THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.
208170 August 20, 2014 phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA
a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in
Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau
(Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659),
and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice
to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the
Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart
Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number
PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. "John" and
"Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA)
Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was
already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St.,
Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for
twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and
while therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe
release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of
the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the
following narration of the kidnapping:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair
Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States,
went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota
taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along
EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a
on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to
have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to
time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy
and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that
when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he
was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who
was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as "John" approached him and
removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him
that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone
calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment,
tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these
equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and
asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions
not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to
call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to
them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six
Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text
message purportedly from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and
ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in
Manila about the situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine
National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding
US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping
thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainant’s brother Aaron
Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s
safety and eventual release.
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was
allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive
and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other
accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down
biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate
number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon
instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand
Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor,
Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On
February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER group
proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the
overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours,
the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they
were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it
down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window
and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant
did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his
name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked
him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce
any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were
supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a
picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is
being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed
under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being
informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK
Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez,
[appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue
operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence,
hewas led back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded
inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The
man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as
his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainant’s
captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to
substantiate their claim of innocence:
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the
supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against
him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many
times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation
and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior
thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at
around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped),
Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 –
9:00 o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money
to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he
alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them
held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing
tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They
kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands
were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still
being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them
talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was
made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus,
someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to
which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to
the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag
containing his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust
bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI
Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his
wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a
window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial
Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin
and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five
Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective
engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He
does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he
cannot drive a taxi as an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his
womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she was
pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street,
Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s
testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the
police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good
condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was
driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was
not informedof his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the
kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is
legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian.
On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village,
Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento
Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated
since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00
(earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank.
She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her
househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around
11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her
residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought
because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their
van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat,
Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror.
She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers, were
detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and
helpers were released and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with
the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John
or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They
owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken
into custody by the police, she had withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank
passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport,
wedding ring, necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she
does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as
principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and
Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions
of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that
Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother
Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over
the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had
adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair
as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food
during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an
accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and
Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the said decision states:
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court
also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she
is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS
MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have
already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy
Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from
the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos
(1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the
CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise
lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to
establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits
thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE
PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE
ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that
she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she
was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12,
2004, even when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus
in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the
Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her
because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and
not because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an
accomplice.11
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they
could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the
Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief,
maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03446.13Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in
amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of
kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of
responsibility of each accusedappellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the
Court in People v. Maxion15 that:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question,
having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies.Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court
can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept
and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will
not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual
findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are
accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and
conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17
In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a
judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective
assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to
establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor, because, evenif the commission of the crime is a given, there
can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla
taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on
the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his
business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to.
Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the
facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is
the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of
their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. 19
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as
belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of
Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to
him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a
unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it
was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced
himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three
weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother
Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent.
There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely
testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive
for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper
motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial
evidence that led tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed
the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the
circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.22
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the
findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus
and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento
Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the
victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center
on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was
found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11,
2004;
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai
Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were
found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered
pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera
cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family
footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of
cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two
(2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite,
under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts
and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate
No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau;
marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana
Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco
bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in
the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe
QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped
victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and
 6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was
recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus
showed that both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces
of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no
other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When
viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive
of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.24
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a
private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance
which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said
accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned
by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and
chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his
will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of
US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is
liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand,
is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It
must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that
Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the
prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he
remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his
kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18
of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that
there bea community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way;
and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but
she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she
stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her
husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus’
illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that
being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a
person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and
indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely
an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this
Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it was stressed that in
case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather thanthat of a principal.
Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure
to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-
settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. 29 Oftentimes,
the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details
anchored entirely on the investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn
statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan
accused, as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies
given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are
often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which transpired. 31
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot
accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi
is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi
must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to
prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no
competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to
substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain selfserving
and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records
does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the
prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify
and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in
such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it
that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the
accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must
fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 34 The accused-appellants
never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their
respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and
coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-
appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests.
The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby
curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that
the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons.35Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their damages (₱573, 132.00 x 213) or ₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should
acquittal. be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or ₱191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in
warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that the amount of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or ₱66,666.6 7;
their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral
People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest damages; and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim
complaint after a trial free from error.37 Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in
penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-
in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day 1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion ₱182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary
temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper. damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount
273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. of ₱91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and exemplary
As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe damages in the amount of ₱33,333.33.
award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to SO ORDERED.
₱200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that
Alastair and his family endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of
detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to
raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical
and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article
2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the
superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of exemplary
damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good.
The Court, however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.38
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for
the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages
awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree
of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The
ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of
civil liabilities among all the accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission
of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and
actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam
actual damages in the amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of
₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, or a total
amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their participation,
the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida
who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of
Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a
notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal
and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all
the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and
chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then
Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of
Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada
in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court
certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had
just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy.
As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station,
the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence
where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto
proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident
allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad
only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed
for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and
started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next
day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct
further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that
same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When
Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of
the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of
the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman
Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken.
The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on
February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately
built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the
lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the
right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm
right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm.
in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior
aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral
border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches
below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward
to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at
the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the
right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the
level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left
armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed
toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in
length, medial aspect, palm right.
 11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward
with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of
the shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the light
thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the
medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the
posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture
of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of
the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right
lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle
lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending
colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex
of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE
DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED
(sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
J Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5)
of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and
intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the
police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved"
in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C.
headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been
indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force
and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES
and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four
other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at
large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill,
and taking advantage of their superior strength and number, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons
with which said accused were provided at the time, thereby
inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on
different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to
the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the
immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of
not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo
on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales,
Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as
earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal
Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo
Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie
Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased
Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to
the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16
wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4)
incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while
admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
(except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to
the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least
two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives
for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted
in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she
incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome
Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other
matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account
of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on
July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his
work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver
by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at
the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he
heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and
takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan"
or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was
then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it
into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters
away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon
reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he
went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police
authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight
months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to
his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at
Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the
deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The
herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his
house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it
after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night
of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of
Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant,
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of
Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of
alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's
testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the
herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p.
43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty
recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without
merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-
39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was
stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were
moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we
think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared
for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to
get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held
in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this
country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal
investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to
affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he
had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria
were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever.
(TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any
reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus,
Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The
appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the
accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the
accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty
should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should
have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the
indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to
P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court.
(E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v.
Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43
(1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of
Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same
insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be
desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even
gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the
sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the
alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime,
there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where the
killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more
definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense
puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there
would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the
ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring
to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is
the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other
place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other
authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales
surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the
"surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe
from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that
Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of
the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st
P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in
their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen
wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed
instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument
might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report
are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the
killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of
Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these
wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower
courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the
self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is
compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the
appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he
(Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters
away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized
the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by
each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I
only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did
the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the
weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act
committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the
Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates
him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing
did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court
of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the
commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also
by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission;
(2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the
act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the
appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there
is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said
that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as
"any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In
this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant
which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his
death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see
who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say,
because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack
of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to
above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one
of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could
as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking
and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest
(already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And
pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that
only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal
wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic
further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the
non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her
womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence
that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt,
the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that
he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly
saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to
report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt
on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several
weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute
for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly
witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his
life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering
that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under
police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they were not
yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life
would still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the
prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that
one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his
landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw
the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs.
Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a
tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his
landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria
are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate
themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported
eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction
of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which
Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his
landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the
financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow,
he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who
gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing
circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say
the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our
customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents
are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and
emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much
younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the
participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the
appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we
seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three
robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were
a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like
in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it
may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at
the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y
PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed
the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor
General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by
Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were
charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away
one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately
resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as
principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and,
in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term
of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally
the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the
offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following
counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established
findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the
transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on
January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta
Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a
driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused
Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro
that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take
his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and
so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on
(sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of
Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He
poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced,
"ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her
go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma.
Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her
gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched
her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There
Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check
for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he
changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma.
Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to
the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles
 ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van.
Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the
car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to
CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying
to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati.
(tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the
car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter
ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the
trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he
was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three
theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial
court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be
kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds
true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at
a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential
to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former,
or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion
and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted
on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official
duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by
reason of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the
crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated,
candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy,
I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are
you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and
that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me
any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that
for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated
thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the
victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary
and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives
or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic)
the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your
nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you
already when the checks was (sic) being handed
to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed
the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her,
why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at
Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the
money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that
when she signed the checks we will take her to
her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her
house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already
given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic)
came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or
some other place along the way we might be
apprehended by the police. So when we reached
Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will
 already stop and allow you to get out of the
car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the
nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what
she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts
involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which
she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime
committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the
theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated
in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from
the allegation in the information that the victim was carried away
and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they
intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with
her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more
cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes
committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on
the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing
clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal
effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement
has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is
not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident
from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that
is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands
are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put
our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary
robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and
pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with
such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation
of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the
formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the
band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a
band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that
the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If
the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band
if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating
and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein,
could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the
same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the
rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and
the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace,
 order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307
of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability
to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice
to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed
firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the
unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived
victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which
is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage
Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the
crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory
decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already
been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that
presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It
is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an
instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that
criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is
forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto,
would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put
the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory
the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario
is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively
set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and
completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in
the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things,
was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section
2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply
demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in
this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery
defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of
craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in
favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use
of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by
Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of
the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for
ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in
the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is
sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the
robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against
appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not
expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the
taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was
unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the
presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra
and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in
relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the
amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
vs.
TOMASA DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.
Manuel Torres, for private prosecutor.
Alfredo Chicote, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila, taken by the
complaining witness, Julian Gonzalez, from a judgment of acquittal, upon a
complaint for bigamy under article 471 of the Penal Code.
The defendant was married to the complaining witness in Manila, May 27, 1897.
After living together in Manila for a time they separated, the defendant remaining in
the house where they had been previously living until some time subsequent to July
12, 1900. On that day she was married in Manila by a Protestant clergyman to
Ramon Martinez. Her defense is that she honestly believed her first husband was
dead when she married Martinez.
It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the
separation, in the same house with the defendant. Gonzalez testifies that the
separation took place in March, 1900, and that he also lived for some months in the
lower story of the same house, the defendant living in the upper story. He further
testifies that after he left this house and went to live elsewhere he visited his relatives
there nearly every day down to a few days before the trial, which took place in
September, 1901. He says that he often saw his wife at these times, supplying her
with means for her support through his relatives, but that he never spoke with her. A
short time after her second marriage the defendant moved away from the house and
has since lived elsewhere.
The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and
two months when the separation took place. That would fix the date of the separation
in July, 1898. She testifies that some time during the year following the separation
she was told by the mother of Gonzalez that she had been informed that her son was
dead, that thereupon prayers were said for his soul for nine nights, and that she put
on mourning and wore it a year. She says that she contracted the second marriage
with the consent of the mother of Gonzalez, and believing that the information which
she had received from her as to the death of Gonzalez was true. The mother of
Gonzalez died before the trial.
There was some further evidence from other witnesses on both sides, but it was of
such a character as to throw but little light upon the facts of the case. On the whole,
we have reached the conclusion, though not without some hesitation, that the story
told by the defendant is in the main more likely to be true than false, and that she
probably did contract the second marriage under a bona fide belief that the first
marriage had been dissolved by the death of Gonzalez.
We have recently held, in the United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique
Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902, that there can be no conviction under article
475 of the Penal Code, where by reason of a mistake of fact the intention to commit
the crime does not exist, and we think the same principle must apply to this case. The
defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint.
We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal
negligence in contracting the second marriage, and should have been convicted
under article 568 of the Penal Code. (See G.O., No. 58, sec. 29.) It does not appear
that she made any attempt to ascertain for herself whether the information received
by her mother-in-law as to the death of Gonzalez was to be relied upon. She never
even saw or communicated directly in any way with the persons who gave her
mother-in-law this information. Moreover, viewing the testimony in the light most
favorable to her, she waited less than two years after hearing the death of her
husband before contracting the second marriage. The diligence with which the law
requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which he is to perform. In a matter so important to the good order of
society as that in question, where the consequences of a mistake are necessarily so
serious, nothing less than the highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard
prescribed by the law. We can not say that the defendant has acted with that diligence
in the present case.
Applying the provisions of article 568 of the Penal Code, the act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage, the prior marriage not having been lawfully
dissolved, being one which, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, the
offense committed by the defendant is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum
degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree. There being no aggravating
circumstance, and as we think the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal
Code may properly be considered in this case, this penalty should be applied in its
minimum degree.
We therefore sentence the defendant to four months and one day of arresto
mayor and costs. The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance
with this opinion. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest,
no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be
said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached
house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was
occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure
of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in
the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by
placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door
of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines
along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that
the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion
the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced
the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events,
it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which
he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch
and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual
was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone
for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants
employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs
and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said
that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the
room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced
to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do
a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
 (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be
entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his
fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in
a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite
his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available
weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That
neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was
in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was
repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife
to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that
the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient
of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes
intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal
liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of
these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically
and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein
defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed,
and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be
observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a
great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked
upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this
disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime,
the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is
greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm"
(Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was
of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by
law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from
that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong
or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies
and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition
of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because,
as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be
said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
(Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without
fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act,
an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury.
(Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice
or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive
judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also
from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first
paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission
of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder
kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In
one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly"
or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely
`voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the
American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not
often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual,
and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously"
"with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to
imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will
always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a
crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position
with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in
the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but
crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment
would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty
unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful
intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
—
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern,
is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man
guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the
 like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So
also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to
the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around
the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public
voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to
man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an
upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is
made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far
from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the
martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost
confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good.
Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to
be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from
this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to
forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists
only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the
law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids."
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in
the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there
is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of
the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28
Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith,
and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and
the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless
of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent
person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to
the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear
to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be
the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was
really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of
this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on
a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his
life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be
innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he
would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that
the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person
slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed
 him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it
will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable
homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds
of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom.,
417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him,
with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in
the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head
before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It
turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol?
Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded —
a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not
the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension,
no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p.
160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth,
at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected
from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to
the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who
struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick
with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a
blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow
on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It
turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days
in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great
grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87
of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted
by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was
nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent,
because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed
demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of
his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with
which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did
he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the
house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was
one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which
they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find
from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means
employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was
no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
"Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the
same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding
the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's
sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and
not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor
of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc.
The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under
the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed
were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March
17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
 QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is
awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this,
he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his
pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the
same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility
as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a
majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but
not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned,
finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting
in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May
23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and
of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of
his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness
or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his
bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-
D.[1] We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper
disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada
y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P.
Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butchers knife, with
intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy
place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital
parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter
due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as
per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel,
Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal
heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other
consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.[2]
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public
Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that
accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was
confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He
prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order confining
him at the said hospital.[3]
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio,
propounded several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were
understood and answered by him intelligently, the court denied the motion that same
day.[4]
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on
accused-appellants behalf.[5]
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel,
the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and
conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the
incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended
accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims sister. The prosecution
established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the
sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a
thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down
the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop
was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the
center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full
view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops chair. The man was accused-
appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-
appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the
Bishops chair. Gripping the chairs armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese:
No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, Santillan moved
away.[6]
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the
cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishops
chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his
nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did
not budge.Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was
about to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back,
lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac
fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac
parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to
the microphone and shouted: Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He
returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding,
slowly dragged himself down the altar.[7]
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a
report of a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1
Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in
one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and
advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and
raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief,
Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near
accused-appellant to pick up the knife.Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief
Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was
able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant,
they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist.[8] He was brought to the police
station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he
expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive,
intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.[9] He was found to have sustained two (2)
stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy
reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
 1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space,
left, 1 x 1 penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one
side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe
of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.[10]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of
murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
that there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellants
hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to
calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.[11]
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the
accused pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind; that after he made the first
stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off
undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was
being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the
trial court in its order of January 6, 1995.[12]
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden
of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow
accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio
General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to
some other institution.The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with
appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the
jail roof so he could escape and see his family.[13]
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail
wardens letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand
trial had already been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies
otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper
person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.[14]
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.
[15]
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-
appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout
at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that
appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining
of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once,
while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste matter
and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates.
Appellants counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for
Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. [16] Attached to the
motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector
Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge
informing him of appellants irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court
order for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant.
[17]
The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis
from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan
City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary and adviser of said
association, informed the jail warden of appellants unusual behavior and requested
that immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the
jail.[18]
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying
the Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered accused-appellant to present his
evidence on October 15, 1996.[19]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the
testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, [20] a resident physician in the Department
of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellants medical and
clinical records at the said hospital. [21] Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been
confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he
suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid,
chronic, paranoid type;[22] and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged
in improved physical and mental condition. [23] The medical and clinical records
consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer,
Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-
appellant for admission and treatment after a relapse of his violent behavior; [24] (2)
the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; [25] (3) the consent slip of appellants
wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; [26] (4) the Patients Record;[27] (5)
the Consent for Discharge signed by appellants wife; [28] (6) the Summary and
Discharges of appellant;[29] (7) appellants clinical case history;[30] (8) the admitting
notes;[31] (9) Physicians Order Form;[32] (10) the Treatment Form/ medication sheet;
[33]
and (11) Nurses Notes.[34]
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution
evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby
sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses
and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[35]
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF
INSANITY.
 II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING
TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY
AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.[36]
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a
felony committed by him.[37] Under the classical theory on which our penal code is
mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. [38] Man is essentially a
moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. [39] When
he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have
been done voluntarily,[40] i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.[41] Man,
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired.[42]
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind[43] and that all acts are voluntary. [44] The moral and legal presumption
under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
person.[45]This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one
of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.[46]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a
hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict
which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.[47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.[48] The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent.[49] He must be deprived of reason and act without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will.[50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. [51] And the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of its execution.[52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to
receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before
and after that time.[53] Direct testimony is not required.[54] Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. [55] Circumstantial evidence,
if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by
outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound
mind.[56]
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with
insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does
not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that
time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan [57] attached to the Information, there are
certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant
may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked
Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit on the
Bishops chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of
Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and
ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security
guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the
Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the
stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address
system, uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He
then returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention
on the day of the arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension
of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently
enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized
under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the
time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to
be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the
mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination,
order such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of
his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can
neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto.[58]
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the
trial court.[59]And the test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended
depends on the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel,
would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an
accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that
not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or
gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every
accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to
be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. [60] In the American
jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at the time of the
court proceedings is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time
of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the
defendants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission. Present insanity is
commonly referred to as competency to stand trial[61] and relates to the
appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendants
present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. [62] In competency cases,
the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense
which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to
stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found
competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial.
[63]
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the
capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to
cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available
defense may be interposed.[64] This test is prescribed by state law but it exists
generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law.[65] Thus:
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time
and place, and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.[66]
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the
defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary
or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. [67] The first requisite is the relation
between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer
coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the
court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding
of the proceedings.[68]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. [69] It has been held that it is inhuman to require an
accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. [70] To put
a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of
the constitutional rights to a fair trial[71] and due process of law;[72] and this has
several reasons underlying it.[73] For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be
assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may
not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover,
he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a
criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in
his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are
safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings
may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal
proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is
his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent
defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may
destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of
comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal
proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a
conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a
reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an
invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant
knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon
his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize
the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized
retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against
one who cannot comprehend its significance.[74]
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered
rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. [75] Mere allegation of insanity is
insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a reasonable
doubt[76] or a bona fide doubt[77] as to defendants competence to stand trial. Among
the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendants irrational behavior,
history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for
mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay
testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case. [78]
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the
arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the
motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently
answered by him. The court declared::
xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked
questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of
fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of
him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to
Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[79]
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial
court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and
assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition
that effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-appellant was
of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him. It is also not
certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made
by accused-appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal to plead.[80]
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-
appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert
equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a persons
mental health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the
court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind
of accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done
so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City
wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual behavior and
requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain
in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One
year later, accused-appellants counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for
Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to this motion was a second
letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of
the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two
(2) attached letters,[81] the judge ignored the Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
Mental and Psychiatric Examination. The records are barren of any order disposing
of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his
evidence.[82]
Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia,
paranoid type, is a lifetime illness and that this requires maintenance medication to
avoid relapses.[83] After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he
never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up.[84]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that
accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was
suffering from mental illness.[85] This manifestation was made in open court more
than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored
by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants
state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even
considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the
judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental
examination.[86] The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
appreciation.[87] Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis
of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt
behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal
question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the accuseds
abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.[88]
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly
made, it may have served a dual purpose[89] by determining both his competency to
stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the
medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of
the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. [90] The crime in
the instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years
ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to
evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission for him to
avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.[91] Nonetheless, under the present
circumstances, accused-appellants competence to stand trial must be properly
ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived
appellant of a fair trial. The trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic
requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said
court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica,[92] we ordered that the joint decision of
the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper
proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one
(1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of guilty to all three charges and was
sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds plea was not an unconditional
admission of guilt because he was not in full possession of his mental faculties when
he killed the victim; and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary
medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission of
the crime.[93]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant
Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to
the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant,
a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION dried marijuana leaves. Although her penalty of life imprisonment had already
[G.R. No. 125672. September 27, 1996] become final, the beneficial effects of the amendment provided under R.A. 7659
JESUSA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR should be extended to petitioner.
WOMEN IN MANDALUYONG, respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is
R ES OLUTION hereby ORDEREDRELEASED IMMEDIATELY, unless she is being detained on
PANGANIBAN, J.: some other legal charge.No costs.
After having served five and a half years of her life sentence, may petitioner --
who was convicted of selling 5.5 grams of prohibited drugs, namely, dried marijuana
leaves -- be now entitled to the beneficent penalty provisions of R.A. 7659 and be
now released from imprisonment?
The Facts
Petitioner Jesusa Cruz, a.k.a. Jesusa Mediavilla, is at present confined at the
Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City serving the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed upon her as a consequence of her conviction on March 31,
1992for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Her appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered
by the Regional TrialCourt of Iloilo City, Branch 33, was dismissed by this Court
on March 1, 1993 in G.R. No. 106389, People vs. Jesusa Cruz. Hence, her life
sentence has become final and executory.
On August 6, 1996, the present petition for habeas corpus was filed by Atty.
Mylene T. Marcia-Creencia (of the law firm of Fortun and Narvasa) who was
appointed by this Court on September 13, 1995 as counsel de oficio to assist the
accused in the preparation of the said pleading. Petitioner alleges that, as of the date
of filing of her herein petition, she has already served five and a half years of her life
sentence (February 2, 1991 to August 5, 1996). She argues that the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court is excessive considering that the marijuana
allegedly taken from her was only 5.5 grams or less than 750 grams. The Solicitor
General, in his Comment filed with this Court on August 30, 1996, interposed no
objection to a favorable application of Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly modified the
penalties prescribed by R.A. 6425; that is, inter alia, where the quantity of prohibited
drugs involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty is reduced to a range of prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. (Ordoez vs. Vinarao, G.R. No. 121424, March
28, 1996). In People vs. Simon (234 SCRA 555, July 29, 1994) and People vs. De
Lara (236 SCRA 291, September 5, 1994), this Court ruled that where the marijuana
is less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional. Moreover, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable is further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as minimum term,
to the medium period of prision correccional as the maximum term, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances (Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 110983, March 8, 1996).
All told, the petitioner should now be deemed to have served the maximum
period imposable for the crime for which she was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5 grams of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993
of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two
offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated from
under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four
months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the
second crime.1
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later
referred to the Court en banc in view of the problematical issue of whether to sustain
the trial court's judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Tac-an,2 People vs. Tiozon,3 People vs. Caling,4 People vs. Jumamoy,5 People
vs. Deunida,6People vs. Tiongco,7 People vs. Fernandez,8 and People vs. Somooc9 or
to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros, 10 which this Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
The informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the
municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then
armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed,
suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the
opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the
accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior
to the incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea
with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his head and
causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, with aggravating circumstance of nighttime
being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime. 11
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the
municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry
and have in his possession, custody and control a firearm (hand
gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit
or license to possess the said firearm from competent authorities
which firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his
residence and was used by him in committing the crime of Murder
with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of PD No. 1866. 12
Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint
hearings were had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO4 Felipe
Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr.
Gregg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis. The defense presented as
witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and
the appellant himself.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball
Court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist
fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel
Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the
former's sister Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178 & 1879, June
8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco
was held in the same place. This benefit dance was attended by
Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo
Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the
dancing area, Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who
were then sitting at the plaza (the area where they positioned
themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four mete's
from the dancing hall), decided to just watch the activities in the
dance hall directly from the plaza.
After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the
gate of the dance area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same
night, while facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita Iroy saw
appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from
behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy,
hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita
 Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while
appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and
Largo Iroy to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the
meantime, Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her parents the
unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8,
1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of the preceding paragraphs).
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting chief
of Police Felipe Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her
daughter Teodula Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the
police blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered
his men to pick up the appellant. But they were unable to locate
appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179,
June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his
father Teogenes Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol.
