MAGIC REASON

AND
EXPERIENCE
STUDIES IN THE ORIGIN AND

D EVELO PM EN T OF GREEK SCIENCE

G. E. R. L L O Y D
Reader in Ancient Philosophy and Science
and Fellow o f K ing's College in the
University o f Cambridge

C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS
CAM BRIDGE

LONDON · NEW YO R K * M ELBOURNE

 Published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge cb 2 ir p
3a East 57th Street, New York, n y 10022, U S A
296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1979

First published 1979

Forji
Printed in Great Britain at the
University Press, Cambridge

Library o f Congress Cataloguing in Publication D ata

Lloyd, Geoffrey Ernest Richard.
M agic, reason, and experience.
(Studies in the origin and development of Greek science)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
I. Science — Greece — History. 2. Science —
Philosophy. 3. Philosophy, Ancient. 4. Science, Ancient.
I. Title. II. Series.
Q127.G7L59 509’.3δ 78-25710
BBN o 521 22373 3 hard cover
ISBN o 521 29641 2 paperback
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgements page ix
Texts and abbreviations xi

Introduction i

1 T h e criticism o f m agic and the inquiry concerning nature lo

The pluralism o f Greek religious beliefs lo
The criticism of magic 15
The persistence of traditional beliefs: Herodotus 29
The philosophical background 32
Healing and healeis in the classical period 37
The notions of ‘ nature ’ and ‘ cause ’ 49

2 D ialectic and dem onstration 59

Some comparative considerations 59
Aristotle’s analysis of modes of reasoning 62
Early philosophical argumentation 66
The development of rhetoric 79
Rhetoric and the development of natural science 86
The criticism of rhetoric 98
The development of demonstration 102
Interactions of dialectic and demonstration 115

3 T h e developm ent o f em pirical research 126

Observation and research 126
The epistemological debate 129
The practice of research 138
Presocratic natural philosophy 139
Hippocratic medicine and the development of dissection 146
Astronomy 169
Aristotle 200

4 G reek science and G reek society 226

The explanandum 226
The Greeks and the Near East 229
Some explanatory hypotheses 234
Political developments 240
T he relevance of politics to science 246
Conclusions 264

Bibliography 268
Indices 3 ^ 7
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

M an y friends and colleagues have been kind enough to read and

com m ent, from different points o f view , on parts or the w hole o f this
book in draft: M yles Burnyeat, Moses F inley, E dw ard Hussey,
G ilb ert Lewis, Jerem y M ynott, M arth a Nussbaum , G . E. L . O w en,
R ob ert Parker, M alcolm Schofield. W h at I have learnt from them
both on the strategy o f m y argum ents and on points o f detail far
outreaches the warm est thanks I can here express. But it is a pleasure
to record, how ever inadequately, m y debts to their stim ulating
criticism s and advice. T h e y need, o f course, no absolution for the
shortcomings that rem ain.
I wish also to thank M ich ael Loew e and Denis T w itch ett for help
on Chinese questions, Peter K h oroch e and Piers V itebsky on points
o f com parative religion, and J a ck G oody, A lan M acfarlane and S.J.
T a m b ia h on anthropological matters. Sections o f this w ork w ere
delivered as seminars at the Ecole des H autes Etudes in the spring o f
1978 and I wish to thank M a ry Dallos for the French version o f m y
text. I am most grateful for the comments and criticisms m ade on
those occasions, especially b y Jacques Brunschwig, M arcel Detienne,
N icole L orau x and Jean-Pierre V ern an t. I wish, too, to record how
m uch I have benefited from m an y instructive conversations w ith
Pierre V id al-N aq u et. In addition to the detailed observations I have
received from Jerem y M yn ott, I owe m uch to the Officers o f the
Press, and especially to Pauline H ire, for their patient and construc­
tive help. F in ally I thank m y fam ily for their continuing tolerance,
and m y son A dam in particular for his perceptive criticisms o f m y
ideas. T h e book is dedicated, w ith love and thanks, to m y wife.

Cambridge igy8 g .e .r . l .
 T E X T S AND AB BREVIATIO NS

E xcept w here otherwise stated, the fragments o f the Presocratic

philosophers are quoted according to the edition o f Diels, revised by
K ran z, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (6th ed., 1951-2) (referred to as
D K ), the works o f Plato according to B urnet’s O xford text, the
treatises o f Aristotle according to Bekker’s Berlin edition and the
fragments o f Aristotle according to the num bering in V . R ose’s
edition (1886). G reek m edical texts are cited, for preference, ac­
cording to the Corpus Medicorum Graecorum {CM G) editions. For those
H ippocratic treatises not edited in C M G , I use E. Littre, Oeuvres
completes d'Hippocrate, 10 vols,, Paris, 1839-61 (L), w ith two excep­
tions. For On the Sacred Disease I use H. G rensem ann’s Ars M edica
edition (Berlin, 1968) (G), cited b y chapter and paragraph, and for
On Sevens W . H. Roscher, Paderborn, 1913. G alen is cited according
to C M G and T eu b n er editions (where these exist), but the reference
is also given to the edition o f C . G . K u h n (Leipzig, 1821-33) (K ),
w hich is also used for works not in C M G or T eubner. E u clid ’s
Elements are cited according to the edition o f H eiberg, revised by
Stam atis, 4 vols., L eipzig, 1969-73 (H S), and the works o f A rch i­
medes according to H eiberg, revised b y Stam atis, 2 vols., L eipzig,
1972 (H S). Ptolem y’s Syntaxis is cited according to the two volum e
edition o f H eiberg (1898, 1903) (cited as li and lii to distinguish them
from the other volum es o f the T eu b n er edition o f Ptolem y: thus
vol. II contains Opera Astronomica Minora, edited b y H eiberg, 1907).
Ptolem y’s Harmonics are cited according to L D iiring, G oteborg,
1930, and his Optics according to A . Lejeune, Louvain, 1956.
Otherwise G reek authors are cited according to the editions nam ed
in the Greek-English Lexicon o f H . G . L id d ell and R . Scott, revised b y
H . S. Jones, w ith Supplem ent (1968) (LSJ), though, w here relevant,
references are also provided to m ore recent editions, and L atin
authors are cited according to the editions nam ed in the new Oxford
Latin Dictionary {O LD ), supplem ented, w here necessary, from Lew is
and Short. A bbreviations are those in LSJ and OLD , again supple­
mented, w here necessary, from Lewis and Short.
F ull details o f m odern works referred to will be found in the
xii Texts and abbreviations
bibliography on pp. 268if. T h e y are cited in m y text b y author’s
nam e and publication date or dates. A double date is used to
distinguish, where this has seemed relevant, the original publication
from the revised or reprinted version used. Such works are listed in
the bibliography b y the first date, but cited according to the second.
T hus O w en (i960) 1975 refers to the 1975 reprint (with additions) INTRODUCTION
o f an article originally published in 1960.

THE PROBLEM

This study, like m y Polarity and Analogy, is a contribution to w hat

m ight be thought to be, b y now, a very hoary problem , nam ely the
relationship between w hat m ay be called ‘ trad ition al’ and ‘ scientific’
patterns o f thought. It is not hard to suggest reasons for the dom inant
role o f this issue in early anthropological writings, or for the w ay in
w hich it was often represented as a m atter o f a polar contrast between
‘ p rim itiv e’ and ‘ civilised’ societies or between two distinct m en­
talities, the one ‘ p re-lo g ical’ or ‘ pre-scientific ’ and the other
‘ lo g ic a l’ or ‘ s c i e n t i f i c B u t the manifest unacceptability o f the terms
in w hich some aspects o f the problem were debated in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries does not m ean either that there was no
problem or that its resolution has now been agreed. Indeed after a
period o f com parative neglect, the issues have recently been revived
b y both anthropologists and philosophers.
F our m ain liv ely areas o f debate have generated w ork that has
m odified the w ay in w hich certain fundam ental questions now present
themselves. First there is the m ajor philosophical issue o f under­
standing alien societies,^ that is o f the com m ensurability or in­
com m ensurability o f the modes o f thought, beliefs and values o f
different societies. T o translate the concepts o f any given society into
those o f any other is to interpret them, and - so it has been argued -
in so doing inevitably to distort them, in particular by prejudging
certain key issues relating both to the nature o f truth and to that o f
rationality. T h ere are, then, some have said , 3 no culture-independent

