Table of Contents

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 1

Index of Authorities ................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4
Fundamental Rights ................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction to Right to Equality…………………..………………………………………….7
Article 14 Equality Before Law Or Equal Protection of Laws .................................................. 9
Source of Article 14 ................................................................................................................. 10
THE STATE ............................................................................................................................ 11
Who May Claim Article 14 Protection? .................................................................................. 12
Concept of Equality ................................................................................................................ 13
Equality Before Law……. ....................................................................................................... 13
Equal Protection of the Laws ................................................................................................... 15
Comparing these two concepts of equality- ............................................................................. 15
Exceptions to Aricle 14 as contained in the constitution itself : .............................................. 16
Under lying Principle ............................................................................................................... 17
Article 14 permits ‘Reasonable Classification’ ....................................................................... 18
Test for Valid Classification .................................................................................................... 19
Administrative Discretion – Wednesbury Test ........................................................................ 22
New Concept Of Equality: Protection Against Arbitrariness .................................................. 23
Article 14 Strikes at Arbitrariness .......................................................................................... 24
Cases on Arbitrary classification ............................................................................................. 25
Rule of Natural Justice and Article 14 ..................................................................................... 27
Article 14 and Admission to Educational Institutions ............................................................. 28
Right of Examinee to have access to Evaluated sheets: .......................................................... 30
Common Entrance Test Examination ...................................................................................... 31
Right of the examinee to have access to the Evaluated Scripts ............................................... 31
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 32
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................34

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 Index of Authorities

1. Nagraj v. UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212

2. UOI v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437
3. Dasaaratha v. State of A.P. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 564
4. Srikant v. Vasant Rao, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 918
5. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India
6. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh
7. David John Hopkins v. Union of India
8. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643
9. Leonid Beyzer v. UOI, AIR 2008 (NOC) 1802 (Bom.)
10. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh, AIR 1996
SC 1234
11. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain
12. Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. Of Tamil Nadu
13. A.L. Kalra v. P. & E. Corpn., AIR 2006 SC 2814
14. Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College, AIR 1990, SCC
30
15. Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India
16. E.P.Royappa V. State of Tamil Nadu
17. Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India
18. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
19. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829
20. Municipal Committe, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Associations, AIR 2007
SC 2844
21. Mithu v. State of Punjab
22. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487
23. D.V. Bakshi v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 662
24. Municipal Committe, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Associations, AIR 2007
SC 2844
25. Secretary, West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das,
AIR 2007 SC 3098
26. Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1999 SC 1149
27. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3014
28. Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879
29. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1
KB
30. Satar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 2008 Pat. 179
31. Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress
32. Mangilal v. State of M.P. AIR 2004 SC 1280
33. Gadde Venkateshawera Rao v. Govt of A.P. AIR 1966 SC 828.
34. K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India AIR 1984 SC 273.
35. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420.
36. P.Ranjendra v. State of Madras
37. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 2178
38. Anant Madan v. State of Haryana
39. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnatka, AIR 2003 SC 355
40. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477.
41. President B.S.E., Orrisa v. D. Suvankar

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 42. Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Comapny, (248 US 152)
43. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P, AIR 1999 SC 2894.
44. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75,79
45. P.S.T. Bar Association v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1115.
46. A.P.B.C. Sangh v. J.S.V. Federation, AIR 2006 Sc 2814
47. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. UOI, WP (Civil) No. 265 of 2006

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 Introduction

Part III, Part IV and Part IV-A, though separate units, carry the common theme of human
rights and duties that carry primarily the theme of the ‘dignity of the individual’ and also of
the ‘unity and integrity of the nation’. Somebody imbued in the Western theories of human
rights may generally classify these three parts respectively as negative obligations of the State
not to interfere, with the liberty of the individual, positive obligations of the state to take steps
for the welfare of the individual and the duties of the individual to the society and fellow
individuals. While he will readily accept the first one as part of human rights regime, he will
have reservations with respect to the second and definitely reject the third one as antithesis of
rights. They are complementary of each other because together they constitute the human
rights regime roughly including the civil and political rights and the social and economic
rights respectively. Without one the rights in the other are not incomplete but also
unattainable. Together they have been called the conscience of the Constitution. In the view
of wide spread violation of human rights and human dignity by individuals rather than the
state, Part IV-A has an important role in the realisation of human rights in India.1

Part III of the Constitution of India, titles as ‘Fundamental Rights’ secures to the people of
India, certain basic, natural and inalienable rights. These rights have been declared essential
rights in order that “human liberty may be preserved, human personality developed and an
effective social and democratic life promoted”.

1
Mahendra P. Singh , V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India 23 (11th Ed. Eastern Book Company 2012)

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 Fundamental Rights

It is generally accepted that the Constitution comprises rules that regulate the organization
and exercise of State power, on the one hand, and the relations between the State and its
citizens, on the other. The rules that stipulate and regulate the relations between the State and
its citizens and, more generally, the relations between the controlling and the controlled are
characterized as public freedoms or fundamental rights or human rights.

“Fundamental Rights” are the modern name for what have been traditionally known as
“natural rights”. As one author puts it, “they have simply because of the fact that in
contradiction with other human beings, he is rational and moral.” They are the primordial
rights necessary for the development of human personality. They are the rights which enable
a man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes the best.2

The fundamental rights were included in the constitution because they were considered
essential for the development of the personality of every individual and to preserve human
dignity. The writers of the constitution regarded democracy of no avail if civil liberties, like
freedom of speech and religion were not recognized and protected by the State. Most of these
rights are enforceable against the State by the way of their language, while some others are
directed both against the State and private individuals. The most important feature is that the
fundamental rights gave the higher judiciary a clear set of criteria to regulate relations
between citizens and the government as well as among citizens themselves. Furthermore,
Indian Courts have interpreted these rights not only in a negative dimension (i.e. in the terms
of protection against violation) but also in a positive dimension (i.e. in the terms of
entitlements to benefits).

