G.R. No. 163898 December 23, 2008
Rent
ROBERTO BARBASA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG,
VICTOR CALLUENG, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision1 dated July 29,
2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 21, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610,
which dismissed his petition for certiorari and
denied his motion for reconsideration,
respectively. The appellate court had found no
reason to reverse the Resolution3 of the
Secretary of Justice ordering the City
Prosecutor of Manila to move for the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 336630 against private
respondents.
Petitioner avers that he is the president of
Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases
commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19 and 30 in
Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties,
Inc., (TPI). On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito,
merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing,
received a notice of disconnection of utilities
from private respondent Grace Guarin, the
Credit and Collection Manager of TPI, for failure
of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its
outstanding obligations for Common Usage and
Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity
and rentals.
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities
and electricity, which payment was accepted by
private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed
to pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1, 1999,
private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang,
engineering manager of TPI, and Victor
Callueng, TPI head of security, together with
several armed guards, disconnected the
electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru
Marketing.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint
for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers,
David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano,
Art Brondial, and herein private respondents
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.4 The complaint dated July 13, 1999
alleged that TPI and its officers cut off the
electricity in petitioner’s stalls "in a violent and
intimidating manner"5 and by unnecessarily
employing "several armed guards to intimidate
and frighten"6 petitioner and his employees
and agents.
The respondents in the criminal complaint filed
separate counter-affidavits7 which presented a
common defense: that the July 1, 1999 cutting
off of electrical supply was done peacefully;
that it was an act performed in the lawful
performance of their assigned duties, and in
accordance with the covenants set forth in the
written agreements previously executed
between petitioner and TPI; that petitioner was
not present when the alleged acts were
committed; and that petitioner had
outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA
billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid
interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to
May 1999) in the amount of P267,513.39 for all
his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-
Penalty Reports8 duly sent to him. Petitioner
was likewise given demand letter-notices in
writing at least three times wherein it was
stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full,
electricity would be cut.9 Of the total amount
due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18
after receipt of the third notice. Accordingly,
private respondents proceeded with the power
cut-off, but only after sending a "Notice of
Disconnection of Utilities"10 to petitioner’s
stalls informing him of the impending act.
Private respondents also pointed out that aside
from the above arrears, petitioner has
outstanding accountabilities with respect to
"Priority Premium Fees" in the amount
of P5,907,013.10.11
They likewise stressed that their
Agreement12 with petitioner contains the
following stipulations:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
Prime Block Cluster Stall
xxxx e.
PRIORITY PREMIUM : P *2,367,750.00 f. Priority Premium
xxxx xxxx
RENT PER MONTH : P *******378.00 per 21. PENALTY CLAUSE
sq. m (Plus P*******37.80 10% VAT)
xxxx
xxxx
It is also expressly agreed that in case the
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE LESSEE fails to pay at any time the installments
TO THE LESSEE: on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA
and utility charges corresponding to a total of
xxxx three (3) months, even if not consecutively
incurred, the LESSOR is hereby granted the
B. COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA)
option to cut off power and other utility
CHARGES
services to the LESSEE until full payment of
Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is
expenses stipulated in Section 6 hereof, subject made, without prejudice to any other
to periodic review and adjustment to reflect remedies provided under this Contract,
actual expenses. including the termination of this Contract.
C. INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered +
Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit,13 claiming
reasonable service
that Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin
(meter to be provided by the and Sangalang, while not personally present at
LESSOR, for the account of the LESSEE) the scene at the time, were to be held liable as
the authors of the criminal design since they
OTHER SERVICES : metered and/or were the ones who ordered the cutting off of
reasonable petitioner’s electricity. Petitioner admitted that
none of the armed personnel drew his gun,
service charge much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that
he was unduly prevented from using electricity
xxxx
to the detriment of his business and his person.
7. PAYMENTS He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable
to show the amount and extent of his unpaid
xxxx bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were
paid; and that there was an ongoing
In cases where payments made by the LESSEE negotiation with respect to the matter of
for any given month is not sufficient to cover all rentals and for reformation of the lease
outstanding obligations for said period, the agreements.14
order of priority in the application of the
payments made is as follows: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila,
through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan,
a. Penalties
dismissed the complaint against David Go,
Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art
b. Interests
Brondial but found probable cause against
c. Insurance private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor
Sangalang and Victor Callueng. On January 13,
d. CUSA Charges 2000, an Information15 for grave coercion was
filed in court, but proceedings therein were
deferred when the private respondents filed an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice
reversed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City
Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave of
court, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
336630 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila and to report the action taken within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.16
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner assailed the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice before the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari, which
was, however, dismissed by the appellate court
for lack of merit. The appellate court likewise
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence
this petition.
Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether
private respondents’ act of disconnecting the
supply of electricity to petitioner’s stalls and
the manner by which it was carried out
constitute grave coercion.
After carefully considering petitioner’s appeal,
we are in agreement to deny it for utter lack of
merit.
The crime of grave coercion has three
elements: (a) that a person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited
by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the
offended party; and (c) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so; in other words, that the restraint
is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.17
Petitioner’s appeal gives us no sufficient reason
to deviate from what has already been found by
the Secretary of Justice and the Court of
Appeals.
The records show that there was no violence,
force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon petitioner’s employees when
the cutting off of petitioner’s electricity was
effected. On the contrary, it was done
peacefully and after written notice to petitioner
was sent. We do not subscribe to petitioner’s
claim that the presence of armed guards were
calculated to intimidate him or his employees.
Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the
guards were there to prevent any untoward or
violent event from occurring in the exercise of
TPI’s rights under the lease agreements. If the
respondents desired a violent result, they
would have gone there unannounced or cut
petitioner’s electricity through less desirable
and conspicuous means.
It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the
Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties
that TPI is given the option to cut off power and
other utility services in petitioner’s stalls in case
petitioner fails to pay at any time the
installments on the priority premium, lease
rentals or CUSA and utility charges
corresponding to a total of three months until
full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty
and interest is made.18 The stipulation under
said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in
what is stated. There could be no grave
coercion in the private respondents’ act of
exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded to TPI
under the solemn and unequivocal covenants
of a contract to which petitioner had agreed
and which he did execute and sign.
As held by this Court in a previous case which
we find instructive:
Contracts constitute the law between the
parties. They must be read together and
interpreted in a manner that reconciles and
gives life to all of them. The intent of the
parties, as shown by the clear language used,
prevails over post facto explanations that find
no support from the words employed by the
parties or from their contemporary and
subsequent acts showing their understanding
of such contracts.19
We could not see how the Office of the City the cause of justice may supersede his duty to
Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor his client’s cause; for such fealty to ethical
Venus D. Marzan, could have made a finding of concerns is indispensable to the success of the
probable cause to file a criminal case for grave rule of law.21
coercion against private respondents, in light of
the evidence then and now prevailing, which WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
will show that there was a mutual agreement, The Decision dated July 29, 2003 and the
Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of
in a contract of lease, that provided for the
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610 are
cutting off of electricity as an acceptable
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what
has been covenanted. Although the propriety
SO ORDERED.
of its exercise may be the subject of
controversy, mere resort to it may not so
readily expose the lessor TPI to a charge of
grave coercion. Considering that petitioner
owed TPI the total amount of more than P5
million, which was undisputed, we find that the
resort to the penalty clause under the lease
agreements was justified. As held in Pryce
Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation:
A penal clause is "an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal
obligation for the purpose of insuring the
performance thereof by imposing on the
debtor a special prestation (generally
consisting in the payment of a sum of money)
in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled."
Quite common in lease contracts, this clause
functions to strengthen the coercive force of
the obligation and to provide, in effect, for
what could be the liquidated damages resulting
from a breach. There is nothing immoral or
illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent
any showing that it was forced upon or
fraudulently foisted on the obligor.20 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this connection, counsels must be reminded
that equally important, as their duty to clients,
is their duty as officers of the court to see to it
that the orderly administration of justice is not
unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to
advise a client, ordinarily a layman
unaccustomed to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, concerning the objective merit of his
case. If counsel finds that his client’s cause lacks
merit, then it is his bounden duty to advise
accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to uphold
G.R. No. 113006 November 23, 2000
ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court for consideration is
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for
unjust vexation.1
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor
Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an
information charging petitioner with unjust
vexation for cutting the electric wires, water
pipes and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a
business establishment owned and operated by
Mildred Ong.2
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the
morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo
Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric
and water lines of "Crazy Feet," because said
lines posed as a disturbance.3 However, Ong
Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from
appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the
electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines
of the business establishment.4
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the
Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan
guilty of unjust vexation,5 and sentenced him to
"imprisonment for twenty days."6 The court
also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding
that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the
electric, water pipe and telephone lines of
"Crazy Feet" caused the interruption of its
business operations during peak hours, to the
detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial
court also awarded exemplary damages to
complainant "as a deterrent to the accused not
to follow similar act in the future and to pay
attorney’s fees."7 The trial court disposed of the
case as follows:
"IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of unjust vexation provided under Article 287
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences
him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of
twenty (20) days and to pay private
complainant the following:
P10,000.00 - moral damages
P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages
P 5,000.00 - attorney’s fees and to pay the cost
of this suit."
