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Hugo Erken, Michael Every and
Björn Giesbergen
Immediately after the announced protectionist measures by the US, China responded it would retaliate with
similar measures. The US therefore also faces two rounds of Chinese tariffs on their exports worth USD 50bn.
The first round of USD 34bn also takes effect on 6 July and consists of 25% tariffs on agricultural products such
as soybeans, corn, wheat, beef, pork, poultry and various types of vehicles. The second round of USD 16bn is
assumed to cover the import of chemicals, medical equipment and energy related products, such as coal and
crude oil.
…Bigly
"China has determined that it will raise tariffs on USD 50bn worth of US exports. China apparently has no
intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and
technology. Rather than altering those practices, it is now threatening US companies, workers, and farmers
who have done nothing wrong... Therefore, today, I directed the United States Trade Representative to identify
USD 200bn worth of Chinese goods for additional tariffs at a rate of 10%. After the legal process is complete,
these tariffs will go into effect if China refuses to change its practices, and also if it insists on going forward
with the new tariffs that it has recently announced. If China increases its tariffs yet again, we will meet that
action by pursuing additional tariffs on another USD 200bn of goods. The trade relationship between the US
and China must be much more equitable."
One can take the view that for now this is still just a US threat ‐ an attempt to 'needle' China into opening up
its markets. However, what will be the damage done even from the existing USD 50bn of measures that we can
already analyse more concretely.
In terms of the direct economic impact of protectionist measures by both China and the US, ideally
one would like to use world trade models which have incorporated all tariffs and non‐tariff barriers
for different product groups, such as Global Trade Analysis Project ﴾GTAP﴿.
Our calculations show that the duties on USD 34bn worth of goods that will be imposed on 6 July on either
Nonetheless, there are possible second‐order Figure 2: So far markets have shrugged off trade
effects. It is hard to see how business confidence in war threats
both countries won't suffer an impact ‐ although it
will be interesting to note any dichotomy between
the reaction of small US firms, which are generally
not trading internationally and/or which face
increasing 'China price' competition in the domestic
market, and US multinationals, who are far more
exposed to global trade tensions. We will also have
to track how financial markets react ‐ though so far
in terms of both benchmark US equities and the VIX
volatility index, there has been no panic selling
similar to that seen in Europe during the recent
stand‐off over the formation of the Italian Source: Macrobond, Rabobank
government, for example ﴾Figure 2﴿. Yet that may
change rapidly now that we are looking at a potential US‐China trade war.
Although the total hit to Chinese and US GDP under the existing USD 50bn bilateral tariffs that are
proposed is quite small as shown, the same cannot be said for the Chinese or US agri markets.
Indeed, the imposition of a 25% tariff on soybeans, as just one example, has enormous implications
for various industries. Raboresearch F&A team covering China has undertaken an extensive analysis
of the impact of the steps already announced to date, which will be published this week. It
underlines how much disruption can be hidden beneath a small change in aggregate national GDP.
Our Agri Commodities Market Research team will also be releasing their analysis of the outlook for
the US agri markets on Thursday 21 June.
China has an enormous stock of around USD 1trn US Treasury holdings and thus to some extent finances the
US current account deficit by buying US government debt with the USD it receives from trading with the US. If
First, the value of China’s USD 3.1trn of FX reserves would naturally be hit should China sell off its Treasuries,
pushing yields higher and the Treasury price lower.
Second, what else could China buy instead of US Treasuries? As noted above, China buys these assets as the
counterpart of its trade surplus with the US. If the trade surplus is reduced ahead, so will Treasury buying in
lock‐step. But until that happens China needs a liquid, safe home for its vast FX earnings. European
government markets are suffering from a shortage of supply; Japanese government bonds are likewise being
rapidly bought‐up by the BOJ; and emerging‐market government bonds and developed‐market corporate
bonds, and equities, are all too volatile for Beijing to invest in. In short, China has no real viable options but the
US.