There and then, appellant was pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and
Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were
entered in the police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim Case
Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-6).13
The slug was embedded at the midbrain. 14 Diosdado Iroy died of
Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation,
secondary to massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to
gunshot wound, 1 cm. left occipital areas, transecting cerebellum
up to midbrain. 15
The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per
certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly licensed firearm
holder as verified from a consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the
province 16 and was not authorized to carry a firearm outside his residence. 17
The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because
he was positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It summarized his
testimony in this wise:
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases,
declared that in the afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in
their house. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran
City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit
passengers. They transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the
evening. They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for
the passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans
Asia Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were
able to pick up two passengers for Graham Avenue near La Roca
Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the arrival of
MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk
with Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his auntie
scheduled to arrive abroad MV Cebu City. They were not able to
pick up passengers which, as a consequence, they went home.
They had on their way home passengers for the Agors Public
Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at Bil-isan,
Pangalao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31,
1992 where he passed the night. He went home to Mariveles,
Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.18
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and sentenced
him accordingly. It appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery considering that the appellant shot the victim at the back of the head while
the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive portion of the decision dated 30
September 1993 reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court
finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua,
with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel
Quijada guilty of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition punished under Sec. 1 of RA No. 1866 as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence from Seventeen (17) years Four (4) months and One (1)
day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain of the back
portion of the head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government.
It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone
preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the term
of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be
entitled to 4/5 of the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has
not executed a waiver. 19
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the
decision an award of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal Case No. 8178,
the trial court issued an order directing the appellant to pay the parents of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son and P10,000.00 for
funeral expenses. 20 The order was to form an integral part of the decision.
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.21
The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends
that the trial court erred
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND FELIPE NIGPARANON.
II
 . . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as
DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she was inside the dancing
ARANSADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE PICTORIAL hall and rushed to her brother only after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The
EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY following testimony of Rosita shows beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA Q You said that you were initially dancing inside
IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO. the dancing place and you went out, about what
III time did you get out?
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION A 11:00 o'clock.
WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SPO4 FELIPE Q And you were standing about two (2) meters
NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 22 incident happened?
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the A Yes I was standing.
killer of Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer was not identified, he Q And where did you face, you were facing
attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SPO4 Felipe Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a motive "to put him in a bad light" and A I was intending to go near my brother. I was
calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado, the victim, approaching and getting near going to my
boxed him on the night of 25 December 1992 because he allegedly "bothered her." brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I
He further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the person who shot Diosdado saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother Diosdado
considering their respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense Iroy. 23
witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and ran towards the xxx xxx xxx
crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the appellant considers it as Q And in your estimate, how far was your
suppression of evidence when the prosecution did not present as witnesses brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting at the
Diosdado's companions who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot. plaza to the dancing place?
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said A More or less four (4) meters distance.
witnesses is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for arbitrary COURT:
detention had already been filed against him by the appellant. The appellant further From the dancing hall?
claims of alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter. A Yes, your honor.
Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, Q And in your observation, was the place where
according to him, gained strength because of the lack of evidence on the identity of Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or illuminated?
the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily going to the police A Yes, sir.
station after having been informed that he, among many others, was summoned by Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of Diosdado Iroy — A I do not know what kind of light but it was
specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be believed that moments after the shooting lighted.
she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy. Q Was it an electric light?
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged decision. Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the place located?
parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit. A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place
The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly and the light from the house.
persuade. The appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean
their fight on the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with the dancing place was enclosed at that time and
human experience that it would be the appellant who would have forthwith there was a gate, an opening?
entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convicting evidence was A Yes, sir.
shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the death of Q What material was used to enclose the dancing
her brother Diosdado. place?
A Bamboo.
 Q And how far was the bulb which was placed
near the entrance of the dancing place to the
place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light
coming from the house, now whose house was
that?
A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not
know the family name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of
spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in your estimate, how far was the source
of light of the house of Fe and Berto to the place
where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A About six (6) meters distance.24
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the
gate of the dancing place?
A The white bulb.25
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly
declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored
principally in ". . . observing the attitude and deportment of
witnesses while listening to them speak" (People vs. Magaluna,
205, SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner
of testifying, the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince the
trial court that they were telling the truth. Settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or
the forthright tone of a ready reply; 26 or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere of the flippant or sneering tone,
the heat, the calmness, the yarn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant
or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 27 The
appellant has miserably failed to convince us that we must depart from this
rule.
Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the
non-presentation as prosecution witnesses any of the companions of Diosdado who
were seated with him when he was shot. In the first place, the said companions could
not have seen from their back the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second
place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most, only corroborate that of
Rosita Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the said companions were not
available to the appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative
or where the witness is available to the accused. 28
The alleged improper motive on the part of SPO4 Nigparanon simply because he is a
neighbor of the Iroy's remains purely speculative, as no evidence was offered to
establish that such a relationship affected SPO4 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police
officer, he enjoyed in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his official duty. 29 As to the alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police
blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified by SPO4 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was
positively identified by a credible witness. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused. 30 Besides, for that defense to prosper it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. 31 As testified to by defense witness Julian
Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where the appellant said he was, is only about eight to
nine kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about thirty
minutes to traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle. 32 It was, therefore, not
physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not
have voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This argument is plain sophistry.
The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers
such act as a mitigating circumstance. 33 Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive proof
of innocence.34
The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the
appellant had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm then that he used
in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, which reads:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or
possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an, 35 and reiterated in People
vs. Tiozon, 36 People vs. Caling, 37 People vs. Jumamoy, 38 People
vs. Deunida, 39 People vs. Tiongco, 40 People vs. Fernandez, 41 and People
vs. Somooc, 42 that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm
commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised
Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court
finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No.
8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation
of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted
for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the
same time laid down the rule that these are separate offenses, with the first punished
under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double
jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for
the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the
same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In
the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged
in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder
punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-
evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different
one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of
Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed
appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to
increase the penalty for homicide or murder; however, the killing of a
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by express provision of P.D.
No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.
In Tiozon, we stated:
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the
offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance
which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the
homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an
anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined
and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory
offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the
qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to
effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to
the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured
firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of
an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a)
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either
Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised
Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or,
stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the
second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal
Code.
In People vs. Doriguez [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A simple act
may offend against two (or more entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional act or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.
In People vs. Bacolod, [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot
from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the
people present and physical injuries to one, informations of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious
public disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was
convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the
ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only
for the same offense. A simple act may be an
offense against two different provisions of law
and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense[s] — the first
against a person and the second against public peace and order —
one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule or double
jeopardy.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal
possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can
also be separately charged with and convicted of homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there
is such a thing as "the special complex crime of Illegal Possession
of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and
defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as
amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. The legal provision
invoked, "Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms [or]
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed.
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the
present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among
others, "unlawfully possess any firearm . . (or) ammunition . . ."
Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary
permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is
attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion
perpetua. Now, if "with the use of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a
"homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is
more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the
fact of possession of a firearm without license. The crime may be
denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its
aggravated form. It is aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of a homicide or murder under the Revised
Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the
crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter
absorbed in the former. There are two distinct crimes that are here
spoken of . One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which may be
either simple or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by
the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD 1866. The
other is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal
authority consummates the crime under P.D. 1866, and the
liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearm's use
in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously
distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and
defined under the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused
who kills another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the
two separate offenses of violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and for homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. Thus:
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of
firearms or ammunition with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second paragraph
thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be
loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense because
both are circumstances which increase the penalty. It does not,
however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would
result whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense,
one which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to
separate prosecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 and (b) the violation of either Article 248 (Murder)
or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
cannot plead one to bar the other; stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished by a
special law while the second — Murder or Homicide — is
punished by the Revised Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon,
198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163
(1968)]. Considering, however, that the imposition of the death
penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper imposable
penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion
perpetua. (emphasis supplied)
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing
an information for murder and pursuing only the information for "Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm," this Court categorically declared:
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's
legal position in withdrawing the information for murder, the
offense defined in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and, therefore, does not bar the simultaneous
or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision
in Lazaro vs. People, involving the violation of P.D. No. 9, which
the investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no
longer controlling in view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-
an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the
terms of that document, although both the Information and the
 decision of the trial court used the term "Illegal Possession of
Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been
supposed to connote a "complex crime" as used in the Revised
Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled
in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no complex crime
of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of
the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This
offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the
unlicensed firearm is shown to have been used in the commission
of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code. The killing of a human being, whether characterized as
homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession
of an unlicensed firearm and is separately punished under the
provision of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995
in People vs. Barros, 43 we set aside that portion of the appealed decision convicting
the appellant of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. We therein made the following
statement:
[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate
offenses [of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form
and of murder], but only that of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and propositions
set forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, to which the Members of the Division,
the ponente included, subscribe.
The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado
referred to therein read as follows:
This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether
or not the crime should properly be the aggravated illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm through the use of which a
homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused
so situated should be liable only for the graver offense of
aggravated illegal possession of the firearm punished by death
under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree No.
1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from the
holding which would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in
addition to that for the illegal possession of the firearm used to
commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense
imputable to the accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the
simple possession punished with reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of
Section 1. Where, complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used
to commit homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will
convert the erstwhile simple illegal possession into the graver
offense of aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the
homicide or murder constitutes the essential element for
integrating into existence the capital offense of the aggravated
form of illegal possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would
be illogical and unjustifiable to use the very same offenses of
homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said
capital offense, and then treat the former all over again as
independent offenses to be separately punished further, with
penalties immediately following the death penalty to boot.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the
punitive standpoint, virtually of the nature of the so-called, "special
complex crimes," which should more appropriately be called
composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and Article
335. They are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the
rules on complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of
a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit
another. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses.
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been
covered by the conceptual definition of a complex crime under
Article 48, but the Code imposes a single definite penalty therefor
it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as
separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by
law. Thus, even where a single act results in two less grave felonies
of serious physical injuries and serious slander by deed, the offense
will not be punished as a delito compuestounder Article 48 but as
less serious physical injuries with ignominy under the second
paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is integrated
into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer
separately punished.
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative
illustration, as well as the discussion on complex and composite
crimes, is that when an offense becomes a component of another,
the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus
aggravated by the integration of the other, the former is not to be
further separately punished as the majority would want to do with
the homicide involved in the case at bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third
inquiry is more of a question of classification for purposes of the
other provisions of the Code. The theory in Tac-an that the
principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of
firearm and the killing shall merely be included in the particulars
or, better still, as an element of the principal offense, may be
conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here is actually source
from the very provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 which
sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the "various laws and
presidential decrees to harmonize their provision" which "must be
updated and revised in order to more effectively deter violators" of
said laws.
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlaying the
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the
principal crime to be charged is still carnapping, although the
penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The same situation, with
escalating punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are
found in the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein the principal
crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in
the matter of destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter
alia, death results as a consequences of the commission of any of
the acts punished under said article of the Code.
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a
case of illegal possession of firearm resulting in homicide or
murder, or, conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal
possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the
possible application of the provision on recidivism. Essentially, it
would be in the theoretical realm since, taken either way, the
penalty for aggravated illegal possession of a firearm is the single
indivisible penalty of death, in which case the provision on
recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is
not established but either homicide or murder is proved, then the
matter of recidivism may have some significance in the sense that,
for purposes thereof, the accused was convicted of a crime against
persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another
crime under the same title of the Code.
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered
and the penalty to be imposed when the unlawful killing and the
illegal possession are charged in separate informations, from what
has been said the appropriate course of action would be to
consolidate the cases and render a joint decision thereon, imposing
a single penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such
possession and the unlawful taking of life shall have been proved,
or for only the proven offense which may be either simple illegal
possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural rule
and substantive disposition should be adopted if one information
for each offense was drawn up and these informations were
individually assigned to different courts or branches of the same
court.
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession
separately from the homicide or murder could be susceptible of
abuse since it entails undue concentration of prosecutorial powers
and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was committed
with a firearm will necessarily be known to the police or
prosecutorial agencies, the only probable problem being the
determination and obtention of evidence to show that the firearm is
unlicensed.
Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed
without alleging therein that the same was committed by means of
an unlicensed firearm, the case would not fall under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein,
but without alleging the lack of a license therefor as where that fact
has not yet been verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even
if proved in that case, would not affect the accused either since it is
not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.
Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with
the prosecution intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide
or murder but the same is inexplicably delayed or is not
consolidated with the information for illegal possession, then any
conviction that may result from the former would only be for
simple illegal possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and
subsequent prosecution for homicide or murder prospers, the
objective of Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be achieved since
the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only be for
the unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying
circumstances as may be proved.
In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the
proposition that the real offense committed by the accused, and for
which sole offense he should be punished, is the aggravated form
of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the writer's position
that the possible problems projected herein may be minimized or
obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one
information or that the trial thereof, if separately charged, be
invariably consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly, this is the
course necessarily indicated since only a single composite crime is
actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and
dispose thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No.
8178 must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the penalty for the aggravated
illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing
conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or homicide and for
aggravated illegal possession of firearm in instance where an unlicensed firearm is
used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy deliberation thereon, the Court en
banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better
rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby
steering this Court away from a dangerous course which could have irretrievably led
it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers through judicial
legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's intent or purpose in
aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed
brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine"
or a "speciously camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal
concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense."
If Tac-an did in fact enunciated such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has
reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a convincing number of years, so
must the same verdict be made in our decision in People vs. De Gracia, 44 which was
promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter case, we held that unlawful possession of
an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecution for a violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between
that situation and the case where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder
would have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements:
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties
that from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989,
there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition
seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in
furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any
person merely participating or executing the command of others in
a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayorin its minimum
period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had
been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active
armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the
Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding
the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter.
We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and
improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the
degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on
him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is
distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Article 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes
penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised
Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of
firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a
rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a
specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms
committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
Missing p. 26
conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion
charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not
because it has become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has always been the
obstacle to the virtues of change," as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to
be, but rather because it honestly believes that Tac-an laid down the correct doctrine.
If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on doctrinal concepts of penal
laws and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not be
laid at the doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did
in Tac-an was to apply the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an
interpretation or the application of the niceties of legal hermeneutics. It did not forget
that its duty is a merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the
law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 45
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code 46 as
crimes against persons. They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary
ingredient therefor. 4 7 On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm
is defined and punished by a special penal law, 48 P.D. No. 1866. It is a malum
prohibitum 49which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the
exercise of his martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but
also because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not
eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the
proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and
explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree
and its policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded
wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into account the
criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed is intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be
clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to any other criminal
or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. 50
A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibitum and
their distinctions is an exercise in futility.
We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and
unequivocally provides for such illegal possession and resultant
 killing as a single integrated offense which is punished as such.
The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single
offense into two but, worse, it resorted to the unprecedented and
invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated
crime and then creating another offense by using a component
crime which is also an element of the former.
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the
illegal possession with murder punished with a single penalty have
been divided into two separate offenses of illegal possession and
murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a compounded
infringement of legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has
done, treat that single offense as specifically described by the law
and impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for
that offense is still proscribed), but then proceed further by
plucking out therefrom the crime of murder in order to be able to
impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond
cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the
consequential murder (or homicide) is an integrated element or
integral component since without the accompanying death, the
crime would merely be simple illegal possession of a firearm under
the first paragraph of Section 1.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a
conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal possession and resultant killing"
(emphasis supplied) "as a single and integrated offense" of illegal possession with
homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the occasion of to
evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its unequivocal and
explicit language, which we quote to be clearly understood:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT
OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE
USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is penalized therein. There
is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the commission
of homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of
Section 1, and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the original
purpose or primary objective of the offender, but a secondary event or
circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of the
commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the second, the
killing, which requires a mens rea is the primary purpose, and to carry that
out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm.
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also
apply the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D.
No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer Penalties Therefor), the
answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the lawmaker clearly intended
a single integrated offense or a special complex offense because the death therein
occurs as a result or on the occasion of the commission of the offenses therein
penalized or was not the primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532
provides:
Sec. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or
boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of
the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or
homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle rustling
as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle
involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is
committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed
as a result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
(emphasis supplied)
and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Penalties. — Violations of this Decree and the rules and
regulations mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be
punished as follows:
a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are
used: Provided, that if the explosion results(1) in physical injury to
person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or
 (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death;
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous
substances are used: Provided, that if the use of such substances
results (1) in physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of human life,
then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or
death; . . . (emphasis supplied)
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to
respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm
where such a firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear language yields no intention
of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to
aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be
separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are palpably clear to
exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as
crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced
as a mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the
unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to
increase the penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 — reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua — to death, seemingly
because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in using
an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve the
accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder
with death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to
consider such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That
could not have been the intention of the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the
subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as
an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death
weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death. . . .
The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of
the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some
other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed
firearm as a qualifying circumstance. This would not be without precedent.
By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179, which amended the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section provides
that when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a
state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
definition of the crime and the application of the penalty under the Revised
Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative
intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as
a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so illegally possessed is used in the
commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that intent is to
impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on
homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if
such firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion,
create two offenses by dividing a single offense into two. Neither did it resort to the
"unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated
crime and then creating another offense by using a component crime which is also an
element of the former." The majority has always maintained that the killing of a
person with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two separate
offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define and punish
a single integrated offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar
meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning
which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth
noting is the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation, 51 leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or
rationalization of the law. 52
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated
crime or composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain of integration of the
essential elements of one crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light
of the clear language and indubitable purpose and intent of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology, the determination of what should
be criminalized, the definition of crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the
exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate, the legislature
may even create from a single act or transaction various offenses for different
purposes subject only to the limitations set forth by the Constitution. This Court
cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single
integrated crime or composite crimes.
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts
is the rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that the majority view offends the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy under the "same-evidence" test enunciated in People
vs. Diaz. 53 He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the
evidence for the murder in the first charge of aggravated illegal
 possession of firearm with murder would be different from the
evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone.
In the second charge, the illegal possession is not in issue, except
peripherally and inconsequentially since it is not an element or
modifying circumstance in the second charge, hence the evidence
therefor is immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the evidence on
murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the crime
is only simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge,
because murder is the very subject of the prosecution. Assuming
that all the other requirements under Section 7, Rule 117 are
present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily
present and can be validly raised to bar the second prosecution for
murder?
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary
objection to the cases of the other composite crimes for which a
single penalty is imposed, such as the complex, compound and so-
called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a
person convicted of estafa through falsification under Article 48
can be validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either
estafa or falsification; or how the accused convicted of robbery
with homicide under Article 294 can be legally charged again with
either of the same component crimes of robbery or homicide; or
how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under
Article 335 can be duly haled before the court again to face
charges of either the same rape or homicide. Why, then, do we now
sanction a second prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since
the very same offense was an indispensable component for the
other composite offense of illegal possession of firearm with
murder? Why would the objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a
second jeopardy lie in the preceding examples and not apply to the
cases now before us?
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is
not raised in this case. For another, the so-called "same-evidence" test is not a
conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first category
under the Double Jeopardy Clause which is covered by Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to
the same act. This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero, 54 from
where People vs. Relova 55 quotes the following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (emphasis in the
original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act
is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first
sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the
same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include,
the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation
of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act,
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an identity as shown to
exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. 56 The
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. 57
If may be noted that to determine the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America
which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb. . .
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not." 58
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was
brought to the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section
5 provided, inter alia:
[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment . . . .
 This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones
Law of 29 August 1916. 59 Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones Law
provision was recast with the addition of a provision referring to the same
act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof provided as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution and in Section 21, Article III of the present Constitution.
This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in Blockburger, Gore,
and Missouri would safely bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle. For undeniably, the elements of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of
homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized
under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter
are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the subject
provision would violate the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be modified. The
penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the
Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty next lower in
degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30
September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-
appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty
imposed in the first case, as amended by the Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained;
however, the penalty imposed in the second case is changed to Reclusion
Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as
maximum.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 39519 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee
vs.
DANIEL PINTO, JR. and NARCISO BUENAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for petitioner-appellee.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on
Christmas day in 1970 a search warrant on Francisco Bello who was allegedly
training a private army, patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then Circuit Criminal Court in said city,
of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and Rosalio Andes
and seriously wounding Maria Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the
decision of June 13, 1974. 1 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and
Daniel Pinto, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of:
(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion
Perpetua); to indemnify the heir of Rosalie Andes in the amount of
Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally;
and to pay the costs;
(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion
Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs of Francisco Bello in the amount
of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and
severally; and to pay the costs;
(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives
(Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs of Richard Tiongson
in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly
and severally; and to pay the costs;
(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and
hereby sentences each of them to imprisonment of from Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to Twelve
(12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
to indemnify the victim, Maria Theresa Tiongson, in the amount of
Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to
pay the costs.
In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office.
According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police
secured from the City Court of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the house and
premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa, Legazpi City on the ground that the police
had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally possessed a garand rifle, a
thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols. 2 The police had earlier
undertaken a surveillance of Bello on the basis of information it had received that he
was conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat since October,
1970. 3
Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado, 4
called his officers to a "confidential
conference" at the residence of Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at the said
conference were the mayor, his secretary, and the officers of the patrol division,
secret service and the administration of the city police. The Chief of Police was
assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police,
in briefing the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the
latter had been identified as the one who shot Salustiano Botin the night before. At
the time of the briefing, no warrant of arrest had yet been issued against Bello. 5
The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who were also present were assigned
to the different teams. 6
Team 3 was placed under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz with a
policeman named Luna and appellants Buenaflor and Pinto as members. Wilfredo
Romero was the PC member assigned to the team. 7 Except for Romero and Pinto
who were each armed with a carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each carried a .38
caliber pistol. 8
Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon arriving there at around seven o'clock in
the evening. The four vehicles met at the junction of Homapon and the road to Mariawa. They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when
one of the jeeps bogged down because of the muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the
teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams maintaining a distance o around ten meters between them. 9
Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard someone shout, "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was
followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. The team had by then deployed to the right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by
shouting the agreed password of "bayawas" for which the person challenged answered "santol", 10
he found that Buenaflor
was 5 meters in front of him "at the bank of the road", Pinto was two meters to the
right of Buenaflor, Sgt. de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's) right, Luna who
was holding a walkie-talkie was to his left and another policeman was in front of
Luna. 11 When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw "flashes of fire" "just in front" of
him or from the place where Buenaflor was. 12
The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling of a jeep going towards the direction of
Homapon when he heard the burst of gunfire and saw the flashes of fire from the direction of Buenaflor. 13
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the
driver. They had just come from a lechonada party in the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs. Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello.
Fr. Capellan had celebrated mass to commemorate the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr. Capellan decided to go back to his
parish, the Anduiza's offered their jeep for his transportation. 14
Seated on the front seat of the "McArthur type"
jeep which had only a canvass top but no cover on the sides and back, 15 were the
driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on her lap and Fr. Capellan. 16 Richard Tiongson
was seated on the steel seat behind the driver while his sister Maria Theresa was
beside him. 17 The three other children were also seated at the back.
After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high heart. 39 His mother paid P862.35 40 for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by
gear with a dual", 18 Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some 300 yards the church. Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Funeraria Oro for Richard's burial. 41
ahead. 19 Fearing that there might be "people with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons, the police pursued their mission to serve

Capellan told the driver to go faster. 20 Then Fr. Capellan heard one shot and after a the search warrant on Bello. When they reached Bello's residence in Mariawa, they were met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted

and a certain Escober met him. Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police searched the area and found a
few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid firing with some of the
bullets hitting the jeep. 21 According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle, ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an

Tiongson of the PC, the rapid firing sounded "automatic". 22 The firing came from automatic pistol. 42
Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared the search terminated and the
the left rear side of the jeep. 23 entire searching party left for headquarters. 43 The following day, he issued Special
Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on the left side of the road just ahead of the
Order No. 24 which states:
jeep. 24
Through the light of the jeep, Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a December 26, 1970
jacket and a hat and he was on the shoulder of the road. 25 After passing the man, the To All Concerned:
rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the floor of the jeep. Maria The following men mentioned below are hereby assigned at Homapon until their
Theresa was about to hold Richard when she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then mission is accomplished, effective as of today, December 26, 1970:
they all screamed. 26 1 Sgt. Salvador de la Paz, In-charge
The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep
2. Pfc. Carlos Barbin, member
came to a full stop. Fr. Capellan saw three men with flashlights but he could not distinguish their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were
3. Pat. Eduardo Arcinue, member
focused on the ground. 27
Mrs. Tiongson saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that one 4. Pat. Juan Luna, member
of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia Citang, the mother of the mayor, at 5. Pat. Daniel Pinto, member
the same time identifying herself. 28 She must have managed to take Richard from 6. Pat. Celedonio Abordo, member
the jeep and was cuddling him on the ground near the left rear end of the jeep when 7. Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, member
she requested Fr. Capellan to administer extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan Report progress of mission any time of day through the radio system. For strict
had no holy oil, he gave the boy absolution. 29 compliance.
Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around, nobody listened to her appeal for help. When
(Sgd.)
she approached Chief of Police Adornado, she hit him and asked him why they shot her and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the
SOLOMON B. ADORNADO
shooting was no longer his fault because Mrs. Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She requested the Chief of Police for
Chief of Police
a car in which to take Richard to the hospital or for a driver and even for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of
Copy furnished: The Honorable City Mayor, The Patrol Command, LCPD, the OIC
Police did not heed her pleas. 30
(TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22). and file . 44
The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of Bello. 45
A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduiza arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and It was not necessary
her children boarded the jeep. At the intersection of the road to Legazpi City proper to specify the mission in the order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close
and the road to Mariawa, the area was brightly lighted and armed men ordered them understanding with the squad that went to Homapon". 46For a "convenient tactical
to put their hands up. They were told to alight from the jeep to be searched but Mrs. deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three groups with patrolmen
Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let them pass so they could bring Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II. 47
her two children to the hospital. 31 At noontime of December 26, 1970, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando,
Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot Talahib, Daraga, Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother, Francisco Andes, Francisco's son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son of
wound at the "right upper quadrant of the right buttocks." 32 Francisco, also arrived with the group. 48
Her pelvis and abdomen were x-rayed. One of Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and his
33
the x-ray plates revealed an oval spot indicating a foreign body in Maria Theresa's group be allowed to spend the night in Inocencia's house. 49
Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1970. At the sala, on her way from her room to the kitchen, she saw
pelvis. The attending physician decided not to extract the foreign body as Maria
Theresa was not a "very good surgical risk". 34 The hospital charged P282.90 for Bello sleeping alone. From the kitchen, Inocencia went to the balcony through the sala. On her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello,

Theresa's hospitalization. 35 She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station who was wearing a red shirt and an underwear, had awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He reentered the sala

Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and hospitalization 36 but and saying that it was cold, Bello put on his clothes and pants. He also wore his jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water.

Inocencia's husband gave Bello a glass of water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and ask Inocencia's husband for a cup of
the foreign body was never removed from her pelvic area.
coffee. 50
Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar
Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was the balcony facing the
vertebrae. The bullet travelled obliquely to the left kidney, the lesser sac, the liver
and the right auricle. 37 Richard was operated at the hospital but he died at 8:45 the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of

gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near
following morning due to massive hemorrhage caused by the gunshot
wound. 38 When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found embedded in his the pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs. 51
Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms, 52
was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled
her. Just then a man, whom Inocencia identified as Buenaflor, came up the house,
pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The
man asked them where the gun was. Inocencia told him that there was no gun in the
house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long firearm with its muzzle
pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters from where
Bello laid flat on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in its holster tucked on
his waist. 53 It was Buenaflor who took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's
holster. 54
When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead. 55
Inocencia went near the pili tree
where Rosalio's body was, knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he
killed Rosalio. The man answered that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did
not notice any weapon near Rosalio's body. 56
Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two men, one of them being Francisco Andes,
could carry the cadaver. 57
Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due
to multiple gunshot wounds". 58 A former pilot and 28 years old at the time of his
death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at the left temple, an inch above the highest
point of the pinna of the left ear. The bullet which entered his head through the
squamous temporal bone travelled towards the occipital region down to the floor of
the left middle cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.
Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of
the right scapular area about the level of the third thoracic vertebrae. The bullet
travelled to the right inna in a slightly upward direction making its exit at the lateral
part of the right supraclavicular fossa above the clavicle. The second gunshot wound
was at the left side interscapular area. The bullet travelled upwards and to the right
fracturing the 7th rib, entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the
pulmonary conus, went through the junction of the right auricular appendage and the
right auricle, the anteromedial side of the pericardium, grazed the medial surface of
the middle lobe of the right lung and exited at the right side of the chest. The third
gunshot wound was below the right nipple. The bullet went to the chest cavity, the
lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the diaphragm, the right lobe of the liver,
the 8th thoracic vertebrae and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior
interscapular area. 59
While Bellos corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments were found at the base of his skull and a
slug was extracted from the floor of his mouth. 60
Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his right temporal area, macerated the brain,
fractured both parietal bones and exited at the left parietal bone. Another bullet entered the left scapular area below the level of the 6th rib,
travelled to the dome of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum below the ramus of the
right pubis. The slug was found at the gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches below the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A
third bullet entered the left knee and exited at the medial side of the leg. 61
The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
on December 29, 1970 by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for safekeeping purposes. 62
The empty shells and slugs which both
the PC and the Legazpi City police found in Talahib were also turned over to the
NBI 63 in the same manner that the four empty carbine shells 64 found by the PC near
the coconut tree a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were also turned
over to the NBI. 65 Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve
Smith & Wesson caliber .38 revolvers, two Smith & Wesson "paltik" caliber .22, four
Tell caliber revolvers, one Bosque automatic pistol caliber .380, four carbine Inland
rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles caliber.30, one Thompson submachine
gun caliber .45 and one Colt automatic pistol caliber.45. 66
Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family. 67
Pinto, who admitted
carrying a caliber .30 carbine during the incident, 68 testified that the shooting
occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going towards" them. 69
According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air. 70
After the search had been
conducted in Bello's premises, Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to
remain and maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity including Mariawa". 71 While
he and Buenaflor were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they "chanced upon a
house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives. 72
At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a single shot coming from the house rang
out. It was answered by a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed" came from Buenaflor. By reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a
nearby coconut tree. But before he reached the coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the man was
menacingly near him, Pinto shot him. 73
After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bello's other companions. He saw the body of Bello on the porch and "near" it was a
garand which he took. He also got Bello's short firearm "from a holster." He turned over both the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of
the captured persons kicked Bello's body saying that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter, the two dead persons were
carried by the captured bodyguards to Mariawa. 74
In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps arrived. When they reached the junction in
Homapon, Major Molo, who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told Pinto to go back with him to Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it
would be dangerous to go back because one of Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other policemen, they
arrived there between eight and nine in the morning where they were instructed to "look for evidence specifically . . . for a thompson." He found in
the porch two shells and the others found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to Mariawa and later, to Legazpi City proper. 75
On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He
admitted that while they were instructed patrol the area, they were also told to effect the arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged
against him. 76
According to Pinto, of the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine,
only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots during the "Bello
incident". 77
Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters. Rosalio was "face to face" with him when
Pinto shot him. As Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto continued shooting him. 78
When he went up the porch he
saw the garand "lying on the floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's waist was still in its
holster. 79
On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his
carbine. 80
When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a flashlight
being waved. A little later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to stop. Then he heard
one shot and immediately after, the volley of fire as the jeep was going towards his
direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's passengers shriek. 81
For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which
had been issued to him by the Legazpi City Police Department. He did not fire his gun at the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered
his firearm for ballistic examination. 82
In the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo
issued him a Thompson submachinegun. 83
While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could guide them to where Bello was. At the place
which they later found to be Talahib, they went near a pili tree from where they saw a house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be
Mostoles. Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber firearm with him. He came by
another man with a bolo, named "Banteque" and apprehended him also. Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They
waited for a while until another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four meters of him. Buenaflor pointed his
submachinegun at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber firearm. 84
From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a pistol tucked in his holster as well as a
garand. He and Pinto then tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he saw a person in the balcony of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice:
"Paquito, mag-surrender ka!" Then Buenaflor heard a "a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive shots." He sought
cover behind the pili tree and, while in a crouching position, fired his submachinegun towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto
shifted his position while firing his carbine, Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going down to the nipa shack" until he was near the
coconut tree. There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was the son of Francisco Andes. 85
After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor went back to the pili tree, untied the four
persons they had captured, and told them to do something so they could carry the bodies of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes. 86
Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying the Tiongsons. 87
While
admitting that the person who led them to Bello had told them that the latter was in
Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that Talahib was a barrio of Daraga, Albay and not
of Legazpi City. 88 He reiterated that he shouted at Bello urging him to
surrender 89 but he was not able to fire a warning shot or identify himself as a
member of the police force "because after the secondshot there was already a burst of
gunfire". 90
Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talalib which was around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came
from a "high caliber firearm". 91
After they had found out that Bello was dead, Pinto went up the
house. Later, Pinto gave him Bello's 380 automatic pistol and garand. 92 Although he
looked at those firearms, he did not determine whether they had been fired. 93 He
noticed, however, that the magazine of the garand was "intact". 94 Aside from Bello's
firearms, Buenaflor and Pinto confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos
found on Bello's bodyguards. 95
Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets. When he gave back the firearm to Major
Molo, only four bullets were left of the one clip he had used. 96
He remembered having squeezed twice the
trigger of his Thompson submachinegun or automatic rifle in Talahib. 97 His service
revolver was still with him then. 98
As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor. The information charging Pinto and
Buenaflor for the murder of Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga, Albay and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable
cause or motive, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident
premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Pat. Daniel Pinto, Jr., and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine
Gun, SN-213436 and a US Carbin Inland, Cal. 30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by said accused, shoot one Rosalio Andes,
inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the attached Autopsy Report marked as Annex "A" and being made an integral
part of this Information, thereby causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same allegations as the above and it was filed on
the same date. On August 24, 1971 two other informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and
another for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello and Andes, the trial court appreciated
evident premeditation as a qualifying circilmstance and treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the
incident involving the Tiongson children, it considered the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of public position.
Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their claim that the killings were perpetrated in the
course of the performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors.
In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the
defense has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the
justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. 99
Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on
Bello. In the process, however, appellants abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with
only a search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons
of their lives.
While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds ranging from taking the harvest of their
hacienda without the permission of his parents to assaulting his stepfather, and that he was "dangerous while under the influence of
liquor", 100
there was no proof that he had been convicted of any offense or that he was a
dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a "shoot to-kill" order from
police authorities. Proof of bad moral character of the victim only establishes a
probability that he committed a crime but it certainly cannot be the reason for
annihilating him nor may it prevail over facts proven showing that the same victim
had been cold-bloodedly killed. 101 As such, the suspicion that Bello was maintaining
a private army was not a sufficient justification for his being rubbed out without due
process of law.
The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on
Christmas eve is neither a justification for his arrest without a warrant. It should be
observed that while the police had obtained a search warrant for illegal possession of
firearms against Bello even on Christmas day which was supposed to be a holiday,
no such effort was made in securing warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged frustrated
killing of Botin. The improbability of the defense evidence through the testimony of
Botin himself that Bello had shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is
bolstered by the same testimony showing that while he was shot by Bello in the
presence of the police force who were converging at the junction of Homapon and
Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable to arrest Bello. Besides the fact that no
other eyewitness corroborated Botin's testimony even in the face of his own
admission that Bello had no reason to shoot him, no complaint was ever lodged
against Bello for the alleged shooting. 102
On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during said shooting incident the police were
looking for Bello at the store of a certain Serrano. 103
Unable to find Bello, the police, specifically Pinto,
mauled Escober while asking him to testify against Bello for allegedly shooting
Botin. 104 The police had focused their vehicles' headlights near the bodega of ex-
Mayor Los Baños in their effort to flush out Bello who, unknown to the police, had
earlier left the vicinity. It was when the police fired at the said bodega that Botin
must have been accidentally shot. 105 This story was uncorroborated but if true,
would show the police's dangerous propensity for using otherwise official operations
in an unlawful manner.
A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving
the Tiongson children. Since the jeep coming towards them was owned by the
Anduizas, the appellants acted obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger
and posthaste they fired upon it even without any inquiry as to the identity of its
passengers. 106Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot, sound discretion
and restraint dictated that, there being no responding shots from its passengers after
the alleged warning shot and considering the condition of the road which was not
only muddy but uphill, instead of directing aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that
they could have done was to render the jeep immobile by shooting its tires. That way,
they could have verified the identity of the passengers. As it were, they riddled the
jeep with bullets injuring in the process innocent passengers who were completely
unaware of what they were up against.
Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the
face of various circumstantial evidence which point to their culpability. There is the
unflinching testimony of Sgt. Romero that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction
of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the Tiongsons passed by. Said testimony was
corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of team 2, that while no one in
his team fired his gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the first of fire
which occurred while the jeep was "abreast of team 2". 107 Even defense witness
Mariano Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was "sure" that he heard gunshots at the
moment when "the jeep had just passed team 2". 108
Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where, according to Romero, Pinto was deployed.
While he himself carried a carbine, Romero did not fire it and his testimony was never contradicted. The four empty shells were compared with the
test shells which were fired from the US carbine, caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the aforequoted information
charging appellant with having killed Andes, was used by Pinto, they were found to have "significant similar individual characteristics". 109
While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was fired from a Smith &
Wesson type firearm 110
and Buenaflor was proven to be carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver,
the findings of expert witnesses or, in this case, the ballistic report pointing to
another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound only serves as a
guide for the courts after considering all the facts of the case. 111 The undisputed fact
is that Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his
firearm as the Anduiza jeep bearing the Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no
evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin responsibility on Buenaflor was ever
presented, there is, therefore, no reason to discredit his testimony. 112
In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such motive provided a circumstantial
evidence leading to the inference that indeed he fired his gun. 113
According to the unrebutted testimony of
Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the Napal hacienda and constant companion of
Bello, on November 1, 1970, Buenaflor and another policeman named Santos
Urbana, Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep on the pretext that they needed it to transfer
Moscoso, the suspect in the Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it
was returned, the jeep had bloodstains. Bello and Escober later learned from a PC
officer that the jeep had been used in dumping in Guinobatan the body of Moscoso.
Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was borrowed by
Buenaflor and Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn statement on the matter.
Consequently, the PC authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the
Moscoso killing.
Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want
to give your statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for thirty minutes. This is a
brotherly advice because something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he
would do what was right and that was to tell the truth. Urbina said that it was up to
Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly warning that something
might happen to him 114 (TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were of
course denied by Buenaflor. However, as between the positive declaration of a
prosecution witness and the negative denial of the accused, the former deserves more
credence. 115
All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior
officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello 116
and to desist from using their weapons "without
clearance from the Chief of Police". 117 Since there is more than one circumstance
and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 118
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or
mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this
conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity
as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. 119
Neither may the fact
that the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered
a mitigating circumstance. 120
It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in
the presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each other. 121
Prior agreement between
the appellants to lull their intended victim is not essential to prove conspiracy as the
same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design. 122 In
this case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact that only the two of
them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons passed by. This they
did in defiance of the order of their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so.
Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or culpability is imposable on both
appellants in equal degrees. 123
The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was shown by the manner by which they
killed the two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their
claim.
Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following elements of said exempting circumstance: (a)
unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. 124
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless
the victim has committed an unlawful aggression on the person defending himself. 125
In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto
corroborates his story but the principal prosecution eyewitness in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender
nor a gunshot from Bello's direction before Bello was fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Buenaflor
himself and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the truth.

Rafael Señora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to take pictures, found no bullet marks at the
crime scene which would pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik" firearm which Bello's men allegedly used. 126
As no other "paltik"
firearms were recovered from the crime scene other than the two which Buenaflor
confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the possibility of said firearms or
one of its kind having been used by Bello's men against the appellant particularly the
one who escaped is nil.
Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered
gun 127 obviously referring to the firearms recovered from Bello himself. According
to Buenaflor however, when he found the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did
not manipulate the rifle to know how many of its bullets had been used. 128 Moreover,
if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster and not the garand
which was found a couple of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did not
fire any of his two firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was
smoking with his back towards them when he was shot at and that at that moment, he
did not see Bello holding a gun. 129 We cannot help, therefore, but conclude that the
defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello was answered by a gunshot is but a
figment of their imagination designed for their own exoneration.
Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have
been clarified had any of Bello's men whom they had captured been presented in
court. These men, Leoncio Mostoles, Francisco Andes, Domingo Bantique and
Ananias Andes had executed statements before the Legazpi City police to the effect
that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that Bello fired his gun at
the appellants. However, all four of them later executed statements before the NBI
retracting said earlier statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened
them to make the statements favorable to the appellants. 130
As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his
statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack Pinto. 131
Inocencia swore that she did
not see any weapon near the fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the aggression did occur, Pinto
would not have lost time in presenting in court the bolo which Andes threatened to
use on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not justified in inflicting
the wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening attitude of the victim
will not constitute unlawful aggression. 132Moreover, Pinto's testimony that Rosalio
menacingly approached him with a bolo after Buenaflor had released a sunburst
directed at the house where Bello was, is contrary to human behavior if not totally
ridiculous. On the contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing until he
saw Rosalio fell.
An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not only on the weakness of that of
the prosecution for, even if weak, the prosecution evidence gains more
credibility. 133 Unfortunately, in this case, inspire of the fact that the prosecution had
only one eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants had not
presented sufficiently strong evidence to shore up their claim of self-defense.
We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four
crimes in this case. The killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello and Rosalio
Andes as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa Tiongson were all so sudden that all
of them were left defenseless. This is shown not only by the testimonial evidence on
the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location of the wounds of all
the victims. 134 The presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the
wounding of Maria Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime, however, may not be
appreciated as there is no proof that it was specifically sought in the commission of
the crime and therefore we deem it absorbed by treachery.
Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but
we find that the appellants indeed took advantage of their public position in
perpetrating the crime. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no
mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the
said Code, the proper penalty is death. 135 However, in view the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on
the appellants for each of the three murders they committed.
For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of
the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium.
There being no reason to further lower the penalty by one degree pursuant to the
provision of Article 250, and there being one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range of prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 136 the proper penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six
(6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand pesos
imposed by the lower court should be respected considering that while there is
evidence as to the actual amount she spent while confined at the Sacred Heart
Hospital in Legazpi City, there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she
was transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in Quezon City.
As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of
frustration in everyone. The crimes committed here ought to have no place in this
democratic and civilized society. True it is that a police officer is sometimes left in a
quandary when faced with a situation where a decisive but legal action is needed.
But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals (96 Phil. 216,
225 [1954]), "(t)he judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of
their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the spirit and
purpose of the law." Police officers must always bear in mind that although they are
dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
criminals are also human beings with human rights. In the words of then Justice
Moran in the Oanis case (Supra):
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm"
without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the
criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot see how, as in the present
 case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle
in the hands of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness an vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably
prudent man, condemnation—not condonation— should be the rule;
otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the
modifications that appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three murders they committed and, for the
frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five
months 137 when the crimes were committed, let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Office of the President for whatever action may be proper to temper his
penalty. 138

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower
court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months
of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this
judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary
Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna
and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the
Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered
to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street
leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at
Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana
stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon
further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida
trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied
by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of
Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by
the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was
not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen
named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the
killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de
Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were
found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence,
particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a
different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief
of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to
the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If
you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and
as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then
fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the
door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued
firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently
watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly
incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate
themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in
an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent
from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself
of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene
Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping
in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According,
to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after
he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the
latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court
had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold
that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of
Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted
but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading
questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the
truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room
with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him
simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without
having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact
in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson
was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the
lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances
of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated
by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim
is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice,
"who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But
at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the
door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked
as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and
with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under
the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without
any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make
a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified
his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to
get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary
force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is
restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall
be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary
force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109).
It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a
fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts
alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers
no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in
effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without
regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may
approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or
does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we
cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of
a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly
supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify
precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of
the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever
to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el
malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el
hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente
el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent
to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a
plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No.
5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken
as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting
for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or
alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded
in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be
Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry
as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared
guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to
be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however,
that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness
testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you
(the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic)
you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court
(RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by
holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the
night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was
not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to
convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent.
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised
Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's
and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.)
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not
been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to
remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been
commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set
about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that
his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end
contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold
him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal
Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a
felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish
such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1)
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation
of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3)
there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
 consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought
his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and
thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he
thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a
different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court
convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking
party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the
roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle
of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an
attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in
the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are
unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is
committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent
to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in
wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It
only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance
that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has
application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the
crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible
for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or
because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit
the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application
to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not
within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted
robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted
Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by
reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the
protection of the public requires the punishment to be
administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket,
etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The
community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where
the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort
to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil;
intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of
attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's
room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in
another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent
to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner.
However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and
appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code
of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided
for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said
jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid
criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated
for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the
matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden.
In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and
consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused
liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention
of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal
attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation,
is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention,
the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus,
following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act
which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus
act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of
legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in
the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory
law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can
be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of
attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an
impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for
any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for
this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it
only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted
Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality
shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013
EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review
of the 10 June 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
30456, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration3of the 10 November 2008 CA
Decision4 affirming the conviction of Edmundo Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated
homicide.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.5 The
victim, Virgilio Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose route traverses the road
where petitioner's store is located.6
Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada and
Arellano Streets, Manila.7 Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this intersection
while facing Arellano Street.8 Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30
meters away from Mendol,9 shot the latter four times, hitting him once in the upper
right portion of his chest.10 The victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for
treatment11 and survived because of timely medical attention.12
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information13 dated 01 December
1999 charging petitioner with frustrated homicide. The Information reads:
That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then
and there shooting the latter with a .9mm Tekarev pistol with Serial No. 40283
hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes, independent of his will, that is,
by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Mendol which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.14 During trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado
Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all positively identified him as the shooter of
Mendol.15 The doctor who attended to the victim also testified.16 The documentary
evidence presented included a sketch of the crime scene, the Medical Certificate
issued by the physician, and receipts of the medical expenses of Mendol when the
latter was treated for the gunshot wound.17 In the course of the presentation of the
prosecution witnesses, the defense requested an ocular inspection of the crime scene,
a request that was granted by the court.18 On the other hand, the defense witnesses
are petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado
(Asumbrado).19 The defense offered the results of the paraffin test of petitioner and
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the court’s ocular inspection of the
crime scene.20
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses
deserve far more weight and credence than the defense of alibi.21 Thus, it found
petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.22 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and
50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused
is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of ₱34,305.16
for actual damages, ₱30,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006.24 In the brief that the CA
required him to file,25 he questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses over
that of the defense.26 On the other hand, the Appellee’s Brief27posited that the
prosecution witnesses were credible, because there were no serious discrepancies in
their testimonies.28 Petitioner, in his Reply brief,29 said that the prosecution witnesses
did not actually see him fire the gun.30 Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a
negative result.31
The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is
within the domain of the trial court, which is in a better position to observe their
demeanor.32 Thus, the CA upheld the RTC’s appreciation of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses in the present case.33 Also, the CA ruled that the victim’s
positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense of
alibi. Hence, it found no reason to disbelieve Mendol’s testimony.34 In addition, it
said that a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and
is inconsequential when there is a positive identification of petitioner. 35
A Motion for Reconsideration36 dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner,
who asserted that the defense was able to discredit the testimony of the victim.37
In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,38 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for being without merit, because the matters discussed therein had
already been resolved in its 10 November 2008 Decision.39
Hence, this Petition40 assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive
identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.41 This Court
resolved to require the prosecution to comment on the Petition.42 In his
Comment43 dated 15 December 2009, the victim said that his positive identification
of petitioner was a direct evidence that the latter was the author of the
crime.44 Furthermore, what petitioner raised was allegedly a question of fact, which
is proscribed by a Rule 45 petition.45 Thus, the victim alleged, there being no new or
substantial matter or question of law raised, the Petition should be denied. 46
We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.47 In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,48 he
assigned as an error the application by the CA of the rule that the positive
identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.49 He posits
that the lower court manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
but if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.50 This Court, he said,
should then admit an exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA
are binding upon the Supreme Court.51
ISSUES
The questions before us are as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.52
II. Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes
the positive identification by three witnesses.53
COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petition.
I. The prosecution proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A. Petitioner was positively identified by three witnesses.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
shooter.54 He is wrong. As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the
identity of the assailant was proved with moral certainty by the prosecution, which
presented three witnesses – the victim Mendol, Velasco, and Garcelazo – who all
positively identified him as the shooter.55 We have held that a categorical and
consistently positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over denial.56 All the three witnesses were
unswerving in their testimonies pointing to him as the shooter. None of them had any
ulterior motive to testify against him.
Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and
Estrada Streets, when petitioner, who was in front of the former’s store, shot
him.57 The first shot hit its target, but petitioner continued to fire at the victim three
more times, and the latter then started to run away.58
Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first
shot, looked around, then saw petitioner firing at Mendol three more times.59
Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same
street corner, he heard three shots before he turned his head and saw petitioner
pointing a gun at the direction of the victim, who was bloodied in the right
chest.60 Garcelazo was just an arm’s length away from him.61
The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all
facing Arellano Street from its intersection with Estrada Street, which was the locus
criminis.62 Although the crime happened in the wee hours of the morning, there was
a street lamp five meters from where petitioner was standing when he shot the
victim, thus allowing a clear view of the assailant’s face. 63 They all knew petitioner,
because they either bought from or passed by his store.64
B. The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after
he was hit.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill.65 He is
mistaken. The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage,
may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.66 The evidence to prove
intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.67
Petitioner’s intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a
gun,68 he shot the victim in the chest. 69 Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the
latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. 70Nonetheless, petitioner
continued to shoot at him three more times,71 albeit unsuccessfully.72 While running,
the victim saw his nephew in front of the house and asked for help.73 The victim was
immediately brought to the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.74 The attending
physician, finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to extract it; its
extraction would just have caused further damage.75 The doctor further said that the
victim would have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the
hospital.76 All these facts belie the absence of petitioner’s intent to kill the victim.
II. Denial and alibi were not proven.
In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the offense; and, second, it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 77The appreciation
of the defense of alibi is pegged against this standard and nothing else. Petitioner, as
found by both the RTC and CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite
conditions. Hence, he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other
witnesses, succeeds as a defense over positive identification.78
A. Petitioner was unable to establish that he was at home at the time of the
offense.
The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol
was shot.79 To support his claim, petitioner presented the testimonies of his wife and
Asumbrado.80
1. The wife of petitioner did not know if he was at home when the shooting
happened.
The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were
awakened at 3:00 a.m. by the banging on their door.81 However, she also said that she
did not know if petitioner stayed inside their house, or if he went somewhere else
during the entire time she was asleep.82 Her testimony does not show that he was
indeed at home when the crime happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was
at home before and after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his
whereabouts between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of his alibi. Even
so, the testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration, especially when there is
positive identification83by three witnesses.
2. Asumbrano did not see the entire face of the shooter.
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the
testimony of Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on duty that night.84 Both courts were
correct in not giving weight to his testimony.
Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by
a big man who was in his twenties.85 This assertion was based only on a back view of
the man who fired the gun 12 meters away from Asumbrado.86 The latter never saw
the shooter’s entire face.87 Neither did the witness see the victim when the latter was
hit.88 Asumbrado also affirmed that he was hiding when the riot took place. 89 These
declarations question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not
petitioner who fired at Mendol.
B. Petitioner's home was just in front of the street where the shooting occurred.
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused
was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. 90 Petitioner failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time in question.
Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's
house or store whenever they testified on the location of the shooter. Petitioner was
in front of his house when he shot the victim, according to Velasco's
testimony.91 Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado that the gate of the store of the
petitioner was closed when the shooting happened92 can only mean that the latter's
house and store were both located in front of the scene of the crime.1âwphi1
Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility
of his authorship of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that
he was the shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the
crime. The charge is further bolstered by the testimony of his wife, who could not
say with certainty that he was at home at 2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the
victim was shot.
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact
that could have justified a different conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in
affirming the R TC 's Decision that petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the
assailant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009
Resolution93 and 10 November 2008 Decision94 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with frustrated
rape 2 and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our
statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the
stages of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of
a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The
danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming
lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto,
sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered
consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of
passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements
of the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do,
having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We
ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that
entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape.
We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as
the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts. 3The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full
penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any
penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated
stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry
into the labia or lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the
entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with
mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,4 the
crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of,
in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just
mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to
the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however
slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female
genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted
rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been
committed either in its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no
substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-
wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the difference
between life and death for the accused — a reclusive life that is not
even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life
on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed
attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must
our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view
of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before
us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
7659. 6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo
Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into
ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her
daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon,
she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified,
she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several
times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when
she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting
her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase
the accused. 8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until
they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of
detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative
results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-
legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his
innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who
allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He
asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back
when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical.
Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained
himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for
help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo.
Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo
immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there.
Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not
true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of
lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this
moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to
the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997
found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death,
and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon
Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be given any weight or credence
since it was punctured with implausible statements and improbabilities so
inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was truly
inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister
was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo
drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact
that the episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance
could easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from
committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to
see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable
that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when
from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the
sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any
external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more
than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of
Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before
Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that
Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art.
335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when
sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetuato death, to the
single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being
below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential
ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be understood here as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not
mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even
if the attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia
were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of
full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or
flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the
Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's
testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her
vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his
organ on the lips of her vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle
part of her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply
mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as
in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. 14 As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis
is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are
visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen,
the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that
becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer
convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered
with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does
not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora
is the labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the
female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the
mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted
"touching of the female organ," 17but has also progressed into being described as "the
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the
bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our mild, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a
"strafing of the citadel of passion.
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to
discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's
vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in
the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her
claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked
what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that
she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her
relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in
automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced
upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which
Corazon described thus:
 Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused
is pinning down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his
left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling
position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point
from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an
unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly reaching Crysthel's external
genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and
arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to
discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby
blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how
Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the
permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what
was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to
inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without
any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold
otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run
roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked
intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully
witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to
remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well
that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the
mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of
Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught
literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more
than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his
evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer
to the question of the court —
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said,
"No." Thus —
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir. 20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the
question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the
possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a
categorical statement denying penetration, 27 obviously induced by a question
propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between
touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this
reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her
sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation
that because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor
can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the
accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her
pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts
to penetrate Crysthel. 22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis
was erect or that he responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon even
narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he
had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is
belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her
legs close together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not
happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not
"Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court
had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's
testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner
lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the
hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in this case. Although a
child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender
age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears
to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we
have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the
accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to
death.1âwphi1
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that
there were no external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to
conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea
P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does
not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to
hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. 27
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both
should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial
evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate,
would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to
carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated.
Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape
will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the
elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the
instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty
of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7)
years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY"
CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to
pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VIOLETO VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al., defendants. CRISANTO
INOFERIO Y ALINDAO alias SANTE, and MARCIANO
YUSAY alias MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of 7/10/67), defendants-
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo P. Pardo and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz, for plaintiff-appellee.
Peralta Law Offices for defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
The charge in this case was for robbery with homicide and the penalty imposed upon
the appellant Crisanto Inoferio and his co-accused Violeto Villacorte and Marciano
Yusay was reclusion perpetua and the payment of indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased Benito Ching in the sum of P6,000.00. This case is now before this Court
only on the appeal of Inoferio, because although the lower court convicted him and
his co-accused Villacorte and Yusay (Alfredo Handig, a fourth accused was
acquitted), Villacorte did not appeal, while the appeal of Yusay was withdrawn upon
his motion which was granted by this Court on July 10, 1967.
In the evening of August 27, 1959, Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-
sari store in the public market of Caloocan1 to go home, bringing with him the
proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed in a paper bag. He was
accompanied by his two employees, Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez, who
acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home located at 133 F. Roxas,
Grace Park, Caloocan, Benito Ching and his two companions were accosted by four
persons near the corner of an alley at F. Roxas street. At that time, Libantino was
some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking directly
behind the Chinese merchant.
One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm
around the neck of Galvez, while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed
a pistol at Ching snatched from him the paper bag containing the money. The fourth
got that paper bag from the snatcher.
Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned
around to respond to his employer's call; but upon seeing the bag snatcher pointing a
pistol at Ching, Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-
holder fired at him. Galvez, Ching's other companion, was able to free himself from
two of the holduppers holding him, and he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled
on the street and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching, notwithstanding his
wound, was able to walk, staggering towards his home. His common-law wife
immediately called for a taxicab, brought Ching to the North General Hospital in
Manila where he died the following day.
Later that evening when Galvez was interrogated by police officers of Caloocan who
were investigating the incident, the interrogation proved fruitless for Galvez was able
to furnish the investigators any information on the identities of the holduppers. But
when investigated by the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame on
September 11, 1959, Galvez declared that Ching was accosted by three persons, one
of them pointing his pistol at the right ribs of his employer. He identified the gunman
as Violeto Villacorte alias Bonging and even described the shirt and pants the
gunman was then wearing. He could not identify the two other companions of
Villacorte.
Libantino, when examined by the investigators of the Caloocan police department on
the same night of August 27, 1959, declared that the holdup and shooting incident
took place in a dark "kalyehon" and that he could not identify the gunman nor the
latter's companions. But, in his written statement taken by the CIS at Camp Crame,
Quezon City on September 11, 1959, he declared positively that he saw Violeto
Villacorte alias Bonging as the person who grabbed the paper bag containing money
from Ching and fired a pistol at Ching. He further said that aside from Villacorte he
saw three other persons, two of them were holding the hands of his companion,
Galvez. He admitted however, that he could not recognize the two persons who were
holding Galvez.
Villacorte who, in the meantime, had been positively identified by Galvez and
Libantino as the bag snatcher and as the gunman who shot down Ching, when
interrogated by the investigators of the Criminal Investigation Service at Camp
Crame on September 12, 1959 admitted that he was the one who snatched the paper
bag from Benito Ching and shot him. He identified his companions as "Roque",
"Sante" and "Fred".
In the information for robbery with homicide filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal on September 12, 1959, Violeto Villacorte was so named therein; "Roque" and
"Fred" were already identified as Roque Guerrero and Alfredo Handig, respectively
while "Sante" was not yet identified and was named "John Doe alias Sante". On
September 24 of the same year, the information was amended by changing the name
of the accused John Doe alias Sante to Crisanto Inoferio y Alindao; and another
person, Marciano Yusay, was included among the accused. Before the trial, upon
motion, the trial court discharged Roque Guerrero to be used as a State witness.
As already above stated, the trial court, in its decision of May 15, 1963, acquitted
Handig, convicted Villacorte who did not appeal, and Yusay who appealed but who
withdrew his appeal, and Inoferio who pursued his appeal.
Upon a careful review of the evidence, We hold that the accused-appellant Crisanto
Inoferio should be acquitted upon the ground that although his defense, in the nature
of an alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be considered sufficient as in this
case, to tilt the scale of justice in favor of the accused because the evidence for the
prosecution is itself weak and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Only Modesto Galvez and the State witness, Roque Guerrero, identified the appellant
Inoferio as one of the holduppers. So, let us now review and analyze their
testimonies, especially insofar as they refer to Inoferio, on the one hand, and the
evidence of Inoferio, on the other.
At the time he testified in Court, Modesto Galvez was 21 years old, married and
unemployed. In synthesis, he declared that: In August, 1957, he was working as a
helper in the store of Benito Ching inside the market in Grace Park. Between 7 and 8
o'clock in the evening of August 27 that year, he and another store helper, Pedro
Libantino accompanied Ching in going home. While they were at F. Roxas Street,
they were waylaid by four men.2
He was able to recognize two of them, namely Villacorte and the herein appellant
Crisanto Inoferio who were pointed to by him in open court. Villacorte snatched the
bag from Benito Ching and fired at him once. The bag contained money. Two
persons held him. Inoferio was one of them. He did not know the other one. Inoferio
held him, Inoferio was behind and to the right of Galvez, placing his left hand over
the nape of the latter. He was able to recognize Inoferio because he looked at his left,
removed his hand around the front part of his neck, and he saw tattoo on his forearm.
It was the figure of a woman with a bird. The place where they were waylaid was
bright. 3
On cross examination, Galvez admitted that he saw accused-appellant Inoferio for
the first time only on that night of August 27, 1959. The place was lighted from two
electric posts; one in the alley and the other east of the alley, corner of the alley and
F. Roxas street. He was scared at the time he was held up. When he was held by two
persons, one at his back (by appellant Inoferio) and another at his front, he was
scared. He did not move nor run away until they released him. Inoferio was holding
him with his left arm, held him tight around the neck; it was difficult to unloose his
hold; the left forearm was so close to his neck that he could hardly breathe; and
immediately after being released, he ran away.4
On further cross examination, the witness testified: The morning following August
27, 1959, he went to the police station in Caloocan. Three officers interrogated him.
He was still scared and was not able to tell them anything.5
On September 11, 1957, he was brought by some PC officers to the CIS office, Camp
Crame. He was interrogated by agents Rodolfo Estevez and Florencio Suela. They
asked him to relate the details of the incident as best as he could. His statement was
taken down in writing. He signed that statement under oath before Assistant Fiscal
Castillo. The last question asked of him was: "Do you have anything more to say?"
And his answer was: "No more". In that investigation, he said that he saw only three
holduppers. In that sworn statement, although he did not mention the name of
Inoferio, he stated that he saw a tattoo on the arm of the person who held his neck
that night. His sworn statement consisting of two pages has been marked as Exh. "1-
Inoferio".
Reading the sworn statement of Modesto Galvez (Exh. "1-Inoferio"), it appears that
it was taken on September 11, 1959 but subscribed and sworn to before Assistant
Fiscal Jose Castillo on September 12, 1959. It is a fact that in this statement, he
mentioned that they were held up only by three persons. But, contrary to his
statement in Court, he did not mention in this sworn statement (Exh. "1-Inoferio")
that the one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm.
Let us now go to the testimony of Roque Guerrero. On direct examination, he
declared: He knows the accused Violeto Villacorte. He had known him for a long
time already. He knows the accused Alfredo Handig. He also knows the accused
Crisanto Inoferio alias "Sante". He came to know him because they used to play cara
y cruz in 1959. As far as he knows, Crisanto Inoferio is a Visayan. He also knows the
accused Marciano Yusay.
In July, 1959, while he was driving a tricycle, Violeto Villacorte called him and
asked if he wanted to make some money by waylaying somebody. He did not agree
and he continued driving the tricycle. After two weeks, they saw each other again
when he was driving a tricycle. Villacorte again asked him if he wanted to make
some money. He did not agree. Then, in the afternoon of August 29, 1959, Villacorte
met him again. His companions then were Alfredo Handig, Marciano Yusay and
"Sante". Villacorte asked him if he was not really going with them. His answer was
how could he go when "Sante" did not want to tell him the person to be waylaid.
Handig told him to go. "Sante" also told him that he go with them. Yusay even pulled
out his .45 caliber gun and threatened him, telling him: "Don't be afraid, this is what
we are going to use." Guerrero told them that he could not go with them because "he
is my kuya," referring to Benito Ching. When Villacorte told him that they were
going to rob Ching, he left them but Alfredo Handig and "Sante" followed him. They
told him that they would kill him if he would approach anybody. He continued
driving his tricycle but they followed him. They left already however at about 7
o'clock that evening.6
On cross examination, Guerrero declared: At the time he met "Sante", he was dressed
in long sleeve — he was always wearing long sleeve shirt in the same manner that he
was dressed while Inoferio was in Court at the time this witness was cross
examined.7
On the night of August 8, 1959, he was arrested in connection with an attempt to rob
the store of Benito Ching. He was prosecuted for vagrancy and he pleaded guilty. He
was sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with
attempted robbery. When investigated by the CIS agents, he did not reveal to them
anything. He gave a written statement at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959. In
that statement, he told "the entire truth of what you (Guerrero) knew about the entire
case."8 In this statement, Guerrero mentioned only "Sante" as among those who
talked to him, but did not mention his name Crisanto Inoferio.
The appellant Crisanto Inoferio, testifying in his defense, stated that he was 39 years
old, single, house painter, and a resident of 1691 Alvarez St., Sta. Cruz, Manila.9 He
came to know the accused Violeto Villacorte for the first time only in Camp Crame
on September 12, 1959. He came to know the accused Alfredo Handig for the first
time also on September 12, 1959 but in the Caloocan Police Department. He came to
know the accused who became a State witness, Roque Guerrero, for the first time
sometime before August, 1959 at Caloocan. He used to ride in his tricycle and they
often played cara y cruz together. 10
He had been to the CIS office at Camp Crame two times. The first was on September
12, 1959. In the morning of that date, he was invited by the policemen of Caloocan
to go to their headquarters. He was made to wait there because some CIS agents
would come. They came at about 1 to 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The Caloocan
police officers and the CIS agents talked to each other. After a while, the CIS said
that they would bring him to their headquarters. The Caloocan police officers
answered that they themselves would take him to Camp Crame which they did. They
were Pat. Cadoy, Cpl. Mauricio and another police lieutenant whom he did not know.
He was brought to the CIS headquarters at Camp Crame at about 3 o'clock already
that afternoon. 11
When he, Inoferio, was brought upstairs, the accused Villacorte was going down. He
did not mind him because he did not know him then. Upon reaching the office of
Capt. Calderon, he was made to sit down. Later on, Villacorte and his companion
came in. His companion asked Villacorte if he knew him (Inoferio) and Villacorte
answered in the negative. He was also asked if he knew Villacorte and his answer
was in the negative. Then the accused Handig was brought and in the confrontation,
both of them stated that they did not know each other. 12
Then he was brought to another room by the CIS agent who said: "You are lucky you
don't know those people. "After that, he told them that he was not "Sante" because
his nickname was "Santing." 13
Towards the afternoon, he was given food to eat. While he was eating, the Caloocan
policemen told him not to finish eating anymore as they were going home. And they
left Camp Crame at about past 6 o'clock in the afternoon of September 12, 1959.
When they reached Grace Park, Caloocan, the Policemen told him to go home
because he had no case. 14
The second time he was at Camp Crame was on September 21, 1959. At about 2
o'clock in the afternoon, some CIS agents went to his house and upon their
invitation, he went with them to Camp Crame. They arrived there at about 5 o'clock
in the afternoon. While they were walking at the corridor, they saw Capt. Calderon
talking with Roque Guerrero. The CIS agent asked him if he knew Guerrero and he
said yes. Guerrero was asked if he knew him and he answered in the affirmative.
Then he was brought to a cell at the groundfloor. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon,
CIS agent Morales came and brought him upstairs. He was asked if he was drinking
wine and when he answered in the affirmative, wine was brought. Morales opened
the bottle and he was asked to drink. While he was drinking, Morales told him: "I
want to help you but you also help me." His answer was: "What help can I do?" And
the reply was: "I'll make you a witness for the government." He asked Morales what
he would testify and the answer was: "At the trial, point to Violeto Villacorte,
Alfredo Handig and Roque Guerrero as the persons who robbed the Chinese and that
they were inviting you to join them." His answer was: "That is bad Mr. Morales. I do
not know anything about the case you are talking about. I even do not know Alfredo
Handig and Violeto Villacorte." Morales stood up, took him downstairs and told him
to think about the matter. He was again brought to his cell. 15
The following morning, after Inoferio had just taken his breakfast, Morales came and
told him: "What about the matter we talked about last night, have you come to think
about it?" He said: "I am sorry, I cannot do what you are asking me." Then Morales
replied: "You might regret, I can also secure another witness," and he left. At about
11 o'clock that morning, Morales returned with somebody named Galvez whom he
did not know. Morales then told him to take off his clothes. After he had taken off his
shirt, Morales saw the tattoo on his arms (anterior portion of his left forearm).
Morales then told him to show his arm with the tattoo to Galvez. After a few
minutes, Morales and Galvez left. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Morales came,
brought him out of his cell and conducted him upstairs. While they were inside a
room, Morales asked him questions which he, the latter, typed. Whenever he would
not be able to answer Morales, Morales would slap him. Morales even tied his belt
around his neck and whenever he could not answer the questions, Morales would just
pull the belt. After the questioning by Morales in that afternoon of September 22,
1959, he was made to sign his statement. At that time, Capt. Calderon was passing by
the corridor. Then he was placed in his cell. 16
The next day, he was brought out his cell, was brought to the stockade and then
afterwards, to the provincial jail in Pasig. 17
Inoferio categorically denied the testimony of Roque Guerrero that he was with
Handig, Yusay, and Villacorte on August 27, 1959, and that before that date, he and
his companions were inviting him (Guerrero) to join them to holdup somebody. And
the reason why Roque Guerrero testified against him was that Guerrero thought that
he was arrested because Inoferio pointed to him when they met at Camp Crame. But
Inoferio said that he pointed to Guerrero only when he was asked by the CIS where
Guerrero was. 18
Inoferio denied the testimony of Galvez that he (Inoferio) was one of those that
embraced him (Galvez) during the holdup. 19 He categorically stated that he had not
known Galvez nor have met him prior to August 27, 1959. He came to know
Villacorte for the first time on September 12, 1959 when they met at the stairway of
a building Camp Crame where he was interrogated. It was while he was coming up
said stairway when he met Violeto Villacorte for the first time. Villacorte was then
coming down the stairs. He admitted that before August, 1959, he already knew
Roque Guerrero. 20
Violeto Villacorte, the person identified as the bag snatcher and the one who shot
Benito Ching, declared: He came to know Crisanto Inoferio for the first time when
he met at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959. Before August 27, 1959, he had not
yet met Inoferio. 21
Another co-accused, Alfredo Handig, testified that he came to know Crisanto
Inoferio for the first time on September 12, 1959 in the municipal building of
Caloocan. He categorically declared that prior to this date, he did not know said
Crisanto Inoferio. 22
By way of background to our findings of facts which justify the acquittal of appellant
Inoferio, we now recapitulate the evidence against the accused Violeto Villacorte,
Marciano Yusay, and Alfredo Handig.
Violeto Villacorte was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Libantino and
Galvez. And in an extrajudicial statement secured from him by CIS investigators and
which he signed and swore to before the Assistant Fiscal of Rizal in Pasig, Villacorte
admitted his role as mastermind of the plan to waylay Benito Ching and his having
grabbed the paper bag containing the proceeds of the sales of the sari-sari store of the
Chinaman. He likewise admitted responsibility for firing the pistol that snuffed the
life of Benito Ching.
Marciano Yusay was equally identified positively by Pedro Libantino and Modesto
Galvez as one of those present when Villacorte was planning the holdup and at the
time of the holdup. And in the ante mortem statement of Benito Ching made to his
wife Candida Pasion, he said that Marciano Yusay was one of those who held him
up.
Alfredo Handig, on the other hand, although mentioned by accused Villacorte as one
of his companions in the planning and in the execution of the robbery, prosecution
witnesses Libantino and Galvez never identified him positively because of which he
was acquitted by the trial court.
With respect to the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio, the evidence of the
prosecution to the effect that he was one of the holduppers is weak and
unconvincing.
In the investigations conducted by the Caloocan Police Department, both Modesto
Galvez and Pedro Libantino never mentioned appellant Inoferio as one of those who
either planned or executed the robbery and killing although the name of Villacorte
was mentioned by Libantino. In the examination conducted by the CIS investigators
at Camp Crame, again Inoferio's name was never mentioned by both prosecution
witnesses although Villacorte's and Yusay's names were now mentioned and linked to
the crime.
When the accused Villacorte was subjected to a thorough investigation by the CIS
agents, he admitted his part in the planning and in the commission of the crime and
named Marciano Yusay, Alfredo Handig and a certain "Sante". Again, Inoferio at this
stage of the investigation had as yet to be linked to this person called "Sante" and to
the crime.
In court, Libantino never identified Inoferio. More than that, he contradicted Galvez,
for while the latter testified that the man who had his arm around his neck was
Inoferio, Libantino who was the one face to face with the man who had his arm
around Galvez, said that it was the accused Marciano Yusay. 23 And Libantino
declared that the place where the holdup and the shooting incident took place was in
a dark "kalyehon," that was why he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's
companions. This contradicts the testimony of Galvez that the place where the
holdup and the shooting took place, was lighted from electric posts. Libantino said
that these two electric posts were quite far from the scene of the crime; they were 10
meters away.
And as we consider the testimony of Modesto Galvez, even by itself, we conclude
that he was not able to see the face of the man who held him around his neck and
therefore could not possibly identify him. He was scared at the time. The one holding
him by the neck was at his back. And immediately after he was released, he ran
away.
Let us now go to the telltale tattoo, the figure of a woman with a bird, on the left
forearm of Inoferio. Yes, Inoferio has that tattoo. And according to Galvez, the one
who held him around his neck was Inoferio because he saw the tattoo of Inoferio
when he looked at his left and tried to remove the arm of the man holding him by his
neck. But any other person could have that kind of a tattoo, the figure of a woman
with a bird. But it may be asked: How did Galvez come to know that Inoferio had
that tattoo? The answer is furnished by the testimony of Inoferio. We have taken
pains to give the synthesis of his entire testimony, and we are satisfied that he told
the truth, particularly on the point that when he was brought to Camp Crame for the
second time on September 21, 1959, he was told to remove his clothes and show his
arm with the tattoo to Galvez.
On top of all of these, there is the testimony in open court by Galvez that as early as
September 11, 1959, when he was investigated at the CIS office in Camp Crame, he
already stated and specifically in his sworn statement given on that date but
subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Castillo the following day, that the
one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm. We have gone over this
written sworn statement and we do not see any mention therein by Galvez of a tattoo
on the arm of person that held him.
And how could Galvez have seen the tattoo on the arm of the man who held him by
the neck when according to Guerrero, "Sante" was dressed in long sleeve in the
afternoon of the holdup (the prosecution would want to prove that "Sante" is the
accused Crisanto Inoferio).
Therefore, the authorities cited by the prosecution that written statements of
witnesses to police authorities are usually sketchy and incomplete; that as a matter of
fact, it is natural for even material matters to be left out when a person gives a sworn
statement during a criminal investigation, do not here apply. The fact is that Galvez
told a lie when he said that in his written statement he declared that the man who
held him had a tattoo.
How about the testimony of Roque Guerrero, the second and the only other witness
linking the appellant Inoferio to the robbery holdup in question? He was not there at
the scene of the crime. All that he said was that he was asked three times before the
robbery holdup took place to go with the holduppers. But Villacorte, Yusay and
Handig denied this testimony of Guerrero. And of course, Inoferio also denied it.
But what is most significant is the fact that all along, he was referring to "Sante" as
the one who was with the group when he was asked to join them in the robbery
holdup. As early as in his written statement given at Camp Crame on September 21,
1959, he referred to one of the holduppers as "Sante"; he never mentioned therein the
name of Crisanto Inoferio; and yet it is a fact, admitted by both Guerrero and
Inoferio, that they had known each other long before the robbery holdup took place
on August 27, 1959. Therefore, if Inoferio was the "Sante" with the group of the
holduppers, Guerrero should have referred to him as Inoferio in his written statement
of September 21, 1959.
And Crisanto Inoferio is not "Sante". He is the best witness to testify on his
nickname and he said that his nickname is "Santing".
Furthermore, this witness Guerrero has very poor credentials as far as his credibility
is concerned. He was, at the time he testified, 18 years old, single and unemployed.
And on cross examination, he admitted that on August 1959, he was arrested in an
attempt to rob the store of Benito Ching; he was prosecuted for vagrancy; pleaded
guilty and sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with
attempted robbery.
And assuming that appellant Inoferio was the "Sante" who took part in the planning
of the robbery holdup in question, which is not the fact in this case, that in itself
would not make him incur any criminal liability if later on there is not that sufficient
evidence to prove that he actually took part in the robbery holdup. For after taking
part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual
commission of the crime by listening to the call of his conscience. This exempts him
from criminal liability whatsoever.
Against the weak and unconvincing evidence of the prosecution regarding appellant
Inoferio are his testimony and those of the witnesses who corroborated him.
At the time he testified, Inoferio was 39 years old, single, and a house painter. The
flow of events as related by him in his testimony, a synopsis of which we have
already given earlier, is so natural and convincing as to set at ease the mind and the
conscience of the Court that he was telling the truth. He denied any participation in
the robbery holdup in question. Moreover, that he did not know co-accused
Villacorte and Handig at the time the crime was committed on August 27, 1959. He
came to know them only when these two were already arrested, a fact corroborated
by Villacorte and Handig. Even at the confrontation before police officers and CIS
agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused, on the other, already denied
having known each other earlier.
