CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No.

L-49549 August 30, 1990

FACTS:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a
classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.
The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner
teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher” which
was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.

ISSUE:
Was her dismissal valid? Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner
and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

RULING:
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady teacher] took advantage of her position to court her student [16-year
old]. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has
reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would
have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the circumstances
of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

LEUS v ST SCHOLASTICA
Facts:
Petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual
relations, got pregnant out of wedlock... married the father of her child,... and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.
petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao... advised her to file a
resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because she
got pregnant... without the benefit of marriage. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in
pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of a Catholic
school.
In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal
impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which... are grounds for the termination of employmen... petitioner
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
Issues: whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her employment.
Ruling:
The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or immoral.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful
or immoral. The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged to be... disgraceful or immoral must be assessed... against the prevailing norms
of conduct. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the...
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable. The right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution. When the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily... refer to public and secular
morality.

Jose S. Santos v. NLRC et al. case brief summary G.R. No. 115795, March 6, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner is a married man and is employed as a teacher by private respondent Hagonoy Institute Inc. from June 1980 until his dismissal on June 1, 1991.
Petitioner and Mrs. Arlene T. Martin, also a teacher employed at Hagonoy Institute, fell in love and had an affair. Private respondent, upon hearing of circulating
rumors among faculty and school officials, of the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Martin, advised the latter to take a leave of absence, Mrs. Martin ignored
such notice and was henceforth prevented from entering the campus of private respondent, effectively dismissing her from work. Private respondent set-up a
committee to investigate the veracity of the rumors, after two weeks of investigation, the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Martin was confirmed. Petitioner
was charged administratively for immorality and asked to present his side, on May 1991, petitioner was dismissed effective June 1, 1991. Petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga and petitioner’s complaint was dismissed but awarded
financial assistance of PHP 13,750. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Can the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin be considered immoral as to constitute a cause for termination under Art. 282 of the
Labor Code?
RULING: Court reiterates that to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: (a) it must be for any offense expressed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code, (b)
employee must be accorded due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself. Art. 282 of the Labor Code lists the following just causes to
terminate an employee: (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by employee of lawful orders of the employer or his representative in connection with his
work, (2) gross and habitual neglect by employee of his duties; (3) fraud or willful breach, (4) commission of crime or offense of the person of his employer or his
family or his authorized representative, (5) other courses analogous to the foregoing.
In addition, Section 94, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, paragraph E, lists “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as ground for termination. Furthermore, the
Court ruled that Art. 68 of the Family Code enjoins the husband and wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.” As a teacher, one stands in loco parentis to his students and must therefore act with a high standard of integrity and honesty. It is settled therefore that
a teacher who engages in extra marital affairs, when both are married, amounts to gross immorality justifying termination from employment.
Petition is dismissed, NLRC decision is affirmed with modification, deleting financial assistance.

A Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC [G.R. 107320, January 10, 2000]
FACTS: PR had been working for a year as a security guard with the Sugarland Security Services, Inc., a sister company of petitioner. He was hired on January 1,
1988 as he was among those absorbed by petitioner when it took over the security contract of its sister company, Sugarland, with the U.S. Embassy. He was forced
by the petitioner to sign a new probationary contract for 6 mos; and on August 1, 1998, his employment was terminated. Labor Arbiter for the petitioner.
ISSUES: 1. Whether PR’s employment with A’ Prime Securities was just a continuation of his employment with Sugarland.
2. Whether PR is a regular employee and thereby illegally dismissed.
HELD:
1. Yes. The allegations of respondent that Sugarland and A’ Prime were sister companies were never denied nor controverted by petitioner before the Labor
Arbiter. It belatedly contended that they were distinct juridical entities, but such fact lacks any legal basis. The Court cannot sanction the practice of companies
that affects the transfer of its employees to another entity whose owners are the same, in order to deprive subject employees of the benefits he is entitled to
under the law.
2. Yes. PR became a regular employee upon competition of his six-month period of probation. He started working on January 30, 1988; and the end of the period
of probation was on July 27, 1988. When he was dismissed on August 1, he was already a regular employee with security tenure. PR’s alleged violations of sleeping
on post and quarrelling with a worker were first infractions and do not amount to valid grounds for terminating employment.

Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRCG.R. No. 75037April 30, 1987

Doctrine:
It cannot be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss anemployee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty
or for anyviolation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair labor practice. It is anindirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-
organization. It is a solemnpronouncement of a policy that while an employee is given the right to join a labororganization, such right should only be asserted in a
manner that will not spell the destructionof the same organization.
Facts:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and
membersof the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and registered labororganization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the petitioner company. A CBA was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein
private respondents. The CBA had a term of three (3) years and also contained a union security clause, which provides: All workers who are or may during
the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in accordancewith its Constitution and By-
Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment,maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement. While the
CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL)
and organized its local chapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos being elected President and Vice-President, respectively.
KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU based on their CBA.
TDLU conducted an investigation of its erring members in accordance with its by-laws wherein herein private respondents were present and given a chance to
explain their side. A resolution was ordered by TDLU wherein they expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the TDLU, whereby the latter
notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private respondents because they had
lost their membership with TDLU. The private respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal against TDI and Benjamin Agaloos, in his
capacity as President of TDLU. The cases were jointly heard and tried by the Labor Arbiter.The Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents' petition calling for a
certification election among the rank and file employees of TDI. The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-alia that the existence of an uncertified CBA cannot be
availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election. On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the order for the holding of a
certification election was reversed and set aside. Kampil filed a motion for reconsideration whereby the BLR ruled that it should be given due course, because CBA
has now expired, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract
bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of the contract. TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision the SC but
it denied the same.Labor Arbiter rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate the privaterespondents and ordering TDI to reinstate the
complainants with backwages. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC.TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration but NLRC denied the
same, hence this petition.
Issue: WON TDI was justified in terminating private respondents' employment due to TDLU'sdemand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA
between TDI and TDLU.
Held:
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they
violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of
anyarbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Courtinterpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review. The
action of therespondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-shop agreement is a valid
exerciseof its rights and obligations under the contract. The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was in pursuance of an
agreement that has been found to be regular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and binding. As members of the TDLU, the private
respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a
requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private respondents
organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, there was no freedom period to
speak of yet.The Labor Code mandates that "no certification election shall be entertained if a Collective Bargaining Agreement which has been submitted in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the
life of such collective agreement (Art. 257). The member’s ignorance of nor their dissatisfaction with the terms and condition would not justify breach thereof or
the formation by them of a union of their own.It cannot be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an employee whenever the union
recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair labor practice, for such is one of
the matters on which management and labor can agree in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the union, and cohesion and integrity of
their organization And asan act of loyalty a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor union and to consider its infringement as
a reasonable cause for separation. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while
an employee is given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same
organization. The law requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to the full extent its cohesion and integrity. It is clear that BLR’s
order which this Court upheld did not pass upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents from TDI by reason of their expulsion
from TDLU for disloyalty. Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor
of private respondents insofar as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and termination from employment of TDI is concerned.Simply put, the BLR
ordered the holding of a certification election because the CBA in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982. Consequently, there appears
to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of
the CBA."But the fact that the CBA had expired and the BLR ordering the holding of a certification election could not and did not wipe out
or cleanse private respondents from the acts of disloyalty.

