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The Virtues of Animals in
Thought
Seventeenth-Century
Peter Harrison
'See George Boas, The Happy Beast in the French Thoughtof the SeventeenthCentury
(New York, 1966); Leonora Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (New York,
1968); Hester Hastings, Man and Beast in French Thoughtof the Eighteenth Century(Balti-
more, 1936); and Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (2 vols.; Rotterdam,1697-
1702), s.v. "Pereira,""Rorarius."
463
Copyright1998by Journalof theHistoryof Ideas,Inc.
464 Peter Harrison
2
This view was typical of both Greek and Christianwritings. See Plutarch,De sollertia
animalium,Bruta animalia ratione uti, and De esu carnum;Porphyry,De abstinentia.
3Augustine, City of God, tr. MarcusDodds (New York, 1950), XI.22 (365); cf. De Genesi
ad litteram 3.16 (Corpus scriptorumecclesiasticorum latinorum,28.3.2).
4 Godfrey Goodman, The Fall of Man or the Corruptionof Nature (London, 1616), 280;
Cf. GeorgeWalker,Historyof the Creation(London, 1641), 193, 229; JohnEdwards,A Demon-
stration of the Existenceand Providenceof God, Fromthe Contemplationof the VisibleStruc-
ture of the Greaterand the Lesser World(London, 1696), pt. 1, 241; R. Franck,A Philosophi-
cal Treatiseof the Original and Productionof Things (London, 1687), 161.
5 Lactantius,On the
Workmanshipof God, V, in Ante-Nicene Fathers (Edinburgh,1989),
VII, 286. Cf. Augustine, City of God, XI.22; Reply to Faustus, XXI, 5.
The Virtues of Animals 465
different Degrees of Life and Perfection." Thus "every Creature even of the
lowest Degree of Life, is Good and Perfect in its Kind."6 Important for our
purposes is the fact that the chain of being provided the ontological basis for
knowledge based on analogy. From our knowledge of particular links in the
chain we can infer probable truths about other links. Thus, what is true of one
link in the chain can be predicated of other links to an extent that depends on
their proximity. Such analogical reasoning was employed by Aquinas and later
came to play an important role in seventeenth-century speculations about the
morality of beasts.7
According to a third view, many of the more puzzling features of the cre-
ated order were to be read, as were problematic texts in scripture, as symbolic
representations of certain moral or theological truths. Animals and plants were
not simply to provide for the physical needs of humanity but also to serve for
higher spiritual and moral needs. In Proverbs we find the familiar injunction:
"Go to the ant, thou sluggard" (Prov. 6. 6). In Job, likewise: "But ask now the
beasts and they will teach thee; and the fowls of the air, and they shall tell thee.
Or speak to the earth, and it shall teach thee, and the fishes of the sea shall
declare unto thee" (12.7f.). The moral significance of the creatures is the main
theme of the hexaemeral literature of the Patristic period. "Fishes," wrote
Ambrose of Milan, "follow a divine law, whereas men contravene it. Fishes
duly comply with the celestial mandates, but men make void the precepts of
God." The birds, similarly, are "examples for our own way of life."8
Animals not only taught important moral lessons but also served as sym-
bolic representations of important theological truths. Basil the Great concluded
that "all poisonous animals are accepted for the representation of the wicked
and contrary powers."9 In the third-century Physiologus, a work on animals,
plants, and stones which was to serve as the chief source of the medieval bestiaries
and books of birds, the symbolic meanings of the creatures were set forth. The
fox "is a figure of the devil," the owl, "the figure of the Jewish people," the
phoenix "represents the person of the saviour," and so on.'0 In short, for the
Church Fathers and their medieval successors, the natural world was a book, a
repository of rich and varied symbols which bore important meanings. So it
was that whatever properties creatures had-physical characteristics, behav-
6 Thomas Robinson, New Observationsof the Natural History of this Worldof Matter,
and of this Worldof Life (London, 1696), 139f, cf. 12; John Cockbur, An Enquiry into the
Nature, Necessity and Evidence of the ChristianFaith (London, 1696), 42; Edwards,A Dem-
onstration, 233; Jean d'Espagnet, Enchyridionphysicae restitutae (London, 1651), 30.
7 Thus Aquinas:"Weinfer the
presence of inneremotions [passiones] in the animals from
their outwardbehaviour."Summatheologiae, la2ae. 40, 3 (London, 1964-76, XXI, 9).
