities
comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on
8
canvassing and proclamation.

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed
candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince,
private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt
and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in its
resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which
reads:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively, of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt of defying and
disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete
the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising
the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on
the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated
of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;

2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by Chairman
Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;

3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the second
position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in
9
accordance with law.

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the
COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No.
92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.

10
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc granted the petition ratiocinating that:

Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's proclamation
without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover, there was no valid
correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's
proclamation.

1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second elected member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the
presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its
interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs
of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was
made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992
Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:

(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis
of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guideline
on canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to the nine 99)
COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively.
Verily, the above resolution is vague and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is notproperty under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office
(CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil.
432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires
due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or
suspend the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas
vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March
1988) andGallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to
partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a Special Case (SPC)
because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27 in relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1,
and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and
companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . . the commission en
banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be
referred to a division

Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation; consequently, its 29
July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC
No. 92-2()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is
similarly void.

2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be
true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San
Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their
corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the members of actually implement the order. Such failure could have
been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose
not to act thereon. As already adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of
sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private respondent; Annex
"A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections
because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective
Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the members of the
board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at least two (2) of the three (3) members
constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board
of canvassers shall be composed of the election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal
treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district or
the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were 7th only ones
who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were
no longer available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC to
appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass.

Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected SOVs and COCs.
Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be accomplished either by inserting the authorized
corrections into the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and
COC incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the COMELEC
referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause,
paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7
been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of the
Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July
1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to
carefully examine what was held out to be as the corrected documents, respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient corrections, they are,
nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared them — on 6 July 1992 — respondent
COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing
the corrections. Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on the other
hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:

. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents (sic) Board's
correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition)

On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:


This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed affirmed by virtue of
the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelecen banc Resolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992;

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992 that SPC No. 92-384
was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC
could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same was promulgated to resolve the
Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of
SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on
this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been
issued in gross violation of the requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for having been
resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case should have been referred first to a division pursuant to
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the
COMELEC's claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless. The PBC did
not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make such
corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone
who signed the sheets of paper purporting to be corrections.

For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private respondent COMELEC
private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent
affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of votes, must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections of 29
July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and
respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the foregoing
disquisitions and pronouncements. No costs. SO ORDERED.

On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the latter hear and
resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-
384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.

Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both Micu and Bince
orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the
Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.

Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of the
PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal. Bince
likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June 24,
1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel aside from being
superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.

On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated that the petitions filed on June 11,
1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in
SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.

On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner Alfonso C. Bince
Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the proclamation
of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly
12
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan.

On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution.

On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a resolution which
dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S. Micu is granted. The
Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July
21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene,
with proper notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary
corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative
13
District of Pangasinan. SO ORDERED.

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.

We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.

Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner
Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in
the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.

At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending incidents" of
the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v.COMELEC on February 9, 1993 Petitioner's
contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we
nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby
depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner,
hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner
of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was
not categorically declared valid.

Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical
error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent.

The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of
the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private
respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely
well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides
that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner, thus:

Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. — (a) Where it is clearly
shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or
certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or
more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures
into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent
precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon verified petition by any candidate,
political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.

(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.

(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal
therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.

(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their votes
are not affected by the appeal.

(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy of
the appeal, to the respondents.

(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.

(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).

The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper determination and
resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void
14
proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, categorically
declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by this
Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs. Commission on
Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni
v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27,
1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512,
December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and the
Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results, This
bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not
frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical and/or
mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does
it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug
and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting
the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected
involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.

In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415.
Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.

In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of
votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received
only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.

Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the
sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the
same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside the illegal proclamation.

As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue
should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money,
if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135716 September 23, 1999

FERDINAND TRINIDAD, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MANUEL C. SUNGA, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1
The instant Petition for Certiorari questions the June 22, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC) in SPA No. 95-213, disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. It also
2
questions the October 13, 1998 COMELEC Resolution which not only denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, but also
annulled his proclamation as elected Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

This case has been filed before this Court when the Petition for Disqualification of private respondent (SPA No. 95-213) was dismissed
3
by the COMELEC. Acting on the Petition for Certiorari of private respondent, this court, inSunga v. Commission on Elections, ordered
the COMELEC to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and act thereon.