"SO ORDERED.
"Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.
"(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA
Judge"8
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod
City, the latter court in a decision dated
December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the
decision of the lower court in toto, without
stating the reasons for doing so.9
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong
Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.10 On August 16, 1993, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing
the appeal,11 agreeing with the lower court’s
finding that petitioner was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
Hence, this petition for review.12
The Court notes that in the decision of the
Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals
affirmed peremptorily without noticing its
nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full
and added two paragraphs, thus:
"This Court, in accordance with the rules,
required the parties to submit their
corresponding memorandum or brief. The
prosecution filed its memorandum, and also
with the defense.
"After a careful perusal of the record of the case
and evaluating the evidence thereto and
exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to
modify, reverse or alter the above-stated
decision and hereby affirms the decision of the however, to show evidence that he had the
lower court in toto."13 necessary permit or authorization to relocate
the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of
The Constitution requires that "[N]o decision electric, water and telephone services during
shall be rendered by any court without peak hours of the operation of business of the
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly
facts and the law on which it is based."14 The annoyed or vexed the complainant.
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is
provides that "[T]he judgment must be written
liable for unjust vexation.
in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and Regarding damages, we find the award of moral
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to
of the facts proved or admitted by the accused be without basis. Moral damages may be
and the law upon which the judgment is recovered if they were the proximate result of
based."15 defendant’s wrongful act or omission.18 An
award of exemplary damages is justified if the
Although a memorandum decision is permitted crime was committed with one or more
under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer aggravating circumstances.19There is no
to the findings of fact and the conclusions of evidence to support such award. Hence, we
law of the lower court. The court must make a
delete the award of moral damages, exemplary
full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its
damages, and attorney’s fees.
own.16
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to
similarly worded decision of a regional trial
pay a fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award
court, we said:
of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.
"[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous
in its content and trite in its form. It achieved SO ORDERED.
nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at
a simple summation of facts which could easily
be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself."17
Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to
their work must rethink their place in the
judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on
decision writing. We warn them of stiff
sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to
the lower court for compliance with the
constitutional requirement of contents of a
decision. However, considering that this case
has been pending for sometime, the ends of
justice will be fully served if we review the
evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting
of the electric, water and telephone lines of
complainant’s business establishment because
these lines crossed his property line. He failed,
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks
the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999
resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-
101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y
David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the
information4 dated December 17, 1991
charging petitioner with attempted rape reads
as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime
thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by forcefully
covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano
with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with
dizzying effects, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
commission of rape by lying on top of her with
the intention to have carnal knowledge with
her but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance,
said acts being committed against her will and
consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented
thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were
private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano
(Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard
Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and
Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated
in some detail in the decision of the CA,
established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie
Building (hereafter "Building", …) along A.H.
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU,
occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of
the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307,
MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right
in front of her bedroom door, her maid,
Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was
awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece
of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but
could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She
wanted to scream for help but the hands
covering her mouth with cloth wet with
chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.
33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right
hand got free. With this …the opportunity
presented itself when she was able to grab hold
of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to
the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin
that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko
pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she
did not, however, know. The only thing she had
made out during their struggle was the feel of
her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper
garment was of cotton material while that at
the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like
(Ibid, p. 17). He … was wearing a t-shirt and
shorts … Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her
classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista,
Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were
staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help.
xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-
turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue …
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the
window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom
was now open. Her attacker had fled from her
room going through the left bedroom window
(Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the
one without iron grills which leads to Room 306
of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with
CHITO, who was her classmate …, was friendly
until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided
his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita,
mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she
rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he
was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at
1:30 in the early morning of December 13,
1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a marking
on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek
letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the
word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and Surgery’” (TSN,
October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the
brand name “Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992,
p.7) and requested permission to go up to
Room 306. This Unit was being leased by
Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was
asking permission to enter, only Joseph
Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required
written authorization and when CHITO could
not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later,
relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following
entry in the security guard’s logbook …:
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert
Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter from
our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let
him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our
tenant this coming summer break as he said so
I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of
December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9
o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991.
xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door
woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of
CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced
at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was
awakened by the knock at the door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-
colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23)
when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3
o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991
when he woke up again later to the sound of
knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard
Baptista (Bernard), ….
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to
MALOU’s room and thereat was shown by
Bernard the open window through which the
intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of
December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to
talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that
something had happened and that they were
not being allowed to get out of the building.
Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room
310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to
Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was
in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet
another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room
401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock
that same morning …. They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp
Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala
(Christian) recalled in Court that in the
afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their
3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard
Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were
called to the Building and were asked by the CIS
people to look for anything not belonging to
them in their Unit. While they were outside
Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel
Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his,
went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found
(TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella"
bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their
unit which they did not know was there and
surrender the same to the investigators. When
he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away
that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had
seen the latter usually bringing it to school
inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and
pulled out its contents, among others, a white
t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p.
7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief ,
three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and
socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"),
the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the
handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s
because CHITO had lent the very same one to
him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity
symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and
the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least
once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the
morning of December 13, 1991, was what
consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s
testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap,
was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared
to be full but was closed with a zipper when
Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that
time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went
back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that
afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw
the bag at the same place inside the bedroom
where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not
until later that night at past 9 o’clock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the
contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, having acted in response to the
written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas
M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991,
(Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.)
conducted laboratory examination on the
specimen collated and submitted…. Her
Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E";
Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked
‘UNIMART’ with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon
pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked
‘JONAS’ with the following:
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked
‘ADIDAS’.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic),
non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the
above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the
above stated specimens gave the following
results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for
chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for
further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile
poison."6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main
witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or
making at any time amorous advances on
Malou. Unfolding a different version of the
incident, the defense sought to establish the
following, as culled from the same decision of
the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical
student of … (UST). With Robert Chan and
Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of
the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was
known to him being also a medical student at
the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building
…, CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong
tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes,
arrived at their Fraternity house located at …
Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7
o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991.
He was included in the entourage of some fifty
(50) fraternity members scheduled for a
Christmas gathering at the house of their senior
fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John
Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside
[the] swimming pool …. Soon after, … the four
(4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity,
CHITO included, were being dunked one by one
into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was
thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he
was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry
clothes to change into and CHITO put on the
white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol and a
pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing
"barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the
symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with
stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p.
15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and
Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of
December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the
Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M.
(Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag
containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear,
socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room
306 in the afternoon of the previous day ….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and
…, S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked
at his own watch and saw that the time was
1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused
CHITO entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G
Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10)
minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived
(Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for
him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie
window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to
open the door until Rommel Montes, …
approached him and even commented: "Okey
ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto
(Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the
door of Unit 306 … but was likewise
unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call
out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and
knocking before Joseph, …, at last answered the
door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan"
Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO
and went inside the bedroom. CHITO ,
…changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed.
He still had on the same short pants given by
Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June
16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13,
1991, CHITO woke up …. He was already in his
school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph
came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked
the latter why this was so and, without
elaborating on it, Joseph told him that
something had happened and to just go to
Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel
Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not
able to identify, went to the room of MALOU
and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p.
36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not
letting anybody out of the Building …. When
two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for
Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself.
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of
MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room
306….
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on
the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and
the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were
brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col.
Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and
talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one
interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to
Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed
them to undergo physical examination at the
Camp Crame Hospital ….. At the hospital, …
CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by
a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip
….
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among
others, the black striped short pants lent to him
by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records,
p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7
o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991.
The next time that he saw it was between 8 to
9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought
before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the
CIS agents had taken it there and it was not
opened up in his presence but the contents of
the bag were already laid out on the table of
Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort
to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found
in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag
which he had left at Room 306 in the early
evening of December 12, 1991 before going to
the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed
placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray
bag when he returned to the apartment at past
1:00 o’clock in the early morning of December
13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when
he dressed up at about 6 o’clock in the morning
to go to school and brought his gray bag to
Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on
December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his
gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas
pants (Ibid). He only found out for the first time
that the black Adidas short pants was alluded
to be among the items inside his gray bag late
in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense
were petitioner’s fraternity brothers, Alberto
Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified
being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
party held in Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills,
riding on the same car going to and coming
from the party and dropping the petitioner off
the Celestial Marie building after the party.
Both were one in saying that CHITO was
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside,
with short pants and leather shoes at the time
they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes,
a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also
testified seeing CHITO between the hours of
1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying
to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark
short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed
lending the petitioner the pair of short pants
with stripes after the dunking party held in her
father’s house.8 Presented as defense expert
witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic
chemistry instructor whose actual
demonstration in open court showed that
chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty
(30) seconds without tearing nor staining the
cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered
its decision10 convicting petitioner of
attempted rape and accordingly sentencing
him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and
prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds
the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito",
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape as principal and as charged in
the information and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10)
YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, and
for the accused to pay the offended party
Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of
P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary
damages, plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat
his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its
assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999,
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law
to deviate from the findings of the court a quo,
the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his
motion was denied by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the
contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for
petitioner to have committed the attempted
rape imputed to him, absent sufficient,
competent and convincing evidence to prove
the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on
the basis merely of circumstantial evidence
since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the
requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied
on to convict the petitioner are unreliable,
inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is
miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the
complainant despite the fact that the award
was improper and unjustified absent any
evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the
constitutional presumption of innocence and
that moral certainty has not been met, hence,
he should be acquitted on the ground that the
offense charged against him has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case
turns on the question on whether or not the CA
erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence
on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for
petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily
because there is no direct evidence pointing to
him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked
cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in
the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to
proof of identity and not per se to that of being
an eyewitness to the very act of commission of
the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect
or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime.