Fundamental rights recognise the importance of the individual in the affairs of the state and
seek to assure to every citizen full freedom to enjoy life, liberty and happiness as he likes.
The development of a citizen’s personality, the pursuit of his profession or vocation, and the
manner in which he seeks to enjoy the pleasure and comforts of life are basically his
individual concern and the State can interfere the basic right only if the consideration of
public good justify the interruption.3

2
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643.
3
P.B.Gajendragadkar: The Indian Parliament and the Fundamental Rights (T.L.L.), p.39.

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 Introduction to Right to Equality

For “We, the people of India”, “Equality of Status and Opportunity” is guaranteed to all in
the preamble.The first Fundamental Right secured to the people of India is the “Right to
Equality.” It is contained in Articles 14 to 18.These provisions are discusses under the
following heads –

1. Equality Before Law Or Equal Protection of Laws (Article 14)

2. Prohibition of Discrimination Against Citizens (Article 15)

3. Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment (Article 16)

4. Abolition of “Untouchability” (Article 17)

5. Abolition of Titles (Article 18)

The Constitution of India guarantees the Right to Equality through Article 14 to 18. “Equality
is one of the magnificient corner-stones of Indian Democracy.”4

The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law which pervades
the Indian Constitution.

Article 15: In a sense the general and abstract principle of equality laid down in
Article 14 is spelt out for certain situations in greater detail in article 15 and in some of the
succeeding article. But it should be noted that article 15 is limited to citizens while 14
extends to all persons. Secondly, article 15 clause (1) and article 15(2) are both limited to
discrimination on ground of religion, race, sex, place of birth or any of them. Thirdly, the
article permits the state to make special provisions for women and children. Fourthly, the
article also permits the state to make any special provisions for the following :
a) Socially and educationally backward classes of citizens;
b) Scheduled castes; and
c) Scheduled tribes.
The Constitution (93rd amendment) Act, 2005 enables the state, to make, any law,special
provisions, for the SC/STs relating to their admission to educational institutions.

4
THOMMEN J. in Indra Sawhney v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477

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 Article 16: The main object of article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality
of opportunity and employment in public offices. This article is confined to citizens as
distinguished from other persons. Further, it is confined to employment or appointment to an
office ‘under the state’.

Certain exceptions to the right created by clause (1) and (2) of article 16 flow from clauses
(3), (4) and (5) of the article. These relate, respectively, to a requirement if sanctioned by
Parliamentary legislation, reservation for backward class of citizens, if not adequately
belonging to a particular denomination, if the office is in connection with the affairs of any
religion or institution.

Article 17: Article 17 has been implemented by the protection of Civil Rights
Act,1995 whose earlier title was ‘The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955’. The principle
object of article 17 is to ban the practice of untouchability in any form. This expression refers
to the social disabilities imposed on certain classes of persons by reason of their birth in
certain castes and does not cover social boycott based on conduct.

`Article 18 : Article 18 abolishes titles. It prohibits the state from conferring titles
except military or academic distinctions on any person whether a citizen or not. It also
prohibits a citizen from accepting title from a foreign state.

Article 14 outlaws discrimination in a general way and guarantees equality before law in all
persons. In view of certain amount of indefiniteness attached to the general principle of
equality enunciated in Article 14, separate provisions to cover specific discriminatory
situations have been made subsequent Articles. Thus, Article 15 prohibit discrimination
against citizens on such specific grounds as religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article
16 guarantees to the citizens of India equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment. Article 17 abolishes untouchability, and Article 18 abolishes titles, other than a
military or academic distinction.5

In this series of constitutional provisions, Article 14 is the most significant. It has been given
a highly activist magnitude in recent years by the courts and, thus, it generates a large number
of court cases. In recent days, Article 16 have also assumed great significance because of the
problems of reservation in public services. Article 14, is the genus while Article 15 and

5
M. P. Jain,Indian Constitutional Law 855 (5th Ed. Wadhwa and Company Publishers 2003)

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Article 16 are the species. Articles 14, 15 and 16 are constituents of a single code on
constitutional guarantees supplementing each other.

Article 14 of the Constitution embodies the principle of “non-discrimination”. However, it is

not a free standing provision. It has to be read in conjunction with the rights conferred by
other articles like Article 21 of the Constitution. It refers to “right to life” and embodies
several aspects of life. It includes “opportunity”, Article 21 and 14 are the heart of the
chapter on Fundamental Rights. They cover myriad features of life.

In situations not covered by Articles 15 to 18, the general principle of equality embodied in
Article 14 is attracted whenever discrimination is alleged. The goal set out in the Preamble to
the Constitution regarding status opportunity is embodied and concretised in Article 14 to
18.6

In may be worthwhile to note that Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, declares that all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of laws. By and large the same concept of equality inheres in Article 14
of the Indian Constitution.

6
For preamble to the constitution.

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 Article 14 Equality Before Law Or Equal Protection of Laws

Article 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal
protection of laws within the territory of India”.

