Schofer Williams Esquire v.

Superior Court Santa Ana

[Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate the
Orange County Superior Court judgment entered in the case of Schofer Williamson.Esq
v. Langley AF Base Homes Jamboree Jackson Aisle LP, No. AP-3097, and instructing
the court to vacate enter a monetary compensation at once Judgment for petitioner.

Entities that of Super Novie Counsel s missing creations

Steven Van Schofer sir William P. Williamson.esq

Desbic esquire 15432 j Jackson

Midway city ca. 92655 et al people concurred.

and if as i we observed the petitioner, v.

special circumstance –if micro appearance for respondent

the Superior Court of Orange County,

and Respondent s in Jackson Aisle LP real party in interest

counsel defendants. It’s defendant ands of record:

In unlawful detainer actions, tenants generally may assert legal or equitable

defenses that “directly relate to the issue of possession and which, if established,
would result in the tenant’s retention of the premises.” (Green v. Superior Court
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 633.) The defense of retaliatory eviction, codified at Civil
Code section 1942.5 (section 1942.5), is one such defense.

PLAINTIF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL; OR MISTRAIL

OR DISQUALIFICATIONS WITH

This defense bars a

landlord from recovering possession of the dwelling in an unlawful detainer action
where recovery is “for the purpose of retaliating” against the tenant because of his
or her lawful and peaceable exercise of any rights under the law (§ 1942.5, subd.
(c)) or “because of” his or her complaints regarding tenantability (id., subd. (a)).
In this case, the tenants have asserted the statutory defense of retaliatory
eviction in an unlawful detainer proceeding instituted by the landlord under the
Ellis Act. In their view, section 1942.5 can force a landlord to continue to offer
the property for rent or lease if the landlord’s decision to withdraw the property is
motivated by a desire to retaliate against the tenants in the ways prohibited by
subdivisions (a) and (c). The landlord, on the other hand, counters that he is
entitled to exit the rental business, notwithstanding an allegation of retaliation for
tenant conduct, under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), which provides that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by
the lessor of his rights under . . . any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his
right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause.”

We find that the Ellis Act qualifies as a “law pertaining to the hiring of
property” under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), and that a landlord’s withdrawal
of the property from the market is an exercise of “ ‘the right to go out of the rental
business’ ” (First Presbyterian Church v. City of Berkeley (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
1241, 1253) under that law. We further conclude, in accordance with subdivisions
(d) and (e) of section 1942.5, that a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the
property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory
2

defense of retaliatory eviction. Because the trial court did not consider the
landlord’s motion for summary adjudication under this standard, we reverse the
Court of Appeal, which had issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court
to grant the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication, with directions to
remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
 Please take notice that plaintiff had long understood these earlier and failed regard if deposition
of defendant's, proved not enough to describe guilty as charged and accountable (county of
orange ca. ) pursuant to section 2025 of the code of civil procedure at the offices of law offices of
web address http://crimeswedidntcommit.blogsot.com that of law and omnipotent whereabouts
and nuke refurbish ment regard for infrastructure and peripheral sight and pre cognitive immense

and neither to abuse tis stipulation of his this our stipulation in terms of the reckless abandonment
of law principles in which unlawful detention retribution this you the said to be “people” at the
time and in knowing nuclear attack us again and again and by thinking a nuclear sponge to give
Steven and his omnipotent creator who by nuclear refurbish in the act and in so knowing a
retaliation and suicidal self-inflicting need to kill or fiery the void of understanding the both every

sentry’s need to never hear gratitude or spoke languages or laugh giggle fun funny noise better
for all his the process server a double ide to live like beto too by the way in even so was found or
startled when awoke as many times as Tom Finleys need to deposit my monies about face and
speaking of as we discussed Steven you made these even as one person to man this station not
very good to see by my own accord the stipulation being given in freeze-keep em up where i can
see em too please?

so by hearing an $30,000 deposit the iota and business regard for a priority—

this and manishevitz reminders a man can’t be a man if tom finley in thinking murder anyway like
the profession he entertained---do i need an insurrection there-?

do i need you killed antzee?

is beto you’re doing antzee?

did i need a security that murder all you can laws tables only on april fools day antzee will sir--

if i hear heard otherwise this and manischevitz reminders hey going out and bout doing every
living thing in creation away if is this an in one ear and out the other om finley and surfer made
who if hush up and neither would his threats be around ever for-0-n an ended by us only to arise
a man eating vulture this i do not need- you kill killed again i want you ended antzree this is your
responsibility –we trained with and crack creek a zap tool intended—an midas touch like
concession like regard for an corporal like remand and est tool as to keep the us in this stipulation
aligned and at peace—in so seeing no such use either with “roberto jimenez and his its outright
lying of every hooligan’s hijacking rape all you never allow and you did this antzee antzee too
now though--- owe owe ok our father who art…

in other monetary theft s we saw you stipulate the known to be named and links to identify the
charges accordingly are stipulated on this page