The motive of Guerrero in testifying against Inoferio was explained by the latter, and
that is, that Guerrero thought, when Inoferio pointed to him at Camp Crame that
Inoferio was implicating Guerrero in the robbery holdup. And Galvez, who never
implicated Inoferio when investigated by the Caloocan police officers in the evening
of August 27, 1959 and when investigated by the CIS Camp Crame on September 11,
1959, must have based his testimony in court, where he identified Inoferio, on the
erroneous information supplied to him that "Sante" (one of the holduppers) was
Inoferio.
This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look
with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated,
the evidence presented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized
with the same care that evidence supporting other defenses deserves. When an
accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a mental
prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting the accused-appellant
Crisanto Inoferio is hereby reversed and he is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. It
appearing that he is at present detained at the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, his
immediate release is hereby ordered. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VIOLETO VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al., defendants. CRISANTO
INOFERIO Y ALINDAO alias SANTE, and MARCIANO
YUSAY alias MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of 7/10/67), defendants-
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo P. Pardo and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz, for plaintiff-appellee.
Peralta Law Offices for defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
The charge in this case was for robbery with homicide and the penalty imposed upon
the appellant Crisanto Inoferio and his co-accused Violeto Villacorte and Marciano
Yusay was reclusion perpetua and the payment of indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased Benito Ching in the sum of P6,000.00. This case is now before this Court
only on the appeal of Inoferio, because although the lower court convicted him and
his co-accused Villacorte and Yusay (Alfredo Handig, a fourth accused was
acquitted), Villacorte did not appeal, while the appeal of Yusay was withdrawn upon
his motion which was granted by this Court on July 10, 1967.
In the evening of August 27, 1959, Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-
sari store in the public market of Caloocan1 to go home, bringing with him the
proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed in a paper bag. He was
accompanied by his two employees, Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez, who
acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home located at 133 F. Roxas,
Grace Park, Caloocan, Benito Ching and his two companions were accosted by four
persons near the corner of an alley at F. Roxas street. At that time, Libantino was
some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking directly
behind the Chinese merchant.
One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm
around the neck of Galvez, while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed
a pistol at Ching snatched from him the paper bag containing the money. The fourth
got that paper bag from the snatcher.
Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned
around to respond to his employer's call; but upon seeing the bag snatcher pointing a
pistol at Ching, Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-
holder fired at him. Galvez, Ching's other companion, was able to free himself from
two of the holduppers holding him, and he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled
on the street and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching, notwithstanding his
wound, was able to walk, staggering towards his home. His common-law wife
immediately called for a taxicab, brought Ching to the North General Hospital in
Manila where he died the following day.
Later that evening when Galvez was interrogated by police officers of Caloocan who
were investigating the incident, the interrogation proved fruitless for Galvez was able
to furnish the investigators any information on the identities of the holduppers. But
when investigated by the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame on
September 11, 1959, Galvez declared that Ching was accosted by three persons, one
of them pointing his pistol at the right ribs of his employer. He identified the gunman
as Violeto Villacorte alias Bonging and even described the shirt and pants the
gunman was then wearing. He could not identify the two other companions of
Villacorte.
Libantino, when examined by the investigators of the Caloocan police department on
the same night of August 27, 1959, declared that the holdup and shooting incident
took place in a dark "kalyehon" and that he could not identify the gunman nor the
latter's companions. But, in his written statement taken by the CIS at Camp Crame,
Quezon City on September 11, 1959, he declared positively that he saw Violeto
Villacorte alias Bonging as the person who grabbed the paper bag containing money
from Ching and fired a pistol at Ching. He further said that aside from Villacorte he
saw three other persons, two of them were holding the hands of his companion,
Galvez. He admitted however, that he could not recognize the two persons who were
holding Galvez.
Villacorte who, in the meantime, had been positively identified by Galvez and
Libantino as the bag snatcher and as the gunman who shot down Ching, when
interrogated by the investigators of the Criminal Investigation Service at Camp
Crame on September 12, 1959 admitted that he was the one who snatched the paper
bag from Benito Ching and shot him. He identified his companions as "Roque",
"Sante" and "Fred".
In the information for robbery with homicide filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal on September 12, 1959, Violeto Villacorte was so named therein; "Roque" and
"Fred" were already identified as Roque Guerrero and Alfredo Handig, respectively
while "Sante" was not yet identified and was named "John Doe alias Sante". On
September 24 of the same year, the information was amended by changing the name
of the accused John Doe alias Sante to Crisanto Inoferio y Alindao; and another
person, Marciano Yusay, was included among the accused. Before the trial, upon
motion, the trial court discharged Roque Guerrero to be used as a State witness.
As already above stated, the trial court, in its decision of May 15, 1963, acquitted
Handig, convicted Villacorte who did not appeal, and Yusay who appealed but who
withdrew his appeal, and Inoferio who pursued his appeal.
Upon a careful review of the evidence, We hold that the accused-appellant Crisanto
Inoferio should be acquitted upon the ground that although his defense, in the nature
of an alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be considered sufficient as in this
case, to tilt the scale of justice in favor of the accused because the evidence for the
prosecution is itself weak and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Only Modesto Galvez and the State witness, Roque Guerrero, identified the appellant
Inoferio as one of the holduppers. So, let us now review and analyze their
testimonies, especially insofar as they refer to Inoferio, on the one hand, and the
evidence of Inoferio, on the other.
At the time he testified in Court, Modesto Galvez was 21 years old, married and
unemployed. In synthesis, he declared that: In August, 1957, he was working as a
helper in the store of Benito Ching inside the market in Grace Park. Between 7 and 8
o'clock in the evening of August 27 that year, he and another store helper, Pedro
Libantino accompanied Ching in going home. While they were at F. Roxas Street,
they were waylaid by four men.2
He was able to recognize two of them, namely Villacorte and the herein appellant
Crisanto Inoferio who were pointed to by him in open court. Villacorte snatched the
bag from Benito Ching and fired at him once. The bag contained money. Two
persons held him. Inoferio was one of them. He did not know the other one. Inoferio
held him, Inoferio was behind and to the right of Galvez, placing his left hand over
the nape of the latter. He was able to recognize Inoferio because he looked at his left,
removed his hand around the front part of his neck, and he saw tattoo on his forearm.
It was the figure of a woman with a bird. The place where they were waylaid was
bright. 3
On cross examination, Galvez admitted that he saw accused-appellant Inoferio for
the first time only on that night of August 27, 1959. The place was lighted from two
electric posts; one in the alley and the other east of the alley, corner of the alley and
F. Roxas street. He was scared at the time he was held up. When he was held by two
persons, one at his back (by appellant Inoferio) and another at his front, he was
scared. He did not move nor run away until they released him. Inoferio was holding
him with his left arm, held him tight around the neck; it was difficult to unloose his
hold; the left forearm was so close to his neck that he could hardly breathe; and
immediately after being released, he ran away.4
On further cross examination, the witness testified: The morning following August
27, 1959, he went to the police station in Caloocan. Three officers interrogated him.
He was still scared and was not able to tell them anything.5
On September 11, 1957, he was brought by some PC officers to the CIS office, Camp
Crame. He was interrogated by agents Rodolfo Estevez and Florencio Suela. They
asked him to relate the details of the incident as best as he could. His statement was
taken down in writing. He signed that statement under oath before Assistant Fiscal
Castillo. The last question asked of him was: "Do you have anything more to say?"
And his answer was: "No more". In that investigation, he said that he saw only three
holduppers. In that sworn statement, although he did not mention the name of
Inoferio, he stated that he saw a tattoo on the arm of the person who held his neck
that night. His sworn statement consisting of two pages has been marked as Exh. "1-
Inoferio".
Reading the sworn statement of Modesto Galvez (Exh. "1-Inoferio"), it appears that
it was taken on September 11, 1959 but subscribed and sworn to before Assistant
Fiscal Jose Castillo on September 12, 1959. It is a fact that in this statement, he
mentioned that they were held up only by three persons. But, contrary to his
statement in Court, he did not mention in this sworn statement (Exh. "1-Inoferio")
that the one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm.
Let us now go to the testimony of Roque Guerrero. On direct examination, he
declared: He knows the accused Violeto Villacorte. He had known him for a long
time already. He knows the accused Alfredo Handig. He also knows the accused
Crisanto Inoferio alias "Sante". He came to know him because they used to play cara
y cruz in 1959. As far as he knows, Crisanto Inoferio is a Visayan. He also knows the
accused Marciano Yusay.
In July, 1959, while he was driving a tricycle, Violeto Villacorte called him and
asked if he wanted to make some money by waylaying somebody. He did not agree
and he continued driving the tricycle. After two weeks, they saw each other again
when he was driving a tricycle. Villacorte again asked him if he wanted to make
some money. He did not agree. Then, in the afternoon of August 29, 1959, Villacorte
met him again. His companions then were Alfredo Handig, Marciano Yusay and
"Sante". Villacorte asked him if he was not really going with them. His answer was
how could he go when "Sante" did not want to tell him the person to be waylaid.
Handig told him to go. "Sante" also told him that he go with them. Yusay even pulled
out his .45 caliber gun and threatened him, telling him: "Don't be afraid, this is what
we are going to use." Guerrero told them that he could not go with them because "he
is my kuya," referring to Benito Ching. When Villacorte told him that they were
going to rob Ching, he left them but Alfredo Handig and "Sante" followed him. They
told him that they would kill him if he would approach anybody. He continued
driving his tricycle but they followed him. They left already however at about 7
o'clock that evening.6
On cross examination, Guerrero declared: At the time he met "Sante", he was dressed
in long sleeve — he was always wearing long sleeve shirt in the same manner that he
was dressed while Inoferio was in Court at the time this witness was cross
examined.7
On the night of August 8, 1959, he was arrested in connection with an attempt to rob
the store of Benito Ching. He was prosecuted for vagrancy and he pleaded guilty. He
was sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with
attempted robbery. When investigated by the CIS agents, he did not reveal to them
anything. He gave a written statement at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959. In
that statement, he told "the entire truth of what you (Guerrero) knew about the entire
case."8 In this statement, Guerrero mentioned only "Sante" as among those who
talked to him, but did not mention his name Crisanto Inoferio.
The appellant Crisanto Inoferio, testifying in his defense, stated that he was 39 years
old, single, house painter, and a resident of 1691 Alvarez St., Sta. Cruz, Manila.9 He
came to know the accused Violeto Villacorte for the first time only in Camp Crame
on September 12, 1959. He came to know the accused Alfredo Handig for the first
time also on September 12, 1959 but in the Caloocan Police Department. He came to
know the accused who became a State witness, Roque Guerrero, for the first time
sometime before August, 1959 at Caloocan. He used to ride in his tricycle and they
often played cara y cruz together. 10
He had been to the CIS office at Camp Crame two times. The first was on September
12, 1959. In the morning of that date, he was invited by the policemen of Caloocan
to go to their headquarters. He was made to wait there because some CIS agents
would come. They came at about 1 to 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The Caloocan
police officers and the CIS agents talked to each other. After a while, the CIS said
that they would bring him to their headquarters. The Caloocan police officers
answered that they themselves would take him to Camp Crame which they did. They
were Pat. Cadoy, Cpl. Mauricio and another police lieutenant whom he did not know.
He was brought to the CIS headquarters at Camp Crame at about 3 o'clock already
that afternoon. 11
When he, Inoferio, was brought upstairs, the accused Villacorte was going down. He
did not mind him because he did not know him then. Upon reaching the office of
Capt. Calderon, he was made to sit down. Later on, Villacorte and his companion
came in. His companion asked Villacorte if he knew him (Inoferio) and Villacorte
answered in the negative. He was also asked if he knew Villacorte and his answer
was in the negative. Then the accused Handig was brought and in the confrontation,
both of them stated that they did not know each other. 12
Then he was brought to another room by the CIS agent who said: "You are lucky you
don't know those people. "After that, he told them that he was not "Sante" because
his nickname was "Santing." 13
Towards the afternoon, he was given food to eat. While he was eating, the Caloocan
policemen told him not to finish eating anymore as they were going home. And they
left Camp Crame at about past 6 o'clock in the afternoon of September 12, 1959.
When they reached Grace Park, Caloocan, the Policemen told him to go home
because he had no case. 14
The second time he was at Camp Crame was on September 21, 1959. At about 2
o'clock in the afternoon, some CIS agents went to his house and upon their
invitation, he went with them to Camp Crame. They arrived there at about 5 o'clock
in the afternoon. While they were walking at the corridor, they saw Capt. Calderon
talking with Roque Guerrero. The CIS agent asked him if he knew Guerrero and he
said yes. Guerrero was asked if he knew him and he answered in the affirmative.
Then he was brought to a cell at the groundfloor. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon,
CIS agent Morales came and brought him upstairs. He was asked if he was drinking
wine and when he answered in the affirmative, wine was brought. Morales opened
the bottle and he was asked to drink. While he was drinking, Morales told him: "I
want to help you but you also help me." His answer was: "What help can I do?" And
the reply was: "I'll make you a witness for the government." He asked Morales what
he would testify and the answer was: "At the trial, point to Violeto Villacorte,
Alfredo Handig and Roque Guerrero as the persons who robbed the Chinese and that
they were inviting you to join them." His answer was: "That is bad Mr. Morales. I do
not know anything about the case you are talking about. I even do not know Alfredo
Handig and Violeto Villacorte." Morales stood up, took him downstairs and told him
to think about the matter. He was again brought to his cell. 15
The following morning, after Inoferio had just taken his breakfast, Morales came and
told him: "What about the matter we talked about last night, have you come to think
about it?" He said: "I am sorry, I cannot do what you are asking me." Then Morales
replied: "You might regret, I can also secure another witness," and he left. At about
11 o'clock that morning, Morales returned with somebody named Galvez whom he
did not know. Morales then told him to take off his clothes. After he had taken off his
shirt, Morales saw the tattoo on his arms (anterior portion of his left forearm).
Morales then told him to show his arm with the tattoo to Galvez. After a few
minutes, Morales and Galvez left. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Morales came,
brought him out of his cell and conducted him upstairs. While they were inside a
room, Morales asked him questions which he, the latter, typed. Whenever he would
not be able to answer Morales, Morales would slap him. Morales even tied his belt
around his neck and whenever he could not answer the questions, Morales would just
pull the belt. After the questioning by Morales in that afternoon of September 22,
1959, he was made to sign his statement. At that time, Capt. Calderon was passing by
the corridor. Then he was placed in his cell. 16
The next day, he was brought out his cell, was brought to the stockade and then
afterwards, to the provincial jail in Pasig. 17
Inoferio categorically denied the testimony of Roque Guerrero that he was with
Handig, Yusay, and Villacorte on August 27, 1959, and that before that date, he and
his companions were inviting him (Guerrero) to join them to holdup somebody. And
the reason why Roque Guerrero testified against him was that Guerrero thought that
he was arrested because Inoferio pointed to him when they met at Camp Crame. But
Inoferio said that he pointed to Guerrero only when he was asked by the CIS where
Guerrero was. 18
Inoferio denied the testimony of Galvez that he (Inoferio) was one of those that
embraced him (Galvez) during the holdup. 19 He categorically stated that he had not
known Galvez nor have met him prior to August 27, 1959. He came to know
Villacorte for the first time on September 12, 1959 when they met at the stairway of
a building Camp Crame where he was interrogated. It was while he was coming up
said stairway when he met Violeto Villacorte for the first time. Villacorte was then
coming down the stairs. He admitted that before August, 1959, he already knew
Roque Guerrero. 20
Violeto Villacorte, the person identified as the bag snatcher and the one who shot
Benito Ching, declared: He came to know Crisanto Inoferio for the first time when
he met at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959. Before August 27, 1959, he had not
yet met Inoferio. 21
Another co-accused, Alfredo Handig, testified that he came to know Crisanto
Inoferio for the first time on September 12, 1959 in the municipal building of
Caloocan. He categorically declared that prior to this date, he did not know said
Crisanto Inoferio. 22
By way of background to our findings of facts which justify the acquittal of appellant
Inoferio, we now recapitulate the evidence against the accused Violeto Villacorte,
Marciano Yusay, and Alfredo Handig.
Violeto Villacorte was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Libantino and
Galvez. And in an extrajudicial statement secured from him by CIS investigators and
which he signed and swore to before the Assistant Fiscal of Rizal in Pasig, Villacorte
admitted his role as mastermind of the plan to waylay Benito Ching and his having
grabbed the paper bag containing the proceeds of the sales of the sari-sari store of the
Chinaman. He likewise admitted responsibility for firing the pistol that snuffed the
life of Benito Ching.
Marciano Yusay was equally identified positively by Pedro Libantino and Modesto
Galvez as one of those present when Villacorte was planning the holdup and at the
time of the holdup. And in the ante mortem statement of Benito Ching made to his
wife Candida Pasion, he said that Marciano Yusay was one of those who held him
up.
Alfredo Handig, on the other hand, although mentioned by accused Villacorte as one
of his companions in the planning and in the execution of the robbery, prosecution
witnesses Libantino and Galvez never identified him positively because of which he
was acquitted by the trial court.
With respect to the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio, the evidence of the
prosecution to the effect that he was one of the holduppers is weak and
unconvincing.
In the investigations conducted by the Caloocan Police Department, both Modesto
Galvez and Pedro Libantino never mentioned appellant Inoferio as one of those who
either planned or executed the robbery and killing although the name of Villacorte
was mentioned by Libantino. In the examination conducted by the CIS investigators
at Camp Crame, again Inoferio's name was never mentioned by both prosecution
witnesses although Villacorte's and Yusay's names were now mentioned and linked to
the crime.
When the accused Villacorte was subjected to a thorough investigation by the CIS
agents, he admitted his part in the planning and in the commission of the crime and
named Marciano Yusay, Alfredo Handig and a certain "Sante". Again, Inoferio at this
stage of the investigation had as yet to be linked to this person called "Sante" and to
the crime.
In court, Libantino never identified Inoferio. More than that, he contradicted Galvez,
for while the latter testified that the man who had his arm around his neck was
Inoferio, Libantino who was the one face to face with the man who had his arm
around Galvez, said that it was the accused Marciano Yusay. 23 And Libantino
declared that the place where the holdup and the shooting incident took place was in
a dark "kalyehon," that was why he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's
companions. This contradicts the testimony of Galvez that the place where the
holdup and the shooting took place, was lighted from electric posts. Libantino said
that these two electric posts were quite far from the scene of the crime; they were 10
meters away.
And as we consider the testimony of Modesto Galvez, even by itself, we conclude
that he was not able to see the face of the man who held him around his neck and
therefore could not possibly identify him. He was scared at the time. The one holding
him by the neck was at his back. And immediately after he was released, he ran
away.
Let us now go to the telltale tattoo, the figure of a woman with a bird, on the left
forearm of Inoferio. Yes, Inoferio has that tattoo. And according to Galvez, the one
who held him around his neck was Inoferio because he saw the tattoo of Inoferio
when he looked at his left and tried to remove the arm of the man holding him by his
neck. But any other person could have that kind of a tattoo, the figure of a woman
with a bird. But it may be asked: How did Galvez come to know that Inoferio had
that tattoo? The answer is furnished by the testimony of Inoferio. We have taken
pains to give the synthesis of his entire testimony, and we are satisfied that he told
the truth, particularly on the point that when he was brought to Camp Crame for the
second time on September 21, 1959, he was told to remove his clothes and show his
arm with the tattoo to Galvez.
On top of all of these, there is the testimony in open court by Galvez that as early as
September 11, 1959, when he was investigated at the CIS office in Camp Crame, he
already stated and specifically in his sworn statement given on that date but
subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Castillo the following day, that the
one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm. We have gone over this
written sworn statement and we do not see any mention therein by Galvez of a tattoo
on the arm of person that held him.
And how could Galvez have seen the tattoo on the arm of the man who held him by
the neck when according to Guerrero, "Sante" was dressed in long sleeve in the
afternoon of the holdup (the prosecution would want to prove that "Sante" is the
accused Crisanto Inoferio).
Therefore, the authorities cited by the prosecution that written statements of
witnesses to police authorities are usually sketchy and incomplete; that as a matter of
fact, it is natural for even material matters to be left out when a person gives a sworn
statement during a criminal investigation, do not here apply. The fact is that Galvez
told a lie when he said that in his written statement he declared that the man who
held him had a tattoo.
How about the testimony of Roque Guerrero, the second and the only other witness
linking the appellant Inoferio to the robbery holdup in question? He was not there at
the scene of the crime. All that he said was that he was asked three times before the
robbery holdup took place to go with the holduppers. But Villacorte, Yusay and
Handig denied this testimony of Guerrero. And of course, Inoferio also denied it.
But what is most significant is the fact that all along, he was referring to "Sante" as
the one who was with the group when he was asked to join them in the robbery
holdup. As early as in his written statement given at Camp Crame on September 21,
1959, he referred to one of the holduppers as "Sante"; he never mentioned therein the
name of Crisanto Inoferio; and yet it is a fact, admitted by both Guerrero and
Inoferio, that they had known each other long before the robbery holdup took place
on August 27, 1959. Therefore, if Inoferio was the "Sante" with the group of the
holduppers, Guerrero should have referred to him as Inoferio in his written statement
of September 21, 1959.
And Crisanto Inoferio is not "Sante". He is the best witness to testify on his
nickname and he said that his nickname is "Santing".
Furthermore, this witness Guerrero has very poor credentials as far as his credibility
is concerned. He was, at the time he testified, 18 years old, single and unemployed.
And on cross examination, he admitted that on August 1959, he was arrested in an
attempt to rob the store of Benito Ching; he was prosecuted for vagrancy; pleaded
guilty and sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with
attempted robbery.
And assuming that appellant Inoferio was the "Sante" who took part in the planning
of the robbery holdup in question, which is not the fact in this case, that in itself
would not make him incur any criminal liability if later on there is not that sufficient
evidence to prove that he actually took part in the robbery holdup. For after taking
part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual
commission of the crime by listening to the call of his conscience. This exempts him
from criminal liability whatsoever.
Against the weak and unconvincing evidence of the prosecution regarding appellant
Inoferio are his testimony and those of the witnesses who corroborated him.
At the time he testified, Inoferio was 39 years old, single, and a house painter. The
flow of events as related by him in his testimony, a synopsis of which we have
already given earlier, is so natural and convincing as to set at ease the mind and the
conscience of the Court that he was telling the truth. He denied any participation in
the robbery holdup in question. Moreover, that he did not know co-accused
Villacorte and Handig at the time the crime was committed on August 27, 1959. He
came to know them only when these two were already arrested, a fact corroborated
by Villacorte and Handig. Even at the confrontation before police officers and CIS
agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused, on the other, already denied
having known each other earlier.
The motive of Guerrero in testifying against Inoferio was explained by the latter, and
that is, that Guerrero thought, when Inoferio pointed to him at Camp Crame that
Inoferio was implicating Guerrero in the robbery holdup. And Galvez, who never
implicated Inoferio when investigated by the Caloocan police officers in the evening
of August 27, 1959 and when investigated by the CIS Camp Crame on September 11,
1959, must have based his testimony in court, where he identified Inoferio, on the
erroneous information supplied to him that "Sante" (one of the holduppers) was
Inoferio.
This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look
with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated,
the evidence presented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized
with the same care that evidence supporting other defenses deserves. When an
accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a mental
prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting the accused-appellant
Crisanto Inoferio is hereby reversed and he is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. It
appearing that he is at present detained at the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, his
immediate release is hereby ordered. So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO
PERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO LARITA, defendants-review.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-
appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.
PER CURIAM:
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of
the present automatic review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants1 charged therein with multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all
sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the
victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of
P6,000, and each to pay his corresponding share of the costs.
The information recites:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of
Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who are convicts confined
in the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final judgments, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by
hitting, stabbing and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other
improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the
victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the
commission of the crime in that the crime was committed after the accused
have been convicted by final judgments and while they are serving the said
judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;
2. That the crime was committed by a band;
3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity;
4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the
defense;
5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have
been broken;
6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of
the act;
7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in
the discharge of their duties.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the
charge against one of the accused2for lack of evidence. After the prosecution had
rested its case, the charges against six of the accused3 were dismissed for failure of
the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against them. One of the defendants
died4during the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted eight5 of
the remaining defendants.
As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary
at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves into two warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and
the "OXO", the former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter
comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. Since then the prison
compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots resulting in the death
of many of their members and suspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent
clashes between the contending groups, prison officials segrerated known members
of the "Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-Sigue"
members, while a majority of the prisoners confined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the
"OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of four brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B
(upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao,
from whom the "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.
It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary
were preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of the
"Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were
assembled, causing a big commotion. The fight was, however, quelled, and those
involved were led away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were
ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to
normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The
inmates thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and sympathizers of
the "OXO" gang were confined. The timely arrival of the guards forced the invading
inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot erupted in Bldg.
4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door and then rampaged
from one brigade to another. The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO"
members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, an inmate
of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more
inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death — before
they could be brought to the hospital.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in
depth; (b) contusion and hematoma of the back of the neck, about 2 inches in
diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of
death: internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in the chest.
Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and
1 cm. in depth; (b) two penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the
intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in
depth; and (d) several bruises at the right and left lower extremities. Cause of death:
shock, secondary to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull;
(c) wound on the upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds in the
chest, two of which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three
punctured wounds on the left hand. Cause of death: fractured skull.
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that
while he was taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego, who was at the time the
representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he "suddenly
heard commotion" near the door of their brigade; that his fellow prisoners started
shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded
into 4-B; that he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of the
passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO"
member from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away, Factora clubbed Carriego
on the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora turned up the face of his fallen
victim and struck him again in the face; that while Carriego was in this prostrate
position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora, repeatedly
stabbed him.
The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito
Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses
identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as the assailants of Carriego.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C.
