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6
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE
J. WAYNE KULIG
2.6.1 INTRODUCTION provided for acquisition of certain strategic and critical materi-
als. Shortly thereafter, the 76th Congress had allocated $70 mil-
The current Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act lion in appropriations and advance contract authorizations in
of 1979, as amended, provides for the acquisition and retention of anticipation of a loss of important imports that could occur if
strategic and critical materials in a National Defense Stockpile Japan conquered parts of Asia or if war broke out in Europe.
(hereafter referred to as the Stockpile). The stated purpose of Little material was accumulated for a stockpile under that act,
the Stockpile, found in Section 2 of the Act, is “to decrease and and when the war broke out, materials were needed badly for
to preclude, when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence immediate use rather than for stockpiling.
by the United States upon foreign sources for supplies of such During the war, the United States found itself short of some
materials in times of national emergency.” important commodities and was forced to resort to substitution
The National Defense Stockpile, as planned, should be suff- and rationing to ensure a sufficient supply of commodities to
cient to sustain the United States through a three-year national support the war effort. Some valuable resources, such as energy
emergency. The Stockpile does this through its inventory of supplies and equipment, were diverted for use in stepping up
strategic and critical materials and through activities that en- domestic mineral production of items in short supply. Thus, at
courage the conservation and development of scarce domestic the close of the war, the United States was ready to adopt a more
materials. formal concept of stockpiling.
The Stockpile and its related efforts at conservation and
development are part of this nation’s industrial base and part of 2.6.2.2 Stock Piling Act of 1946
its national defense arsenal. The existence of the Stockpile is a
visible sign to our allies and our adversaries that this nation has At the close of World War II, with the renewed interest in
the reserves to sustain the industrial base during an extended a stockpile, the US government sought new legislation for ensur-
national emergency. ing a constant supply of strategic and critical materials in case
To better understand the US Stockpile program and the of a national emergency. Congress prepared to revise the 1939
foundation of its policies, we should first review the history of provision in favor of provisions that would better meet the needs
the Stockpile in the United States. of national security. But the proposed new provisions brought a
host of considerations that had to be adequately addressed.
One consideration was that of who should control the Stock-
2.6.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STOCKPILE pile. The question stemmed from what purpose the Stockpile
should serve. The expressed purpose was that of providing for a
Throughout the history of the Stockpile in the United States, national emergency, so the military seemed to be the logical
two factors, other than its central purpose, stand out: the far- controller.
reaching impact of establishing a stockpile and the changing Another issue that arose was whether the Stockpile should
nature of the program. be a factor for consideration in international, political, and eco-
Although the National Defense Stockpile is maintained for nomic policy and whether it should function in compliance with
defense purposes, its presence affects more than the defense sec- international raw materials controls and price stabilization
tor. Purchases and disposals of Stockpile commodities directly agreements. In this case, the Department of State should be
affect the US and the international mining and minerals industry. involved.
In fact, the stockpiling program has been a recognized factor in Then, again, the domestic ramifications of establishing a
the national economy. Stockpile and meeting the needs of the US mining industry
Another salient feature of the Stockpile program is its vari- had to be considered. These subjects were of importance to the
ability. The Stockpile is not static, but continually shifts to meet Departments of Commerce and the Interior.
projected demands. Throughout its history, the Stockpile has After much debate, a stockpiling act was created that re-
been adjusted to adapt to changing conditions. Changing projec- flected a compromise among the interested parties. The Secretar-
tions of defense need, obsolescence of materials resulting from ies of War, Navy, and Interior were authorized “to . . . deter-
new technology, development of new sources of supply, and mine, from time to time, which materials are strategic and critical
changes in Stockpile policy regarding the adequacy of the Stock- . . . and to determine, from time to time, the quality and quanti-
pile have kept the program in a constant state of review. ties of such materials which shall be stockpiled.”
Responsibility for performing some major functions of the
2.6.2.1 Need for a Stockpile Stock Piling Act was originally given to the Army-Navy Muni-
tions Board and then to the National Security Resources Board.
Although the United States has considerable mineral re- Later, the responsibility was shifted to the Treasury Department.
sources, it is far from being self-sufficient, particularly in time A few years later, partially as a result of a Hoover Commission
of war. The advent of World War II dramatically brought to the study, the functions that were being carried out by the Treasury
attention of the US government and the US public the need for were merged with the newly created General Services Adminis-
a cache of materials that could be drawn on in an emergency. tration (GSA) that was to be a major focal point for federal
Prior to the war, a law permitting stockpiling was already procurement. Operational responsibilities transferred to the
on the books. In 1939, Congress had enacted legislation that GSA included the following:
102
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE 103
1. Purchasing strategic and critical materials, as directed. Treasury Department ruling stated that domestic bids were sup-
2. Storing, securing, and maintaining strategic and critical posed to be accepted if their price was not more than 25% over
materials. the nearest foreign bid.
3. Arranging commercial refining or processing of materi- One of the expressed purposes of the Stock Piling Act was
als, as directed. to “encourage the conservation and development of sources of
4. Rotating and replacing materials as necessary to prevent these materials within the United States . . .” But President Tru-
deterioration. man had dealt a blow to the “Buy American” Act on July 23,
5. Conducting Congressionally authorized disposals of ex- 1946, when he signed the Stock Piling Act into law. The Presi-
cess materials that were no longer needed. dent stated that he felt the “Buy American” provision of the
The Act also contained a provision to prevent undue disrup- Stock Piling Act would increase the cost of stockpiling, hamper
tion of the usual markets of producers, processors, and consum- our foreign economic policy, and deplete domestic reserves of
ers by preventing Stockpile materials from being released indis- strategic materials.
criminately. The Stock Piling Act was signed by President In the early years of stockpiling, many purchases were made
Truman on July 23, 1946. from foreign sources, for two basic reasons. For one thing, two-
While the Act in itself was straightforward, it engendered a thirds of the materials to be stockpiled were not produced in the
number of complex problems. Soon after the Act was made United States. Of the listed materials that were available in this
official, a question arose as to what objectives the Stockpile country, many could not be mined and processed economically.