GR No. 163431 Aug. 28, 2013 LABOR LAWNATHANIEL DONGON vs RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., and/or NICANOR JAO,JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rapid is engaged in the hauling and trucking business while private respondent Nathaniel T.Dongon is a former truck helper leadman. Private
respondent’s area of assignment is the Tanduay Otis Warehouse where he has a job of facilitating the loading and unloading [of the] petitioner’s trucks. On 23
April 2001, private respondent and his driver, Vicente Villaruz, were in the vicinity of Tanduay as they tried to get some goods to be distributed to their clients.
Tanduay’s security guard called the attention of private respondent as to the fact that Mr. Villaruz’[s] was not wearing an Identification Card (I.D. Card). Private
respondent, then, assured the guard that he will secure a special permission from the management to warrant the orderly release of goods. Instead of complying
with his compromise, private respondent lent his I.D. Card to Villaruz; and by reason of such misrepresentation, private respondent and Mr. Villaruz got a clearance
from Tanduay for the release of the goods. However, the security guard, who saw the misrepresentation committed by private respondent and Mr. Villaruz,
accosted them and reported the matter to the management of Tanduay .On 23 May 2001, after conducting an administrative investigation, private respondent
was dismissed from the petitioning Company. On 01 June 2001, private respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, and ruled that respondent Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc. (Rapid Movers) rightly exercised its prerogative to dismiss
petitioner, considering that: (1) he had admitted lending his company ID to driver Vicente Villaruz; (2) his act had constituted mental dishonesty and deceit
amounting to breach of trust; (3) Rapid Movers’ relationship with Tanduay had
been jeopardized by his act; and (4) he had been banned from all the warehouses of Tanduay as a result,leaving Rapid Movers with no available job for him.On
appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, and held that Rapid Movers had not discharged its burden to prove the validity of petitioner’s dismissal
from his employment. It opined that Rapid Movers did not suffer any pecuniary damage from his act; and that his dismissal was a penalty disproportionate to the
act of petitioner complained of. It awarded him backwages and separation pay inlieu of reinstatement.Rapid Movers brought a petition for certiorari in the CA
which reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter upholding the right of Rapid Movers to discipline its workers. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied his motion on March 22, 2004. Petitioner is now on appeal before the SC.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the petition for certiorari in this case is an improper remedy and hence dismissible;
2. W/N Dongon’s dismissal on the ground of wilful disobedience to the company regulation lawful.
HELD:
1. NO. Ordinarily, an original action for certiorari will not prosper if the remedy of appeal is available, for an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually exclusive, not alternative nor successive remedies.
On several occasions, however, the Court has treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari when: (a) the petition has been filed within the
15-day reglementary period; (b) public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate such treatment; (c) the broader interests of justice require such
treatment; (d) the writs issued were null and void; or (e) the questioned decision or order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The Court deems
it proper to allow due course to the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 in the broader interest of substantial justice, particularly because the NLRC’s
appellate adjudication was set aside by the CA, and in order to put at rest the doubt that the CA, in so doing, exercised its judicial authority oppressively. Whether
the petition was proper or not should be of less importance than whether the CA gravely erred in undoing and setting aside the determination of the NLRC as a
reviewing forumvis-à-vis the Labor Arbiter. We note in this regard that the NLRC had declared the dismissal of petitioner to be harsh and not commensurate to
the infraction committed. Given the spirit and intention underlying our labor laws of resolving a doubtful situation in favor of the working man, we will have to
review the judgment of the CA to ascertain whether the NLRC had really committed grave abuse of its discretion.This will settle the doubts on the propriety of
terminating petitioner, and at the same time ensure that justice is served to the parties.2. NO. Willful disobedience to the lawful orders of an employer is one of
the valid grounds to terminate an employee under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code. For willful disobedience to be aground, it is required that:
(a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional; and (b) the order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge. Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude
rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination. In any case, the conduct of the employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the Labor
Code constitutes harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer. It is implied that in every act of willful disobedience, the erring employee
obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer.Under the foregoing standards, the disobedience attributed to petitioner could not
be justly characterized as willful within the contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code. He neither benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudiced the business