According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A
rushing toward their brigade; that among the invading inmates who forced open the
door of 4-C, with help from the inside provided by Visayan prisoners confined in 4-
C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and
Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest
of their companies instructed the Visayans to leave their cell and ordered the "Manila
boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that
he saw Peralta stab Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora
clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose Halili, not only corroborated
the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well added grim details. He declared
that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to death
by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel
Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, in readiness to repel
any intervention from the Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C,
declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.
The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the
invading "OXO" members and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz,
another Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili testified, that he saw Peralta,
Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt
down and pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;"
that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan
declared that after the death of Barbosa, Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the
invading inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cell only to be recaptured by
Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he was clubbed
and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and Espino
corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect to the killing of
Santos Cruz, and both mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:
"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of
the rivalry between the two organizations. All those who were killed,
namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and well known
as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue Sigue, while the accused so
charged with their killing were mostly members if not sympathizers of the
Oxo organization. These three killings were sparked by the commotion that
happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the
prisoners were preparing to go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that
occurred in the plaza produced a chain reaction among the members and
followers of the two organizations. The inmates of Building No. 1, known
lair of the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells and tried to invade
Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and their
sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced to retreat by the
timely arrival of the guards who sent them back to their building. When the
members of the Oxo in Building No. 4 learned about this, they went on a
rampage looking for members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who
were confined with them in the same building. As the evidence of the
prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of
Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories
and with the help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door of the
different brigades, and once they succeeded in bolting the doors of the
different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate the Tagalogs from
their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemies they clubbed and
stabbed them to death ...
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta
nevertheless claims self-defense. He testified that on the morning of the riot he was
attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella near the door of 4-A while he was returning to
his brigade from the chapel with some companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the
head; that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then succeeded in
squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith he whipped out an
improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta) was
already dizzy due to the head wound he sustained from the clubbing, Carriego
managed to slip away; that he then became unconscious, and when he regained
consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.
Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution
witnesses who saw him actively participate in the killing of the three victims pointed
to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively
identified him as one of the assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of
Peralta, Carriego an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked him,
knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue"
members were outnumbered. Anent the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta
failed to offer any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory declarations of
prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of
Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as one of the
murderers of Santos Cruz.
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-
defense in exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino,
Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-
for-all forthwith ensued; that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and
advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person (Dosal);" that with
a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was
about to hit him again, he got hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until
the latter fell.
Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and
Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal
killed Santos Cruz in self-defense when the latter together with his companions
supposedly invaded Dosal's brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of Santos Cruz
was found at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first floor of
Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed
to explain why he was seen in 4-C, which he does not deny, since he was an inmate
of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and
Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he did not offer any evidence in his
behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza identifying him as one
of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino implicating him in
the death of Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.
Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion
of his co-accused who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did
not hit Barbosa anymore because the latter was already dead; that it was his co-
accused who actually killed the three victims. Again, the declarations of the
prosecution witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial court, expose
the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose
testimony was corroborated by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the mass assault
by clubbing Carriego treacherously. Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to
Factora as one of the killers of Barbosa, while at least three prosecution witnesses,
namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora participate in the slaying of
Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in the killing, which is clear index of
voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly engendered by
his co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory
device of alibi. Parumog testified that he did not participate in the killing of the three
inmates because he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees
for investigation after the fight in the plaza; that he was implicated in the killing by
the prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their request to testify
against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija.
Larita claims that he did not know about the killing until he was informed that three
inmates had died; that on the day in question he was brought to the police trustee
brigade for investigation after the incident in the plaza; that he was escorted back to
his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna likewise disclaims any knowledge of the
killing and asserts that for the entire duration of the riot he remained in his cell
(brigade 4-A).
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the
positive testimonies of prosecution witness identifying them as participants in the
killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that
Larita was one of the killers of Barbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw
Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they saw Parumog
participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that
Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that
Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the
contrary. The defense of alibi is generally weak since it is easy to concoct. For this
reason, courts view it with no small amount of caution, and accept it only when
proved by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog
and Larita were really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation on the
day of the incident, there should have been a record of the alleged investigation. But
none was presented. The testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in his
cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not even help his cellmates barricade
their brigade with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent the entry of the invading
inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner."
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps
criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which
depends almost entirely on the credibility of witnesses who seek to establish it. In
this respect the relative weight which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the
witnesses must, unless patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be
accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing the alibis of Parumog,
Larita and Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate directly in the execution of the
conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz."
The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of the presence of
treachery as a qualifying circumstance: Carriego was clubbed by Factora from
behind, and as he lay prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him
repeatedly on the chest. The blow on the nape and the penetrating chest wounds were
all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength qualified
the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of murder. The victims, who
were attacked individually were completely overwhelmed by their assailants'
superiority in number and weapons and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or
elude the attack. All the attackers were armed with clubs or sharp instruments while
the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial court. In fact, Halili testified that
Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to hide under a cot,
and Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees pleading for his life.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the
commission of the murders. The resolution of this issue is of marked importance
because upon it depends the quantity and quality of the penalties that must be
imposed upon each of the appellants.
For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with
particular emphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required,
the scope and extent of the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties
imposable by mandate of applicable law.
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.9 Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason,10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The crime of conspiracy known to
the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines.13 An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as
the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design,
the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante
and Barreto14 opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a
penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.15 The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons
unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one,
or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone."16 Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit
a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case18 where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each
of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by
common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of
the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
...
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate
nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who
was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one
of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate
indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of
malversation and rape committed in furtherance of a common design.
The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer
who misappropriates public funds or public property under his trust.19 However, in
the classic case of People vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and
five municipal policemen, all of whom were not accountable public officers, who
conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the malversation of public funds under
the latter's custody, were principally liable with the said municipal treasurer for the
crime of malversation. By reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable
public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not
similarly situated with the former in relation to the object of the crime committed.
Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private party does not act independently
from the public officer; rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get
possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by
circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's
unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of accomplishing a deed
which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a
social crime."21 In an earlier case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine
Constabulary who conspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the
malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-principal in the crime of
malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the
funds misappropriated were not in his custody but were under the trust of his
superior, an accountable public officer.
In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits
but also of the separate and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators.
He may have had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only once but his
liability includes that pertaining to all the rapes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that
... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at
Consolacion's house to the consummation of the offense of rape on her
person by each and everyone of them, it clearly appears that they conspired
together to rape their victim, and therefore each one is responsible not only
for the rape committed personally by him, but also that committed by the
others, because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by each one of
the defendants with the offended was consummated separately and
independently from that had by the others, for which each and every one is
also responsible because of the conspiracy.
The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where
the appellant Teofilo Anchita was convicted of forcible abduction with double rape
for having conspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the aggrieved woman,
although he himself did not actually rape the victim. This Court observed:
We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual
assault ... the accused inserted his fingers in the woman's organ, and
widened it. Whether he acted out of lewdness or to help his brother-in-law
consummate the act, is immaterial; it was both maybe. Yet, surely, by his
conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.
With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so
much so that "any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery
by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the
band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same." 25 In this instance,
conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly
established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the assaults
committed by his group is likewise anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act
of all.
Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by
positive evidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy.27 Since by it
nature, conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence.28 Consequently, competent and convincing circumstantial evidence will
suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies are
generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which
vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and
another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment
of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a
conspiracy to effect the object." Or as elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30the
presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be
inferred from "proofs of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently
indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among to concert means is proved ..." In two recent cases,31 this Court ruled that
where the acts of the accused, collectively and individually, clearly demonstrate the
existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose, conspiracy is evident.
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however,
to establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be proof as to previous
agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall
have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved
if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is
that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability
emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarity liable.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy. The difference between an accused who is a principal
under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code
and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former's criminal
liability is limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's responsibility
includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who
was convicted by the trial court of robbery with homicide as a conspirator, on the
ground that although he may have been present when the conspiracy to rob was
proposed and made, "Robles uttered not a word either of approval or disapproval.
There are authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction." In a more recent case,35this Court, in exonerating
one of the appellants, said:
There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico
was absent not only from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery
itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined otherwise.
Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the first meeting sufficiently
involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the
location of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets and
the points thereof through which entrance and exit should be effected), such
participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him
criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution
of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include robbery.
Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense.
Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of the
conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Consequently, if the conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of
murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three
murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Thus in People
vs. Masin,36 this Court held:
... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not
simultaneously indeed but successively, inasmuch as there was, at least,
solution of continuity between each other, the accused (seven in all) should
 be held responsible for said crimes. This court holds that the crimes are
murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the frequently reiterated
doctrine that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the
conspirators must answer for the acts of the others, provided said acts are
the result of the common plan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the
penalty that should be imposed upon each of the appellants for each of their
crimes should be the same, and this is the death penalty ... (emphasis
supplied).
In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon
each of the conspirators for the three murders committed was not carried out due to
the lack of the then requisite unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.
In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of
eleven murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:
Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under
the circumstances of the case, but they fall short of the required number for
the imposition of this punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion
perpetua; but each appellant is guilty of as many crimes of murder as there
were deaths (eleven) and should be sentenced to life imprisonment for each
crime, although this may be a useless formality for in no case can
imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis supplied.)
In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life
imprisonment for each of the accused was modified by this Court on appeal on the
ground that "inasmuch as their (the conspirators') combined attack resulted in the
killing of three persons, they should be sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion
perpetua) for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently
stressed that once conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is not
only solidary (all co-principals) but also multiple in relation to the number of
felonies committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It can also be said that had there
been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple death penalties
would have been imposed upon all the conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An
accused who was charged with three distinct crimes of murder in a single
information was sentenced to two death penalties for two murders,39 and another
accused to thirteen (13) separate death penalties for the 13 killings he
perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may
not be sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and number
of crimes they commit in furtherance of a conspiracy. Since it is the settled rule that
once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then
each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a
result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate
penalties prescribed by law.
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is found guilty of
two or more separate and distinct crimes charged in one information, the accused not
having interposed any objection to the multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in
the leading case of U.S. vs. Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses
charged in the complaint or information, the prescribed penalties for each and all of
such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in conformity with the provisions of
article 87 of the Penal Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other
words, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law should be
imposed. Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple
penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex crime under
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special complex crime (like robbery
with homicide). Anent an ordinary complex crime falling under article 48, regardless
of the multiplicity of offenses committed, there is only one imposable penalty — the
penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period. Similarly, in
special complex crimes, there is but a single penalty prescribed by law
notwithstanding the number of separate felonies committed. For instance, in the
special complex crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death42 irrespective of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason or
on occasion of the robbery.
In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The accused went
to trial without objection to the said information which charged him with more than
one offense. The trial court found the accused guilty of two murders and one
homicide but it imposed only one death penalty. In its review en consulta, this Court
modified the judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the three offenses
committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting
with respect to the imposition of two death penalties), held:
The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the prescribed penalties
for the offenses of which the accused was convicted should be imposed in
accord with the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is
only applicable to cases wherein a single act constitutes two or more crimes,
or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (U.S.
vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or penalties
should have been imposed upon the accused upon conviction of the accused
of three separate felonies charged in the information.
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the convict of two
separate crimes of asesinato (murder) marked with the generic aggravating
circumstances mentioned in the decision of the trial judge ... It follows that
the death penalty must and should be imposed for each of these offenses ...
Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of one or both
the asesinatos with which he is charged in the information, it would seem to
be a useless formality to impose separate penalties for each of the offenses
of which he was convicted, in view of the nature of the principal penalty;
but having in mind the possibility that the Chief Executive may deem it
proper to grant a pardon for one or more of the offenses without taking
action on the others; and having in mind also the express provisions of the
above cited article 87 of the Penal Code, we deem it proper to modify the
judgment entered in the court below by substituting for the penalty imposed
by the trial judge under the provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death
 penalty prescribed by law for each of the two separate asesinatos of which
he stands convicted, and the penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of homicide) ... these separate
penalties to be executed in accord with the provisions of article 87 of the
Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a unanimous Court,
speaking again thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm concurring in the
result in view of the Balaba ruling), opined:
For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in the court below,
the trial judge imposed the death penalty, that is to say the penalty
prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in its maximum degree,
and for this purpose made use of the provisions of article 89 of the Penal
Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in the
case of the United States vs. Balaba, recently decided wherein the
controlling facts were substantially similar to those in the case at bar, "all of
the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law" should have
been imposed under the express provisions of article 87 [now engrafted in
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in that case, the
trial court erred in applying the provision of article 89 of the code.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be
reversed, ... and that the following separate penalties should be imposed
upon him [the accused Jamad], to be executed in accordance with article 87
of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for the parricide of his wife
Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Labonete; (3)
the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of
12 years and one day of cadena temporal for the frustrated murder of
Taclind ...
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which applied the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, where this Court, after finding the
accused liable as co-principals because they acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress
that where an "information charges the defendants with the commission of several
crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the multiplicity of
the charges made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced
accordingly for as many crimes the information charges them, provided that they are
duly established and proved by the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)
The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority in Balaba for imposing
all the penalties (two deaths and one life imprisonment) corresponding to the offense
charged and proved was article 87 of the old Penal Code which provided:
When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or misdemeanors, all
the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law shall be
imposed, the same to be simultaneously served, if possible, according to the
nature and effects of such penalties.
in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:
When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of
the law can not be simultaneously executed, the following rules shall be
observed with regard thereto:
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity
shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as
may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the words used by
reason of style, of the above-cited provisions have been preserved in article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code which is the product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the
old Penal Code. Article 70 provides:
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the
following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall
be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may
be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties
first imposed, or should they have been served out.
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former article 87 clearly
did, that "all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law shall be
imposed," it is unmistakable, however, that article 70 presupposes that courts have
the power to impose multiple penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be
served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of the existence of
judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of
the offenses charged and proved is manifest in the opening sentence of article 70:
"When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has to serve are those legally
imposed by the proper court. Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is
found in the second paragraph of article 70 which provides that "in the imposition of
the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed ..." Even
without the authority provided by article 70, courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every
individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each
single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts
ofjustice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no statutory
prohibition or jurisprudential injunction against it. On the contrary, article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code presumes that courts have the power to mete out multiple
penalties without distinction as to the nature and severity of the penalties. Moreover,
our jurisprudence supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as initially
advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the accused was
sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death penalties. Significantly, the Court
in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed multiple penalties of two deaths
and one life imprisonment.
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality,
an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict like
all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and
biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death
penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the
execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four
basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties;
(2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and
(4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though
related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by
the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and, proved, whereas service of
sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not
concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like successful escape of the
convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into
the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity
and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties
prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only
two modes of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties
shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the
case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only
permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has
practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an
indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of
the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper
penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending
clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute)
deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum
of forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed,
and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a
maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial court
correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. We quote
with approval the following incisive observations of the court a quo in this respect:
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court can safely say
that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by
the accused was planned. The following circumstances show beyond any
doubt the acts of conspiracy: First, all those who were killed, Barbosa,
Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many
Tagalogs like them confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and
killed thereby showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the
accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with
team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the
same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly,
almost the same people took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa and
Santos Cruz.
It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A; that all
were from either the Visayas or Mindanao except Peralta who is from Masbate and
Parumog who hails from Nueva Ecija; that all were either "OXO" members or
sympathizers; and that all the victims were members of the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in
concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they
killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna
did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators
they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in
every act and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is
the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the
execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in
the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals.45 Hence, all of
the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz —
each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.
We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident premeditation was also
present. The facts on record and the established jurisprudence on the matter do not
support the conclusion of the court a quo that evident premeditation "is always
present and inherent in every conspiracy." Evident premeditation is not inherent in
conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of
the latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a sufficient period of time must
elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to
deliberate on the consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to commit it.47 This view finds added support in People vs.
Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:
Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is directly
established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the
method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be taken for granted. In the case before us, however, no
such evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the
accused in the perpetration of the crime. There is no proof how and when
 the plan to kill Melanio Balancio was hatched, or what time elapsed before
it was carried out; we are, therefore, unable to determine if the appellants
enjoyed "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." (cf. People vs.
Bangug, 52 Phil. 91.) In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity
of reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that characterize the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (People vs. Mendoza, 91
Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs.
Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)
Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of any of the six
accused, as they did neither allege nor prove any.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses
were serving sentences49 in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of
convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed
on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.50
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo
Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and
Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of
murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN DE
VERA yGARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM,
KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE
VERA yGARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the
distinction between the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present
appeal, which assails the March 12, 1997 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 57) in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant
Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M.
Gavero charged with murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick
Garcia and two other persons who were subsequently identified during the trial as
Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other
persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y
DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark
Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside,
hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the
mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.[2]
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to
Amend the Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of
Frederick Capulong. The trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended
Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other
persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y
DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark
Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside and
a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him between his eyes and
striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick
Capulong y Dizon.[3]
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera [4] and Roderick
Garcia[5] pleaded not guilty. The other two accused were at large. Trial in due course
proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA
y GARCIA and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua, including all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs
of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the
information until full payment; and,
f) Costs of suit.[6]
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following
narration of facts:[9]
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of
Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before
he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest II,
together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992 in
the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak branch in
Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the homeowners association.
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the
witness saw a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with
four (4) other passengers. He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the
subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as Kenneth Florendo
and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him,
but then he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around
Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit were through the same
point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao walked to the
opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already parked. Moments later,
he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place.
Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo
aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between the eyes. After the
shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached
a sketch of the crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative
position at the time of the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia
and pointed to appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation
Division, Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the
shooting incident from a security guard of the subdivision. The officer immediately
dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando Garcia, PO3 Armando
Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5,
September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the team to the corner of Denver and
Doa Justina Streets, site of the shooting, where they discovered blood stains
and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed them that the victim was rushed
to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security guards. The policemen then
found a color red sports car with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its
doors opened. They recovered inside the car several class cards and a license
belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came
upon a person wearing muddied maong pants and white t-shirt standing and walking
around near the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked his name, the person
identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Explaining the mud stains on
his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his
conduct, the policemen brought appellant to Station 5 and turned him over to the
desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989,
was assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by
SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3
Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue
Medical Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving
medical treatment. The victim was unconscious. After conferring with the victims
parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On his arrival, the desk
officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was told that appellant was
picked up near the crime scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked about
his participation in the shooting, he was reluctant at first to talk, but later relented
after SPO3 Guspid told him that his conscience would bother him less if he would
tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated
the crime, and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a
group of policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doa Justina
Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid informed him
that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He was then invited to the station
to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the
interview, Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and
black cap. According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With the
revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together
with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to a grassy portion
near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek
and about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September
30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber revolver, black t-shirt and
black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993). While there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2
Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect the explanations and answers
given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As identifying marks,
SPO3 Gacute placed his initials OG (acronym for his first name and family name)
between the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as
in the inner lining of the black cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where
SPO3 Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written statements, to
which they assented. Consequently, they were brought to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. They
were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal
Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time were appellants relatives, including his
mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty.
Sansano, a competent lawyer. They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two
conferred with Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the
suspects [i]n his office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step
outside the building in order to assure that no pressure would be exerted on the
suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After they left,
Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of
their rights under the constitution and inquiring from them if they indeed wanted to
give voluntary statements. To the query, the suspects answered positively. They also
affirmed their earlier declaration that they were willing to be assisted by the IBP
(ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during the investigation to
answer or not to answer the questions which they thought would incriminate them,
but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty.
Sansano requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to
determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he then
summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators readied two
typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as the lawyer
of the suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that they did not
understand, and to seek xxx a clarification, if needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single
separate room from where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the
two tables used by the investigators for typing the questions and answers, involving
himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the signing of the statements.
He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with [the] standing
policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then
informed the suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under the
constitution, specifically, the right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their own
choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who would assist them; that
they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The investigators also asked
him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects. They also asked the
suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel. They agreed expressly
by saying: Oho.
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They
conducted the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of
appellant was marked as Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The
statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking
the statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of
appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he reminded appellant
of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4) questions under the
heading Paunawa, to which the latter gave positive answers. The statement was
signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned
over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: both hands of
Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the test for
gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo gave
negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates.
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the
victim to get her own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared
a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution Office which was signed by Senior
Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation Division. During the
inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his
other companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought
to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth
Florendo who had shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest
the other accused and Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latters request. A few
hours after the shooting incident, appellant was picked up by the police, who
subsequently tortured and coerced him into signing his Statement regarding the
incident. The trial court summarized appellants evidence in this wise:[10]
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were
already close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latters house at No
106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay
Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro, his and
Kenneths friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneths house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and
went home at 7:00 am of June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by
Edwins house to invite him back to [the formers] house that morning and to bring
Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo, who were then with
him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another friend
of Kenneths.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneths house at 11:00 am. Kenneth,
his girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After
lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was
Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend. Edwin was not
aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the four
of them Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneths
car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the
four of them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was.
Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they were going
to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom Kenneth and
Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him personally before then. From
his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be
arguing (x x x x parang nagtatalo sila). The voices came from some twenty-two (22)
meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where
Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not used to hearing
gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His singular thought
while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 pm when he was already outside of
Filinvest subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4)
persons in civilian attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying
his feet together and binding his hands from his back with handcuffs, and then
covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water was poured little by
little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his thighs. This maltreatment
lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted him to admit something and
to name my companions but he refused to admit or to name anyone. They next took
him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At one
point during the torture, a policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his
temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not escape
because he could see that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could xxx get a lawyer[;] instead, one of
them, whose name he [did] not know, told him that I should listen only to them and
not to anyone else. He claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in court, and he
identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his torture,
because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not drunk or under
the influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the influence of drugs when
he took his statement because of his troubled appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his
request to contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation
continued (x x x x puro pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin). After his torture at the
mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he remained until
the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him
once in the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He was not given any
dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and
brought to the IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were
Deo Garcia and two other police officers. At the IBP office, the officers talked with
one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be Atty. Sansano only after
the lawyer was introduced (present) to him and Deo. That was the first he met and
saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk
or not. Edwin could not make any comment because wala po ako sa sarili ko. Then,
Atty. Sansano warned Edwin substantially that: Alam nyo ba na ang salaysay na ito
ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan, referring to the statement taken from Edwin by
officers Guspid at around past 8 pm until 9 pm on the day before (June 8, 1992) at
the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, and had no relatives present.
Guspid appeared to be like drunk or tipsy, when he took down Edwins statement that
night.
At the IBP office, Edwins and Deos statement were taken separately by Guspid and
Selvido, respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from
each other, but he could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked the
questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were given in
Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was about seven
(7) meters away from where he and Guspid were situated. The office of Atty.
Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty. Sansano was
doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he was not able to
read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxxxxxxxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng
sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City,
for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the precinct in the evening of
June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were
given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled
that it was indeed Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick
Capulong. It convicted appellant as a principal, however, because the scientific and
forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and substantially confirmed the
existence of conspiracy among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer
Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia.[11]
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged
errors:
I does not amount to conspiracy.[14] Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-
WITNESS BERNARDO CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF
APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE
WAS A CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A
CO- CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT O, ALLEGED
STATEMENT OF APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER
UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT
WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.[12]
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, (2) the admissibility of appellants extrajudicial statement, and
(3) the nature of his liability.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an
accomplice, not as a principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellants Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they
shall be discussed jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and
Appellant De Vera, the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness
Cacao. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the following facts: appellant was
seen with the other accused inside the victims car; the victim was clearly struck with
a blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it
all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been
unaware of Florendos dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt.[13] In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to
do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation
later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently
disabled Capulong and shoot the victim in the head moments later.
Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from
the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a
common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be
founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacaos testimony
does not establish appellants culpability.
Appellants Extrajudicial Statement
 Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant
De Veras extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendos malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at
pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[15]
Second, appellants companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the
unmistakable plan of the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang
dalawang baril[,] sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami
sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si
Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by
placing himself at a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a
lookout. This is clear from the following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at
noong araw ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na
huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan
ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may
sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na kaysa
raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya
ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si
Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay
sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si Elmer Castro at
magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay xxx lalakad na
raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at
pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at
Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa
kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay kumain
kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest.
P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila
Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar
ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa
tiyuhin ni Deo. P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay sumunod po kami ni
Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar
upang tignan kung mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay
lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan
itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong si
Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick
at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at
pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay
natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni
Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si Deo at
sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay
nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli
naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.
[16]
Appellant an Accomplice, Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellants presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo
intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he
had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he
was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These
facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[17] To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: (1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was]
decided upon.[18] Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be
shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[19]
The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement
need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused
pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.[20]
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those
persons who, not being included in Article 17,[21] cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[22] The Court has held that an accomplice is
one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or
intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be
committed just the same.[23] To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must be present: (1) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.[24]
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of
its effect on appellants penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective
and not individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. [25] In the case of
an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices
come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then
do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should
be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether
the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely
their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,[26] the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with
two others, as a principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held
that their concerted action in going armed and together to their victims house, and
there, while one stayed as a lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and
his wife, leaving again together afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but
conspiracy. It may be noted further that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the
three of them, together with some others, had planned to kill the victim on the
promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,[27] the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a
principal for conspiring with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was
shown by their conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime. The
Court also noted that, upon their arrest, they disclosed that they had intended to rob
the victims store and that they did so in accordance with their plan. In that case, it
was clear that all three of them, including the lookout, were the authors of the crime.
In People v. Loreno,[28] the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as
principals because they had acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal
was armed at the time like the other conspirators, and he gave his companions
effective means and encouragement to commit the crime of robbery and rape.
