THE QUESTION IN A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF, BY HIS

EVIDENCE IN CHIEF, HAD BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE

Republic of the Philippines vs Alfredo De Borja

G.R. No. 187488; January 9, 2017
Caguioa, J.

Facts:
Due to Verano’s testimony, respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a claim
for damages against De Borja, thereby granting the Demurrer to evidence.

ISSUE:
Was the Sandiganbayan correct in granting respondent De Borja’s demurrer to
evidence?

HELD:
Yes, the grant of re
COURT MAY PROMULGATE JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA IF THE ACCUSED, AFTER
BEING NOTIFIED, FAILS TO APPEAR WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION; AN ACCUSED
WHO JUMPS BAIL LOSES AVAILABLE REMEDIES TO ASSAIL JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION

Loida M. Javier vs. Pepito Gonzales

G.R.No.193150; January 23,2017
Sereno, C.J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Loida M. Javier 9 Javier)
seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA, which affirmed the decision
penned by Judge Soluren reversing the decision of Judge Buted convicting respondent
Pepito Gonzales (Gonzales) of murder, frustrated murder, and multiple attempted
murder.

Gonzales was charged for murder, frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder.
Gonzales filed a motion for bail, which the RTC granted. On the scheduled date of
promulgation, December 15, 2005, Gonzales failed to appear. Thereafter, his counsel
personally files a “Withdrawal of Counsel.’’ Still, on rescheduled date of promulgated the
decision finding Gonzales guilty of the crime charged. Less than a month after judgment
of conviction was rendered, Gonzales filed an omnibus motion asking that the judgment
be reconsidered and set aside contending that he had not been properly notified of
promulgated of judgment. Judge Soluren, who was then the presiding judge of the RTC,
granted the motion and set aside the judgment of conviction. Javier then filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA against the RTC which was dismissed by the
CA. The CA held that promulgation is absentia was invalid because Gonzales was not
notified of the rescheduled promulgation because his counsel field a motion to withdraw,
The CA further ruled that Javier should have first filed a motion for reconsideration
being a plain and adequate remedy available under the law and is indispensable before
an aggrieved party can resort to a special civil action for certiorari.

Javier argues that the CA erred in not finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting Gonzales motion to set aside the judgment of conviction.

ISSUES:
1. May the court promulgate judgment in absentia against an accused who jumped
bail?
2. Is a motion for reconsideration required before filing a petition for certiorari to
assail the reversal of the judgment promulgated in absentia an accused eho
jumped bail?

HIELD:
1. Yes, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid.
 Section 6, Rule 120 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to
promulgate a judgment in absentia. The promulgate of judgment in absentia is
mandatory pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section, Rule 20, which stated
that the case accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by address or thru his
judgment in criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
Records show that Gonzales was properly informed of the promulgation
scheduled on December 15,2005. During the promulgation of judgment on
December 15, 2015, when Gonzales failed to appear despite notice, and without
offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have immediately
promulgated its decision.

Therefore, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid.

2. No, a motion for reconsideration is not required before a petition for certiorari be
filed to assail the reversal of the judgment promulgated in absentia against an
accused who jumped bail.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can

only be restored to if he accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face
the promulgation of judgment. Gonzales did not appear during the scheduled
promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The fifth
paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and
the failure of the accused to appear is without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in the rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his
arrest.

Therefore, no motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari

may be filed to assail the reversal of a valid judgment promulgated in absentia
against an accused who jumped bail.

QUALIFYING CIRCUMTANCES MUST BE SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AND DULY PROVED WITH EQUAL CERTAINTY AS THE CRIME
ITSELF
People of the Philippines vs. Ludegario Belen y Marasigan
G.R No.21533;January 23,2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This appeal by accused-appellant Ludegario Belen y Marasigan (Belen) from the
decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting Belen of two
counts of simple rape.