The facts of the case, as found in Sunga v. Commission on Elections, supra, are as follows:

Petitioner (herein private respondent) Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent (herein petitioner)
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.1âwphi1.nêt

On 22 April 1995, Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing
him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Section 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint with the
COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism
or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first
letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two
(2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department
for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the
other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed
second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the
motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of
the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Bancrecommending that
Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec.
261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions.
The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand D. Trinidad as the
duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor, and, direct Sunga to
take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding
informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations for various election
offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand,
was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent
Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed
the petition for disqualification, . . . .

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition
contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification . . . .
As we have mentioned, above, private respondent's Petition with this Court was granted and COMELEC was ordered to reinstate SPA
4
No. 95-213 and hear the same.

Finally, on June 22, 1998, the COMELEC 1st Division (former 2nd Division) promulgated the first questioned Resolution disqualifying
5 6
petitioner as a candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming denial of due process.
7
Private respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion, at the same time moving for the cancellation of petitioner's proclamation as
elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and praying that he be proclaimed Mayor instead.

On October 13, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and also annulled his proclamation as
8
duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent's motion to be declared Mayor was, however,
denied. Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores rendered a dissenting opinion insofar as the Resolution annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections, which she found to be "bereft of any legal basis."

Petitioner alleges that the questioned Resolutions were promulgated without any hearing conducted and without his evidence having
been considered by the COMELEC, in violation of his right to due process. He also contends that the portion of the October 13, 1998
Resolution annulling his proclamation as Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections was rendered without prior notice and hearing and that
he was once more effectively denied due process. Petitioner also adopts the stand of Commissioner Dy-Liacco Flores that his
disqualification, if any, under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the three-year term to which he was elected on May 8, 1995, in
relation to which the corresponding Petition for his disqualification was lodged.

9
In his Comment, private respondent assails the arguments raised in the Petition and prays that he be proclaimed as the elected Mayor
10
in the 1998 elections. Petitioner filed a Reply to private respondent's Comment on February 24, 1999. Meanwhile, on February 25,
11
1999, the criminal cases filed against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan were dismissed. On March
12
8, 1999, the Solicitor General filed a Comment for the COMELEC, reiterating the argument that the COMELEC is empowered to
disqualify petitioner from continuing to hold public office and at the same time, barring private respondent's moves to be proclaimed
elected in the 1998 elections. Respective Memoranda were filed by both parties.

The issues before us may be summarized as follows:

1. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8,
1995 elections was concerned?
2. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 11,
1998 elections was concerned?
3. May petitioner's proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed
against him during the May 8, 1995 elections?
4. May private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be proclaimed as Mayor in the event of
petitioner's disqualification?

The Commission on Elections is the agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and
city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Unless the
13
Commission is shown to have committed a grave abuse of discretion, its decision and rulings will not be interfered with by this Court.

Guided by this doctrine, we find that no violation of due process has attached to the COMELEC's June 22, 1998 Resolution.

Petitioner complains that while the COMELEC reinstated SPA No. 95-213, it conducted no hearing and private respondent no
14 15
evidence. Yet, this does not equate to a denial of due process. As explained in Paat v. Court of Appeals —

. . . . Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard
(Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995). One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings (Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995). In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense (Ibid.) Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration (Rodriguez
v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995), as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan.
In Navarro III vs. Damasco (G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995), we ruled that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
16
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his
counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight (48) witnesses. While he complains that these were not considered by the Hearing
Officer, he, himself, admits that the COMELEC did not rely on the findings of the Hearing Officer but referred the case to its Second
Division. Thus, by the time the Second Division reviewed his case, petitioner's evidence were already in place. Moreover, petitioner was
also given a chance to explain his arguments further in the Motion for Reconsideration which he filed before the COMELEC. Clearly, in
the light of the ruling in Paat, no deprivation of due process was committed. Considering that petitioner was afforded an opportunity to
17
be heard, through his pleadings, there is really no denial of procedural due process.

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the second and third issues together.

18
We note that petitioner's term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998. Thus, when the first questioned
Resolution was issued by COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term. However, by the time the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had already become moot and academic as his term had already
expired. So, too, the second questioned Resolution which was issued on October 13, 1998, came at a time when the issue of the case
had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's challenged term of office.