• L loyd 1966, pp. 3ff, outlines Levy-Bruhl’s hypothesis and mentions some of the classical
scholars who were directly or indirectly influenced b y his ideas.
^ A m ong im portant recent studies o f the sociological aspects o f this problem are W inch
1958, Horton 1967, the papers o f G ellner (1962), W inch (1964), M acIn tyre (1967) and
Lukes (1957) in B. R . W ilson 1970, S. B. Barnes 1972, the contributions o f Gellner,
Lukes and S. B. Barnes in Horton and Finnegan 1973, S. B. Barnes 1974 and Skorupski
1976. O f the more purely philosophical discussions, Q u ine’s work (1953 and 1960,
especially ch. 2) is fundamental.
3 See, for example, M annheim 1936, pp. 239ff, 262ff. T h e idea that language not merely
influences but determines thought has been m uch debated in connection with the
ideas o f Sapir and W ho rf (e.g. Feuer 1953, Hoijer 1954, Black 1959, Penn 1972).
2 Introduction
criteria that can be used as the basis o f ‘ o b je ctive ’ judgem ents
concerning other societies, and a society can only be understood from
‘ w ith in ’ , that is b y the actors themselves, not b y outside observers.
H ow ever it was appreciated early in this debate that m any o f the
points that had been expressed as difficulties concerning the under­
standing o f one society b y another apply also to the m utual under­
standing o f different groups w ithin the same society even w hen those
groups use the same natural language. W hile one o f the salutary
effects o f this controversy has been to emphasise both the crucial
im portance o f the distinction between ‘ a cto r’ and ‘ observer’ cate­
gories and the ever-present danger o f distortion in the application o f
our own concepts to another culture, I shall not here attem pt to
justify w hat after all must always be assumed in any discussion o f the
ancient world, nam ely that some progress towards understanding is
possible, even i f at a quite modest level and subject to the reservations
im plied b y the problems o f interpretation I have m entioned. M ean ­
w hile one o f the aims o f m y inquiry is to analyse w ithin G reek
thought both the conditions under w hich confrontations between
contrasting belief-systems w ere possible and the nature and lim its o f
such confrontations as occurred.
Secondly, there have been im portant anthropological studies
devoted to the interpretation o f the com plex o f phenom ena loosely
categorised as ‘ m a g ic ’ and directed, in particular, to a critique o f the
old idea w hich saw m agic as, broadly speaking, failed appUed
science . 4 Evans-Pritchard’s classic m onograph on Zande religion
em ployed w hat now seem simple-minded distinctions between
‘ m ystical’, ‘ com m on-sense’ and ‘ scien tific’ notions, defining the first
as ‘ patterns o f thought that attribute to phenom ena supra-sensible
qualities w hich, or part o f w hich, are not derived from observation
or cannot be lo gically inferred from it, and w hich they do not
possess’ , and taking science and logic to be the ‘ sole arbiters o f w hat
are m ystical, common-sense, and scientific notions’ .s A n y attem pt to
contrast m agic as a whole directly w ith science is now seen to be
liable to distort the nature and aims o f the former. M agic, so it has
been forcefully and in part, at least, surely righ tly argued, should be
seen less as attem pting to be efficacious, than as affective, expressive
or sym bolic. T h e criteria that are relevant to ju d g in g m agical
behaviour are not w hether it achieves practical results but w hether it
has been carried out appropriately or not. Thus T am biah has
* See especially Frazer 19 1 1-15 , i pp. aaoff and cf. Jarvie and Agassi (1967) 1970.
5 Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 12. I made what I now see as an uncritical use o f Evans-
Pritchard’s categories in m y 1966, pp. 177-9.
Introduction 3
'V focused on the perform ative or illocutionary nature o f m agical
actions and insisted th at they should be assessed from the point o f
view o f their felicity or infelicity, not from that o f their practical
effectiveness.6 T h e distance that m any anthropologists have m oved
from E vans-Pritchard (let alone from earlier writers) can be illust­
rated b y a passage in M a ry D o u g l a s ‘ O n ce w hen a band o f !K ung
Bushmen had perform ed their rain rituals, a small cloud appeared on
the horizon, grew and darkened. T h en rain fell. But the anthropo­
logists who asked if the Bushmen reckoned the rite had produced the
rain, w ere laughed out o f court.’
T h e third m ain area o f discussion where recent contributions have
far-reaching im plications for the understanding o f the early develop­
m ent o f science is the philosophy and sociology o f science itself,
w here the w ork o f Popper, K u h n , Feyerabend and Lakatos on the
dem arcation between scientific and other forms o f knowledge and
on the grow th o f science has been especially influential.^ In this
debate K u h n has argued for a fundam ental distinction between
puzzle-solving ‘ norm al ’ science and periods o f crisis w hen the shared
assumptions, or paradigm s, o f a scientific com m unity are at issue and
w hen a ‘ gestalt sw itch ’ o f paradigm s m ay occur. M an y aspects o f
this thesis rem ain controversial or obscure or both, and the key
notion o f the ‘ p arad ig m ’ its e lf-u s e d both glob ally o f the ‘ constel­
lation o f group commitments ’ and m uch more specifically o f certain
‘ shared exam ples’ - has been acknow ledged b y K u h n him self to have
been unclear. ^ Y e t the effect o f his w ork has certainly been to draw
* T am b iah 1973, pp. 22off (where he refers explicitly to Austin 1962a). A t pp. 227-9,
however, he expresses reservations concerning the applicability of this point to the whole
o f magic. C f. also T am b iah 1968.
’ Douglas 1966, p. 73, with a reference to M arshall 1957· W hat M arshall wrote was:
‘ O n e night when the R a in dance was being beautifully danced with a fine precision
and vigour o f clapping, singing, and stamping, which to us suggested fervour, w e were
w atching it so intently that we had not noticed the sky. T h e first storm o f the season had
crept up behind us and suddenly burst over us like a bomb. W e asked G ao if he believed
the dance had brought the rain. H e said that the rain was due to come. T h e dance had
not brought i t ’ (M arshall 1957, p· 238). M arshall cited this as evidence that the
purpose o f the R ain dance is not to control the weather; it is, rather, one o f a number of
‘ m edicine’ dances ‘ danced during the medicine men’s cerem ony to cure the sick and
protect the people and drive aw ay any o f th e . . . spirits o f the dead w ho m ight be
lurking to bring some evil upon the p eop le’ (p. 238). H owever the same article of
M arshall’s contains other suggestions about how the Bushmen do believe they can
control the weather, for exam ple b y cutting the throats o f pafticular animals to bring
on or to stop rain (p. 239).
®A p art from Popper 1959, 1963, and 1972, K u h n (1962) 1970 and 19706, Feyerabend
1962 and 1975, Lakatos 1978a and 19786, see also the papers in Lakatos and M usgrave
1970, and Hesse 1974. Several o f these writings are also concerned w ith, and refer
directly to, the debates on the problems o f comm ensurability and translation mentioned
above, pp. if.
® See K u h n 1974 (written before, but published after, 1970a and 19706) as well as ΐ970«>
4 Introduction
attention to the role o f the consensus o f the scientific group and to
that o f their shared im plicit or explicit assumptions, and this in turn
has m ade it easier to see the im portant similarities between the
scientific, and other, comm unities, and between science itself and
other belief-systems. Thus w hile Evans-Pritchard’s category o f the
‘ m ystical’ has been subject to drastic revision from the side o f the
anthropologists, the same is equally true o f his notion o f the ‘ scientific ’
from the side o f the sociologists and philosophers o f science.
Fourthly, there have been fundam ental studies o f the developm ent
o f literacy carried out by G oody and others, dealing, especially, w ith
the effects o f changes in the technology o f com m unication - in ­
cluding the availab ility o f written records o f various types - on the
nature and com plexity o f w hat is com m unicated. M ost recently, in
his significantly entitled The Domestication o f the Savage Mind, G oody
has argued forcefully for a recasting o f the problem o f the ‘ G rand
D ich o to m y ’ between ‘ p rim itive’ and ‘ a d va n ce d ’, ‘ trad ition al’ and
‘ m odern’ , ‘ c o ld ’ and ‘ h o t’ , societies, and emphasised the im portance
o f com plex and m ultiple changes in the means o f com m unication,
focusing attention p articularly on those that took place in the ancient
N ear East. ‘ “ T ra d itio n a l” societies’, he m aintained, ‘ are m arked not
so m uch b y the absence o f reflective thinking as b y the absence o f
the proper tools for constructive r u m i n a t i o n a n d he p u t it that
‘ the problem can be p artly resolved, the G rand D ichotom y refined,
b y exam ining the suggested differences in cultural style or achieve­
m ent as the possible outcom e o f changes in the means o f com m uni­
cation, an outcom e that w ill always depend for its realisation on a set
o f socio-cultural factors.’ "
So far as the interpretation o f early G reek thought is concerned,
the debates o f the anthropologists and philosophers have been, at
most, interm ittently influential. In the discussion o f m any aspects o f
the relationship between ‘ m a g ic ’ and ‘ scien ce’ in the ancient world
D odds’ classic The Greeks and the Irrational is still the starting-point.
T h anks very largely to this study, certain points m ay now be taken
as generally agreed. T hus it is abundan tly clear that the ‘ irra tio n a l’
in one or other o f its com plex and diffuse forms is to be found at every
period o f G reek thought for w hich there is any evidence. M a gical
beliefs and practices o f a w ide variety o f kinds can be docum ented
pp. I74ff, and ig y o i, pp. 23iff: and cf. Shapere 1964, Scheffler 1967, ch. 4 and
M asterm an 1970.
G oody 1977, p. 44.
" G oody 1977, p. 147. I return to consider the bearing o f these theses for the under­
standing o f early Greek thought below, ch. 4, pp. 23gf.
** Dodds 1951.
Introduction 5
from H om er to the end o f antiquity and on into the m iddle ages.
T h is is not to den y th at w e can talk about certain fluctuations in the
extent o f p articular beliefs, or even in ‘ m agic ’ as a w hole, at p a rti­
cular periods. D odds him self argued, * 3 w ith some plausibility, that
after the fifth-century B .C . ‘ enligh ten m ent’ there was som ething o f a
reversion or reaction in the fourth century. A ga in the evidence both
from literary sources and from papyri suggests an increase in
m agical beliefs and practices - notab ly in the form known as theurgy
- f r o m about the second century a .d ., though this is, to be sure,
impossible to quantify. But the prin cipal conclusion, not only from
Dodds b u t from m an y other studies, is clear, nam ely that m agic and
the irrational can be docum ented from the very earliest to the very
latest times.
T h is b y itself gives the lie to any classical scholar who m ight still be
tem pted to suppose that in ancient G reece ‘ scien ce’ supplanted
‘ m a g ic ’, or ‘ reason’ ‘ m y th ’ . M oreover, as w e shall be illustrating
later, 15 several o f those who w ere prom inent in the developm ent o f
G reek cosm ology and science com bined an interest and b elief in
m agic w ith their other w ork in the ‘ in q uiry into n a tu re’ . T o m ention
ju st the most obvious single exam ple here, it is w ell known that most
ancient, like most m edieval and Renaissance, astronomers w ere also
practising astrologers.
B ut i f there can be no doubt about the continuous im portance o f
m yth and m agic throughout antiquity, it is also agreed on all sides,
at the broadest and most general level, that inquiries th at are
recognisable as science and philosophy w ere developed in the
ancient world. H ow ever m uch scholars differ in their detailed inter­
pretations, they acknow ledge th at certain significant changes or
developm ents occurred during the period from the sixth to the
fourth centuries B .C . B ut ju st how those changes are to be described -