should meet. The Stock Piling Act had stated that the Stockpile Purchasing those materials would have raised costs more than
was to be used for national defense purposes. National defense the specified 25%. On the other hand, foreign procurements
included consideration of the following requirements: were important early in the program because the strategy was
1. Military requirements—materials needed by the military to purchase some of the foreign-made materials and have them
to carry on a war. in stock in case an unexpected emergency again cut the United
2. Domestic nonmilitary requirements—the essential civil- States off from foreign sources.
ian and war-supporting needs of industry and the civilian popula- Naturally, senators and representatives who favored devel-
tion that must be met to successfully carry on the war. These opment of domestic mining industries took a dim view of the
requirements assumed substitution and conservation measures foreign purchases for the Stockpile. So did the miners, who
would be in effect. had originally opposed the stockpiling legislation because they
3. Export requirements—the usual peacetime exports to believed it could undercut their business. They, and the Depart-
friendly countries. ment of Interior, rejected the notion that vigorous domestic
After vigorous discussion, a “factoring system” was adopted mineral production would actually weaken national security by
in 1950 to determine the estimated availability of wartime sup- depleting important domestic resources. On the contrary, some
plies. A comparison with requirements helped determine what congressmen fought for high Stockpile objectives as a means of
materials and what quantities should be stored. The system took stimulating domestic mining and regional economies. They felt
into account the possible military accessibility to critical materi- that stockpiling alone was not enough to ensure readiness, and
als, political dependability of potential foreign suppliers, concen- so they encouraged development of US mining as a supplement.
tration of supplies of needed materials, and other miscellaneous Two other procurement issues that had to be considered
factors, such as vulnerability to sabotage. were the quality of material that should be stored and the form
Of course, the concept of Stockpile objectives was a long- in which it should be stored. On the issue of quality, the question
term issue. More immediate was the question of what to begin was the degree of impurity that was acceptable in stockpiled
purchasing to start meeting those objectives. The major question materials. At first, only materials of the highest purity were
was whether to work for balance in the Stockpile by purchasing accepted for stockpiling on the grounds that in an emergency
materials that were needed to meet the quantity requirements or they could be mixed with available lower-grade materials to
by purchasing materials that were readily available. produce an acceptable product.
The original appropriation for the Stockpile was $100 mil- Obviously, this limitation was not palatable to those who
lion. With this beginning, the Munitions Board created an ideal advocated the interests of the US mining industry. Interior Secre-
procurement schedule. Their plans were subject to self-imposed tary Harold Ickes argued that insistence on highest purity would
policies. During the early postwar period, the Munitions Board “discourage the utilization of domestic ores, particularly those
purchased items conservatively. Any commodity price higher of a marginal character.” In addition, Congress charged that
than one and one-half times the prewar price was considered too the specifications were deliberately set high to exclude domestic
high. Even when the price was right, the Board did not buy materials from the Stockpile. The Preparedness Subcommittee
material needed for industrial consumers. of the Senate Committee on Armed Services insisted that the
Right after the war, business was active and materials were adherence to the concept of “universal applicability,” that is,
generally in demand. Prices were high for many items on the stockpiling only the purest materials because they would be
Stockpile list. So, as a result of the Board’s acquisition policies, suitable for any use, was unrealistic. They suggested stockpiling
procurement was slow during the program’s first year. Of the various qualities for a variety of end uses, thereby enabling more
$100 million appropriated, $33 million remained unobligated at domestic materials to qualify for inclusion in the Stockpile in-
the end of the fiscal year. ventory.
Closely linked with the early purchasing decisions was the Initially, however, the argument for highest purity won,
debate over the “Buy American” Act of 1933. The Act stated although this standard was later relaxed.
that only materials or supplies produced in the United States Regarding the issue of form, the question revolved around
could be acquired for public use unless buying US materials was whether materials should be stored in their raw form or, for
“inconsistent with the public interest” or the cost was “unreason- example, in upgraded forms or alloys that would be ready for
able.” Under the Act, domestic producers were allowed up to use. On one hand, it was argued that stockpiling raw materials
one year for delivery and were normally exempt from the require- would be less expensive, would ensure a supply of raw materials
ment of giving bond to guarantee delivery. Moreover, a 1937 for whatever was needed, and would prevent waste, if, for in-
104 MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK
stance, some alloys became obsolete. The counter argument pro- stockpiling legislation, Congress, in 1939, had allocated $70 mil-
posed by the Department of Interior was that storing already lion in appropriations and advance contract authorizations. Be-
processed materials would save time, labor, and other resources tween 1939 and 1950, Congress had appropriated $1,535 million
if a war actually occurred. During wartime, having a stock of (including contract authorizations) for stockpiling, but only $895
already processed materials would prevent the necessity of di- million had actually been spent. The rest of the money was
verting valuable labor and natural or economic resources from tied up in long-term contracts for future deliveries. Within a
the war effort to process raw materials into forms needed for the 14-month period during 1950 and 1951, Congress increased au-
military effort. Ultimately, however, the decision was made to thorizations for the program, totaling nearly $3.5 billion.
continue stockpiling primarily raw materials. By the end of fiscal year 1955, major appropriations for
Stockpile procurement had ended, though some Stockpile objec-
2.6.2.3 Defense Production Act tives remained unfulfilled. Within the first five years after its
enactment in 1950, the Defense Production Act had become a
When the Korean War began, Congress recognized the need
major source of materials for filling National Stockpile objec-
to expand production of materials quickly to meet the emer-
tives.
gency. This necessity led to the Defense Production Act of 1950,
Particularly noteworthy in this regard were the expansion
an act that gave the President expanded powers for production
programs created under the Defense Production Act. Through
emergencies. Among those powers were the following:
various procurement and financing techniques, as well as other
1. Encouraging banks to lend money and extend credit to
incentives, these programs created new industries and expanded
speed production and deliveries of defense-related materials.
existing industries. Some of the programs instituted were
2. Authorizing broad direct lending to speed government
1. Contracts, loans, and grants. Agencies of the government
contracts for production of strategic and critical materials.
entered into over $8 billion in contracts, grants, and loans for
3. Purchasing metals, minerals, and other raw materials for
defense production. Over 90% of the commitments were made
government use or resale.
by GSA.
4. Encouraging development and mining of critical and stra-
2. “Put” contracts. These contracts gave the contractor the
tegic minerals and metals, as long as those minerals and metals
option to deliver to the government that part of his production
were not sold below the current US market price.
that he could not sell on the open market at or above a stipulated
Naturally, use of such authority benefited the domestic min-
option price.
ing industry and eventually created one of the major alternate
3. Reopening old facilities. Government-owned mining,
sources of materials for the Stockpile.
smelting, and refining facilities originally built during World
In addition to these powers, the President was also author-
War II and later deactivated were rehabilitated and put into
ized to subsidize domestically produced materials; process, re-
operation.
fine, transport, and store such materials; and expand and modify
4. Purchase regulation programs. Basically, these programs
government-owned industrial facilities and upgrade private facil-
were government commitments to purchase from any qualified
ities. A later amendment, approved June 30, 1953, points up the
producer who delivered specified material to a designated receiv-
success of these expanded powers. The President was permitted
ing point, on a first-come, first-serve basis, until the program
to transfer to the existing National Stockpile those materials
limit was fulfilled or the expiration date was reached.
that had been accumulated under the Defense Production Act.