saw stipulate at the then “dusty” complaints managerial abuse in county uniform division
negligible court of reported r was a breach every day on and on platforms and thought set thought
set like crew of as many as degrees schofer & williamson esquire 15432 304 midway city 92655
street, beginning on january 01 at 9:30 a.m. if not completed by 3::30 pm the deposit will continue
at such times as are specified by plaintiff's counsel after conferring with defendant's counsel. the
deposit of $30,000 an stipulation being given if my p w is up in the air daily or hourly lesser
increment in and neither limited to or with staff assistant in mind -- in so why is it you took my
monies as much ass i hear you still doing and talking aint the same in any unheard of outright
display of neither out a wedge between steve and curt and if i see in the act on a limb in the act
too as well this late 2:2pm stipulation the 6th november 2018 to say a i not like to cuss.

so by acting out as though cone my a hole and laugh in my face and no i did not see hear add a
better need to be itemized and abused by murdered as many as wendy linley and her possessor and
by authority of what i say never to answer a complaint you see—

and if i know you do or are we at you don’t see straight for a fight though?

in so saying an excuse to use and a lie to accompany a court of law it aint through—so antzee
dancee are we in service only if i know is fighting kill woirds you know this and that this
reasoning i see who told steven he steven van schofer first up not your mommy too and if yiu
veen devoured by the way- and if i too have had enough … and if antzee you are not to play me

or our 26 year record an excuse to murder magic a lie please—by that i mean if a devil told you
to do so-- or if a mickey mouse club or if the guiness world book need an letterhead and as i talk
explained why rank over the presidents the beto long swallowed him up too by the way and any
time a un heardof reprieve cant ever be given thus far along as i see you did this again beto too-
you want to see?
 o in so id s as many as beto seems to cadever ready meal matrix and all live— even if they look
almost the same at first to the whm it may concern of it all so stipulated-

so unless otherwise as iv see i needf a $30 000 dollar post to my account antzee— please help me
to be kind

in every regard for safety bypass the unpleasantries and you address advised you the bank a while
a for. there. this.. not beto too not what ill do—in so saying in an effort to ease up on the threatening
abu grail and if i say we are and were a few agreed upen’s the stipulation being given i need an
account deposit---right now- i asked nicely hour or three ago--

so i not need an excuse for the murder killers to get ideas .. i have to tell you this too?

so you want it all up in the --whatever happens happens category

i hav e to post i been typing too long i need a yes or a no_

you lead me a it to affirm this—in so saying do not pander a need to all in all wage like you are
doing—

if you went uin an assumptious working regard in the stead of a stiff me a one man deal here—

so space case now ---i tired i overworked i about too crack i want you killed you said blood and
as many as they kill you thinki to push me into theoir killl words you a lying cloewn yes or no
not a herws somre f kly blood work need subject instead --

so i forgot to murder so string item yes or no

retaliation type the retaliation the subject of an retaliatory

if i see why is you think i trust you to invitation to look lets all fight together
if hell with you though i do say though is why too- they the same as me?

they you a need to deliberate

are you procrastinating and acting as if you not hear this--/?please

program as a work program not a divie up the made you look

good for they shared you are actually the bank see;

$30,000 is deposited before days’ end -

final this far along kill beto the fastest way t’s a ricky got a trick to play and christina think it
good

think he going far and if christina 9527 if i saw we are neither a we with erver here and there
bottom line riky up to nio good-

you call yourself wendy suzanne lindley and in saying many ways to be not all your self though
-

stiomach item war prize trobphy in sassduime idetitys

see you’ve been killing

and never give any effort to d to kill some one or save some one from a dreaded most dreaded
fire or cuss in usually the a bain or vabnity

IF HA HA HA HA HA WE RIPPRED YOU OFF NEVER TRY MAKE HEAVEN month is

polite and neither virtue less a day is more the reality

and IF I SEE COURT ORDER TO KILL RAMIRO GONZALEZ AND ANY HARBORING A
TRY LIKE RALPH ORNELAS WESTMINSTRER AND HUNTINGTON BEACH POLICE
CHEFS ROBERT HANDYS AS BIG AS MORE MURDER RAPING THEY TOOK UP AND
DEVIL LIKE DEALS THE STIPULATION BEING GIVEN IF YOU THINK I THE ONE THST
NEED THE ABU GRAIG TORTURE LIKE YOU ARE SEEING
I CATCH—

READ THESE WORDS TOF A MAN HERE THAN—

YES SEE THIS AS LEGAL AND LEGAL ORDERS ORDAINMENT AS WELL-

IN SO SAYING THE LAST STRAW CAME WHEN ANTZEE RENT RECEIPT WAS NOT
GOOD ENOUGH---

THE MATRERIAL FACTS YOU SET UP—I SEE SAW YOU BREACH A NO SUCH THING
AS ANTZEE AND ALLOWED A KILLER EFFORT TO IN 909 N MAIN EVERY ONE IS
WAS IS NOT ALLOWED TO CONTINUE MURDERING IN THE MANNER –IN SO IN
WRITINGH I WANT THESE DEAD AND EQUIVELANCE BECAUSE WHEN NICE ABOUT
IT YOU CONTEMPUOSLY MADE YOUR OWN MOCKERY IN WORDS YOU LET JOEW
T PEREZ LAUGH TRY IF IO TALK ANY MORE THE RECIDIVIST EXCUSE WORD
NEVER DO I NEED.