19
In Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, this Court clearly pronounced that expiration of the challenged term of office renders the
corresponding petition moot and academic. Thus:

It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June
30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty
seat in his municipality (Amatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 71003, April 28, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Artano
v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 76823, April 26, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) because expiration of the term of office
contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic (Atienza v. Commission on
Elections, 239 SCRA 298; Abeja v. Tanada, 236 SCRA 60; Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76).

When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest
involving the office of the mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the
rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value (Yorac v. Magalona, supra). This rule we established
in the case of Yorac v. Magalona which was dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of
office of the Municipal Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. . . . . (emphasis, ours)

With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's term of office
therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office
in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that "it comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA No. 95-213
promulgated after the 1998 election." While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of
petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed petitioner
20
from his office. Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public
21
official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.

In this regard, therefore, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in the second questioned
22
Resolution that petitioner's disqualification under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the term to which he was elected in 1995.

Yet another ground to reverse the COMELEC's annulment of petitioner's proclamation under the 1998 elections is the undeniable fact
that petitioner was not accorded due process insofar as this issue is concerned. To be sure, this was not part of the first questioned
Resolution which only touched on the matter raised in the complaint — the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent merely prayed for
the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as winner in the 1998 elections in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. It was
with grave abuse of discretion, then, that the COMELEC went on to annul petitioner's proclamation as winner of the 1998 elections
23
without any prior notice or hearing on the matter.

24
As per the Certificate of Canvass, petitioner obtained 5,920 votes as against the 1,727 votes obtained by private respondent and 15
votes garnered by the third mayoral candidate, Johnny R. Banatao. This gives petitioner a high 77.26% of the votes cast. There is no
doubt, therefore, that petitioner received his municipality's clear mandate. This, despite the disqualification case filed against him by
private respondent.

This further lends support to our decision to bar his disqualification insofar as the May 11, 1998 elections is concerned. Indeed, in
election cases, it is fundamental that the people's will be at all times upheld. As eloquently stressed in Frivaldo v. Commission on
25
Elections —

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect
to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand
in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Benito v. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA
436, 442 [August 17, 1994]).

Finally, we see no error in the COMELEC's rejection of private respondent's move to be declared as Mayor on account of petitioner's
disqualification. To begin with, the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's challenged term of
office. Second, even in law and jurisprudence, private respondent cannot claim any right to the office. As held by the COMELEC, the
succession to the office of the mayor shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides
26 27
that the vice mayor concerned shall become the mayor. Also, in Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, citing Reyes v. Commission
28
on Elections, we already rejected, once and for all, the position that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may be proclaimed the winner in the event of disqualification or failure of the candidate with the highest number of votes to hold office.
This court ratiocinated thus —

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified is now settled (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 [1991]; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297
[1992]; Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 [1994]). The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings (Compare
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912] with Ticson v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 687 [1981]; Geronimo v. Ramos, 136
SCRA 435 [1985] with Santos v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 [1985]) has since been removed. In the latest ruling
(Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We
are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Private respondent claims that there are compelling reasons to depart from this doctrine. He argues that since the disqualification case
filed against the petitioner for the 1995 elections has been rendered moot and academic, it is with the 1998 elections that its impact
must be felt. He also claims that justice should be given him as victim of petitioner's dilatory tactics.

We are not persuaded. On the other hand, the fact that despite the disqualification case filed against petitioner relating to the 1995
elections, he still won the mandate of the people for the 1998 elections, leads us to believe that the electorate truly chose petitioner and
repudiated private respondent. To allow private respondent, a defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
29
meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.

Therefore, the Resolution of the COMELEC dated October 13, 1998 which annulled petitioner's proclamation as Mayor of Iguig,
Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections should be set aside. On the other hand, the petition filed before the COMELEC against
petitioner for election offenses committed during the May 1995 elections should be dismissed for being moot and academic, the term of
office to which petitioner was elected having already expired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC, dated October 13, 1998 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
annuls the proclamation of petitioner as winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. Insofar as the May 8, 1995 elections is concerned, we
find the issues related thereto rendered moot and academic by expiration of the term of office challenged and, accordingly, DISMISS
the petition lodged in connection therewith. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126669 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.

G.R. No. 127900 April 27, 1998

FERDINAND D. MENESES, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 128800 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.

G.R. No. 132435 April 27, 1998

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of
Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections.

