SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 224, QUEZON CITY and ATTY. TEODORICO A.
AQUINO, respondents.
1. Remedial Law; Certiorari; Pro Forma Motions; The proscription against a pro forma
motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one.-
—We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the
appellate court was time-barred. However, the raison d’etre for its ruling is incorrect.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only
to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this Court in
University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 432 SCRA
601 (2004), involved a final order of the NLRC and not an interlocutory order.
2. Settlement of Estate; Substitution of Parties; The heirs may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor;
Pronouncement of the Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173 (1986) is no
longer true.-
—The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or
executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the
court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the
appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate
of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146
SCRA 173(1986) (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative
of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort
to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.
3. Same; The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of his first motion
for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.-
—We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with
the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner
received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion
for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18,
2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner
filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004. The 60-day period
should not be reckoned from petitioner’s receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May
7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the
trial court’s denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will
ensue.
4. Certiorari; Three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order;
The purpose is to determine its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed
not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
nullified.-
—There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order:
(1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received; (2) when a
motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted;
and (3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner. The requirement of
setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required
to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be nullified.
5. Pro Forma Motions; The second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner cannot be
rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order
is forbidden by law or by the Rules of Court.-
—It bears stressing however that while the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court based on the same grounds as
those alleged in his first motion is not pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration
can nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration
of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion
cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is forbidden by law or by the Rules of Court.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87458 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of
petitioner Epifanio San Juan, Jr., as well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one
of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A.
Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
1

City. The case was raffled to Branch 224 of the court and was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 98-36118.
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of
Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as
counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their
representative.
On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance
of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator
of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his
representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22,
2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an
administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be
substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator"
signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden,
all surnamed Casa, on February 24, 2003, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr.,
be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted
for the deceased.
NOW THEREFORE, in compliance with the ORDER of the Probate Court, cited
above, we, the legal heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, unanimously designate
and appoint FEDERICO CASA, JR., as the ADMINISTRATOR of the property to
be inherited by the deceased OSCAR CASA, in the WILL of the late LORETO
SAMIA SAN JUAN, considering that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is the nearest
accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will and is most
competent to assume the responsibilities and the duties of the ADMINISTRATOR.
We authorize him to represent us the heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, on the
hearing of the probate of the will of the testatrix and to perform such duties as
might be required by the Probate Court; to take possession of the properties
designated in the WILL upon distribution by the appointed ADMINISTRATOR of
the Estate of LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN. (emphasis supplied)3
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare
Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient."4 He maintained that the heirs
should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the
estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs
of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an
administrator or executor of the estate. He also claimed that the court is enjoined to require
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
the representative to appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed
period.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary
to its Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that there was, after all, no need for
the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. It
is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.5
San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15, 2003 and
filed, on December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,6 he averred that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, while the court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be substituted in cases of
unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or where the heirs
resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, priority is still given to the legal
representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of the estate.
Moreover, in case the heirs of the deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior
determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are. He opined that this doctrine
is in line with Article 1058 of the New Civil Code, and the provisions of Section 6, Rule 78
and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. In this case, however, the alleged heirs of
Oscar Casa did not file any petition for the appointment of an administrator of his estate;
hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is not qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased
devisee. San Juan pointed out that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court
contravened its August 14, 2002 and November 22, 2002 Orders.7
The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the probate court
declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised by the parties and found no
compelling ground or cogent reason to set aside its December 2, 2003 Order.8 Petitioner
received a copy of the Order on March 18, 2004.
On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for reconsideration
dated May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2, 2003 Order of the RTC.9 He
cited Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 where it was held that the purpose behind the rule
on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process, to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The need for substitution of
heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any proceeding, and
the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause presupposes that the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the parties.
San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administrator that the
heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased party. He averred that the
purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be
2

substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to the requirement of a prior hearing for the
court to ascertain who the rightful heirs are. The Orders of the Court dated December 2,
2003 and February 27, 2004 may be used by purported heirs in order to "inherit" properties
from estates of deceased parties, which will then allow the rules of procedure to be used
as an instrument for fraud and undermining due process.11 San Juan reiterated the rulings
of this Court in Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals12 and Lawas v. Court of Appeals,13 that court
proceedings conducted or continued without a valid substitution of a deceased party
cannot be accorded validity and binding effect. He prayed that the February 27, 2004 Order
be reconsidered and a new order be issued as follows:
(a) declaring the "Appointment of Administrator" dated February 14,
2003 insufficient or inadequate compliance with the rules of procedure on
substitution of a deceased party;
(b) directing petitioner to secure from the appropriate court the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa; and
(c) directing that further proceedings in the case be deferred until after the
substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa by the court-appointed administrator or
executor of his estate.
Oppositor prays for other and further reliefs which may be just and equitable.14
On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for
reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely reiterated the same
arguments in his first motion for reconsideration which had already been passed upon.
Citing the rulings in Montañano v. Suesa15 and Riera v. Palmanori,16 it concluded that there
was no need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar
Casa at that stage of the proceedings since a legatee is not considered either as an
indispensable or necessary party in the probate of a will.17
When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed, on
July 23, 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. He took exception to the probate
court's reliance in the Montañano and Riera cases, as claiming that said rulings were not
relevant to the issue of the validity of the appointment of Federico Casa Jr., by the alleged
heirs of Oscar Casa, as administrator and substitute for the deceased devisee. He insisted
that the cases dealt only with the question of whether or not the probate court can rule on
the validity of the provisions of the will; they do not involve the same issue presented by
the oppositor, namely, whether or not a substitution of a legatee under the will who died
during the probate proceedings may be done by simply submitting an "Appointment of
Administrator," or whether or not there is a need for a deceased legatee to be substituted
by his/her duly appointed legal representative or administrator of his estate.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
San Juan further posited that the estate court, sitting as a probate court, does not only
decide on the questions of identity and testamentary capacity of the testator and the due
execution of the will; it is likewise charged with the settlement of the estate of the testator
after the will has been approved. Thus, the probate court must not only determine the
validity of the will, but also the rightful heirs, legatees and devisees for the purpose of
settling the estate of the testator.18
Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.19
On September 8, 2004, the probate court issued an Order sustaining Aquino's argument
and denied the motion for reconsideration of San Juan.20
San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22, 2004
for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate court on the following grounds:
A. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE "APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR"
DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2003 MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PROPER
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.
B. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT SAID MOTION IS A THIRD
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING
UNDER SEC. 5, RULE 37 OF THE RULES OF COURT.21
On December 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial court's February 27, 2004
Order. The appellate court declared that the May 6, 2004 motion for reconsideration of
petitioner was a pro forma motion because it was a second motion for reconsideration
which sought the same relief as the first motion, hence, did not toll the running of the 60-
day period.22 The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in University of Immaculate
Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.23
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA, contending that the
orders sought to be reconsidered by him were interlocutory, hence, cannot be considered
pro forma or forbidden by the Rules of Court. He cited the rulings of this Court in Dizon v.
3