Many suppliers saw these programs as an important com-
Indeed, the act had created a “stockpile” of its own.
mercial outlet. Previously nonexistent domestic industries flour-
Besides these existing Stockpiles, legislation enacted by Con-
ished under them, only to vanish when the programs were cur-
gress in 1954 resulted in another “Stockpile.” To increase foreign
tailed or finally completed by 1962.
consumption of surplus US agricultural products, Congress au-
thorized the sale of these products for foreign currencies that
could be used to purchase strategic and critical materials for a
“supplemental stockpile.” In effect, the United States was able 2.6.2.5 From Shortage to Surplus
to get rid of bulky, short-lived farm products that were costly to
The Stockpile expansion programs that were begun in re-
store and receive in return needed strategic materials that were
sponse to the Korean War created an unprecedented buildup of
longer-lasting and less expensive to store. Releases from this
stockpiled materials. These programs continued long after the
supplemental Stockpile were restricted, as were releases from the
war ended in 1953. Within the same time period, the expansion
National Stockpile.
of the nuclear age, with its completely different theories and
This Act also gave rise to the Barter Program. Under the
strategies of warfare, changed the philosophy of stockpiling ma-
Act, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was permitted
terials. These two factors laid the foundation for an era of Stock-
to barter agricultural commodities that it owned for strategic
pile surplus.
materials, creating, in essence, a fourth major Stockpile. Actu-
Certainly, discord over Stockpile policy was not new. As
ally, the Barter Program was not primarily intended for acquir-
we have seen, the program was plagued since its inception by
ing strategic and critical materials; it was intended to reduce
disagreements over how stockpiling should be conducted. In
costs and storage of short-lived surplus agricultural commodities
August 1955, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Supply and
by exchanging them for more durable metals and minerals.
Logistics, sent a letter to the Director, Office of Defense Mobili-
Between 1950 and 1954, barter was used when possible to
zation (ODM), in which he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of
acquire necessary materials for the Korean conflict. Beginning
Staff had recently approved a revised objectives plan based on a
in 1954, however, materials obtained through barter were placed
three-year war instead of the five-year war. Nothing came of his
in the CCC inventory and, when Public Law 480 was modified
concern at the time, but the issue resurfaced in October 1957.
in 1956, transferred to the supplemental stockpile.
The new Director of Defense Mobilization appointed a Special
Stockpile Advisory Committee to advise him of the adequacy of
2.6.2.4 Accelerating the Stockpile Program Stockpile policy. On Jan. 28, 1958, the committee submitted its
Unquestionably, the Defense Production Act was a major report to the Director, ODM. Among their most important
factor in expanding the Stockpile program. Prior to the original recommendations were the following:
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE 105
1. That the current government Stockpiles virtually elimi- In February 1962, the President created an Executive Stock-
nated the possibility of raw material shortages. pile Committee under the chairmanship of the Director, Office of
2. That the correct government inventory plus production Emergency Planning. Members were drawn from Cabinet-level
in accessible areas could support an expanded defense industry government agencies, namely the Departments of State, Defense,
for several war years. Interior, Commerce, and Labor, and the General Services Ad-
3. That a nuclear war would require fewer materials than a ministration. The President’s committee recognized the magni-
limited war. tude and importance of the Stockpile disposal problem. In this
4. That instead of raw materials, the Stockpile should con- regard, they made a series of recommendations, including the
tain more finished items and supplies for survival, relief, and following:
rehabilitation. 1. Develop a program to provide the public with appropriate
5. That Stockpile planning should be revised to meet short- information about Stockpile surpluses.
ages for a three-year emergency; provisions should also be made 2. Present maximum Stockpile objectives should be used to
for major military and atomic energy programs. determine the surplus.
6. That the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, should 3. Defer disposals when they might inadvertently upset the
have more authority to dispose of surplus materials. economies of foreign countries and thus cut the US off from
On June 11, 1958, the Director, Office of Defense Mobiliza- needed imports.
tion, ratified most of the advisory committee’s findings when 4. Give priority to cash sales of surpluses to commercial
he signed Defense Mobilization Order (DMO) V-7. The order sources.
became effective on June 30, 1958. 5. Reuse surpluses for other government functions only
Major policies delineated in the order were when those surpluses could not be disposed of.
1. Strategic Stockpile objectives should be reduced from a 6. Pass legislation to speed up disposal of Stockpile sur-
five-year war to a three-year war; Stockpile objectives should be pluses.
adequate for a limited or general war. The rationale behind some of those recommendations is
2. Commitments for deliveries beyond the maximum Stock- clear. The first recommendation took into account the disastrous
pile objectives should be cancelled when possible. effect of rumors upon the national economy. Rather than let the
3. Disposals of excesses should be made only if they do not public speculate about Stockpile surpluses, partly because such
disrupt US domestic markets or US international relations. information had been classified in the past, the committee chose
In effect, the order reduced current Stockpile objectives by to inform them. The second recommendation sprang from the
40%, thereby creating surpluses in a number of commodities. committee’s belief that the present Stockpile objectives were ade-
In response to DMO V-7, terminations of or reductions in quate, despite recurring suggestions to develop new objectives to
outstanding contracts for defense materials were implemented, meet the needs of a nuclear or a conventional war.
and obligations declined progressively year by year. Although The final recommendation sought to correct what the com-
these contracts did not generally contain termination clauses for mittee saw as defects in existing legislation. The committee felt
government convenience, they could usually be cancelled by that the DPA had too many restrictions on Stockpile sales and
negotiation. And by the close of fiscal year 1962, natural attrition on trading surplus items to upgrade Stockpile materials. The
had further reduced outstanding contracts. Commodities in- Strategic and Critical Materials Act, on the other hand, was
cluded agar (seaweed gelatin), hog bristles, castor oil, coconut considered too restrictive about disposals. What the committee
oil, cryolite, opium poppy seed, pyrethrum, quinine, titanium, preferred was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
and zirconium ore. ance Act of 1954, which allowed supplemental Stockpile materi-
Disposals, on the other hand, did not proceed quite so als to be sold or exchanged with National Stockpile commodities.
smoothly. The original V-7 order provided for retention of mate- It also recommended more flexibility in the interchange of mate-
rials to meet not only current objectives but also anticipated rials among the different “Stockpiles” to make disposals easier
increases in objectives. A revised order issued in 1959 further and improve Stockpile management.
restricted disposals by adding a requirement for review of any In addition, the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum
proposed disposal of excess materials by the Departments of Reserves Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator Stu-
Interior, Commerce, State, Agriculture, and Defense, as well as art Symington, initiated a series of hearings on the Stockpile that
any other concerned Federal agencies. Inevitably the necessary began on Mar. 28, 1962, and concluded on Jan. 30, 1963. In
review and approval process greatly slowed disposals. Fear of October 1963, the committee published the reports of the
disrupting foreign or domestic markets, based on the original hearings.
