T H E P R I N C E T O N E C O N O M I C H I S T O R Y

OF T H EW E S T I i R N W O R L D
THE GREAT D I V E R G E N C E
J(K'I Mckvr, luiitur
CHINA, EUROPE, AND

THE MAKING OF
C i i d w l h i n a T r i u l i l i o n a l Sociflv: Tlif hiviuh Coimlrysiile,
I45()-Ifil5. by Philip T. I l o l í m a n
THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY
T l i e V c i n i s h i n t i I r i s h : H i > i i s e l u > l i l s , M i ^ r c i t i o n . and
the Riinú Economy inIrehmd. 1850-1914,
by Timothy W. Guinnane
Kenneth Pomeranz
Blcick ' 4 7 íinil Beyonil: T h eG r e a l Irish F a m i n e i n
H i s u i i y . Economy. and M e m a i y . by C o r m a c O Grada

T h e G r e a l D i v e r ) > e n c e : C h i n a . E u r o p e . and l h e
M a k i n g o f the M o d e m World Economy.
by Kenneth Pomeranz

SBD-FFLCH-USP

249686

1' R I N C- E I o N U N 1 V i; R S n Y P R E S S

P R 1 N C li r O N A N U O X F O R D
 CONTENTS

C O P Y R I G H T © 2000 B Y P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

PUBUSHED B Y P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S , 41 W I L L I A M STREET,

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY ()8.'i40 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix

IN T H E UNITED K I N G D O M : PRINCETON U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS,

3 M A R K E T PLACE, WOODSTOCK, OXFORDSHIRE OX20 ISY INTRODUCTION

ALLRIGHTS RESERVED
C o m p a r i s o n s , C o n n e c t i o n s , and Narratives o f
European Economic Development 3

THE LIBRARY O F C O N G R E S S H A S C A T A L O G E D THE C L O T H EDITION

Variations on the Europe-Centered Story:
O F THIS B O O K AS FOLLOWS
Demography, Ecology, and Accumulation 10
Other Europe-Centered Stories: Markets, Firms.
POMERANZ, KENNETH
and Institutíons 1 4
THE GREAT DIVERGENCE ;CHINA, EUROPE, A N D THE MAKING
Problems with the Europe-Centered Stories 1 6
OF THE MODERN W O R L D ECONOMY / KENNETH POMERANZ. Building a More Inclusive Story 1 7
P. C M . (THE PRINCETON ECONOMIC HISTORY OF Comparisons, Connections, and the Structure of
THH WESTERN WORLD) the Argument 2 4
INCLUDES BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES AND INDEX. A Note on Geographic Coverage 2 5
I S B N 0-691-00543-5 ( C L : A L K . PAPER)

1. E U R O P E — E C O N O M I C CONDITIONS—1 STH CENTURY PART ONE: AW O R L D OF SURPRISING

2. E U R O P E — E C O N O M I C C O N D I T I O N S — 19TH CENTURY. 3. C H I N A — RESEMBLANCES 29
ECONOMIC C0ND1TI0N.S—1644-1912. 4. E C O N O M I C ONE
DEVELOPMENT—HISTORY 5. C O M P A R A T I V E ECONOMICS. E u r o p e before A s i a ? P o p u l a t i o n , Capital A c c u m u l a t i o n , and
I. T I T L E . II. SERIES. Technology in Explanations o f European Development 31
HC240.P5965 2000 Agriculture, Transport, and Livestock Capital 32
337—DC2I 99-27681 Living Longer? Living Better? 3 6
Birthrates 4 0
THIS BOOK HAS BEEN COMPOSED IN TIMES ROMAN Accumulation? 4 2
What ahout Technology? 4 3
P R I N T E D O N ACID-FREE PAPER. ~
TWO
WWW.PUP.PRINCETON.EDU M a r k e t E c o n o m i e s i n E u r o p e and A s i a 69
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Land Markets and Restrictions on Land Use in China
and Western Europe 7 0
5 7 9 10 8 6
Labor Systems 8 0
Migration, Markets, and Institutions 8 2
Markets for Farm Products 8 6
Rural Industry and Sideline Activities 8 6
Family Labor in China and Europe: "Involution " and
the "Industrious Revolution " 91
Conclusion to Part 1: Multiple Cores and Shared Constraints in
the Early Modern World Economy 1 0 7
 C oN 1KN I S
PART T W O : F R O M N E W E T H O S T O N E W E C O N O M Y ?
C O N S U M P T I O N , I N V E S T M E N T , A N D C A P I T A L I S M 109
INTRODUCTION 1 11
THREE
L u x u r y Consumption andtheRise o f Capitalism
More and Less Ordinary Luxuries 1 1 4
Everyday Luxuries and Popular Consumption in Early Modern Europe
and Asia 1 1 6
Consumer Durahles and the "Ohjectification " of Luxury 1 2 7
Exotic Goods and the Velocity of Fashion: Global Conjuncture and
the Appearance of Culturally Based Economic Difference 1 5 2
Luxury Demand, Social Systems, and Capitalist Firms 1 6 2
FOUR
Visible Hands: F i r m Structure, Sociopolitical Structure, and
"Capitalism" i nEurope andAsia 166
Overseas Extraction and Capital Accumulation:
The Williams Thesis Revisited 1 8 6
The Importance ofthe Obvious: Luxury Demand, Capitalism,
and New World Colonization 1 8 9
Interstate Competition, Violence, and State Systems:
How They Didn 't Matter and How They Did 1 9 4
Conclusion to Part 2: The Significance of Similarities—
and of Differences ' 2 0 6
PART T H R E E : B E Y O N D S M I T H A N D M A L T H U S :
FROM ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS T O
SUSTAINED INDUSTRIAL G R O W T H 209
EIVE
Shared Constraints: Ecological Strain i n Western Europe
and East A s i a 2 1 1
Deforestation and Soil Depletion in China:
Some Comparisons with Europe 2 2 5
Trading for Resources with Old World Peripheries:
Common Patterns and Limits of Smithian Solutions
to Quasi-Malthusian Problems 2 4 2
SIX
A b o l i s h i n g t h e L a n d C o n s t r a i n t : T h e Américas a s a
N e w Kind o fPeriphery 2 6 4
Another New World, Another Windfall: Precious Metals 2 6 9
CONTENTS vii
Some Measurements of Ecological Relief:
Britain in the Age of the Industrial Revolution 21A
Comparisons and Calculations: What Do the Numbers Mean ? 2 7 9
Beyond and Besides the Numbers 2 8 1
Into an Industrial World 2 8 3
114 Last Comparisons: Labor Intensity, Resources, and
Industrial "Growing Up" 2 8 5
Appendix A
C o m p a r a t i v e E s t i m a t e s o f L a n d T r a n s p o r t C a p a c i t y p e r Person:
G e r m a n y a n d N o r t h índia, c i r c a 1 8 0 0 3 0 1
Appendix B
Estimates o fManure Applied toN o r t h China and
European Farms i ntheLate Eighteenth Century, and a
Comparison o fResulting Nitrogen Fluxes 303
Appendix C
Forest C o v e r a n d F u e l - S u p p l y E s t i m a t e s f o r F r a n c e , L i n g n a n , a n d
a Portion o fNorth China, 1700-1850 3 0 7
Appendix D
Estimates o f"Ghost Acreage" Provided b yVarious Imports to
Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Britain 3 1 3
Appendix E
Estimates o f E a m i n g Power o fRural Textile Workers i n
the L o w e r Y a n g z i R e g i o n o f C h i n a , 1 7 5 0 - 1 8 4 0 3 1 6
Appendix F
Estimates o fCotton andSilk Production. L o w e r Yangzi and
C h i n a as a W h o l e , 1750 a n d L a t e r — W i t h C o m p a r i s o n s t o
United K i n g d o m , France, andGermany 3 2 7
BiBLIOGRAPHY 339
INDEX 313
 ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 265

SIX became too expensive for most plantation owners; they preferred to pay more
m o n e y up front and get a slave w h o never had to b e freed.' T h e s u r v i v i n g N e w
W o r l d peoples were sometimes enslaved (especially i n Brazil), but Africans
ABOLISHING THE L A N D CONSTRAINT:
w e r e preferred for several reasons. N e w W o r l d peoples w e r e seen as fragile
because s om a n y died u p o n contact w i t h E u r o p e a n s ; and a tleast s o m e E u r o p e -
T H E A M E R I C A S A S A NEW KIND
ans opposed their enslavement o n h u m a n i t a r i a n grounds (but not that o f A f r i -
c a n s ) . - A m e r i n d i a n s a l s o w o u l d h a v e f o u n d i t m u c h e a s i e r t o flee a n d t o m a k e
OF P E R I P H E R Y
c o m m o n cause w i t h unconquered native peoples nearby (though Africans
s o m e t i m e s did this, too). A n d since the conquest o fnative peoples s l o w e d
d o w n c o n s i d e r a b l y a f t e r t h e first h a l f c e n t u r y ( o n c e s m a l l p o x h a d d o n e i t s
worst damage and various indigenous peoples had acquired guns and horses),