In an information Belen was charged with qualified rape. The information alleged that
AAA is 8 years old girl, and Belen is the common law husband of AAA’s mother, BBB.
The prosecution presented AAA as one of the of the witness and testified that she was
8 years old when the incident occurred. The prosecution also presented a copy of
AAA’s birth certificate but same was not authenticated. AAA’s baptismal certificate,
although attached to records, was not offered in evidence Belen, however, it did not find
two rape incidents as qualified rape for the failure of the prosecution to prove AAA’s
minority. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Were the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient
to prove the age of the victim?
HELD:
No, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient
to prove the age of the victim?

In People vs. Pruna (G.R. No.138471, October 10,2002), the Court set the guidelines in
appreciating the age of the victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstances.(1) The best evidence of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. (2) In the absence thereof, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. (3) In the absence thereof, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either
by affinity of consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient. (4) In the absence thereof, the
complaint’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused. To this effect, qualifying circumstances must be specially alleged in the
information and duly proved with equal certainly as the crime itself.

In this case, the prosecution a copy of AAA’s birth certificate but the same was not
authenticated, hence, could not be given any probative value. While attached to the
records is AAA’s baptismal certificate which showed that she was born on July 27,1991,
which the defense admitted to be faithful reproduction of the original, however, the
same was not offered in evidence, Furthermore, while BBB testified that her daughter
was 8 years old at the time of the rape incidents, she admitted that she did not know
when AAA was born, hence, her testimony as to AAA’s age could not be considered as
sufficient compliance with Number (3) of the guidance in the Pruna case.

Therefore, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution was
not sufficient to prove the age of the victim.

CORPORATE OFFICER ACQUITTED FROM A CRIMINAL CHARGE OF BP 22

CANNOT BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE IN THE SAME CASE
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Carlos Duque and Teresa Duque.
G.R. No.216467; February 15,2017
Peralta,J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision which
reversed and set aside the RTC’s Decision finding respondent corporate officers of
Fitness Consultants (respondents) not civilly liable for the value of the subject check
because they have not been convicted of the offense (BP 22) with which they had been
charged.

Respondents were accused of a BP 22 violation by Pilipinas Shell ( petitioner). MTC

found respondents guilty and imposed upon them civil liability for the amount if
P105,000.00. RTC reversed finding guilt but maintained finding of civil liability. RTC
ruled that respondents acquittal, the same having been based on the prosecution’s
failure to prove all the elements of the offense charged did not include the
extinguishment of their civil liability. Citing Section 1 of BP 22, the RTC held that the
person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable, without any
condition, qualification or limitation. CA reversed, holding that upon acquittal, the civil
liability of corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished with criminal liability, without
prejudice to an independent civil action may be pursued against the corporation.

Petitioner now argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion by citing the rule that
the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
Meanwhile, respondents argue that, being corporate officers, they may not be
personally and civilly liable for the debts of the corporations they represent, considering
that they had been acquitted of criminal liability.

ISSUE:
May the respondents, as corporate officers, still be held civilly liable despite their
acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22?

HELD:
No, a corporate officer who Issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly
liable when he is convicted.

In the case of Gosiaco vs. Ching (G.R no. 173807, April 16, 2009), the court held that
the general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing checks can be held
civilly liable when he is convicted. The criminal liability of the corporation itself, such civil
liability arising from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to
recover such civil liability, not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the
check in its behalf.

As such, in this case, it follows that once acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a
corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability arising from the issuance of the
worthless check in the name of the corporation he represents. Since the respondents
were acquitted from criminal liability, civil liability does not attach against them.
Therefore, a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held
civilly liable when he is convicted.

DEATH OF ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL EXTINGUISHES HIS CRIMINAL

LIABILITY AS WELL AS THE CIVIL LIABILITY BASED SOLELY THEREON
People of the Philippines vs. Pala Toukyo y Padep
G.R No. 225593, March 20, 2017
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
Facts:
This appeal filed by accused-appellant Pala Toukyo assails the CA decision which
modified the RTC decision which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11 of RA 9165.

Toukyo was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and the RTC found him
guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision with some
modifications. Hence, this appeal. During its pendency, Toukyo died.

ISSUE:
Whether the criminal case may be dismissed due to the death of the accused pending
appeal?

HELD:
Yes, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the appeal, is hereby dismissed.