This provision corresponds to the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment of the U.S.
Constitution which declares : “NO state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”

A constitution bench of the supreme Court has declared in no uncertain terms that the
equality is the basic feature of the constitution and although the emphasis in the earlier
decisions evolved around discrimination and classification, the content of Article 14 got
expanded conceptually and has recognized the principles to comprehend the doctrine of
promissory estoppel non arbitrariness, compliance with rules of natural justice eschewing
irrationality.7

Article 14 and 15 read in the light of the preamble to the Constitution reflect the thinking of
the Constitution makers and prevent any kind of discrimination on the basis of religion or
origin in the matter of equal treatment or employment.

It is now firmly established that Art.14 strikes at arbitrary state action both administrative and
legislative. There has been a significant shift towards equating arbitrary and unreasonableness
as the yardstick by which administrative and legislative functions are to be judged. A basic
and obvious test to be applied in cases where administrative action is attacked as arbitrary is
to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if
so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.8 It is now considered that non- compliance
with the rules of natural justice amounts to arbitrariness thus violative of Art. 14.

7
M. Nagraj v. UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212
8
UOI v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437

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 Source of Article 14

The source of the Article 14 lies in the American and the Irish Constitutions. It may be
mentioned that the Preamble to the Indian Constitution speaks of equality of status and of
opportunity and this Article gives effect to that principle in the text of the Constitution. In a
sense, the demand for equality is linked up with the history of the freedom movement in
India. Indians wanted the same rights and privileges that their British masters enjoyed in
India and the desire for civil rights was implicit in the formation of the Indian National
Congress in 1885. The Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925, in clause 8 demanded, inter alia
equality before the law and provided especially that there was to be “no disqualification or
disability on the ground only of sex”, along with the provisions that all the persons were to
have equal right to the use of “roads, courts of justice, and all other places of business or
resort dedicated to the public”. The Right to Equality finds place in the report drawn by
Motilal Nehru as Chairman of the Committee appointed to determine principle of the
Constitution for India. The Karachi Resolution (March 1931) reiterated, inter alia, this right
in the resolution on Fundamental Rights and economic and social change. Chakravarty and
Bhattacharya, Congress in Evolution (1940). The Sapru Report(1945) incorporating the
proposals of the Sapru Committee, while laying emphasis on “minorities” did enunciate the
fundamental rights and in page 260 of the report, described the fundamental rights of the
proposed new constitution as a standing warning to all—

“that what the Constitution demands and expects is perfect equality between one section of
the community and another in the matters of political and civil rights, equality of liberty and
security in the enjoyment of the freedom of religion, worship, and the pursuit of the ordinary
application of life.”9

9
P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India 15 (3rd Ed. Universal Law Publishing Co. 1997)

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 THE STATE

The term “State” in Article 14 means as defined by Article 12.

The definition of the term ‘the State’ specifies the authorities and instrumentalities
functioning within or without the territory of India which shall be deemed to be ‘the State’ for
the purposes of Part III of the Constitution. The definition is inclusive and not exhaustive.
Therefore, authorities and instrumentalities not specified in it may also fall within it if they
otherwise satisfy the characteristics of ‘the State’ as defined in this Article. The authorities
and instrumentalities specified in Article 12 are –

a) The Government and Parliament of India;

b) The Government and Legislature of each of the States;
c) All local authorities;
d) Other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government
of India.

The definition of the ‘State’ given under Article 12, is only applicable for the purpose of Part
III. Conversely, the definition in Article 12 cannot be used to interpret any provision outside
Part III, e.g., Article 311.10 Hence, even though a statutory corporation, exercising statutory
powers, would be ‘State’ for the purposes of enforcing fundamental rights against it, its
employees cannot take advantage of Arts. 309-311, for, their services are held not under the
government of India or of a State, but under a separate legal entity, even though that entity
may be regarded as ‘State’ for the purposes of Article 12 and its employees may resort to
Article 32 for violation of their fundamental rights by the corporation.11

Thus, it includes not only the legislative as well as the executive organs of the State, but also
the local authorities, the instrumentalities and agencies of the Government.

10
Dasaaratha v. State of A.P. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 564.
11
Srikant v. Vasant Rao, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 918

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 Who May Claim Article 14 Protection?

The obligation imposed on the State by Article 14 is for the benefit of all persons, within the
territory of India. The benefit of Article 14 is, therefore, not limited to citizens but an alien is
also entitled to the protection of this Article. It may however be noted that an alien (a foreign
national) cannot claim equal rights under Article 14 with that of the Indian Nationals, so far
as the grant of the Citizenship of India is concerned.

In Louis De Raedt v. Union of India,12 the Supreme Court had ruled out that the fundamental
right of the foreigner was confined to Article 21 and did not extend to a foreigner, the right to
reside and settle in India, as stated in Article 19 (1)(e). However, a foreign national, having
given valid business visa and, therefore, not residing in India illegally, cannot be deported
without giving any reason.13

Relying on this judgment and distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in National
Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh14, the Madras High Court in
David John Hopkins v. Union of India15, held that foreign nationals did not have any
fundamental right guaranteed for the grant of Citizenship of India, in which matters, the
Government of India had got unrestricted power under the Citizenship Act, 1955, to refuse
citizenship, without assigning any reason whatsoever and that a foreign national could not
claim equal rights under Article 14 with that of the Indian Nationals.

Also, Article 14 applies to all persons and is not limited to citizens. A corporation, which is a
juristic person is also entitled to the benefit of this article. But application of article 14 to
corporations vis-à-vis natural person may differ.

12
Louis de Raedt v.Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1886.
13
Leonid Beyzer v. UOI, AIR 2008 (NOC) 1802 (Bom.)
14
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1234.
15
David John Hopkins v. Union Of India, AIR 1997 Mad 366.

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 Concept of Equality

Article 14 uses two expressions to make the concept of equal treatment a binding principle of
State action. The Concepts are:

a) Equality before law

b) Equal protection of laws.