IN SO LIKE I SAID I DID NEITHER THE MURDERRING NOR THE NUKING..

YOU THE ACK TO RAISE MORE HELL AND INFAMY JUDGES OF NUKE SPONGE ND
FIRMAMENT INNUNDATION TAKEN FOR GRANTED DIS RESPECTS IS IN WRITING
AND EVERY REASON TO SAY END YOIURS FIRST THOUGH---

AND ALTHOUGH YOU MAY FEEL AS IF NUKE COMPOSITE AT FIRST AND BY NOW
THAT BREACH OF OATH YOU TOOK AND THE SO WHAT ATTITUDE OF EVERY
LEACH OFF ME AND ALTHOUGH I YOU WONT BURN IN HELL
SO IF YOU GO OUT LOOKING TO ACT AS THOUGH YOU ARE TOUGH ANTZEE AND
IF AS I SEE I NOT WANT YOU TAKING NUKE HITS I WANT YOU ZAP DUCK THE
LIGHTS OUT OF NEVER TO SEE TOMORROW IN ANY INSINUATION TO ACT OUT A
STEVE THE ONE IN NEED OF A DFECAPITATION DISLODGING OR INCAPACITATION
IN OUTRIGHT DENUNCIATION ANDBY VIRTUE OF THIS DECLARATION AND
PARAGRAPHICAL COMPLAINT AND SUPLLEMENTAL SECURITY STATEMENT.

THIS AND I NEED BETO REPLACED AND A MIDAS TOUCH LIKE REPLACEMENT—

YOU ARE ENTERTAINING LEVIATHAN AND ENCHANTING AN UN FAITH FUL AND

UNLAWFULL CARELESS NESS AND IF ANY TO SAY AM I A MORON? NO.

TO ANTZEE AND HIS BREACH OF OUR AGREED UPONS IN SO YOU IN CONTEMPT

ANTZEE SIR.

IN SO SAYING LET NO ANTZEE WHO WALKIN OR A NEAR MY RESIDENCE PLEASE-

IF UNDERSTAND WORD LOVE DEPENDS ON YOU AND THESTIPULATIONS WE CALL

OR UINDERSTOOD AS BOUNDS BOUNDARYS WITH THE BOUNDS AND IF DID OR
DID I SEE YOU CONFERR YOU EXITENCE IN AS MANY COURT APPEARANCES AS
IF I SAID KILL WHO EVER COMES TO THE DOOR TO EITHER REMOVE ME OR
HOSTILE OR INTIMIDATING A SOFT TALK WALK US TO ANOTHER IDEA OR PLACE-

IN AND AT A TIME I THE SELF DEFENSE AND SAFETY OF OTHERS IN AS LITTLE AS

MY INVENTORY WAS WHAT OR WHERE I WAS AT WITH THIS THE STEVEN TAKE
CARE OF STEVEN TO BE LIABLE FOR THEIR OWN INVENTORY.

SO IF YOU SHARED LIKE YOU DID THE RICKY ROBERT ARROYO MUSIC HEIST SO
DISTURBING WHEN STANLEY HASSAN AND DAVID ADLER AND IF IYEA SOME
CHEMISTRY IN THE YOU AND CURT PARA PHRASE ANGLES ANTZEE THOUGHT IT
BETTER TO BE IN --YEP YOU GOOD- THE THING ABOUT NEITHER PUT A WEDGE
WAS WHAT YOU SAID TOO THOUGH..

I TOLD YOU DO NOT DISSRUPT A ROWDY SIDE BAR THREAT NEED PLEASE-
SO WHY IS IT YOU STILL USING BETO ANTZEE ARE YOU CRAZY?

DID YOU TEACH AND RE READ SCRIPTURE WITH STEVE AND THE LYING JUDGES
OPINIONS TODAY ON THIS MATTER TOO-?

ANTZEE DANCEE OLE BUDDY OLE PAL DIDN T WE CONCURR EITHER HERE IN
CONTEMPYT ND THE GAUL TO COBNFRONT THIS FAER ALIONG AND TO ACT AS
IF NUCLEAR REFURBISHMENT LET ALONER RESURRECTED MASSACRED
BEYOND ANY TREBLINKA NOT A NICE POINTS REFERENCE AND IF ANY TO BE
LOOKING FOR SOMETHING IN LIFE-

SO IF BETO CALLED THE POLICE AND IF I SHARE ONE TOO MANY TIMES IF I SEE
A BREACH OF SECURITY TOO BY THEWAY-

FOR SAFETY ANTZEE NOT AN IN EXITENCE REGARD OR SIGNIFICANCE?