8
Ambrose, Hexaemeron,V.x.29, V.xv.50 (Fathers of the Church [Washington, 1947-],
XLII, 184, 200).
9 Basil, Homilies, XIII.6 (Fathers of the Church,XLVI, 207).
10
Physiologus, tr. M. Curley (Austin, 1979), XVIII (27), VII (11), IX (14).
466 Peter Harrison
like the lamb,clever like the fox."'7 By the time of the Renaissancetherewas a
generalconsensusaboutwhich animalsrepresentedparticularvirtuesandvices.
In Spenser's Fairie Queen, for example, the peacock appearsas a symbol of
pride, the lion of wrath,the wolf of envy, the goat of lust, the pig of gluttony,
the ass of sloth.'8
These allied notions-that the humanbeing was a microcosmand thatthe
beasts representeddistinct virtuesor vices-enjoyed wide currencyto the end
of the seventeenthcentury. The Germantheosophical writer Jacob Boehme
wrote in his Mysteriummagnum(1623) that man was "a Beast of all beasts."
There are, he thought,"variouspropertiesin man;as one a Fox, Wolfe, Beare,
Lion, Dogg, Bull, Cat, Horse, Cock, Toad, Serpent; and in briefe as many
kindes of creaturesare upon the earth,so many and Variouspropertieslikewise
there are in the earthlyman."'9In his Governmentof the Passions (1700) Wil-
liam Ayloffe observedsimilarlythatwe can "unitein the Personof Every Man,
the Malice of a Serpent,the Furyof the Tyger,the Cholerof the Lyon, and the
Lubricityof the Goat."This demonstrates"thatMan alone has as many Pas-
sions as all the Beasts together."20 Ayloffe also relies upon the principle of
macrocosm-microcosmin his accountof the changes to which humanpassions
were subjectat the Fall. Just as in the macrocosmthe animalsrebelledagainst
human dominion following upon Adam's lapse, so in the microcosm, human
passions rebelled against a woundedreason. "Reasonwhich ought to regulate
his now disobedientPassions,is becomeobnubulated," wroteAyloffe,and"from
this mighty Disorderproceed all the Malignity of our Passions."21 In the same
vein John Donne had read the grantingof dominionover the beasts in Genesis
as an injunctionto controlthe beastwithin,andthusmake"thatraveningWolfe
a Man, that licentious Goate a man, that insinuating Serpent a man."22
'7 Qu. in Allers, "Microcosmos from Animaxandros to Paracelsus,"346. See also the
exhaustive list of animals along with their moral and symbolic characteristicsin Alanus de
Insulis, De planctu naturae 11-17 (Patrologialatina, ed. Migne, CCX).
18Fairie Queen, 1.4.17-36; and see Diane McColley, A Gustfor Paradise: Milton's Eden
and the VisualArts (Urbana, 1993), 82f.
19Jacob Behm, MysteriumMagnum.Or an Exposition of the first Book of Moses (Lon-
don, 1654), 93. Cf. EdwardTaylor,Jacob Behmen's TheosophickPhilosophy Unfolded(Lon-
don, 1692), 75; John Pettus, Volatilesfrom the History of Adamand Eve (London, 1674), 188.
20William Ayloffe, The Governmentof the Passions, according to the Rules of Reason
and Religion (London, 1700), 31. See also, e.g., Jean FranqoisSenault,De L'Usage des Pas-
sions (1641): "he uniteth in his person the guile of Serpents, the fury of Tygers, Choler of
Lions; teaching ... That man alone hath as may Passions as have all Beasts put together."Qu.
from the translationby Henry, Earl of Monmouth,The Use of Passions (London, 1671), 85.
Cf. also G. Havers(tr.),A General Collectionof Discourses of the Virtuosiof France (London,
1664), 141; Taylor,Jacob Behmen's TheosophickPhilosophy Unfolded,75.
21
Ayloffe, Governmentof the Passions, 22f.
22
John Donne, Sermon on Genesis 1.26, in G. Potterand E. Simpson (eds.), The Sermons
of John Donne (10 vols.; Berkeley, 1953-62), IX, 58; "To Sr Edward Herbert.at Julyers,"
Complete English Poems, ed. C.A. Patrides(London, 1994), 200. Donne relies explicitly on
the idea that man is a microcosm: "Manis a lumpe, where all beasts kneadedbee, /Wisdome
468 Peter Harrison
makes him an Arke where all agree; / our businesse is, to rectifie Nature to what she was."