let alone explained - is problem atic. Those w ho have proposed
general accounts o f the grow th o f early G reek speculative thought
have advanced various theses on such questions as w hat the Greeks
owed to their ancient N ear Eastern neighbours, on the debt o f
science and philosophy to religion, and on the influence o f social,
political, econom ic and technological f a c t o r s . Y e t although
” Dodds, 1951, ch. 6 (‘ Rationalism and reaction in the classical a g e ’).
See especially Preisendanz 1973-4.
*5 See, for example, below, pp. 33ff, on Empedocles.
** This is true o f both H ipparchus and Ptolem y, for instance: see further below, p. 180
n. 292.
*7 A m ong the most im portant contributions to these debates have been those o f Burnet
(1892) 1948, Cornford 1912 and 1952, Farrington (1944-9) ^961» Vlastos (1947) 1970,
pp. 56ff, (1952) 1970, pp. 92ff, (1955) 1970» PP· 42if and 1975, G . Thomson 1954 and
6 Introduction
references to a ‘ revolution in thought ’ are com m on in works on the
Presocratic period, the prior question o f w hat exactly that revolution
consisted in has often been dealt w ith som ew hat schem atically. In
particular the force o f the obvious point th at G reek science and
philosophy developed in the continuing presence o f traditional
patterns o f thought has tended to be underestim ated, as also some­
times have the com plexities, heterogeneities and lim itations o f w hat
w e know as G reek science and philosophy. O n e o f the ch ief diffi­
culties th at this inquiry faces is to do justice to the differences
between and indeed within the various distinguishable, i f overlapping,
strands o f early G reek speculative thought - cosmology, ‘ natural
scien ce’, m edicine and m athem atics - a problem that is exacerbated
b y the disparities in the evidence that is availab le to us for each o f
them . ^ 8 M oreover, so far from speculative thought being totally
hostile and injurious to all aspects o f the irrational, there are certain
w ays in w hich the developm ent o f m agic itself m ay be said to have
depended on, and followed the m odel of, philosophy and science.
T h e developm ent o f ‘ tem ple m edicine ’ m ay w ell owe a good deal
to - certainly it often im itates - rationalistic m e d i c i n e . T h e system-
atisation o f astrology does not happen before the third century
B . C . ,20 nor th at o f ‘ a lch e m y ’^’' before the first century B . C . , and in
both cases it is possible to argue that the very success o f natural
science and philosophy contributed to the system atisation o f these
other ‘ sciences ’ . 2 2
T h e prim ary task is to delineate as carefully as possible the nature
o f the developm ents that took place in early G reek thought during
the crucial period w hen science and philosophy w ere em erging as
recognisable inquiries. W e must juxtapose G reek and non-G reek
m aterial - w hether from the ancient N ear East or from m odern
non-literate societies - in order to isolate such distinguishing features
as the form er exhibits. W e have, too, to ask how far the new inquiries
involved or consisted in new aims and methods, and at w h at point
1955, V ern ant (1957) 1965, pp. aSsff, 1962 and (1963) 1965, pp. i45ff, Popper (1958-9)
1963, p p. i36fF, V id al-N aquet 1967 and Hussey 1972.
** See below, pp. 8f.
See further below, pp. 4of.
A lthough Herodotus (11 82), for instance, attributes to the Egyptians the belief that a
m an’s future can be foretold according to the day o f his birth and says that G reek poets
used these ideas, astrological beliefs do not become prominent in G reece until the
fourth century B .C ., and it is not until later still that astrology was turned into a universal
system: see N eugebauer 1957, pp. i7off, and 1975, 11 pp. 6 i3f, and cf. further below,
p. 180 and n. 292.
** O n the limitations o f ‘ a lch em y’ in the Greco-Rom an world, see especially J. N eedham
1954- V, 2.
** A s P riau x 1973, for exam ple, has suggested in connection with astrology.
Introduction 7
those aims and methods themselves becam e the object o f self-
conscious reflection. O n ly then can we pose the question, finally, o f
how such developm ents as we can identify occurred, and analyse the
social, political and other conditions that m ay be thought to have
stim ulated or perm itted them.
T h e problems as outlined relate to early G reek thought: yet they
clearly have general im plications. In a contribution to the recent
anthropological debate on m agic, Jarvie and Agassi co n clu d e d : ‘ T h e
problem is not, then, “ how on earth can they [primitive peoples]
believe in m a g ic? ” ; it is rather “ can people w ith inefficient m agical
beliefs come to be critical o f them, under w hat conditions and to
w hat e xten t?” T o us this seems the really urgent sociological
problem posed by m agic.’23 But th at very w ay o f stating the problem
indicates its diachronic character. W h at is required is an exam ination
o f the beliefs and practices o f any given society over a considerable
period o f time. Y e t it is just evidence o f that kind - on changes in
beliefs and practices over an extended period - that the anthropo­
logist studying a non-literate society often finds it hard or impossible
to obtain. W hilst the data for early G reek thought suffer from their
ow n severe lim itations,24 our sources do provide some inform ation
on the vital issue o f changes in the beliefs and attitudes o f at least
certain groups w ithin G reek society over a period w hen science and
philosophy were first developing.
W e must, to be sure, bear in m ind T a m b ia h ’s caveats concerning
the relevance o f the E uropean experience to the study o f m agic as a
whole. H aving rem arked that ‘ there is no denying that in Europe
there is some kind o f developm ental sequence b y w hich out o f more
“ p rim itive” notions and “ m ag ica l” practices more “ scientific”
notions and experim entation were b o rn ’,25 T am b iah w ent on: ‘ it
m ay very w ell be that the W estern experience is a privileged case o f
transition from “ m a g ic” to “ science” .’26 W hen he thus insists on the
possibly exceptional nature o f aspects o f the G reek situation,
T a m b ia h ’s points are w ell taken.27 But i f caution is certainly in order
in any attem pt to ap ply conclusions based on the study o f the Greeks
to other societies, we m ay still recognise that the evidence for early
« Jarvie and Agassi (1967) 1970, p. 193. Cf. Gellner 1973, pp. iGaff, who deliberately
‘ thinks a w a y ’ the ‘ middle grou n d ’ in posing the problem o f what he calls the ‘ G reat
D ivid e ’ between ‘ the Savage and the M odern m in d ’, and contrast G oody 1977, p. 147,
quoted above, p. 4 n. 11.
See below, pp. 8f.
T am b iah 1973, p. 227.
** T am b iah 1973, p. 228, his italics.
27 Indeed from a different point o f view, classical scholars, for their part, have often in
the past been too ready to see the G reek experience as exceptional.
8 Introduction
G reek thought offers a quite special opportunity's to exam ine the
background circum stances, and the precise form and lim itations, o f
the em ergence o f science.
T H E E V ID E N C E
T h e ch ie f evidence for this study is, quite sim ply, the sum total o f
extant G reek literature from the period that p rin cip ally concerns
us - roughly from H om er to the end o f the fourth century B .C . -
together w ith such later texts as bear on our problems. T o this we
can add the inscriptional and papyrological data relevant especially
to G reek m agic, m edicine and religion. This evidence suffers from
two m ajor shortcomings. First we are dealing, in the m ain, w ith
literary texts. T h e effect o f this lim itation is c le a r : in discussing the
ancient world we must forego any extravagant am bition to recon­
struct the beliefs, attitudes and practices o f ordinary Greeks as such,
and confine ourselves largely to analysing those beliefs as they are
represented by particular individuals or groups. T h e question o f how typical
or deviant particular views and reactions are w ill, o f course, occupy
us in considering the social background and conditions o f those
developm ents, but here the richness and variety o f our sources can,
to some extent, compensate for their m ainly literary character.
O utside the early philosophers and scientists themselves there is
im portant direct and indirect testimony relevant to our concerns, in,
for exam ple, the dram atists, the orators and the historians.
Secondly, the evidence is fragm entary and uneven, particular
individuals and groups being m uch better represented in our extant
sources than others. T h e lack o f reliable inform ation concerning the
M ilesians is a notable handicap, and so too is that for the early
Pythagoreans and for the atomists. W hile we can reconstruct certain
aspects o f early G reek m athem atics from E uclid and later com m en­
tators, the almost com plete loss o f original G reek m athem atical texts
from the fifth and early fourth centuries B .C . severely restricts our
discussion o f the developm ent o f techniques o f argum ent and o f the
notion o f proof in that field. O n the other hand w e are fortunate
enough to have, for exam ple, more than fifty com plete m edical
treatises from the period in w hich we are chiefly interested. T h e
lim itations, and the possible distorting effects, o f our evidence must
be acknow ledged and borne in m ind: yet w e have m aterial enough
Perhaps the only com parable opportunity is that presented by the rich docum entation
for the developments that took place in Chinese thought. Conscious that these would
require a full length study in themselves - and that b y a specialist - I have paid only
very limited attention to them in the course of this inquiry.
Introduction 9
to undertake an exploratory, if at points necessarily speculative,
investigation o f the problem s we have posed.
T h e natural starting-point o f our inquiry is the texts in w hich w hat
are represented as m agical beliefs and practices are exp licitly
criticised and rejected. These w ill enable us to analyse in some detail
the precise character o f the criticism s advanced, and the nature, and
grounds, o f the ideas that w ere p ut in place o f the beliefs that were
rejected. O u r study o f this evidence w ill, in turn, suggest further
m ore general topics for investigation relating to the grow th - and
lim itations - o f science and philosophy in the sixth to the fourth
centuries b . c . T w o related, even at points overlapping, aspects o f the
m ethodology o f early G reek speculative thought appear to be o f
fundam ental im portance, nam ely ( i ) the developm ent o f t£chni_ques
o f argum entation, in refutation, persuasion and dem onstration, and
(2) th at o f observadpn and research. In chapter 2 w e shall outline
the developm ent, and assess the significance, o f the theory and the
practice o f argum ent in early G reek science, including for exam ple
the influence o f rhetoric on the grow th o f natural science, and the
developm ent o f the notions o f an axiom atic system and o f an exact
science. Sim ilarly chapter 3 w ill study the developm ent o f em pirical
research, w here the question o f the relationship betw een theory and
practice, and the reasons for the variab le perform ance o f the Greeks
in different domains o f science, w ill occupy us, and w here w e shall
extend the discussion beyond the fourth century B .C . in order to put
the achievem ents o f earlier and later periods into perspective. No
claim is or can be m ade th at the two topics thus chosen for the two
prin cipal sections o f the inquiry exhaust the p ro b lem : nor is it pos­
sible to discuss more than a small proportion o f the extensive m aterial
available to us under each head. Sim ilar reservations ap ply w ith
even greater force to our final study w hich follows up aspects o f the
p icture o f early G reek science that emerges from our investigations
and confronts the issue o f the social background to the developm ents
described. W hile m any o f the questions surrounding the problem o f
w hy the Greeks produced the natural science they did are, adm ittedly,
not ones to which definitive answers can be given, an attem pt w ill be
m ade to assess various hypotheses that m ay be advanced on the
possible relations between G reek science and G reek society.