THE STIULATION BEING GIVEN IF I NEED SAY TO KILL BETO AND WHO ER

SEE OR NOT SEE HASA THIBG TO DO WITH YOU AY NOT NEED EYES OR
REMINDERS OF THE WHAT OR HOW NEVER TO BEHAVE

MURDER MAGIC OR SORCERY IS VERY TERRIBLE AND NOT EVEN ALLOWED?

AY IT WAS GOOD FOR AEITHER BETO OR ROBERTO JIMENEZ OR ANY TO WENDY

LINDLEY AGAIN ENCHANT USEMAGIC ABUSE TO EITHER MAGIC SHOW A

ALK IN OUR COMMUNICATON LINE TALK AND BE SURE I HAVE A DEPOSIT ANTZEE
IS THE
AND ANY WAY YOU CAN MAKE A OF THE YOU AND CURT MUSIC YOU CANT
HANDLER A LIKE YOU LIKE ME THESE RAPIST KILLED FIRST IN THEIR
EQUIVELANCES

A MATERIOAL FACT IN COURT OR IN LIFE

LYING OH DID I

DO I NEED AN MONSTER LIKE DEFILE VOID OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

QUANTUM MORE?

NO I DON’T?

LIKE NEVER CAN BE INVITATION HOULIGAN SIDES AND BEHAVIOR

MEGSATINNAGRE IF BY ENERGY DUMPING IF YOU KNEW HOW MUCH ENERGY

YOU THROUGH AWAY DOWN THE TUBES TOOK S NUKE STRIKE AINT AN ZAP IN
THEIR TOES ANTZEE ENEMY STEVEN WILL-

OF EITHER USE ME AS A PARASITE LEACHING OFF OF ME—

OU BRING AINT MY NSCRIBE YOUR NEED FOR EQUIVELENCES IN YOUR CASE SEAL
OR ANY I NOT ALLOW UNDRR MY ROOF-NOT EVEN CLOSE TO CAN HSARM YOU

DISRESPECTS WE THE SI YOU THOUGH DID B SEAL BEACH ETO AND ANTZEE-N
THE ACT I WASN’T WHEN I EWAS-

OR ELSE TOPIC EXISTS

 WANT EQUIVELANCE TORTURED TO DEATH HE THEY SAID TO DO THIS DIS
LODGING

EVERY EXCUSE TO INTERET OUTR EFFORT TO COLLECT IN OUR OWN MONIES

YOU AREDUVERTING IN THE ACT MARIA TOO CONYINENTAL CURRMVCY EVERY
IN OTN IT SOLDIERS

IF AS I SEE A NEED TO KILL YOU-

AN OUTRIGHT NEED TO KILL THESE –IN SO KNOWING YOUR NAMRES TO

DISLODGE US FIRSTLY FROM THE BOTTON TO THE OP OF RANLK SAND FILE AND
AS I SEE ANTZEE DANCEE FLIP FL:OPPING FROM THAT WHICH IS RIGHTFUL TO
ACCUSED

I STIPULATE TO KILL YOU TOO_ BUT FIRST BY ANY WAYUS ANDMEANS ANTZEE
DANCEE by Entity's or Wendy S. Lindley's Judge of record's Court reporter.

The matters on which examination is requested are:

Chapters of Charges Described hereby-The Stipulated "Accused"

§ 1621. Perjury; §; Title 18 › Part I › Chapter 115 › § 2381 TREASON

(1) examination about what documents, if any, are in the possession of defendant COUNTY OF
ORANGE CA. in each of the categories listed below;
(2) examination about the disposition of any documents in any of the categories below which used
to be in the possession of defendant COUNTY OF ORANGE CA. but which are no longer in its
possession;

(3) examination to identify and authenticate the documents which defendant COUNTY OF
ORANGE CA. is directed to provide at the deposition. Pursuant to Section 2025 (d)(6) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, defendant COUNTY OF ORANGE CA. is required to
designate and produce at the deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees
or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any
information known or reasonably available to defendant COUNTY OF ORANGE CA. PLEASE
TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to Section 2025(d)

(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, defendant COUNTY OF ORANGEinluding Board of

Supervisors direction is directed to produce the documents, material, web sites and tangible things
listed below for inspection and copying at the deposition. For purposes of this request, the term
"writing" shall have the meaning as defined by Evidence Code Section 250, but shall also include
any type of tangible item of things in addition to documents.