Ibid., 200. Donne's source is probably Philo, who writes that the ark "is an emblem of the
body, which of necessity thereforecontained all the most tameable and ferocious evils of the
passions and vices." De plantatione XI.43 in Works,194b; or Augustine:'Then the wild ani-
mals are quiet and the beasts are tamed and the serpents renderedharmless:in allegory they
signify the affections of the soul.... So in the "living soul" there will be beasts that have
become good by the gentleness of their behaviour....For these animalsserve reason when they
are restrainedfrom their deathly ways." Confessions XIII.xxi, tr. Henry Chadwick (Oxford,
1991), 291. Cf. JohnChrysostom,Homilies on Genesis VIII.14 (Fathersof the ChurchLXXIV,
113); Jerome, Commentariorumin Hiezechielem 1.1.6/8 (Corpus christianorumseries latina,
LXXV, 11f).
23
Foucault, The Orderof Things, 17-44.
24Jacob Boehme, SignaturaRerum:Or the Signatureof all Things(London, 1651), 77, 3.
25Physiological discussions generally rely on Aristotle and Galen. See Aquinas, Summa
theologiae, la2ae. 44, 1 (XXI, 61-5), and editor's appendix6, 172-77; Duns Scotus, Quaest in
Lib. Arist. de Anima, Disput. II, sec. 7, in Opera omnia (Paris, 1891), III, 698.
The Virtuesof Animals 469
26
WolfgangFranzius,TheHistoryof the Brutes(London,1670),12.
27
Ibid.,13.
28
Ibid., 9. See also Edward Topsell, The History of Four-FootedBeasts and Serpents
Aldrovandi,
(London,1658),EpistleDedicatory; insectis(Bologna,1602),505-
De animalibus
Wilde,Deformica(Amberge,1615),70 andpassim;ThomasMoufet,Insectorum
12;Jeremiah
sive minimorumanimalium theatrum(Londini, 1634), ch. XVI; Noel Pluche, Spectacle de la
de Reamur,
Nature(7 vols.;London,17705),I, dialogues7, 8 (106ff);ReneAntoineFerchault
The Natural History of Bees (London, 1744), 297.
29Ibid., 39.
30 Ibid., 41. Cf. Samuel Clarke,A Mirrouror
LookingGlass (London, 1671): A lion's tail
"is his Sceptre,by whichhe expresseshis passion."The angrylion was also commonlyde-
pictedin emblembooks.AndreasAlciati'sEmblemata (Padua,1621)includesanemblemof a
lion beingattackedby fourdogs.The mottois anger,andthe epigramreads:"TheAncients
saidthe tail of the lion is powerful;becauseof its stimulusthe lion conceivesgreatanger.As
the yellow bile rises, and the resentmentbegins to mountwith the black gall, it arouses
uncontrolablefury (EmblemLXII).The Spanishtranslation,Los Emblemasde Alciato
Traducidos in RhimasEspanolas(Lyon,1549),adds,"justlike the manwho stimulatesand
incites himselfto unbridledfury."See PeterDaly et al. (eds.), AndreasAlciatus(2 vols.;
Toronto,1985).
470 Peter Harrison
34 Ibid., 54.
The Virtuesof Animals 471
43 Ibid., 241f.
44 (Paris, 1645). See the response by Pierre Chanet, De l'instinct et de la connoissance
des animauxauec l'examen de ce que Monsieur de la Chambrea escrit sur cette matiere (La
Rochelle, 1646), and La Chambre,Traite de la connoissance des animaux, ou tout ce qui a
este dit pour, & contre le raisonmentdes bestes (Paris, 1648); English tr. (by "a person of
quality"),A Discourse of the Knowledgof Beasts (London, 1657).
45 La
Chambre,Discourse, 21. Cf. 28f.
46Ibid., 21f.
47 See Plato, Timaeus,69c-70c, Laws, 644d, Protagoras,358c-d. Cf. Summatheologiae,
la2ae (Blackfriarsedn., XLIV, 2).
474 Peter Harrison
charactersof the passions, then, was primarilya science of signs, based upon
physical resemblance.And the significance of these characterslay in the fact
that they were signs bearingmeaning, ratherthan the effects of physiological
causes.57
The possibilitythatthe various"characters" of animalpassionsmight serve
as signs for the animals themselves and not merely for humanobservershad
not escaped the theriophilists.It was frequentlyalleged, againstthe Cartesians
in particular,that animalshad naturallanguagesof their own, bodily or vocal,
and thatthe humaninabilityto comprehendthese languagesreflected a failing
on our part, ratherthan theirs.58Some claimed that we had once enjoyed the
ability to comprehendthe naturallanguagesof bird and beast, a capacity now
lost. Our presentdeficiency in this regardwas variously attributedto the Fall,
to the events which took place at Babel, or simply to the artificialand affected
structuresof humanlanguageas comparedto the naturallanguagesof animals.