V-7 order, was often cited as the basis for vetoing proposed Chief among the subcommittee’s findings was the conviction
disposals. that the assumption of a three-year conventional war was unreal-
The total value of disposals under this order was about $550 istic because it would be useless in fighting a nuclear war. On
million, divided about equally between the National Stockpile the other hand, survival and rehabilitation items for such a war
and the Defense Production Act Stockpile. Disposal items from should be stockpiled, and many of these items were lacking. The
the National Stockpile totaled approximately $276.5 million and surpluses created by this proposed change in objectives should
included hog bristles, coconut oil, rubber, and tin. Disposals be disposed of, but maximum caution should be used to avoid
from the Defense Production Act Stockpile totaled approxi- disrupting the usual markets and US employment. The commit-
mately $273.7 million and included aluminum, copper, and tee’s final recommendation, however, was the most salient one—
nickel. that all inventories of strategic and critical materials be consoli-
Perhaps the greatest impetus to such disposals was the dated so they could be uniformly acquired, stored, and disposed
shake-up of the Stockpile program that occurred after Jan. 30, of.
1962, when President Kennedy announced at a news conference
his assessment of the Stockpile program. Kennedy stated that, 2.6.2.6 Changing the Face of the Stockpile
“. . . this excessive storage of costly materials [is] a questionable
burden on public funds, and in addition a potential source of The reevaluation of the Stockpile during the early 1960s set
excessive and unconscionable profits.” the stage for changes in Stockpile policy. In March 1973, the
106 MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK
National Security Council analyzed all aspects of the Stockpile. second major revision since the 1946 Act, which rewrote the
Their analysis was the basis for new guidance regarding Stockpile original 1939 Stock Piling law.
objectives for individual materials, issued by President Nixon on One important feature of the revised Act was that it shifted
Apr. 16, 1973. The guidance assumed that Stockpile administration again. On July 15, 1979, the Federal
1. The new Stockpile would be used for defense purposes Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was officially cre-
only; the planning period would be for the first year of an emer- ated. The Stockpile policy functions previously delegated to GSA
gency. were transferred, with the entire Federal Preparedness Agency,
2. Theaters of war would exist simultaneously in Europe to FEMA. Management functions, such as purchases and sales
and Asia. of materials, storage, security, maintenance, rotation, and refine-
3. Imports of supplies would be available for all years of an ment and processing of materials, remained with GSA.
emergency from all noncommunist countries outside the war In addition to changing the manager, the revised Act also
zone. accomplished the following:
Obviously, these assumptions reflected confidence that stra- 1. Established the National Defense Stockpile Transaction
tegic and critical materials would not be inaccessible in wartime. Fund to receive money from the disposal of excess Stockpile
In his April 16th message on the Stockpile, the President had materials. Monies from the fund, if authorized by Congress, were
stated that, “. . . [because the US] economy and technology are to be used only to buy new materials or transport newly acquired
dynamic, our capability to find substitutes for scarce materials materials.
is far greater today than in the past . . . [The United States 2. Encouraged the uses of barter to acquire and dispose of
is] now able to meet defense requirements for materials during Stockpile materials.
possible major conflicts without imposing an excessive burden 3. Reaffirmed the statement that the Stockpile is to be used
on the economy or relying on an enormous stockpile, as was only for defense purposes.
once necessary.” 4. Specified that the Stockpile must be sufficient to sustain
Clearly, the policy trend was toward reduction of the Stock- the United States for a period of not less than three years in the
pile, a complete reversal of the acceleration policy promulgated event of a national emergency.
in the early 1950s. The July-December 1973 edition of the Stock- The revision of 1979 eventually set the wheels of change in
pile Report to Congress reported that, “As of December 31, motion. On Mar. 13, 1981, President Reagan announced a new
1973, total quantities of the Stockpile grade materials on hand major purchase program for the National Defense Stockpile.
in all Government-owned inventories with the exception of jewel Reagan stated that, “It is now widely recognized that our nation
bearings, were in excess of the Stockpile objectives for all of the is vulnerable to sudden shortages in basic raw materials that are
materials now in the National Stockpile.” necessary to our defense production base.”
In fact, from July to December 1973, disposal sales of excess At the time, the Stockpile contained 61 family groups and
strategic and critical materials from all government inventories individual materials. These materials could be categorized as
totaled $734.7 million, the largest sales effort since 1966. Of this follows:
total, $646.2 million represented sales from the national and 1. Twenty-four group and individual materials with invento-
supplemental Stockpiles, $87.2 million came from sales from the ries equal to or greater than Stockpile goals.
Defense Production Act inventory, and other sales accounted 2. Thirty-seven group and individual materials with inven-
for the remaining $1.3 million. tories less than the goals. Of these materials, 14 goals were over
That same year, control of the Stockpile planning policy 50% filled.
changed hands. On July 1, 1973, a Reorganization Plan abol-
To fill these gaps, the administration set up priorities for
ished the Office of Emergency Preparedness that ran the Stock-
purchasing materials to ensure that urgently needed ones with
pile. Its functions were transferred to the President and later
high defense uses and large goals were purchased first. Priority
reassigned to other agencies. The General Services Administra-
materials included refractory grade bauxite, cobalt, medicinals,
tion was made responsible for emergency resources planning,
nickel, platinum group metals, rubber, tantalum, titanium, and
resources allocation, resource crisis management, and Stockpile
materials policy. The Federal Preparedness Agency was created vanadium. Congress appropriated an initial $100 million from
in GSA and made responsible for those functions. the Transaction Fund for fiscal year (FY) 1981 purchases. In fact,
In August 1976, the President issued new Stockpile policy purchases of cobalt, bauxite, iridium, tantalum, and quinidine
guidance, based on the results of an interagency study of stockpil- sulfate were made during FY 1981.