T H E C R I T I C I S M OF M A G I C A N D
THE I N Q U IR Y C O N C E R N IN G N A T U R E
THE P L U R A LIS M OF G R E E K R E L IG IO U S B E L IE F S
T h e first time in extant G reek - indeed in extant W estern - literature
that an attem pt was m ade exp licitly to refute a set o f w hat the w riter
him self called m agical· beliefs and practices is in a w ork that dates
from the later p art o f the fifth or the early fourth century B .C . B ut
the attack on m agic - including, especially, any claim to be able
forcibly to m anipulate the divine or the supernatural - must be
understood against the background o f the pluralism o f G reek
religious beliefs; so we must first consider briefly the developm ent o f
critical attitudes towards certain aspects o f G reek traditional notions
concerning the gods. This begins already w ith H esiod, i f not w ith
the Horneric poem s themselves.^ A lthough the extent o f the origin­
ality o f H esiod’s Theogony is hard to estimate, it represents at the very
least a systematisation o f a group o f stories about the origins o f the
gods. A lthough he invokes the Muses at the start o f the poem, it is the
‘ fine son g’ that they taught him (and he identifies him self by name) ^
that he recounts. Hesiod stands at the head o f a line o f writers o f
theological cosmogonies - the group Aristotle refers to as the θεολόγοι.
These include such men as Pherecydes and Epimenides - and we can
now add A lem an on the evidence o f the recently discovered fragm ent
o f his theogony - as w ell as a num ber o f other more shadowy figures.
O u r sources for their ideas are often, to be sure, late and unreliable,
but A lem an in the seventh,® and Pherecydes in the sixth, century, at
least, evidently introduced a num ber o f new theogonical myths,
based partly on earlier Greek and partly, it m ay be, on non-G reek
material.^ A gain another recent discovery, the so-called D erveni
* O n the origin and application o f the terms μάγοι and μαγεία, see below, p. 13 n. 20.
^ T h e extent to which the Homeric poems introduced new religious conceptions has been
much debated. See, for example, Guthrie 1950, pp. iiy ff , and Finley (1954) 1977,
pp. i3 5 ff (and the works listed in his bibliographical essay, pp. i83f), and Burkert
1977, pp. ig iff.
3 Th. iff, 22flT. * E.g. Metaph. lo o o a gf, io 7 ib 2 6 f, I075b26 and i09ia33fT.
5 T h e interpretation o f A lem an ’s theogony (Fr. 5) is notoriously controversial. See, for
example. Page 1959, pp. 2of, Frankel (1962) 1975, pp. 164 and 25sf, Burkert 1963a,
West 1963, 1967 and 1971, pp. 2o6ff, V ernant 1970 and Penwill 1974.
* For an account o f Pherecydes’ myths, see, for example, K irk and R aven 1957, pp. 48-
The mticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 11
papyrus, provides valuab le evidence that is independent o f Plato for
O rp h ic theogonical speculation . 7
M oreover the first natural philosophers, the M ilesians, m ay also
be thought o f as innovators in this area in two respects. First they
attem pted naturalistic explanations o f phenom ena such as earth­
quakes, lightning and thunder, w hich had often been ascribed to the
gods.8 Secondly, there is evidence that they considered their
principles - that is, w hat the w orld comes from - to be d ivin e,’ and
' in that, adm ittedly very lim ited, sense they m ay be seen as putting
forw ard a new or ‘ reform ed’ theology.*® A gain although the precise
nature o f Pythagoras’ religious teaching is d isp u ted ," we h ave good
early evidence that he held that the soul is im m ortal and trans­
migrates from one species o f living being to another.
W hilst a num ber o f seventh-, sixth- and early fifth-century writers
m ay be represented as religious innovators, the two outstanding
early explicit critics o f certain traditional G reek religious notions are
X enophanes [c. 570-470 b . g .) and Heraclitus (active at the turn o f
the sixth and fifth centuries). Xenophanes inveighed against the
conception o f the gods in H om er and Hesiod first on m oral grounds.
‘ H om er and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods everything that is
sham eful and a reproach am ong men, thieving, adultery and
deceiving each o th er’ (Fr. 11, cf. Fr. 12). B ut he also satirised
anthropom orphism m ore generally. ‘ But m e n ’ , he says in Fr. 14,
‘ think that gods are born and th at they have clothes and voices and
shapes like their ow n.’ In the first extant text to bring to bear
know ledge o f w h at other societies believed about the gods he sa y s:
‘ the Ethiopians say their ow n gods are snub-nosed and black, the
72. T h e degree o f dependence on non-Greek ideas has recently been rather exaggerated
in W est’s discussion (West 1971, chh. i and 2).
’ See especially Burkert 1968 and 1970. T h e papyrus itself dates from the second h a lf o f
the fourth century, but the com m entary on O rphic ideas it contains is thought to be
a product o f 400 B .C . or shortly afterwards.
* See further below, p. 32.
\ ^ T hus Aristotle suggests that A naxim ander described the Boundless as im m ortal and
1 imperishable {Ph. 2 0 3 b i3 ff, D K 12 A 15 ). O u r late sources report that Anaxim enes held
I his principle, air, to be divine (e.g. A e tiu si 7.13, Cicero, N .D . i 10.26, both i n D K i 3 A i o ,
and cf. A et. i 3.4, D K 13B2 and H ippolytus, Haer. i 7.1, D K 13 a 7). Even Thales, too,
m ay have considered his principle, water, to be divine, though the precise application
o f the dictum that ‘ all things are full o f go ds’, ascribed to him by A ristotle {de An.
4 i i a 8 , D K 11A 2 2 ; cf. Plato, Lg. 899b, where, however, there is no mention o f the
author o f the saying), is controversial (see L loyd 1966, p p. 233ff).
*0 D ifferent versions o f this line o f interpretation can be found in, for exam ple, Jaeger
1947 and Hussey 1972.
” See especially Burkert 1972a, ch. 2.
Xenophanes Fr. 7 is quoted by Diogenes Laertius, v iii 36, as referring to PythagorM .
Even if that were incorrect, the fragm ent is good early evidence o f the belief in
transm igration.
12 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
T h racian s say theirs are blue-eyed and red -h aired ’ (Fr. i6 ).
A noth er fragm ent (15) attem pts to reduce anthropom orphism to
absurdity b y draw in g an analogy w ith a n im als: ‘ I f oxen and horses
and lions had hands and could draw w ith their hands and produce
works o f art like m en, horses w ould draw the forms o f the gods like
horses, and oxen like oxen, and they w ould m ake their bodies such
as each o f them had themselves.’ In place o f the crude anthropo­
m orphism he rejects, he puts forward an idea o f god as the divine
M ind (Frr. 24-6), a notion that is, to be sure, still influenced b y a
hum an m odel, even i f his god is said to be ‘ not like mortals either in
shape [form] or in th o u g h t’ (Fr. 23).
W ith H eraclitus, the range o f religious notions and practices under
attack is e x t e n d e d . T hus in one fragm ent (5) he condemns ritual
purifications after m urder and praying to statues: ‘ T h e y purify
themselves polluting themselves further w ith blood, as if a m an who
had stepped into m ud w ere to wash it o ff in m ud: he w ould be
thought mad^s i f anyone rem arked him doing this. A n d they p ray to
these statues, as i f someone were to converse w ith houses, not
know ing at all w ho the gods and heroes are.’ In another passage
(Fr. 15) he refers to the D ionysiac religion in p articular: ‘ For i f it
w ere not for Dionysus that they were holding processions and singing
the hym n to the phalli,^^ it w ould be a most shameless a c t : b ut H ades
and Dionysus, in whose honour they go m ad and perform bacch ic
rites, are the sam e.’ H ere and elsewhere it m ay be that it is not the
acts themselves that he objects to, so m uch as perform ing them in
ignorance o f their true significance, that is o f the true nature o f the
god or gods to whom they are addressed . * 7 In a third fragm ent (14),
the extent and authenticity o f w hich are unfortunately in doubt, *8
he is again reported as criticising the m ystery religions (‘ w hat are
” H eraclitus often expresses his contem pt both for the ordinary mass o f m ankind (e.g.
Frr. I, 2, 17, 29, 34, 104) and for most o f those (including Xenophanes himself) who
passed as ‘ wise m en ’ (e.g. Frr. 35, 40, 42, 56, 57, 106).
R eadin g άλλφ with D K (and M arcovich). Alternatively, reading άλλω;, ‘ they purify
themselves in vain, polluting themselves with b lo o d ’ .
Here, as so often elsewhere in the fragments, there is a calculated play on words -
μιαινόμενοι (translated ‘ p ollutin g’ ) and μαΙυΕσθοι (translated ‘ m a d ’) - which cannot be
captured in English.
A gain there is a p la y on words. T h e term translated ‘ p h a lli’ is αίδοίοισιν (lit. ‘ shameful
p a rts’), which is im m ediately followed by άναιδέστοττα (‘ most shamelessly’ ).
C f. G uthrie 1962, pp. 475f, who also refers to Fr. 69.
O u r source is Clem ent o f A lexandria (who is also responsible for Fr. 15). Clem ent is not
a very reliable witness at the best o f times, since his own chief purpose, in the Protrepticus,
is to expose all heathen religions (and especially the G reek mysteries). But there is an
additional reason to be cautious about the first part o f what appears in D K as frag­
ment 14: it does not form a gram m atical sentence, but consists simply o f a list o f the
types o f people whom Clem ent represents Heraclitus as ‘ prophesying again st’ . T h e
dangers o f such a list being subject to interpolation and corruption are obvious.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 13
deem ed to be mysteries am ong m en are unholy m ysteries’) and as
‘ prophesying a g a i n s t ‘ night-roam ers, “ m ages” (μάγοι), b a c­
chants, m aenads, in itiates’ . I f μάγοι here is part o f the original
quotation and not - as is quite possible - an addition b y our source,
this is the first reference in extant G reek literature to these m e n : our
earliest extensive authority, Herodotus, represents them as a M edian
tribe who - or members o f w hich - acted as priests and the inter­
preters o f signs and dreams.^® L ike X enophanes, H eraclitus’ remarks
about the gods are not m erely destructive and critical, for he has his
own quite different, if in parts obscure, conception o f the divine to
propose, one that is linked w ith his central philosophical doctrine o f
the unity o f opposites. Thus we are told in Fr. 67 that ‘ god is day
night, w inter summer, w ar peace, satiety h u n g er’, w hile another
fragm ent (102) says that ‘ to god all things are beautiful and good and
just, b ut m en have thought that some things are unjust, others
ju s t ’ .
These texts show that in the sixth and early fifth centuries it was,
w ithin broad limits, perfectly possible both to criticise existing
This is C lem ent’s term (μαντεύεται) and Clem ent held (incorrectly, as is now generally
thought) that Heraclitus, like the Stoics m uch later, believed that the world is periodic­
ally destroyed by fire (the doctrine o f έκπύρωσίξ). Y e t C lem ent’s m isinteφretation o f
Heraclitus on that point does not, b y itself, undermine the value of this testimony as a
whole, since it is still possible that it reflects some statement o f Heraclitus criticising
some at least o f the types o f person that Clem ent mentions.
*0 See Herodotus i lo i , 107, 120, 128, 132, 140, vii 19, 37, 43. It is clear that for H ero­
dotus the μάγοι were a distinct tribe (the doubtful accuracy o f his reports does not affect
their value as evidence of w hat was believed about the μάγοι in G reece). But already in
the fifth century μάγοξ and its derivatives came to be used pejoratively - often in
association w ith such other words for vagabonds, tricksters and charlatans as άγύρτηί,
γόη$ and άλα^ών - for deception, imposture and fraudulent claims for special knowledge.
T his is so not only in Morb. Sacr. (on which see below), but also in G orgias’ Helen
(para 10, cf. para. 14), Sophocles, O T 387ff and Euripides, Or. I496ff (cf. Aristotle
Fr. 36, which however exonerates the μάγοι themselves o f the practice o f γοητική
μαγεία). Thus these texts already exhibit w hat was to remain a prominent feature of
words from the μαγ- root (and o f their Latin equivalents, magus, magicus etc.). T h e y were
never clearly defined in terms o f particular beliefs or practices, but were comm only
used o f such activities or claims to special knowledge as any particular author or
speaker suspected o f trickery or fraudulence. Pliny, for instance, attacks the ‘ m agical
a r t’ at length in Nat. x x x especially (as often elsewhere, e.g. x x iv i.4f, x x v i 9.i8ff,
x x v iii 23.85f). But that does not prevent him from including in his work a mass o f
hom eopathic and sym pathetic remedies, amulets and the like, which he is h a lf inclined
him self to believe to be efficacious; he often mentions, for example, the special,
ritualistic procedures to be used in their collection and preparation (see e.g. x xn i
7 i.i3 7 ff, x x v i 62.95ff, x x v ii 43.66, x x v m 23.77!?, x x ix 32.981!). See further H ubert
1904, Thorndike 1923-58, Hopfner 1928, Bidez and Cum ont 1938 and N ock 1972,
I p p. 3o8flf, especially.
C f. such other, often cryptic, fragments on god and the divine as Frr. 24, 32, 53, 62,
86, 114 and notably those that emphasise the contrast between divine knowledge and
human ignorance, e.g. Frr. 78, 79, 83. Even though his statements on soul and on
im m ortality are exceptionally obscure, it is fairly clear that he believed in some form
o f after-life, see, e.g., Frr. 63, 77, 88 and cf. Frr. 27, 36, 45, 98, 115.
 14 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
religious ideas and practices and to introduce new ones.^^ T o p ut it
negatively, there was no dogm atic or systematic religious orthodoxy.^^
A lth ou gh there w ere certain widespread and deeply held beliefs,
there was no com m on sacred book,^"^ no one true religion, repre­