For long the nature and extent of the guarantee has been understood to be the same under
both the expressions. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed that the second expression was the
corollary of the first.16 Indeed, it will be difficult to imagine any violation of ‘the equal
protection of the laws’, which would not also be a violation of ‘equality before law’.

Equality Before Law

The first expression ‘equality before the law’ which is taken from the English common law,
is a declaration of equality of all persons within the territory of India, implying thereby the
absence of any special privilege in favour of any individual, that all are equally subject to the
ordinary law of the land and that no person whatever be his rank or condition, is above the
law. This is equivalent to the second corollary of DICEAN concept of rule of law in Britain.
Dicey wrote “every official from the Prime Minister down to constable or a Collector of taxes
is under the same responsibility for every act done without the justification as any other
citizen”. Professor Dicey gave three meanings of the Rule of Law thus—

(a) Absence of Arbitrary Power or Supremacy of the law: It means the absolute
supremacy of law as opposed to arbitrary power of the Government.

(b) Equality before the law : It means subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the
land administered by ordinary law courts.

16
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75,79

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(c) The constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land.17 : It means that the
source of the right of individuals is not the written constitution but the rules as defined by the
courts.

The first and second aspect apply to Indian system but the third aspect of Dicey’s Rule of
Law does not apply to Indian system as a source of rights of an individual is the Constitution
of India.The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and all the laws passed by the
legislature must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.18

Thus, Equality before the law means absence of any special privilege for any particular
person. It also strikes at arbitrary power on the part of the Government. It is, therefore, a
negative concept.

Exceptions to the Rule of Law –

Firstly ‘Equality before the law’ does not mean the “powers of the private citizens are
the same as the powers of the public officials”. Thus, a police officer has the power to arrest
whereas no private person has no such power.
Secondly, the rule of law does not prevent certain classes of persons being subjected
to special rules. Thus, members of the armed forces are controlled by military laws.
Similarly, medical practitioners are subjected to the regulations framed by the Medical
Council of India a statutory body, are immune from the ordinary courts.
Thirdly, certain members of the society are governed by special rules in their
professions, i. e. lawyers, doctors, nurses, police etc.
Fourthly, foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the country’s judicial process,
Article 361 extends immunity to the President of India and the State Governors; public
officers and judges also enjoy some protection, and some special groups and interest, like the
trade unions, have been accorded special privileges by the law.

17
JN Pandey, The Constitutional Law of India 78, (50th Ed. Central Law Agency 2013)
18
http://www.scribd.com/doc/245123435/Article-14-a-Brief-Introduction#

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 Equal Protection of the Laws

The phrase “equal protection of laws” is based on Section 1 of the Fourteeth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America adopted on July 28, 1868, which runs as:
“nor shall any State—deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws”.

It has been said that ‘the equal protection of the laws’ is a pledge of protection or guarantee
of equal laws. The phrase is interpreted to mean “subjection of equal laws applying to all in
the same circumstances”. It means that all persons have the right to equal treatment in similar
circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed by laws. It
requires that equal laws should be applied to all in the same situation and that there should be
no discrimination between one person and another. Thus, the phrase “equal protection of
laws” lays down the rule that “like should be treated alike and not that unlike should be
treated alike”. It is known to be positive in content. It is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws.

The concept of equality has been held basic to the rule of law and is regarded as the most
fundamental postulate of republicanism. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain19, the
majority of the Supreme Court has held that the right to equality conferred by Article 14 is
Basic Structure of the Constitution and an essential feature of democracy or rule of law.

Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed on December10,

1948, uses both the expressions. It says: “All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”.

Comparing these two concepts of equality-

The court has observed that even if there is much in common between the two expressions in
Article 14, they do not mean the same thing.

The word ‘law’ in the former expression is used in a generic sense – a philosophical
sense – whereas the word ‘laws’ in the latter expression denotes specific laws.

19
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2999.

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The Supreme Court has explained in Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu20, that
the two expressions ‘ equality before law’ and ‘equal protection of law’ do not mean the same
thing even if there may be much in common between them. “Equality before law” is a
dynamic concept having many facets. One facet is that there shall be no privileged person or
class and that none shall be above law. Another facet is “the obligation upon the State to
bring about, through the machinery of law, a more equal society….for, equality before law
can be predicated meaningfully only in equal society.” The dominant idea common to both
these expressions is that of equal justice.

Exceptions to Aricle 14 as contained in the constitution itself :

The scope of right to equality under Article 14 has been considerably restricted by the
42nd amendment act, 1976. The new Article 31-C added by the Amendment Act provides that
laws made by the state for implementing the Directive Principles contained in clause (b) or
clause (c) of Article 39 cannot be challenged on the ground that they are violative of Article
14. Such laws thus will be an exception to Article 14 to the Constitution. In Sanjeev Coke
Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd., the Supreme Court has held that ‘where Article 31-C
comes in, Article 14 goes out’.
Article 359(1) provides that where a proclamation of emergency is in operation the
President may, by order, declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such
rights conferred by Part III (except Arts. 20 and 21) shall remain suspended. Thus , if the
President of India issues an order, where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation,
enforcement of Article 14 may be suspended for the period during the proclamation is in
force.