On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having
garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's 8,612 votes.

On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court
1
of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the municipality's forty-seven (47) precincts. In due time,
2
Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precincts of the 47 protested by
Manalastas.

On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San
3
Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. Meneses, on his part,
4
filed an answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts of the 157 protested by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered consolidated and were jointly tried
by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.

Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and
other illegal electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes such as:

a. the registration of flying voters;


b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the "lansadera;"
d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;
e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the respondent/protestee;
f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;
g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to
substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;
h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and the reducing of the votes
actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation of the corresponding election return;
i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group, by only one (1) person;
j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons. 5

By way of counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too, was a victim of massive fraud and illegal
electoral practices such as:

a) The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
b) The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the "lansadera;"
c) False reading of votes for the protestee;
d) The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;
e) Switching of ballots in favor of protestant;
f) Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute
therefor illegal votes for the protestant;
g) The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the reducing of the votes actually
counted for the protestee in the preparation of the corresponding election returns;
h) Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one (1) person;
i) One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons. 6

Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered a revision of the ballots. The result of
said physical count coincided with the figures reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses — 10,301 votes; Manalastas — 9,317
votes; and Punzalan — 8,612 votes.

After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 with the following findings, viz: that
massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election returns and tally
sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70 "disappeared under mysterious circumstances;" and that filled-up
ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of
these irregularities, the trial court was constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came
up with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In EPC No. E-005-95 — declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered 7,719 votes or 33 votes more than
the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D. Manalastas and dismissing the instant protest.

2. In EPC No. E-006-95 — declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to vacate his position and to cease and desist from
further discharging the duties and functions officially vested in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga which now and henceforth, unless otherwise disqualified by law, are conferred unto and in favor of
Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities
and all incidents appertaining to and in connection with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga,
immediately and after he shall have taken his oath of office as such.

3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are hereby dismissed.

The authorities concerned are hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the enforcement and
implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M. Punzalan shall have had taken his oath of office.

As soon as this Decision becomes final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on Elections, Department of
Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Immediately thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga. The case was docketed as EAC No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas did not appeal from the said decision.

On October 1, 1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga. On the same
day, the COMELEC issued an order directing the RTC to elevate the entire records of the case.

On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalan's motion for execution pending appeal. On the same date,
Meneses filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No. 47-96, seeking the nullification of the RTC's order of execution pending
appeal.

On October 11, 1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its Order dated October 10, 1996.

On October 22, 1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt against Punzalan, alleging that the latter was holding
the office of mayor of Mexico, Pampanga in violation of the TRO issued by the COMELEC.

On October 28, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and declaratory relief with application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside the COMELEC's TRO issued on
October 11, 1996.

On November 7, 1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which submitted for resolution Meneses' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and motion for contempt and another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of
the RTC's order of execution dated October 10, 1996.
On November 12, 1996, this Court issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing the TRO it issued on
October 11, 1996 in SPR No. 47-96.

On November 21, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the petition seeking to declare as void the COMELEC's
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and to declare Meneses in contempt of court.

On January 9, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as follows:

Considering that the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission was pursuant to its 11 October 1996
temporary restraining order, which was specifically covered by the Supreme Court's temporary restraining order, the
Commission will respect and abide by the order of the Supreme Court. Considering, however, that the temporary
restraining order of the Supreme Court relates only to the implementation of the order of execution of judgment
pending appeal of the Regional Trial Court, the Commission finds no legal impediment to proceed with the resolution
of the main action forcertiorari pending before it and shall act accordingly.

On January 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not act on Meneses' motion reiterating the prayer to
suspend pendente lite the implementation of the Order dated January 9, 1997, and 2) the Order dated January 9, 1997 shall take effect
thirty (30) days from notice thereof to the parties.

On February 10, 1997 Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside the COMELEC Orders dated January 9
and 30, 1997.

On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of Meneses to set aside the RTC's order of execution
pending appeal and allowing Meneses to continue to discharge the duties and functions of municipal mayor of Mexico, Pampanga,
without prejudice to the resolution of his pending appeal from the RTC's decision.

On April 28, 1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 128000, which sought to nullify the
COMELEC's Resolution dated April 24, 1997.