Upon the other hand, in People v. Corbes,[29] the Court noted that Manuel
Vergel knew of the criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with
the robbers by driving the vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as
an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court observed that he was merely
approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He
was not with the robbers when they resolved to commit a robbery. When his services
were requested, the decision to commit the crime had already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,[30] the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of
some appellants who knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the
victim, and distracting his attention. The Court ruled that they were accomplices and
not co-conspirators, [i]n the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact
envisaged by them.
In People v. Suarez et al.,[31] Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes
to Suarez who intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In
ruling that he was merely an accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence
showing that he took part in the planning or execution of the crime, or any proof
indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of
confederacy on his part.
In People v. Balili,[32] the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding
that in going with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of
the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, [he]
effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as
an accompliance. The Court noted that there was no evidence that he had conspired
with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the
crime.
In People v. Doble,[33] the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a
conspirator when he looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers.
Ruled the Court: Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio
into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his
help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms and weapons to
perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which [was] not shown with
respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just
a few hours before the actual robbery.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had
intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he
himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made
by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill
had already been agreed upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na. This is clear
from his statement, which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at
pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[34]
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It
should be noted further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and
Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was
part of the conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own
Statement, was made, after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in
several cases, the Court has held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had
acted as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this
Court to resolve in their favor the question, by holding x x x that they were guilty of
the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.[35]
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely -- without coercion, intimidation,
inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the
normal experience of mankind. [36]
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it
was not made in the presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the
Quezon City IBP Legal Aid Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused
in the execution of their extrajudicial Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer
was in his office, not with them, at the time. Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellants claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave
them at any time.
 Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their
statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official
matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the
police insofar as custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that
the rights of the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the
course of the entire interrogation.[37]
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on
Appellant De Vera, and Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they
understood what they were doing.
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to
assure myself that no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the
presence of the police officers during my personal interview. Before we
allow any police officers to take the statements of people brought before
us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing
and sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were
able to interview the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to
give their own statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used
against them for a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody
coerced them, that they were never threatened by anybody much less by the
police officers to give these statements. Casually I asked the two boys to
raise their upper clothes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove
their upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily
harm committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In
spite of their [personal] assurances xxx, verbal assurance that they were
never hurt.[38]
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among
others, the use of duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial
confessions.[39] In the present case, the Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano
sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional mandate. Moreover,
appellants allegations of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To
hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere
allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution,
it constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. [40] The defense has the burden of proving that it
was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. [41] Appellant failed to
overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that [a]n extrajudicial
confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. In the present case, the prosecution
presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain
result has been proven for example, a man has died; and (b) some person is
criminally responsible.[42] It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and that
the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired
with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he was at
the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the company
of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to the
voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule
merely requires that there should be some other evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. [43]
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the
killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. One of these was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others
constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower court explained that the
evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with
deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the
criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned and
performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design without
risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers
took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating
circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. [44] Hence, there
is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence
of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because
the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree
lower than that of a principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. He is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
 We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may
be awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award
of P211,670 as compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on
the evidence presented, moral damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of
P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the
payment of interest.[45] However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity
lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages,
which must be duly proven.[46] In this case, the trial court merely presumed the
amount of Capulongs earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence of the
current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera
is CONVICTED as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as
compensatory damages and (c) interest of six percent per annum on these two
amounts. The award of moral damages is however REDUCED to P50,000 and the
award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the
Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-
Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of murder and
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong
Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the
Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm,
hitting her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of her breast which
caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which
states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him
on the posterior aspect, middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused; that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not
guilty in both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four
witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn
Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura, the
physicians at the Sara District Hospital where the victims were admitted. The
defense, on the other hand, presented appellant, Demapanag, and the latter’s brother,
Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23
December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde,
were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio
stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from
Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn
rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused
were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the
three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced
dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot
wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death
was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to
gunshot wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He
found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in
diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in his right
shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December
2000. He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a
shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun
jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle,
the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which
is approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by
Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive
portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie
Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in
Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion
perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy
Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided by law and
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein
imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes
charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan,
Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless
he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred
in convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the
conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral
and exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction
between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555
and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should
have awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds of damages. For
death indemnity, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial
policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise,
the mental anguish of the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of
appropriate and reasonable moral damages."9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision
dated March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said Joint
Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie
Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in
Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of
Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period of detention shall be
deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the
crime(s) charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center,
Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody
unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that
appellant is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold
appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the
civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of
moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected
by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of
evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his
defense. However, appellant’s version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare
and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two
(2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and
his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the
RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the
CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged
unlawful aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant
claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not also
inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun
accidentally fired is also implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the
CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and
presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has consistently put much
weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the
truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the
voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has
the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the witnesses
were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts,
the same must be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack
is one in which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or
resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely determined by the type of
weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the
execution of the crime, and to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may be
properly appreciated against the accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The
use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous,
as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies
as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony
in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an
attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other
hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime
is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous
desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have
been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to
convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death
without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde
was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after
the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what
was the situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in
distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation
at the anterior aspect right shoulder.22
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be two
degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248, that
is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense.1âwphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of
damages imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555,
this Court hereby awards ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.24 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing
case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-
Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted
Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and pay ₱40,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555,
appellant shall pay ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First
Division), Respondents
R ES OLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and
SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by
the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTSthe
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-
12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-
ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no
pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for
the reconsideration of the decision, submitting that:
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A
CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION
23 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER
DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE
REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH
AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN
PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO HIM/HER, BOTH OF
WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.)
NO. 7080.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT
FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE
FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE
OF CO-MINGLING OF FUNDSAND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE
PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S (PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE
ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN
CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174,
COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-
CRM-0174 ARE GUILTY OF MALVERSATION.2
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the
consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because
doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against them
despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably
failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the
identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the
raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of
plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the
charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would
violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the information
did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the
information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already
barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to
deny the motion for reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply
because it was denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the
Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order to find the
petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently
included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations
against them.
Ruling of the Court
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were
improper remedies in light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to the judgment in the
case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own
power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to
evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to
proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there
had been grave abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers
should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with the stringent
requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not
establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx
xxxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or
the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment. (n)
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was
squarely resolved in the decision, as follows:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action,
however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of
the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they
may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so -
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the com1 that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it
is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong
or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the
duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and
despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII
the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is
because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave
abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a
guilty verdict.3
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the
review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We
have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v.
Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the
decision imposed additional elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No.
7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e., the identification of the main
plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate
crime of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the
opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the imposition of new
elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the
information despite the issue revolving only around the sufficiency of the evidence;
and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond reasonable doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not
require personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that
the definition of raids on the public treasury, conformably with the plain meaning
rule, is the taking of public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such
definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of plunderer or
on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit
in the predicate act of raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A. No.
7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the
decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was
an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of
their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable
that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was
by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who,
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
[As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds
or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities
or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified
as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it
plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge
for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and
her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be
identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the
main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by the
Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court
explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main
plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made,
thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by
their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada. 5 [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by
amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of such
public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is
logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No.
SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were
10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or
plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated,
or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is
itself ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of
raiding the public treasury cannot be divided into parts. This is to differentiate the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other offenses involving property,
like robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not expressly
define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory construction.
In so doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that personal benefit on
the part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have
defeated the clear intent of the law itself,6 which was to punish the amassing,
accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the
deliberations of Congress indicated the intent of Congress to require personal benefit
for the predicate act of raids on the public treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080,
which provides:
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key
is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the
maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the
company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association
with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds,
or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms
together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on
the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of
the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use
of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending
that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on
the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.7
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a
requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted
the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who
conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have to conspire or
rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited". A candidate
for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer,
knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited
from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life
imprisonment?
Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these
lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that
the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that under the examples he
has given, the Court will have to...
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the
plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful
husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of course, she
enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or
him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the
fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out
in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor
Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in those examples,
the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances
prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that
what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually
became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator,
but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of
their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but,
more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its
evidence, particularly the different irregularities committed in the disbursement of
the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance with LOI No.
1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with
the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds,
showed the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.
The contention lacks basis.
As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners'
respective demurrers to evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for
insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion
when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and
despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced
against the petitioners. We need not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced,
for it is enough simply to stress that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus
delicti of plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly
petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the
Court did not engage in purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary
task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State against the
petitioners. What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what would
have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to
discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the
Court categorically clarified that in discussing the essential need for the
identification of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the
information, but was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof
that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the "mastermind" - which was how
the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the implied
conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the
information contained nothing that averred her commission of the overt
act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of
plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient
incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to evidence.
Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the
petitioners.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads thusly:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but
is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use. (As amended by RA 1060).
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public
officer; (b) he/she is responsible for the misappropriation of public funds or property
through intent or negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and received such funds
and property by reason of his/her office. 10
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers:
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L.
MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS.
VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B.
PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as
follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of
the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman,
SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L.
MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS.
VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then
Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then
Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission
on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,,
accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt
or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to
its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any
time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally
 conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of
fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several
instances, the above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund
from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same
into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement
vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich
themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently
allege the aforementioned essential elements of malversation in the information. The
omission from the information of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned
elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations.
Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State can amount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal under the decision was a
prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and
granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to
the petitioners for insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime
of plunder charged against them. In People v. Tan, 12the Court shows why:
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to
wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after
tile prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for
an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency
to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the
case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to
do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v.
Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such
as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the
same offense bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in
the same action after jeopardy had attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes
final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or
amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion
for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the
petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy provides to the accused three related protections, specifically: protection
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The rationale for the three protections is
expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a
defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime,
principles of fairness and finality require that he not be subjected to the
possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense.Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176
(1889). When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause
guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict him,
"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that
exceptions to the principle have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new
trial was thought to be unavailable after appeal, whether requested by the
prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No.
15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear
that a defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the
Government enjoyed no similar right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 123979 December 3, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA PILLUETA and JOSE
VICENTE (JOVY) CHANCO, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose
Vicente (Jovy) Chance were indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John
Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an amended Information,
docketed Criminal Case No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial
thereupon ensued.
The evidence submitted by the prosecution, disclosing its version of the case, is
narrated by the Solicitor General in the People's brief.
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and
his live-in partner, Loida Navidad were arrested by appellants Jose
Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and several other NARCOM agents
for alleged illegal possession of marijuana (p. 32, TSN, April 20,
1994).
After the arrest, they were brought to the NARCOM Office
situated at the compound of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Headquarters, Naga City (p. 32, ibid.). Thereat, they were at first
warned by appellant Pillueta not to contact a lawyer (p. 35, ibid.).
Appellant Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only a matter
of P10,000.00" (p. 35, ibid.).
When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived accompanied by a
lawyer, appellant Pillueta got angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once, the
victim and Navidad were dragged to the Naga City Jail situated at
a distance of six (6) to seven (7) meters from the NARCOM Office
(pp. 10, 38-39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained at the
Naga City Jail (ibid.).
Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio Santiano was detained at
the Naga City Jail (pp. 4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the same cell
occupied by the victim (p. 6, ibid.). When appellant Santiano was
mauled by the inmates of Cell 3, the victim was one of those who
participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).
After the release of Santiano, he returned to the City Jail in
November 1993 accompanied by one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
Thereat, the victim was pointed to by appellant Santiano as the one
who mastermind his mauling (ibid.).
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the
victim asked permission from a jail trustee to allow him to buy
viand outside the jail (pp. 7-9, ibid.). When he left, the victim was
wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p. 9, ibid.).
As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by
appellants Sandigan and Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25, 1994). The
two (2) appellants held the victim between them and thereafter
hurriedly, proceeded towards the NARCOM Office situated at a
distance of about twenty-five (25) meters away (pp. 7, 38-
41, ibid.). Upon reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the
victim was pushed inside (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Once the victim was
already inside the NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan proceeded
to and took his place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police Station
(pp. 8-12, ibid.). The victim was made to sit and thereafter mauled
by appellant Santiano (pp. 8-11, ibid.). Santiano got hold of a
handkerchief, rolled it around his fists and continued to punch the
victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes (p. 16, ibid.). As the victim
was being mauled, appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the
NARCOM office, her both hands inside her pockets while looking
to her right and left, acting as a lookout (ibid.).
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile,
parked it in front of the door of the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17,
TSN, April 25, 1994). Thereafter, he proceeded inside the
NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM
Office and started the trimobile (p. 21,ibid.). His co-appellant
Santiano and Pillueta followed him. Inside the trimobile, appellant
Pillueta occupied the back seat (p. 21, ibid.). Santiano occupied the
reserved seat in front of the passenger seat which was occupied by
the victim (ibid.).
As appellant Chanco was about to start his trimobile, appellant
Sandigan, who was at Plaza Barlin, transferred to and stationed
himself at the Century Fox in front of the GSIS building situated at
the corner of General Luna and Arana Streets (p. 23, ibid.).
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco
Church (p. 40, TSN, April 23, 1994). When it passed the
Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way towards the direction of
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was still aboard the
trimobile seated at the passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN,
May 24, 1994).
When prosecution witness Rañola heard over the radio that a
person was found dead at the canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines
Sur, he lost no time in informing a policeman Prila of the Pili
Police Department that the descriptions of the dead person he
heard over the radio fit not only the person he saw being hauled to
and thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but likewise the
same person who was on board the trimobile driven by appellant
Chanco (p. 13, TSN, May 6, 1994).
 Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili,
Camarines Sur, as his brother Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.1
The defense presented its own account of the facts hereunder expounded by it; viz:
Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an organic member of the
NARCOM, Naga City, Command. Accused-Appellant Jose
Sandigan is a regular member of the PNP but, he was a former
organic member of the NARCOM. On the other hand, Accused
Alipio Santiano and Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the
active Civilian Volunteer/Assists of the NARCOM.
That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December 27, 1993, accused-
appellant Sandigan was in front of the Advent theater; that while
thereat, he saw accused-appellant Santiano and he invited the latter
for a snack at the Mang Donald's, a burger house, situated just
beside the Advent theater; that after taking their snacks, they
decided to go to the NARCOM office; that while on their way to
the NARCOM office, they saw accused-appellant Chanco
emerging from the Nehrus Department Store where the latter
bought something; that this Nehrus Department Store is located in
front of the Naga City Police Head Quarters which is also near the
NARCOM office, that the three of them (Sandigan, Santiano and
Chanco) proceeded to the NARCOM office; that when they
arrived, accused-appellant Pillueta, SPO3 Lorna "Onang"
Fernandez, Tet Deniega and the NARCOM, District Commander
P/Insp. Del Socorro were at the NARCOM office while accused-
appellant. Chanco's trimobile was parked in front of the NARCOM
office; that while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant
Santiano and Chanco were joking with each other, like kids, such
that accused-appellants Santiano would sling accused-appellant
Chanco with his handkerchief; that, as it was intermittently raining,
accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco left the
NARCOM office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the trimobile of accused-
appellant Chanco, while accused-appellant Pillueta together with
SPO3 Lorna Fernandez and Tet Deniega left the NARCOM office
at or about 8:00 P.M. and proceeded to the Sampaguita Music
Lounge to watch a lady band performing at the Sampaguita Music
Lounge, leaving behind P/Insp. Nelson Del Socorro at the
NARCOM office.
That upon leaving the NARCOM office and while on board the
trimobile accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco were
deciding whether to see a movie or have a round of drink and, after
failing to decide whether to see a movie or a round of drink,
accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco conducted accused-
appellant Santiano to the jeepney terminal for Milaor, Camarines
Sur and thereupon, accused-appellant Chanco also conducted
accused-appellant Sandigan to the Philtranco terminal where the
latter boarded a bus to Bato, Camarines Sur where he resides.
That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same date,
accused-appellant Santiano was in Milaor, Camarines Sur, a
Municipality less than four kilometers away from Naga City, and
fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife (komadrana), from
the latter's residence to conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy (hilot)
upon his (Santiano) pregnant wife; that Ms. Paz and accused-
appellant Santiano proceeded to and arrived at the latter's house in
Naga City about past 7:00 o'clock in the evening where Ms. Paz
conducted a pre-natal therapy upon appellant Santiano's wife; that
Ms. Paz finished the pre-natal therapy at or about 9:00 o'clock
P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of accused-appellant Santiano
and was accompanied for home by latter at or about 10:00 o'clock
of the same evening; that from past 7:00 o'clock when Paz and
Santiano arrived at the latter's house until past 10:00 o'clock when
they left Santiano's house, accused-appellant Santiano was all the
time present at and never left his house;
That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-
appellant Pillueta, upon leaving the NARCOM office, went
directly to the Sampaguita Music Lounge and watched the lady
band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a common acquaintance of
SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, even
saw and approached them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta)
at their table inside the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that the three of
them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) left the Sampaguita
Music Lounge at or about 2:00 A.M. of December 28, 1993, and
thereupon, they went to their respective homes.
That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the day, the late Ramon
John Dy Kow, Jr. was neither seen by the accused-appellants nor
was he in the NARCOM office more specifically and particularly
between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the same date; that the late Ramon
John Dy Kow, Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and his (Dy
Kow, Jr.) height and body built is almost the same or similarly the
same as that of accused-appellant Chanco; that she (SPO3
Fernandez) also known William Rañola whom she usually see
drunk/under the influence of liquor;
That in the first week of January, 1994, during the investigation of
the case conducted by the PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, SPO3
Fernandez was asked by major Ernesto Idian, chief of PNP Pili,
Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's whereabouts in the
night of December 27, 1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez) told
Major Idian that accused-appellant Pillueta was with her (SPO3
Fernandez) at the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that Major Idian did
not ask her (SPO3 Fernandez) to execute an affidavit of what she
told him instead, Major Idian requested her not to tell accused-
appellant Pillueta about what he asked her.
 That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was later on
Chanco, reported and submitted themselves to their superior identified by Robert Dy Kow as that one of his brother, Ramon
officer, Col. Norberto Manaog, Deputy Director of the NARCOM John Dy Kow, Jr. 3
at Camp Crame, Quezon City, wherein they reported that they were Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His
suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and requested findings revealed that Dy Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained the following injuries:
that they be placed under his custody; that Col. Manaog referred Eye: Contusion, upper lid
them to the legal officer of the NARCOM, Major Acpal; that after extending to the outer canthus,
being informed by accused-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and right;
Chanco that they did not have any idea of whether a warrant of Ear: lacerated wound ripping
arrest was already issued against them, Col. Manaog, in off the lowest pole of the
consultation with Major Acpal, told them that there is no yet basis lobule, right; serrated border
for them to be placed under custody, so that, Col. Manaog Sub-occipital region: lacerated
instructed them just get in touch with him so that if a warrant of wound, 0.9 cms. in length,
arrest comes out, the same could be served upon them; that Col. centrally located;
Manaog directed Major Acpal to proceed to Pili, Camarines Sur to Neck: punctured wound, 3-4
determine the status of the investigation and to know whether a mm deep, semi-circular with
warrant of arrest was already issued; that on January 24, 1994, serrated border, base of neck at
Major Acpal went to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that a the sternomastoid border, right;
warrant of arrest against accused-appellants, Sandigan, who was Chest: Gunshot wound
already arrested, Pillueta and Santiano has been issued on January point of entrance: 2nd ICS,
21, 1994; that on January 25, 1994, Major Acpal, being a lawyer sternal border, right, 12 mm in
and the Legal officer of the NARCOM filed before the Municipal diameter
Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, a motion to quash the warrant of Bullet route: from the point of
arrest; that on January 23, 1994 accused-appellant Pillueta entrance extending backwards
informed Col. Manaog that she was hospitalized due to a car to the left, piercing the heart
accident and that she may be placed under his custody should a and left lung and lodging on
warrant for her arrest be issued; on January 26, 1994, she was the anterior aspect or surface
placed under the custody of her superior, Col. Manaog of the of the sub scapular area, left
NARCOM. On the other hand, accused-appellants, Santiano and Point of exist: None
Chanco were, from time to time, contacting Col. Manaog to Bullet slug: Recovered
determine whether a warrant of arrest was already issued but, since CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL
Col. Manaog was always out of his office, they were able to HEMORRHAGE
contact, via telephone facility, Col. Manaog only on April 16, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4
1994; and accused-appellants Chanco and Santiano went to the Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused guilty beyond
office of NARCOM, Camp Crame, Quezon City, voluntarily reasonable doubt of kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed them under the custody of the Revised Penal Code; the court adjudged:
NARCOM and were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell, Camp UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court
Crame, Quezon City. The records of this case show that no warrant FINDS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and finds all
of arrest was issued against accused-appellant Chanco (Order dated of the accused, Jose Sandigan, Armenia, aka Armie Pillueta, Alipio
Sept. 5, 1994), however, he voluntarily surrendered and submitted Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka Jovy, guilty beyond
to the custody of the NARCOM and to the trial court.2 reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING as defined and
Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
thus: being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was sentences each and all of them to suffer
discovered somewhere in the vicinity of Barangay Palestina, imprisonment, RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories
Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the of the penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon John Dy Kow,
 Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos, and to pay the costs; they are
credited in full for the preventive imprisonment.5
Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
Assailing the decision of the court a quo, appellants would insist that the amended
information under which they were arraigned, tried and convicted, although so
captioned as an indictment for the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, was, in
reality a mere indictment for murder. According to appellants, the use of the words
"abducted" and "kidnapping" in the amended information was not in itself indicative
of the crime of kidnapping being charged but that, from the averments of the
information, it could be apparent that Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., was "abducted or
kidnapped" not for the purpose of detaining but of liquidating him. Hence, the
defense theorized, the conviction for kidnapping had no legal ground to stand on.
Let it not be said that the contention lacks remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal
proposition that can here hardly be accepted. The amended information reads:
The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines
Sur accuses JOSE SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO, ARMIE
PILLUETA and JOVY CHANCO of the crime of KIDNAPPING
WITH MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 267 and
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993
between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the
evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality of
Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another
with intent to kill, with treachery, superior
strength and evident premeditation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct, kidnap, and bring into a secluded place at
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, one RAMON
JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while thereat attack
and shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy
Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the
different parts of his body causing his
instantaneous death.
That as a consequence of the death of the victim
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs suffered
damages. 6
The information is not so wanting as to render it legally inadequate for the purpose it
has been intended by the prosecution. It should be sufficient for an information to
distinctly state the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
complained of as being constitutive of that offense.7 A reading of the amended
information readily reveals that the charge is for "kidnapping with murder,
defined and penalized under Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention) and Article 248 (Murder) of the Revised Penal Code" Evidently,
appellants have been properly apprised of the charges, the information did go
on to state thus —
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00
o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Palestina,
Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior
strength and evident premeditation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct kidnap and bring
into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur one
RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while thereat attack and
shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for
several times hitting him on the different parts of his body
causing his instantaneous death. 8
The accused have gone through trial without any objection thereover.
Exceptions relative to the statement or recital of fact constituting the
offense charged ought be presented before the trial court; if none is
taken and the defective or even omitted averments are supplied by
competent proof, it would not be error for an appellate court to reject
those exceptions on appeal.9
The issue is next posed: When a complex crime has been charged in an
information and the evidence fails to support the charge on one of the
component offenses, can the defendant still be separately convicted of the other
offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United
States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has ruled to be legally feasible
the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime
charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the
accused guilty of the other charge.
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of
Republic Act 7659, 11 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another; or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female,
or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
 above mentioned were present in the commission of the December 27, 1993 with appellant Chanco on its way towards
offense. the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim
The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the was found dead. 14
offender is a private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM"
or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the act and appellant Sandigan a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them
of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the commission of from the criminal liability for kidnapping. 15 It is quite clear that in abducting
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of official
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days, or (ii) that it is function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
committed simulating public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats concert with their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.
to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder
minor, female, or a public officer. 12 since the detention of the victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of
Prosecution witness William Rañola testified that he had seen the victim being liquidating him. Appellants themselves, in fact, all deny having killed the victim.
accosted, held and thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants And while the evidence may have thus been found to be wanting by the trial
Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the NARCOM office the victim was mauled by court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the death of the victim, the
Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued to batter him with punches Court is conviced that the court a quo did not err in making them account for
while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lockout." The appellants kidnapping. The circumstances heretofore recited indicate the attendance of
then took the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Rañola conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them each liable for the
positively identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his offense.
abduction on 27 December 1993 and when his lifeless body was found in the The claim of appellants that they cannot be held liable for indemnity in the
morning of 28 December 1993. Don Gumba corroborated Rañola's testimony. amount of P50,000.00 because the prosecution did not present evidence to prove
Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at around eight o'clock in the damages is without merit. The indemnity awarded by the trial court clearly
evening of 27 December 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board refers to the civil indemnity for the offense 16 and not for actual damages
the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of sustained.
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, where, the following morning the victim was SO ORDERED.
found dead evidently after succumbing to several gunshot wounds.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses
that might have influenced them to declare falsely against appellants; the Court
sees no justification to thereby deny faith and credit to their testimony. 13 The
Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor General in pointing out that —
1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in
question detained at the Naga City Jail, asked permission from
the jail trustee in order to buy viand outside. It was while he
was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted by
appellants Santiano and Sandigan.
2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City,
he was at first dragged to the NARCOM Office where he was
mauled. This circumstance indicated the intention to deprive
him of his liberty for sometime, an essential element of the
crime of kidnapping.
3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but
likewise died as indicated in the autopsy report, thus, belying
appellants' claim that none of the circumstances in Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code was present.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he
saw the victim at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial,
resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8,
1970, with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper
penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts.
248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represented by a private
prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represent by a private
prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan,
Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased
Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of
George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place
was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by
George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum,
South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice
drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II).