This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually witnessed the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still
be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when,
for instance, the latter is the person or one of
the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second
type of positive identification, which forms part
of circumstantial evidence.13 In the absence of
direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge
its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under condition where concealment
is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted
under all circumstances, the prosecution of
vicious felons who committed heinous crimes
in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The
provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient
– Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification
of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the
other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner
was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the
circumstantial evidence that led to the identity
of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on
MALOU took place. He had access to the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the
night over had a window which allowed ingress
and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed.
Not only the Building security guard, S/G
Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well
confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black
"Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he
arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the
morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was
dark during their struggle, MALOU had made
out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be
something made of cotton material on top and
shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside
Room 310 at the very spot where witness
Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were
discovered the most incriminating evidence:
the handkerchief stained with blue and wet
with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas"
satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt,
also stained with blue. A different witness, this
time, Christian Alcala, identified these
garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned
out, laboratory examination on these items and
on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU
during the incident revealed that the
handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both
contained chloroform, a volatile poison which
causes first degree burn exactly like what
MALOU sustained on that part of her face
where the chemical-soaked cloth had been
pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether
the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the petitioner for the crime of attempted
rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that
petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face the
piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding
her body tightly under the weight of his own,
had commenced the performance of an act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the
victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation
thus described is an overt act contemplated
under the law, for there can not be any other
logical conclusion other than that the petitioner
intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to
put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor
General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if
petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would
not have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under
any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and (3) When the woman is under twelve years
of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in
relation to the aforementioned article of the
same code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted
felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that
"the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is
that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by
overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to
its realization and consummation." Absent the
unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, as
where the purpose of the offender in
performing an act is not certain, meaning the
nature of the act in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, which is not
a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the
absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. The next
question that thus comes to the fore is whether
or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing
of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
Malou, constitutes an overt act of
rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some
physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of
this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked
cloth in the mouth of Malou which would
induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it
were, petitioner did not commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent
or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be
overemphasized that petitioner was fully
clothed and that there was no attempt on his
part to undress Malou, let alone touch her
private part. For what reason petitioner wanted
the complainant unconscious, if that was really
his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no
intention to rape, he would not have lain on top
of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate
court even anticipated the next step that the
petitioner would have taken if the victim had
been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the
attacker and his victim, will have to come later.
His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his
intended victim is still struggling. Where the
intended victim is an educated woman already
mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting
his attack on her. He has to make her lose her
guard first, or as in this case, her
unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in
plain speculation, a practice disfavored under
the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For,
mere speculations and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court
acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of
attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an
essential act of execution to produce the
felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape,
the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of
the victim but for some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the
complainant, embracing and kissing her,
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside
her panty and touching her sexual organ, while
admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not
constitute attempted rape absent any showing
that petitioner actually commenced to force his the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape
penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx. proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
The penalty for coercion falling under the
xxx, appellant was merely holding second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio arrived Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging
at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be from ₱5.00 to ₱200.00 or both.
stretching to the extreme our credulity if we
were to conclude that mere holding of the feet WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court
is attempted rape. of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING
saying that petitioner is innocent, under the petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge
premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is
information filed against petitioner contained adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is
an allegation that he forcefully covered the face accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto
of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in menor and to pay a fine of ₱200.00, with the
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
about the pressing against her face of the costs.
chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled
after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her SO ORDERED.
down. Verily, while the series of acts
committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light
coercion under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context
of the constitutional provision assuring an
accused of a crime the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it
cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the
dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was
proceeded against. To be sure, the information
against petitioner contains sufficient details to
enable him to make his defense. As aptly
observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
there is no need to allege malice, restraint or
compulsion in an information for unjust
vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even
without the element of restraint or compulsion
for the reason that this term is broad enough to
include any human conduct which, although
not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person.25 The paramount question is
whether the offender’s act causes annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to
the mind of the person to whom it is
directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in
question, cried while relating to her classmates
what she perceived to be a sexual attack and