Vestiges of what might have once been our naturallanguage remained,how-
ever.59In his Chirologia(1644), John Bulwer,for example, arguedthathuman
gestureswere "naturallsignes"which enjoyedcertainadvantagesover conven-
tional speech. The motions of the hand, said Bulwer, "proceedfrom the meere
instinct of Nature, and all these motions and habits of the Hand are purely
naturall,not positive; nor in their senses remote from the true natureof the
things that are implyed."60Bulwer pointed out that humangestures amounted
to a naturallanguage which had survivedthe confusion of Babel. They were
tracesof a paradisalpast when man and beast comprehendedeach other's dis-
course.Following Montaigne,he assertedthatanimalsstill communicatedwith
a naturallanguage and "expressetheir desire of honour,generositie, industri-
ous sagacity, courage, magnanimity,and the love and feare; neither are they
void of subtiltyand wisdome."Animals, moreover,are "ableto understandand
expresse themselves in this languageof gesture,teaching us by learningof us,
that capable they be not onely of the inwarddiscourse of Reason, but of the
outwardgift of utteranceby gesture."61
While such comparisonsof humanand animallanguages seem to us rather
strained,there is a consistency in the theoriophilists'position: both in their
behaviorsand in their "languages"animals are closer to naturethan their hu-
With this precaution,we may presumeto affirm ... that the Womanis
cold andmoist,in orderto theend,whichNaturehathproposedto her
self, andthatfromherbeingcold, it followsthatshe shouldbe Weak,
andconsequentlyFearfull,Pusillanimous,Jealous, Distrustfull,Crafty,
apt to Dissemble, Flatter,Lie, easily Offended,Revengefull,Cruel in
her revenge, unjust, Covetous, Ungratefull, Superstitious,And from
her being moist, it follows, that she shouldbe Unconstant,Light,
Unfaithfull,Impatient,easily Persuaded,Compassionate,Talkative.65
Whereasa rationalistaccountwouldsuggestthatmoralityinvolvesbringing
thesepassionsunderthecontrolof reason,advocatesof theviewthatmorality
62
Pere Garasse,La Doctrine Curieuse des Beaux Esprits de ce Temps,ou pretendus tels
(Paris,1624);cf. ScipionDupleix,La Physique,I.iv,citedby Boas, TheHappyBeast,72f.
63
Ibid., 693.
64Chanet,Considerations
sur la sagessede Charon(Paris,1643),142,378.
65La Chambre,
TheArtHowto KnowMen,26.
478 Peter Harrison
(Ithaca, 1992), 1-3. Harth observes that Descartes's disembodied soul enabled women "to
overcome their perceived sexual inferiority"and that the Cartesian active will "offered the
possibility of dominatingdisabling passions" (93). Also see Ruth Perry,"RadicalDoubt and
The Virtuesof Animals 479
As forthegreatdeedsof thebeasts,Chanetarguedthatthosethingswhich
Montaigneandhis followershadattributed to reasonandmoralitycouldas
easily be explainedby instinct.(By instincthe seemsto mean,at times,the
directactivityof God.Boas haspointedout thatthisis a clearanticipation of
Occasionalism.68)Concedingto his opponentsthemarvellousachievements of
someof thebeasts,he concludesthatthisonly showsthattheyarenot guided
by reason.Humanreasonrequiresexperience,is often slow,andoftenfails.
