Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG

Author(s): Amit Gupta

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 5 (May, 1995), pp. 441-458
Published by: University of California Press
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DETERMININGINDIA'SFORCE
STRUCTURE AND MILITARY
DOCTRINE
I WantMyMiG

Amit
Gupta

Since theend of the Cold War,Westernattention has

shiftedto the threatposed by emergingmilitary powersin the developing
world. The proliferation of nonconventional weapons,the development of
indigenousarmsindustries, and the importationof weaponssystemshave
prompted concernin theWest,particularly theUnitedStates,thatthenext
majorwar couldbe againsta nuclear-armed regionalpower. In SouthAsia,
India's testingof theAgni and Prithviballisticmissiles,the acquisitionof
advancedconventional weaponryfromboththeWestand theformer Soviet
Union,and the growthof the IndianNavy into a blue waterforcehave
promptedanalyststo call India everything fromthe nextsuperpower to a
regionalpowerwitha long extraregional arm.
This articlearguesthat,despiteacquiringan advancedmilitary capability
in the 1980s,India's abilityto developintoa majorpoweris constrained by
the interactionbetweendemandand supplyfactorsthathave existedsince
independence.Perceivedthreats andbureaucraticpressureshavecreatedde-
mandsfornew weaponsand forshiftsin thedoctrinesof thethreearmed
services,buttheextentto whichthesedemandshavebeenmethas been lim-
itedby the Indiangovernment's abilitybothto mobilizehardcurrency re-
sourcesand findan external powerwillingto supplyweaponsto New Delhi.
Thesefactorshaveshapedtheevolutionof forcestructures andmilitary doc-
trinein severalways: theyhavecausedforcemodernizations, on occasion,to
takeplace in low threatperiods,theyhave modifiedmilitary doctrinewith
onlya partialrelationship to changesin the externalenvironment,and they

AmitGuptais Research
Associate inSouthandWest
intheProgram
ofIllinois,
University
AsianStudies, Urbana-Champaign.
? 1995byTheRegents ofCalifornia
oftheUniversity

441

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 442 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
have limitedIndia's capacityto developits indigenousweaponsproduction
capability.Because thedevelopment of India's armedforcesis stilldeter-
minedby theinteraction ofthesefactors,thisarticleconcludesthatitwillbe
forIndiato resolvethestructural
difficult constraintsand makethejump to
majorpowerstatus.

Buildupin India
forMilitary
Motivations
Threats
Since the 1950s,India's armedforcesand politicalleadershiphave used the
rivalrywithPakistanto justifytheirdemandfornewerand moreadvanced
weapons. The argument frequentlymade is thatPakistan'sacquisitionof a
newweaponssystemhad upsettheregionalmilitary balance,thereby forcing
Indiato seekcomparableweaponry.The external however,is notjust
threat,
restrictedto Pakistan.Militaryplannerscontinueto pointoutthatthepres-
ence of a Chinesenuclearforce,and morerecently theChineseNavy,also
enhancesthe Indiandesirefornew weaponssystems.Whilethreatsare a
necessarycomponent in explainingIndianweaponsacquisitionand doctrinal
changes,theydo notprovidea sufficient explanation forit.
As Ravi Rikhyehas shown,theaction-reaction modelis notparticularly
usefulforexplaining Indianweaponsacquisitionbecausein thevastmajority
of cases it was Indiathatintroduced a newweaponssystemintoSouthAsia.
Rikhyeexaminestheinduction of 97 systemsintothearmedforcesof India
and Pakistanin the40-yearperiod1948-88. His analysisconcludesthaton
21 occasionsPakistanwas thefirstto introduce a systemand India thefirst
on 76 occasions. If one takesintoaccountthatsomeofthePakistani"firsts"
weredue to Indiandelaysin procurement-aswas thecase withthe 155mm
gun-and otherswerein suchminuscule numbers thattheycouldhardlyalter
themilitary balancebetweenthetwostates, the number of Pakistani"firsts"
in Rikhye'sanalysisactuallygoes down to six.1

BureaucraticPressures
A morecomplexexplanation ofthedemandforweaponsacquisitionanddoc-
trinalshiftsemergeswhen one examinesthe developmentof the Indian
armedforcesin termsof bureaucratic pressures.Threekeygroupsmakeup
India's nationalsecurity system-thenationalleadership,thearmedforces,
and the armsindustry.Each groupexertsdifferent bureaucratic
pressures
based on its goals and objectives.
India's leadershipis boundby economic,foreignpolicy,andtechnological
considerations towarddefensespendingandthedevelopment
in itsattitude of

ofMotherIndia (New Delhi: Chanakya,1990),p. 38.

1. Ravi Rikhye,TheMilitarization

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 AMIT GUPTA 443
a military forcestructure. At the economiclevel, it recognizedearlythat
defenseand development werecompeting claims,and therefore feltthatde-
fensespendinghad to be restricted in orderto promotedevelopment pro-
grams. In fact,militaryexpenditure was raised dramatically only after
India's defeatin the1962 Sino-Indian war. At theforeign policylevel,simi-
larly,Nehrubelievedthata policyof nonalignment wouldnotonlykeepIn-
dia out of theemerging East-Westconflict butalso ensureits securityfrom
superpower intervention.ButIndia's leadersalso acknowledged thatin order
to remainnonalignedtheywouldhave to developan indigenous militaryca-
pabilityto withstand externalpressures.To do this,Nehruand his mostac-
tive defenseminister, KrishnaMenon, soughtto createa domesticarms
industry thatwould eventuallysatisfyall the requirements of the armed
forces.It was withthisin mindthatthegovernment in thelate 1940s con-
tractedwithP. M. S. Blackettto suggestmeansto develop"defensescience"
a Germanaircraft
in India. Later,in 1956,itrecruited designer,KurtTank,to
head a projectto builda supersoniccombataircraft, theHF-24 Marut.
Attitudeof the armedforces. The second set of bureaucratic pressures
emergedfromthearmed forcesthemselves, which had been raised,trained,
andorganizedby theBritish.The IndianArmy servedthe empire overseasin
boththe World Wars, and the net resultof such a heritagewas two-fold: a
lastingimpact on organizationand doctrine,and lookingto the West fornew
ideas and weaponssystems.Thus,whatexistedin effectwas a culturelag.
The armedforcespartiallydrewtheirideas of forcestructure and doctrine
fromtheWest,ignoring at timesthethreatson theground.Combinedwith
thisculturelag was theperceivedrolethateach servicesaw itselfas playing.
India's armedforcessaw themselves assuminga military rolecommensu-
ratewiththeirstatusas well as thatoftheircountry.The Navyvieweditself
as a blue waternavy,andfromthelate 1940ssoughtto includeaircraft carri-
theAir Force viewedstrategic
ers in its fleet. Similarly, bombingand in-
terdiction missionsas its tasks,and wantedthe aircraft to carryout such
missions.The Army,in contrast, was trainedin Britishinfantry tacticsand
thesetraditions continuedto dominateits thinking in theimmediate period
afterindependence.Britishdoctrineadvocatedgivinggroundto theinvader
and thenlaunchinga majorcounterattack.Major GeneralSukhwantSingh
arguesthatsucha strategy was easy fortheBritishto carryout sincethey
werefighting in alienlandsandcouldafford to tradegroundfortime.2Such
a luxurywas notavailableto theIndianArmyafterindependence as national-
isticcompulsionsdemandedthatterritory notbe ceded to theinvader.The
Anny'sdoctrinal responseto thisobjectivewas to establishdefensiveposi-
tionsand fightfromthem.Further, thelack of mechanization placedan em-