ing policies and procedures. The new policy required a stockpile Disposals were also an important issue. On Aug. 13, 1981,
that could support US defense requirements President Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
1. During a major war over a three-year period. Act (Public Law 97-35). The Act authorized disposal of anti-
2. Assuming large-scale industrial mobilization and in- mony, asbestos (amosite and chrysotile), diamond stones, dia-
creased materials demands. mond industrial crushing bort, iodine, mica (muscovite split-
3. Providing for a wide range of basic civilian economic tings), phlogopite splittings, muscovite film first and second
needs to ensure a healthy wartime economy. qualities, muscovite block (stained and lower), mercuric oxide,
The new policy also contained stipulations regarding Stock- mercury, silver, and vegetable tannin wattle to be sold over a
pile planning, including provisions to three-year period from 1982 to 1984.
1. Maintain current data and planning factors. Also included in the Budget Reconciliation Act were several
2. Develop an “Annual Materials Plan,” a plan that will amendments to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
respond to changes in national security, budgetary considera- Act. Most significant was the new Section 11, which required
tions, domestic markets, and international events. Congress to submit an Annual Materials Plan (AMP) each year
The new policy became effective Aug. 23, 1976; new goals with the President’s budget. The AMP, developed through an
were announced on Oct. 1, 1976. interagency effort, was supposed to include planned expenditures
The Stockpile program underwent another change in 1979 for acquisitions and anticipated receipts from sales. The plan
when President Carter signed the Strategic and Critical Materi- was required to cover the next fiscal year and the assumptions
als Stock Piling Revision Act on July 30. This Act was the for the succeeding four fiscal years.
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE 107
The Annual Materials Plan process was conducted within 2. Using tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act to
the framework of the AMP Steering Committee, an advisory encourage private research with wide general application to ma-
group to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management terials problems and increased productivity.
Agency. The AMP Steering Committee was chaired by FEMA 3. Carefully disposing of excess Stockpile items while ac-
and included as designated member representatives of the De- quiring needed items. To enhance acquisitions and disposals, the
partments of Agriculture, State, Commerce, Defense, Energy, President encouraged the use of exchange and barter.
Interior, and Treasury, and GSA, OMB, and NSC. The AMP The other important policy was separately created in No-
was developed in a way that balanced National Defense Stockpile vember 1982, when President Reagan issued a directive stating
requirements against the need to avoid undue market disruption that, over a 10-year period, chromite and manganese ores in the
and to conform to budget limitations. Stockpile were to be upgraded into high-carbon ferrochromium
The AMP process began within the Office of Resources and high-carbon ferromanganese. The intent of the directive was
Preparedness of FEMA, which provided a list of goals, shortfalls, to help sustain the processing capability necessary to national
excesses, and priorities to GSA. After an evaluation of the mar- defense. The idea was that maintaining this capacity would re-
ket outlook, the Office of Stockpile Transactions of GSA pro- duce the time required to convert Stockpile materials to ferroal-
posed quantities of commodities for acquisition or disposal. After loys in an emergency.
FEMA review, the proposals were sent to the Strategic Implica- Careful management of the Stockpile continued to be an
tions Subcommittee and the Market and International Political important issue in subsequent years. On Nov. 14, 1986, the
Impacts Subcommittee, which furnished suggested revisions to National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 (PL 99-661)
was enacted. Among its provisions were the following:
the full AMP Steering Committee.
1. No action may be taken before Oct. 1, 1987, to implement
The Strategic Implications Subcommittee was chaired by
or administer any change in a Stockpile goal in effect on Oct. 1,
the Department of Defense and included, as other designated
1984, that results in a reduction in the quality or quantity of any
members, the CIA, the Department of Energy, and FEMA. The
strategic and critical materials to be acquired for the National
subcommittee’s primary function was to determine whether any
Defense Stockpile.
of the materials proposed for the AMP would be affected by
2. Uses of the Stockpile Transaction Fund are extended to
anticipated changes in defense requirements.
include transportation of commodities, storage, development of
The Market and International Political Impacts Subcommit- specifications, upgrading expenses, testing and quality studies of
tee was cochaired by the Departments of Commerce and State Stockpile materials, material and mobilization studies, and other
with the other designated members being the Departments of reasonable requirements for management of the Stockpile.
Defense, the Treasury, and the Interior, and FEMA, and GSA. 3. A seven-year ferroalloy upgrading program is required to
This subcommittee evaluated, case-by-case, the effects that convert Stockpile chromite and manganese ore to 374,000 st (339
Stockpile acquisitions and disposals would have on domestic and kt) of high-carbon ferrochromium and 472,000 st (428 kt) of
international markets. The subcommittee examined significant high-carbon ferromanganese, effectively putting the President’s
trends and areas in which Stockpile activities could lead to undue 1982 directive into law.
market impacts and affect the normal market participants, as In addition, the Act required the Secretary of Defense to
cited in the Stock Piling Act. The subcommittee also determined submit to the Congress a report describing, inter alia, the war
. the international economic and political impacts of Stockpile emergency situation that should serve as the basis for planning
acquisitions and disposals. In particular, the subcommittee deter- and management of the National Defense Stockpile. This re-
mined the impact that Stockpile activities could have on earnings quirement reflected the Senate Committee on Armed Services’
of international producers and producer countries, on interna- concern that a 1985 Stockpile goal study performed by the Na-
tional trade patterns, and on international agreements. tional Security Council had been inadequate. Evidence provided
The results of these analyses were presented to the AMP by the General Accounting Office, the various Administration
Steering Committee, which developed a recommended AMP. agencies, and private individuals indicated that the National
The AMP was submitted to the Director of FEMA for approval Security Council had used “an optimistic wartime scenario.”
and then to the NSC for review. At the same time, an information Based on the National Security Council Study, a proposed
copy was provided to the Office of Management and Budget. modernization program of the National Defense Stockpile of
Any revisions to the initial AMP each year were made jointly Strategic Materials was sent to Congress. The plan called for the
by the NSC and FEMA. The AMP was then submitted to the inclusion of two types of materials in the Stockpile, those that
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of would be unavailable during a long war and a reserve of materials
Representatives. already in the Stockpile to provide extra protection against mate-
In 1982, two other important policies were created, each rials shortages during a war.