O
N E C O R E , western Europe, was able to escape the proto-industrial cul
acquiring indigenous slaves w a s not a l w a y s easy.' B y contrast, the large inter-
de sacand transfer handicraft w o r k e r s into m o d e r n industries as the
nal slave trade in A f r i c a made it relatively easy for Europeans to acquire slaves
t e c h n o l o g y b e c a m e available. It c o u l d d o this, i nlarge part, because
there, as long as they had goods that the slaveholders wanted. M e a n w h i l e , the
the exploitation o f the N e w W o r l d made i tunnecessary t o m o b i l i z e the huge
Spanish and the Portuguese c r o w n s preferred the transatlantic slave trade t o
n u m b e r s o f additional w o r k e r s w h o w o u l d have been needed t ouse E u r o p e ' s
N e w W o r l d slave-raiding, because the f o r m e r w a s m u c h easier to m o n i t o r and
o w n land i n m u c h m o r e intensive and ecologically sustainable w a y s — i f even
tax than local slave-raiding.'' T h i s w a s yet another w a y i n w h i c h interstate
that could have provided enough p r i m a r y products t o keep ahead o f nine-
competition and military fiscalism indirectly helped accelerate the repopula-
teenth-century population growth. T h e N e w W o r l d yielded both "real r e -
tion o f the N e w W o r l d f r o m overseas and helped place the settlers i n a context
sources" and precious metals, w h i c h require separate treatment. L e t u s begin
i n w h i c h t h e y ( u n l i k e , s a y , s e t t l e r s o n t h e C h i n e s e f r o n t i e r ) w o u l d find i t h a r d
w i t h real resources; they, i n turn, begin w i t h plantation products f r o m the C a -
to s w i t c h a w a y f r o m a focus o n export production. T h e slaves had no choice
ribbean, northeastern Brazil, and later the southern U n i t e d States.
at a l l , a n d e v e n t h e i r o w n e r s m a y h a v e h a d little c h o i c e , since t h e y ( u n l i k e a
T h e N e w W o r l d ' s f a r m exports were largely slave g r o w n . T h e plantations
hypothetical group raiding locally for slaves) had t opay for their purchased
w e r e a l m o s t all either o n islands or near the coast. Consequently, exports f r o m
workforce.
the c i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n plantation zone did not plateau t h ew a y that exports
Slave imports t o t h eBritish W e s t Indies equaled roughly one-fourth o f
f r o m the C h i n e s e interior t o Jiangnan and L i n g n a n d i d w h e n free laborers ran
sugar export revenues between 1760 and 1810; imports f r o m Britain itself
into d i m i n i s h i n g returns and switched m o r e o f their efforts to handicrafts; nor
covered about one-half, a n dfood a n dw o o d f r o m British North A m e r i c a
w e r e they beset b y the soaring transport costs that O l d W o r l d foresters faced
(above and beyond the a m o u n t s swapped directly for sugar) covered the re-
once they m o v e d a w a y f r o m the riverbanks. A n d because the proprietors o f
m a i n i n g quarter."* F r e n c h C a r i b b e a n s u g a r e x p o r t s w e r e a b o u t 1 5 p e r c e n t
N e w W o r l d plantations ( u n l i k e those o f eastern E u r o p e a n estates o r southeast
b e l o w those o f B r i t a i n j u s t before the F r e n c h a n d H a i t i a n R e v o l u t i o n s , a n d its
A s i a n pepper fields) purchased most o f their labor force f r o m abroad and often
slave imports were almost identical to those for the British Caribbean through-
curtailed their subsistence production, western Europe's trade w i t h this area
out the eighteenth century: s ohere slave imports should have covered r o u g h l y
also escaped the " s m a l l - m a r k e t p r o b l e m " that h a d d o g g e d its trade for eastern
3 0 percent o f sugar revenue.'' A n d i n B r a z i l , the w o r l d ' s largest slave importer,
E u r o p e a n r a w materials. E x p o r t s had t o b e h i g h enough t ocover the costs o f
t h e p r i c e s p a i d f o r i m p o r t e d s l a v e s i n 1 8 2 1 - 2 6 ( t h e first s e t o f s e v e r a l c o n -
b u y i n g slaves and m u c h o f the cost o f feeding and c l o t h i n g t h e m .
s e c u t i v e y e a r s f o r w h i c h I f o u n d figures) e q u a l e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s t o t a l e x p o r t
T h e r e w e r e m a n y reasons w h y A f r i c a n slaves b e c a m e t h e principal
w o r k f o r c e i n s o m a n y N e w W o r l d colonies. First and f o r e m o s t are the aston- ' Galenson 1989: 52. 76; Morgan 1975: 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 296-99.
ishing death rates a m o n g N e w W o r l d peoples after contact, m o s t l y f r o m dis- -Thornton 1992: 1.3.5-.36.
' Ibid.. 1,^8-41.
ease. F e w o fE u r o p e ' s poor, as w ehave seen, c o u l d pay their o w n passage
-•Ibid., 136-37.
before 1800, and they were o n l y worth transporting i f one could force t h e m t o
' Calculations based on slave prices from Miller 1986: 70; British import data based on Mitch-
produce exports. W i t h outright enslavement o f Europeans unacceptable, this ell 1988: 4 6 2 - 6 4 and Deerr 1949-50: 1: See also appendix D .
meant indentures that w o u l d end w i t h f r e e d o m and a grant o f land. A s s u r v i v a l ^ F o r export volumes, see Deerr on the British Caribbean (1949-50: I : 193-203) and the French
rates f o r E u r o p e a n s (and A f r i c a n s ) i n the N e w W o r l d began t o i m p r o v e , this Caribbean ( I : 2 3 5 ^ 2 ) ; for slave imports, see Curtin 1969: 216.
266 CHAI'IKR SIX
revenues for those years.' Since the i82()s saw a n unusually high v o l u m e o f
h i g h - p r i c e d slave i m p o r t s , t h i s is n o d o u b t a t y p i c a l : the late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
average was probably closer to one-fourth the value o f all exports, m u c h as i n
the British and F r e n c h W e s t Indies.* T h u s , the slave trade helped m a k e E u r o -
A m e r i c a n trade fundamentally different and m o r e expandable than the m o r e
direct exchanges o f r a w materials for manufactured goods and silver between
O l d W o r l d cores and peripheries.
Furthermore, though nearly all bound cash-crop producers in the O l d W o r l d
also g r e w w h a t w a s needed for their subsistence, m a n y N e w W o r l d slaves had
little o r n o o p p o r t u n i t y for subsistence f a r m i n g . A n d since for a l o n g t i m e
plantation o w n e r s purchased v e r y f e w w o m e n slaves (and m a n u m i t t e d m o r e o f
t h e m than they did m e n ) , m a n y slaves also lacked families, w h o helped supply
the subsistence needs o f c o m p u l s o r y cash-crop w o r k e r s i n m a n y O l d W o r l d
settings.'' T h u s , despite t h e i r poverty, the e v e r y d a y needs o f slaves created a
significant m a r k e t for imports; i n this, slaves w e r e u n l i k e m o s t o f the unfree
populations i nO l d W o r l d peripheries. These goods (above all cheap cotton
cloth f o r slaves t o w e a r ) w e r e a large part o f the m a n u f a c t u r e d imports that
took u palmost 5 0 percent o f sugar export proceeds in the British Caribbean.
S o m e o f t h e s e g o o d s w e r e a l w a y s m a d e i n E u r o p e ; o t h e r s c a m e a t first f r o m
India v i a E u r o p e but w e r e later replaced by British imitations.
Grain and w o o d f r o m British N o r t h A m e r i c a (above and beyond a n un-
k n o w n a m o u n t obtained i n direct barter for sugar) t o o k u pthe r e m a i n i n g one-
quarter o f Caribbean sugar revenue. A n d since this trade enabled the m a i n l a n d
to p a y f o r its o w n i m p o r t s o f B r i t i s h m a n u f a c t u r e s , ' " it represented a n indirect
route t h r o u g h w h i c h B r i t a i n t u r n e d still m o r e o f its r e l a t i v e l y abundant capital
and labor into land-saving imports. Slave plantations i n Brazil a n d British
N o r t h A m e r i c a acquired m o r e o f their supplies locally than those in the Carib-
bean, and Brazilian plantations i n particular also economized b y providing
exceptionally s k i m p y f o o d and clothing t otheir slaves;" thus they purchased
less f r o m a b r o a d , but t h e s e n e e d s w e r e still n o n - t r i v i a l . ' - M o r e o v e r , the B r a z i l -
ian strategies that l i m i t e d supply p u r c h a s e s — f r o m s k i m p y diets to unbalanced
sex r a t i o s — i n c r e a s e d the need t o replenish the supply o fslaves t h e m s e l v e s
w i t h fresh purchases f r o m Africa.
' Figures for 1821-26 from Miller (1986: 70) and L u d w i g (1985: 107. 314), using a rough price
of 250,(X)() reis per slave (toward the low end of Miller's range); calculation methods the same as
for West Indies,
* F o r slave purchases and prices, see Miller 1986: 70; L u d w i g 1985: 107, 314; Curtin 1969:
216, Brazilian export figures for 1796 and 1806 from Morineau 1985: 177-78,
•* See, e,g,. Schwartz (1985: 3 5 4 - 5 8 , 385) on sex ratios and marriage rates in Brazil.
'« See Shepherd and Walton 1972: 4 3 ^ 4 ; Richardson 1987: 765-66.
" See, e.g., Schwartz (1985: 136-38, 296, 4.36. 4 4 1 ^ 2 ) on Brazil.
" See, e.g., Subrahmanyam (1993: 182-85 on the cheapest cloth being shipped to Brazil for
slave clothing.
ABOI.ISHINt; THK LAND CONSTRAINT 267
T h u s , slavery helped m a k e E u r o - A m e r i c a n trade u n l i k e any between O l d
W o r l d cores a n dperipheries. A free-labor periphery like southwest C h i n a
w o u l d not have served E u r o p e as well, even i f it had been just as ecologically
bountiful; nor w o u l d a periphery like eastern E u r o p e (or later Java) i n w h i c h
participants i na still-functioning subsistence-oriented e c o n o m y were forced
into part-time export production. Silver exports f r o m Potosi, w h i c h fell as the
native population recovered a n d a more self-sufficient regional economy
r e e m e r g e d , " r e m i n d u s that E u r o p e a n d e m a n d alone did not ensure a contin-
u e d flow o f a c o m m o d i t y t o E u r o p e w i t h o u t e i t h e r m a s s i v e f o r c e o r t h e repro-
duction o flocal needs for E u r o p e a n goods. W e w i l l return t o silver shortly.
W h a t needs emphasizing here is that i t was not o n l y ecology that made s o
m u c h s u g a r , t o b a c c o , a n d l a t e r c o t t o n flow f r o m t h e c i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n r e g i o n :
the region was also sociologically a n d politically set u p t o "need" almost
e v e r y t h i n g else. Indeed, o n e o f B r i t a i n ' s advantages w a s that u n l i k e France,
Holland, o r D e n m a r k , it did not need t o ship f r o m E u r o p e t o its sugar
c o l o n i e s but c o u l d r e l y o n c o n t i n e n t a l N o r t h A m e r i c a t o d o so, w h i c h i n t u r n
bought E n g l i s h manufactures ( e m p l o y i n g labor and capital rather than land).
T h u s , a c o m b i n a t i o n o f depopulation and repopulation w i t h slaves m a d e the
circum-Caribbean region a perversely large m a r k e t for i m p o r t s and a source o f
l a n d - i n t e n s i v e e x p o r t s . I n f a c t , i t b e c a m e t h e first p e r i p h e r y t o a s s u m e a n o w
familiar " T h i r d W o r l d " profile; that o f a large i m p o r t e r o f both capital goods
(in this case, w a l k i n g , t a l k i n g , k i d n a p e d ones) and m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s f o r
d a i l y use, w i t h e x p o r t s that kept f a l l i n g i n price as p r o d u c t i o n b e c a m e m o r e
efficient, capital intensive, and widespread. B y contrast, the prices o f most
f o r m s o f energy produced i n Europe, including food, rose throughout the eigh-
t e e n t h c e n t u r y , r e l a t i v e t o b o t h w a g e s a n d o t h e r goods.'•* T h u s t h e p l a n t a t i o n
areas o f the N e w W o r l d w e r e a n e w k i n d o f periphery: one that w o u l d i m p o r t
e n o u g h t o k e e p its trade w i t h the core fairly balanced. M o r e o v e r , its i m p o r t s
and exports stimulated each other: m o r e sugar exports consistently led to m o r e
slave imports, m o r e food and clothing imports, and (often) m o r e plantation
d e b t , w h i c h l e d t o s e l l i n g m o r e s u g a r n e x t y e a r , a t w h a t e v e r price.'-''
M e a n w h i l e , concentration o none o r t w o exports i nm o s t plantation areas
greatly facilitated a crucial i m p r o v e m e n t in trade itself Transatlantic shipping
costs fell r o u g h l y 5 0 percent d u r i n g the eighteenth century, e v e n w i t h o u t sub-
stantial technological change. Part o f the decline was due t opolitical change:
" L a n g 1975: 6 1 . 6 5 - 6 6 . See also Stern (1988) for a more general discussion of the reemer-
gence of economies with a significant degree of internal coherence and autonomy in the Spanish-
ruled New World.
'" See, for instance, the chart in Goldstone 1991: 186; also Thomas 1985a: 1 4 0 - 4 1 .
Richardson (1987: 7 4 5 - 4 6 ) shows a direct relationship between the exports of sugar from the
British West Indies in any given year and the area's demand for slaves in the following year, which
in turn produced more sugar.
268 CHAPTER SIX
the B r i t i s h N a v y repressed m o s t piracy, w h i c h reduced insurance rates a n d
a l l o w e d m o r e freight t o travel o nu n a r m e d ships w i t h smaller crews.'* H o w -
ever, t h e other m a j o r c o m p o n e n t (briefly discussed i n chapter 4 ) w a s a sharp
decline i n t h e t i m e spent a c q u i r i n g cargo. T h i s m e a n t a faster t u r n o v e r o f w o r k -
i n g capital, m o r e intensive u s e o fships, a n d large savings i n sailors' wages
( w h o h a d to be paid for every day away from home, even i f they were waiting
in port w h i l e a cargo w a spurchased). This reduction i n port t i m e w a s achieved
by h a v i n g a local agent collect t h e desired goods i na warehouse before the
ship arrived, rather than having the ship visit m a n y plantations and spend t i m e
haggling. S u c h delegation o f responsibility w a s m u c h easier w h e n each area
o n l y sold o n e o r t w o exports, rather than the n u m e r o u s possibilities in, say, a n
Indian Ocean port."
T h u s , w h i l e seeking m o r e p r i m a r y products f r o m m a n y O l dW o r l d periph-
eries meant exhausting t h e m o s t accessible sources, facing higher transport
costs, a n d w o r k i n g against t h e logic o fi m p o r t substitution, a n opposite d y -
namic w a s at w o r k i n m u c h o fthe N e w W o r l d . W i t h political and sociological
factors w o r k i n g against i m p o r t substitution, export monocultures brought
d o w n transatlantic transport a n d transaction costs. T h i s i n t u r n a l l o w e d A m e r i -
cans t o incur higher local transport costs—i.e., expand further inland—and
still sell e n o u g h i n E u r o p e t o p a y f o r m a n u f a c t u r e s a n d repay start-up costs.
T h i s d y n a m i c operated w h e t h e r t h e labor i n question w a s slave, indentured, o r
free b u t i nneed o f start-up m o n e y , a n d i tplayed a crucial role i n populating
N o r t h America."* I t also helped t h e transatlantic exchange o f manufactured
goods (and kidnaped "capital goods") keep expanding, u n l i k e the Baltic trade
or the trade f r o m the Chinese interior.
I n other words, a demographic catastrophe, colonial legislation, a n d slavery
c o m b i n e d t ocreate a periphery that w a s a never-expanding source o f r a w m a -
terials i n a n era before most production required expensive capital goods a n d
w h e n m o s t people still h a d some connection t o subsistence production. I n -
deed, this situation proved t e m p o r a r y even i n m u c h o ft h e N e w W o r l d ; as
population levels recovered i nPeru a n d M e x i c o , m o r e self-sufficient econo-
mies reemerged a n d exports fell.'' W i t h o u t t h e peculiar conditions created i n
the c i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n region, t h e mere existence o f trade between a rich, free
labor core a n d a poorer, bound labor periphery w o u l d n o t have h a d such e p -
ochal effects; w e s t e r n E u r o p e ' s trade w i t h eastern E u r o p e , f o rinstance, w a s i n
no w a y m o r e important o r d y n a m i c than that between the L o w e r Y a n g z i a n d
its v a r i o u s free labor peripheries. T h e f o r m o f labor c o n t r o l o nt h e p e r i p h e r y
w a s indeed crucial, as w o r l d - s y s t e m s theorists insist, b u t w e o v e r s i m p l i f y
Shepherd and Walton 1972: 8 1 - 8 4 .
" Ibid.. .52-53. 87. O n the enormotis diversity of cargo carried on any given merchant ship in
the Indian Ocean, see Van Leur 1955: 132, 253: Chaudhuri 1978: 2 0 4 - 8 .
Shepherd and Walton 1972; especially M c C u s k e r and Menard 1985: 18, 23, 2 8 - 3 0 ,
" L a n g 1975: 6 1 , 6 5 - 6 6 ,
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 269
gready i fw e l u m p together all kinds o f "coerced cash-crop producers." N e w
W o r l d slavery and colonialism were different i n very important ways.
Earlier arguments about the importance o f slavery i n European (especially
British) industrial g r o w t h have often focused o n export markets as a stimulus
for burgeoning industries; they have thus been vulnerable t othe "internalist"
a r g u m e n t that domestic m a r k e t s w e r e g r o w i n g , too, a n do f f a m u c h larger base.
S u c h debates m a yb e inherently i n c o n c l u s i v e — i f Caribbean d e m a n d ac-
counted f o r 12 percent o fthe g r o w t h o fB r i t i s h industrial output b e t w e e n 1 7 4 8
and 1776,-" is t h e proverbial glass half full o r half e m p t y ? B y contrast, t h e
argument here emphasizes that s o m e markets mattered m o r e than others. F o r
the N e w W o r l d a n d the slave trade offered w h a t a n expanding h o m e m a r k e t
could n o t have: w a y s i n w h i c h manufactured goods created w i t h o u t m u c h use
of British land could beturned into ever-increasing amounts o f land-intensive
f o o d a n d fiber ( a n d l a t e r t i m b e r ) a t r e a s o n a b l e ( a n d e v e n f a l l i n g ) p r i c e s .
Another New World, Another Windfall: Precious Metals
M e a n w h i l e , M e x i c o , P e r u , a n d later B r a z i l sent E u r o p e vast a m o u n t s o f pre-
cious metals. S o m e o f this w a s t h e direct result o f colonial extraction, such as
the Spanish a n d Portuguese kings' c u t o f all m i n i n g i n their domains. Legally,
this share w a s a t least 2 7 . 5 p e r c e n t — a n d perhaps as m u c h as 4 0 p e r c e n t — o f
all shipments p r i o r t o 1640.-' Since these rates q u i c k l y l e d t o widespread
s m u g g l i n g , t h e c r o w n ' s actual share o f output w a s never that h i g h , a n d t h e
legal rates w e r e g r a d u a l l y l o w e r e d t o t r y t o reduce contraband; e v e n so, t h e
c r o w n probably received one-tenth t oone-fifth o f registered output.^^