vol. 3 (New Delhi: Vikas,1981),p. 8.

Singh,India's WarsSinceIndependence,
2. Sukhwant

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 444 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
tactics,withArmygeneralshappyto makeminor
phasison infantry-oriented
territorial
gainsalong thefront.
Althougheach armedservicehad a perceivedmission,theforcestructure
requiredto carryout thesemissionswas not availableto the Air Force or
Navy because of the lack of financialresources.India's sterlingreserves
stoodat Rs. 1,516crores(15.16 billionrupees)in 1947,butby 1949 a sharp
rise in importsand a 30% devaluationof the rupeewas causinga steady
declinein thesereserves.In factby 1951-52,thetradedeficithad reached
Rs 2.21 billion. Thus,theNavy was unableto get an aircraft carrieruntil
1961, and whatshipsit did acquireweresurplusvessels fromWorldWar
Two. The Air Force purchasedsurplusfighters fromtheWest,and forits
bombingrole made do withcannibalizing Liberatoraircraftleftbehindin
Indiaafterthewar.3 The Army,on theotherhand,becauseits doctrineand
missionrequiredtheleastmodemweapons,could affordto armitselfade-
quatelywithsurplusweaponry, anditsprincipalopponent,Pakistan,also was
buildingup itsforceswithvintageWorldWar Two equipment.India's first
military expansionbecamepossiblein thelate 1950swhentheKoreanWar
boom led to a favorablehard currencysituation.This allowed for the
fortheAir Force.
purchaseof theNavy's carrieras well as new aircraft
The defenseindustry.The thirdset of bureaucratic pressureswas to come
fromthe defenseindustry, althoughin the earlyyearsafterindependence
armsmanufacturing was limitedby governmental and thelack of a
priorities
necessaryinfrastructure to produceweapons. The government wantedto
scale downdefenseproduction, andin the1950splantswithsurpluscapacity
wereused to produceconsumer productssuchas coffeepercolators and sew-
ingmachines.Further, Indiadidnothavethenecessaryinfrastructure or sci-
entificpersonnel to go in for the indigenous development of advanced
weaponssystems.Consequently, thearmedservicesdependedon imported
weaponssystems to fulfilltheirrequirements. In theaftermath of indepen-
dence,therefore,it was the wishes of the leadership,
political thesituationin
the externalenvironment, and theavailabilityof resources,ratherthanjust
theexistenceof threats, whichshapedtheforcestructure and doctrineof the
armedforces.

Rearmament 1962-71
The 1962 Sino-Indian warbrought abouta sea changeinIndiandefenseplan-
ningbecause India now faceda two-front threatthatcould onlybe metby
raisingforcelevels. Yet thedefensebuildupthatfollowedwas onlypartially
relatedto theeventsin thewar,whichhad been a land battlewiththeAir

3. PratapChandLal, My YearswiththeIAF (New Delhi: Lancer,1986),p. 73.

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 AMIrrGUPTA 445
Forceproviding onlytransport support andassistancethrough searchandres-
cue missions.As fortheNavy,itplayedno roleintheconflict giventhelong
distancefromtheChinesecoastline.
Afterthewar,however,a defenseperspective planwas drafted whichrec-
ommendedexpandingall threeservices. The Armywas to be enlargedby
raisingtenmountaindivisions(basicallyinfantry divisionswithmorevehi-
cles and lighterweaponry),six additionalinfantry divisions,and a second
armoreddivision;thisallowedtheArmyto increaseitspre-1962strength of
ninedivisionsto 25 by thetimethe 1971 Indo-Pakwarbrokeout. Six new
ordnancefactories weresetup to producesmallarmsand ammunition. The
Air Force,similarly, was to be raisedto 45 squadronsand a phasedwith-
drawalof itssubsonicaircraft was to be carriedout. The AirForcenowwas
to be builtaroundtwo types of supersonic aircraft(theMiG-21and theHF-
24) backedup by thetransonic Gnat.4
Plansfornavalexpansionwerealso laid afterthewarbuttheyclearlywere
notin responseto thenewthreat.The Navyin thelate 1960s,arguingthatit
shouldreplacethewithdrawing Britishfleetin theIndianOcean,requesteda
carrier
four-aircraft fleetto carryoutthemission.The government, however,
struckdowntheproposalbecauseitwas seen as havingimperialist connota-
tions. Despitethe lack of a convincingthreatenvironment, theNavy was
successfulin gettingthe government to agree to the fleet'sexpansionby
claimingthata largernavywas an integral partofan overallmaritime policy.
Its expansionin the 1960swas madepossibleby theopeningup ofthemili-
taryrelationship withtheSovietUnion,whichtransferred submarines, frig-
ates, and missileboats to the Navy. In fact,whateventuallyshaped the
militaryexpansionprogramthenwas theunavailability of resourcesand the
militarylinkwiththeSovietUnion.
By themid-1960sIndia was in theworsteconomiccrisissince attaining
independence.Westernmilitary aid driedup afterthe 1965 India-Pakistan
war,whenWesternnationsimposedan armsembargoon bothcombatants.
In 1962 DefenceMinisterKrishnaMenonhad overridden theobjectionsof
the Air Force and optedforthe SovietMiG-21 as India's firstsupersonic
fighter.MenonarguedthattheSovietswerewillingto transfer thetechnol-
ogy to India,and thiswould serveas the foundation foran Indianaircraft
industryas technologicallyadvancedas thoseofWesternnations.5The mili-
tarylinkwas expandedafterthe 1965 war to provideweaponsforall three
branchesof thearmedservices. The proposedexpansionof the Air Force
andNavywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout Sovietassistance,andbythe