sented by universally recognised spokesmen - priests or prophets -
and backed b y an organised religious authority such as a church.
T h e expression o f new and quite individualistic views on god and the
divin e was, as our exam ples show, not only possible but quite
com m on, and b y the end o f the iifth century w e have evidence's o f
a series o f rationalistic accounts o f the origin o f religion.^6 First
Dem ocritus explained b elief in the gods as in part a m istaken
inference from terrifying natural phenom ena , 2 7 although he evi­
den tly did not dismiss notions o f the gods entirely, for he is also
reported to have related certain such ideas to ‘ im ages’ that appear
to m en.28 Secondly, Prodicus is said to have accounted for beliefs in
the gods in terms o f m an’s gratitude for the benefits he derives from
such things as bread, w ater, wine and fire. Thus Sextus reports that
Prodicus of Ceos says: ‘ T he ancients considered as gods the sun and moon and
rivers and springs and in general everything that aids our Ufe because of the benefit
from them, just as the Egyptians consider the Nile a god.’ He adds that for this
** M odifications to religious practices and the introduction o f new ones appear to
continue throughout the sixth and fifth centuries - especially, though not exclusively,
in connection with the growth o f the mystery religions.
Thus Herodotus, ii 3, puts it that all men have equal knowledge - or ignorance - o f
the gods. W e shall be discussing later the significance o f trials for im piety, see below,
p. 255 and n. 129, p. 257 and n. 138.
Such ‘ sacred stories’ , Upol λόγοι, as the Greek possessed were associated with particular
exclusive cults, such as the mysteries: see, for exam ple, Burkert 1972a, pp. i78ff,
2i9ff, 1977 » PP· 4 i 4 f
^5 A dm ittedly much o f our most striking evidence derives from a single source, Sextus
Empiricus, who sets out in M . ix i3 ff to show the doubtfulness o f the inquiry con­
cerning gods. But it is clear that by the end o f the fifth century rationalising specu­
lations about the gods were common in two contexts in particular, etymologising on the
gods’ names and allegorical interpretations o f incidents in Homer. T h e D erveni
papyrus reflects the former interest: for the latter, see Richardson 1975, pp. 66f, 7off.
Conjectures concerning the possible origins of particular religious beliefs and customs
begin already in Herodotus. Thus at n 43ff (especially 50) he speculates on the
E gyptian origin o f the Greek names o f the gods. See also n 81 on the prohibition
concerning the use o f wool (on the problems posed by the alternative readings in this
text, see, for exam ple, Burkert 1972a, pp. i2 7 f), n 104 on circumcision and 11 123 on
the Egyptian origin o f the belief in imm ortality. C f also, for example, Euripides,
Hec. 799ff, where the gods themselves are said to be subject to νόμο$, custom or con­
vention.
Sextus, M . IX 24, D K 68 a 75, mentioning thunder, lightning, the conjunctions o f stars
and eclipses o f the sun and moon among the ‘ happenings in the upper regions’ for
which men in the past thought the gods responsible.
2* Democritus Fr. 166 (some o f these images are beneficent, others harm ful: he is reported
to have wished for the former kind him self), c f also e.g. Plutarch, Quaei/. Conv. vm 10.2,
7 3 4 p f (D K 68 A 77). In Fr. 30 Democritus was, presum ably, being ironical in referring
to those who, gesturing towards the air, spoke o f Zeus as ‘ king o f a ll’ .
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 15
reason bread was worshipped as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, water as Poseidon,
fire as Hephaestus, and so on with each of the things that are good for use.*®
T h irdly, and far more radically, a text from Critias’ Sisyphus
represents the gods as a hum an invention for the purposes o f m oral
co n tro l:
Then when the laws prevented them [men] from committing open deeds of
violence, but they continued to do them in secret, it seems to me that a man of
clever and cunning wit first invented for men fear of the gods, so that there might
be something to frighten the wicked, even if they do or say or think something in
secret. Hence he introduced the divine, saying that there is a deity [daimon] who
enjoys immortal life, hearing and seeing with his mind, thinking of everything and
caring about these things, and possessing a divine nature, who will hear everything
said among mortals and be able to see everything that is done. . .T h e place he
said the gods lived in was one by the mention of which he could most frighten
men - from which he knew came fears for mortals and rewards for their miserable
life - the upper circuit, where he remarked lightnings and fearful claps of thunder,
and the starry frame o f heaven, the beautiful workmanship of the cunning crafts­
man T im e .. .W ith such fears he surrounded men. . . and quenched lawlessness by
his ordinances. . . So I think did someone first persuade men there is a race of
deities.3°
THE C R IT IC ISM O F M A G IC
In addition to this evidence for the rational criticism o f religious
beliefs and customs in the philosophers and sophists, we have first­
hand inform ation relating to the rejection and refutation o f certain
m agical notions. For this w e have to turn to the m edical writers.
O u r ch ief text is the treatise On the Sacred D is e a s e ,the date o f which
cannot be fiixed at all precisely but w hich is generally thought to
belong to the end o f the fifth or the beginning o f the fourth century
B . C .32 T h e principal aims o f this w ork are (i) to establish that the
‘ sacred d i s e a s e t h a t is, epilepsy 33 - is, as the author puts it, ‘ no
Sextus, M . IX 18 (cf. 52). O n the im portant evidence in Philodemus, Piet. {PHerc. 1428)
see most recently Henrichs 1975, pp. io7ff’. Cf. also Cicero, N .D . i 42.118, Themistius,
Or. XXX 349ab (H ardouin), n 183.i f f (Schenkl, D ow ney, Norman) (D K 84b 5).
3° Critias, Fr. 25.9ff": see, for exam ple, Burkert 1977, p. 465 and cf. ch. 7, pp. 452ff', in
general on the topic o f philosophical criticism o f religious beliefs.
3 * I follow Grensem ann’s edition (1968, cited by chapter and paragraph) except where
otherwise indicated. M y translations are adapted from those in C hadw ick and M ann
(1978) w ho follow the chapter divisions in W . H. S. Jones, 1923-31, n (J) rather than
those in L ittr i (L) and Grensem ann (G). Some aspects o f this material are discussed in
L loyd 1975c.
” See, for example, W . H . S. Jones 1923-31, 11 p. 134, Pohlenz 1938, p. 35, Heinim ann
1945, pp. i7off, especially 206-9, Bourgey 1953, pp. 75f, Grensemann 1968, pp. 7-3 1.
T h e philosopher Diogenes o f Apollonia, whose floruit is usually assigned to about 430
B.C., provides a probable terminus post quern, but we have no reliable means o f deter­
m ining how long after Diogenes the treatise was written.
O n the identification o f this disease, see especially T em kin 1933a, and b, and 1971»
pp. i5ff, for exam ple 19: ‘ various diseases were called “ sacred disease” in A n tiq u ity ’ ,
but ‘ in the great m ajority o f cases “ the sacred disease” meant epilepsy for physicians
as w ell as laym en ’.
16 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
more sacred than any other disease’ and that it has a natural cause
like all other diseases, and (2) to expose as frauds those who claim ed
to be able to cure the disease by purifications, incantations and other
ritual means. T h e w ork b egin s:
I do not believe that the sacred disease is any more divine or sacred than any other
disease but, on the contrary, just as other diseases have a nature from which they
arise, so this one has a nature (φύσιζ) and a definite cause (πρόφασΐ5). Neverthe­
less, because it is completely different fi-om other diseases, it has been regarded as
a divine visitation by those who, being only human, view it with ignorance and
astonishment.34
Shortly afterwards the w riter makes a suggestion about w h y the
disease cam e to be considered ‘ sacred ’ ;
It is m y opinion that those who first called this disease ‘ sacred’ were the sort of
people we now call mages (μάγοι), purifiers (καθαρταί), vagabonds (άγύρται) and
charlatans (άλα^όνες). These are exactly the people who pretend to be very pious
and to be particularly wise. By invoking a divine element they were able to screen
their own failures to give suitable treatment and so called this a ‘ sacred ’ malady
to conceal their ignorance of its nature. By picking their phrases carefully,
prescribing purifications and incantations along with abstinence from baths and
from many foods unsuitable for the sick, they ensured that their therapeutic
measures were safe for themselves.^®
T h e w riter’s criticisms o f his opponents^^ take various forms. H e
accuses them not only o f ignorance, but also o f deceit and fraudu-
lence, o f inconsistency and indeed o f im p iety . 3 7 In opposition to the
views he attacks he puts forward his own naturalistic doctrines about
diseases in general and about the sacred disease in particular, during
the course o f w hich he produces some fairly detailed anatom ical and
physiological theories. Several o f the criticisms he advances can be
paralleled either from anthropologists’ reports concerning attitudes
towards witchdoctors and m agic in non-literate societies, or from the
accounts o f historians o f witchcraft, such as K eith Thom as’ cele­
brated study o f sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, Religion
34 C h. I paras. 2f (G). C f. the rather different texts of Littre, v i 352.iff, and o f W . H. S.
Jones, 1923-31, II p. 138. Grensemann square-brackets the first sentence I have
translated: but even if this is a gloss, the idea it expresses is genuine enough, being
repeated in a slightly different form at the beginning of ch. 2 (para. 2 (G) = ch. 5 (J))
and cf. ch. 18 (para, i (G) = ch. 21 (J)).
35 C h. I paras. 10-12 (G) (cf. L v i 354.i2ff).
36 T h e identity o f these opponents cannot be determ ined precisely, but see further
below, pp. 37f.
3’ E.g. ch. I para. 28 (G) (cf. L vi 3 58 .i6 ff); ‘ A n d yet I believe that all these pro­
fessions - as they think - o f piety are really more like im piety and a denial o f the
existence of the gods, and all their piousness and talk o f the divine is impious and
unholy, as I shall demonstrate.’ Cf. also ch. i paras. 30, 39 and 44 (G) (L v i 360.3ff,
362.6ff, i6 ff).
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 17
and the Decline o f Magic?^ It is essential, then, both to analyse the
precise nature o f the attack on the ‘ mages ’ in On the Sacred Disease - in
particular to identify where that attack departs from patterns that
m ay easily be paralleled elsewhere - and then also to assess w hat the
H ippocratic author offers in place o f the doctrines he rebuts.
A comparison m ay be suggested, first, in respect o f certain accusa­
tions o f dishonesty and fraudulence. Discussing attitudes to witch-
doctorhood am ong the A zande, Evans-Pritchard wrote;
I was surprised to find a considerable body of sceptical opinion in many depart­
ments of Zande culture, and especially in regard to their witch-doctors. Some men
are less credulous than others and more critical in their acceptance of statements
made by witch-doctors.. . M any people say that the great majority o f witch­
doctors are liars whose sole concern is to acquire wealth. I found that it was quite
a normal belief among Azande that many of the practitioners are charlatans who
make up any reply which they think will please their questioner, and whose sole
inspiration is love of gain. 39
Sim ilarly the author o f On the Sacred Disease both explicitly accuses
his opponents o f ignorance,^® and suspects that their m otive is love
o f g a in :
But perhaps these claims are not true and it is men in search of a living (βίου
δεόμενοι) who invent all these fancy tales about this particular disease and all the
others too - attaching the responsibility for each of the different forms of the
complaint to a god, for they hold not just one, but several gods responsible for
these.41
N ext there are charges o f special pleading, or o f recourse to w hat
w e m ay call secondary elaborations. A nalysing the factors that
contributed to the reputation enjoyed by the ‘ cunning m e n ’ in
T u d or and Stuart England, and in particular the defences available
to them when they failed actually to produce a cure, Thom as w ro te:
When failure was unavoidable the belief in witchcraft provided a ready excuse. By
informing their clients that they had been ‘ overlooked ’ or ‘ forspoken the cunning
men could imply that if only the disease had been natural they would have been
able to cure it. Even the Catholic who held charming sessions at St James’s in
3* Thom as 1971.
39 Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 183.
^ E .g. ch. I para. 11 (G) (L v i 354 .i5ff) quoted above, p. 16.
·♦' C h. I para. 32 (G) (L v i 36o.9ff). A m ong m any other passages in Greek literature, one
m ay com pare Oedipus accusing Teiresias o f prophesying for gain { O T 387ff: he calls
Teiresias μάγον and άγύρτην) though he does not deny the art o f prophecy as a whole.
Sim ilarly accusations o f greed and fraudulence are particularly common in the m any
scenes in which Aristophanes satirises both nam ed prophets and soothsayers and their
kinds in general, e.g. Pax 1045-1126, Av. 958-91, Eq. i isff, ioo2ff, cf. Plato, Lg. 909 ab.
Homer already provides examples o f attacks on particular prophets or prophecies,
e.g. II. I io6ff, Od. 11 i78ff, and in a famous speech at II. x ii 23i f f Hector, dismissing
Polydam as’ interpretation o f an omen, says that he does not care whether birds fly to
the right or to the le ft: there is one best omen, to fight for the fatherland.
 i8 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
1664 was prepared to fall back on this. In this way the wizard’s procedure could be