A s u b s t a n t i a l f u r t h e r p o r t i o n o f t h e flow w a s o n l y s l i g h t l y l e s s d i r e c t l y b a s e d
o n coercion. Forced labor quotas l o w e r e d the costs o f m i n i n g , w h e t h e r indige-
nous people actually d i d the labor themselves o r bought their w a y o u t o f it,
subsidizing t h e wages o fothers.-^ W h i l e t h e direct beneficiaries o fthese quotas
were m i n i n g entrepreneurs resident i n the N e wW o r l d , they clearly increased
the output possible at a n y g i v e n price; a n d since m a n y p e o p l e — f r o m b i g a n d
medium-sized m i n e operators t o "sharecropping" miners themselves—had
g o l d a n d s i l v e r t o sell,-"* t h e y c o u l d n o t k e e p f r o m p a s s i n g a l o n g t h e s e s a v i n g s
to European buyers. M e a n w h i l e , colonial legislation greatly reduced competi-
tion a m o n g those bringing European a n dA s i a n goods to exchange for precious
m e t a l s — a n d a t least attempted t o restrict p r o d u c t i o n o flocal alternatives t o
these imports. T h u s b o t h t h escale o f this trade a n d t h eprices at w h i c h i t
™ Richardson 1987: 768.
" Hamilton 1934; F l y n n and Giraldez 1996: 3 2 1 - 2 9 .
2 2 Morineau 1985: 102, 1 2 1 , 2 8 9 .
• 2 3 Stern 1988: 8 4 9 - 5 2 ; Tandeter 1993: 1,5-85.
Stern 1988: 8 5 2 - 5 4 .
270 CHAPTER SIX
occurred were distorted, malting some u n k n o w n further portion o fgold a n d
silver exports a "gift" t o Europe.
S o m e o fthis "gift" stayed i n western Europe. T h o s e metals probably d i d
little f o r Europe's e c o n o m i c development, since they financed n u m e r o u s wars,
i n c l u d i n g Spain's nearly successful assaults o n t h e e m e r g i n g core e c o n o m i e s
o f northwest Europe.^'' Nonetheless, t h e metals m a y have helped grease t h e
wheels o f E u r o p e a n trade, a n dthey certainly played a role i n t h eg r o w t h o f
m o r e effective militaries. M e a n w h i l e , m u c h N e w W o r l d treasure w e n t further
east, b r i n g i n g o t h e r c o m m o d i t i e s t o E u r o p e . I t c a n b e r o u g h l y d i v i d e d i n t o
three separate streams.
O n e substantial stream o f N e w W o r l d gold a n d silver exports went t o vari-
ous ecologically rich small market zones i nt h eO l dW o r l d — f r o m Southeast
A s i a t o parts o f t h e N e a r East t o eastern E u r o p e — m a k i n g i t possible f o r E u -
rope t oexpand itsi m p o r t s o freal resources f r o m these peripheries. I n these
cases, silver o r (less o f t e n ) g o l d w e r e used like m o d e r n c u r r e n c y reserves: t h e y
w e r e a residual store o f value transferred t o cover a n otherwise unbalanced
trade w i t h areas that h a d limited d e m a n d f o r t h e goods E u r o p e sold. B u t o n e
could also see these metals, w h i c h were usually coined before transshipment
f r o m Europe, as t h e o n e European manufactured g o o d f o r w h i c h these zones
had fairly large markets a n d(lacking t h e proper r a w materials) limited local
production.^* I n e c o n o m i e s that w e r e m o n e t i z i n g r a p i d l y (e.g., m u c h o f Scan-
dinavia), this m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d w a s a tleast partially a n i t e m o f popular use;
in t h e least m a r k e t i z e d peripheries, such as eastern E u r o p e , i t w a s essentially
a l u x u r y good. Either way, i tmade i t possible t oobtain m o r e p r i m a r y products
f r o m these areas than w o u l d have been possible otherwise.
B u t , since precious metals d on o t w e a r o u t o r g e t used u p( u n l i k e cloth, o r
g r a i n ) , i t w a s h a r d t o c r e a t e a n expanding ( o rperhaps even enduring) market
for t h e m i f o n l y a tiny part o ft h e society used t h e m . T r u e , w e a l t h y people
could a d d t otheir silver o rj e w e l r y hoards; but atsome point they h a d enough
for all conceivable obligations, a n d silver as a f o r m o f conspicuous consump-
tion m u s t have begun t o lose value relative t o silk, porcelain, paintings, a n d s o
on. Thus, N e w World silver helped western Europe obtain more r a w materials
than they could have h a dt h efifteenth-century " b u l l i o n f a m i n e " continued,^''
but c o u l d n o t b y itself i n d e f i n i t e l y e x p a n d w e s t e r n E u r o p e ' s trade w i t h less-
monetized O l d World economies.
T h e second s t r e a m also h e l p e d E u r o p e o b t a i n l a n d - i n t e n s i v e goods, b u t less
directly. T h i s flow w a sexchanged f o r various A s i a n (mostly Indian) manufac-
" F l y n n 1984: 43.
Perlin (1994: 113-18, 147-74) emphasizes the point that coins in this period are often more
usefully thought of as a manufactured good than as "money" that stands opposed to "goods."
Perlin (1991: 2 3 9 - 3 7 3 , esp. 2 4 8 - 4 9 , 2 6 8 - 8 0 ) examines the production of coins as goods often
designed for remote target markets.
" D a y 1978: 3-54.
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 271
tured products, w h i c h then covered m u c h o fthe cost o f p r o c u r i n g slaves for t h e
Americas. Indian cloth alone made u p roughly one-third o fall t h ecargo b y
value exchanged b yE n g l i s h traders f o r A f r i c a n slaves i nt h e eighteenth cen-
tury a n d m a y have m a d e u p over half o ft h e goods that French traders ( w h o s e
industries were slower t oproduce good imitations o fIndian fabrics) used t o
a c q u i r e slaves.^* M u c h P o r t u g u e s e i m p e r i a l trade w e n t d i r e c t l y f r o m A s i a t o
Africa t o Brazil, stopping i nthemother country only t odeliver N e w W o r l d
g o o d s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i s p o r t i o n o f t h e m e t a l s flow f a c i l i t a t e d t h e p r o c e s s
w e have already described, i n w h i c h N e w W o r l d slave areas b e c a m e a n i m p o r -
tant c o m p l e m e n t t o labor a n d capital rich, land-poor Europe.
I n I n d i a , a s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e r e i s a s t r o n g c a s e f o r s e e i n g m u c h o f t h e flow
o f gold a n d silver coins asmeeting a broadly based transactions demand, rather
than as a store o f w e a l t h that covered a "trade deficit." B u t despite impressive
evidence o f ongoing m o n e t i z a t i o n i nIndia, itdoes n o t necessarily f o l l o w that
in the absence o f N e w W o r l d metals, India w o u l d simply have imported more
o f other E u r o - A m e r i c a n goods. M u c h o f t h e population still o n l y entered t h e
m a r k e t t o o b t a i n a f e w necessities, m e e t occasional c e r e m o n i a l expenses (e.g.,
for weddings), a n draise cash t op a y taxes a n dother dues; a n dt o t h eextent that
they d i d purchase other goods, i t is n o tclear that European manufactures
w o u l d have been competitive. A n d t h e greater prestige o fChinese fabrics and
ceramics. Southeast A s i a n delicacies, a n d specifically Islamic goods f r o m t h e
M i d d l e East meant that E u r o p e a n l u x u r y goods w o u l d n o t have f o u n d a large
m a r k e t either. S o e v e n i fw e treat precious metals flowing t o India as just
another product, they w e r e probably special i nanother sense: they w e r e about
the o n l y European good that o n e could imagine India b u y i n g o n such a huge
scale. ( T h e o n e possible alternative that c o m e s t o m i n d i s a r m s ; i ti s unclear
w h a t effect a large further increase i n this already substantial trade m i g h t have
had i n the period spanning M o g u l decline a n d British ascendancy.)
Finally, t h e t h i r d stream o f metals w a s f o r decades t h e largest o f all; b u t this
flow o f s i l v e r p r o b a b l y d i d t h e l e a s t t o e a s e p r e s s u r e s o n E u r o p e ' s l a n d . I t w e n t
to densely populated, h e a v i l y c o m m e r c i a l i z e d parts o fA s i a , w h e r e i tw a s used
as a m e d i u m f o r t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g e v e r y class i n s o c i e t y ; a n d i n r e t u r n ,
v a r i o u s c o n s u m e r g o o d s flowed t o E u r o p e a n d t o t h e A m e r i c a s t h e m s e l v e s .
T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , a s w e h a v e s e e n , m a y fit s o m e o f t h e I n d i a n t r a d e , b u t i t r e f e r s
a b o v e a l l t o t h e e n o r m o u s flow o f s i l v e r t o C h i n a , w h e r e m i l l i o n s o f o r d i n a r y
people used silver t o p a y their taxes a n d f o rm a n y ordinary purchases.
H e r e silver w a s clearly a g o o d , n o t residual w e a l t h used t o settle unbalanced
a c c o u n t s . I n d e e d , w h i l e s i l v e r flowed i n t o C h i n a b e t w e e n 1 5 0 0 a n d 1 6 4 0 , g o l d
and copper left C h i n a , often ending u p i n E u r o p e . ' " A n d t h o u g h silk, t h e m o s t
2« H . K l e i n 1990: 2 9 1 .
2 9 Subrahtnanyam 1993: 183-85.
F l y n n and Giraldez 1997: xxvii; Von Glahn 1996: 129-33, 2 2 4 - 2 9 .
272 CHAPTKR SIX
important "real g o o d " a m o n g China's exports, w a s a fabric rather than a metal,
it, t o o , w a s used asm o n e y i n s o m e places. T h u s , N e w W o r l d s i l v e r i nthis trade
was just o n e o fm a n y goods being arbitraged: items that were m o r e plentiful i n
C h i n a than elsewhere (gold, porcelain, silk) were exchanged f o r silver, w h i c h
w a s comparatively scarce i n C h i n a " b u t i n very h i g h d e m a n d as i tb e c a m e the
m o n e t a r y a n d fiscal base o fthe w o r l d ' s largest economy.'^ B y about 1640, this
trade h a d brought silver t ogold ratios i n C h i n a a n d Europe into rough equilib-
r i u m ; thus, h a v i n g lost itsraison d'etre, this trade w e n t into a sharp decline,
r e c o v e r i n g o n l y i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . ' ' I n its first i n c a r n a t i o n , t h e trade d i d
little t o supply land-intensive c o m m o d i t i e s t o E u r o p e . I th a d , h o w e v e r , been
e n o r m o u s l y profitable a n dyielded goods that (unlike m o r e a n dm o r e silver)
could b e used t o m a k e exchanges elsewhere.
In C h i n a , as i n India, i tm a yb edifficult t oi m a g i n e another good that w o u l d
have been i m p o r t e d o n such a massive scale h a d silver n o t been available.
T h u s i nthis case, too. N e wW o r l d m i n e s w e r e i m p o r t a n t t o E u r o p e ' s capacity
to o b t a i n g o o d s i n t h e rest o f t h e O l d W o r l d . B u t t h e C h i n e s e case differs f r o m
the I n d i a n o n e ,f r o m t h e i m p o r t e r ' s side, i n that i ti s f a r harder t o seem u c h o f
the silver it imported asnonessential; thus, i n the absence o fthat flow, w e m u s t
imagine either other imports o fmonetary m e d i a o r a large reallocation o f
China's o w n productive resources, perhaps i n turn expanding d e m a n d f o r
other i m p o r t s . F r o m t h e E u r o p e a n side, m e a n w h i l e , t h e difference b e t w e e n this
flow o f m e t a l s a n d t h a t w h i c h w e n t t o I n d i a i s t h a t t h i s o n e d i d r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e ,
e v e n indirectly, t oease pressure o nthe land.
T h e s e distinctions a m o n g various uses o f N e w W o r l d treasure are post h o c
and h i g h l y imperfect, a n d the association o f different uses w i t h different final
destinations for the metals m u s t b e seen astendencies, n o tabsolute rules. E v e n
in eastern Europe—perhaps the periphery i n w h i c h the general population w a s
the least i n v o l v e d i n t h e cash e c o n o m y — n o t a l l i m p o r t e d metals represent
abstract " w e a l t h " hoarded b y t h e elite i n a stagnant e c o n o m y . A t t h e other
end o f t h e scale, there w a s surely s o m e h o a r d i n g o f s i l v e r e v e n i n C h i n a . W h a t
w e need t o recognize isthat s o m e o f this behavior w e n t o ne v e r y w h e r e ; there
are n o grounds f o r t h e sharp d i s t i n c t i o n s o m e scholars have seen b e t w e e n
western "spenders" a n d A s i a n "hoarders."''* M o r e o v e r , t h e line b e t w e e n hoard-
ing a n dtransactions d e m a n d w a sitself vague i na w o r l d i n w h i c h ordinary
people d i d not have savings accounts, a n d i n w h i c h j e w e l r y and other items o f
display w e r e often a crucial part o fsecuring t h e marriages that reproduced
productive units.
3 ' F o r data on gold/silver ratio.s in different place.s, see Von Glalin 1996: 127.
F l y n n and Giraldez 1997: xix.
" V o n G l a h n 1996: 128, 232.
For a recent restatement of this alleged difference and its enduring importance, see Kindle-
berger 1990.
AHOI.ISII INC T H E I.ANP CONSTRAINT 273
B u t d e s p i t e t h e a p p r o x i m a t e a n d fluid n a t u r e o f t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s , t h e y d o
s h o w u s something: N e wW o r l d metals w e r e n o t s i m p l y " m o n e y " that E u r o -
peans turned into "real" resources b y distributing t h e m around the O l d W o r l d ,
w i t h E u r o p e a n needs a l w a y s d r i v i n g t h e story. T h e internal d y n a m i c s o f other
r e g i o n s c o u l d create " n e e d s " n oless real t h a n those o f E u r o p e , s u c h as C h i n a ' s
need for a m o r e usable currency, o r t h edesire o feastern E u r o p e a n elites t o turn
their grain surpluses into s o m e t h i n g easily stored a n d shipped a n d thus usable
f o r p r o v i s i o n i n g t h e i r t r o o p s o n c a m p a i g n . ' " ' I t w a s t h e intersection o fEuro-
pean a n d other regional dynamics that determined t h e extent a n d nature o f
t h e s e m e t a l s ' flows: t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y r e m a i n e d p o l y c e n t r i c , a n d f o r c e s e m a -
nating f r o m elsewhere could shape i t just as m u c h as those e m a n a t i n g f r o m
Europe.
Indeed, as w e s a w i nchapter 4 . h a d C h i n a i n particular n o t h a d such a
d y n a m i c e c o n o m y that changing its metallic base could absorb t h e staggering
quantities o f silver m i n e d i nt h e N e w W o r l d over three centuries, those mines
m i g h t have become unprofitable w i t h i n a f e w decades. T h e massive inflation
o f silver-denominated prices i nE u r o p e f r o m 1500 t o 1640 indicates a shrink-
ing value f o rthe metal there even w i t h A s i a draining o f f m u c h o fthe supply,'*
and t h e less-monetized parts o fthe O l d W o r l d w o u l d n o thave indefinitely kept
absorbing precious metals w i t h o u t also devaluing them. T h i s iso n e m o r e w a y
in w h i c h early m o d e m silver a n dgold were n o t quite like contemporary
" m o n e y " : today those w h o have hard currency t o spend will never have trouble
obtaining m o r e resources, since c o n t e m p o r a r y peripheries have staggeringly
large needs f o r capital.
Nonetheless, t h etransshipment o fN e w W o r l d metals d i dallow western
E u r o p e t oexpand itsimports o f real resources f a r b e y o n d w h a t i tc o u l d have
obtained otherwise. S o m e N e wW o r l d silver m a y have had t ohave been con-
v e r t e d t o c l o t h , p o r c e l a i n , o r s p i c e s t o k e e p e x p a n d i n g t h e flow o f r e s o u r c e s
f r o m some o fthe less-monetized O l d W o r l d peripheries; but thanks t o Chinese
demand, this option w a savailable, t o o . A n d as w e have already noted, t h e
c o m b i n a t i o n o f N e w W o r l d metals themselves, transshipped A s i a n goods that
had often been obtained w i t h silver, a n dexotica f r o m t h e N e w W o r l d itself
(such as sugar a n d tobacco) paid f o r m o r e o fwestern Europe's imports f r o m
the rest o f t h e O l d W o r l d t h a n d i d m a n u f a c t u r e s created w h o l l y w i t h i n E u r o p e .
T h u s t h edistinction that some authors m a k e between bullion extracted
t h r o u g h c o e r c i o n a n d a f a r m o r e i m p o r t a n t flow o f r e a l r e s o u r c e s o b t a i n e d
through consensual trade seems artificial." N o to n l y were the land a n d labor
that produced N e w W o r l d resource exports v e r y m u c h t h efruits o f extra-
m a r k e t coercion, b u t i ttook the unique arrangements o f Caribbean plantations
" B l u m 1961: 2 0 1 - t .
Hamilton 1934; F l y n n and Giraldez 1996: 323-29.
" See, e.g., Jones 1981: 8.3-84.
274 CHAI'IKR SIX
and o f mercantilist policies throughout the N e w W o r l d to escape all the forces
that caused core-periphery exchange w i t h i n the O l d W o r l d to plateau. W i t h o u t
these features, and w i t h o u t silver that helped pay for colonial administration
and provided for A s i a n goods t ob e transshipped t oAfrica and the Americas,
i t i s h a r d t o s e e h o w t h e " e c o l o g i c a l w i n d f a l l " c o u l d h a v e f o u n d i t s w a y to_
E u r o p e i n such quantities; nor is i tclear h o w E u r o p e could have obtained as
m u c h ecological relief f r o m the rest o f the O l d W o r l d as it did.
Some Measurements of Ecological Relief:
Britain in the Age of the Industrial Revolution
T h e q u a n t i t i e s i n v o l v e d w e r e vast,"* but t o discuss t h e m u s e f u l l y t h e y m u s t b e
b r o k e n d o w n a bit. F o r argument's sake, let us e l i m i n a t e goods that c o u l d have
been obtained from O l d W o r l d peripheries w i t h o u t major institutional changes
(e.g., furs, w h i c h R u s s i a p r e s u m a b l y c o u l d h a v e e x p o r t e d i n larger a m o u n t s )
and gains f r o m O l d W o r l d adoptions o f N e w W o r l d plants such as the potato
(without w h i c h neither Ireland nor Prussia could have exported grain t o E n -
gland). T h e N e w W o r l d ' s huge fisheries, for w h i c h N o r t h A m e r i c a n landfalls
w e r e c o n v e n i e n t but not essential, are also best left out. T h e s e b e l o n g t o the
N e w W o r l d w i n d f a l l i n s o m e loose sense, but i f w e cast o u r net t o o w i d e l y , w e
are s i m p l y c o u n t i n g traffic across the A t l a n t i c rather than s h o w i n g that these
e x c h a n g e s ( m u c h less a n y p a r t i c u l a r m e c h a n i s m b e h i n d t h e m ) w e r e essential.
So for the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the discussion w i l l focus
almost exclusively o n sugar and cotton, w i t h some reflections o n the larger
torrent o f p r i m a r y products that c a m e f r o m the A m e r i c a s i n the m i d - and late
nineteenth centuries.
M i n t z estimates that sugar made u p roughly 2 percent o f Britain's caloric
i n t a k e b y 1800, a n d a s t u n n i n g 14 percent b y 1 9 0 0 . ' ' I n fact, the real figures
w o u l d appear to be even higher. U s i n g the same estimates o f per capita sugar
c o n s u m p t i o n as M i n t z does, and the s a m e c o n v e r s i o n into calories, the per-
person, per-day c o n s u m p t i o n o f sugar for the U n i t e d K i n g d o m (including Ire-
land) comes to over 9 0 calories in 1800. I f the average Briton consumed 2,500