4. Raju G. C. Thomas,TheDefenseofIndia: A BudgetaryPerspective (New Delhi: Macmil-

lan, 1978),p. 191.
5. Hajinder Singh,Birthof an AirForce (New Delhi: Palitand Palit,1977),p. 278.

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 446 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
consistedof Sovietair-
1971 war close to 40% of theAirForce's inventory
craft.At a timewhenIndia faced a severeshortageof hardcurrency,the
Sovietlinkallowedthecountry tanks
to buyaircraft, and shipsand modern-
ize the inventoriesof thearmedforceson extremely favorabletens. The
weaponswere paid forin Indianrupeesratherthanscarce hardcurrency,
therewas a sevenyeargraceperiodbeforepayments begananda totalrepay-
mentperiodof 17 years,andtheSovietschargedan interestrateofonly2.5%
Domesticarmsindustry.In thegeneralbuildupafter1962,defenseresearch
and production receiveda majorboostas thenumberof ordnancefactories,
defensepublicsectorundertakings, and defensesciencelaboratories was in-
creased. The 1960salso witnessedtheemergence of a civilianscientifices-
tablishment whoseresearchhad dualpurposeuses. Thiswas particularly the
case withIndia's atomicenergyprogram, and theperiodwas markedby a
debatein Indianintellectual, andpoliticalcirclesabouttheneedto
scientific,
go nuclear.Nuclearweaponswereseen as consolidating India's nonaligned
statusas well as providingit withthe currency to join the club of major
powers.
The pro-bomblobbygainedconsiderablesupportin thecountry afterthe
Chineseexplosionofa nucleardevicein 1964becausetheIndiangovernment
fearedpotentialnuclearblackmailby China. An additionalworrywas the
growingcall in internationalcirclesfora nonproliferation regimeto haltthe
further spreadof nuclearweapons. The combination of thesefactorsled the
headof India's atomicenergyprogram, HomiBhabha,to tellPrimeMinister
Lal BahadurShastrithatif governmental permission was givenIndia could
havea bombwithin18 months.Bhabha'spremature death,thepoorstateof
theeconomy,and factionalfighting in therulingCongressPartyled to the
shelvingof theseplans.6 The othermajorcivilianprogram withmilitary im-
plicationswas thespaceprogram, whichstarted withthelaunching of sound-
ing rocketsin the 1950s. Plans werelaid in the 1960s forbuildinglaunch
vehiclesand satellites,and by themid-1970s,thefirstrockethad been suc-
cessfullylaunchedand thefirstsatelliteputintoorbitwithSovietassistance.
The threatlevel declinedin the 1970s to thelowestpointsince indepen-
dence. WithPakistandismembered, Indiabecamethepredominant military
powerin SouthAsia. RelationswithChinaimprovedas thetwo countries
resumeddiplomatic andthesuperpowers,
relations whohadbeentheregion's
armorers in the 1960s,shifted to othercrisisareas. But while
theirattention
it was a low threatperiod,otherfactorsshapedIndiandefenseplanning.

6. RobertS. Anderson,"BuildingScientific in India: Saha and Bhabha,"Occa-

Institutions
sionalPaperSeries,no. 11 (Montreal:CentreforDeveloping-Area Studies,McGill University,
1975),p. 81.

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 AMITGUPTA 447
First,thedeterioratingeconomicsituationand lack of hardcurrency hin-
deredweaponsprocurement efforts,as in thecases of theJaguargroundat-
tackaircraftand theSea Harriernavalfighter. Second,problemsemergedin
the relationshipwiththe SovietUnion. India refusedbase facilitiesto the
SovietNavy and wouldnotendorseMoscow's plan foran Asian collective
security schemebecauseitwas viewedamongotherthingsas anti-Chinese in
itsorientation.The Sovietresponsewas to constrict thesupplyof spareparts
to India and refuseto sell it somenew weaponssystems.7
Third,theIndianarmsindustry failedto provideindigenoussystemsfor
theuse of the services,and thearmedforcesdependedinsteadon license-
producedsystemsliketheMiGs,theBritishLeanderfrigates, and theFrench
Allouettes.Butmostof thesesystemswerebecomingobsolete;theworsthit
was theAir Forcewhoseinventory mainlyconsistedof obsolescentaircraft
liketheHunter,theCanberra, and theSu-7. Fourth,thecombination of low
financialreservesand the failureof indigenousweaponsaffecteddoctrinal
development.The Navy,unableto procurea new carrieror new aircraft to
complement theold one, shelveditsplansfora blue waternavyin theearly
1970s,decidinginsteadto use theVikrant as an anti-submarine warfareheli-
coptercarrieruntiltheendof itsservicelife. The AirForcealso delayedthe
acquisitionofa deeppenetration strikeaircraft,theJaguar, whichwouldhave
been used to takeout strategic targetsdeep in Pakistan.
Yet whilethelack of resourcesdictatedthatdoctrine be unfulfilled,it did
not stop the development of military thoughton the subject. In 1975 the
Indiangovernment appointedan expertcommittee consisting GeneralsK.
of
V. KrishnaRao, M. L. ChibberandK. Sundarjito developa 20-yearperspec-
tiveplanfortheArmy.The recommendations ofthiscommittee, witha few
modifications,werecarriedoutintothe1980s. The committee statedthatthe
primary goal of theArmywas theprevention ofwarwithas smallan invest-
mentas possible,and itrecommended thatIndia's researchand development
capabilitybe used to minimizetheArmy'sdependency on imports.The ex-
pertcommittee saw Pakistanand Chinaas themainthreats to Indiansecurity
and recommended thata forcestructure be evolvedthatwould deterboth
sides. In operationaltermsthismeantthattheIndianArmyshouldhave a
forceadvantageof two corps(six divisions)over the PakistaniArmy(the
existingbalance of forceswithChina was consideredsufficient to detera
Chinesethreat).Further, thetankregiments in thearmyshouldbe doubled,
from27 to 58, and twomechanizedinfantry divisionsaddedto theexisting
forcestructure.8