one affecting the Stockpile. On Apr. 5, 1982, President Reagan Congressional opposition and evidence presented before the
transmitted to Congress a report related to the National Materi- Armed Services Committee caused the proposed plan to be heart-
als and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980. ily rejected. Instead, the committee members made recommenda-
The President stated that, “It is the policy of this administration tions of their own, including the following:
to decrease America’s minerals vulnerability by taking positive 1. Amending Section 2 of the Strategic and Critical Materi-
action that will promote our national security, help ensure a als Stock Piling Act by restating (a) “that the intent of Congress
healthy and vigorous economy, create American jobs, and pro- is that the National Defense Stockpile be used to serve the inter-
tect America’s natural resources and environment.” est of national defense only and not be used for economic or
To put this policy into action, the President endorsed the budgetary purposes” and (b) “that the quantities of materials
following actions: stockpiled under the Act should be sufficient to sustain the
1. Continuing to inventory federal land to determine its United States for a period of not less than three years during a
mineral availability and potential. The President wanted to open war emergency that would necessitate total mobilization of the
appropriate public lands for mining and to develop deep seabed economy of the United States for a conventional global war of
mineral resources as well. indefinite duration.”
108 MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK
2. Transferring management of the Stockpile to the Secre- The Stockpile is not an inventory of finished products but is
tary of Defense. The Secretary would be responsible for acquisi- rather comprised of materials necessary to meet military, indus-
tion, storage, security, maintenance, disposal, refining, rotation, trial, and essential civilian needs during a crisis. The form of the
processing, and upgrading Stockpile materials; for budgeting for material stockpiled should reflect (1) handling and processing
Stockpile operations; and for managing the National Defense capabilities of US industry and (2) defense requirements during
Stockpile Transaction Fund. a national emergency.
3. Requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual The classification of materials as strategic and critical
report of his recommended requirements for the National De- changes over time as underlying assumptions and new technol-
fense Stockpile based on total mobilization of the US economy ogy dictate the obsolescence of materials such as silk and talc
for a three-year conventional global war. The Secretary would and the emergence of new materials such as germanium. The
also be required to provide the National Emergency Planning Stockpile is generally comprised of materials that are raw or
Assumptions used to determine the Stockpile requirements. refined rather than finished. (For a list of materials currently in
The proposal to return control of the Stockpile to DOD the Stockpile, see Appendix B.)
represented a departure from previous policy since control had
been in the hands of civilian agencies, namely FEMA and its
2.6.3.2 Quantities of Materials to be Stockpiled
predecessors, the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, since the 1950s. At the The Stockpile’s Annual Materials Plan (AMP) contains an
time, the House adopted the recommendations as part of H.R. operations forecast of the Stockpile during the fiscal year and
1748, but the Senate did not concur. So more time was allotted the succeeding four fiscal years. The Stock Piling Act requires
to determine whether the Stockpile could be efficiently managed the report to include “details of planned expenditures . . . and of
by FEMA and GSA. anticipated receipts.” Estimates are provided for both disposals
In addition to provisions on stockpiling goals, the Transac- and acquisitions.
tion Fund, and ferroalloy upgrading, PL 99-661 actually added Each year, by February 15, the President should submit a
certain amendments to the existing Strategic and Critical Materi- new AMP to the Congress, as required by Section 1 l(b) of the
als Stock Piling Act. A particularly important one was the new Act.
Section 6A, which required the President, by Feb. 15, 1987, to
designate a single federal official to be the National Defense
Stockpile Manager and perform the functions of the President 2.6.3.3 Method of Acquisition and Disposal
under the Stock Piling Act. The designated official “. . . shall be Stockpile goals indicate the magnitude of Stockpile require-
an officer who holds a civilian position to which the person was ments for given materials. Section 6(b)(2) provides that efforts
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent shall be made to avoid undue market disruption to the “maxi-
of the Senate.” The official was to be known as the “National mum extent feasible” for both acquisitions and disposals.
Defense Stockpile Manager.” To comply with Section 6A, Presi- Section 6(b) of the Stock Piling Act stipulates that Stockpile
dent Reagan, on Feb. 13, 1987, named Julius W. Becton, Jr., acquisitions and disposals must, to the maximum extent feasible,
Director of FEMA, National Defense Stockpile Manager. utilize formal advertising or competitive negotiation procedures.
Becton’s appointment was short-lived, however. On Feb. 25, The Stockpile’s contract managers must draft their solicitations
1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12626, designat- for acquisitions in accordance with the established federal pro-
ing the Secretary of Defense as National Defense Stockpile Man- curement practices and the agency regulations.
ager. Essentially, control of the Stockpile was being shifted from
civilian to military hands, as had been suggested earlier in H.R.
1748. That same year, the National Defense Authorization Act 2.6.3.4 Barter and Other Stockpile Transactions
for FY 1988 and 1989 expanded the powers of the Stockpile Section 6(c) of the Act permits and encourages the use of
Manager by adding provisions to the new Section 6A of the barter for accomplishing Stockpile transactions. In recent years,
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. The new provi- excess Stockpile materials that are authorized for disposal have
sions required the President to delegate most presidential func- been transferred at fair market value as payment to contractors
tions to the National Defense Stockpile Manager. The Stockpile who are upgrading ferroalloys. Industrial diamonds, iodine, tin,
Manager, however, could not authorize special releases from and vegetable tannins, for example, have been used as payment.
the Stockpile, initiate research and development of Stockpile Should the President determine that he cannot acquire or
commodities, or determine whether certain imported commodi- dispose of Stockpile materials in accordance with established
ties should be prohibited. federal procurement practices, he may elect to waive the applica-
bility of any provision that controls or limits an acquisition or
2.6.3 THE STOCK PILING ACT disposal. This waiver provision requires the Stockpile Manager
to provide the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and
The Stock Piling Act reflects current philosophy about the House of Representatives with a written notice at least 30 days
Stockpiling program. (For a complete text of the Act, see Appen- before proceeding with the transaction. The notice must include
dix A.) Highlights of the implementation of the Stock Piling Act the reasons for not following established procedures.
of 1979, as amended, are summarized in the following.