calories per day i n 1800 ( a generous estimate),*' then 9 0 calories is almost
4 percent o f total intake even at that early date; the average 1901 sugar intake
For methods of calculation throughout this section, see appendix D .
' ' M i n t z 1985: 13.1
C l a r k , Hubertnan, and Lindert (1995: 223) assemble various surveys of per capita consump-
tion in workers' households and come up with estimates as low as 1.500 calories per adult male
equivalent (for a sample of the rural poor in 1787-96) and as high as 2.400 (for urban workers in
1863 and 1889-90). plus one estimate of 3.200 for rural workers in the 186()s; but even the latter
figure would translate into less than 2,500 calories per person.
ABOLISHINC THK LAND CONSTRAINT 275
w o u l d h a v e y i e l d e d o v e r 18 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l c a l o r i e s i f p e o p l e r e a l l y a v e r a g e d
2 , 5 0 0 calories per day, and over 2 2 percent i f they averaged a m o r e likely
2,000. A n d although today sugar is often derided as a source o f " j u n k " calo-
ries, i tcan b e valuable i npoorer diets, preventing scarce protein f r o m being
burned for energy.^'
T h e 4 p e r c e n t figure f o r 1 8 0 0 m a y s e e m m o d e s t , b u t i t i s w o r t h r e c a l l i n g t h a t
an acre o f tropical sugar land yields as m a n y calories as m o r e than 4 acres o f
p o t a t o e s ( w h i c h m o s t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n s scorned**'), o r 9 - 1 2 acres
o f wheat.'" T h e calories f r o m the sugar consumed in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m circa
1 8 0 0 ( u s i n g figures f r o m M i n t z ' * " ' ) w o u l d h a v e r e q u i r e d a t l e a s t 1 , 3 0 ( ) , 0 0 ( ) a c r e s
o f average-yielding English farms and conceivably over 1,900,000; i n 1831,
1,900,000 to 2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 acres w o u l d have been needed. A n d since the land that
remained uncultivated in Europe (and especially in Britain) b ythis time was
h a r d l y the c o n t i n e n t ' s best, w e c o u l d p l a u s i b l y m a k e these n u m b e r s still larger.
D r i e d meat, plus ships, w o o d - b a s e d naval stores, and s m a l l a m o u n t s o f t i m -
ber and grain spared s o m e land i n the late eighteenth c e n t u r y and a g o o d deal
in the early nineteenth century. N o r t h A m e r i c a n timber exports t o Britain, for
instance, were trivial before 1800 (though exports t o southern E u r o p e were
not); b u tb y 1825, they were large enough t o replace t h eoutput o f over
1,000,000 acres o f E u r o p e a n forest and soared thereafter.''' S o m e savings also
came indirectly, as N e w W o r l d silver and reexports paid for m u c h o f Britain's
Baltic t i m b e r imports ( w h i c h replaced the output o f about 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 acres per
year i n the 1780s and 1790s). G i v e n that the total arable land o f Britain was
r o u g h l y 1 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 acres,*" t h e 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ^ , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 N e w W o r l d " g h o s t
acres" f o u n d s o far are a n o n - t r i v i a l a d d i t i o n t o B r i t a i n ' s land base, e v e n w i t h -
out c o t t o n — a n d before the m u c h , m u c h larger b o o m in A m e r i c a n imports in
the mid-nineteenth century.
B y 1815, Britain imported over 100,000,000 pounds o f N e w W o r l d cotton;
b y 1 8 3 0 , 2 6 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s . ^ ' I f o n e r e p l a c e d t h i s fiber w i t h a n e q u i v a l e n t
w e i g h t o f h e m p o r flax, t h e e x t r a a c r e a g e n e e d e d w o u l d b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y
*' Daniels 1996: 277.
•»2 Braudel 1981: 170; Salaman 1949: 4 7 9 - 8 4 .
^ ' M i n t z 1985: 191.
Mintz refers here to "Britain." but since his figures match those both Deerr and Mitchell
provide for the U . K . . he probably meant the U . K . as well; for his purposes, it would make little
difference. A n d since, as we have seen, England from 1770 on drew heavily on food supplies from
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland—supplies that would have been reduced had those places not had
some other way to meet minimum caloric need.s—the U . K , figures are what we need to use for
estimating the Caribbean contribution to feeding industrializing England,
For methods of calculation, see appendix D ; export figures from L o w e r 1973: 259,
Mitchell 1988: 186, The figure is actually for a later date (1867), but it is the earliest one
available and seems to have been fairly stable at that point,
• ^^Mann I860: 112,
276 CHAPTER SIX
modest: 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 acres i n 1 8 1 5 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n 1 8 3 0 . B u t h e m p a n d flax—
e s p e c i a l l y h e m p — w e r e b o t h c o n s i d e r e d i n f e r i o r fibers f o r m o s t p u r p o s e s , w e r e
m u c h m o r e difficult t ow o r k w i t h , a n dprocesses f o r spinning t h e m m e c h a n i -
c a l l y e m e r g e d l a t e r t h a n t h a t f o r c o t t o n . " * M o r e i m p o r t a n t , b o t h h e m p a n d flax
w e r e e x t r e m e l y labor-intensive a n d manure-intensive crops: s o m u c h s o that
m o s t people o n l y g r e w t h e m as garden crops. E v e n three centuries o f govern-
m e n t schemes a n d subsidies h a dfailed t op r o m o t e larger-scale production i n
either England o r N o r t h America.*''
T h i s l e a v e s w o o l , l o n g E u r o p e ' s m a i n c l o t h i n g fiber. B u t r a i s i n g e n o u g h
sheep t o replace t h eyarn made w i t h Britain's N e w W o r l d cotton imports b y
w o u l d have required staggering quantities o fland: a l m o s t 9,000,000 acres i n
1815, using ratios f r o m m o d e l farms, a n d over 2 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 acres i n 1830. T h i s
final figure surpasses Britain's total crop a n dpasture land combined. I t also
surpasses A n t h o n y W r i g l e y ' s estimate that matching the annual energy output
o f Britain's coal industry circa 1 8 1 5 w o u l d have required that t h e c o u n t r y
m a g i c a l l y receive 15,000,000 additional acres o f forest.'" I fw e a d d cotton,
sugar, a n d t i m b e r circa 1830, w ehave s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 a n d
3 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ghost acres, exceeding even t h ec o n t r i b u t i o n o fcoal b ya healthy
margin.
Extracontinental imports also reduced p e r capita food needs b y changing
habits, as discussed i n chapter 5 ; this m i g h t increase o u r land-savings calcu-
lation significantly, b u ti t i s probably uncountable. Cheaper h o m e heating
was, o f course, largely attributed t o t h e surge i n coal output. B u t h a v i n g f a r
m o r e people w o r k indoors—rather than f o l l o w i n g t h e"Jiangnan" o reven t h e
" D a n i s h " r o u t e t o e c o l o g i c a l s u r v i v a l — w a s c r u c i a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n both
cheap coal-based energy a n d overseas supplies o fcotton, grain, a n d other
land-intensive imports; a n d indoor laborers appear t o have consumed about
one-third fewer calories p e r capita than outdoor ones." T h e unprecedented
amounts o fcheap cloth that helped preserve w a r m t h a n dfurther reduced ca-
loric needs w a s unimaginable w i t h o u t A m e r i c a n cotton. A n d insofar as caloric
needs w e r e also reduced b y t h e appetite-suppressing qualities o ftea a n d sugar,
this w a s another hidden savings achieved i n part t h r o u g h coercion abroad.
M o s t s u g a r c a m e f r o m N e w W o r l d p l a n t a t i o n s , w h i l e t e a w a s p a i d f o r first w i t h
N e w W o r l d silver a n dthen w i t h I n d i a n o p i u m . These factors together w o u l d
M o k y r 1990: K B .
See Warden (1967: 3 2 ^ 0 ) on England and lis colonies.
5 " Wrigley 1988: 5 4 - 5 5 . Wrigley actually makes "the death of George I I I (1820)" his cut-off
date, but according to the coal production statistics in Mitchell (1988: 247) it would be 1815 when
production actually reached the requisite 15,000,000 tons. More important, Wrigley's estimate that
an acre of woodland produced two tons of dry wood a year is, as he notes, probably generous, and
biases his estimate of coal's impact downward. Were he to use the contemporary global mean as
S m i l does (1983: 36) and as 1 have elsewhere, his estimate of the impact of coal would rise to
slightly over 21,000,000 "ghost acres,"
5 ' C l a r k , Huberman, and Lindert 1995: 223 vs, 226,
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 277
add significantly t ot h e "ghost acreage" even i n t h eearly nineteenth century
and e n o r m o u s l y i nt h em i d d l e a n dlater years o f t h e century.
O f course, t h e southern U n i t e d States is n o t t h e o n l y place w h e r e cotton w i l l
g r o w ; b u t w i t h o u t that area, t h e e a r l y g r o w t h o f M a n c h e s t e r w o u l d h a v e faced
very serious impediments. S o m e sense o fh o w m u c h m o r e difficult i t w o u l d
have been t o sustain a b o o m i ncotton textiles w i t h o u t this area's particular
ecological a n dinstitutional heritage c a nb e gained b y l o o k i n g a t t h e so-called
c o t t o n f a m i n e that o c c u r r e d later, d u r i n g t h e A m e r i c a n C i v i l W a r .
T h o u g h A m e r i c a n cotton exports were cuto f f only between 1 8 6 2 a n d the
m i d d l e o f 1865 (during 1861 t h eN o r t h d i dn o t y e thave a neffective blockade),
Britain h a d begun b y 1 8 5 0t o m a k e considerable efforts t o increase cotton
supply. These efforts w e r e almost certainly f a rgreater than Britain w o u l d have
m a d e t o find c o t t o n s u p p l i e s i n a n i m a g i n a r y w o r l d i n w h i c h U . S . e x p o r t s w e r e
n o t a v a i l a b l e i n t h e first p l a c e . B r i t i s h p o w e r w a s f a r g r e a t e r a t t h i s p o i n t t h a n
it h a d b e e n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c e n t u r y , a n d t h e s h i p p i n g a n d o t h e r r e l e v a n t
technologies available t o i t w e r e f a r superior. Perhaps m o r e important, t h e
existence o fn u m e r o u s mills, huge n u m b e r s o fw o r k e r s , a n dexisting customers
expecting products created f a r greater incentives t o a v o i d a d i m i n u t i o n o f cot-
ton supply than t h e imagined possibility o f building such a n industry could
ever have created f o r o v e r c o m i n g a n initial lack o fcotton. Y e t i n spite o f these
efforts, " t h esupply o f r a w material . . . prov[ed] obstinately inelastic.""
T h e major focus o fBritish efforts w a sIndia. T h e Indian government w a s
pursuing a "cotton-oriented policy o fannexation a n d r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n "
d u r i n g t h e 1 8 5 0 s b u t w i t h l i t t l e t o s h o w f o r i t f o r t h e first d e c a d e . A b i g j u m p
did occur i n 1 8 6 1 — m u c h o f itat theexpense o fdomestic consumption a n d
shipments t o C h i n a rather than b y expanding output—but Indian shipments
w e r e still less t h a n h a l f o f U . S . s h i p m e n t s t o B r i t a i n i n 1 8 6 1 . M o r e o v e r , e x -
ports rose o n l y 8.6 percent further after this, even t h o u g h this w a sw h e n t h e
U n i o n blockade became effective a n d cotton prices soared.''
T h e o t h e r r e l a t i v e s u c c e s s — w i t h f a r less o u t s i d e e f f o r t — c a m e i n E g y p t .
This w a spossible because the E g y p t i a n government itself had been c o m m i t t e d
to expanding cotton output since t h edays o fM o h a m m e d A l i : once t h e mills h e
had ordered built proved uncompetitive, t h ecotton crop w a s available f o r e x -
port. Exports began i n 1821, passed 27,000,000 pounds i n 1824, a n d almost
5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s b y t h e 1850s;''' b u t this w a s less t h a n h a l f o f w h a t U . S .
e x p o r t s h a d been as f a rback a s 1 8 1 5 . A tits peak, E g y p t i a n e x p o r t s a p p r o a c h e d
2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 pounds (still w e l l short o f those o f t h e U n i t e d States i n 1 8 3 0 )
before falling back very sharply." These short-lived achievements c a m e after
forty years o f intense pressure f r o m above—indeed until the C i v i l W a r , E g y p -
''^Farnie 1979: 1.36.
" I b i d . , 137, 142, 14.5-46, 151.
" Issawi 1966: 362. 4 1 6 - 1 7 , measurement conversion from 518.
" I b i d . , 417.
278 CHAPTER SIX
tian c o t t o n c u l t i v a t i o n d i d n o t spread m u c h b e y o n d t h e estates o f M o h a m m a d
A l i a n d h i s relatives—engineered b y a regime that h a d been inspired b y t h e
e x a m p l e o fLancashire's success. Despite this l o n g preparatory period, they
d i d n o t represent a sustainable l e v e l o fp r o d u c t i o n , m u c h less o n e c a p a b l e o f
further expansion. N o r d i dthey provide the cotton at a price Lancashire could
have lived with f o rvery long.
D u r i n g t h eU . S . C i v i l W a r , about 4 0 percent o f the N i l e D e l t a w a s g r o w i n g
cotton i n a n yg i v e n season; g i v e n t h e rotations being used, i t appears that
cotton w a s g r o w n i nevery delta field at some point between 1863 a n d 1865."'
G i v e n t h elimited a m o u n t o fw e l l - w a t e r e d land i nEgypt, this probably repre-
sented a nabsolute m a x i m u m o fpossible c u l t i v a t i o n w i t h o u t t h e k i n d o f irriga-
tion made possible b y twentieth-century mega-projects. E v e n o n this land,
costs o f cultivation q u i c k l y rose t olevels that w e r e profitable o n l y at t h e abso-
lute peak o fprices i n 1 8 6 4 ; " a n d a tthose prices ( i n fact, e v e n att h e l o w e r ones
o f 1862), r a wcotton w a s actually m o r e expensive than coarse yarn.'*'
Britain's less-focused efforts t o stimulate exports f r o m other promising-
sounding sources—Brazil, west Africa, Queensland, a n d Burma—produced
almost n o t h i n g , " e v e n t h o u g h prices soared. British cotton c o n s u m p t i o n fell
55 percent between 1861 a n d1862, w h i l e prices (already u p i n 1861 because
o f the w a r ) doubled. I nrelative terms, cotton h a d cost about o n e - t h i r d t h e price
o f w o o l i n 1860, b u t cost m o r e b y 1864.''" Prices w o u l d n odoubt have gone
higher still were i tn o t that w h e n t h eC i v i l W a r began, there w a s both a fairly
large supply o fstockpiled r a wcotton a n d a huge glut o f finished cotton goods
in warehouses (thus depressing demand f o rm o r e spinning a n d weaving).'''
E m p l o y m e n t i n Lancashire mills fell b yr o u g h l y half i n 1862, a n d t h e r e m a i n -
ing operatives were w o r k i n g t w o a n da third days a w e e k b y N o v e m b e r (versus
six days i n 1860-61);*'^ large n u m b e r s o ffirms (especially smaller ones, w h o
m o r e closely resembled t h eearly mills i n terms o fcash reserves, equipment,
and other resources) w e n t bankrupt.
True, even this inadequate supply o fr a w cotton w a swell above what t h e
U n i t e d States h a d supplied i n t h e early nineteenth century; but, as w e have
seen, i t also resulted f r o m efforts that w o u l d h a v e been inconceivable at that
time. A n dw i t h o u t twentieth-century f a r m i n g tools, a substitute f o r t h e later
a n d greater b o n a n z a o f f o o d crops f r o m t h e " n e o - E u r o p e s " i s c o n s i d e r a b l y less
likely still; there s i m p l y w a s n oplace i nt h e O l d W o r l d w i t h a n y t h i n g like t h e
same c o m b i n a t i o n o f ecologies that w e r e better f o rE u r o p e a n f o o d plants
than E u r o p e itself, relatively sparse population a n d favorable institutional
structures.*^
O w e n 1966: 424. " Ibid.
"*Farnie 1979: 145. Ibid., 150.
« ' I b i d . , 147, 162. " Ibid., 138-39, 1 4 4 ^ 5 .
" Ibid.. 145-46. See, generally. Crosby 1986.
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 279
Comparisons and Calculations: What Do
the Numbers Mean?
O n e m i g h t object t o these calculations i n w a y s that parallel a c o m m o n r e -
sponse (discussed i n chapter 4 ) t o arguments about overseas extraction a n d
European capital accumulation: h o wc a n w ecall something decisive i f other
factor(s)—capital accumulation w i t h i n Europe, domestic supplies o ffood, o r
w h a t e v e r — w e r e larger? T h e question isimportant, both for this particular case
and f o rconceptualizing historical processes m o r e generally.
I f w e a r e largely concerned w i t h g r o w t h a c c o u n t i n g f o ra single case,
smaller factors a r e m i n o r factors. B u t even here, problems o f categorization
arise. " N e w W o r l d f a r m goods i m p o r t e d t o B r i t a i n " as a n inclusive category
m a y look small next t o a parallel category o f"domestic (British) f a r m produc-
t i o n , " a n d " i m p o r t s f r o m t h e rest o fE u r o p e , " b u t i fw e break these categories
d o w n further ("food imports from Germany," "timber imports from Scandi-
navia," etc.) w efind that s o m e N e wW o r l d subcategories, such as "fiber i m -
ports f r o m t h e U n i t e d States," w o u l d b e a m o n g t h e largest items o n this longer
list o felements. A n d h o w n a r r o w w em a k e o u r categories depends o n c o m p l e x
judgments (and some further counterfactuals) about the substitutability o f dif-
ferent products, t h ei m p o r t a n c e o f particular sectors f o r t h e larger e c o n o m y ,
and s o o n . ( T h i s is o n ereason w h y N e wW o r l d resources seem m o r e crucial
than N e w W o r l d profits: there were clearly alternate investments that could
y i e l d m o n e y , b u ti t is less clear that there w e r e alternate w a y s t o g e t h u g e
amounts o f land-intensive goods.) T h u s , unless w ew a n t t om a k e a categorical
s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e r e a r e always substitutes for any particular thing, a n d markets
always accurately measure t h e relative importance o factivities, goods, etc.,
such j u d g m e n t s cannot be avoided. ( T o seesome limits t othese assumptions,
imagine that martians suddenly deprived t h e earth o f all itsfossil fuels. W e
could estimate the impact b y looking at thefairly small percentage o f w o r l d
G D P that currently goes t ofossil-fuel producers, b u ttheactual impact w o u l d
certainly b e greater.)
M o r e generally, there areclearly s o m e situations w h e r e a fairly s m a l l incre-
ment i n something makes a l l t h e difference. H u m a n genes a r e9 8 . 4 percent
identical t o those o fp y g m y chimps,"* b u t f e w o f us w o u l d disqualify a n expla-
nation o fw h y h u m a n s have spread across almost theentire planet ( w h i l e c h i m -
panzees survive i n just a f e wpockets) because i t focused t o o m u c h o n t h e