Court of Appeals, Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, and
24 25
the cases cited in the latter decision.26 However, on February 24, 2005, the CA resolved
to deny the motion of petitioner.27
Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari, for the
reversal of the resolutions of the appellate court. He raises the following issues:
(A)
WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED
FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED
MOTIONS) OF THE SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND
WERE LATER DENIED.
(B)
WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON NOMINATED AS "ADMINISTRATOR" BY
PURPORTED HEIRS OF A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN A WILL UNDER
PROBATE MAY VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN
THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH
"ADMINISTRATOR" IS NOT THE COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DEVISEE OR LEGATEE.28
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the reckoning of the 60-day period for filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the notice of denial of the first motion
for reconsideration is applicable only if the subject of the petition is a judgment, final
resolution, or order. It does not apply if the subject of the petition is merely an interlocutory
order. He points out that the reason for this is that only one motion for reconsideration of
a judgment or final order is allowed under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. A
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is a prohibited pleading;
hence, the period for filing a petition for certiorari may not be reckoned from notice of denial
of such second and prohibited motion for reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that a second
(or even a third) motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not prohibited;
hence, the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari may be reckoned from notice of
denial of subsequent motions for reconsideration.
Petitioner further claims that the Orders dated December 2, 2003, February 27, 2004, June
11, 2004 and September 8, 2004 issued by the RTC are only interlocutory orders. They
deal solely with the issue concerning the proper substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
who is one of the devisees and legatees named in the purported will of the testatrix, Loreto
San Juan, which is the subject matter of the probate proceedings pending with the
respondent court. Said orders did not terminate or finally dispose of the case but left
something to be done by the respondent court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. The assailed orders do not go into the merits of the probate case, particularly on
the due execution and validity of the will. It pertains only to the proper substitution of the
parties. Thus, the orders are not final orders from which no second or third motion for
reconsideration may be filed.29 It cannot also be said that the second motion for
reconsideration did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari, considering that there is no prohibition in the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order. Furthermore, there is no intention on the part of
petitioner to delay proceedings before the lower court when he filed the third motion for
reconsideration, as he only sought to correct the probate court's patently erroneous
application of the law. Petitioner emphasizes that he filed the petition for certiorari with the
CA in view of the grave abuse of discretion which amounted to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction committed by respondent trial court when it wrongfully assumed in its Order
denying the third motion for reconsideration that the order sought to be reconsidered is a
final order on the merits of the case and that the motion for reconsideration is a third motion
for reconsideration of a final order.30
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the
appellate court was time-barred. However, the raison d'etre for its ruling is incorrect.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only
to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this Court
in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment31 involved
a final order of the NLRC and not an interlocutory order.
In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of petitioner
to consider insufficient or inadequate respondent's compliance with its November 22, 2002
Order is interlocutory. The order does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
task of the court of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done.
Such order may not be questioned except only as part of an appeal that may eventually
be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.32 It bears stressing however that
while the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003
Order of the trial court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first motion is
not pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration can nevertheless be denied on the
ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already
passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the ground
4

that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or by
the Rules of Court.33
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by the resolution of the
Court in Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order:
(1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received; (2) when a
motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted;
and (3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a
petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be nullified.34
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the
CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner
received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion
for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18,
2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner
filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of
the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall
be reckoned from the trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise
indefinite delays will ensue.35
We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective pleadings not only on
the timeliness of the petition for certiorari in the CA but also on the validity of the assailed
December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal of the petition
because it was time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues
raised in the petition. However, in this case, we find it appropriate and necessary to resolve
once and for all the issue of whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator
of the estate of Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure
of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs.
The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
5

within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest
of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs.36
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or
executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the
court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the
appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate
of the deceased.37 The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals38 (relied
upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the
executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the
appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing
the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.39 In Gochan
v. Young,40 a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution
of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the
heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the
SEC. (Emphasis supplied)41
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into
his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan.
Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is
not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives
of the estate.42Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before
the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition for certiorari in
the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent

or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already
been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the
heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to
protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do
nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.

The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of

securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put
undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent,
this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives
of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the
court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the
more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.
Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased,
6

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Administrators; The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate.―The paramount consideration in the appointment of
an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest
in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate.
The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of
waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any
other candidate.
Same; Same; Same; In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those
interested therein.―In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. We
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment. Under
certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the
benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied
and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and when
a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent
person associated with him in the office.
Civil Law; Succession; Curtain Bar Rule; Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar
rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate
of the decedent.―Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial
restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not
yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving
the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent. Suntay III vs.
Cojuangco-Suntay, 683 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the
estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute
as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio
III) and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons
with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina
was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation
of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide
filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her
among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient
was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.
7

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified
as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the
disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-
psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing
at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same
special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC)
granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s
testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted
his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the
petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be
appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did
not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death
of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated
to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared
null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of
Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently,
Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-
Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the
execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned
as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on
the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when
required by the court, and
8

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his
favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked
the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001
of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of
the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate,
giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between
Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the
subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those
of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution
of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor
of her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina,
whose estate she seeks to administer.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and
that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had
demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore,
not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the
decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof;
(3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of
preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint
administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and
Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not
choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that
Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as
a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore,
reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
9