virtually foolproof. For if the patient recovered it was a tribute to the cunning
man’s perception, and if he died then the witch was to blame.'^^
A lthough it is not witches or other m agicians, but the gods, whom
the charlatans attacked in On the Sacred Disease invoke, the w ay they
are said to excuse themselves is strikingly similar. ‘ T h e y also em p loy’ ,
the H ippocratic writer reports, ‘ other pretexts so that, if the patient
be cured, their reputation for cleverness is enhanced, w hile, if he dies,
they can excuse themselves by explaining that the gods are to blam e
w hile they themselves did nothing w rong.’ ^^
Y e t whilst references to anthropological and other sources shows
that there are certain similarities between points that On the Sacred
Disease makes in its attacks on the purifiers and w hat can read ily be
found elsewhere, the criticisms in our H ippocratic text do exhibit
certain exceptional features. Evans-Pritchard, for instance, em ­
phasised that although m any A zande suspect individual witchdoctors
o f being frauds, there is no scepticism about witchdoctorhood in
g en eral: ‘ I particularly do not wish to give the impression that there
is any one who disbelieves in witch-doctorhood. M ost o f m y
acquaintances believed that there are a few entirely reliable prac­
titioners, but that the m ajority are quacks.’-^^H e observed that ‘ faith
and scepticism are alike traditional. Scepticism explains failures o f
witch-doctors, and being directed towards particular witch-doctors
even tends to support faith in others, ’^s Sim ilarly, although there is
this m ajor difference in the m aterial that Thom as dealt w ith, that
general scepticism about w itchcraft was occasionally expressed in
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century E n g la n d ,T h o m a s too drew
Thom as 1971, p. 247, and cf. p. 401 on astrology.
C h. I para. 20 (G) (L v i 356.gfF).
^ Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 185.
■
♦5 Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 193.
For exam ple by R egin ald Scot, in his Discoverie o f Witchcraft (1584) 1964, on which see
Thom as 1971, pp. 684f especially. Although Scot has a four-fold classification o f
witches, and adm itted they existed in the sense that he admitted the reality o f ‘ im ­
postors, poisoners, scolds and deluded persons ’, the key point is that he denied that any
o f them had any supernatural power. A lthough Scot had some followers, Thom as went
on to note (p. 685) that ‘ most members of the educated classes remained slow to accept
the full implications o f his thesis. . . Scot’s position remained that o f a self-conscious
m inority.’ O ne m ay also compare J . Needham ’s account (1954-, n Section 14,
pp. 346ff) o f the sceptical tradition in Chinese thought. T here are some adm ittedly
rather lim ited signs o f critical and rationalistic attitudes towards divination in two
i' third-century b.c. writers, Hsun Chhing (see Dubs 1927, pp. 68ff, and 1928, p p. I79ff)
and H an Fei (see Liao 1939, e.g. pp. i56ff, and 1959, e.g. p. 308), and a more general
attack in H uan T ’an (43 b .c .-a .d . 28). In Fragm ent 210 of H uan T ’an (Pokora 1975,
p. 239) we read: ‘ T o d a y all the artful and foxy, magicians o f small talent, as well as the
soothsayers, disseminate and reproduce diagrams and documents, falsely praising the
records o f prognostication. By deception and misinformation, by greed and dishonesty.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 19
attention to the w ay in w hich failures in the predictions o f individual
astrologers did nothing to underm ine, and even confirmed, b elief in
astrology as a whole.
Everyone knew that some practitioners were better than others and that the
profession was infested by charlatans and quacks. . . The paradox was that the
mistakes of any one astrologer only served to buttress the status of the system as a
whole, since the client’s reaction was to turn to another practitioner to get better
advice, while the astrologer himself went back over his calculations to see where
he had slipped up.'*’
W h at is im portant in the attack expressed by the author o f On the
Sacred Disease is that it is directed against all the purifiers, and against
any idea that the sacred disease or any other disease is the result o f
divine intervention, indeed against any idea that ritual purifications
can influence natural phenom ena in any w ay. H e w rites:
If these people claim to know how to draw down the moon, cause an eclipse of the
sun, make storms and fine weather, rain and drought, to make the sea too rough
for sailing or the land infertile, and all the rest of their nonsense, then, whether
they claim to be able to do it by rites or by some other knowledge or practice,
they seem to be impious rogues.'*®
T h e H ippocratic author here and elsewhere clearly has in view not
ju st this or that practitioner, but such practitioners as a whole^ not
ju st this or that instance o f the b elief in divine intervention causing
diseases or in the ability to influence natural phenom ena by ritual
practices, but, again, such beliefs in general.
T h e author o f On the Sacred Disease is evidently confident enough
to attack his opponents’ underlying assumptions as such, and this
they lead the ruler astray. H ow can we fail to suppress and banish such things? ’ (cf. also
Frr. 40, 58, 68, 157, Pokora 1975, pp. 31, 5of, 65, isG f). T he position of W an g Chhung
(a . d . 27-97) is particularly interesting: as both J . Needham 1954-, n pp. 368!?, and
Forke 1907, pp. i6ff, point out, m any o f his criticisms o f teleology, o f superstitions and
o f im aginary causal connections between things are strikingly similar to those that can
be cited from Greco-Rom an sources, especially Lucretius. W hile W ang C hhung did not
reject omens and portents com pletely, he attacked not just particular groups o f diviners,
but also the general assumptions on which common methods o f divination were based,
as for exam ple those using milfoil and tortoise shells in ch. 71 o f his work Lun Heng
(Forke 1907, ch. 14, pp. 182-90). ‘ As a matter of fact, diviners do not ask Heaven and
Earth, nor have weeds or tortoise shells spiritual qualities.’ Nevertheless ‘ when a lucky
man cuts up a tortoise, he finds auspicious omens, whereas an unlucky one, grasping
the milfoil, obtains contrary signs ’ - even though this is not Heaven replying to the
diviner, but a matter o f chance (cf. also Forke 1907, p p. I73ff). Sim ilarly he rejects the
idea that dead men become ghosts, but not that there are ghosts or phantoms - which
he explains as being formed by the Y a n g fluid. ‘ Thus we hold that the dead do not
become ghosts, are not conscious and cannot hurt people. Consequently, it is evident
that the ghosts, which are seen, are not the vital force o f dead men, and that, when men
have been hurt, it cannot have been done through this vital fo rce’ (Forke 1907, p. 201,
cf. pp. 2 3 9 flF).
Thom as 1971, p. 401. T h e argum ent that lack o f skill was to blam e for failures was
common in antiquity, e.g. Cicero, Div. 1 52.118.
C h. I paras. 2gf (G) (cf. L vi 358.1911) and cf. ch. i para. 31 (G) (L v i 36o.6ff).
20 The criticism, o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
im m ediately raises the question o f w hat his ow n explanation o f the
sacred disease was. His account, w hich brings epilepsy under a
general theory o f diseases, is explicit, detailed and, in parts, sur­
prising. ‘ T h e brain is responsible for this disease’ , he says, ‘ as it is
for the other very severe diseases. I shall explain clearly the m anner
in w hich it comes about and the reason (ττρόφασις) for it . ’ ^ 9 Th ere
are ‘ vein s’ 5 ° leading up to the brain from all over the body, and he
proceeds to give a quite com plex account o f these to w hich I shall
return. These ‘ vein s’ , he believes, norm ally carry air, air being
responsible, in his view , for, am ong other things, sensation and
consciousness .51 B ut if the air in the ‘ vein s’ ‘ remains still and is left
behind in some part o f the body, then that part becomes pow erless’ .52
H e goes on to describe a variety o f other conditions that m ay arise
when the air is obstructed by discharges, especially by phlegm , and
then applies this general theory to epilepsy w hich he describes as
follows: ‘ Should these routes for the passage o f phlegm from the
brain be blocked, the discharge enters the veins w hich I have
described. This causes loss o f voice, choking, foam ing at the m outh,
clenching o f the teeth and convulsive m ovements o f the h an ds; the
eyes roll, the patient becomes unconscious and, in some cases, passes
a stool . ’ 5 3 H e then promises, and gives, an explanation o f each o f
these symptoms in turn. Thus ‘ loss o f v o ic e ’, he says,
occurs when the phlegm suddenly descends in the veins and blocks them so that
air can pass neither to the brain nor to the hollow veins nor to the body cavities,
and thereby inhibits respiration. . .Therefore, when the veins are shut off from
this supply of air by the accumulation of phlegm and thus cannot afford it passage,
the patient loses his voice and his wits.S'^
This account is supported by remarks concerning the observed
or supposed differences in the incidence o f the sacred disease am ong
different sections o f the population. H e suggests that the disease
attacks the phlegm atic, but not the b i l i o u s . ss H e notes that older
people are not killed by an attack o f the d i s e a s e , but that the young
C h. 3 para, i (G) (L v i 366.5^).
5° I use the conventional translation for φλέβες, though it should be understood that the
vessels in question are imagined as carrying air and phlegm , for example, as well as
blood.
5 ' T h e chief proponent of the view that air is responsible for intelligence was Diogenes o f
Apollonia (Frr. 4 and 5): of. also Anaximenes Fr. 2.
52 C h. 4 para. 2 (G) (L v i 368.5f).
53 C h. 7 para, i (G) (L v i 372.417). T his account was considered accurate enough to be
paraphrased by Osier 1947, p. 1364, in his own description of G rand M ai, or major
epilepsy.
s·* C h. 7 paras. 3 and 7 (G) (L v i 372.ioff, 22f).
55 E.g. ch. 5 para, i (G) (L v i 368 .iof).
5* E.g. ch. 9 para, i (G) (L v i 376. i7 f).
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 21
are p articularly prone to it.s 7 H e m aintains that ‘ the discharge o f
phlegm takes place m ore often on the right side o f the body than on
the left because the veins on that side are m ore numerous and o f
greater calibre than on the le ft’,®^ and he states that ‘ attacks are most
likely to occur when the w ind is southerly; less when it is northerly,
less still when it is in any other q u a r t e r a r g u i n g that the winds have
a direct effect on the body, especially the brain.
F inally at the end o f the w ork he puts forward a general aetiology
o f diseases:
This so-called ‘ sacred ’ disease is due to the same causes (προφάσιεξ) as all other
diseases, to the things we see come and go [i.e. to and from the body], the cold
and the sun too, the changing and inconstant wi nds. . . Each [disease] has its own
nature (φύσιζ) and power (δύναμίζ) and there is nothing in any disease which is
unintelligible or which is insusceptible to treatment. T he majority of maladies may
be cured by the same things as caused t hem. . . A man with the knowledge of how
to produce by means of a regimen dryness and moisture, cold and heat in the
human body, could cure this disease too provided that he could distinguish the
right moment for the application of the remedies. He would not need to resort to
purifications (καθαρμοί) and magic (μαγίη)®° and all that kind of charlatanism.®^
As these quotations indicate, the w riter exhibits an extraordinary
self-assurance in the theories and explanations he advances not only
about the causes and cures o f epilepsy and other diseases, but also
about the internal structures and functioning o f the body. Y e t m any
o f those theories and explanations are quite fanciful. His account o f
respiration is that ‘ when a m an draws in breath through the m outh
and nose, the air passes first to the brain and then the greater part
goes to the stom ach, but some flows into the lungs and some to the
veins. From these places it is dispensed throughout the rest o f the
b od y b y means o f the veins.’^2
His descriptions o f the ‘ vein s’ themselves too is very largely
im aginary. L ike m any other early G reek a n a t o m i s t s , ^ ^ he speaks o f
two particularly im portant vessels, one connected with the liver and
the other w ith the spleen, and some o f w hat he says m ay be thought
to reflect some knowledge o f the m ain trunks o f the inferior vena cava
and the abdom inal aorta. D escribing the vein connected w ith the
5’ E.g. ch. 8 paras, i f and ch. lo para. 2 (G) (L v i 374.2iflF and 378 .i2ff).
58 C h. 10 para, i (G) (L v i 378.1 o f).
5® C h. 13 para, i (G) (L v i 384.4ff).
Littre reads μσγευμάτων, Jones μαγεΙηξ, for μαγίηξ (Grensemann).
C h. 18 paras, i f f (G) (L v i 3 9 4 ·9 - 3 9 6 ·9 )·
C h. 7 para. 4 (G) (L v i 37 2 .i4 ff).
T h e notion o f two vessels, one connecting the liver with the right arm, the other the
spleen w ith the left, occurs in Diogenes o f A pollonia Fr. 6 (Aristotle, HA 5 i2 a 4 ff, 9ff,
agff) and Polybus (Aristotle, H A 5 i2 b 3 2 ff = Nat. Horn. ch. 11, L v i 60.iff) and
reappears in a modified form in Aristotle him self {HA 5 i4 a 3 2 ff, b s ff).
22 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
liver, he says;^'^ ‘ one h a lf runs down on the right side in relation w ith
the kidney and the lum bar muscles, to reach the inside o f the thigh
and then continues to the foot. It is called the “ hollow v e in ” .’ 6 s But
then he goes o n :
T h e other half courses upwards through the right side of the diaphragm and the
right lung; branches split off to the heart and to the right arm while the remainder