b e h a v i o r s m a d e p o s s i b l e b y t h e r e m a i n i n g 1.6 p e r c e n t .
T h e basic idea that relatively s m a l l differences c a n create large historical
divergences isboth proverbial ( " F o r w a n t o fa n a i l . . . " )a n d m o d e r n (asi n t h e
Diamond 1992: 23.
280 CHAPTKR SIX
f a m o u s " c h a o s t h e o r y " e x a m p l e o f a b u t t e r f l y b e a t i n g its w i n g s i n A f r i c a a n d
c h a n g i n g t h e weather i n Greenland). I t cuts against e q u i l i b r i u m - s e e k i n g
m o d e l s , i n w h i c h s m a l l d i f f e r e n c e s s h o u l d n o t c r e a t e l a r g e and lasting diver-
gences. It thus makes for an a w k w a r d marriage between history and e c o n o m -
i c s — a t least schools o f e c o n o m i c s that posit a single e q u i l i b r i u m as the desti-
n a t i o n t o w a r d w h i c h a g i v e n s y s t e m tends. A c c e p t i n g the i m p o r t a n c e o f s m a l l
factors can also lead to intellectual anarchy. Explanations can become s o clut-
tered that w e can not grasp t h e m ; or they can become a grab bag, w i t h every-
body c h a m p i o n i n g as "crucial" the factor that suits their personal agenda. B u t
for history t o matter, there m u s t s o m e t i m e s b e factors w i t h lasting effects
larger than their size m i g h t suggest.
A r g u i n g f o r s u c h factors based o n c o m p a r i s o n s rests i n part o n h o w clear i t
i s t h a t t h e c a s e s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d a r e o t h e r w i s e s i m i l a r . H i s t o r y is n e v e r as n e a t
as t h e c h i m p a n z e e / h u m a n c a s e , i n w h i c h 9 8 . 4 p e r c e n t o f t h e g e n e s a r e a b s o -
lutely identical. Instead, w e have statements o f rough similarity, or o f advan-
tages that seem closely tied t o s o m e off-setting disadvantage, o r w h e r e i t i s
hard to think o f any m e c h a n i s m that w o u l d have greatly magnified the impor-
tance o fa particular difference d u r i n g the p e r i o d i nw h i c h the larger diver-
gence emerged.
Thus, h o w important coal and the N e w W o r l d will seem depends partly o n
h o w c o n v i n c e d readers are o f the s i m i l a r i t i e s I have suggested i n other areas,
as w e l l a s o n t h e a r g u m e n t s a b o u t t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r p h e n o m e n a . A s f o r t h o s e
p h e n o m e n a themselves, I w o u l d suggest four reasons t o give t h e m special
weight:
1. t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s a b o v e s h o w t h e y w e r e n o t s m a l l r e l a t i v e t o s o m e
reasonable standards (e.g., B r i t a i n ' s d o m e s t i c l a n d base)
2. t h e y a p p e a r a t t h e r i g h t t i m e t o e x p l a i n a c r u c i a l d i v e r g e n c e ( o n c e
w e have pushed the date o f that divergence back to the century surround-
ing 1800)
3. t h e y a f f e c t e d d e v e l o p m e n t t h r o u g h r e l i e v i n g a c o n s t r a i n t — t h e finite
a m o u n t o f l a n d — w h i c h was otherwise very difficult to relieve w i t h i n the
k n o w l e d g e base and institutions o f the t i m e
4. t h e e x a m p l e s o f c o r e r e g i o n s i n C h i n a , J a p a n , a n d c e r t a i n p a r t s o f
E u r o p e itself (such asD e n m a r k ) provide plausible examples o f h o w soci-
eties l a c k i n g these advantages m i g h t have l o o k e d .
T h e y d onot require u s t oi m a g i n e that w i t h o u t this relief, E u r o p e w o u l d have
suffered a M a l t h u s i a n catastrophe: a situation a k i n to the "butterfly w i n g s y i e l d
hurricane" scenario or to i m a g i n i n g that w i t h a slightly longer ecological w i n -
dow, India, China, or Japan w o u l d have produced a nindustrial revolution. A
E u r o p e a n e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s could h a v e h a p p e n e d , b u t o u r c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a l l o w s
us t o i m a g i n e a v a r i e t y o f m o r e l i k e l y o u t c o m e s , w h i c h h a v e i n c o m m o n a set
o f labor-intensive adjustments t o land pressures that actual people i n some-
A B O I , I S H 1 N (; r HK LAND C () N S I R A I N T 281
what similar circumstances made successfully but w o u l d not have led to any-
t h i n g l i k e the B r i t i s h b r e a k t h r o u g h . I n d e e d , a s w e s h a l l see i n o u r last s e c t i o n ,
these labor-intensive paths m a y have also made it harder to imitate industrial-
ization even once the technology was there for the copying. T h u s , highlighting
the factors I have chosen seems to m e a reasonable, rather than reckless, invo-
cation o fthe principle that not s o large initial difference can lead t o vastly
larger future ones.
Beyond and Be.sides the Numbers
H a v i n g introduced the idea o f d y n a m i c effects not easily captured b y e q u i l i b -
r i u m m o d e l s o r quantitative measure m o r e generally, let u s l o o k briefly at
some o f these w a y s o f relating the N e w W o r l d to Europe's divergence f r o m the
rest o fthe O l d W o r l d . W e have t o u c h e d o n l y b r i e f l y ( i n chapter 3 ) o n t h e
d y n a m i c cultural effects o f N e w W o r l d exports such as tobacco and c o f f e e — i n
particular, their influence o n c o n s u m p t i o n habits and incentives to produce for
the m a r k e t . T h o u g h not significant i n the sorts o f ecological calculations w e
have made, these "unnecessary" goods—and others obtained i n A s i a w i t h the
use o f N e w W o r l d s i l v e r — n o doubt d i d m u c h t o speed the " i n d u s t r i o u s r e v o -
lution" s ocrucial t oEurope's economic d y n a m i s m .
F o r one t h i n g tobacco, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and tea w e r e a l l s o m e w h a t ad-
dictive, easy t o prepare and c o n s u m e quickly, and provided short bursts o f
energy. T h i s made t h e m perfect for punctuating long w o r k days, especially
a w a y f r o m h o m e : these characteristics became m o r e important as h o m e and
w o r k p l a c e w e r e separated, especially i n the f a c t o r y age. ( I n B r i t a i n i n p a r t i c u -
l a r , t h e N e w W o r l d s i l v e r t h a t financed t h e p a r t i a l s u b s t i t u t i o n o f C h i n e s e t e a
for g i n and beer m a y also have done m u c h to create a population better suited
to rapid, sometimes dangerous w o r k . ) Moreover, these n e w "everyday luxu-
ries" w e r e all (except for tobacco) c o m m o d i t i e s that did not g r o w in E u r o p e
and thus could never b e made w i t h i n the household; consequently, they could
o n l y b e obtained through producing for the market. T h e same was true for
those desiring cotton o r silk fabrics, o r the popular blends thereof; and the
s a m e w a s true for the silver belt buckles and other s m a l l a d o r n m e n t s that be-
c a m e i m p o r t a n t status s y m b o l s e v e n a m o n g p o o r people.
N o t o n l y did these materials have t ob e purchased but i n m a n y cases their
cost w a s an i n c e n t i v e t o s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . A f a m i l y that m i g h t h a v e m a d e its o w n
c l o t h e s o u t o f h e m p o r flax w o u l d b e l e s s l i k e l y t o r i s k r u i n i n g a f a n c i e r p i e c e
o f fabric; and one w o u l d have to bequite wealthy to b ewilling to write o f f all
the fabric that w o u l d b ewasted i n the process o f training a youngster to w o r k
w i t h silk, unless this was going t o be h o w they made their living. Conse-
quently, the exotic c o m m o d i t i e s that b e c a m e parts o f m a n y o r d i n a r y people's
lives i n this period m a y have contributed in important though unquantifiable
282 CHAPTKR SIX
w a y s t o the reallocation o f labor t i m e f r o m production for h o m e uset o produc-
tion f o rt h e market, w h i c h i nt u r n w a s crucial t o Europe's " i n t e r n a l l y gener-
ated" gains f r o m increased d i v i s i o n o f labor. W e h a v e also left t oo n e side t h e
possible significance o fthe plantations themselves as laboratories f o r factory
organization, as suggested b y Sidney M i n t z . " '
M o r e o v e r , w em u s t r e m e m b e r that N e w W o r l d treasure did m o r e than j u s t
a l l o w E u r o p e a n s t o buy a d d i t i o n a l g o o d s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e N e w W o r l d . I t
also helped create E u r o p e a n military c o m m a n d e r s a n d paymasters w h o b e -
c a m e influential partners o flocal elites a n doften later their c o l o n i a l masters.""
C o n s u m p t i o n taxes o n p l a n t a t i o n - g r o w n sugar a n d tobacco, as w e l l as other
colonial goods, also played a significant role i nbuilding these military capabil-
ities. H a l f t h e increase i n B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t revenues ( i nconstant prices)
between 1670 a n d 1800 (or 1810, i f one prefers t o take i n m o r e o f the Napole-
o n i c W a r s ) c a m e f r o m c u s t o m s r e v e n u e ; a n da t least i n 1 7 8 8 - 9 2 , t w o - t h i r d s o f
customs revenue c a m e f r o m t h e duties o n tea, sugar, I n d i a n cloth, r a w silk,
tobacco, a n d "foreign spirits" (mostly r u m made w i t h Caribbean sugar—this
category d i dn o t include w i n e ) . " ' Together, customs o n these particular c o m -
modities made u p2 2 percent o f the y i e l d f r o m all m a j o r taxes i nBritain d u r i n g
t h e s e years."** A n d , o f c o u r s e , t h e v a r i o u s E a s t I n d i a C o m p a n i e s , w h i c h l i v e d
o f f these trades, carried o u t m a n y o ft h e early E u r o p e a n conquests i n A s i a
themselves.
It i s also w o r t h n o t i n g that w h i l e g r o w i n g m i l i t a r y p o w e r a l l o w e d late e i g h -
teenth- a n d early nineteenth-century Europeans t otake advantage o fpolitical
instabilities i n v a r i o u s parts o fA s i a , E u r o p e w a s h a v i n g internal upheavals o f
its own."** J a c k G o l d s t o n e h a s d r a w n p l a u s i b l e c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n E u r o p e a n
political instability i nb o t h t h e m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h a n d late eighteenth centuries
and population-induced resource shortages a n dprice shifts.'" I n that light, t h e
resources f r o m abroad l o o m larger, h a v i n g kept these p r o b l e m s f r o m being
still w o r s e . T h es a m e c o u l d b e said o f t h e state r e v e n u e s g a i n e d f r o m N e w
W o r l d c o m m o d i t i e s , since t h e s e taxes w e r e f a r less u n p o p u l a r t h a n t h o s e o n
d o m e s t i c products a n d assets. T h i s l o o k s still m o r e significant w h e n w e r e -
m e m b e r that Britain had a relatively s m o o t h passage t h r o u g h the A g e o f R e v o -
lution, w h i c h f o r m u c h o f t h e continent i n v o l v e d m a j o r economic setbacks,
and that itemerged f r o m t h eperiod w i t h a vastly enlarged empire.
T h u s , i t seems likely that t h e exploitation o ft h e N e w W o r l d , a n d o f t h e
Africans taken there t o w o r k , mattered i n m a n y w a y s above a n dbeyond those
Mintz 1985: 4 6 - 6 1 . Bayly 1989: 74; Washbrook 1988.
" Calculated from data in O ' B r i e n 1988: 15. ^" Calculated from ibid., I I .
'''' B a y l y (1989) provides an excellent account of the importance of political crises rooted in
commercialization that shook Muslim empires from north Africa to Java in opening the way for a
new wave of European imperialism and notes general similarities between these crises and the
"general wreck of nations" that Europeans found closer to hoine.
™ Goldstone 1991 passim.
ABOKISHlNt; T H K I,AND CONSTRAINT 283
r e f l e c t e d i n o u r g h o s t a c r e a g e figures. T a k i n g a l l t h e i n d i c e s t o g e t h e r , i t s e e m s
likely that this e x p l o i t a t i o n d i d m o r e t o differentiate western E u r o p e f r o m
other O l d W o r l d cores than a n y o f the supposed advantages over these other
regions generated b y the operation o f markets, f a m i l y systems, o rother institu-
tions w i t h i n E u r o p e . O n l y three strong candidates w o u l d seem t o exist f o ra " \
factor o fcomparable importance i n differentiating western Europe f r o m at
least east A s i a n cores. O n e , paradoxically, w o u l d b e E u r o p e ' s ecological " a d -
vantages o f b a c k w a r d n e s s , " w h i c h left u n e x p l o i t e d resources that t h e n p r o -
v i d e d ecological breathing r o o m i n t h e nineteenth century. W ehave seen,
however, that these advantages did not extend t o Britain (or t o t h e L o w C o u n -
t r i e s ) o r t o s o m e c r u c i a l c o m m o d i t i e s ( n o t a b l y fiber c r o p s a n d w o o d ) , a n d t h e y \
w e r e offset b yecological disadvantages. T h e second possibility w o u l d b e t h e /
fortunate location o fBritain's coal deposits a n dits relationship t o t h e develop-
m e n t o fthe w h o l e coal/steam c o m p l e x . T h e t h i r d w o u l d b e t h ew a v e o fIndus- !
trial innovations t h e m s e l v e s — s o m e t h i n g still n o tfully understood and, as w e '
have seen, o f vastly greater significance because i t w a s c o m b i n e d w i t h b o t h
plentiful coal a n dthe easing o f other resource constraints m a d e possible b y the ;
New World.
In this b o o k ' s last t w o sections, I f o l l o w u p t h e idea o f fateful divergences
in t w ow a y s . First, I carry t h eargument about t h e importance o ft h e N e w
W o r l d f o rEuropean development further into t h e nineteenth century, briefly
sketching h o w these dynamics both changed and continued asindustrialization
spread b e y o n d Britain. Finally, I l o o k back at C h i n a , Japan, a n dIndia, a l l
places w h i c h , t o v a r y i n g degrees, h a d t o adopt increasingly labor-intensive
approaches t o ecological stresses a n d t o v a r y i n g degrees f o u n d that these a d -
justments made capital-intensive, energy-intensive industrialization more dif-
ficult later. S i n c e I h a v e a r g u e d r e p e a t e d l y that w i t h o u t t h ew i n d f a l l s d i s c u s s e d
here, Europe, too, could have been forced d o w n a m u c h m o r e labor-intensive
d e v e l o p m e n t path, these last examples arem e a n t not just t o r o u n d out a global
story, b u tt o complete the argument that the early nineteenth century represents
a crucial m o m e n t o f divergence with lasting effects—the m o m e n t when,
thanks t o a l lt h e factors w e have discussed, E n g l a n d avoided b e c o m i n g t h e
Y a n g z i Delta, a n dt h e t w o came t ol o o k s odifferent that it became hard t o see ^
h o w recently they h a dbeen quite similar.
Into an Industrial World
L a n d - s a v i n g N e w W o r l d i m p o r t s w o u l d o n l y g r o w i n significance after 1830:
for decades they kept pace w i t h t h estunning progress o ffossil fuels. Britain's
coal output w o u l d increase fourteen times f r o m 1815 t o 1 9 0 0 , " b u t its sugar
^' Mitchell 1988: 247.
284 CHAPTKR SIX
imports increased roughly eleven-fold over the same period,'' and its cotton
imports increased a stunning t w e n t y - f o l d . ' ' M e a n w h i l e , Britain also began t o
live o f f A m e r i c a n grain, beef, a n d other p r i m a r y products; l u m b e r i m p o r t s
soared; a n d t h e N e wW o r l d , a t last, also b e c a m e a n e n o r m o u s o u t l e t f o r E u -
rope's surplus population.
In t h e early nineteenth century, o f course, Britain ceased selling slaves t o
N o r t h A m e r i c a a n d t h e Caribbean, a n d i th a d never sold m a n y t o A r g e n t i n a .
B u t b y mid-century, n e wtechnology h a d made possible still larger declines i n
transatlantic shipping costs than i n the eighteenth century, a n d other changes
(particularly the railroad) were revolutionizing inland transport. This greatly
accelerated the process discussed above, i nw h i c h falling transport costs a l -
l o w e d E u r o p e a n emigrants t o cover their costs o f passage, start-up, a n d m a n u -
factures b y sending p r i m a r y products back t o E u r o p e f r o m ever larger parts o f
the A m e r i c a s . ( T h e g r o w t h o fa n i n d e p e n d e n t U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , m u c h less
concerned w i t h getting back w h a t i t spent t o secure a n d develop t h e frontier
than w e r e earlier for-profit colonial companies, also accelerated t h e process.)
B y that t i m e there were also mechanical (as opposed t o h u m a n ) capital
g o o d s that N e w W o r l d producers w a n t e d f r o m E u r o p e a n d at least s o m e patent
protection f o r the designs. M e a n w h i l e , cheap transport, mechanized produc-
tion, a n d tastes b r o u g h t b y E u r o p e a n e m i g r a n t s m e a n t that E u r o p e c o u l d also
n o w sell large a m o u n t s o fc o n s u m e r goods i n t h eN e w W o r l d . W i t h large
inflows o f capital a n d labor i n the straightforward f o r m s o f immigrants a n d
investment, as w e l l as i n the indirect f o r m o f manufactured goods, t h e land-
rich, market-oriented U n i t e d States w e r e a perfect c o m p l e m e n t t oa n increas-
ingly densely populated and industrial Europe.
Y e t e v e n w i t h a l l these changes, a t least B r i t a i n w a s still i n d i r e c t l y depen-
d e n t o n c o e r c i o n t o finance a g o o d p a r t o f i t s n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s u r g e i n i m -
p o r t e d N e w W o r l d resources. I n fact, e v e n a t t h e h e i g h t o fi t s r e p u t a t i o n as
"workshop o f the world," Britain rarely sold enough i n the Americas t o bal-
ance its transatlantic imports.'* T h e situation g o t worse as i m p o r t substitution
proceeded o n t h e European continent a n dNorth A m e r i c a a n d eventually
created industries that competed i n export markets as well. Consequently,
European colonialism a n d overseas c o e r c i o n — n o w concentrated i n theO l d
W o r l d — c o n t i n u e d t o matter f o rm a n y decades, i f not as m u c h as before 1850.
Indeed, i n t h e last f o u r decades before W o r l d W a r I , B r i t a i n balanced w h a t
had become very substantial trade deficits w i t h t h e A m e r i c a s a n d continental
E u r o p e — e v e n a f t e r figuring i n s u c h " i n v i s i b l e s " a s s h i p p i n g , i n s u r a n c e , a n d
Calculated based on Mitchell 1988: 7 0 9 - 1 1 .
" C o m p a r e F a m i e 1979: 7; see Mitchell (1988: 7 0 9 - 1 2 ) on sugar consumption and (1988:
196-201) showing no significant domestic production until the 1920s; and Bruchey 1967: table
2-A.
" See Latham (1978b: 69) and Hobsbawm (1975): 138, 144-45) on the trade balances; see Piatt
(1972: 4 - 5 ) on limits of British markets in Latin America.
ABOLISHING THK LAND CONSTRAINT 285