On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 48-96 setting aside the trial court's decision and affirming
the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No. E-006-95 declaring
protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Mexico, Pampanga in the
May 8, 1995 local elections is hereby ANNULLED and SET-ASIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the proclamation of protestee-appellant
Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga but
with the modification that protestee-appellant received only 9,864 votes, or a deduction of 437 votes from his original
10,301 votes. Further, this Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan
to RELINQUISH his post in favor of protestee-appellant Ferdinand Meneses immediately upon finality of this
Resolution. 8

Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. In its Resolution dated February 13, 1998, the COMELEC
denied said motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, filed on
February 16, 1998 and docketed as G.R. No. 132435, to set aside the COMELEC's resolutions of December 8, 1997 and February 13,
1998. Thus, petitioner alleges:

1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;
3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a "prejudged decision;" and
4 that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the public respondent favoring the private respondent.

First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses
which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this Court in Bautista
10
v. Castro wherein it was held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law
and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.

This contention is not meritorious.


11
While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections
and For Electoral Reforms," requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not
invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it
state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members
of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility,i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should
12
not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people.

13
In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose T . Ramirez, this Court affirmed
14
the ruling of the Tribunal in Libanan v. Ramirez to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman's signature at the back is valid and not
spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those
cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. The
Court explained in this wise:

What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid
and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b)
the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" provides that
in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its
rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a
good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.

Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots wherein the
signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b) those
group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two (2) persons. He argues that the trial
court's findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the
Regional Trial Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty.
Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding where both parties were
represented by their lawyers and the expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public
respondent were made unilaterally, without any hearing and without the presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties
15
themselves.

These arguments fail to persuade us.

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the
COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is the constitutional commission vested
with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate
jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
16
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.

Anent Punzalan's assertion that the trial court's finding which was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding wherein an expert witness
testified and was cross-examined, should not be interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was arrived at without the benefit of a
hearing or the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine
the authenticity of ballots or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does it need to solicit the help of handwriting experts in examining
17
or comparing the handwriting. In fact, even evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the Commission to determine the authenticity
18
of the ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.

19
In Erni v. COMELEC, we held that:

. . . . With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered to determine
whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the
Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestee's request. The rule is
settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts.

Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the handwriting on
the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient . . . . 20

21
In Bocobo v. COMELEC, we likewise ruled that:

. . . . Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this
can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is
marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718) . . . . 22
In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert, was not binding upon the COMELEC
especially so where the question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be determined by a
23
comparison of existing signatures or handwriting. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly authorizes the
court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."

24
In Lorenzo v. Diaz, this Court enumerated the tools to aid one in the examination of handwriting, thus:

The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, presence of the pen, loops in
the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one
are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examination of questioned handwriting,
even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that
must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper
used, played an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given
case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between the
questioned handwriting and an authentic one. 25

Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of polling places could certainly affect the
handwriting of both the voters and the election officers manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be done and the numerous
documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be considered. Verily, minor and insignificant variations in handwriting must be
perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falsity.

26
In Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippines Islands, this Court held that carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing
27
are evidence of genuineness. In U . S. v. Kosel, it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in a handwriting may be attributed to
the mental and physical condition of the signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather
have some influence in one's writing. Because of these, it is an accepted fact that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a person's
signature are exactly alike.

On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A.
28
Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned. This
fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC
should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to
make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is offered."

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are
generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may
29
reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.

In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the COMELEC by personally and actually
examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
30
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.

Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The
petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by this Court
on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and academic by the
foregoing disquisition.

Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time between now and the next elections and to prevent the
case from becoming moot and academic. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61260 February 17, 1992

SERGIO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.


HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX (Quezon City), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, and ROBERTO MIGUEL, respondents.

R.C. Domingo, Jr. & Associates for petitioner.


Cenon C. Sorreta for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 9,
Quezon City rendered in an appealed election case and which decision proclaimed herein private respondent Roberto Miguel as the
duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay Elections held on May 17, 1982, with
a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over herein petitioner Sergio Bautista.

Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned. After
canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two
(2) votes.

On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on the
ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.