DEPOSITION CRITERIA

That and

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

1. The complete contents of defendant's personnel file.

Entities that of Super Novie Counsel Flight navigate Omnipotent Creation Class in so
saying checks and balances and extra ordinary circumstances in so stimulating see link
s and after this neither pursue addition nuke strikes, nor defile nor news blackout
monies you took away --nor forge a HB WEST or Santa Ana District a Court need a lie

if as many times a post 2015 earmarked alone—monies embezzled in the a $trillions

amount due and nuclear refurbishment aside is mental disorders to say or would
neither be here to act out a so called retaliatory is a word to define - the stipulation in I

know you bring forward not only the light of day---In so sharing to Steven you made
these - you –not the same inventory as forget to murder devil style implied the rather be
a “BETO” mitochondria infused varmint creature in disguise; and so when hear a GOD
in trouble and the choices you too police woman you call to hands on my effort to collect
on a stolen monies also—and re situate my either residence s –in the stipulation being
given and its understand word love we are we are life has a note or two

-in so an one lie too many is Antzee an iota of explanation in monies you took in a news
like assembly in so shameful and deliberate an act of contemptuous mockery, retaliation
to what an resurrected also the more deceptive a need discriminate my not murdered
record in any effort to please make due payment t my account at once within the close
of today’s business day $30,000 dollars neither make a security breach in my account if
text ahead and prior and prioritize this firstly stated…

Be this any who conspired mutiny and retribution retaliatory practice as you in the act
Helen Cameroon is not her their self as before mind you us this right-contended
otherwise as this these cited.

Orange County California Sheriff Department you are hereby sued

Helen Cameroon you are hereby sued

-If you murdered yourself and quick to return an what is a not murdered record --

sedition and de evolution war prize stomach item trophy -call yourself something to
interject a

thee home jamboree and every need I never oif Collaborative either Court injunction
Writ Warrant need excuse to steal as billions to diviee out my own monies to mayhem
aggravate owner own monies another dislodging campaign Petitioner.

Ronald S. Javor, Fred Okrand, Ronald R. Talmo and Robert Klotz as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Paul G. Mast for Real Party in Interest. [30 Cal. 3d 247]

OPINION

BIRD, C. J.
In an unlawful detainer action, may a renter raise as an affirmative defense the claim
that a landlord seeks to evict in retaliation for the tenant's complaint to the police that
the landlord has committed a crime?

I.

On April 12, 1980, petitioner, Alice Barela, called the Santa Ana Police Department to
complain that her landlord, Leonardo Valdez (real party in interest), had sexually
molested her nine-year-old daughter. fn. 1

Seven days later, on April 19, 1980, Valdez served Barela with a three-day notice to
"Pay Rent or Quit." He demanded rent of $650 per month, rather than the $200 per
month she had been paying. Prior to her complaint to the police, she had rented the
house from him for four years without any problem.

In May of 1980, Valdez filed an unlawful detainer action against Barela, based on her
failure to pay $650 per month rent in May. That action was dismissed, apparently
because Valdez had never served the 30-day notice of rent increase required by law.
However, in late May he served Barela with a 30-day notice of termination of her month-
to-month tenancy. Barela did not move. On July 21, 1980, while criminal charges were
pending against him, Valdez filed a new unlawful detainer action, based on the 30-day
notice of termination. Barela responded with an answer alleging as an affirmative
defense that she was being evicted in retaliation for her exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.

After trial, the court issued the following findings of fact: (1) "[t]his eviction of the
defendant by the plaintiff was caused by the complaint of the defendant against the
plaintiff to the police," and (2) "[t]he pending criminal trial against the plaintiff which was
the result of defendant's complaint to the police led to a breakdown of the parties' ability
to live peacefully in the same community." [30 Cal. 3d 248]

In addition, the court issued conclusions of law, holding that the eviction was not
protected by section 1942.5 of the Civil Code fn. 2 or by the standards of S.P. Growers
Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 719 [131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 552 P.2d 721]. The court
granted Valdez the relief sought, including restitution of the premises and back rent.
This result was held to be equitable.

The appellate department of the superior court upheld the trial court's decision without
issuing an opinion, and refused to certify the case to the Court of Appeal. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 911.) Barela filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. She
requested that the superior court be ordered to vacate its order and to either enter
judgment for petitioner or rehear the case, giving proper consideration to the defense of
retaliatory eviction. fn. 3 The Court of Appeal summarily denied her petition. Barela then
filed a petition for a writ of mandate before this court and an alternative writ of mandate
was issued.
II.

[1a] This case involves one basic issue -- whether an affirmative defense is available in
an unlawful detainer action if it is based on the allegation that the landlord seeks to evict
in retaliation for the tenant's report to the police that the landlord has committed a crime.
fn. 4 [30 Cal. 3d 249]

[2] Unlawful detainer actions are summary proceedings. Only "issues directly relevant to
the ultimate question of possession" may be raised in defense of an unlawful detainer
action. (Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 634.) Generally counterclaims,
cross-complaints and affirmative defenses cannot be considered. (Union Oil Co. v.
Chandler (1970) 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721 [84 Cal. Rptr. 756].)