interest p a y m e n t s — l a r g e l y through huge surpluses w i t h Asia. B y f a r the big-
gest surplus w a s i n Britain's trade w i t h India, w h e r e legislation artificially
enlarged its markets f o r everything from cloth t o locomotives; a n d India i n
t u r n s t i l l financed m u c h o f t h a t d e f i c i t t h r o u g h e x p o r t s o f o p i u m t o C h i n a a n d
o f various farm goods such as tea and indigo produced under highly coercive
circumstances f o rexport t o continental E u r o p e . " M e a n w h i l e , B r i t a i n ' s ability
to sustain large deficits w i t h itsA t l a n t i c a n dcontinental E u r o p e a n trading part-
ners w h i l e still e x p o r t i n g large a m o u n t s o f capital mattered t om o r e than just
British consumers: i talso aided the next w a v e o f industrializers, particularly
the U n i t e d States, w h o c o u l d protect their o w n markets, sell i n a n unprotected
market, a n d receive large capital inflows.
It i s true, as E r i c Jones h a s argued, that not j u s t a n y g r o u p o f people s t u m -
bling o n t h eN e w W o r l d (and depopulating it, asa n y people bearing O l d W o r l d
diseases w o u l d have done) could have used these continents asE u r o p e did; b u t
t h e E u r o p e a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p J o n e s p o i n t s t o ' " w a s n o t t h e unique part o f t h e
equation, o r one i nw h i c h western Europe h a d surpassed developments i n other
densely settled parts o f t h e globe. W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n s ' i n n o v a t i o n s i n organiz-
ing f o re x p l o r a t i o n a n d durable conquest a n d i n creating institutions that c o m -
bined entrepreneurship w i t h intense coercion—plus favorable global conjunc-
tures shaped b y e v e r y t h i n g f r o m A m e r i n d i a n s ' vulnerability t o smallpox t ot h e
massive supplies o f N e w W o r l d silver a n d t h e equally massive project o f C h i -
nese remonetization—gave t h e m m u c h o ftheir edge. This, i n turn, gave west-
ern E u r o p e a n s a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h t oendure t h e last c e n t u r y o f
the "biological o l dregime," w i t h its multiple ecological challenges, and even
continue expanding industries ( f r o m textiles t o b r e w i n g t o iron) that made
great d e m a n d s o n t h e products o f t h e land.
Last Comparisons: Labor Intensity, Resources,
and Industrial "Growing Up"
T h u s w h e n coal, steam, a n d m e c h a n i z a t i o n opened u pvast n e wtechnical pos-
sibilities, western Europeans (especially i nEngland) were i n a unique position
to capitalize o n them. Vast untapped N e w W o r l d resources ( a n d underground
resources) still l a y before t h e m , essentially abolishing t h eland constraint.
Moreover, what they h a d already gained i nthe N e w W o r l d meant they entered
the nineteenth century w i t h a higher standard o f living than they w o u l d other-
wise have had,enlarged military capabilities ( w h i c h could force open markets
in s o m e cases a n d i m p o s e m o n o p o l i e s i n others), a n d f a rm o r e extensive hand-
icraft industries than they could o t h e r w i s e have maintained. A n d i tw a s f r o m
' " See Latham 1978b 6 9 - 7 0 , 80. 89; F a m i e 1979: 325; Hobsbawm 1975: 149.
Jones 1981: 84.
286 CHAPTKR SIX
these proto-industrial w o r k e r s , n o tdirectly f r o m t h e peasantry, that m o s t early
factory workers came.
T h e importance o f a factory workforce d r a w n heavily f r o m people already
w o r k i n g i nproto-industry isbrought o u tvery clearly i nJoel M o k y r ' s "grow-
ing u p " m o d e l o fE u r o p e a n industrialization. First, despite n u m e r o u s attempts
t o find " s u r p l u s l a b o r " i n a g r i c u l t u r e — i . e . , w o r k e r s w h o c o u l d b e r e m o v e d
f r o m t h a t .sector w i t h o u t a p p r e c i a b l y a f f e c t i n g p r o d u c t i o n ' ' — s u c h c a s e s s e e m
rare, e v e n i ntoday's T h i r d W o r l d ; ' " a n dnone o f o u r cores c o u l d afford t o have
their agricultural output fall very m u c h circa 1 8 0 0 .Second, factories e m -
ploying former proto-industrial w orkers have a distinct advantage. I f factory
workers were d r a w n o u to fagriculture, then even i f demand f o rt h e m d i d n o t
r a i s e w a g e s ( i n o t h e r w o r d s , i f t h e r e was s u r p l u s l a b o r i n a g r i c u l t u r e ) , t h e r e
w o u l d b e n o reason f o r that w a g e t o fall; a n das t h ediffusion o f mass-produc-
tion techniques caused t h e price o f t h eproduct made b y a factory t ofall, t h e
firm w o u l d e n c o u n t e r d e c l i n i n g p r o f i t s a n d m i g h t h a v e d i f f i c u l t y e x p a n d i n g .
( M o k y r a s s u m e s t h a t t h e fixed c a p i t a l n e e d e d i s f a i r l y c h e a p , a s i s c o m m o n i n
early industrialization; a n d since t h e r a w materials cost r o u g h l y t h e same r e -
gardless o f theproduction process, t h e factory's wage bill is t h emost impor-
tant variable cost.) B u ti ft h e nascent industry c a n d r a w o n proto-industrial
w o r k e r s w h o m a d e t h esame product as t h efactory did, then t h esame techno-
logical diffusion that places d o w n w a r d pressure o nt h e factory's prices also
depresses w o r k e r s ' alternate earnings possibilities. T h u s thefactory c a n reduce
wages a n d still attract recruits f r o m this sector; this a l l o w s i t t o m a i n t a i n higher
p r o f i t s f o r longer.'"*
T h u s , i n this scenario, industry c a n result f r o m t h e" g r o w i n g u p "o f proto-
i n d u s t r y ; i t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a simultaneous social a n dtechnological transfor-
m a t i o n that enables agriculture t om a i n t a i n o rincrease output f r o m about t h e
same amount o f land while releasing a huge number o f workers. Moreover,
proto-industrial workers often m o v e d t othefactory w i t h some relevant skills
and/or k n o w l e d g e useful f o r m a k i n g further innovations. A l l this suggests
that t h e continued g r o w t h o f proto-industry i n t h edecades preceding a n d
o v e r l a p p i n g t h e g r o w t h o fm e c h a n i z e d industry left E u r o p e i n a f a rbetter posi-
tion than i f i t h a d been compelled t o keep more people i n agriculture a n d
forestry.
T o put things slightly differently: Europe's expansion o fboth proto-indus-
try a n d m a n y early mechanized industries required m o r e agricultural output.
Quite aside f r o m whether Britain ( o reven E u r o p e m o r e generally) could have
found e n o u g h land ath o m e t o resolve these problems, putting large additional
amounts o flabor into supplying these f a r m goods directly w o u l d have created
" L e w i s 1954: 1 3 9 - 9 L for later literature, see Myint 1958: 3 1 7 - 3 7 .
™ Schultz 1964: 6 1 - 7 0 .
' ' ' M o k y r 1976: 132-64.
ABOLISHINC; THK LAND CONSTRAINT 287
further p r o b l e m s later on. B u t instead, E u r o p e acquired m a n y o fthese supplies
by h a v i n g others g r o w t h e m , w h i l e putting itso w n labor into additional sol-
diers, sailors, traders, a n d producers o f manufactured goods. A sfactories at
h o m e needed m o r e labor, they c o u l d d r a w o nproto-industrial w o r k e r s , w i t h
the advantages discussed above.
O v e r time, soldiers a n d sailors became m o r e effective p e r capita thanks t o
technological c h a n g e (e.g., better guns a n d ships) a n d w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y sup-
plemented o rreplaced b y "natives" hired w i t h t h eproceeds o fcolonial taxa-
tion. T h u s t h eoverseas sector w e n t t h r o u g h a sort o f" g r o w i n g u p " o fits o w n ,
w h i c h meant that this w a y o f obtaining p r i m a r y products d i d n o t absorb i n -
creasing amounts o fEuropean labor T h emassive expansion o fagriculture at
home, w h i c h w o u l d have been needed otherwise, w o u l d have been n o t o n l y
ecologically difficult, b u t hard t oreconcile w i t h t h eexpansion o f the industrial
w o r k f o r c e . W h e n B r i t a i n ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l w o r k f o r c e finally b e g a n t o d e c l i n e i n
absolute n u m b e r s after 1850, i t w a s tied both t o technologies that h a d been
unavailable earlier i n t h ecentury a n d t o massive increases i n agricultural
imports; production held steady as labor inputs declined, b u td i d n o t rise
much.**" T h e c o n t r a s t t o t h e a t y p i c a l ( f o r E u r o p e ) case o fD e n m a r k , d i s c u s s e d
i n chapter 5 , i s striking. There, a near-stabilization o ft h e ecology through
labor-intensive methods seems t o have been inconsistent w i t h industrialization
for m a n y decades, even though t h e marginal returns t o m u c h o f this w o r k —
and t h e real wages o f both urban a n d rural laborers—were l o wa n d falling
further.*"
F o r a long t i m e C h i n a a n dJapan, like Europe as a whole, also found w a y s
to keep e x p a n d i n g their p r o t o - i n d u s t r i a l sectors, e v e n w i t h o u t a N e w W o r l d t o
s u p p l y t h e n e e d e d fiber a n d o t h e r l a n d - i n t e n s i v e i n p u t s . T h e s e p r o c e s s e s a l s o
i n v o l v e d s o m e e x p a n s i o n o f t r a d e ( a n d o f fishing) t o r e l i e v e l o c a l p r e s s u r e o n
the land i n cores; b u t compared t o t h e E u r o p e a n solution, they i n v o l v e d a
greater intensification a n d e x p a n s i o n o ftheir o w n a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors, particu-
l a r l y f o r fiber p r o d u c t i o n . A n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h a t p r o -
cess s e e m s t o h a v e been p r o c e e d i n g a t d i m i n i s h i n g rates a n d a t c o n s i d e r a b l e
ecological cost. Japan's p o p u l a t i o n stopped g r o w i n g b y 1 7 5 0 , a n d w h i l e
China's continued g r o w i n g f o ranother century, thepercentage o fthe popula-
tion i n proto-industry likely stagnated o r even declined. I nall probability, f e w
areas i nC h i n a that h a d extensive proto-industry actually u n d e r w e n t significant
deindustrialization. W h a t happened instead w a s that t h e heavily agricultural
areas o fC h i n a came t o m a k e u p a m u c h larger percentage o fthe p o p u l a t i o n b y
1850 than they h a d i n 1750.
""Thompson (1989: 189) shows that output of food per farm worker rose about 50 percent
between 1840 and the early 190()s. but the number of farm workers fell by 25 percent, making a
net gain in output of 12.5 percent. Moreover, even those gains required a massive increase in the
use of off-farm chemicals and other products for agriculture (see 193-99).
See Kjaergaard 1994: 160 on wage trends.
 288 CHAPTER SIX
T h e most advanced prefectures o f t h e Y a n g z i D e h a , w h i c h h a d r o u g h l y
16-21 percent o f China's population i n 1750, w e r e barely 9 percent o f t h e
empire b y 1850, a n d about 6 percent b y 1950. A s w e shall see shortly, t h e
percentage o f these prefectures' population that w o r k e d i nproto-industry m a y
have fallen slightly, but whether o r not that happened, the empire's most proto-
industrial region s i m p l y ceased t o have t h e same weight i n aggregate figures.
In L i n g n a n , t h esecond most proto-industrial macro-region, popul a t i on g r o w t h
b e t w e e n 1 7 5 0 a n d 1 8 5 0 w a s about 7 5 percent, b u t C h i n a as a w h o l e g r e w
about 1 0 0 percent; moreover, a disproportionate share o f L i n g n a n ' s g r o w t h
was i n G u a n g x i , a province largely limited t o agriculture a n d forestry.
^ T h u s , even t h o u g h s o m e o fthe heavily agricultural macro-regions w e r e be-
c o m i n g m o r e proto-industrial, their v e r y large share i n post-1750 p o p u l a t i o n
g r o w t h m e a n t that C h i n a as a w h o l e w a s at least as a g r a r i a n i n 1 8 5 0 as i n 1 7 5 0
a n d n o t m u c h less s o i n 1 9 5 0 . M o r e o v e r , p r o t o - i n d u s t r i a l w o r k e r s scattered
across t h efarmsteads o fthe i n t e r i o r and o f t e n seen as part o f a n ideal agrarian
h o u s e h o l d w e r e n o tas easily available t o m o v e into hypothetical factories as
true proletarians w i t h n o ties t o the land m i g h t have been. T h u s , d u r i n g the t w o
c e n t u r i e s o r s o after 1 7 5 0 , C h i n a b e c a m e less w e l l p o s i t i o n e d f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z -
ing along t h erelatively easy path o f" g r o w i n g u p " a n dh a s instead h a dt o deal
w i t h a l lthe problems o f drawing most o f its factory workers directly o u t o f
agriculture.
T h e U n i t e d States, h o w e v e r , is a n i m p o r t a n t r e m i n d e r that n o tall early i n -
dustrializers h a d large p r o t o - i n d u s t r i a l sectors. I n fact, K e n n e t h S o k o l o f f a n d
D a v i d Dollar, c o m p a r i n g t h e U n i t e d States a n dE n g l a n d i nt h e nineteenth cen-
tury, have emphasized that t h e m u c h greater seasonality o f agricultural w o r k
in E n g l a n d s l o w e d t h e development o f factory-based industry. W i t h large
n u m b e r s o f w o r k e r s available o n l y part o f the year, b u tat wages far l o w e r t h a n
what they w o u l d have required t o leave t h eland completely, handicraft indus-
try proved a tenacious competitor for factories, a n d investment i n centralized
plants, e q u i p m e n t , a n d s u p e r v i s i o n w a s less a d v a n t a g e o u s t h a n i t w o u l d h a v e
been h a dt h eagricultural a n dindustrial w o r k f o r c e s been m o r e c o m p l e t e l y sep-
arate. I n t h e U n i t e d States, b y contrast, v e r y favorable land-to-labor ratios
m e a n t that farmers c o u l d supplement their g r a i n - g r o w i n g w i t h other activi-
ties—animal husbandry, wood-cutting, fruit-raising a n d land-clearing, f o r i n -
s t a n c e — w h i c h y i e l d e d less p e racre but p a i d w e l l p e rh o u r ; thus t h er u r a l labor
force w a s occupied full-time w i t h o u t m u c h resort t o handicraft industries.
T h u s w h e n factories w e r e built, they c o u l d g r o w still m o r e rapidly than i n
E n g l a n d (especially g r a i n - g r o w i n g , h a n d i c r a f t - p r o d u c i n g s o u t h England).**-
T h i s a r g u m e n t is persuasive f o rt h e t w o cases o f E n g l a n d a n d t h e U n i t e d
States. B u t t h e A m e r i c a n case w a s radically different f r o m a n y t h i n g i n o u r
E u r a s i a n cores. T h every favorable land-to-labor ratios meant that A m e r i c a n
«2 Sokoloff and Dollar 1997: 1-20.
ABOMSHINC; THE LAND CONSTRAINT 289
f a r m s c o u l d easily feed a separate i n d u s t r i a l w o r k f o r c e as that g r o u p e m e r g e d
( w h e t h e r f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n o r f r o m rapid natural increase a n drural-urban m i -
gration). I t also meant that these farmers w e r e sufficiently prosperous, e v e n
without industrial by-employments, t o buy factory goods, even i f those goods
w e r e made w i t h fairly expensive labor. L o n g distances a n dtariffs, m e a n w h i l e ,
helped ensure that E u r o p e a n manufactures made w i t h w h a t w a s often cheaper
labor did not capture all o fthe U n i t e d States market.
U n d e r t h o s e s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , A m e r i c a n f a c t o r i e s t h a t h a d t o find t h e i r
laborers a m o n g ex-farmers (whether f r o m Massachusetts, Ireland, o r Ger-
m a n y ) m i g h t still, contrary t o t h e " g r o w i n g u p " m o d e l , expand m o r e rapidly
than E n g l i s h factories. B u t very f e w places i n t h e eighteenth-century O l d
W o r l d could have accommodated a huge increase i n population that neither
raised local f a r m output n o r brought i n p r i m a r y products b y producing indus-
t r i a l exports; a n d where rural populations i n O l d W o r l d cores were not avail-
able for proto-industry, this w a sm o r e likely d u e t o very labor-intensive year-
r o u n d m u l t i - c r o p p i n g (e.g., i nparts o f L i n g n a n ) o r e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s o f w o r k
to preserve a fragile e c o l o g y (e.g., m a r l i n g , d i t c h - d i g g i n g , a n d s o o n i n D e n -
m a r k ) than t o t h e sorts o f lucrative b u t land-intensive b y - e m p l o y m e n t s that
o n e finds o n n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y U . S . f a r m s .
T h u s , O l d W o r l d cores could not create a factory labor force i nt h ew a y t h e
U n i t e d States did. F o rt h e m , t h e choice w a s b e t w e e n p u l l i n g people o u t o f
f u l l - t i m e p r o t o - i n d u s t r y o r o u t o fat least p a r t - t i m e f a r m i n g . G i v e n that, b e i n g
able t o d r a w o n proto-industrial w o r k e r s w o u l d still seem t h e m o s t advanta-
geous w a yt o create O l d W o r l d industrial w o r k f o r c e s . T h i s left E n g l a n d f a r
better-off than places like the Y a n g z i Delta, w h i c h lacked peripheral trading
partners that w o u l d c o m p l e m e n t it i n t h e w a y that England's did.
T h i s a r g u m e n t c a n also b e expressed i nterms o fanother feature o fM o k y r ' s
" g r o w i n g u p " m o d e l o f E u r o p e a n industrialization. T h em o d e l assumes that
p e o p l e t u r n t o p r o t o - i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e first p l a c e w h e n t h e m a r g i n a l
productivity o f their labor i n agriculture falls b e l o w that o f proto-industry.
( T h e f o r m e r starts o f f h i g h e r t h a n t h e latter, b u t falls m u c h m o r e rapidly,
largely because the supply o f land is limited.) T h u s , theextra labor beyond a
certain p o i n t w i l l all g o i n t o proto-industry, as l o n g as t h earea i n q u e s t i o n c a n
continue exporting proto-industrial products i n exchange f o r food (and, w e
m i g h t a d d , fiber a n d t i m b e r ) w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g t h e r e l a t i v e p r i c e s o f f o o d a n d
handicrafts i n the " w o r l d " m a r k e t w h e r e it makes these exchanges.
T h i s c o n d i t i o n , usually called t h e " s m a l l - c o u n t r y a s s u m p t i o n , " m a k e s per-
fect sense f o r the Netherlands a n d B e l g i u m , t h ecases for w h i c h M o k y r devel-
oped this m o d e l — a n d at o n e point i t also m a d e sense f o rt h e L o w e r Y a n g z i
and L i n g n a n , a n dt h e K a n t o a n dK i n a i regions. A l t h o u g h , as w e h a v e seen, t h e
Yangzi Delta prefectures imported huge amounts o f p r i m a r y products—
36,000,000 people i m p o r t i n g 15-22 percent o ftheir food, plus timber, bean-
cake fertilizer, a n dso o n — t h e hinterlands a n dmarketing networks they drew
290 CHAPTKR SIX ABOLISHING THK LAND CONSTRAINT 291