interest of Rapid Movers. His explanation that his deed had been intended to benefit Rapid Movers was credible. There could be no wrong or perversity on his
part that warranted the termination of his employment based on willful disobedience.It is true that an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing
its own affairs. The broad discretion includes the implementation of company rules and regulations and the imposition of disciplinary measures on its employees.
But the exercise of a management prerogative like this is not limitless, but hemmed in by good faith and a due consideration of the rights of the worker. In this
light, the management prerogative will be upheld for as long as it is not wielded as an implement to circumvent the laws and oppress labor. Dismissal should only
be a last resort, a penalty to be meted only after all the relevant circumstances have been appreciated and evaluated with the goal of ensuring that the ground
for dismissal was not only serious but true. The cause of termination, to be lawful, must be a serious and grave malfeasance
to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This requirement is in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws to lean over backwards in favor of the
working class, and with the mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their
favor. Although we recognize the inherent right of the employer to discipline its employees, we should stillensure that the employer exercises the prerogative to
discipline humanely and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. The discipline
exacted by the employer should further consider the employee’s length of service and the number of infractions during his employment. The employer should
never forget that always at stake in disciplining its employee are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely dependent
on his earnings.
Considering that petitioner’s motive in lending his company ID to Villaruz was to benefit Rapid Movers as their employer by facilitating the loading of goods at the
Tanduay Otis Warehouse for distribution to Rapid Movers’ clients, and considering also that petitioner had rendered seven long unblemished years of service to
Rapid Movers, his dismissal was plainly unwarranted. The NLRC’s reversal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter by holding that penalty too harsh and
disproportionate to the wrong attributed to him was legally and factually justified, not arbitrary or whimsical. Consequently, for the CA to pronounce that the
NLRC had thereby gravely abused its discretion was not only erroneous but was itself a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not being in
conformity with the pertinent laws and jurisprudence. We have held that a conclusion or finding derived from erroneous considerations is not amere error of
judgment but one tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Union Motors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission and Alejandro Etis(G.R. 159738)
Facts:
Alejandro Etis was hired by Union Motors as an automotive mechanic at the servicedepartment in its Paco Branch. In 1994, he was transferred to Caloocan City
branch, where his latest monthly salary wasP6,330.00. During his employment, he was awarded the "Top Technician" for the month of May in 1995 and Technician
of the Year (1995), and received several other awards that year. Etis made a phone call to Rosita de la Cruz, the company nurse, and informed her that he had to
take a sick leave as he had a painful and unbearable toothache. The next day, he again phoned de la Cruz and told her that he could not report to work because
he still had to consult a doctor. Finding that Etis' ailment was due to tooth inflammation, the doctor referred her to the dentist for further check-up. Because of
several absences, Union Motors issued an Office Memorandum terminating the services of Etis for having incurred these absences without notification. To them,
it was considered abandonment under Sec. 6.1.1. Article III of the Company Rules.Eventually his dentist successfully extracted Etis' tooth and as soon as he
recovered, he reported back to work. Unfortunately he was denied entrance to the company premises; and was also informed that his employment had already
been terminated. Soon he filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Etis allege that he was dismissed from his employment without just and legal
basis, while Union Motors averred that his dismissal was justified by his ten unauthorized absences. It posited that under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an
employee's gross and habitual neglect of his duties is a just cause for termination. It further alleged that the respondent's repetitive and habitual acts of being
absent without notification constituted nothing less than abandonment, which is a form of neglect of duties.The Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal
complaint on the ground that Etis' failure to report to work for 10 days without approved leave of absence is a gross neglect of duty. On appeal to the NLRC, it
reversed the LA's decision ordering reinstatement to Etis. In the CA, it agreed with the NLRC that medical certificates need not be notarized in order to be admitted
as evidence.
Issue: Is it a valid dismissal?
Court Ruling:
No.Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Thus, it must be based on just cause and must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. To effect a valid dismissal, the law requires not only that there must be a just and valid cause for termination; it must likewise enjoin the employer to
afford the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. The Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the termination of employment by the
employer. Second, to warrant removal from the service, the negligence should not merely be gross but also habitual. Gross negligence implies a want or absence
of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them.