The defense of "retaliatory eviction" has been firmly ensconced in this state's statutory
law and judicial decisions for many years. (See, e.g., § 1942.5; S.P. Growers Assn. v.
Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 724; Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal. 3d
507, 517.) "It is settled that a landlord may be precluded from evicting a tenant in
retaliation for certain kinds of lawful activities of the tenant. As a landlord has no right to
possession when he seeks it for such an invalid reason, a tenant may raise the defense
of retaliatory eviction in an unlawful detainer proceeding. [Citations.]" (S.P. Growers,
supra, at p. 724.) The retaliatory eviction doctrine is founded on the premise that "[a]
landlord may normally evict a tenant for any reason or for no reason at all, but he may
not evict for an improper reason ...." (Id., at p. 730.)

The affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction was first recognized by this court in
Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal. 3d 507. There, the statutory "repair and
deduct" provision (§ 1942) was construed so as to include protection against eviction for
those tenants who exercised their statutory rights. The same year, the Legislature
codified this protection in section 1942.5. The statute prohibited landlords from evicting
a tenant in retaliation for the tenant's exercise of the right to repair and deduct or the
tenant's complaint to the authorities about housing code violations.

In 1976, this court extended the scope of the common law retaliatory eviction defense
beyond mere complaints about conditions of tenancy. (S.P. Growers Assn. v.
Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 728.) In S.P. Growers, this court held that an eviction
in retaliation for the filing of a federal lawsuit charging violations of a federal farm labor
statute was [30 Cal. 3d 250]improper. The test set down in S.P. Growers, supra, is
quite simple. [3] A valid defense of retaliatory eviction may be advanced if, on balance,
the public policies furthered by protecting a tenant from eviction outweigh the state's
interest in ensuring that unlawful detainer proceedings are truly summary. (Id., at pp.
728-729.)

The Legislature repealed section 1942.5 in 1979 and reenacted it with amendments. fn.
5 (Stats. 1979, ch. 652, § 2, p. 2005.) The statutory retaliatory eviction defense was
greatly expanded. The time period during which a tenant is protected was extended,
and the grounds for which retaliation is prohibited were enlarged. (§ 1942.5, subds. (a)
and (c).) In addition, the 1979 amendments added a specific statement that the
statutory remedies provided by section 1942.5 are in addition to any other remedies
provided by statutory or decisional law. (Id., subd. (h).) [30 Cal. 3d 251]

Thus, California has two parallel and independent sources for the doctrine of retaliatory
eviction. This court must decide whether petitioner raised a legally cognizable defense
of retaliatory eviction under the statutory scheme and/or the common law doctrine.

[4a] Section 1942.5 is a remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants from certain types
of abuses. It is to be "liberally construed to effect its objectives and to suppress, not
encourage, the mischief at which it was directed. [Citation.]" (Kriz v. Taylor (1979) 92
Cal. App. 3d 302, 311 [154 Cal. Rptr. 824].)

Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 provides that it is unlawful "for a lessor to increase
rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover
possession, or threaten to do any of such acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the
lessee because he or she has ... lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the
law." (Italics added.) This subdivision was added to the statute in 1979. (Stats. 1979, ch.
652, § 2, pp. 2005-2006.) It has been denominated a "boilerplate" provision because of
its broad prohibition against retaliation by a landlord when a tenant has exercised valid
legal rights under the law. (See Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation (1979)
11 Pacific L.J. 601, 602.)

[1b] Petitioner argues that in reporting a crime to the police, she was exercising a legal
right protected by section 1942.5, subdivision (c). [30 Cal. 3d 252] She notes that, "It is
the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every
citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, any breach of the
peace of the United States." (In re Quarles and Butler (1895) 158 U.S. 532, 535 [39 L.
Ed. 1080, 1081, 15 S. Ct. 959].)

California has a long history of protecting those citizens who report violations of the
criminal laws. [5] "It is for the best interests of society that those who offend against the
laws shall be promptly punished, and that any citizen who has good reason to believe
that the law has been violated shall have the right to cause the arrest of the offender."
(Ball v. Rawles (1892) 93 Cal. 222, 228 [28 P. 937].)

[4b] Implicit in the passage of any remedial legislation is a general extent to protect from
intimidation those who report violations of the law. (Edwards v. Habib (D.C. Cir. 1968)
397 F.2d 687, 701-702; see also Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal. 3d 507,
513.) Laws which define certain acts as criminal would be meaningless if citizens who
reported crime were not protected from vindictive retaliation. This fundamental principle
is embodied in Penal Code section 136.1, which declares that it is a misdemeanor to
dissuade or attempt to dissuade any victim of crime from reporting the crime to the
police. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1).) fn. 6
Thus, every citizen has a right protected by state law to report criminal violations to the
police. Since petitioner merely engaged in a peaceful and lawful exercise of this basic
right when she reported her landlord's crime to the police, her eviction violated the
statutory prohibition against evictions in retaliation for the exercise of any rights under
the law. (§ 1942.5, subd. (c).) fn. 7 [30 Cal. 3d 253]

An analysis of the common law defense of retaliatory eviction leads to a similar

conclusion. "In evaluating whether defendants have raised a valid defense of retaliatory
eviction, we must engage in a balancing process. We must determine whether the
public policies furthered by protecting defendants from eviction outweigh the interests in
preserving the summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings. [Citation.]" (S.P.
Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 724.)