Under paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

As held in People vs Bayots(G.R. No. September 2,1994) the effects of the death of the
an accused pending on his liabilities, are so follows:
1. Death of accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.’’
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
Thus upon Toukyo’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no private
complainant to begin with.

Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is herby
dismissed.

THERE IS PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IF GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED

IN A CRIMINAL CASE WOULD NECESSARY BE DETERMINED IN THE CIVIL CASE
Renato S.D Domingo on his own behalf and on behalf of his co heirs of the late
Spouses Felicidad De Domingo and Macario C. Domingo vs.Spouses Engracia D.
Singson and Manuel F. Singson
G.R. No.203287; April 5,2017
Reyes,J

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to annul the decision of the CA
which affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint.

Macario C. Domingo and Felicidad S.D. Domingo ( Spouse Domingo) are the parents of
respondents Engracia D. Singson ( Engracia), petitioners Renato S.D. Domingo
(Renato), and his cohiers whom he represents herein, all surnamed Domingo (the
petitioners). Spouse Domingo, Engracia filed for a civil action for ejectment, unlawful
detainer against petitioners, claiming ownership over the subject property, having
bought the same from the Spouse Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale.
The petitioner sought to nullify the sale, alleging that the signatures of their parents
appearing on the Deed as vendors were forged. Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon also
charged Engracia and her spouse with the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents.

Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend Proceeding Due to Prejudicial Question

with the RTC in the criminal case, alleging that the subject of the ejectment case was
then still pending with another court, is determinative of their guilt of the crime charged.
The Motion was granted by the RTC based on Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Were the proceeding in the criminal case properly suspended on the fround of
prejudicial question?

HELD:
Yes, the proceeding in the criminal case were properly suspended on the ground of
prejudicial question?

The appears to be a prejudicial question in this case. Engracia’s defense in the civil
case is that Engracia bought the subject properly from her parents prior to their demise
and that their signatures appearing on the Deed are true and genuine. Their allegation
in the civil case is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the
signatures of the Spouses Dominggo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then
there would be no falsification and Engracia and her spouse be innocent of the offense
charged. Hence, the criminal case was properly suspended.

IN APPEALS OF CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE CA AND SC, THE OSG IS THE
APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE, AND NOT THE PRIVATE PARTIES
Juanito Victor Remulla vs. Sandinganbayan and Erineo Maliksi
G.R. No. 218040; April 17,2017
Mendoza J.

FACTS:

This is petition for certiori seeking to annual Resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second
Division which dismissed the case filed by Juanito Victor C. Remulla (Remulla) against
respondents Erineo S. Maliksi ( Maliksi) for violation Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A)
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi before the Ombudsman, alleging that
Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused the purchase of certain medical supplies from
Allied Medical Laboratories Corporatin without conducting any public bidding. The
Ombudsman found probable cause against Maliksi, and an information was filed by the
same before the Sandinganbayan. The Sandinganbayan dimissed the case and also
denied the Mr. filed Remulla.

In this present petition, Maliksi contends that the certiorari was defective because it was
filed by Remulla, a private party. He underscored that only the OSG or, in certain
instances, the Office of the State Prosecutor (OSP), may bring or defend actions for or
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Remulla contends otherwise.

ISSUE:
Was the petition for certiorari defective because it was filled by a private party on behalf
of the State?

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALONE SHALL REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT IN

THE SUPREME COURT IN ALL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY IS MERELY A WITNESS IN THE PROSECUTION OF AN
OFFENSE
Jona Bumatay vs, Lolita Bumatay
G.R. No.191320; April 25,2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by Petitioner Jona Bumatay (Jona)
against Reponsdents Lolita Bumatay (Lolita), assailing the decision of the CA which
denied petitioner’s appeal.

Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete when she was 16 years old. Prior to
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado, Lolita married Jona’s father, Jose
Bumatay. Jona filed a complaint-affidavit for Bigamy against Lolita. Subsequently, an
Information for Bigamy was filed by a prosecutor with the RTC. Lolita sought a
determent of the arraignment for bigamy. She filed a motion to quash the information
arguing that the first element of the crime of bigamy is that the offender has been
previously legally married is not present, which was granted by the RTC. The CA upheld
RTC’s order granting Lolita’s motion to quash the Information for the crime of Bigamy.
Then, Jona filed in her personal capacity a petition for review under rule 45 before the
SC.