7. Ibid.
withLt. Gen. M. L. Chibber,13 September1990,Urbana,Illinois.
8. Interview

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 448 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
The recommendation to increaseindigenousarmsproduction was made
primarilybecauseofthehardcurrency crisis.By theearly1970s,thegovern-
menthad alreadydecidedto producea follow-ontankto theVijayanta-the
Chetak. Along withthe Chetak,the Armywas also to benefitfromthe
planneddevelopment of an AdvancedLightHelicopter(ALH), butneither
projectcameto fruitioninthedecadeandbothprograms werecarriedintothe
1980s(withtheChetakrenamedtheArjun). Finally,the1970sweremarked
by majorachievements in theatomicenergyand space programs.In 1974
India explodedits firstnucleardevice and establisheditselfas a potential
nuclearpower. Withina coupleofyearsitwas able to launchitsfirstindige-
nouslydevelopedrocketand satellite.Thus,Indiahad notonlybecomea de
factonuclearstatebuthad also takenthefirststeptowardbuildinga guaran-
teed deliverysystem.

Buildupinthe 1980s
India'sMilitary
The period 1980-87 was markedby a majormilitary buildup. The Army
acquiredT-72 tanks,Bofors155 mmhowitzers, and BMP-2 ICVs (infantry
combatvehicles). The AirForceemergedwithone ofthemostmodemfleets
in thedevelopingworld-Mirage2000s,MiG-23s,27s and 29s, and theJag-
uar groundattackaircraft.It also builtup a strategic transport component
withtheacquisitionoftheIL-76 Candid. The mostspectacular growth, how-
ever,was of theNavy,whichacquired12 submarines (8 SovietKilo class
and4 German-type 1500s),a secondaircraft squadronsof Sea Harrier
carrier,
aircraftto equip bothcarriers, Tu-142 long-range maritime patrolaircraft,
and a leased CharlieI nuclearattacksubmarine.
This buildupwas possiblefora numberof reasons. First,India's foreign
exchangesituation had improved by theearly1980sto theextentthatit was
able to procuremajorweaponssystemsfromBritain,France,Germany, and
Sweden. Second,fearinga reduction in itsinfluence,Moscow viewedthese
purchasesfromtheWest withconcern;also, it was keen to secureIndia's
supportforits Afghanpolicy. Throughout the 1980s, the Soviets offered
India virtually everyconventional weaponsystemin theirinventory, often
beforesupplying theWarsawPact countries.
Third,thepoliticalleadershipsoughtto use India's militarystrength to
pursueits foreignpolicygoals. WhenIndiraGandhireturned powerin to
1980 she faceda changedthreatenvironment in SouthAsia. The Soviets
were in Afghanistan and the United States was rearmingPakistanas a
frontline statein thestruggleagainst communism. This conflictedwithIn-
dia's desirefor a South Asia that was free from superpower influences,
thereby allowingit to be thepredominant powerin theregion. To achieve
thisgoal, Mrs. GandhiespousedtheSouthAsian (Indira)Doctrinein 1983
underwhichIndianconcernsweredirected predominantly to SouthAsia and

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 AMIT GUPTA 449
external
to preventing powersfromexploitingtheinternalcrisesof other
SouthAsianstatestoenhance ownpositions
their intheregion.OtherSouth
Asiannationswerenottoinvite outside as suchanactwouldbe
intervention,
consideredhostileto Indiaandgrounds Insteadthese
forIndianretaliation.
statesweretoseektheassistance Thedoctrine
ofIndiafirst.9 wasoperation-
alized whenIndia sentpeacekeepingtroopsto Sri Lanka (1987-90) and to
crusha coup in theMaldivesin 1988.
Another aspectofthebuildup wastheresuscitation ofthedomestic arms
industry. Bythelate1970s,theIndianarmsindustry wasinthedoldrums as
itsindigenous projectshad not come to fruition.The Arun program was
behind scheduleanditwasproving tobuildanengine
difficult withsufficient
powerforthetank, theALH project due
faltered to major be-
disagreements
tweentheAirForceandHindustan Aeronautics overtheshape oftheaircraft,
andworkat India'smissileproduction unitground to a haltwithtalkof
disbanding theproject.
Buttheavailabilityoffinancialresourcesandkeychanges inthedecision-
making altered
structure Inthelate1970sRajaRammana,
thesituation. who
headedtheteamthathadconstructed the1974nuclear deviceandtherefore
wieldedconsiderable influence was appointed
in politicalcircles, scientific
adviserto thegovernment. Rammana recognized thatthearmsindustry's
survival depended on producing hightechnology weapons,andhe decided
bothtoreviveoldprojects newonesthatwouldsatisfy
andinitiate theneeds
ofthearmed forcesinthe1990s.Withthisinmind, thearmsindustry pushed
fortherevivaloftheALH andArjunprojects andfora newLightCombat
Aircraft(LCA). Rammana's successorwasV. Arunachalam, whoconvinced
thepoliticalleadershipandthearmedforces in 1983oftheneedtodevelop
missiles.Thisproject
ballistic wasexpanded byDefense R. Venka-
Minister
traman intoanIntegrated GuidedMissileDevelopment Program (IGMDP)10
under whichIndia'sshort-rangePrithvimissile(1988)andintermediaterange
Agnimissile(1989)weredeveloped.