passes up behind the clavicle on the right side of the neck and there lies sub-
cutaneously so as to be visible. It disappears close to the ear and then divides; the
thickest and largest and most capacious part finishes in the brain while smaller
branches go separately to the right ear, the right eye and to the nostril
A lth ou gh the account o f the lower part o f the liver-vein m ay be
thought to correspond, very roughly, to the inferior vena cava, this
identification breaks down when we find the liver- and spleen-veins
correlated w ith the right and left sides o f the body respectively . ^ 7
His picture o f the vascular system - like that o f m any other G reek
writers^^ - is strongly coloured b y his expectations o f general bilateral
sym m etry and b y a firm conviction in the superiority o f the right-
hand s i d e . T h u s on the spleen-vein he sim ply notes: ‘ It is similar
to that com ing from the liver, but is thinner and weaker.
T h e boldness o f his general pathology and therapeutics is equally
striking. T h e idea that certain diseases are cured by w hat causes
them, or b y their opposites, is a comm on one in G reek m edical
writings. H ere w e find the principle generalised: ‘ T h e m ajority o f
m aladies m ay be cured b y the same things as caused them .’^i Jt jg
particularly rem arkable that he should claim that there is no
disease - not even epilepsy - that is not susceptible to treatm ent, and
indeed b y fairly simple means, to ju d g e from his reference to the
control o f dryness, moisture, cold and heat b y diet. 72
A lth ou gh the description the writer gives o f an epileptic attack is
accurate enough as far as it goes, and so too are some o f his remarks
concerning the incidence o f the d i s e a s e , 7 3 most o f the pathological,
‘ 4 C h. 3 para. 4 (G) (L v i 3 66 .i2 ff).
κοίλη φλέψ, the regular term, in G reek anatomists, for the vena cava.
66 C h. 3 paras. 5 -7 (G) (L v i 366 .i5ff).
67 Note especially the reference to the right ear and the right eye, as well as the right arm,
in the account o f the connections o f the liver-vein.
68 See further below, pp. i s y f
69 Cf. Lloyd 1966, pp. 48ff, and 1973.
70 See ch. 3 para. 8 (G) (L v i 366.23ff).
7 Ϊ C h. 18 para. 3 (G) (L vi 394. is f ) , quoted above, p. 21.
72 C h. 18 paras. 2 and 6 (G) (L v i 394. i4f, 396.5(1), quoted above, p. 21. H e notes,
however, that epilepsy m ay not be curable if it is firm ly established (ch. 2 para. 3 (G)
(L VI 364.12!?)).
’ 3 For exam ple that the young are more prone to the disease than older people (see
above, pp. 2of). Cf. Osier 1947, p. 1363: ‘ in a large proportion the disease begins shortly
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 23
anatom ical and physiological theories are highly speculative and
schem atic, and this prompts one to ask how far he attem pted to
support his ideas b y observation and research. A m ong the - fairly
rare - occasions on w hich we find attempts m ade to collect and use
em pirical evidence, two are worth considering especially. First, when
he speaks about the role o f the winds in the disease, he suggests that
the effects o f the south wind in particular on the fluids in the body
can be inferred from the changes it brings about on things outside the
body. ‘Jars in the house or in the cellars w hich contain w ine or any
other liquid are influenced b y the south wind and change their
appearance . ’ 7 4 A lthough it is not clear precisely w hat change the
w riter had remarked or had in m ind, 7 s he was evidently attempting to
point to observable data outside the body in order to establish or
support conclusions about w hat happens inside it. 76
T h e second passage is m ore striking. In this the writer sets out to
justify his suggestion that the sacred disease is due to the brain being
flooded w ith phlegm especially w hen the wind is southerly. It is
particularly hard to cure then since ‘ the brain has become m ore
moist than norm al and is flooded w ith phlegm . This renders dis­
charges m ore frequent. T h e phlegm can no longer be com pletely
separated out; neither can the brain, w hich remains wet and soaked,
be dried u p . ’ 7 7 But then the w riter goes on:
'■h This observation results especially from a study of animals, particularly of goats
which are liable to this disease. Indeed, they are peculiarly susceptible to it. I f you
cut open the head to look at it, you will find that the brain is wet, full of fluid and
foul-smelling, convincing proof that disease and not the deity is harming the
body .78
It is clear from this passage that the idea o f carrying out a post­
m ortem exam ination on an anim al had occurred to this writer, and
I this is quite exceptional not only for the period at w hich the treatise
' was composed, but for any period in antiquity, since post-mortem
investigation to establish the cause o f death or to throw ligh t on the
aetiology o f diseases never becam e a regular procedure in the ancient
before puberty. It is well always to be suspicious o f “ epilepsy” beginning in adult life,
for in a m ajority o f such cases the disease is not epilepsy. ’
C h . 13 para. 8 (G) (L v i 384.22!?).
7 * T h e writer seems to have in mind not so much a change in the shape o f the jars (as
some translations imply) as in their appearance or - more plausibly - in that o f the
liquids they contain.
76 Cf. Anaxagoras’ dictum δψΐξ των άδήλων τά φαινόμενα, ‘ things that are apparent are the
vision o f things that are u n cle ar’ (Fr. 2 ia ), on which see below, p. 134.
” C h. II p ara. 2 (G) (L v i 382.2!?).
7 * C h. II paras. 3-5 (G) (L v i 382.6!?).
24 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
w orld . 7 9 It is, to be sure, not certain that the w riter o f On the Sacred
Disease actually carried out the inspection he suggests: if he did not,
that w ould not be the first nor the last time that a test that could be
conducted in practice was treated by an ancient w riter as a hypo­
thetical exercise - a thought experiment. But if we assume, as perhaps
we m ay, that he did do the test he describes, the result is as interesting
for w hat is om itted as for w hat is included. T h e statement that ‘ the
brain is wet, full o f fluid and foul-sm elling’ does indeed help to
achieve w hat the w riter wanted, nam ely to estabhsh that the ‘ sacred
disease ’ is the result o f natural causes: ‘ disease, and not the deity, is
harm ing the b o d y ’ . A t the same tim e we m ay rem ark that it
apparently did not occur to the writer to check the description o f the
veins leading to the brain w hich he had set out in explaining the
origin o f the d i s e a s e . Y e t m uch o f w hat he presents b y w ay o f w hat
w e should call anatom ical theories could have been verified by
observation. A lthough the possibility o f direct inspection, using
dissection, is m entioned in this one context, at least, in fact the w riter
evidently tested very few, i f any, o f his general anatom ical doctrines
b y this method.
These texts certainly show that this w riter occasionally thought to
support his theories by appealing not ju st to w hat could easily be
observed, but to the results o f deliberate research. But they also
illustrate just how lim ited the research in question was. M a n y o f
his doctrines are not so supported at all. Furtherm ore m any could have
been disproved, or at least seriously underm ined, b y the use o f quite
simple techniques o f investigation, including techniques (such as
post-mortem dissection) that the w riter him self refers to.
But w hile his attempts to provide em pirical backing for his own
ideas are often feeble and abortive, the deploying o f critical and
destructive arguments to defeat his opponents is clearly one o f his
strengths. As we have rem arked, he uses a w ide variety o f arguments
79 Herodotus (iv 58) says that the fact that the grass in Scythia is very ‘ bilious’ m ay be
judged by opening the bodies o f the cattle (though he does not describe this further).
Otherwise our evidence is late. T h e nearest ancient parallel to the text in Morb. Sacr.
is, perhapw, the story in Plutarch (which m ay well be apocryphal) that Anaxagoras had
the head o f a one-horned ram opened in order to demonstrate that its deform ity was
due to natural causes {Pericles ch. 6). As regards post-mortem dissection o f men, this
seems to be im plied by Pliny {Nat. x ix 26.86) when, in mentioning that radish juice
is a specific for certain diseases o f the internal organs, he says that the kings in Egypt
had the bodies o f the dead dissected (he does not specify whether men or animals, but
the former seems more likely in the context). Y e t if carried out at all, such a procedure
was clearly not a regular one. O n the early history o f dissection, see further below,
pp. i56ff.
See above, pp. 2 if, on ch. 3 paras. 3-8 (G) (L v i 366.1 off).
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 25
against the ‘ m ages’ and ‘ purifiers’ , and some o f these are particularly
interesting when considered as techniques o f refutation. A t one
point, for instance, he mentions that the purifiers prohibit the eating
o f goat m eat, the w earing o f goat skins and the use o f goat skin
blankets. ‘ I suppose’ , he says, ‘ that none o f the inhabitants o f the
interior o f L ib y a can possibly be healthy seeing that they use goat
skins and eat goat meat. In fact, they possess neither blanket,
garm ent nor shoe that is not m ade o f goat skin, because goats are the
only animals they keep.’ ^i I f we supply w hat the writer m erely leaves
im plicit here, w e have an argum ent o f the form that later cam e to
be known as M odus Tollens^^ (‘ I f A, then B\ b ut not therefore
not A ') . I f goat skins are responsible, then the Libyans w ould be
expected to suffer especially from the disease; but that is not the
case; so goat skins cannot be held to be responsible.
A second instance o f a similar type o f argum ent occurs when he
adopts as one o f his premisses the supposed distinction in the
incidence o f the disease am ong the phlegm atic and the bilious.
‘ A nother im portant proof that this disease is no more divine than
any other lies in the fact that the phlegm atic are constitutionally
liable to it while the bilious escape. Y e t if its origin were divine, all
types w ould be affected alike w ithout this particular distinction.
A ga in the im plied argum ent is a M odus Tollens; if the disease is
divine, it should attack all equally; but it does not do so; so the
disease is no more divine than any other.
A lthough M odus Tollens as such is not stated in general terms
until Aristotle , 8 4 and not form ally analysed until the Stoics in the
early H ellenistic p e r i o d , ^ve find plenty o f examples o f the use o f
arguments o f that general type in the philosophers and m edical
writers - and indeed in other authors - before Plato. H ere then is
one powerful technique o f refutation, the developm ent o f w hich we
shall consider in detail later.^^ W e m ay observe here, however, that
in both the examples we have taken from On the Sacred Disease the
w riter presupposes w hat is at issue between him and his opponents,
C h. I para. 22 (G) (L v i 3 5 6 .i5 ff). T h e writer continues (para. 23) with a second
argum ent based on his opponents’ premisses: see below, p. 55.
Now more often called D enying the Consequent.
*3 C h. 2 paras. 6-7 (G) (L v i 364.2off).
Thus in the context of showing that it is not possible to draw false conclusions validly
from true premisses, Aristotle states that ‘ If, when A is, it is necessary that B is, then,
when B is not, it is necessary for A not to b e ’ {APr. 53b i iff).
T h e schema o f the second of the Stoics’ elem entary arguments is: ‘ I f the first, then the
second; but not the second; and so not the first.’ See, for example, Sextus, M . viii 227,
cf. 225, and for discussion, see M ates 1961, pp. 7off, Frede 1974, pp. i27fT, i48ff.
See below, ch. 2.
26 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
nam ely the doctrine o f the uniform ity o f nature, the regularity o f
natural causes and effects. I f a factor is to be held to be a cause or
contributory agent in bringing about a disease, then the action o f
that factor must be supposed to be uniform. I f w earing goat skins is
relevant, then this must be so whenever and wherever that is done.
Indeed the gods too (whom his opponents invoke) are assumed by the
H ippocratic author to be uniform in their b eh avio u r: he takes it for
granted that they w ould not discriminate between the phlegm atic
and the bilious.
T h e two interrelated concepts o f nature, φύσι$,^^ and cause, to
express w hich he uses such terms as αίτίη, αίτιος and πρόφασις,®® pro­
vide the key to the w riter’s own position. ‘ N a tu re ’, for him, implies
a regularity o f cause and effect. Diseases, like everything else that is
natural, have determ inate causes and this rules out the idea o f their
being subject to divine (‘ supernatural’) intervention or influence o f
any sort. Interestingly enough, however, the w riter o f On the Sacred
Disease does not exclude the use o f the notion o f the ‘ d iv in e ’ al­
together. Indeed his view is not that no disease is divine, but that all
are: all are divine and all n a t u r a l . F o r him, the whole o f nature is
divine, 9 o but that idea does not im ply or allow any exceptions to the
rule that natural effects are the result o f natural causes.
This suggests that w hat we are dealing w ith has some o f the features
o f a paradigm sw itch : the author and his opponents disagree funda­
m entally on w hat sort o f account to give o f the ‘ sacred disease’, that
is on w hat w ould count as an ‘ exp lan ation ’ or ‘ cau se’ o f this and
other phenom ena. U nlike the Zande sceptics described b y Evans-
Pritchard, the H ippocratic writer rejects the notion o f supernatural
*7 C h. I para. 2, ch. 2 paras, i, 2, 6, ch. 11 para. 2, ch. 13 paras. 9, 10, ch. 14 paras. 5,