G.R. No. 199314 [Formerly UDK No. 14553], December 07, 2015 ]
TAMBLOT SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO ITEM, LEONARDO PALM A, et al., respondents.
Facts:Respondent were employed by petitioner as security guards and were deployed at Marcela Mall. Respondent Florencio Item had a misunderstanding with
the security officer at Marcela Mall, thus, he was recalled and relieved from duty by the petitioner. Florencio consulted a lawyer who told him that he was also
underpaid. He shared this information to his co respondent which prompted the rest of them to file a letter commplaint to the DOLE. During the meeting for the
said case, petitioner representatives tried to convince them to withdrew their complaint but they refused. As a result of their refusal they were also relieved of
their duty at Marcela Mall.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner contends that they did not dismissed the employees and that they are the one who
did not report for work.
Issue: Whether or not the employees were illegally dismissed.
RULING: Respondents were illegally dismissed. Petitioner utterly failed to establish the requisite for abandonment of work 1) that the employees has failed to
report for work or must be absent without valid or justifiable reasons 2) that there must have been a clear intention to severe th employee-employer relationship
by some overt acts. In this case there were no showing of any overt act of the respondents that would point of an intention to abandon their work.

Gonzales vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Facts: Lorlene Gonzales has been an elementary schoolteacher for private respondent Ateneo de Davao University since 1974, assigned to teach Grade VI class. In
1991, headmaster Fr. Oscar Millar sent a letter to inform Gonzales of the complaints for alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. 2yearslater, Ateneo
began to solicit complainants to lodge written complaints against her. On Mar. 31, 1993,she wrote a letter to the headmaster demanding that she be formally
informed of the complaint and be duly investigated. On June 9, 1993, she was informed of the composition of an investigative committee to look into the
complaints but petitioner refused to take part unless the rules of procedure be revised,contending that they were violative oh her right to due process. She
specifically objected to the provision which forbids her counsel from directly participating in the investigation.
Issue: whether or not procedural due process was accorded to the petitioner in the investigation prior to her dismissal
Held: Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin
requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with
assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due
process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on a sound legal foundation. It is precisely to demand compliance with these
requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by the Investigative Committee. The adamant
refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. This is a serious violation of petitioner's
statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation. The dismissal of complainant is declared illegal for lack of factual basis.

G.R. No. 178762 June 16, 2010 LUZVIMINDA A. ANG, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
Facts:
This case is about the dismissal of an employee for offenses committed during her employment in a government-owned corporation but which offenses were
discovered after the privatized corporation rehired her to work for it. Peitioner Ang claimed that respondent PNB, then a government-owned corporation, hired
her as a probationary clerk. But she rose from the ranks, eventually becoming an Assistant Department Manager, a position she held when the PNB was privatized
and when she, like her co-employees, was deemed automatically retired. PNB administratively charged her with serious misconduct and willful breach of trust for
taking part in a scam, called "kiting operation," where a depositor used a conduit bank account for depositing several unfunded checks drawn against the same
depositor’s other current accounts and from which conduit bank account he later withdrew those checks. PNB heaped other charges against Ang of serious
misconduct and gross violation of the bank’s rules and regulations wherein she issued six certificates of deposit in amounts exceeding the true deposit balance of
various depositors, issued two bank commitments for providing a credit line in favor of a government contractor without authority, committed tardiness and
"under time.” In the answer to the charge Ang claimed that it was not a "kiting operation," but an accommodation of a very valued client and the issuance of the
certificates had been a marketing strategy and prevent their valued clients to move to other banks.
Ang also claimed that she was not covered by the circular governing office hours because she was a bank officer. Managerial employees, according to her, worked
beyond the usual eight hours and even worked on Saturdays and Sundays. She added that, since the bank had already made deductions for tardiness on her pay
check, she cannot anymore be administratively charged for it. Ang further pointed out that the causes for her termination took place when she was yet a
government official. The PNB had since ceased to be government-owned. If she were to be charged for those causes, the jurisdiction over her case would lie with
the Civil Service Commission. Even then, since she already retired from the government service, the employment that could be terminated no longer existed. Ang
filed complaint against illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, allowances, separation pay, and retirement benefits with prayer for
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. The Labor Arbiter found PNB’s dismissal of Ang illegal for failure to show that
the dismissal was for a valid cause and after notice and hearing. Specifically, the PNB failed to prove any basis for loss of trust. The NLRC deleted the award of
damages because of absence of bad faith on the part of the PNB officers but maintained the LA’s finding that the PNB had not proved loss of trust as a ground for
dismissal. The Court of Appeals found a valid reason to uphold Ang’s dismissal from the service for willful breach of the trust reposed in her by the PNB.
Issue: Whether or not there was willful breach of trust and confidence.
Held: Yes. Ang claims that her dismissal by PNB, the private corporation, was illegal since she had committed no offense under its employ. The offense for which
she was removed took place when the government still owned PNB and she was then a government employee. But while PNB began as a government corporation,
it did not mean that its corporate being ceased and was subsequently reestablished when it was privatized. It remained the same corporate entity before, during,
and after the change over with no break in its life as a corporation.
Consequently, the offenses that Ang committed against the bank before its privatization continued to be offenses against the bank after the privatization. But,
since the PNB was already a private corporation when it looked into Ang’s offenses, the provisions of the Labor Code governed its disciplinary action. The PNB
rightfully separated her from work for willful breach of the trust that it reposed in her under the Labor Code. Her defense that the PNB did not suffer any loss is of
no moment. The focal point is that she betrayed the trust of the bank in her fidelity to its interest and rules.