ISSUE:
Does Jona has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case?

HELD:
No, Jona has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.
Rule 110. Section 5 of the Rules of Court, dictates that all criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a
public prosecutor. Thus, in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and
only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People can represent the
People in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court. In as much as the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, it follows therefore that in
criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be appealed by
the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Moreover, settled is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest, who, in turn, is one “who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit”.

Here, the record is replete with indications that Jona’s natural parents are unknown and
she was merely raised as the “foster daughter” of Jose Bumatay, without having
undergone the process of legal adoption. Even in her own Reply to the comment to the
petition for review, Jona merely denotes herself as “the only child of the late Jose
Bumatay,” without, however, presenting or even indicating any document of proof to
support her claim of personality or legal standing.

Hence, Jona has no legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.

THE RULE AGAINST WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ADMITS OF

EXCEPTIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS WARRANTLESS ARREST
Peopl vs. Marciel Pardillo
G.R. No. 219590; June 7, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision of
convicting the accused, Marciel Pardillo, for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act.

In the information charged, a police officer stated that while walking along Brgy. Suba,
Cebu City, he saw the accused holding two packets of transparent plastic. Believing that
the two packets of transparent plastic are illegal drugs, the police officer confronted the
accused, told him that he was a police officer, and inquired into the contents of the
sachet. The accused told him that somebody just asked him to buy shabu. For his part,
accused-appellant narrated that he was just standing outside his house when a man
suddenly approached him and held up his left hand. Subsequently, he was frisked. The
accused was thereafter charged for violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act. The RTC
convicted him, which CA affirmed.

In this appeal, the accused contends that there was no valid warrantless arrest, which
justified the warrantless search.

ISSUE:
Is a valid warrantless necessary before a warrantless search?
HELD:
Yes, a valid warrantless necessary before a warrantless search may be conducted.

It is well- settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. Any evidence obtained in violation of his
provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, the rule against
warrantless arrest, which justifies a subsequent search under Sec 5 (a), Rules 113. The
same provides that (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. For exception in Section
5(a) to operate, this Court has ruled that two elements must be present: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, actually
committing or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the case at bar, the accused was seen by the police officer holding the transparent
plastic containing shabu and when he was asked what he was holding, the accused
said that someone just asked him to buy shabu.

Hence, a valid warrantless search was conducted.

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS NOT LIDGED WITH THIS SC; ITS

DUTY IS CONFINED IN THE ISSUE OF WHETHER EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF ABUSE OF DESCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISSDICTION
P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 20800; June 19, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A.
Pfleider (Ret.) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

Petitioner and one Ryan Bautista were charged with the crime of murder for the death of
one Manuel Granados. The RTC dis missed the same for lack of probable cause
against petitioner. In a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA did set aside the
Resolution and order of the RTC and directed the reinstatement of the Information for
Murder against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition is lodged.

Petitioner contends that the CA gravely erred in giving due course and not dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by the OSG as the same is not the proper remedy and
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal. Petitioner further
contended that the CA erred in holding the RTC judge arrogated upon himself the
executive function of determining probable cause, and allegedly assumed the power to
prosecute vested in the executive department. Respondent argued that the a special
civil action for certiorari under rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct errors of
jurisdiction which, in this case, are demonstrated by the trial court in exercising the
executive function of determining the existence of probable cause in support of the
murder charge, among others.
ISSUE:
May the SC validly determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause?

HELD:
No, the SC may not validly determine the existence of non-existence or probable cause.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka
vs. Enrile (G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990). It must be emphasized that this
Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail
a review of the facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail a
review of the facts of the case.

The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but
raised questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled
that, “Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfleider as
the inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime”. From
this query, the CA has raised doubt.

Therefore, this petition is granted and the Court finds it appropriate to remand the case
to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable
cause.