20
Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu ,AIR 1992 SC 1004

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 Under lying Principle

As no two human beings are equal in all respects, the same treatment to them in every respect
would result in unequal treatment.
For example : The same treatmeant in all respects to a child as to an adult or to a sick or
physically challenged to a healthy person or to a rich person to a poor person or to a woman
to a man will result in unequal treatment or a treatment which nobody will justify or support.
Therefore, the underlying principle of equality is not the uniformity of treatment to all in all
respects but rather than to give them the same treatment in those respects in which they are
similar and different in treatment in different situations. In nutshell it is stated: Equals must
be treated equally while unequals must be treated differently. For the application of the
principle of equality in real life, we must differentiate. Though no two human beings are
similar in all respects, they are similar in one respect, namely, they are human beings.

Ancient Context: In Ancient Indian context, as much as in Christianity and Islam, even if we
are produced from different parts of the body of that person or God, we are all its(God’s)
product. In that respect we are all equals. As human beings in Kantian terms we all have
equal worth and in Dworkin’s words are entitled to equal respect and concern. Any
classification or absence of it that ignores this aspect, violates equality and cannot be justified
under Article 14.

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 Article 14 permits ‘Reasonable Classification’

Article 14 prescribes equality before law. But the fact remains that all persons are not equal
by nature , attainment or circumstances, and therefore, a mechanical equality before the law
may result in injustice. Thus, the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of law does
not mean that identically the same rule of law should be made applicable to all persons in
spite of difference in circumstances or conditions. The varying needs of different classes or
section of people require differential and separate treatment.

Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. The
classification, however, must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive” but must be based on
some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation.

Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. But
where equals and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply.

Class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular

privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of
whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted that between whom and the persons
not so favored so reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the
inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege.

Explaining the concept of equality, the Supreme Court in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v.
Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College21, observed:

Equality must become a living reality for the large masses of the people. Those who are
unequal, in fact, cannot be treated by identical standards; that may be equality in law but it
would certainly not be real equality in law but it would certainly not be on the absence of
disabilities, but on presence of abilities. It is not simple a matter of legal equality. De jure
equality must ultimately find its raison d’etre in de facto equality.

All persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or circumstances. The varying needs of
different classes of persons often require separate treatment. From the very nature of the
society, there should be different laws, applying differently in different places. Application of

21
Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College, AIR 1990, SCC 30

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same laws uniformly to all, under different circumstances, may result in violation of principle
of equality.

Equality of opportunity embraces two different and distinct concepts. There is a conceptual
distinction between a non discrimination principle and affirmative action under which the
State is cbliged to provide a level playing field to the oppressed classes. Affirmative action in
the above sense seeks to move beyond the concept of non discrimination towards equilising
results with respect to various groups. Both the conceptions constitute ‘equality of
opportuniy’.22

Test for Valid Classification

A classification to be valid must be reasonable .The court in the leading judgement R.K.
Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar, laid down the tests for reasonableness. In order to pass the test
for permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely:

(1) the classification must be found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and

(2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.

Illustration: Under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 persons who have not
attained majority cannot enter into a contract. The two classes of persons are adults and
minors. The basis of classification is the age. Age, obviously, has a relation to the capacity to
enter into contract. The section, therefore, satisfies both the requirements for valid
classification, i.e. it groups minors and adults separately and such grouping has a rational
relation with a capacity to make a contract. But suppose the basis of classification is the
colour of hair, e.g. all persons having black hair can enter into contract. This classification
fail because the differentiation has no relation with the object of the legislation—the capacity
to contract.

22
M. Nagaraj v. UOI (2006) 8 SC 212

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In Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India23, the Governor-General of India
promulgated the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions)
ordinance, 1950, empowering government to take over the management and administration of
the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., which was closed down due to disputes
between the management and the employees. The ordinance was subsequently replaced by an
Act of Parliament, containing similar provisions. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the impugned Act and the action taken against the Company. The Court
held that there was no infringement of these provisions of Article 14 even though the
Legislature had proceeded against one company only and its shareholders. The Court
observed that the law would be constitutional, even if it applied to one person or one class of
persons, if there was sufficient basis or reason for it.

The court upheld the action taken against the petitioner and laid down that while Article 14
forbade class legislation, it did not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of
legislation.

Object : The object of classification should be lawful. Classifications made in the utmost
good faith; classifications that are scientific and rational; that have direct and immediate
relation with the object sought to be achieved can be bad because the object offends Article
14. In such a case the object must be struck down and not the mere classification which, after
all, is only a means of attaining the desired end. But whether the end is a desired end, is
subject to the judicial scrutiny. An object which may be valid at, one point of time or
situation may become invalid at another point of time or scrutiny.

The true meaning and scope of Article 14 have been explained in a number of cases by the
supreme court. In view of this the propositions laid down in Dalmia case still hold good
governing a valid classification and are as follows-

(a) A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account
of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that
single individual may be treated as a class by itself .24

23
AIR 1951 SC 41.
24
Dharam dutt v UOI, AIR 2004 SC 1295

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(b) There is always presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of
constitutional principles.25
(c) The presumption may be rebutted by showing that on the fact of the statue, there is
no classification & no difference peculiar to any individual or class & not applicable to any
other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.26
(d) It must be assumed that Legislature correctly understand and appreciates the need of
its own people that its law are directed to problem made manifest by experience and that its
discrimination are based on adequate grounds.27
(e) In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into
consideration maters of common knowledge, matters of report, the history of the times and
may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of the
legislation.28
(f) Thus the legislation is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its
restriction to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest.
(g) While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature
are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances
brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonable be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to extent always that there must
be some and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals.29
(h) The classification made by the legislature need not be scientifically perfect or
logically complete.30
(i) The classification may be made on different basis, e.g. geographical or according to
the objects or occupations or the like.
(j) There can be discrimination both in the substantive as well as the procedural law.
Article 14 applies to both.