2.6.3.5 National Defense Stockpile Transaction
2.6.3.1 Materials to be Stockpiled
Fund
The National Defense Stockpile Manager, per delegation by
the President, makes the ultimate determinations as to which The Transaction Fund, or T-Fund, was established as of
materials are strategic and critical. He also determines the qual- 1979 in the US Treasury as a separate fund under Section 9 of
ity and quantity of each such material. Section 3 of the Stock the Act. Moneys received from the sales of Stockpile materials
Piling Act provides Congressional guidance as to how these are deposited into the T-Fund in the Treasury where they remain
determinations are to be made. until expended. By earmarking the money in the Transaction
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE 109
Fund, Congress helps ensure that funds will be available for This provisional authority has been utilized sparingly in re-
restructuring and upgrading the Stockpile. sponse to situations that have not been national emergencies but
Moneys in the Transaction Fund are restricted in the Act to are of concern or impact on national security.
a limited number of specific uses. These uses include the acquisi- The President has ordered releases pursuant to Section 7 for
tion of strategic and critical materials, transportation related to mercury for atomic weapons production when mercury was not
such acquisitions, storage, development of current specifications, available through commercial sources in 1956 and also in 1959.
the upgrading of existing Stockpile materials to meet current In 1973, quinine was released for sale to pharmaceutical manu-
specifications, testing and quality studies of Stockpile materials, facturers with unfilled defense orders so they could meet Viet-
and studying future materials and mobilization requirements for nam requirements. As recently as 1979, chrysotile asbestos was
the Stockpile. released to meet specific defense contract deficiencies caused by
international supply problems.
2.6.3.6 Operational Expenditures for the
Stockpile 2.6.4 FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
National Defense Stockpile operating expenses are author-
DEFENSE NATIONAL STOCKPILE PROGRAM
ized by Section 5(c) of the Act. This section provides for appro- Operation of the Defense National Stockpile Program is
priation of moneys to provide for the transportation, processing, conducted through the Defense National Stockpile Center
refining, storage, security, maintenance, rotation, and disposal (DNSC). Under the policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary
of materials. Now that the Stockpile is part of the Department of Defense for Production and Logistics, Operations, manage-
of Defense, operating expenditures are a portion of the agency’s ment is provided by the Directorate of the Defense Logistics
appropriation for Operations and Maintenance. Agency. The DNSC is composed of two major separate entities,
the Primary Level Field Activity (PLFA) and the Secondary
2.6.3.7 Congressional Oversight of the Stockpile Level Field Activities (SLFA). (See organization charts, Appen-
dix C.)
The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives oversee the National Defense Stockpile. The 2.6.4.1 Primary Level Field Activity
President and the Stockpile Manager must notify these commit-
tees in writing if the Stockpile Manager does any of the following: The Primary Level Field Activity has its headquarters in
(1) releases materials for national defense purposes; (2) waives Washington, DC, and is staffed by approximately 100 people.
competitive procedures for acquisition or disposal actions; (3) The PLFA includes the Office of the Administrator; Office of
waives the disposals for domestic use requirement; (4) revises Counsel; Office of Management and Systems Support; Office of
the quantity of any Stockpile material goal by more than 10 Planning and Market Research; and the Directorates of Stock-
percent. The Act specifies additional reporting requirements pile Contracts; Quality Assurance and Technical Services; and
concerning: (1) information on foreign and domestic purchases Stockpile Operations.
of materials; (2) information on acquisition and disposal actions The Administrator, who heads the PLFA, reports to the
by barter; and (3) the financial status of the National Defense Director, DLA. The Administrator oversees all functions of the
Stockpile Transaction Fund and anticipated acquisition appro- PLFA and the Secondary Level Field Activities. He ensures
priations for the following fiscal year. that all programs are operating effectively to achieve program
Congress must legislate any disposals from the Stockpile. objectives. He is assisted by the Deputy Administrator, who acts
Section 5(b) of the Stock Piling Act requires that all disposals, for the Administrator whenever necessary.
whether by direct sale or by barter, be authorized to include the The Office of Counsel provides legal advice and services to
commodity’s name and quantity. The only exceptions are for the Administrator and all staff elements on matters involving or
rotational sales, for sales of excess materials with a limited shelf affecting the DNSC. Such services include analyzing the legal
life that might deteriorate if the disposal were delayed seeking impact of proposed and new legislation, helping to formulate
authorizing legislation, and for releases ordered by the President acquisition policy and procedures, and providing advice on the
in time of national emergency or for the national defense. legal aspects of establishing internal controls.
The Office of Management and Systems Support keeps ac-
counting and inventory records for the Stockpile Transaction
2.6.3.8 Specialized Leasing Authority Fund and for the quantity of materials sold and purchased by the
The Act provides a special leasing authority for use in Stock- contracting officers. The staff provides property accountability;
pile operations. Subsection 6(e) permits the President to “acquire supplies and services; mail, telecommunications and audit-report
leasehold interests in property, for periods not in excess of 20 response; space management; management studies; and person-
years, for storage, security, and maintenance of materials in the nel services.
Stockpile.” This office also maintains and periodically updates an inter-
national mailing list of persons or firms interested in selling
strategic and critical materials to or buying excess commodities
2.6.3.9 Special Disposal Authority of the from the National Defense Stockpile inventories located at vari-
President ous depots around the country.
The Office of Planning and Market Research plays a major
In addition to the normal disposals authorized by Congress role in determining the market limitations on buying and selling
for excess materials, the President, under Section 7 of the Act, materials. It evaluates proposed and current purchases and dis-
has authority to release materials from the Stockpile for use, posals of Stockpile materials and considers whether these actions
sale, or other disposition. The President may order release of are feasible and what effect they will have on the worldwide
materials whenever he determines such release is necessary for markets. The Office also recommends, evaluates, and monitors
the national defense. potential and actual domestic mining and processing projects
110 MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK
approved for funding by Defense Production Act (DPA) appro- takes care of and secures all storage depots and sites. It develops
priations. and administers an equipment preventive maintenance system
The Office has a legislative affairs group that monitors and and maintains a nationwide equipment usage and inventory sys-
comments on proposed legislation affecting the Stockpile and tem. It also develops and implements plans for moving Stockpile
reports the Stockpile program’s progress semiannually in the materials and for maintaining the quality of commodities in the
Stockpile Report to Congress. inventory.
The Directorate of Stockpile Contracts acquires Stockpile For the secondary level field activities, the Directorate devel-
materials and contracts for services needed for upgrading ex- ops storage, handling, and packaging methods and publishes
isting materials and for repairing and maintaining storage facili- instructions for receiving, safeguarding, and shipping various
ties. When authorized, the Directorate also disposes of excess materials. It also offers technical advice and assistance on storage
Stockpile materials to producers, consumers, trading firms, or and handling methods to other government agencies and private
other government agencies. industry.