Impacton theArmedServices
Army.Armsimports theIndianArmy's
facilitated moveintoa newmilitary
rewritten
doctrine, inthe1980s-largely theefforts
through ofGeneralSun-
dari-to use India'sgrowing mechanized tocarry
strength outdeepthrusts
intoenemyterritory.Havingbroken throughenemy were
lines,Indianforces
expected amounts
to seize significant andfight
of territory theenemyon

9. DevinHagerty,"India'sRegionalSecurity
Doctrine," April1991,pp.
AsianSurvey,
351-52.
withDr.V. Arunachalam,
10. Interview Defense
director, Organ-
andDevelopment
Research
8 August1991,NewDelhi.
ization,

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 450 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
groundsof theirownchoice.1IThis doctrine was to be followedin conflicts
withChinaand Pakistan,althoughin theChinesecase thebreakthrough was
to be carriedout withhelicopters.The evolutionof a new doctrinecame
gradually.Duringthe1983ExerciseDig Vijay,theArmy'striennial military
exercise,thefirstattempts weremadetouse armorto thrust deep intoenemy
territory. But therealshift,and itsimpacton proposedforcestructure, came
afterGeneralSundarjibecamechief-of-staff and plannedOperationBrass-
tacksin 1986.
Froma doctrinalstandpoint thegoal of OperationBrasstacks,thelargest
military exercisein Indianhistory, was to tryto givethearmyexperiencein
usingmulticorps formations.'2 It used forthefirsttimeReorganizedArmy
PlainsInfantry Divisions(RAPIDS); each divisionhad one mechanizedbri-
gade thatprovidedit withgreatermobilityand allowed it to be mobilized
quicklyforeitherdefensiveor offensive purposes.Sundari also plannedto
set up ReorganizedArmyMountainsInfantry Divisions(RAMIDS) and an
AirAssaultDivision. The RAMIDS wereequippedwithmoremodemartil-
lery,and were to have greatermobilityand firepower by employingfour
typesofhelicopters-light, utility,heavyandattack.'3The AirAssaultDivi-
sion was Sundarji'smostambitiousventure.In Brasstacks,he labeled the
54thInfantry divisionfromHyderabadan air assaultdivisioneventhoughit
didnothavethenecessaryaerialcapability.The eventualgoal,however,was
to establisha divisionthatwouldbe fullyair mobileand couldbe movedin
helicopters scoresof milesawayin a singleday,allowingitto
to a battlefield
strikedeep in theheartof enemyterritory.
The development of thisnew forcestructure was putdownin Sundarji's
1987 perspectiveplan-Army 2000. Accordingto thisplan, by the year
2000 theArmywas to buildup to a forcelevel of 45 (from34) divisions
includingfourtank divisions,eightmechanizedinfantry divisions,seven
RAPIDS, and two Air AssaultDivisions. The development of this force
structure wouldhave giventheIndianArmythecapabilityto move quickly
intoany area in theregionand imposeits will effectively. However,Sun-
darji's proposedexpansioncould notbe completedbecause of a worsening
economicsituation.By thelate 1980s India's externaldebt,fueledby un-
restrictedimports in theearlyyearsofthedecade,had soaredto a record$48
billionand by 1991 had risento around$70 billion. Hardcurrency holdings
also fellto theirlowestlevel in a decade. The government curtailedspend-
ing,and armedforcesexpansionwas one of themajorcasualties.The Army
shelvedplansfortheRAPIDS and RAMIDS, and droppedtheidea of creat-

Kanwal,
11. MajorGurmeet CorpsOffensive
"Strike forSuccess,"
Imperatives
Operations:
1988,p. 82.
IndianDefenseReview,January
interview,
12. Chibber 1990.
September
K. Sundarji
General
13. Interview, 1988,p. 38.
inIndianDefenseReview,January

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 AMIT GUPTA 451
force.
ingtwoairassaultdivisionsbecauseof thecostof raisinga helicopter
The raisingoffourarmoredandeightmechanizedinfantry divisionswas also
slowedby thefinancialcrisis.
Navy. The IndianNavy,whileseekinga bluewaterrole,hadbeenforcedby
insufficientfunding and an indifferent politicalleadershipto assumea more
modestmission. The Navy's role was to protectIndia's maritimeassets
(commercial andfishing vessels),guardharborinstallations, andarrestsmug-
glersand poachers.'4The Navywas expectedto detera Pakistaniattackby
thesheerexistenceof a large,thoughadmittedly antiquatedforce.This exis-
tentialdeterrence,as Telliscalls it,ended with the 1965 war whenthePakis-
taniNavyattackedthenaval base at Dwarka. In the 1971 war, therefore,the
Navyplanneda campaignof "sea denial" by attacking Karachi harbor in the
Westandbottling up PakistanisurfaceshippingintheEast. The eventin that
warthathad themostlong-term effecton navalplanningwas theU.S. deci-
sionto send the USS Enterprise into theIndianOcean,givingIndiansecurity
plannersan opportunity to claima threat ofcoercivesuperpower navaldiplo-
macyand thusjustifyincreasedexpenditures. But it was regionaleventsin
themid-and late 1970sthatgave theNavythethreatrationaleit requiredto
make a case formodernization. The growingsuperpower presencein the
IndianOcean, themilitarization effortsof the Shah of Iran,and the Soviet
occupationofAfghanistan wereall seenas leadingto a deteriorating regional
environment.
Giventhisgrowthin externalthreats, theroleof theNavybecameone of
two contradictory
fulfilling roles: to "maintaincommandof the sea in the
eventof a conflictwithsmallerregionaladversaries (sea control),whilecon-
currently deployinga modestbut effectivedeterrent againstextraregional
powersoperatingwithinthe environsof the Indiansubcontinental barrack
(sea denial)."'5 Sea controlwas to be establishedin thepeninsularregion
extendingfromPakistanin theWest to Burmaand Indonesiain the East.
This entailedthe completedenialof access routesavailableto India's re-
gionalcompetitors andthemaintenance of absolutecontrolovertheircontig-
uous sea zonesthrough whichnavalpowercouldbe brought to bearin either
a coerciveor a supportive mode.
The outerringin whichIndia was to pursuea policyof sea denialwas
describedas stretching to thechannelbetweenSouthAfricaand Madagascar
on thesouthern end,to theRed Sea/SuezCanal areaon thewesternside,and
to theStraitsof Malacca on theeast. In thisouterringIndia wouldhave a
fleetthatcould inflictsufficient damage to detera superiorextraregional

and Objectivesof India's

14. AshleyTellis, "Securingthe Barrack: The Logic, Structure
Naval Expansion,"Naval WarCollegeReview,September1990,p. 84.
15. Ibid.,p. 87.