25
P.S.T. Bar Association v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1115.
26
A.P.B.C. Sangh v. J.S.V. Federation, AIR 2006 Sc 2814
27
The rule is enunciated by the American Supreme Court in Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Comapny, (248 US
152) quoted in Government of A.P. v. P.L. Devi, Air 2008 Sc 1640
28
Municipal Committe, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Associations, AIR 2007 SC 2844
29
A.L. Kalra v. P. & E. Corpn., AIR 2006 SC 2814
30
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/reasonable-classification-under-article-14-1061-1.html

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American Position: In US reasonable classification test has been further refined into strict
scrutiny and immediate scrutiny depending upon the basis of classification such as race or
colour in which case the classification is deemed prima facie suspect and the state must prove
substantial public interest to justify the classification. After noting tests and the hinting at
their relevance the court has not yet specifically applied those tests in any case. In the context
of affirmative action under Article 15, the court has clearly held that the US principles of
“suspect legislation”, “strict scrunity” and “compelling state necessity” are not applicable to
us.31

Administrative Discretion – Wednesbury Test

There may be situation when an Act or a Statute, instead of making the classification,
confers power on the Executive in that regard. In such cases, if the Act confers unregulated
discretie4 `DXon on the Executive, the Act itself would be void under Article 14. It may
be that the Act has laid down some principles or policy for the guidance of the exercise of
discretion by the Executive in making classification, and then in that case, the Act conferring
discretion would not be void as offending Article 14. The Apex Court, the Patna High Court
in Satar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India32, held that if it was found that the
actions of the State/States instrumentality were lacking in reasonableness and fairness then,
notwithstanding contractual terms, the actions would be quashed and the Court would be
constitutionally obliged to do the same. One of the tests to determine the reasonableness of
State action, the court said would be Wednesbury Principle.

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 is

an English law case that sets out the standard of unreasonableness of public-body decisions
that would make them liable to be quashed on judicial review, known as Wednesbury
unreasonableness . Relying on Wednesbury case, it has been ruled that the court should not
interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or is shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it is defiance or
logic or moral standards. It is thus held that an administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review on the following three grounds, namely—

31
Ashok Kumar Thakur v. UOI, WP (Civil) No. 265 of 2006
32
Satar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 2008 Pat. 179

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(i) If it is illegal ;

(ii) That it is irrational; or

(iii) That is suffers from procedural impropriety.

New Concept Of Equality: Protection Against Arbitrariness

A common tendency in modern democracies is to confer discretionary power on the

government and administrative officers. The power is usually couched in very broad
phraseology and gives a large area of choice to the administrator concerned to apply the law
to actual factual situations.
In order to ensure that the discretionary power is properly exercised, it is necessary that the
statute in question lays down some norms or principles according to which the administrator
has to exercise the discretion. Many a time the statutes do not do this and leaves the
administrator free to exercise his power as per his judgement. This creates the danger of
official arbitrariness which is subversive of the doctrine of equality. To mitigate this danger,
the courts have ivoked Article 14. In course of time, Article 14 has evolved into a very
meaningful guarantee against any action of the Administration which may be arbitrary,
discriminatory or unequal.
This principle manifests itself in the form of the following propositions :

(a) A guided conferring unguided and unrestricted power on an authority is bad for arbitatry
power is discriminatory.
(b)Article 14 illegalise discrimination in the actual exercise of any discretionary power.
(c) Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in administrative action and ensures fairless and equality
of treatment.

In E.P.Royappa V. State of Tamil Nadu33, the Supreme Court has challenged the traditional
concept of equality and laid bare a new dimension to Article 14. The court declared that this
equalizing principle contained in Article 14 as “founding faith, a way of life”, and for that

33
AIR 1974 SC 555

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reason, it must not be subjected to a “narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach.” Bhagwati
j. pointed out that: “Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it
cannot be "cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a
positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other,
to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it
that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore
violative of Article 14.

The new approach Article 14 has now been consistently adopted and applied by the courts in
determining the true content and reach of the equalizing principle.

Article 14 Strikes at Arbitrariness

It may however be noticed, that by the passage of time, considerations of necessity and
expediency may be obliterated and the grounds which justified classification, may cease to be
valid. The Apex Court in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India34, thus, ruled that the court
might strike down a legislation in subsequent litigation, though it was held to be reasonable
and rational at the time of its enactment. The doctrine of reasonable classification has been
for long, the undisputed touchstone to determine the scope and content of Article 14.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India35, a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court

emphasized on the content and reach of the great equalizing principle enunciated in Article
14. Warning against any attempt to truncate it’s all embracing scope and meaning, which
might violate its activist magnitude, the court observed: Equality is a dynamic concept with
many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire
limits.

34
Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2008 SC 3148
35
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

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 Cases on Arbitrary classification

a) Conferring Absolute Discretion

In Air India v. Nargesh Meerza36, Regulation 46 of the Air India and Indian Airlines
Regulations provided that an Air Hostess was to retire from service upon attaining the age of
35 years or on marriage, if it took place within 4 years of her joining service or on first
pregnancy, whichever occurred earlier. Regulation 47 empowered the Managing Director, at
his option, to extend the age of retirement by one year at a time beyond the age of retirement,
up to the age of 45 years, if a Air hostess was found physically fit. The Supreme Court struck
down the Regulation providing for retirement of the Air Hostess on her first pregnancy, as
unconstitutional, void and violative of Article 14. However, the provision that an Air Hostess
was to retire if she marries within 4 years of joining service was upheld as there was no
arbitrariness in the provision.

b) Oral Interview Test and Article 14

In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib37, the Regional Engineering College admissions of candidates
on the basis of oral interview after a written test. The test of oral interview was challenged on
the ground that it was arbitrary and unreasonable because high percentage of marks were
allocated for oral test, and candidates were interviewed only 2 or 3 minutes. The Court struck
down the rule prescribing high percentage of marks for oral test, i.e. allocation of one third of
total marks for oral interview was plainly arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. It said that the oral interview test cannot be regarded a very
satisfactory test for assessing and evaluating the capacity and caliber of candidates as it is
subjective and based on first impression and its result is influenced by many uncertain factors
and it is capable of abuse. It cannot be the exclusive test. It should be resorted to only as an
additional or supplementary test and must be conducted by persons of high integrity, caliber
and qualification. It was observed that allocation of 15 percent marks to interview will be
arbitrary and unreasonable.