Thenearperfectionof manyof thefeatsof thebeastsmerelyshowsthattheir
behaviorsaretheeffectsof someperfectcounsel-God.69Descartes'sfirstre-
cordedobservation aboutanimalsconveysa similarmessage:"Thehighdegree
of perfectiondisplayedin someof theiractionsmakesus suspectthatanimals
do not havefreewill."70
In sum, for the traditionof ChristianStoicismwhichemergedwith re-
newedvigorin the sixteenthcentury,followingthe law of natureis nothing
otherthanfollowingthelawof rightreason.Accordingto thisview,thedivine
reasonis thesourcebothof regularities
inthenaturalworld(andtheknowability
of nature)andof humanreason.71 Withtheadventof theBaconianprogramfor
scientificadvancement, however,the agendaincreasinglybecameone of the
mastery of naturerather thanconformityto it. Humanreasonis nowviewedas
somethingapartfromnature.Onlythroughits independence fromnaturecan
humanreasonassertits dominance.Nowhereis thisnewdichotomybetween
humanreasonand the naturalworldmore explicit thanin the thoughtof
Descartes,who positsa vastgulf betweenthe immaterial mind,characterized
by reason,andthecorporealworldwhichis totallydevoidof human-likepur-
poses.Whereashumansuperiority wasonceperceivedto lie in thefactthatthe
humanbeing,as a microcosmof nature,comprehended all naturalthingsin
itselfandthuswasmoreintimatelyconnectedwitheverysinglepartof nature
thananyothercreature,nowhumansuperiority lay in thepossessionof a mind
whichparticipated in a differentorderfromthe rest of materialnature,and
whichwas not subjectto thebasemechanicallawswhichgovernedthe lower
partof creation.
Fromourearliestyearswe haveoftenjudgedthatsuchmotions,which
arein factstoppedby causesunknownto us, cometo an end of their
own accord.Andwe tendto believethatwhatwe haveapparently ex-
periencedin manycasesholdgoodin all cases-namely thatit is in the
verynatureof motionto cometo anend,or to tendtowardsa stateof
rest.73
72
Philosophical Writings,I, 9.
73 Principles of Philosophy, 2.37, in Philosophical Writings,I, 241.
74 Descartes, Letter to Reneri, April 1638, in Philosophical Letters, 53.
The Virtuesof Animals 481
has been wound up, a dead animal to one which has run down.75If analogies
were to be made, they mustnow be made between animaland machine,not the
animal and human mind. The Cartesianhypothesis about animal movements
thus entailed a rejection not only of knowledge by analogy but also of the
Peripateticview according to which animals were animatedby souls. In the
words of the CartesianGeraudde Cordemoy:"Forasmuchas most of the Mo-
tions, that are observ'd in Animals, are accompaniedin us with some knowl-
edge, it hathbeen believed, thattherewas in Animals a principleof knowledge,
which is called a Sensitive Soul."The sensitive soul, however,becomes obso-
lete ontological baggage once it is recognized that God "hath contriv'd the
Bodies of Animalsaftera certainway, andthathe hathestablish'dcertainRules
of Motion."76 Only in the humananimal,concludes Cordemoy,is "themotion
of the Organ... accompaniedwith a thoughtor Perceptionof the Soul."77
For the Cartesians,then, beasts have no soul. They do not think, they do
not feel. They are not, in any sense, autonomousagents. Animals have sensa-
tions but not conscious sensations;they have passions but not conscious pas-
sions. These latter distinctionshave understandablybeen the source of some
confusion.At least one influentialcommentatorhas arguedthatDescartesmust
allow brutesto be conscious in some sense, for he allows that they are subject
to passions.78This view, however,fails to take into considerationthe signifi-
cance of Descartes'sdistinction,statedin the opening lines of The Passions of
the Soul, between a passion "with regardto the subject"and a passion "with
regardto that which makes it happen."79 Descartes does ascribe passions to
animalsbut only in a limited sense:
And the same may be observed in animals. For although they lack
reason,and perhapseven thought,all the movementsof the spiritsand
of the gland which producepassions in us are neverthelesspresentin
them too, though in them they serve to maintainand strengthenonly
the movements of the levers and the muscles which usually accom-
pany the passions, and not, as in us, the passions themselves.80
phy, 53 (1978), 551-61. Also Boas, The HappyBeast, 90, n. 201. Cf. Peter Harrison,"Descartes
on Animals" Philosophical Quarterly,42 (1992), 219-27.
79 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, I.i, in Philosophical Writings,I, 328.