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule
is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of
the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to
be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest
in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration
of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal
partnership or community property forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2
of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and
American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have
the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-
administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will.
Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s
estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be
excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that
the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an
instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in
the management of the decedent’s estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory
heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we
allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
as co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as
next of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that
"the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the
choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference
is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to
be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled
to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the
person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
10

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we maintained that the order of preference in the
23
appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that
case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and
eventually as regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving
spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia 24 as good law,
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over
the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to
appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the
estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence
weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously
discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court
to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate
court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single
estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are
fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual
circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent
from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-
administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix
designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection
during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had
already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave
abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status
in the selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion
given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special
co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of
conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation
of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or,
in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of
"impracticality and lack of kinship."
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special
co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife
owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her
husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate
of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving
spouse in the special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of
Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin
in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the
conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not
just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular
administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that
"there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit
was based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the
appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being
repeatedly urged by respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the
rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation
of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate
of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.
When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he
is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore,
the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of
the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration,
11

the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed
relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to,
the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized
that where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle,
the appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in
the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight
to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the
attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a
review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled
does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order
of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator
of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest
in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable
interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as
we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped
out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one
over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the
one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some
kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the
estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate,
has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in
the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio
III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points
out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has
not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage
and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the
estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of
stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of
the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a
declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for
Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the
following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals
or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified
documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing
the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel,
in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption
of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not
12

among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately
implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous
objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision
was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof,
and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s
estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s
properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the
prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the
filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to
complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any
clarification on Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the
inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator
rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became
proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his
inaction on two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of
distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio
III’s omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion
for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to
1awp++i 1
work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that
Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the
decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order
to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not
without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court
of Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased
"to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset
of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination
and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance
of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an
order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations
are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2,
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings
upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of
the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or,
in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns,
or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
13

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold
that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article
992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is
better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making
a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of
the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio
III asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is
unconstitutional and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately
from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second
Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another
Special Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court
in Manila.47
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different
division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010,
penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the
advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed
resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution
and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by
the ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has
inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he
or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the
new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated
and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall
be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed
resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she
shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the
other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon
the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as
replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the
other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed
Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member
of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the
other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with
14
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the
time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the
Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision

in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

15

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
1. Wills and Succession; Settlement of Estates; Intervention; Notwithstanding Section 2 of
Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim-
—the definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.—It is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of
deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,
not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings.” We can readily conclude that
notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
2. Same; Same; Same; While Section 2, Rule 82 is silent as to who may seek with the
court the removal of the administrator, the Court does not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.-
—Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to
the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence
or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
3. Same; Same; Same; There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to return to
the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment and to render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration, but a
person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.-
—Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of
his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator
to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not
the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
4. Same; Same; Same; Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records
of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them; Nonetheless, in the instances that
the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested parties,
petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice.-
—Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing
to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will
be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them
to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual
claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of
the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the
estate are preserved. Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings
do require notice to any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will
be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties
are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning
the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even
the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.
5. Same; Same; Same; While there is no general right on the part of a creditor or any
person interested in the estate to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected-
—it is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.—In the
same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
16

accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or
relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard
that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
6. Same; Same; Same; Torts; Actions for tort or quasi-delict, being as they are civil, survive
the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87.-
—Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the
aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters
of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such
notice. However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case
No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already pending review before this Court at
the time of Benedicto’s death.
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He
was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,
Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by
respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of
the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued
an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to
5
the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for
Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the
Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set
a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the
decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC,
alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on
the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules
of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the
petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the
decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in
denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not
the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13
17

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders
issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto
with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date
for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the
rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section
1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings,
case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of
estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules
of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the
RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short,
even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule
19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before
the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn
our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or
intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1,
Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;"
(3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest
therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested
in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express
or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of
the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such
notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case
No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at
the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims
for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate
in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does
provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in
order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents,
and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate
18

proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier.
Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of
her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the
pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the
administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil
case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took
cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition
of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation
is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does
not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence
because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as
having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that
there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after
the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to
recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first
taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling
which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules
would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed
by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-
in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind
such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to
protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on
their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are
viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows
not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with
a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of
the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or
any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or
relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard
that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the
petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings,
including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them
to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no
matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the
estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.
19