At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that
the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he
saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of
his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible
you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over
what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's
compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No,
gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his
equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there
is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him
(pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia
died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9,
Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal
battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the
secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and
the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari
(G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following
antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to
Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a
separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built
his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President
Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and
nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the
settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an
American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3,
1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation
Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual
survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the
outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares
Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales
Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares
each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was
declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the
public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the
only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the
corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was
sent by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty.
Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the
representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the
settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved
the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and
Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the
order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order
of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The settlers as
plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated
as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent
machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the
Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance
dated September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about
30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily
dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to
his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house
is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated
by Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store
from his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he
also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a concrete
pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains and
copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V.
Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with
prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case, appellant on
February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he
agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38
from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration
of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the ownership
of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of
ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that
the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968,
deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for
that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are located as
per agreement executed on February 21, 1967. You have not paid
as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr.
Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the
agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our agreement on
this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill,
bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers &
Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December 31,
1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within
the six- month period, the company shall cause their immediate
demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing
Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway.
Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting
diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just
adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would
have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from
the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing
continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four strands
of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on
his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was
being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the
laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p.
129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased
Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked
on the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-
quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No.
1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following
errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his
person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in
convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his
rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant
admitted having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he
surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of
his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal
liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following
requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as
amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer
of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request
addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona
ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This
was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being
chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the
ground doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his
window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused
this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the
bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr.
Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon
hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr.
Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing
that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take
that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis
supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution.
They claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off
appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals
that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the
fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting
up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in
several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such
as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary
gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the
place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the
steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his
walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage
being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be
shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to
his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things
over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed
his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the
fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house
as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were
not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is no question, therefore, that
there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia
was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the
person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right
to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his
ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence
his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for
annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case
would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was
dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment
of the award to the company, between the same parties, which the company won by
virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the
settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the
dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on
November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding
certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands
had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental
petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968,
nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt
all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the
contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained
by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better
rent the place because even though we do not know who really
owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay
while waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known
who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will
clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay
rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2,
Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant
the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the
walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He
who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court,
if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means established
by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or
cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while
he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on
appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by
law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened
assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas,
46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which
he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis
supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article
11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window,
killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As
a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at
first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers.
His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not
all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible
for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation
on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA
598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the
party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer
acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation
not sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance
was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum,
South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which may be summarized
as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00
A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto
Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the
accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to
help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him
that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken.
Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr.
Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but
I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the
latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle threats
designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol.
2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be
"direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough
that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the
crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that
the accused premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated
act; and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the
execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the
act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased
Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation
to kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his
premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance
may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to
stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the
shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the
authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the
crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to
the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house
being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack
of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house,
must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing
him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.
Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier
migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative
prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the
deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance. DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS
being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO
on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR,
surrender and passion and obfuscation. TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS,
as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR
degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR
the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY
two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the ORDERED. NO COSTS.
presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance. SO ORDERED.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced
because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at
bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by
damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the
community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were
apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose
that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and
detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the killings. She
was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31,
1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968
(p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and
Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend
its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had
the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the
lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take
advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to
fight the big landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material
suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted
of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to
meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day
for each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on
April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and
costs of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused
who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013
SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the August 2 7, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan,
First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case No. 16946, finding petitioner
Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
and its November 29, 2007 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9,
1991, filed before the Sandiganbayan which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay
Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in the performance of his official
functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO
with an M-16 Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds in
different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and
waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: Paulito Duran, one of the visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son of
the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and Dr. Ruben Escueta, the
physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus
Avenido (Jesus).
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his
companion-members of the Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo
Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo; and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad, resident physician of
San Pablo City District Hospital.
The Version of the Prosecution
On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos,
Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and
Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus. They started drinking at
8:30 o’clock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors only at around 11:00
o’clock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to
settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The
drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle.4
Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading
towards the terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near
the terrace, Duran focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several
gunshots prompting him to duck under the table. Right after the shooting, he looked
around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was
no longer in sight.5
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a
hospital. Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was
brought to the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any time during
the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him.6
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting
incident took place, anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. His parents were then attending to his problem regarding a vehicular
accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation with his father, who
later joined their visitors at the terrace.7
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company
of some members of the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw
Flores and his father talking to each other from a distance of about six (6) meters.
Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right shoulder. Flores continued
shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he
felt hurt to have lost his father.8
Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their
visitors when she saw Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace. By the
time she reached the terrace, her husband was already lying on the ground and still
being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she and her children rushed him to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.9
As a consequence of her husband’s untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She
testified that Jesus had an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) before he died at the age of forty-one (41). He left four (4) children.
Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual damages consisting of lawyer’s
fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos
(₱500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) for
the funeral expenses.10
Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an
autopsy on the cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours
before his body was brought to him.11
Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot
wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the
left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region
through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the
tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The
victim died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.
The Version of the Defense
To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.
Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four
members of the CAFGU and Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo
Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo Alquizar, upon the instructions of
Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, conducted a ronda in Barangay San
Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta.13
At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who
had earlier invited them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots
seemingly emanating from his house. Flores asked the group to stay behind as he
would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the shooting practice for the fiesta
celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the house, he was
stopped by Latayan and handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was
prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the weapon over his right shoulder, with its
barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores that such posture
would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus.14
Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a
drinking spree with four others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus
and his guests to cease firing their guns as it was already late at night and to save
their shots for the following day’s fiesta procession. Flores claimed that despite his
polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the
barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was
met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately
stood up and approached
him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his
magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate,
he was able to partially parry Jesus’ right hand, which was holding the pistol, and
was hit on his upper right shoulder.15
With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the
latter was able to instinctively take hold of Jesus’ right hand, which was holding the
gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting Flores’ left hand. 16
Twice hit by bullets from Jesus’ magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two
wounds, Flores, with his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his
right hand the baby armalite dangling on his right shoulder towards Jesus and
squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he
immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut groves,
bleeding and utterly bewildered over the unfortunate incident that just transpired
between him and his cousin Jesus, he heard more gunshots. Thus, he continued
running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow. He proceeded to the
Mayor’s house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had
happened. There, he found his ronda groupmates.17
The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt.
Alfredo Sta. Ana.
Decision of the Sandiganbayan
On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
decision18 finding Flores guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected
Flores’ claim that the shooting was justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave
credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot
Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which resulted in his death. According to the
Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses
who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. The dispositive
portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding
the accused Simon A. Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide and to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to 17 years, and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido, another Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (₱6,500.00) as actual or compensatory damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any
notice of hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records
Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration."20
In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of
accused Flores is considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to
appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this Court has
become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors involving questions of substantive and
procedural laws and jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores raises the following
ISSUES
(I)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF SELF-
DEFENSE
(II)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED
SERIOUS BUT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS
(III)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED22
The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the
Sandiganbayan on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due
process. The dismissal rendered final and executory the assailed decision which was
replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the evidence
on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits
of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective,
indubitably demonstrate selfdefense on his part.
Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37
and Section 4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served
upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores,
such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion which is the
intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for
reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is
required under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores’ argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not
be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The
motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written
notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
xxxx
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X
x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the
prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37
and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the
movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to
the rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all
parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the
requirement renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of
hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."24
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of
hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever.
Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other
members of the First Division who rendered the assailed decision, were not able to
observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying as they were not present during
the trial.25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that
led to wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction.
His contention is likewise devoid of merit.
"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial,
unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached
by him."26
"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in
divisions of three Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only
after deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the
required majority vote."27
In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was
misapprehension or misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the defense able
to adduce evidence to establish that the factual findings were arrived at with grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that
Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after he was
already lying helpless on the ground.
Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of
self-defense. According to him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of
Jesus. He was just at the entrance of Jesus’ terrace merely advising him and his
guests to reserve their shooting for the fiesta when Jesus approached him, drew a
magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was sudden, unexpected and
instantaneous. The intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun
directly at him. As he tried to parry Jesus’ hand, which was holding the gun, the latter
kept firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use the baby armalite he was
carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was lack of sufficient provocation
on his part as he merely requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their
shooting for the following day as it was already late at night and the neighbors were
already asleep.
In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying
circumstance of self-defense interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses instead.
His argument deserves scant consideration.
The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of
fact. In appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be raised and not issues of
fact. The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this
Court.28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of self-defense.
Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent."
If the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden
of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To
escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance. 29
In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by
shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked
self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of
the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was legally
justified under the circumstances.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the
concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any
criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful
aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger––not merely threatening and intimidating action. It
is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s
life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-
defense."32
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative value of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the
Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were
crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility, to wit:
First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a
magnum handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful
weapon, at such close range, and without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is
quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accused’s shoulder. On the
contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried
to make it appear later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to
have hit any of the bones located in that area of his shoulder.
Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he
did not mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet
remained lodged in his shoulder at the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic
why he kept mum during the preliminary investigation when it was crucial to divulge
such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for trial
before finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply
stretches credulity.
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on
his right shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or
any medical records from the hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have
most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during the preliminary
investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter
lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical
record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the incident.
Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a
hard object, such as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain
is visibly concentrated only on the area around the hole forming a circular shape.
Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 o’clock midnight when he was allegedly
shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were
treated, the blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the
shirt was not even definitively shown to be human blood.
Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking
only at 11:00 o’clock in the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident
happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido
was not yet drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses
themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the
accused. Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns,
having previously worked as a policeman.1âwphi1 In addition, the latter was
relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore
finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot the
accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the
accused. We find it much less acceptable to believe how the accused allegedly
overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun from the latter, despite
allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such
ease, the armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have
no experience handling, while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling
with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted)
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores’ credibility and reliability, his
story being contrary to ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that
testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine
the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in
conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of
mankind."34
The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to
prove that Flores was shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan:
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since
the same is in the nature of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbad’s testimony was a
mere re-statement of what appeared as entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"),
over which he admitted to possess no personal knowledge. The photocopy of the
logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value since it was not established by
the defense that such evidence falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 130, which pertain to the rules on the admissibility of evidence. 35 x x
x
Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by
Jesus, the same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to
the ground. At that point, the perceived threat to Flores’ life was no longer attendant.
The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus’ abdomen and buttocks.
Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further
negate the claim of self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered
four (4) gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial
portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left
hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the
left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards
the umbilicus. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the
victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of
the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores’ claim that he merely acted in self-defense,
his first shot on Jesus’ shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the ground,
would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But
Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds
sustained by the victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to
defend himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this regard that the
location and presence of several wounds on the body of the victim provide physical
evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of self-defense."37
"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to
kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation against the original aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still
existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.39
The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound
was about two to three inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could
not have taken place when accused and his victim were standing and facing each
other. Another bullet entered through the medial portion of the victim's buttocks and
exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the left
hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen.
The respective trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused shot
Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the ground. Moreover, according
to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making him fall to
the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that unlawful aggression initially existed,
the same had effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground.
There was no more reason for the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times
more, and continue shooting at the victim.40 (Emphasis in the original)
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.41 In this case, the continuous
shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot wounds were not necessary and
reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter was
already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 109614-15. March 29, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRONICO
GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The instant appeal seeks the reversal of the joint decision of
the Regional Trial Courtof Bacolod City, Branch 43, rendered on April 20, 1992, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 428 and 6307 finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
The facts of the case as established by the evidence for the prosecution are
faithfully summarized in the Peoples brief, to wit:
Around 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his
fifteen year old son Romeo Catorse arrived at the house (the house is composed of
two storeys) of appellant Adronico Gregorio at Sitio Bug-as, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the wake of the latters grandson (TSN March
24, 1987, pp. 3-4).
When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake.
Jovito Nicavera, Marcelo Lo and Adronico were conversing downstairs while
upstairs, some were playing pusoy (russian poker), among them were Jerry Nicavera,
Renato Calabas, Tunggak, (son of Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio (brother and co-
appellant of Adronico). Kibitzing and at times betting in the game were John
Villarosa, Remolito Calabas, Carmelo Alubaga and Crispin Calalas (I.D.,
pp. 5; TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 12-13).
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with
him any weapon in their possession for safekeeping so as to avoid trouble.
Complying therewith, Carlos Catorse handed over his samurai, John Villarosa and
Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to Adronico (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 16-
19; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 22-23).
Around 1:00 oclock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the game of pusoy was
still in progress, appellant Ricardo, in a very loud voice, reprimanded Tunggak from
(sic) peeping at the cards of other players. In response, Tunggak stood up and also in
a very loud voice ordered the game stopped (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 25-27; TSN,
November 14, 1987, pp. 45-50).
Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered Tunggak downstairs and right there and
then Adronico scolded and boxed him (Tunggak) several times (TSN, May 30, 1989,
pp. 27-30; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 51-55).
While Adronico was severely beating Tunggak, Carlos Catorse approached and
begged Adronico from further hurting his son so as not to put him to shame before
the crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying the matter between the father and son
when suddenly appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind with a
samurai (the same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and thereafter hacked
and stabbed him several times more in different parts of his body: Right after Carlos
fell to the ground, Adronico, for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim with a bolo.
(TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 30-31; November 14, 1989, pp. 57-65).
Terrified, Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house. Jovito
Nicavera also tried to get out of the house but Adronico hacked him instead with a
bolo hitting his left shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo,
with the same samurai used against Carlos hacked him on his forearm. Adronico
immediately followed and using a bolo hacked Marcelo on the nape.Although
wounded, Marcelo was able to run out of the house but Adronico ran after and
overtook him. Adronico then hacked him again. When Ricardo followed the two, the
visitors attending the wake scampered out of the house (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 44-
56; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 66-77).
Later, Romeo Catorse together with his sister and younger brother returned to the
house of Adronico where they found their father lying prostrate and dead. Nobody
was around. Later on, the family of Jovito Nicavera arrived and brought the latter to
a hospital in Bacolod (TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 8-10).
Around 9:00 oclock of the same morning of May 8, 1987, police authorities arrived
at Adronicos place to investigate the killing incident. The bodies of Carlos Catorse
and Marcelo Lo were found inside the house and at the yard of Adronico,
respectively (TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 76-78).The investigation revealed that
appellants Adronico and Ricardo fled to Sitio Anangge, Barangay Buenavista,
Murcia, Negros Occidental, about 4 kilometers away from the situs of the crime. The
authorities pursued and succeeded in apprehending the appellants. Appellants were
thereafter brought and investigated at Murcia Police Headquarters (TSN, April 5,
1991, pp. 9-10).
The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims reveals that Carlos
Catorse sustained twelve hack and four stab wounds while Marcelo Lo sustained six
hack wounds. Both victims died of cardio respiratory arrest due to multiple wounds
(Exhibits A, B, C & D).[1]
Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed against
Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch LXII, BagoCity. The indictment, docketed as Criminal Case No.
428, reads:
That on or about the 8th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a samurai and a bolo, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one, CARLOS CATORSE y APELYEDO,
thereby inflicting multiple stab and hack wounds upon the body of the latter, which
caused the death of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty.[3]
Another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo was instituted against
Adronico Gregorio, this time, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 43, Bacolod City. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 6307, the accusatory
portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack one MARCELO LO Y NICA VERA,
thereby inflicting multiple injuries upon the body of the latter which caused the death
of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, Adronico Gregorio entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.[5]
Later, the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 43.
On April 20, 1992 as aforestated, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds the two (2)
accused Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principals of having committed the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 428 and
hereby sentences each to life imprisonment and to solidarily indemnify the heirs of
Carlos Catorse the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Crim. Case No. 6307 (2292) (sic) the Court finds the same Adronico Gregorio
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having committed Murder and hereby
sentences him to another life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Marcelo Lo
the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Further, the two (2) accused shall be credited with the full term of their preventive
confinement.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
In their brief, appellants raised the following errors, to wit:
I EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THAT
OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANTS
DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST
CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[7]
However, before the Office of the Solicitor General could file its Appellees
Brief, appellant Ricardo Gregorio died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his
criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon is extinguished.
[8]
Evidently, this appeal will proceed only with respect to appellant Adronico
Gregorio.
After a careful perusal and evaluation of the case, this court is not inclined to
disturb the findings and conclusion of the court below, there being no cogent reason
therefor.For, aside from the well-settled rule that the factual findings of the trial
judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and assess
their credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect, [9] there appears to be no
strong reason to depart from the said doctrine since the decision is fully supported by
the evidence on record.
Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from
criminal liability. However, the trial court, skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same,
reasoning that appellant failed to establish self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. We agree. In numerous cases decided by this Court, the guiding
jurisprudential principle has always been that when an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove the
elements of that claim; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is
inescapable.[10] Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the prosecution. [11] Having admitted the killing, appellant has
to justify his taking of a life by the exacting standards of the law.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[12]
In the case at bench, appellants claim of self-defense must fail. For one, the
physical evidence tells us a different story. Dr. Emmanuel Boado, the medico-legal
officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo
Lo, submitted the following post-mortem reports and attested to the veracity and
authenticity of the same, thus:
Cadaver of Carlos Catorse:
1. Hack wound 5 inches bong, left temporal going backward with chip
fractured (sic) of the skull.
2. Hack wound 8 inches long, from the base of the left Nose, going backward
below the left ear.
3. Hack wound 7 inches long, neck left side going backward with complete
chip fractured (sic) of the fourth vertebrae cutting blood vessels.
4. Stab wound 2 inches wide, 4 inches deep anterior abdomen, below the 10th
rib, left side.
5. Stab wound 1 1/2 inches wide, 4 inches deep at the side of the navel left.
6. Hack wound, base of the palm, 3 inches bong posterior side, cutting bones.
7. Hack wound, cutting left small finger.
8. Hack wound, 3 inches bong upper 3rd right forearm running
anteroposteriorly, chip fracture of bones.
9. Hack wound left shoulder back 4 inches bong going downward with chip
fracture of the shoulder joint.
10. Hack wound 5 inches long posteriorly left joint with chip fracture of the
bones.
 11. Hack wound 3 inches long posteriorly forearm below the elbow joint chip
fracture of the bones.
12. Hack wound 3 inches long middle 3rd forearm, posterior surface, with chip
fracture of the bones.
13. Stab wound 4 inches wide left back level of the 11th embracio rib, back side
through and through of the level of 12th rib right.
14. Hack wound 2 1/2 inches bong with chip fracture of the 11th lobar
vertebrae.
15. Hack wound middle right arm posterior side 4 inches long with chip
fracture of bone.
16. Stab wound 1 inch wide hitting the vertebral bones, 5th thoracic vertebrae.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound, liver, large intestine, small intestine
2. Massive abdominal bleeding.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to Multiple hack and Stab wounds.[13]
Cadaver of Marcelo Lo:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Hack wound 6 inches long left temporal area going occiput, chip fracture
skull.
2. Hack wound, left face going back ward base of the skull, brain tissue coming
out, with chip fracture of the skull.
3. Hack wound, right 4 inches long right back cutting the scapular bones.
4. Hack wound 6 inches long, with chip fracture of the Vertebrae bones.
5. Hack wound 4 inches long cutting the 1st thoracic rib; scapular bones.
6. Hack wound 4 inches long, below the left scapular bones, cutting ribs.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Cerebral Hemorrhage, Massive
2. Thoracic Hemorrhage, Massive
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to multiple hack wounds.[14]
If Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo
merely to defend themselves, it certainly defies reason why they had to inflict sixteen
stab wounds on Carlos and six on Marcelo. The location, number and gravity of the
wounds inflicted on the victims belie the appellants contention that they acted in self-
defense.[15]The rube is settled that the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on a
victim negate an accuseds claim of self-defense.[16]
The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of
accused Ricardo Gregorio and appellant Adronico Gregorio. Ricardo Gregorio
testified that at around 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse
suddenly kicked, from the outside, the front door of the house of Adronico, then ran
towards Eduardo (nephew of Ricardo) and boxed the latter; that he intervened to
pacify Carlos but the latter drew his samurai and attempted to attack him and
Eduardo; that he grappled for possession of the samurai and was able to turn its point
back to Carlos who was hit in the stomach and then fell on the ground; and thereafter
he left the victim, then went home.[17]
On his part, appellant Adronico Gregorio declared that at the same time his son,
Eduardo, and brother, Ricardo, were being attacked by Carlos, he was in the kitchen
preparing food for the people attending the wake of his grandson; that suddenly
Marcelo Lo and Jovito Nicavera destroyed the bamboo walls of his kitchen, entered
threat and assaulted him; that Marcelo attacked him with a bob but he was able to
parry the latters hand and the bolo instead landed and struck the wooden rail of the
kitchen sink; that Jovito in turn pointed a gun at him but without wasting time, he
dislodged the bolo from the wooden rail of the sink and slashed Jovitos hand; that
because of the injury sustained, Jovito dropped the gun and ran out of the house; that
he turned to Marcelo and struck him with a bolo until the latter fell outside of the
kitchen; and that he never knew what happened next to Marcelo until the following
morning when he learned that the latter died.[18]
Not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are
innately false and fatuous.
By making said allegations, appellant and deceased accused would want to
impress upon this Court that both were able to inflict only a single stab wound on
deceased Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo. Curiously, however, none of their empty
claims could explain the physical evidence and findings of the autopsy reports that
Carlos Catorse sustained a total of 16 hack and stab wounds while Marcelo Lo, 6
mortal hack wounds.[19]Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were unanimous in their
declaration that it was the appellant and his brother Ricardo who started the skirmish.
There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Carlos Catorse who only wanted to
help pacify Adronico nor on Marcelo Los part, who was only trying to flee from the
melee when he was attacked and hacked to death. Likewise extant from the records
is the absence of any act on the part of the victims giving sufficient provocation for
the attack.
Likewise telling is the fact that appellant and his brother fled from their homes
soon after the incident instead of reporting the matter to the police. Their flight
negates self-defense and indicates guilt. [20] As we have repeatedly held, flight
evidences guilt and a guilty conscience; the same strongly indicates a guilty mind
and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.[21]
Appellant also challenges the court a quos finding that there was conspiracy
between him and his brother Ricardo. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.[22] However, direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, [23] as it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused.[24] Where the acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and regardless
of the fact, the perpetrators will be liable as principals.[25]
In the case at bench, although there is no proof as to a previous agreement by
the assailants to commit the crime charged, conspiracy is evident from the manner of
its perpetration.[26] After Ricardo lunged at Carlos with a samurai from behind
several times, Adronico attacked him in turn with a bolo. Likewise, appellants
successively hacked Marcelo using the weapons they used against Carlos. The
incident happened in split seconds, so to speak. Under the circumstances, it is
evident that Adronico and Ricardo acted in unison and cooperated with each other
towards the accomplishment of a common felonious objective. In People v.
Regalario[27] cited in People v. Lopez,[28] we held:
An indicium of conspiracy is when the acts of the accused are aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to
complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts though
apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness
of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The
evidence need not establish the actual agreement which shows the pre-conceived
plan, motive, interest, or purpose in the commission of the crime; conspiracy is
shown by the coordinated acts of the assailants.[29]
Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Adronico and Ricardo, and it
was not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit the crime since from
their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful
design or common goal which was to kill the victims.[30]
We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery (alevosia) may be appreciated against the appellants. Treachery exists
when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.[31] In this case, it was clearly established that Ricardo stealthily
stabbed Carlos from behind, and repeatedly hacked him in different parts of his body,
with a samurai. As Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico followed suit, repeatedly
hacking the victim with a bolo. Though the assault upon Marcelo was preceded by
appellants assault upon Carlos and Jovito, the incident happened in a span of seconds
only. Terrified by what he witnessed, Jovito Nicavera tried to run out of the house
but Adronico hacked him instead. Instinctively, Marcelo Lo came to help his uncle
Jovito but Ricardo followed by Adronico hacked him using the same samurai and
bob they used against Carlos. Defenseless and severely wounded Marcelo tried to
run but Adronico finished him off by more mortal hacks. From all indications, the
mode of attack adopted by the appellant and his brother qualifies the killing to
murder as the same rendered the victims who were unarmed at that time defenseless
and helpless, without any opportunity to defend themselves from their assailants
unreasonable and unexpected assault. The attack was sudden and was specially
employed by the assailants to insure the execution of the said crime without risk to
themselves arising from the defense which the victims might make.
Indeed, the use against Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo of the samurai and bolo,
both deadly weapons, the traitorous manner in which they were assaulted, and the
number of wounds inflicted on them, all demonstrate a deliberate, determined assault
with intent to kill. Appellant is guilty of murder.
Some last notes. The fallo of the assailed decision sentences the appellant to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse
and Marcelo Lo the sum of P30.000.00 each. The correct penalty, however, should
be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As
we have held time and again, life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are different
and distinct from each other. In People v. Ruelan,[32] we outlined the distinction
thusly:
As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment for the crime of murder. Evidently, the said
court failed to appreciate the substantial difference between Reclusion
Perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and Life Imprisonment when imposed as a
penalty by special law. These two penalties are different and distinct from each
other. Hence, we would like to reiterate our admonition in the case of People v.
Penillos, likewise quoted under Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 amending
Administrative Circular No. 6-92 dated October 12, 1992 re: the correct application
of the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Evidently, it
considered the batter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case.
Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People v. Baguio, this
Court held:
The Code does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized
not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible
for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing,
does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration.
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones, and in
the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court
already made it clear that reclusion perpetua, is not the same as imprisonment for
life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this
Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other. [33]
Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court and pursuant
to People v. Sison,[34] the civil indemnity for the death of a victim is increased to
P50,000.00. Consequently, the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo are entitled to
P50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that appellant Adronico Gregorio
is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos
Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000.00 each, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. As aforestated, the death of Ricardo Gregorio
extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising from said crime.
SO ORDERED.