36
Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829
37
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487

Page | 25
c) Legislature and Article 14
In Mithu v. State of Punjab38the Supreme Court struck down Section 303 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 as unconstitutional on the ground of violation of Article 14. The
court held that classification between persons who committed murder whilst they were not
under the sentence of life imprisonment, for the purpose of making the death penalty
mandatory in the former case and optional in the latter case, was not based on any rational
principle.
d) Gender Equality – Harmonious Construction
The Supreme Court, in Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India39,for securing the
constructional guarantee of gender equality. The Court upheld the validity of Section 6 (9) of
the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and held that mother could act as natural
guardian of minor even when father was alive. The Court said that the word after in this
Section did necessarily not mean “after the lifetime” but it meant “in the absence of”. So,
interpreted, the court said that if the father was absent, from the care of the minor’s property
or person, for any reason whatever, mother of the minor, being a recognized natural guardian,
could act validly on behalf of the minor as the guardian.
e) Guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of working women

In a landmark judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan40, the Supreme Court had laid
down exhaustive guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of working women in places of
their work until a Legislation is enacted for this purpose. The petition was filed by a social
worker by way of public interest litigation for the enforcement of rights of working women
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and in finding suitable methods for
realization of the true concept of ‘gender equality’. Gender equality includes protection from
realization of the true concept of ‘gender equality’. Gender equality includes protection from
sexual harassment and right to work with dignity, which is universally recognized basic
human right.

38
AIR 1983 SC 130
39
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1999 SC 1149
40
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3014

Page | 26
f) Equal Pay for Equal Work
In Randhir Singh v. Union of India41, the Supreme Court has held that although the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not expressly declared by our constitution to be a
fundamental right, but it is certainly a constitutional goal under Article 14, 16 and 39 (c) of
the Constitution. This right can, therefore, be enforced in cases of unequal scales of unequal
scales of pay based on irrational classification

Rule of Natural Justice and Article 14

The principles of natural justice have been developed and followed by the judiciary to protect
the right of the public against the arbitrariness of the administrative authorities. Natural
Justice implies fairness, reasonableness, equity and equality.42

Article 14 requires not only reasonable classification but also that the classification must be
just, fair and reasonable. The classification would not be reasonable if it is made without
observing the rules of natural justice. The violation of principles of natural justice results in
arbitrariness; therefore, violation of natural justice is a violation of Equality clause of Article
14.

The following are the two important basic principles of natural justice:

No one can be a judge in his own cause (‘Nemo debet essa judex in propria
cause’),

No man must sit in judgment in his own cause, or the deciding authority must be Impartial
and without bias. It is also called as the ‘doctrine of bias’ as the judge may have a prejudice
in the case. He must be totally free from any bias. Bias can be of three types: (a) a pecuniary
interest, (b) a personal interest, and (c) a general interest, in the subject matter brought before
him for decision. Bias is relevant not only in the disciplinary authority but also in the inquiry
officer even where the inquiry officer is a different person from the disciplinary authority.

41
Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879
42
Upadhayaya JJ.R, “Administrative law”, Central law agency, Allahabad, 193

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 Hear the other side (‘Audi Alteram Partem’)

The second principle, ‘Hear the other side’ means both the sides must be heard and one
should not be condemned unheard. In other words, No person accused of any charge or likely
to suffer any civil consequences, must be adjudged unless and until he is aware of the
proceedings together with a notice thereon and an opportunity to present his case fully.

It has thus been held that the rules of natural justice form an essential component of Article
14.43

In the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress44 the Supreme
Court held that Regulation 9 (b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Regulations, 1952,
which conferred power on the Authority, to terminate the services of a permanent employee
by issuing a notice without assigning any reason without giving him any opportunity of
hearing, was wholly arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable, violating principles of natural
justice as well as Article 14.

However there can be certain cases in which an order passed in violation of natural justice
need not be set aside, for instance where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned and if
quashing of the order made in the breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of
another order which is in itself illegal.45The Supreme Court in several cases has developed
the principle that in addition of breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved.46

Article 14 and Admission to Educational Institutions

In the context of admission to institutions imparting education in professional courses, the

question as to giving preferential treatment to candidate on various grounds has been
considered by the Courts and the approach of the Courts, has been such that preferential
treatment must be consistent with the mandate of Article 14.

43
Mangilal v. State of M.P. AIR 2004 SC 1280
44
AIR 1991 SC 101
45
Gadde Venkateshawera Rao v. Govt of A.P. AIR 1966 SC 828.
46
K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India AIR 1984 SC 273.