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 452 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
navy. While it was neverclear whichextraregional powershad been tar-
geted,some seniorspokesmenhad identified SouthAfrica,Iran,Malaysia,
Australia, andChinain additionto thetwosuperpowers as potential
threats.
16
The IndianNavy is fullycapableof securingitsobjectiveswithinthepe-
ninsularregionbecause it enjoysmaritime superiority
in thatarea. Witha
largesubmarine fleet,an integralair arm,and a surfacefleetof whichover
halfoftheshipsarearmedwithmissiles,theIndianNavyis unmatched in the
regionand is themostbalancednaval forcein theIndianOcean littoral.
Despite financialfluctuations, the naval buildupis likelyto continue:
dockyards are buildinga new generation of destroyers,
an indigenouslypro-
ducedaircraft carrieris tobe designedwithFrenchassistance,andtheTrishul
anti-ship missileis forthcoming fromtheIGMDP. ConcernaboutIndianac-
tivitiesin theoutercircle,however,have forcedNew Delhi to reassurena-
tionsin theIndianOcean littoralaboutits intentions. The impressive naval
expansionof the 1980s made the SoutheastAsian countriesand Australia
concernedaboutIndia's intentions in theIndianOcean region.Thisled New
Delhi to call forjoint naval exerciseswiththesecountriesin an effortto
alleviatetheirconcerns.
AirForce. In an interview, AirChiefMarshalS. K. Mehraspelledoutwhat
theAirForce's rolewouldbe in a future conflict.If theenemystruckfirst,
theAirForcewouldabsorbtheattackwhiletrying to cause maximumdam-
age to theenemy'soffensive air capability.It wouldthenretaliate"against
theaggressor'sairfields,road/railway network, military, and com-
industrial,
mandand controlcenters.Secondly,shouldtheinitiative restwithus, theair
powereffort in thefirstinstancewouldattempt toputtheenemyairforceout
of actionto the extentpossible."'17The emphasis,therefore, seems to be
returningto thestrategic bombing,interdiction, and air superioritymissions
of the 1965 war.
In the 1980s theAirForce also begandiscussingtheneed fora Strategic
Air/Aerospace Command.WiththeJaguarsand theMiragesbeingnuclear-
capableand thedevelopment of Prithviand Agni,therewas a demandfora
StrategicAirCommandtobetteremploytheseresources.AirMarshalMehra
seemedto expandthe function of such a commandwhenhe statedthatit
wouldincludebothstrategic transportandreconnaissance missions.He also
said thatnotall strategicsystemswouldbe brought underone head as was
thecase in theU.S. and theformer SovietUnion. It shouldbe stressedthat
theprerequisite forsucha commandwouldrequireIndia goingnuclear;the
implicationsof sucha move are discussedbelow.

16. AshleyTellis,"SecuringtheBarrack,"part2, Naval WarCollegeReview,October1990,

p. 45.
17. AirChiefMarshalMehrainterview, IndianDefenseReview,January1990,p. 25.

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 AMIT GUPTA 453
The AirForce'srole,however, has notchangedas dramatically as the
Navy's. Its primary countering
missionis intraregional, thePakistani and
Chineseairforces, andit doesnotenvisage playing an extraregionalrole.
Thefactis thatitdoesnothavethenecessary systems todothis-tankers for
andairborne
refueling warning andcontrol systemstoserveas forcemultipli-
ers. Without thesetheAirForcewouldneither be able to reachfar-flung
targetsnordefend itselfinthehostile environmentitwouldencounter. Fur-
ther,thegrowing economic burden imposed bydefense expenditureis likely
to havea majorimpacton future forcemodernizations in thatservice.A
seriousproblem willarisewhenIndiatriestoreplaceabout400MiG-21s.Its
solutionto thisproblem has beenstop-gap.It recently awardedRussia's
Mikoyan bureau a contractforrefurbishingsomeofthelatergeneration MiG-
21s,18thusallowing theLCA tobe flly developed forsquadron service, or
evena laterpurchase ofWestern Theescalating
aircraft. costsofWestern-
producedfighter aircraft,however, make anything morethana token
purchaseunlikely.
Noris theLCA a certainty. Marred bydelays,escalating developmental
costs,theexistenceofonlya smalldomestic market,andadvancing technol-
ogy,theaircraftmaybe obsolete bythetimeitenters squadron service.The
projectwasstarted inthemid-1980s butfullproductionis expectedtobegin
onlyin 2005. So farthegovernment hasspentapproximately $468million
on theaircraft'sdevelopment, andcurrent estimatesarethatan additional
$834 millionwillbe required to complete theprojectsuccessfully. Faced
withsuchmounting costs,Indiais seekinginternationalcollaborationboth
forlowering developmental costsandentering thearmsmarket.'9

TheNuclearFactor
Throughout the1980s,Indiacontinuedtopursue itspolicyofambivalence in
thenuclear sphere.Thepolicy,whichhad been borrowed from the in
Israelis
the1970sandaimedatdeflecting Westernpressure,requiredthatIndiabuild
up all therequirementsforproducinganddelivering a nuclearweaponwith-
outopenlygoing nuclear.Following thispolicy,the nationdevelopedand
testeddelivery systems-the Prithviand Agni missiles-and acquirednu-
clear-capable andaircraft-the
fieldhowitzers Bofors155mm Howitzerand
theJaguar andMirage2000. Thereis alsoan attempt todevelopa nuclear-
propelled attacksubmarinethatcouldlaunchcruisemissiles.AlongwithIn-
dia,Pakistan hassought tobuilditsownbombinthebasement. Bythelate
1980s,ithadacquired a nuclear butIndiastillheldan asymmetric
capability
advantage. Pakistan
produceda missilewitha rangeofonly250kilometers,