on w e r e s o vast that t h e s m a l l country assumption still m a k e s sense as a w a y
o f l o o k i n g att h eregion's trade i n t h e mid-eighteenth century. B u tas s o m e o f
these hinterlands, such as t h e M i d d l e a n d Upper Y a n g z i a n d N o r t h China,
grew m o r e populous, experienced d i m i n i s h i n g returns i nagriculture a n d de-
veloped m o r e o f their o w n proto-industry, t h e terms o ftrade d i dshift, t o t h e
m a r k e d disadvantage o fproto-industrial producers.
T h o u g h s i l v e r - d e n o m i n a t e d cotton cloth prices fluctuated f r o m year t o year,
there seems t o have been n o trend i n n o m i n a l cloth prices f r o m 1750 t o 1850."'
R a w cotton prices i n C a n t o n , f o r w h i c h w ehave r e l a t i v e l y g o o d data, also
s h o w n oclear trend, t h o u g h short-term fluctuations w e r e often violent."'' B u t
silver-denominated rice prices i nt h e L o w e r Y a n g z i rose b y 4 0 percent over
that same century."' T h a t increase alone w o u l d have c u tt h espinning a n d
w e a v i n g i n c o m e o fthe hypothetical w o m e n i nchapter 2 b yabout 3 0 percent,
f r o m 7 . 2 shi o f r i c e i n 1 7 5 0 t o 5 . 0 shi i n 1 8 5 0 .
Moreover, fragmentary data collected b yK i s h i m o t o M i o suggest that i n t h e
L o w e r Y a n g z i itself, r a wcotton prices d i d rise substantially b e t w e e n 1750 a n d
1 8 0 0 . S u c h a finding i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t r e n d l e s s p r i c e s n e a r C a n t o n , s i n c e
transport costs b e t w e e n these t w o areas fell sharply i n t h e late eighteenth a n d
early nineteenth centuries. I t w o u l d also b e consistent w i t h seventeenth-
century patterns, i nw h i c h t h eprice o fr a w co t t o n i nt h eY a n g z i D e l t a seems t o
have r o u g h l y tracked that o frice."" I f K i s h i m o t o ' s data arer o u g h l y representa-
tive f o rJiangnan, then t h e fall i nspinners' a n d weavers' earnings w o u l d b e
r o u g h l y 5 0 percent just b e t w e e n 1750 a n d 1794 ( w h e n h e rdata stop), t h o u g h
they w o u l d b e falling f r o m a higher starting point. A n di fw e guess that t h e
trend i nr a wcotton prices f o l l o w e d that o f rice over t h e long haul, t h e rice-
buying p o w e r o f o u r hypothetical weaver/spinner w o u l d fall 2 5 percent be-
t w e e n 1 7 5 0 a n d 1800, a n d 3 7 percent b y 1 8 4 0 . " ' M e a s u r e d i n salt o r p r o b a b l y
firewood, they fell further still.
In M o k y r ' s m o d e l , such a fall i n returns t o proto-industrial labor i n t h e
L o w e r Y a n g z i s h o u l d have l e dt o a tleast s o m e labor s h i f t i n g back i n t o agricul-
ture atw h a t w o u l d previously have been unacceptably l o w returns, andthus t o
a combination o ffurther agricultural intensification andsome measure o f de-
industrialization."'' T h o u g h a n y such shift w o u l d have been modest, w e have
one possible indication o f it. R a wcotton f r o m t h e L o w e r Y a n g z i seems t o t o
have become cheaper andmore plentiful i n Guangzhou (Canton) i n the early
nineteenth century, m u c h t othe dismay o fforeign merchants bringing Indian
cotton t o sell. T h o u g h t h e fall i n price m a y have been largely a matter o f
i m p r o v e d transportation,'^" t h e g r o w t h i n q u a n t i t y suggests that p e r h a p s less
Y a n g z i Delta cotton w a sbeing spun a n dw o v e n locally; i t seems u n l i k e l y that
L o w e r Y a n g z i r a w cotton output rose m u c h i n this period, a n d imports f r o m
N o r t h China were almost certainly falling.
A n d yet,most Yangzi Delta w o m e n continued t o spin a n d weave, even at
l o w e r returns; i n fact, as w e s a w earlier, i t is precisely i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y
that references t o w o m e n o f that region w o r k i n g w i t h m e ni nt h e fields finally
disappear completely.'" I fs o m e f a m i l i e s w e r e u n w i l l i n g t o m o v e their w i v e s
a n d d a u g h t e r s b a c k i n t o t h e fields w h e r e t h e y w o u l d b e m o r e v i s i b l e — a n d
perhaps even tried t oincrease cloth output t om a i n t a i n i n c o m e — t h e situation
might have come t o resemble t h e quasi-involutionary situation described b y
Goldstone, i nw h i c h w o m e n "stuck" i n very l o w - w a g e home-based spinning
a n d w e a v i n g m a d e i t m u c h less p r o f i t a b l e t o c o n t e m p l a t e f a c t o r y - b a s e d t e x t i l e
production. A n y such pattern emerging i nthis period w o u l d be t h eresult o fa
When graphed, the relationship looks roughly like this:
Marginal Agriculture Agriculture
Productivity
ofl.al>or