[G.R. No. 145901 December 15, 2005] EASYCALL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC., Petitioner, vs. EDWARD KING, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. was a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of message handling. Petitioner, through its general
manager, Malonzo, hired the services of respondent as assistant to the general manager. He was given the responsibility of ensuring that the expansion plans
outside Metro Manila and Metro Cebu were achieved at the soonest possible time. He was promoted to assistant vice president for nationwide expansion and
later appointed to the even higher position of vice president for nationwide expansion. Respondent’s promotion was based on his performance during the six
months preceding his appointment. As vice president for nationwide expansion, he became responsible for the sales and rentals of pager units in petitioner’s
expansion areas. He was also in charge of coordinating with the dealers in these areas.
Thereafter, Malonzo reviewed the sales performance of respondent and scrutinized the status of petitioner’s Nationwide Expansion Program (NEP) which was
under respondent’s responsibility. He found that respondent’s actual sales for the period October 1992–March 1993 was 78% of his sales commitment and 70%
of his sales target. Malonzo also checked the frequency and duration of the provincial sales development visits made by respondent for the same period to
expansion areas under his jurisdiction. He discovered that the latter spent around 40% of the total number of working days for that period in the field.
The management then confronted respondent regarding his sales performance and provincial sales development visits. A series of dialogues between petitioner’s
management and respondent ensued. He was then informed that the general manager wanted his resignation. Respondent, however, declared that he had no
intention of resigning from his position. Consequently, respondent received a notice of termination signed by Malonzo. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
Petitioner argues that since respondent was a “corporate officer,” the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter under PD 902-A.
ISSUE Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
HELD The SC held that under Section 5 of PD 902-A, the law applicable at the time this controversy arose, the SEC, not the NLRC, had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of corporate officers. Section 5(c) of PD 902-A applied to a corporate officer’s dismissal for his dismissal was a
corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy.
However, it had to be first established that the person removed or dismissed was a corporate officer before the removal or dismissal could properly fall within the
jurisdiction of the SEC and not the NLRC. Here, aside from its bare allegation, petitioner failed to show that respondent was in fact a corporate officer. “Corporate
officers” in the context of PD 902-A are those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-
laws. Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the “corporate officers” are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in
the by-laws.
The burden of proof is on the party who makes the allegation. Here, petitioner merely alleged that respondent was a corporate officer. However, it failed to prove
that its by-laws provided for the office of “vice president for nationwide expansion.” Since petitioner failed to satisfy the burden of proof that was required of it,
we cannot sanction its claim that respondent was a “corporate officer” whose removal was cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A and not by the NLRC under the
Labor Code.
An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies no
office and generally is employed not by the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the
compensation to be paid to such employee.
In this case, respondent was appointed vice president for nationwide expansion by Malonzo, petitioner’s general manager, not by the board of directors of
petitioner. It was also Malonzo who determined the compensation package of respondent. Thus, respondent was an employee, not a “corporate officer.” It is
therefore correct that jurisdiction over the case was properly with the NLRC, not the SEC. Petition is denied.