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In Pradeep Jain v. Union of India47, the Supreme Court held that the wholesale reservation
of seats in the M.B.B.S and B.D.S Courses, on the basis of domicile or “residence” within the
state, was unconstitutional and void as being voilative of Article 14. The Court observed that
the object of any scheme of admission should be to select the best and most meritorious
students by providing equal opportunities to all citizens in the country. Any departure from
this rule must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14. As far admission to post graduate
courses, such as M.S., M.D. and the like were concerned, the court laid down that there
should be not reservation at all, on the ground of residence. However in regard to admission
to super- specialties post- graduate courses such as neurosurgery or cardiology, the court held
there should be no reservation at all, even on the basis of institutional preferences and
admission to such courses should be granted purely on merit on all India basis.

In P.Ranjendra v. State of Madras48, the SC struck down the provision for allotment of
seats in medical the population of each district to the total population of the State. The
provision was held violative of Article 14.

In Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh49,(Second Capitation fee case), a

Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court evolved a scheme regulating the admission to
private unaided/aided, recognized/affiliated educational institutions conducting professional
courses such as medical, engineering courses etc, and charging capitation fee for the purpose
of admission. As regards aided institutions, it was held that they were to abide by the rules
and regulations as might be framed by the appropriate authority and in the matter of
admission of students, they were to follow the rule of merit and merit alone, subject to any
reservation that might be made under Article 15(4) and they were not charge any fees higher
than which was charged in governmental institutions for similar courses. As regard un-aided
institutions, which were recognized/affiliated, the Scheme postulated that at least 50% of the
seats in every government/university, and the students for these seats were to be selected on
the basis of merit determined on the basis of a common entrance test and in its absence, by
such criteria as might be determined by the competent authority. The remaining 50% seats
were to be filled by the candidates prepared to pay the prescribed higher fee. However, the
allotment of students against such seats, known as payment seats, were to be done o the basis
of inter se merit determined on the same basis as in the case of free seats. There would be no

47
Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420.
48
AIR 1968 SC 1012
49
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 2178

Page | 29
quota reserved for the management or for any family, caste or community, which might have
establishes such college. The scheme was evolved to eliminate discretion in the management
altogether in the matter of admission.

The decision in Unni Krishnan’s case, in so far as it framed the scheme of “free seats” and
“payment seats”, relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, has been
overruled by a Bench 0f eleven judges of the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State
of Karnataka50. The Apex Court Observed that the private unaided educational institutions
imparted education and that could not be the reason to take away to take away their choice in
matters, inter alia, of selection of students and fixation of fees.

Anant Madan v. State of Haryana51, the Government made a rule providing that in the
matter of admission to M.B.B.S./B.D.S. courses, 85% of the seats would be reserved for
candidates who has studied 10th, 11th and 12th standards as regular candidates in recognized
institutions in the State of Haryana. Upholding the rule, the Supreme Court said that the rule
provided preference on the ground of domicile/residence, which was permissible under
Article 14. The rule was made to curb practice of availing admission by producing forged
domicile certificates.

Right of Examinee to have access to Evaluated sheets:

In President B.S.E., Orrisa v. D. Suvankar52itis in the public interest that the results Public
examinations when published should have some finality attached to them. If inspection,
verification in the presence of the candidates and revaluation are to be allowed as of right, it
may lead to gross and indefinite uncertainty, particularly in regard to the relative ranking etc.
of the candidates, besides leading to utter confusion on account of the enormity of the labour
and time involved in the process. The Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its
own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in
preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich
experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments
controlling them.

50
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnatka, AIR 2003 SC 355
51
AIR 1995 SC 955
52
(2007) 1 SCC 603.

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 Common Entrance Test Examination

53
The Apex Court in Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P., explaining the desirability of
holding a common entrance test (CEE), observed – The provision for a common entrance
examination, provides a uniform criteria for judging the merit of all students, who come from
different Universities. The purpose of such an examination is, not merely to grade candidates
for selection, but also to evaluate all candidates by a common yardstick,the most legal and
equitable way of selecting students for admission to Post- Graduate Courses.

Right of the examinee to have access to the Evaluated Scripts

The permissibility of re-assessment of the answer scripts, in the absence of statutory

provision has been dealt with by the courts. It has been said that finality had to be attached to
the result of public examination and that in the absence of statutory provision; the court could
not direct re-assessment/ re-examination of answer scripts. In Secretary, West Bengal
Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das,54 the Apex Court set aside the order
of the High Court Directing the inspection of the answer-book by the examinee and its re-
evaluation.

53
Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P, AIR 1999 SC 2894.
54
Secretary, West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das , AIR 2007 SC 3098.

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 Conclusion

What article 14 forbids is discrimination by law that is treating persons similarly

circumstanced differently and treating those not similarly circumstanced in the same way or
as has been pithily put treating equals as unequals and unequals as equals. Article 14
prohibits hostile classification by law and is directed against discriminatory class legislation.

A legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problem that arise out of an infinite
variety of human relations cannot but proceed on some sort of selection or classification of
persons upon whom the legislation is to operate.

Its is well settled that Article 14 frobid classification for the purpose of legislation. Its is
equally well settled that in order to meet the test of Article 14

(i) classification must be based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or

things that are grouped together from those that are left out of group and (ii) the differentia
must have a rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by the executive or legislative
action under challenge.

Article 14 contains a guarantee of equality before law to all persons and protection to them
against discrimination by law. It forbids class legislation.

Page | 32
 Bibliography

BOOKS:

1. Narender Kumar, Constitutional Law of India

2. Dr. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law.
3. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India.
4. Dr. V.N.Shukla, The Constitution of India.
5. P.M. Bakshi, Constitutional Law.
6. Upadhayaya JJ.R, Administrative law

WEBSITES:

1. www.oxforddictionaries.com
2. www.merriam-webster.com
3. https://indiankanoon.org
4. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/

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