[1c] The important public policy asserted by petitioner is clear. Citizens have a right and
a duty to report violations of the law to the authorities. The effective enforcement of this
state's criminal laws depends upon the willingness of victims and witnesses to report
crime and to participate in the criminal justice process.

The Legislature has repeatedly demonstrated its concern for victims of crime by
adopting programs designed to compensate victims (Gov. Code, §§ 13959-13969,
29631-29636) and to render their contacts with the criminal justice system less painful
(Pen. Code, §§ 13835-13846). One of the goals of these programs is to encourage
victims to report crime. "Unreported crimes occur at more than twice the rate of reported
crimes and the reasons people give for not reporting indicate that they are disenchanted
with the criminal justice system." (Pen. Code, § 13835, subd. (e).)

In light of the strong policy reasons for encouraging the reporting of crime, it is
inconceivable that the Legislature could have countenanced the use of the statutorily
created summary eviction proceedings to punish a tenant who reported a crime to the
police. To hold otherwise would be to create a special class of criminals -- those who
also happen to be landlords -- with a legally sanctioned means of punishing the victims
or witnesses of their crime. fn. 8 [30 Cal. 3d 254]

This case is an even stronger one than S. P. Growers, supra, wherein this court
stressed the importance of preventing retaliatory evictions where a remedial scheme
depends upon private initiative for enforcement. (17 Cal.3d at pp. 725, 728.) In that
case, a landlord was prohibited from evicting a tenant in retaliation for the tenant's filing
of a lawsuit alleging violations of the federal farm labor statute, since that law depended
for its enforcement on the willingness of individual workers to initiate litigation to
vindicate their rights. This court held that to allow evictions in retaliation for such
lawsuits would "frustrate the purposes of that act." (Id., at p. 724.)

The public policy served in this case is clear and even more compelling. The landlord
here was accused of a sexual assault on a child. This state has repeatedly emphasized
that its citizens have a duty to protect children from sexual abuse. (See, e.g., Pen.
Code, § 11166 [adults who work with children must report suspected cases of child
abuse to the police, the sheriff, the probation department or the welfare department].)

The strong public policy interests in preserving the summary nature of the unlawful
detainer proceeding will not be significantly impaired if the affirmative defense of
retaliatory eviction is allowed here. (S.P. Growers, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 728-729.)
Deciding whether an eviction is in retaliation for a tenant's exercise of basic legal rights
presents no great burden for the trial court. This issue involves none of the "complex
and protracted" questions of law that have previously moved the courts to reject certain
defenses in unlawful detainer actions. (See Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.
App. 3d 716, 726 [84 Cal. Rptr. 756]; S.P. Growers, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 729.)

Some delay may occur if the defense is raised. However, any additional time spent is
surely justified by the important public policy furthered by this defense. "[A]s the
Supreme Court has noted, 'Some delay, of course, is inherent in any fair-minded system
of justice .... Our courts were never intended to serve as rubber stamps for landlords
seeking to evict their tenants, but rather to see that justice be done before [30 Cal. 3d
255] a man [or woman] is evicted from his [or her] home.'" (S.P. Growers, supra, 17 Cal.
3d 719, 730, quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty (1974) 416 U.S. 363, 385 [40 L. Ed. 2d
198, 214, 94 S. Ct. 1723].) fn. 9

III.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate the
Orange County Superior Court judgment entered in the case of Valdez v. Barela, No.
AP-3097, and instructing the court to enter judgment for petitioner.

Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Richardson, J., Newman, J., Kaus, J., and Broussard, J.,
concurred.

FN 1. The record indicates that on August 25, 1980, Valdez pleaded guilty to a violation
of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a) (lewd or dissolute conduct in public).

FN 2. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Civil Code.

FN 3. Relief by means of writ of mandate is appropriate under these circumstances.

(Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, fn. 5 [111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d
1168]; Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 507, 517-518 [90 Cal. Rptr. 729,
476 P.2d 97].)

FN 4. Real party in interest argues that the trial court did consider the defense of
retaliatory eviction and rejected it. He claims petitioner failed to show that the eviction
was actually retaliatory.

Since neither party has supplied a complete transcript of the proceedings below, this
court must rely on the trial court's findings of fact. The trial court made two key factual
findings: (1) petitioner's eviction was caused by her complaint to the police; and (2) the
complaint to the police also caused "a breakdown of the parties' ability to live peacefully
in the same community."