One important program is the initiative to sustain a domestic Environmental protection is an important concern. The Di-
ferroalloy furnace and processing capability that is vital to na- rectorate of Stockpile Operations Management has overseen the
tional security. Calendar year contracts provide for the upgrad- removal of radioactive wastes from several storage sites to the
ing of the Stockpile’s chromite and manganese ore at a combined Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed burial sites.
cost of more than $60 million/year. The soil and nearby waterways were thoroughly tested for radio-
This Directorate also manages the William Langer Jewel active thorium and were certified as safe by the NRC.
Bearing Plant at Rolla, ND. This plant is the only facility of its The Directorate determines the long-term environmental ef-
kind in the Western Hemisphere. Its purpose is to maintain a fect of materials stored outdoors. Tests are devised to discover
US capability for the manufacture of jewel bearings and related the extent to which certain materials can leach into groundwater
items to ensure a domestic source of supply in a national emer- and surface water and to find out whether acid rain can cause
gency. The plant is a government-owned facility, operated under some substances, such as lead, to leach into the surrounding soil.
contract by the Bulova Corp. Skilled personnel, 60% of whom Since the Directorate is concerned about the health of depot
are of Chippewa Indian descent, shape, polish, and drill synthetic workers, it maintains high industrial hygiene standards. It also
sapphire and ruby raw materials into jewel bearings for Stockpile administers the pilot Baseline and Annual Medical Surveillance
requirements and for sale to defense contractors. Each year, Program to guard employees’ health. The program requires em-
from 500,000 to l,000,000 jewel bearings, valued at more than ployees to be medically and physically examined before they
$l,000,000, are purchased for the Stockpile. begin working with the Stockpile and to be reexamined annually
Two of the metals that the division has purchased recently to be certain they are continually capable of performing the job
for the Stockpile are beryllium and germanium. Beryllium, a safely while wearing any necessary protective clothing or devices.
lightweight, high-strength metal vital in nuclear and aerospace
technology, is produced by a domestic firm. Germanium is a
2.6.4.2 Secondary Level Field Activities
hard, glassy, brittle metal closely related to silicon. It is used in
lenses for night-vision optics and has been obtained from domes- The Secondary Level Field Activities consist of three zones
tic and foreign firms. and their respective storage depots. Each zone supports the NDS
The Directorate of Stockpile Contracts administers legisla- mission for a specific geographical area within the United States.
tively mandated grants to construct facilities for scientific re- The Defense National Stockpile Center maintains 94 storage
search on strategic materials. It also sells excess silver to the US sites around the country, staffed by approximately 200 people.
Treasury to be minted into bullion and commemorative coins. Each zone has an Administrator who guides and supports all
In recent years, the Treasury has used more than $100 million Stockpile activities within that zone. The Administrator formu-
worth of Stockpile silver and lowered inventory holdings by lates and controls zone funding allotments and carries out the
more than 30 million oz (933 Mg). zone contracting program.
The Directorate of Quality Assurance and Technical Services The Quality Assurance Division of each zone inspects, sam-
ensures the quality of all materials acquired for the Stockpile by ples, and tests Stockpile materials within the zone, following
sampling and testing these materials for conformance with the procedures and instructions provided by the PLFA. The Storage
purchase specifications and contract requirements. The Direc- Operations Division manages the operations of the depot proper-
torate also develops sampling, testing, and analyses procedures ties and is responsible for commodity shipments, receipts, con-
and acceptance/rejection criteria for use by quality assurance trol, and proper storage.
personnel in the secondary level field activities. These procedures
are used for materials accepted into the Stockpile by acquisition
or upgrade. 2.6.5 THE FUTURE OF THE STOCKPILE
The Directorate also conducts semiannual inspections of
materials in the Stockpile to ensure their readiness. These inspec- What will be the future of the Stockpile? This question is
tions are especially important for the more sensitive materials or especially pertinent as the NDS enters a new stage as part of
those materials subject to deterioration, such as quinidine sulfate the Department of Defense (DOD). Current projections for the
and natural rubber. Some materials are also selected for special Stockpile involve changing priorities to make the Stockpile more
quality assessment tests and analyses. This testing determines responsive to defense needs. Program changes and advancing
the effect of long-term storage on the quality and usability of the technology will continue to affect the content of the Stockpile as
commodities. well as its funding.
This Directorate, through its secondary level field activities,
acts as the contracting officer’s representative for most field 2.6.5.1 Modernization
operations involving commodities.
The Directorate of Stockpile Operations Management man- A primary objective is to modernize the Stockpile to make
ages the Stockpile storage space, assuring safe storage, security, sure it can support both the military and civilian requirements
and maintenance of Stockpile commodities. This Directorate in case of a national emergency. The modernization program is
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE 111
to be conducted in two phases. The first phase will be directed As we have seen, new trends in technology and in military
at making the Stockpile useful for accelerating and sustaining strategies can render existing policies and stores of materials
military production during a national emergency. This phase will obsolete. If the Stockpile is to serve as an essential resource to
be guided by the recommendations contained in the Secretary of America’s defense system, it must adapt accordingly. The major
Defense’s annual report to the Congress on Stockpile require- objective of the National Defense Stockpile, then, is not stability
ments. but adaptability. With careful foresight, flexibility, and good
The second phase of modernization is expected to begin in management, the Stockpile will serve this country well in the
FY 1992 and to be carried out over the next five to ten years. coming decades, a symbol of America’s strength and readiness.
This phase will aim at changing the character of the Stockpile For reports on the program status and questions regarding
to meet the needs at that time. Changes will reflect refinements commodity/material specific activities involving contracts for
in military requirements and consideration of civilian require- acquisition, disposal, upgrading, storage, or testing, the reader
ments. The purpose is to support national security efforts in a should contact the Administrator, Defense National Stockpile
future national emergency. Center, Defense Logistics Agency, 1745 Jefferson Davis High-
way, Crystal Square 4, Ste. 100, Arlington, VA 22202.
2.6.5.2 Consultations
A second program priority will be to consult more with APPENDIX A.
Congress and private industry to receive expert suggestions on STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS STOCK
policy and program direction. DOD will work closely with the PILING ACT
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.)
and Critical Materials to determine long-term objectives for the As amended by the National Defense Authorization Act
NDS program. DOD also plans to consult with industrial experts for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510)
regarding technical information on special low-volume, highly
critical advanced materials. SEC. 1. This Act may be cited as the “Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act.”
ZONE 2 ZONE 1
ZONE 3