80 Ibid., 1.50, (I, 348).
482 Peter Harrison
In short, animals share with us the physiology of the passions, the movement
of the animal spirits,but they have no conscious states. In humans"whatis a
passion in the soul, is usually an action in the body."8'In animals,which lack a
soul, the passions are merely bodily dispositions. The "meagre"and "implau-
sible" writingsof the ancientson this topic, Descartessuggests, owe theirdefi-
ciencies to the failureto observe this distinction.Animals then, as Descartes's
disciple Malebrancheexpressed it, are not "susceptibleof all the Motions of
the Passions, Fear,Desire, Envy,Hatred,Joy, Sorrow."Rather,"theyeat with-
out pleasure, cry without pain."82
The Cartesianapproach,while admittedlyrathercounter-intuitive,solved
a numberof seventeenth-centuryquandariesaboutanimals.Thus, for example,
if animalshad spiritualsouls, were they immortal?And if they were immortal,
were even the imperfect animals (like flies and beetles) to be recipients of
eternal life? If animals did not have spiritual souls, how could they be con-
scious? If matter were capable of thought and sensation, might not human
beings too, be purelymaterial?Finally,why, if animalswere not moralagents,
were they createdsuch thatthey were subjectto pain and suffering?God would
seem to have createdanimalssuch thatthey suffered,despite theirneverhaving
committed wrongs. This would impugnthe justice of God. To deny both that
animals had souls and states of consciousness was an elegant way of negotiat-
ing all of these difficulties, and one thatwas more in keeping with the prevail-
ing science thanany of the alternatives.
The Cartesianapproachalso spelled an end to the marriagebetween natu-
ral history and ethics. The new attitudeto naturalhistory was clearly spelt out
later in the centuryby English naturalistJohn Ray. In the Ornithologyof 1678
Ray professes to have gathereda naturalhistory which is totally devoid of
"Hieroglyphics,Emblems,Morals,Fables, Presages or ought else appertaining
to Divinity,Ethics, Grammar,or any sortof HumaneLearning."83 Science now
concentratedon tracingcauses fromphysical effects, ratherthanseeing effects
as signs. The naturalworld hadcome to be regardedas a complex web of cause
and effect ratherthanbook of signs which had moral or transcendentalmean-
ings.
For all this, animalswere to retainsomethingof a moralrole, butnow their
exploits were relocated to the literaryrealm, where they could still exert a
powerfulinfluence over the morallives of theirrationalcousins. The passions,
virtues, and vices of animals became literary devices for moral edification.
81
Ibid., 1.1, (I, 328).
82
Nicolas Malebranche,Father Malebranche, his Treatise concerning the Search after
Truth, tr. T. Taylor (London, 17002), 185; Oeuvres completes, ed. G. Rodis Lewis, (Paris,
1958-70), II, 394.
83 John Ray and Francis
Willughby,TheOrnithologyof Francis Willughby(London, 1678),
Preface.
The Virtuesof Animals 483
Such a shift had been forshadowedas early as the end of the sixteenthcentury,
when Sir Philip Sidney inquired"whetherthe feigned image of Poesy or the
regularinstructionof Philosophyhathmore force in teaching?"84 Increasingly,
as the seventeenthcentury progressed,the question was resolved in favor of
Poesy.85While naturalistslike JohnJohnstonhad attributedlove, fidelity,chas-
tity, and courageto horses, these equine virtues were transferred,for example,
in JonathanSwift's Gulliver'sTravels,to the fictional"houyhnhnms"a race of
rationalhorses.86Here horses are imbuedwith "temperance,industry,exercise
and cleanliness" and comprise a society "well united, naturallydisposed to
every virtue,wholly governedby Reason."87 CyranoDe Bergerac'sStoryof the
Birds(1650), the numerouseditions of Aesop's fables which begin to appearat
this time, La Fontaine'sFables (1668-94), Bunyan'sBookfor Boys and Girls
(1686)-all are in some way compensationsfor the increasingtendencyof the
seventeenthcenturyto exclude real animalsfrom the moral universe.
84Philip Sidney, An Apologyfor Poetry, in E. Jones (ed.), English Critical Essays (Ox-
ford, 1963), 16.
85 Cf. Sidney,An Apology, 17.
86Johnston,Nature of Four-FootedBeasts (Amsterdam,1678), 4. It is not clear how these
virtues stand given Johnston's earlier statementthat horses are the most lustful of beasts.
87
JonathanSwift, Gullivers Travels,pt. IV (chs. 8, 9).
88
See, e.g., Walter Charleton, Natural History of the Passions (London, 1674), 33-7;
Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises, 343; John Norris, Essay, pt. II, 92; Pluche, Spectacle de la
Nature, I, 315.
484 Peter Harrison
BondUniversity.
89
See, e.g., Ignace-GastonPardies,Discours de la connoissance des bestes (Paris, 1672);
Julian de La Mettrie, L'homme-machine(Leyde, 1748). Also see Rosenfield, From Beast-
Machine to Man-Machine, 141-153.