E v e n these depreciated earnings c o u l d still meet t h e subsistence needs o f the

w o m a n herself a n d w o u l d b e close enough t om a l e agricultural wages ( w h i c h
w e r e also f a l l i n g i n real t e r m s ) that C h i n a ' s " g e n d e r g a p " r e m a i n e d less severe
Handicrafts ,
than that i n Europe. B u tthey d o s h o w a substantial decline i n earnings f r o m HiindK-rafts 1
home-based textile production, even before a n y competition from machine- 1
1
made cloth. A w o m a n weaving very high-grade cotton cloth w o u l d have es- 1
H
Labor I n p u t s "
caped these pressures, since itsprices nearly doubled over this s a m e century,""
but these w e r e atypical w o m e n w h o h a d unusual skills a n dprobably produced Time T = I Time T = 2

f e w e r pieces each year. Before rise in relative price After rise in relative price

ol' p r i m a r y products ol primary products

*' Zhang Zhongmin 1988: 208. H , H * = points at w h i c h labor switches into handicrafts

See Dermigny 1964: I V : table 19. L . L * = total labor input

« 5 Y . C . W a n g 1992:42. 45. I . - H , 1.* - H * = labor devoted lo handicrafts
Kishimoto 1997: 1.39, 141; Greenberg 1951: 92; Dermigny 1964: IV: table 19. F o r more
details, see appendix E . '"Greenberg 1951: 9 1 - 9 2 .
*' See appendix E for more details. ** Zhang Zhongmin 1988: 194. See L i Bozhong 1996, and above pp. 1 0 3 ^ .
 292 CHAPTER SIX
temporary conjuncture, rather than a fundamental feature o flong-term Chinese
d e v e l o p m e n t based o n timeless n o r m s (as H u a n g suggests) a n d it w o u l d b e t o o
late appearing t o b e t h e basic explanation o f t h e n o n d e v e l o p m e n t o f factories,
as G o l d s t o n e proposes.''- N o n e t h e l e s s i t m i g h t h a v e h e l p e d s l o w t h e r e p l a c e -
ment o fdomestic textile production b y factory production, even once the tech-
n o l o g y b e c a m e available, as G o l d s t o n e suggests later i n h i s essay. E i t h e r w a y ,
these w o m e n r e m a i n e d part o fhouseholds i n w h i c h t h e m e n ( a n d t o s o m e
extent children) w e r e d r i v e n t o increasingly labor-intensive strategies o f
farming, fuel-gathering, and land-management—not a promising precursor t o
industrialization.
^ Japan's response t o similar pressures remained w i t h i n the same basic frame-
w o r k as China's, b u t w i t h some differences that m a y have h a d long-term i m -
plications. First o f all, Japan's population broke through its historic ceiling,
never t o return, earlier than that i n either C h i n a o r E u r o p e . P o p u l a t i o n reached
n e w heights i n t h elate seventeenth century, w h e n both E u r o p e a n d C h i n a
experienced d o w n t u r n s , a n d b y about 1720 i t h a d reached a plateau that w o u l d
last u n t i l about I 8 6 0 . ' ' ' T h i s l o n g p e r i o d o f zero p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h m a y repre-
sent a m o r e rapid a n d t h o r o u g h d e m o g r a p h i c adjustment t o ecological c o n -
straints than t h e s l o w i n g , b u t still positive p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h o f early n i n e -
teenth century C h i n a , b u ti t c o u l d also b e argued that t h e adjustment w a s
sharper because t h e situation w a seven worse: after all, overall p o p u l a t i o n den-
sity i n Japan e v e n circa 1860 w a s still m u c h higher than it w a s i nChina.'''' A n d
w h i l e t h e e n o r m o u s i n c r e a s e i n J a p a n e s e o c e a n fishing o f f e r e d a k i n d o f r e l i e f
m u c h less used i n C h i n a ( i t p r o v i d e d b o t h f o o d a n d f e r t i l i z e r ) , a n d t h e e a r l y
development o fsystematic silviculture w a s also a n important adjustment,*"
Japan, too, faced serious barriers t ofurther expansion o f proto-industry i nits
core regions.
Agricultural prices rose sharply relative t o those o f industrial goods d u r i n g
the 1730s, then s h o w e d n o trend until t h e late 1820s, w h e n they began another
steep c l i m b ; t h e average p r e v a i l i n g level f o rt h e 1 7 3 5 - 1 8 2 5 period w a s about
2 0 percent above the m i d - 1 7 2 0 s peak a n d almost 5 0percent above the 1 7 3 0
trough.'"' I k n o w o f n o signs o f deindustrialization i n either t h e K a n t o o r t h e
K i n a i i n response t o changing relative prices, b u t these regions d i d decline
''- A s I argued in chapter 2 and elsewhere, it is not clear that this particular nondevelopment
needs much explanation—it faced many barriers both in China and elsewhere, and the more "nat-
ural" path appears to have been an exhaustion of the possibilities of proto-industrialization. What
needs explaining is why parts of Europe did not follow this path, too—so that Europe can be seen
as C h i n a manque (or England as Flanders manque) rather than the whole world being England
manque,
Saito 1985; 185,
M c E v e d y and Jones 1978: 1 6 6 - 7 1 , 1 7 9 - 8 1 ; note especially the low percentage of Japanese
land that is arable,
' ' T o t m a n 1989: 8 1 - 1 7 0 ; Howell 1992: 2 7 1 - 7 5 ,
Saito and Shinbo 1989: 9 1 ,
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 293
in population: 16 percent f o r the K a n t o between 1751 a n d 1 8 2 1a n d perhaps
5 percent f o r t h eK i n a i , while t h eprefectures w i t h impressive population
g r o w t h w e r e m o s t l y i n areas that w e r e still relatively sparsely populated i n
1870 a n d also still w e l l b e l o w t h e national average o n Saito's index o f rural
industrialization, ( B y contrast, the Kinai region h a d both a population density
and a rural i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n index that d o u b l e d t h e n a t i o n a l averages,)*" W e
have already seen that the m a j o r g r o w t h o f both industry a n d population w a s
in poor d o m a i n s such as Tosa, w h e r e o l dm o n o p o l i e s w e r e being relaxed; b u t
m a n y such m o n o p o l i e s persisted, asd i dbarriers t o m i g r a t i o n . These barriers t o
g r o w t h i n the peripheries m a y have spread pressure f o rf a m i l y limitation into
more peripheries than i nC h i n a (though a n y comparison is speculative w i t h
current data), u l t i m a t e l y preserving s o m e o f t h e same sort o f slack capacity
that m u c h o f continental E u r o p e h a d b u t C h i n a lacked. T o p u t i tanother w a y ,
the share o f Japan's m o s t advanced regions i nnational aggregates declined,
as i t d i d i n C h i n a , b u t m u c h m o r e g e n t l y , s i n c e p e r i p h e r a l g r o w t h w a s m o r e
modest. L a b o r intensity increased, b u t this w a s d u ealmost entirely t o i n -
creased hours per worker, n o t t o population g r o w t h . A n dthough cities a n d
t o w n s lost g r o u n d relative t o t h e countryside,''" the country's still relatively
h i g h urbanization rate also suggests that m o r e o f w h a t M o k y r calls "pseudo-
surplus" labor w a s stored i n handicrafts (as opposed t oagriculture) than w a s
the case i n C h i n a .
A s w e w o u l d e x p e c t , t h e I n d i a n s t o r y i s d i f f e r e n t a g a i n , b u t i t s t i l l fits w i t h i n
the same general f r a m e w o r k . Moreover, India's differences f r o m C h i n a point
in t h e opposite direction f r o m Japan's differences a n d suggest m o r e serious
l o n g - t e r m obstacles t o industrialization. India, as w e have seen, began its pop-
ulation b o o m later than C h i n a o r western E u r o p e d i d , a n d m u c h later than
J a p a n : p r o b a b l y a f t e r 1 8 3 0 , a n d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y a f t e r 1800.''"' T h e n i n e t e e n t h
century s a w a ne n o r m o u s increase i n cultivated land i n India a n d f e w signs o f
s e r i o u s o v e r a l l s h o r t a g e s o f f o o d , f u e l , fiber, o r b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s . ( D i s t r i b u -
tion was, o fcourse, quite another matter: India exported large a m o u n t s o f grain
i n t h e late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , f o r instance, w h i l e i t h a d .serious h u n g e r a t
h o m e . ) B u t despite a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f late precolonial c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n , t h e
share o fIndia's p o p u l a t i o n i n n o n - f a r m i n g occupations probably fell d u r i n g
early British rule. T h esubcontinent underwent w h a t B a y l y calls "peasantiza-
tion," as both f o r m e r l y migratory peoples a n d f o r m e r handicraft w o r k e r s w e r e
increasingly d r a w n — a n d pushed—into sedentary farming. T h e process a p -
pears t o have begun before c o l o n i a l i s m , i npart because t h e c o m p e t i n g suc-
cessor states t o t h e M u g h a l e m p i r e h o p e d that settling m i g r a t o r y peoples o n
the l a n d w o u l d increase state c o n t r o l , p u b l i c security, a n d state r e v e n u e s ; i t
See Saito (1985: 211) and compare with Iwaha.shi (1981: 440).
'"Sugihara 1997: 153.
" M o o s v i 1987: 402, 405; Subrahmanyam 1990: 3 5 8 - 6 0 ; Habib 1982a: 166-67; Visaria and
Visaria 1983: 4 6 3 - 6 5 .
294 CHAPTKR SIX
accelerated under t h e British a n dtouched increasing numbers o ff o r m e r urban-
ites as w e l l . " "
A n intense debate has been w a g e d about whether India deindustrialized i n
the nineteenth century; w i t h inadequate data, i t i s u n l i k e l y t o b e settled.""
H o w e v e r , i t does seem fairly w e l l established that t h e n u m b e r o f full-time
weavers a n d spinners (especially those based i n t o w n s ) decreased significantly
b e g i n n i n g i n t h e late e i g h t e e n t h century. T h i s s e e m s t oh a v e been d u e a t first
to measures t a k e n (especially i n B e n g a l ) b y t h e East I n d i a C o m p a n y a n d s o m e
other merchants w h oincreasingly bound weavers t oa single potential buyer;
a s t h i s d e p r e s s e d e a r n i n g s , m a n y a r t i s a n s fled t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n . " ' " L a t e r , e a r n -
ings came under intense further pressure f r o m c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h Lancashire.'"^
A n d t h e percentage o f the Indian population living i n cities declined signifi-
cantly over t h e long t e r m — f r o m 1 3 - 1 5 percent i n t h e late seventeenth century
to 9.3 percent i n 1 8 8 1 — t h o u g h i t i s c u r r e n t l y i m p o s s i b l e t odate t h e decline
m u c h m o r e precisely.'"'* D e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i salso suggested b y H a b i b ' s
ing that t h e value o f sugar, cotton, a n d i n d i g o g r o w n i n India quite likely fell
in absolute terms ( n o t t o m e n t i o n per capita terms) between 1 5 9 5 a n d the
1870s.""
W h i l e total yarn a n d cloth output i n India m a y have held their o w n , thanks
to a n increase i np a r t - t i m e rural s p i n n i n g a n d w e a v i n g , this w o u l d n o t have h a d
the same significance f o r future industrialization as w o u l d the g r o w t h o f a
full-time proto-industrial w o r k f o r c e . These w e r e n o t people w h ocould later
be m o v e d i n t o factories w i t h n o cost t oa g r i c u l t u r a l output;""" n o r w e r e they
w o r k e r s w h o s e cost t o a potential factory o w n e r w o u l d fall together w i t h t h e
unit price o f h i s product, since m u c h o f their i n c o m e came f r o m f a r m i n g .
T h u s , it could b eargued, though India began t h e nineteenth century w i t h a
less-monetized e c o n o m y than that f o u n d i n C h i n a , Japan, o rw e s t e r n E u r o p e ,
it w a s m o v i n g i n s i m i l a r d i r e c t i o n s a n d h a d m o r e e c o l o g i c a l r o o m f o r i n c r e a s -
ing population a n d per capita c o n s u m p t i o n than they d i d . B u t b y t h e early
t w e n t i e t h century it h a d lost that advantage a n d h a d both t h e disadvantages o f
a densely populated zone a n d those o f a zone w i t h limited proto-industrial
development and a limited internal market. This combination o fproblems had
occurred n o t s o m u c h t h r o u g h t h e sort o f ( l a r g e l y ) m a r k e t - d r i v e n regional de-
v e l o p m e n t that seems t o have l e d t o C h i n a ' s c u l d e sac, b u t t h r o u g h t h e pref-
erences o f colonial ( a n d ,t o s o m e extent, indigenous) authorities f o r settled
""'Bayly 1983: 2 1 9 - 2 6 . 2 9 0 - 9 2 : Bayly 1989: 188-89.
"" See. e.g.. Bagchi 1976; Vicziany 1979: 10.5-^3; Bagchi 1979: 1 4 7 - 6 1 ; Perlin 1983: 89-9.');
Harnetty 1991: 4.'i.'i-.'il0.
"'- Hossain 1979: 326-3.5; Mitra 1978: 23. 2.5, 29, 32, 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 8 - 4 9 . 56, 7 9 - 8 0 , 84. 8 7 - 9 2 ,
132, 144, 164. 172-73.
Harnetty 1991: 46.3-66. 5 0 5 - 7 ; Milra 1978: 188. 194-95,
" " H a b i b 1982a: 168-69.
I " ' Ibid.
""• O n the absence of true "surplus labor" in Indian agriculture, even in the twentieth century,
see Schultz 1964: 6 1 - 7 0 .
ABOLISHING T H E LAND CONSTRAINT 295
populations, " c u s t o m a r y " l a w ,agricultural a n d forest exports, a n d a captive
market for the mother country's industrial goods. T h e result w a s a n increasing
emphasis o nprimary-product exports even a m i d great population g r o w t h —
p r i m a r y products o f t e n p r o d u c e d w i t h labor that w a s n o less coerced ( a n d
m a y b e m o r e s o ) t h a n i n t h e least free areas o f e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y I n d i a . " "
T h u s , despite considerable g r o w t h i n agriculture a n d c o m m e r c e , India m a y
h a v e b e c o m e less w e l l p o s i t i o n e d f o r i n d u s t r i a l - l e d t r a n s f o r m a t i v e g r o w t h .
C o m p a r e d t o w h a t at least m i g h t h a v e h a p p e n e d h a d e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y social
trends continued a bit longer w h i l e population g r e w a n d competition f r o m
mechanized goods stayed a w a y a little bit longer, colonial India's f o r m o f
"peasantization" m i g h t reasonably be labeled a "development o f underdevel-
opment." T h e British probably d i d n o t frustrate a n industrial breakthrough
that w a s otherwise h i g h l y likely, as s o m e nationalist scholars c l a i m , b u t nine-
teenth-century changes m a y have made such a breakthrough even more diffi-
cult than i tw o u l d have been otherwise and m o r e difficult than the transition
find-
faced b y either western E u r o p e a n economies o r east A s i a n ones. T o p u ti t
another way, Japanese a n d especially Chinese cores m a y have faced bottle-
necks d u e t othe convergence o f their peripheries toward "core" profiles, but
Indian cores suffered t h e w o r s e fate o f converging t o w a r d a m o r e peripheral
profile.
T h e w o n d e r then is that at r o u g h l y t h e same t i m e that t h e " s m a l l - c o u n t r y
a s s u m p t i o n " b e c a m e less applicable t o east A s i a n c o r e s — l a r g e l y b e c a u s e t h e
growth o f population and proto-industry i n their peripheries w a s m a k i n g the
quantity o f primary products available o n their " w o r l d " markets smaller rela-
tive t o their need.s—that same assumption r e m a i n e d applicable t o Britain e v e n
t h o u g h its p o p u l a t i o n soared a n d itsp e r capita d e m a n d g r e w (first s l o w l y , t h e n
very rapidly after about 1840). M o r e o v e r , it r e m a i n e d applicable over t h e next
century, notonly to Britain, but t o an ever-larger "industrial Europe." W i t h o u t
that w o n d e r t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a m u c h larger population, higher per capita
c o n s u m p t i o n , a n d f a r less l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e l a n d m a n a g e m e n t — a l l c e n t r a l t o t h e
" E u r o p e a n m i r a c l e " — w a s n o t possible. W i t h o u t that wonder, t h e achieve-
ments o fEurope's preindustrial market economy—impressive though they
w e r e — c o u l d have led i nthe same direction as the also impressive market
economies o fother regions. E v e n that other w o n d e r — t h e string o f technologi-
cal innovations that m a k e s u pt h e o r i g i n a l history o f t h e "Industrial R e v o l u -
t i o n " — m i g h t well have slowed t o a c r a w l w i t h o u t this o n e .
The wonder can b epartly explained b y western Europe's o w n "advantages
o f b a c k w a r d n e s s , " as discussed i n chapter 5 : d o m e s t i c resources left u n -
exploited because o finstitutional blockages that w e r e o n l y relieved i n t h e
nineteenth century a n d that, a tthat point, kept t h e i m p o r t needs o fs o m e indus-
t r i a l i z i n g areas f r o m b e i n g e v e n larger. B u t as w e h a v e seen, this a r g u m e n t
h a s l i t t l e a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o B r i t a i n , a n d l i t t l e t o fiber a n d w o o d . T e c h n o l o g i c a l
"" See, for instance. Bayly (1989) on tea plantations.
296 CHAPTER SIX
ABOl.lSHINC THE LAND CONSTRAINT 297
catching up—e.g., i n per-acre yieid.s—also helped, b u t that alone c a n hardly
industrial expansion could have been t h e basis f o ra later catastrophe; o r i t
e x p l a i n E u r o p e ' s surge a h e a d o fthe rest o fthe globe. E u r o p e ' s w o o d p r o b l e m
could have been stopped b y rising primary-product prices i n t h e nineteenth
was o f course substantially eased b y coal, b u t f o rquite a w h i l e this applied
century; o r it could have been severely constrained b y a need for m u c h m o r e
o n l y i n Britain a n d a f e wother places. F u r t h e r m o r e , overall t i m b e r d e m a n d
labor-intensive approaches t o e x p l o i t i n g a n dc o n s e r v i n g a l i m i t e d land base.
kept rising even w h e r e coal w a s used heavily, since w o o d h a d m a n y other
T h u s , forces outside t h em a r k e t a n dconjunctures beyond E u r o p e deserve a
uses: t i m b e r i m p o r t s c o n t i n u e d t o rise t h r o u g h o u t t h e late eighteenth century
central place i n explaining w h y western Europe's otherwise largely unexcep-
and at a n unprecedented rate i n t h e nineteenth century. ( T h o u g h coal, as w e
tional core achieved unique breakthroughs a n d w o u n d u p as t h e privileged
saw, also h a d other dimensions, t h r o u g h its links t o steam power, railroads, center o fthe n i n e t e e n t h century's n e w w o r l d e c o n o m y , able t o p r o v i d e a soar-
and so on.) ing population w i t h a n unprecedented standard o f living. O u rlong j o u r n e y
T h u s , f o r a m o r e complete explanation o fw h a t occurred i n Europe's core, t h r o u g h i n t e r r e g i o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s h a s b r o u g h t u s t o at least s o m e r e s o l u t i o n
w e m u s t also l o o k at its peripheries a n dunderstand w h y t h e y b e c a m e g r o w i n g o f the methodological question w i t h w h i c h w e began: i t has s h o w n that rather
rather than shrinking suppliers o f p r i m a r y products t o the " w o r l d " market. Part than pretend w e are seeking t h edifferences a m o n g truly independent entities
o f the a n s w e r lies i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements i n eastern E u r o p e a n d R u s s i a o n t h e e v e o f industrialization, w e m u s t acknowledge t h e importance o f pre-
that long inhibited p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h a n d proto-industrialization o f t h e sort existing connections i ncreating those differences.
that occurred relatively rapidly i n t h e Chinese interior a n d Japan's R e g i o n
I I — m o r e "advantages o fbackwardness." but ones that c o u l d not be reaped o n
a large scale until after 1860. M u c h o fthe rest o fthe a n s w e r — a n d t h e bridge
that g o t E u r o p e t h r o u g h t h e first c e n t u r y o f t h e p r o t o - i n d u s t r i a l t o i n d u s t r i a l
transition—lay, as this chapter h a s argued, i n t h e N e w W o r l d : not just i n its
natural bounty, b u t i nt h eunique institutions a n dconjunctures that brought f a r
m o r e o fits b o u n t y t o E u r o p e far earlier t h a n p u r e l y S m i t h i a n trade c o u l d have.
T h e institutional factors include s o m e — l i k e t h e slave trade a n d t h e m i n e
labor systems—whose departure f r o m market principles are obvious a n d
which w e often consign t o o quickly t o a "premodern" world, forgetting their
role i n m a k i n g o u rw o r l d possible. Others, like t h e corporation, are familiar,
" m o d e r n , " and clearly E u r o p e a n i norigin. Consequently, w e tend t o forget that
they w e r e created b y a n d f o rextracontinental encounters a n d that f o ra l o n g
t i m e they m a y have been m o s t significant as a m e t h o d o f u n d e r w r i t i n g t h e
huge fixed costs o f violence: a m e t h o d that then forced these enterprises t o
i n c r e a s e volumes o f "exotic" imports (rather than focusing exclusively o n
profit m a r g i n s , as t h e V e n e t i a n s a n d P o r t u g u e s e h a d tended t o d o ) a n d thus t o
expand t h e European presence abroad. Still others, like the specialized slave
plantation, are well k n o w n , buttheir role i n creating a n e w kind o f periphery
for Europe is here placed i n a n e w light. A n d beyond these institutions l i e
various global conjunctures that favored t h e expansion o f t h e E u r o p e a n pres-
ence i n the N e w W o r l d : f r o m w i n d patterns a n ddisease gradients t o E u r o p e a n
state c o m p e t i t i o n a n d C h i n e s e s i l v e r d e m a n d .
Together, these largely extra-European a n d n o n m a r k e t factors were essen-
tial i n m a k i n g transatlantic trade a uniquely self-expanding route b y w h i c h
Europe (especially Britain) could use its labor a n dcapital t o relieve its hard-
pressed land a n dthus turn even a demographic a n dproto-industrial expansion
that ( u n l i k e i n east A s i a ) f a r outpaced advances i n agriculture into a n asset
for further development. W i t h o u t those factors, this demographic a n d proto-