18. Jane'sDefenseWeekly, May 21, 1994.

29, 1994,p. 4.
19. Ibid.,January

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 454 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
andIndiaalso is estimated to havegreater holdingsoffissilematerialandthe
capacityto producemoreif necessary.
Whilesucha builduphas been goingon, littlehas been written aboutthe
nuclearwar-fighting doctrineIndia shouldemploy.Instead,theemphasisin
Indianwritingsin the late 1970s was on convincingthe worldof India's
peacefulintentions in contrastto theunstablenatureofthePakistanipolitical
systemandtheimplications thathad forIslamabad'suse of a nucleardevice.
Indianwritings began to changein themid-1980swithsuggestions thatas
bothcountries weredevelopingnuclearweaponsit wouldbe in theirmutual
interest to keep themin thebasement,thereby preventing an open,destabi-
lizing,and costlyarmsrace.20 By late in the decade, the emphasishad
shifted oncemore,withleadingIndianstrategists likeK. Subrahmanyam sug-
gestingthatbothcountriesshouldopenlygo nuclearsincethiswouldbring
abouta stateofmutualdeterrence betweenthem.Suchwritings havehad an
impacton themilitary's thinking as well.
GeneralSundarji,discussingthenuclearchallengesIndiafaced,contended
thatthepossessionof nuclearweaponsbybothIndiaand Pakistanhad stabi-
lized the situationbetweenthe two countriesby makingit impossiblefor
eithernationto achievea conventional victory.Sundarjiarguedthateven
thoughan asymmetry existedin therelationship, it was notlargeenoughto
allow Indiathefreedomto launcha majorconventional attackagainstPaki-
stan. In fact,ifPakistanwereto dropevena fewbombson Indiatheeffects
would be calamitous,causing"considerabledamagewhichno government
can ignore."Sundarjicontinued:"IfIndiahada conventional edge,Pakistan
wouldbe fullydeterred fromtakinga conventional whileIndia in
initiative,
theory couldhavean optionofexploiting itin low intensity actionswhichare
unlikelyto trigger a nuclearripostebyPakistan.However,in practicethisis
mostunlikelybecause of thedangerof upsetting thenuclearquasi-stability
whichwouldcause considerable damageto bothsides. The same wouldap-
ply witheven greaterforceif Pakistanhad a conventional edge. Therefore,
one mayconcludethatin thisscenario,evenifone of thetwopowershad a
conventional edge,it wouldbe unlikelyto exploitit in practice."21
China,Sundarjifelt,posed a different problem.Theretheasymmetry in
nuclearforceswas so greatthatBeijingwouldnotbe deterred fromlaunching
a conventional attackagainstIndia. Sundarjitherefore recommended thatIn-
dia buildup a securesecondstrikecapability againstChina,writing:"In this
scenarioit is assumedthatIndiahas sufficient operational SSBNs and a mix

20. BhabaniSenGuptaand AmitGupta,"The Rootsof Conflictin SouthAsia," in Bhabani

SenGupta,ed.,RegionalCooperationandDevelopment inSouthAsia,vol. 1 (New Delhi: South
Asian, 1986),pp. 265-66.
to Developing
in theAge ofNuclearDeterrenceand ItsApplication
21. K. Sundarji,Strategy
Countries,thesis,MadrasUniversity,1984,p. 33.

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 AMIT GUPTA 455
of land-basedICBMs and IRBMs to giveheran assureddestruction capabil-
ityagainstChinain thesecondstrikemode. It shouldbe emphasizedthatfor
a strategicnuclearbalance,Indiadoes notneedto havematching numbersof
variouscategories withChina.... Whatis necessary, however,is theability
to inflict
assureddestruction againstChinain a secondstrikemode,thushav-
ing an essentialequivalenceleadingto essentialnuclearbalance. In such a
situation,nuclearstability withChinawouldprevail."22
Sundarji'scall fora secondstrikecapabilityagainstChinahas beenechoed
by othersbut the cost of attainingsuch capability,the prevailingstateof
India-Chinarelations, and theinternationalenvironment do notwarrant such
a move. Estimateson buildingup a nuclearforceforIndiaare hardto come
by,butone studywritten in theearly1980sclaimedthatitwouldcostup to
$70 billionovera periodof 15 yearsto buildevena modesttriad-a figure
thatwas well beyondthe country'sreach.23Further, Sino-Indianrelations
have improved dramatically, and in 1993thetwocountries reachedan agree-
mentto reducetrooplevelsalongtheirborderand to freezetheborderdis-
pute. As thingsstand,therefore, India's principalnuclearopponentremains
Pakistan.Continuing a policyofambivalencewouldsuitbothsides in South
Asia becauseitwouldprevent a costlyarmsraceanditsconsequences:insta-
bilityand international repercussionsincludingsanctionsandthetermination
of economicassistance.But a realdangerexiststhatcontentious issueslike
theKashmirdisputecould driveone of thestatesto make itsnuclearforce
public.

The Presentand the Future

Withthebreakupof theSovietUnion,India initiallyfacedbotha financial
crisisand a supplyside problem.The highdebt incurredthroughimport
liberalizationin the1980sled to a reductionin defensespending,and devalu-
ationof therupeereducedthebuyingpowerof thearmedservices.Recent
growthin theeconomy,however,allowedthe1994-95 defensebudgetto be
realincreasein defensespend-
raisedto Rs 230 billion($7.4 billion),thefirst
ing in the 1990s. Moreover,"givenIndia's burgeoning foreignexchange
reserves,it is believed'special provisions'mayeven be made to buymuch
needed systems to replace obsolete equipment crippled by spares
shortages."24 But thismaybe a short-term because,as pastindica-
situation
torshave shown,hardcurrency reservestendto fluctuate.

22. Ibid.,p. 36.

23. Quotedin AkhtarAli, Pakistan'sNuclearDilemma(New Delhi: ABC, 1984),p. 67.
March12,
24. RahulBedi, "IndiaStemsFall in DefenseSpending,"Jane'sDefenseWeekly,
1994.