Third, a mass dump of US assets would result in further upward CNY/CNH pressure. This would lead to even
lower exports through higher export prices, and thus a deterioration of the competitiveness of Chinese
exporters on top of the hit from US tariffs.
Another potential option to offset the loss of competitiveness due to US tariffs would be to devalue
the CNY against the USD. Ironically, China could do that under the guise of allowing market mechanisms to
function freely. All that it would take for a serious market‐led CNY/CNH depreciation would be for the PBOC
to announce that from now on the currency is free‐floating and that it will let the market set its value and/or
perhaps to remove capital controls. We have already seen how the market has tried to test towards USD/CNH
7.0, and that would no doubt be achieved in short order. Indeed parity with USD/HKD at 7.75, and beyond,
would not be unrealistic. However, this is surely still a last resort. It would risk a collapse in FX reserves, a USD‐
crisis, and financial instability. The key Belt and Road Initiative would also be impacted, as its local‐currency
price tag would rise dramatically. Moreover, it might trigger an even more aggressive US trade response: even
though CNY/CNH would be trading freely, it seems unlikely that the US would refrain from accusations of
currency manipulation that harms US interests, and even higher tariffs in response.
So what other areas does China have to explore if it wants to raise the ante? Potentially, geopolitics.
There will be an attempt to build an anti‐Trump trade coalition with the EU: such overtures are already being
made. However, who in Europe trusts China on trade? And who in Europe is willing to risk the loss of the US
defence umbrella? More pertinently, the recent Trump‐Kim summit happened with Chinese help. Is detente
there, as Trump proclaims, or might China swing Kim back towards a more belligerent stance that would make
Trump lose face and be forced to contemplate the ruinous expense of military action? Kim is about to visit
Different logics
Traditional economic analysis sees all trade wars as harmful ‐ and this one is unlikely to be an exception. In
case this winds up into a global trade war, with a general 20% import tariff in the US vs. all other countries,
and a retaliatory tariff of 20% by all US trading partners, not just China, scenarios run with our macro
econometric model ﴾NiGEM﴿ show serious, negative outcomes.
In such a case, the global economy would lose out on 2.5ppt of economic growth over 5 years in total. The US
would end up in a recession in 2019 and the economic damage would be substantial in the first 5 years: ‐
6.3ppt of growth loss compared to a situation where trade tensions would be absent. We are talking about
massive amounts here, up to USD 1,000bn of lost economic growth, something which is ironically the same
amount Trump vowed to invest in infrastructure over the next ten years during his campaign. For China, the
negative impact of a global trade war would also be substantial ﴾‐1.6ppts over five years’ time﴿, but far lower
than in the US. This is due to the fact that China would have the opportunity to step up trade with the rest of
the world, as their relative competitiveness vis‐à‐vis the US increases.
Let's not forget though that there is always the possibility that the US cranks up political pressure to force its
trading partners and political allies, like the EU, to implement protectionist measures against China as well. If
other countries followed up on US demands to 'tackle China' with tariffs, the economic impact on Asia's giant
would be much more substantial. Could even expected Chinese domestic stimulus compensate? It's doubtful it
could for long. As such, this is a very high stakes game of poker.
As such, not only are US tariffs back, but: a strategic logic says the US threats of USD 450bn, not just USD
50bn, in tariffs on China may be real. For China, the same strategic, not economic, logic points to upping the
ante in any number of ways too, rather than backing down ‐ even if that creates other global risks/volatility;
and the same strategic logic says we are back to the issue of US vs. China trade wars as part of a larger fight
over whether it will be a US‐ or China‐led economic future. The economy itself appears to be just a bystander.
Author﴾s﴿
Hugo Erken Michael Every Björn Giesbergen
RaboResearch Global Economics & RaboResearch Global Economics & RaboResearch Global Economics &
Markets Markets Markets
+31 30 21 52308 +852 2103 2612 +31 ﴾0﴿30 21 62562
Hugo.Erken@rabobank.nl michael.every@rabobank.com Bjorn.Giesbergen@rabobank.nl