It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A
revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The votes obtained by both of the protagonists were as
follows:
1. In Voting Center. No. 519:
MIGUEL = 126 votes
BAUTISTA = 180 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. a, b, c, d, e, f, g,
h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and o.
Protestee-appellee contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
2. In Voting Center No. 520:
MIGUEL = 152 votes
BAUTISTA = 122 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. P, Q and R.
3. In Voting Center No. 521:
MIGUEL = 150 votes
BAUTISTA = 136 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 6 and 7.
4. In Voting Center No. 522:
MIGUEL = 222 votes
BAUTISTA = 212 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. AA, BB, BB-1,
BB-2 and CC.
Protestee-appellee contented the ruling of the lower court on the following ballots: Exhs. 8, 9, 9-a 10, 10-a,
11, 11-a, 12, 12-a, 13, 14, 14-a, 15, 15-a, 16 and 16-a.
5. Total Votes in all Voting Centers Nos. 519, 520, 521 and 522:
MIGUEL = 650
BAUTISTA = 650 (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

The trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same number of votes as the protestee Sergio
Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City. (p. 12, Rollo)

From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982,
judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the duly
elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee
Sergio Bautista. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaiming protestant-appellant ROBERTO MIGUEL as the duly
elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982
with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over and above his protagonist protestee-appellee SERGIO BAUTISTA; setting aside
as null and void the proclamation of protestee-appellee as the elected Barangay Captain made by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers on May 17, 1982; sentencing protestee-appellee to pay protestant-appellant the costs and expenses that the latter
has incurred in this protest, in accordance with Sec. 7, of COMELEC Resolution no. 1568, to wit:

P 25.00 for filing and research fee for petition of protest


2,500.00 for cash deposit for expenses for revision of ballots;
25.00 for appellant docket and research fee;
50.00 for appeal bond deposit;
P 2,600.00 Total

The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish 4 copies of this Decision to the Commission on Elections, the Ministry of Local
Governments, the Commission on Audit, and the Secretaries of the Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Barangay, in
accordance with Sec. 15 of Comelec Resolution No. 1566. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari on August 13, 1982 on the following questions of law:
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but who was never presented as a
witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes
cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot.
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots (Exhibits "Z", "Z-I", "S", "5", "6", "7").

1
Considering that the term for the contested office had expired on June 7, 1988, this petition has become moot and
academic. However, this case had already been submitted for decision as early as December 19, 1984, prior to the expiration of the
contested office. Hence, We deem it proper to resolve this case on the merits and determine the true winner of that elections.

Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the opinion of oneDesiderio A. Pagui, who
was never presented and qualified as an expert witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case on file
with the CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel.

The ballots involved in this objection of petitioner are exhibits "B" to "O" which all pertained to voting center No. 519 and Exhibits "T",
"T-l", "U", "U-l", "V" and "V-1" from voting center No. 521. Respondent court ruled:

b) Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N and O were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA, over the objection of
protestant-appellant that these ballots were written by a single hand. These ballots and the writings therein contained were the
subject of QUESTIONED HANDWRITINGS EXAMINATIONS and PDIL REPORT NO. 09-682 of Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui,
Examiner of Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document Examiner, NBI), who was allowed by the lower court to assist it in
the appreciation of ballots contested by either party as having been written by a single hand and to take photographs of the
questioned ballots, his report and photographs having been submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his
memorandum. The pertinent portions of the FINDINGS in the said report read as follows:

Comparative examinations between and among the various letter designs, their structural constructions and
other characteristics appearing in Exhibits "B" to "O" inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "U-I", "V" and "V-l", reveal the
existence of significant identifying handwriting characteristics, more particularly in —

l. general style of writings;


2. size and propertion (sic) of letter designs; base and height alignments; and relationship
between adjacent letters;
3. lateral spacing; and initial and terminal strokes;
4. structural constructions and more perplexed elements embedded in the structures of
letter forms; and such characteristics are exemplified in the following words/ names: . . .;
and the scientific evaluation of the aforementioned writing characteristics includes the
consideration of the idiosyncrasies of natural variation as shown in the numerous similar
letter forms, although at some instances, the writer succeeded in having changed the
entire letter designs of certain letters (at different style), but somehow certain significant
writing characteristics reappeared in the various letters during the process of writing, thus
be able to connect one writing from the others as having emanated from one source."

The probative value of the above-mentioned writing characteristics are further augmented by the presence
of unusual structural construction of letter forms and/or in combinations with adjacent-letters, thus . . .

The CONCLUSION of the said report states:


The questioned handwritings appearing in Exhs. "B" to "O", inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "V" and "V-l", were
WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.

Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned
ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with each other in order to determine whether or not they were indeed written
by a single hand, and this Court is convinced beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, N and O, were written by a
single hand, considering the remarkable similarity if not almost identity of the writings on these ballots. The lower Court's ruling
on these twelve (12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes for protestee-appellee based thereon should be
deducted from him.

With respect to Exhs. I and J, this Court entertains some doubt on their having been written by a single hand, and therefore
resolves the doubt in favor of the validity of these two (2) ballots, as votes for protestee-appellee. Therefore, the ruling of the
lower Court counting Exhs. I and J for protestee-appellee stands. (pp. 78-80, Rollo)

The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be noted
that while respondent court considered the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words of respondent
court, "(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings and compare
the same with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true value of the contested ballots and in order not to
disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by
only one person. It contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was circumspect in relying
on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots were prepared by one person. The ballots are the best evidence of the
objections raised. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting, this can be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal in this
election protest) itself (Bocobo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94173, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 576).

Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly
failed to take into consideration the other provisions of said Section 36 of the Resolution.

We do not agree. Section 36 in its entirety provides:

Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. (a) Identification of votes. — The chairman shall check in the certified list of voters
the name of the person offering to vote. He shall then announce the voter's name distinctly in a loud tone. If there is no
challenge, or if having been challenged and the question is decided in his favor, the voter shall be allowed to vote and he shall
affix his signature on the proper space of the Voting Record (Comelec Form No. 5).

(b) Delivery of ballot. — Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the Chairman shall, in the presence of the voter, the other
members of the board and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the ballot
in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding
ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the corresponding space of the voting record. He shall then fold the ballot
once, and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter together with a ball pen.

(c) Instructions to the voter. — If a voter so requests, the poll clerk shall instruct him on how to fill the ballot.The voter shall be
reminded that he should fill the ballot secretly and return it folded so as not to show the names of the candidates he voted
for. He shall also be warned not to use any other ballot; not to show the content of his ballot; not to put any mark thereon; not
to erase, deface or tear the same; and not to remove the detachable coupon.

(d) Preparing the ballot. — Upon receiving the ballot, the voter shall fill the ballot secretly.

(e) Returning the ballot. — (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix his right hand thumbmark
on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon; and shall give the folded ballot to the chairman; (2) The chairman shall
without unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members of the Board, verify
if it bears his signature and the same serial number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the
voter shall then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting record. (4) The chairman
shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded ballot in the compartment for the valid ballot and the coupon in the
compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.

(f) When ballot may be considered spoiled. — Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon already detached, or which
does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial number that does not tally with the serial number of the
ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record,shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed by
the members of the board and shall not be counted.

The ballots concerned were marked Exhibits "BB", "BB-1" and "BB-2" from voting center No. 522. The respondent court ruled that:

b) Exhs. BB, BB-l and BB-2 were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of protestant-appellant that
these ballots are not duly authenticated by the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the
back thereof. An examination of the back portion of these ballots reveals that it is completely blank of any signature or
initial. The mandatory requirement of authentication of ballots is found in Sec. 14 of B.P. 222 and in Sec. 36 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 1539, and the legal consequence for the absence of such authentication is stated precisely in Sec. 36, sub-par.
(f), and generally in Sec. 152 of the 1978 Election Code, . . . (p. 84, Rollo)
The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The
absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules
as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.

As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court which ruled that these were not marked ballots
and hence, were valid votes for petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow
with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter.

We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of
candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election
Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par.
5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name
or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words
written on the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule. Consequently, they are
irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent
court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".

Exhibit "S" (Voting Center No. 521) was excluded by respondent court as a vote for petitioner. It held:

a) Exh. S was counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of protestant-appellant that this ballot was found in
the small compartment of the ballot box for spoiled ballots and the said ballots appear to be in excess of the number of ballots
actually used. The records show that as reflected in the MINUTES OF VOTING AND COUNTING OF VOTES found inside the
ballot box, (1) there were 311 voters who cast their votes, and the ballots actually used bear Serial Nos. 1-311, (2) 1 voter did
not return his/her ballot, 8 ballots were spoiled ballots and 302 ballots appreciated by the Board of Election Tellers. The
questioned ballot, Exh. S, together with blank questioned ballot, was found by the Committee in the small compartment for
spoiled ballots. It does clearly appear that these two (2) ballots, one of which is Exh. S, are in excess of the 311 ballots
actually used and must be considered as "EXCESS BALLOTS" under Sec. 151 of the 1978 Election Code and "shall not be
read in the counting of votes." In view of the foregoing considerations, the ruling of the lower court on Exh. S is hereby
reversed, and this ballot shall not be counted as a vote of protestee-appellee and therefore deducted from him. (pp. 81-
82, Rollo)

We affirm.

Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was written in the spare for Barangay
Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Section 155 (11) of the 1978 Election Code
provides:
11. The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first name or surname of the
candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole
ballot is invalid: Provided, That if the nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a candidate and it is the
one by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality and stated in his certificate of candidacy, the same shall be
counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with the same nickname.

While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner
was popularly known and which nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent court's decision as
regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner.

Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city court as stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name, written as
"Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the first line intended for councilmen. In the case of Farin v. Gonzales and CA, G.R. No. L-
36893, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 237, cited by petitioner, it was ruled that where the name of a candidate is not written in the
proper space in the ballot but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for
such candidate. Such rule stems from the fact that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into
effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. In this case, while the name of petitioner was written
in the space for barangay councilman, his name was preceded by the name of the office for which he is being elected, that as Punong
Barangay or Barangay Captain (See Exh. "6"). The respondent court ruled that what was placed before the name BAUTISTA was Bo.
Barangay and not Po. Barangay for Punong Barangay (or Barangay Captain). We believe however that the voter's intention to vote for
BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be counted in favor of petitioner.

Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote for petitioner whose name was written
seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other
purpose than to identify the ballot (Katigbak v. Mendoza, L-24477, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 543).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and "6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in
declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22)
votes. The temporary restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division
1
in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A
promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the
8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.

2
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3)
local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
3
amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec.
261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the
4
earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition for disqualification consolidating
the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

5
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation.
Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any
evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was
proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend theeffects of the proclamation. Both motions were not
acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

6
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Bancrecommending that Trinidad be
charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b)
Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment,
vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke
the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected
Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding informations in the
7
Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early
Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification,
holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that —

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a
candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact
been committed . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or on motion of any of the
parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election
laws . . . .
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No.
6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this
Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall,
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to
the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until
after the election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners; and (3) The
disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it
nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on
11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of the
disqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646
requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation and
assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and
void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations against
private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and substantial
evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as
if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General concurred with petitioner's arguments.

Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not
petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC;
and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was
only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the
COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation
of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

8
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit ruling in support of
the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted
under any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending (unresolved)
after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the
disqualification case was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the winner.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case
against private respondent Trinidad.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its
Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus —

This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter from petitioner accusing
respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the latter's immediate disqualification. Another
letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioner's prayer while
alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an
Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the
previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.

That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the
charges filed by petitioner against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the
Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in
the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired
9
after the service of the original complaint.

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon
until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that it is permissive only and
operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees. That the
COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal
obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent payment of docket
fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private
respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not required to
answer.

Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering
or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the
Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law
Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations
contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that
filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.

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Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to
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impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains
unresolved after the election,Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-
judiciallegislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its
authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course,
the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, aquasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an
act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would be
undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating
body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification
case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud
which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and
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jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. InAguam v. COMELEC this Court held —

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to
the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we
perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a
victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of
office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the
guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of
proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether
the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and
requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate
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may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga's motion to suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of
Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought
to be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidad's guilt
was strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department —

Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against the respondent for disqualification for the alleged commission of
election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation
and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of witnesses and other documents.
Consequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting the disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply because
respondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to the
presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995, thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known
right of respondent TRINIDAD.

In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of four (4) criminal informations against
Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that there was indeed prima facieevidence of violation of election laws.

However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be
valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as
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stray, void or meaningless.

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the sociological and psychological elements behind
voters' preferences. Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to
give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and women who will run their government.
Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
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whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the people of
Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then
as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a
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candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." In Aquino v. COMELEC, this Court made the following
pronouncement:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for
the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the election. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate; the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under
such circumstances.

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Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No. 7160, which provides in part —

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or
Mayor . . .
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office . . . .

This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but merely application. This is the
basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for
failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by
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law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad," for
disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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