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this
Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners
to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein
against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135
came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public
records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court
ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance
with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing
to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will
be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them
to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual
claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of
the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the
estate are preserved. 1aw phi 1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to
any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1)
Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account
of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending
cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same;
and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of
his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator
to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not
the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to
the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence
or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as
persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices
and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates
of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
20

G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION
LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
1. Settlement of estates; Letters of administration; To whom issued; Although surviving
spouse with preferential right to be appointed administrator, hearing should be held to
determine the said spouse’s competency to discharge trust; Reasons.-
While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys preference in
the granting of letters of administration it does not follow that she should be named
administration without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that
trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should
act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him
to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his
fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was
executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
It was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to
be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and
affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
2. Settlement of estates; Conversion of proceedings for issuance of letters of
administration into testamentary proceedings where deceased died with a will.-
It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding.
The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. After the
will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be
conducted.
3. Certiorari; When available.-
Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the lower court
or if the petitioner’s contention is clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or
public policy justify the nullification of the questioned order.
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate
allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that
the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable
of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the
meantime as special administrator.
The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that she was unaware that
her deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the allegation as to
her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the
appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special
administrator. In that same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a
series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally
qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. Acting on that motion, the
lower court in its order of March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special
administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of September 2, 1975 asked that Espino,
former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero
Baluyut, be appointed administrator should she not be named administratrix.
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
administratrix. She reasoned out that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no more interest in the
decedent's estate because as a collateral relative he was excluded by Espino and other
supposed descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the proceeding, and,
therefore, it was not necessary to continue with the reception of his evidence.
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural
child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and
Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent
by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of September
25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That
proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe
Lopez-Viray.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and
documentary evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut as
follows:
21

Court: We want also to hear her testimony.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Salunat: We are now therefore presenting the widow,
your Honor, to take the witness stand for examination by
the court.
xxx xxx xxx
Court to witness: Can you testify in English?-No, your
Honor, Pampango.
Q. Ilocano? — A. No, your Honor.
Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog your Honor, which
comprehensible.
Court: Your remember when you were born, Mrs. Baluyut?
— A. March 25, 1901.
Q. Where did you graduate? — Madres Dominicas.
Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut? — A. I
cannot remember the date but this was in Lingayen.
Q. What church? — A. A Catholic.
Court: You want to ask more questions Attorney?
Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions, your
Honor.
Q. Do you know Gov. Espino? — A. Yes.
Q. Why do you know him? — A. Because he is like a son
to me.
Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any relationship
with the late Don Sotero Baluyut? — A. Yes, why not.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Q. Will you please tell us what is the relationship if there is
any? — A. He is his son, sir.
Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your Honor.
Court: Submitted?
Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be allowed to)
submit a rejoinder, your Honor.
The probate court in its order of November 27, 1975 terminated the appointments of
Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as
regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as
surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as administratrix of her
deceased husband's estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate:
one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased. The lower court said it
was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her "sufficient understanding" justified her
appointment.
Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond. She took
her oath of office on November 29, 1975.
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut
and the Espino spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the order
of November 27 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order of
November 27 and from disposing of the funds or assets of the estate in their possession
or deposited in certain banks.
The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose Espino
was acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child.
Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted the administration
proceeding after he had failed to get from her a cheek for P500,000 belonging to the
decedent's estate and that he grossly misrepresented that she was mentally incompetent.
She further alleged that the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declaring
her an incompetent was issued in a blitzkrieg manner because it was based on the report
of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz which was filed in court just one day before the order was
issued.
22

Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her competency to act as
administratrix.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed that Sotero Baluyut
executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his
one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The
remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene, Erlinda,
Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all
surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not
mentioned in that will.
In this Court's resolution of May 7, 1976 respondents' comments were treated as their
answers. The case was deemed submitted for decision.
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving
spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without
conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as
executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the
issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness
to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed
but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the
person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court
of Appeals, L-26106, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to
satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to
contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The
probate court assumed that
Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one
of the legatees named in the decedent's alleged will.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public
policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479 and 98 Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and
proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa,
38 Phil. 620; Rodriguez vs. De Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the
orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness
to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an
adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was
not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G.
Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that
development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed
wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the lower court
or if the petitioner's contention is clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or
public policy justify the nullification of the questioned order (Manila Electric Company and
Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez and Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499, 503; Pacheco vs.
Tumangday and Fernando, 108 Phil. 238; Raneses vs. Teves, L-26854, March 4, 1976).
Before closing, a pending incident herein should be resolved. Alfredo G. Baluyut in his
motion of January 15, 1976 prayed that respondent Judge be enjoined from acting on Mrs.
Baluyut's motion for the appointment of Espino as special administrator. In view of Alfredo
G. Baluyut's manifestation of
April 2, 1976 that his motion had become moot, the same is hereby denied.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The
probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines
delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.
SO ORDERED.
23

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,
ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO
GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and
FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and
ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.
1. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Order of preference in the issuance
of letters of administration to be observed in appointing an administrator.-
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.
2. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; In the appointment of the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.-
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate.
The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
3. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband
since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.-
Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such
reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel,
the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to
the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the
estate is preferred to another who has less.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
4. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Failure to apply for letters of
administration for thirty (30) days after decedent’s death is not sufficient to exclude the
widow from the administration of the estate of her husband.-
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving
spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply
for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent’s death. However, it is
our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify
the exclusion of the widow from the administration.
5. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Just as the order of preference is
not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause so may the 30-day period be likewise
waived.-
Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid
cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance,
so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b)
of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, “may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors.”
6. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests in the sound judgment of the Court
exercising the power of appointment.-
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent
as administrator. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the
said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest
in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the
probate court to remove an administrator.
7. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; The removal of an administrator
does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the Estate.-
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a
24

mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the
court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are
entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.
8. Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Co-administrators; Various reasons
upholding the appointment of co-administrators.-
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators
has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate
of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives
to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to
the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with
him in the office.
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing
the orders of the lower court in Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively
sustained the appointment of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator
of the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that decision of
respondent court, hence the need to examine the chronology of antecedent facts, as found
by respondent court and detailed hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their
recourse now before us.
On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college
graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late
Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other
next of kin and heirs of the decedent. 2
On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on
June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in
"Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate
court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as administrator
of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4
Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent
was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of
private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P.
Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained
unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5
On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an
"Inventory and Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at
P18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6
On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all
surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of
administration issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to
petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other
oppositors who are the herein petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the
court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989,
alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred
over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest
against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the
properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership
to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be
administered by private respondent. 8
On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had
not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor
Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who
was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment
inadvisable under these circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order
dated December 22, 1989. 10
From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, on the following grounds:
1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null and
void, being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;
2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted with
abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence
said orders are null and void ab initio; and
25

3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to perform the
duties of an administrator as he would give prior preference to the claims
of his mother against the estate itself. 11
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition
for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the
sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the
fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process
as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their
opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any, is an error of
fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal and not by the special
civil action of certiorari. 12
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of
preference for the appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the
widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore,
be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent
by claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is
incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate
child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter,
must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is
contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of preference already
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not
absolute and the choice of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He
calls attention to the fact that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never
applied for appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of
Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate court to have considered them
for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties of the deceased have
already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have no interest in
applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it has not been
shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being appointed or serving as
administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
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(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate.
The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 13
This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing
the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death,
because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal
partnership. 14 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much
entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater
interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16
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Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be
appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within
thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules.
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving
spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply
for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is
our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify
the exclusion of the widow from the administration. 17
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the
order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the
mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day
period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which
merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors."
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent
as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the
said court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest
in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the
probate court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant case,
a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the
court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are
entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21
On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be
appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a)
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of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there
is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-
administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-
administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the
widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be
expected from private respondent for the same estate.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators
has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate
of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him
in the office. 28
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that
there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of
having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they
will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.
Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with
the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate
court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as
judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
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