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 456 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
More worrisomeforIndiandefenseplannersis thedemiseof the Soviet
Union. Approximately 70% of India's defenseequipment is of Sovietorigin
andreplacingit-even maintaining it-is a difficultand costlyprocess. The
softcurrency purchaseof weaponsis a thingof the past. A morecritical
problemis theshortageof spareparts,as thebreakupoftheUSSR has forced
Indiato deal withthedifferent republicsandtheindividualweaponsfactories
withinthem.Attempts to manufacture sparepartsindigenously have moved
slowly,affecting thereadinessof thearmedforces.Nor is theIndianarms
industry likelyto meetmostotherrequirements of thearmedforces.Armor
andaircraft, twocriticalpartsof India's conventional arsenal,willhaveto be
importedbecause indigenoustank and aircraftprogramshave run into
trouble.The armsindustry willalso remaintechnologically dependent on the
Westand theformer SovietUnionforyearsto come. The systemsthatare
comingthrough dependheavilyon imported components, and thesupplyof
such components was progressively restrictedthroughout the 1980s due to
Westerncontrolson technology exports.Whilethiswill notaffectthecur-
rentgenerationof weapons,since India insistson licensedproductionof
thesetechnologies, it will preventthe armsindustry frombuildinga next
generation oftanks,aircraft, andmissiles.Indiacouldcontinueto buildolder
systemsthatwould stillbe assets in a SouthAsian battleground, but that
wouldseriouslyaffectanyattempts at extraregionalpowerprojectionwhere
thearmedforceswouldface technologically superioropponents.
The armsindustry is also unlikelyto achievemajorexports,therebyre-
movingone ofthemeansofsubsidizing militaryexpenditure.My impression
aftertalkingto officialsin variousdefenseproduction unitsin 1991 was that
no clear thinking had gone intodevelopingan exportcapabilityformajor
weaponssystems.Marketshad notbeen identified, marketingstrategieshad
notbeen developed,and strictrestrictions stillexistedon whatcould be ex-
portedand to whom. Arunachalam pointedout thatIndia had turneddown
$150 millionworthof military-related businesswithIraq in the 1980s.25
Armedforcesdoctrinemay also be affectedby internalevents. In the
1980s,internal securitymissionsincreasingly tieddownthemilitary, particu-
larlythe Armywhose internalsecurityrole consistsof fighting counterin-
surgencycampaignsand maintaining law and order. The Armyhas been
increasingly draggedintothelatterrolebecause of thefailureof thepolice
and theparamilitary to checkcommunalviolencein Indiancities. Boththe
police and elementsof theparamilitary are heavilypoliticizedand are not
trustedby the Muslimminority.In some situations, the Armyalone can

withofficialsat theAeronautical
25. Interviews DevelopmentAgency,Bangalore,July15,
1991,and theDefenseMetallurgical ResearchLaboratory, withDr. V.
July17, 1991; Interview
Arunachalam,August1991.

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 AMIT GUPTA 457
maintainorderbecauseit is stillseen as thebestavailablebrokerby all In-
dian religiousgroups.But it wouldprefernotto carryout thisrole,which
distractsit fromitsmainmissionand thusreducesitswar-fighting ability;it
also breaksdowndisciplinein theranks,encouragescorruption, and is seen
as a destructive careerassignment forArmyofficers.
A moreseriouschallengeemergesfromthegrowing numberofinsurgency
movements in thenation.The extentto whichsuchoperations tie downthe
Armycan be seen fromits experiencein Punjab whereduringOperation
Bluestar,the 1984 operation to cleartheSikhGoldenTemplein Amritsar of
terrorists,seven divisionsweredeployedto tie downthe statesof Haryana
andPunjab. In 1990,duringthewarscarewithPakistan,fourdivisionswere
usedto maintain internalsecurity inPunjab,andseveralmorearedeployedin
thecurrent disputein Kashmir.In a future war,theexistenceof suchinsur-
gencieswouldconstitute a serioushandicapfortheIndianArmy.
The factthatacquisitionefforts and doctrinalshiftsare largelydetermined
by resourceavailability and externalsuppliersrather thanby threatsand bu-
reaucratic politicsputsobviouslimitson thedevelopment of India's military
capability.Atthesametime,thefactthatdemandsforweaponsanddoctrinal
shiftscome fromthreatsand bureaucratic politicscreatessecurity dilemmas
and hurtsindigenousprocurement efforts.First,because resourceand sup-
plierconstraints determine weaponsprocurement, theacquisition programs of
thearmedforceshave an on-again,off-again quality.The Navy's questfor
an aircraftcarrier and,subsequently, foroneto complement it,is indicativeof
thistrend.Further, thesecharacteristicslead to the creationof incomplete
forcestructures, withthe armedforceshavingonlybits and pieces of the
systemstheyrequireforpursuinga particular militarydoctrine.
Second, the fluctuations in resourceavailabilityand supplierreliability
workagainstthedevelopment ofan indigenous production capability.Indig-
enousweaponsprograms in Indiahavetakena longtimeto matureandhave
been continually threatened by theoptionof buyingabroad. Once resources
or suppliersbecomeavailable,domesticprograms tendto be sidelinedas the
armedforcesprefer thequalityof imported systems.Thus,Indiagetscaught
in the development of expensiveweaponssystemsthatdo not satisfythe
armedforcesneeds. The Marutfighter, and mostlikelythe LCA and the
Arjuntankare examplesof this.
Further, the dynamicsof Indianweaponsprocurement has allowed pro-
gramsthatarenotaffected bybureaucratic politicsorresourcesconstraints to
succeed. For example,theIndianmissileprogramsucceededbecause it did
nottakeaway resourcesfrompet projectsof thedifferent servicesand be-
cause therewas no possibilityof importing alternativesystems.Similarly,
Indianshipbuilding has succeededbecausethenaval budgetcould notfully
fundtheimportation of vesselsforthefleet.The problemhereis thatthese

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 458 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995
aretheveryprograms thathaveextraregional implicationsand,therefore,are
viewedwithconcernbytheotherstatesin theIndianOcean littoral.Finally,
theinteractionof demandand supplyfactorsnotonlyleads to thedevelop-
mentof incompleteforcestructures but also heightensthe Indiansecurity
dilemma. This was particularly the case with the naval buildup,which
sparkedconcernin bothSoutheastAsia and Australia.Thus,theorganiza-
tionaldesireforweaponsprocurement based on vague threatsis dangerous
sinceit can becomea self-fulfillingprophesy.
India's attemptto build militarycapabilityreflectsthe problemsother
ThirdWorld statesface. Its scientificbase, while capable of producing
weaponssystems,is constrained by pressuresemanating fromthedomestic
securitypolicy-making process. At thesame time,its continuing economic
constraintsforceit to relyon externalsourcesfora successfulmilitarization
effort.As longas thisstateof affairscontinues, India's abilityto becomea
majormilitary powerwill be constrained.

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