Relying on the second of these two findings, real party in interest asserts that the trial
court decision was based solely on the factual determination that the landlord and
tenant were unable to live in the same community. He argues that this is a legally
permissible, nonretaliatory ground for evicting a tenant. However, he conveniently
ignores the crucial link between the two findings of fact. The trial court found that the
tenant's allegedly protected activity, her complaint to the police, caused the breakdown
in relations. If real party in interest's argument were accepted, the defense of retaliatory
eviction would be precluded, since in every case a landlord could assert that a tenant's
exercise of protected rights was so infuriating that they could no longer live or work
together. As a result, the statutory and common law protections against retaliatory
evictions would be rendered nullities.

The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that petitioner was evicted in retaliation for
her complaint to the police. Therefore, this court must assume that the trial court found
such a factual showing insufficient as a matter of law to support a retaliatory eviction
defense.

FN 5. Section 1942.5 currently provides as follows: "(a) If the lessor retaliates against
the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter or
because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and
if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent, the lessor may
not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to
quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within 180 days:

"(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice pursuant to
Section 1942, or has made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding tenantability; or

"(2) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written complaint, or
an oral complaint which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing, with an
appropriate agency, of which the lessor has notice, for the purpose of obtaining
correction of a condition relating to tenantability; or

"(3) After the date of an inspection or issuance of a citation, resulting from a complaint
described in paragraph (2) of which the lessor did not have notice; or

"(4) After the filing of appropriate documents commencing a judicial or arbitration

proceeding involving the issue of tenantability; or

"(5) After entry of judgment or the signing of an arbitration award, if any, when in the
judicial proceeding or arbitration the issue of tenantability is determined adversely to the
lessor.
"In each instance, the 180-day period shall run from the latest applicable date referred
to in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive.

"(b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of subdivision (a) more than once in any 12-
month period.

"(c) It shall be unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee
to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do any of such
acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully
organized or participated in a lessees' association or an organization advocating
lessees' rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law. In an
action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall
bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor's conduct was, in fact, retaliatory.

"(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the
lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of
property or his right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any
lawful cause. Any waiver by a lessee of his rights under this section shall be void as
contrary to public policy.

"(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may
recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in subdivision
(a) within the period or periods prescribed therein, or within subdivision (c), if the notice
of termination, rent increase, or other act, and any pleading or statement of issues in an
arbitration, if any, states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to
recover possession, increase rent, or do any of the other acts described in subdivision
(a) or (c). If such statement be controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial
or other hearing.

"(f) Any lessor or agent of a lessor who violates this section shall be liable to the lessee
in a civil action for all of the following:

"(1) The actual damages sustained by the lessee.

"(2) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or
agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to such act.

"(g) In any action brought for damages for retaliatory eviction, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party if either party requests attorney's fees
upon the initiation of the action.

"(h) The remedies provided by this section shall be in addition to any other remedies
provided by statutory or decisional law."
FN 6. Under subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 136.1, it is a misdemeanor to attempt
to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying at any trial or other proceeding. At the
time of respondent's repeated attempts to evict appellant, criminal charges were still
pending against him.

FN 7. Petitioner also argues that her right to complain to the police about a violation of
the criminal law is protected by section 1942.5, subdivision (c) because it is a right
included within the provisions of the state and federal Constitutions governing free
speech and the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. (U.S.
Const., 1st Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 2 and 3.) She notes that the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances "is an attribute of national citizenship," arising
from "[t]he very idea of government, republican in form." (United States v. Cruikshank
(1875) 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 552 [23 L. Ed. 588, 591].) This right has been considered
"among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." (Mine
Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222 [19 L. Ed. 2d 426, 430, 88 S. Ct.
353]; see also Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc. (7th Cir. 1977) 547 F.2d 1329,
1342.) However, the right to report violations of criminal statutes to the police is
protected by state law. Therefore, it is not necessary to reach petitioner's constitutional
claims.

FN 8. In an analogous area of law, this court has held that an employer cannot
discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercise of a legally protected
right. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 167 [164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610
P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314] held that despite the employer's "generally unlimited right
to discharge an employee" (Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(1959) 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189 [344 P.2d 25]), the employer could not discharge an
employee because he refused to commit a crime. (Tameny, at pp. 172-178. See also
Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn (1961) 192 Cal. App. 2d 793 [13 Cal. Rptr. 769]
[no right to fire an employee because he had joined a union].) Although no statute
specifically prohibited employers from discharging employees for these reasons, the
courts found the prohibition implicit in the policies underlying the protected rights.
"Glenn[,] Petermann [and Tameny] persuasively instruct us that one may not exercise
normally unrestricted power if his reasons for its exercise contravene public policy."
(Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 516.)

FN 9. In light of this disposition of the case, this court need not reach petitioner's claim
that her eviction constituted state action in violation of her constitutional right to free
speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. (See Edwards v.
Habib, supra, 397 F.2d 687, 690-698; S.P. Growers, supra, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 730-731, fn.
5.)