6, ch. 17 para. 4, ch. 18 para. 2 (G) (L v i 352.2f, 364.iof, 366.1, 382.3, 386.4, 388.4-7,
392.1 if, 394.14). Cf. H olwerda 1955.
88 αΙτίη, alxios ch. i paras. 20, 21, 23, 25, 32, 33, 34, 37, 43, ch. 3 para, i, ch. 17 paras. 5,
6, 8 (G) (L VI 356.13, 15, 358.3, 10, 360.12, 15, 16, 362.3, 16, 366.5, 392.13, 17, 3 9 4 -2 )·
■ττρόφασίξ ch. i paras. 2, 7, 20, ch. 2 para. 2, ch. 3 para, i, ch. 10 paras. 4, 7, ch. 15
para. 2, ch. 18 para, i (G) (L v i 352.4, 354.5, 356.10, 13, 364.iof, 366.7, 378.18, 380.8,
388.16f, 394.9f). See especially the studies o f Deichgraber 1933c, W eidauer 1954,
pp. 8flF, 32ff, Norenberg 1968, pp. 49ff, 6 iff, Rawlings 1975, pp. 36-55, and cf. further
below, p. 54 n. 231.
*9 As he puts it in the final chapter, for exam ple: ‘ T his so-called “ sacred” disease is due
to the same causes as all other diseases, to the things we see come and go, the cold and
the sun too, the changing and inconstant winds. These things are divine so that there
is no need to regard this disease as more divine than any other; all are alike divine and
all human. Each has its own nature and power and there is nothing in any disease which
is unintelligible or which is insusceptible to treatm ent’ (ch. 18 paras. 1-2 (G) (L v i
394.9ff). Cf. H. W . M iller 1953, K udlien 1967, p. 58, Norenberg 1968, pp. 68ff,
D ucatillon 1977, pp. i59ff.
O ne m ay com pare the evidence, noted above, p. 11 n. 9, that some philosophers too
held that that from which the world originates is divine.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 27
intervention in natural phenom ena as a whole, as w hat m ight even be
called a category mistake. Even when we have to deal w ith the
divine, the divine is in no sense superrnXuidiX. W e have, however, seen
that, although appeals to observation and research are m ade, the
em pirical support for his ow n theories and explanations is often weak,
and indeed m any o f his ideas could have been underm ined b y quite
simple tests. A gain , although he deploys a range o f techniques o f
refutation to good effect, the key notion o f the uniform ity o f nature
is an assumption, not a proposition for w hich he explicitly argues.
On the Sacred Disease provides a full and in general clear statement
o f a controversy concerning the origin and treatm ent o f the sacred
disease as seen from the H ippocratic w riter’s side. But w e must now
place this w ork in the w ider context o f debate in w hich it was
composed. First there are other texts that afford further illustrations
o f the criticism o f the b elief in the supernatural intervention in
diseases. A t the same time that b elief continued to be m aintained in
different forms b y a variety o f writers in the fifth and fourth, not to
m ention subsequent, centuries. T h e developm ent o f the notions o f
nature and o f cause, and the survival o f certain traditional beliefs,
present, as we shall see, a com plex set o f interrelated issues. O u r task
now is to set out the ch ief evidence from both philosophy and
m edicine that w ill help to define the interaction o f criticism and
popular assumptions.
T h e closest parallel to w hat we find in On the Sacred Disease
comes in the treatise On Airs Waters Places, another w ork o f the
late fifth or early fourth c e n t u r y , w h i c h expresses such similar
views to those in On the Sacred Disease on certain topics that it has
sometimes been thought to have been b y the same author.92 In
N o precise date can be assigned to Air. (which m ay, in any case, not be a unity, see
below, n. 92) any more than to Morb. Sacr. T here are possible echoes of views o f Diogenes
o f Apollonia in the account o f evaporation in ch. 8 (cf. D K 6 4 A 17), and it has been
thought that ch. 22 echoes Euripides, Hippolytus η ί (which w ould give a date for that
chapter after 428) although the sentiment expressed - that the gods are pleased by the
honours they receive from men - is a comm onplace. T here are m any similarities
between Aer. and Morb. Sacr., although there is no agreement as to which treatise was
written first (for Air. being the earlier, see, for example, Heinimann 1945, p. 209: for
Morb. Sacr. being the earlier, see, for example, H . D iller 1934, p. 100, Pohlenz 1938,
p. 35). It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that both were composed within about
20 years o f the turn o f the fifth and the fourth centuries.
9 * See, for example, W ilam owitz 1901, p p. i6fF, H . D iller 1934, pp. 94ff (for identity o f
authorship o f Morb. Sacr. and Air. chh. i - i i) , and cf. Grensemann 1968, pp. 7-18 . But
contrast W . H . S. Jones 1923-31, 11 pp. I3 if, Edelstein 1931, p. 181 n. i, Heinim ann
1945, pp. 18iff. Y e t whether Air, as a whole, as we have it, was composed by the same
man is itself not certain. T h a t the treatise falls into two main halves (chh. i - i i and
chh. 12-24) been generally recognised at least since Fredrich 1899, p. 32 n. 2.
Although D eichgraber 1933a, p p. ii2 ff, Pohlenz 1938, pp. 3ff, 3 iff, and Heinim ann
28 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
ch. 22^3 the writer discusses the im potence that affects certain Scythians,
the so-called Anarieis. ‘ T h e Scythians themselves he says, ‘ attribute
this to a divine visitation and hold such men in awe and reverence,
because they fear for themselves.’ His own view on the general issue
is identical w ith that put forward in On the Sacred Disease: he believes
that all diseases are divine, but equally all are natural. As he puts i t :
‘ Each disease has a natural cause (φύσΐ5) and nothing happens
w ithout a natural cause.’ H e goes on to offer his own view o f the
cause o f the A narieis’ condition. Horse-riding, he suggests, leads to
varicose veins, w hich the Scythians then treat by cutting the vein
that runs behind each ear. It is this treatment, he claims, that causes
im potence: ‘ M y own opinion is that such treatm ent destroys the
semen ow ing to the existence o f veins behind the ears which, if cut,
cause im potence and it seems to me that these are the veins they
divid e.’ As w ith On the Sacred Disease, we m ay rem ark the quite
speculative nature o f the anatom ical theory im plied (the idea o f a
vein linking the ears and the seminal vessels). A n d as in that treatise,
so too this w riter refutes the idea o f divine intervention b y an im plied
M odus Tollens argum ent. H e states that the rich Scythians suffer
m ore from the condition than the poor - since the poor ride less than
the rich - and he proceeds: ‘ Y et, surely, i f this disease is m ore to be
considered a divine visitation than any other, it ought to affect not
the most noble and richest o f the Scythians only, but everyone
equally.’94
A third H ippocratic treatise that adopts a sim ilarly naturalistic
attitude towards p articularly frightening conditions is On the Diseases
o f Young G i r l s . This provides a brief account o f the sacred disease,
o f apoplexies and o f ‘ terrors ’ in which patients believe they see evil
δαίμονες. Y o u n g wom en who do not m arry when o f the age to do so
are, the w riter says, particularly liable to such complaints, w hich he
explains as due to a retention o f blood. H e remarks that when they
1945, pp. i7ofT, have argued that the two main parts are b y the same man, that view
has been contested: see, for instance, Edelstein 1931, pp. 57ff, and H. D iller 1934,
pp. 8gff (but cf. H. D iller 1942, pp. 65ff).
C M G I, I 74.10-75.25. M y translations are again based on those o f C hadw ick and
M ann 1978.
CM G I, I 7 5 .5 ff. T h e writer goes on, however, to consider the possibility that the gods
m ay not behave uniform ly in respect of the rich and the poor. I f there is any truth in
the belief that the gods take pleasure in sacrifices, one would expect the poor to be
more liable to this condition, not less (as the writer claims is in fact the case because the
poor do not ride). ‘ Surely it is the poor rather than the rich who should be punished.’
But he then proceeds: ‘ R eally, o f course, this disease is no more o f “ d iv in e” origin
than any other. A ll diseases have a natural origin and this peculiar m alady o f the
Scythians is no exception’ {CM C i, i 75 .13 -17).
’ s L vni 466-470.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 29
recover, wom en are often deceived by diviners (μάντιες) into dedi­
cating costly garm ents to Artem is, although their recovery is to be
attributed - he claims - m erely to the evacuation o f blood, and his
own recom m endation for treatm ent in such cases is that the girls
should m arry as soon as possible.^6
THE P E R S IS T EN C E OF T R A D IT IO N A L B E L IE F S : H ERO D O TU S
Y e t whilst in certain m edical circles, at l e a s t , the b elief in the
possibility o f supernatural intervention in diseases and in the efficacy
o f spells and purifications was vigorously attacked, such beliefs not
only persisted w id ely am ong ordinary people in the fifth and fourth
c e n t u r ie s ,b u t can be found in leading writers some o f whom are
generally claim ed as representatives, if not o f the ‘ enlightenm ent’, at
least o f the more advanced thought o f their period. T h e evidence in
H erodotus is particularly suggestive. O n the one hand his w ork
includes not only m uch natural history (topography, descriptions o f
flora and fauna), but also attem pted explanations o f such problem atic
phenom ena as the flooding o f the N ile (11 2off), explanations that are
directly com parable w ith those attributed to the Presocratic philo-
L VIII 468.17fT.
9’ But not in all: cf. below, pp. 4oflF.
Such beliefs can be attested from H om er and Hesiod (e.g. II. i 43-52, Od. v 395f,
IX 4 1 1, XIX 4 5 5 ff, Hesiod, Op. 240-5, c f lo a ff) to late antiquity (as we can see from, for
exam ple, Vhitaxch, DeSuperstitione i68 bc, G alen, C M G v ,9,2 205.28ff = K x v i i i b i7.9ff,
Plotinus, Enneads 11 9.14, Porphyry, De Abstinentia 11 40, as well as from a mass of
m agical papyri). In the period that particularly concerns us, the fifth and fourth
centuries B.C., such texts as Pindar, P. iii 5 iff, Aeschylus, A. lo ig ff, Eu. 649f, Sophocles,
Aj. 58if, Tr. I235f, Aristotle, HA 6o5a4ff, are evidence o f popular beliefs in super­
natural interventions in diseases and in the power o f spells, whilst pseudo-Demosthenes,
Against Aristogeiton x x v 79-80 (with Plutarch, Demosthenes ch. 14) implies that the
practice o f m agic could be the subject o f legal action. Plato took those who claim ed to
have special m agical powers and to be able to control the gods by sacrifices and spells
sufficiently seriously to issue a w arning against their evil influences in the Republic
364b ff and to legislate against them in the Laws 909 a -d , 933 a if (the latter passage
notes how difficult it is to get to the truth o f the matter in such cases). A t Phdr. 244d -
245 a Socrates, referring to the second kind o f ‘ divine madness’ , sp>eaks o f maladies that
afiiict certain families because o f ancient sins, and says that relief m ay be procured
from these by means o f worship involving rites and purifications (cf. also Chrm. I5 5e ff,
Smp. 202 6-203a, R. 426b, Tht. i4 9 cd and Pit. 280e among other Platonic texts).
T o this literary evidence m ay be added the m ainly epigraphical data concerning the
continued belief in god- or hero-healers, Apollo, Paean, H ygieia, and a variety o f local
heroes (see, for exam ple, Kutsch 1913), whilst the cult o f Asclepius him self grew in
im portance and spread during the latter part o f the fifth, and in the fourth, century
(see, for exam ple, H erzog 1931, Edelstein and Edelstein 1945 and cf. further below,
pp. 4of). T h e whole topic o f such popular beliefs has been extensively discussed and
docum ented: see especially H eim 1893, Tam bornino 1909, W einreich 1909, W achter
1910, D eubner 1910, Stemplinger 1922 and 1925, H alliday 1936, Edelstein (1937) 1967»
pp. 205fF, Dodds 1951, M oulinier 1952, Lan ata 1967, K u dlien 1968.
30 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
sophers . 9 9 In his descriptions o f the habits o f the crocodile (ii 68)
and o f the form o f the hippopotam us (ii 71) H erodotus employs the
term φ ύ σ ις- ‘ n a tu re’, ‘ ch aracter’ or ‘ g ro w th ’ - m uch as it is used in
connection w ith the philosophers’ ‘ inquiry into n a tu re’ (περι
φύσεω$ ίστορία) or in the H ippocratic C o r p u s . M o r e o v e r in
reporting beliefs and stories that invoke the m arvellous or the super­
natural he often records his own doubts or frank disbelief
O n the other hand there are other passages where he voices no
such d o u b t s , and on several occasions he him self endorses the idea
that misfortunes o f m any kinds, including diseases, m ay be the result
o f divine displeasure. Thus in discussing Cleom enes’ madness and
suicide he first recounts three views all o f w hich associated Cleom enes’
fate w ith some offence against the gods (vi 75). M ost Greeks said
that his misfortunes occurred because he suborned the Pythian
priestess to give judgem ent that D em aratus was not the son o f
A risto n ; the Athenians, however, said it was because he invaded the
precinct o f the gods at Eleusis, whilst the Argives held that it was
because he desecrated the tem ple o f Argus. H e later notes (vi 84)
that the Spartans said that ‘ heaven had no hand in Cleom enes’
madness ’ - έκ δαιμονίου μέν ούδενό$ μανηναι Κλεομένεα - w hich cam e
about rather because he had consorted w ith Scythians and becom e
a drinker o f neat wine - but H erodotus concludes his account b y
endorsing w hat he had represented as the general view , nam ely that
Cleom enes paid the penalty for w hat he had done to D e m a r a t u s .
A gain after describing the death o f Pheretim e following a disease in
See Aetius iv i . i f f and the other testimonies collected at D K i i a i (37) (Thales),
3 5 A I (Thrasyalkes), 4 1 A I 1 (Oenopides), 59A91 (Anaxagoras) and 64 a 18 (Diogenes
o f A pollonia).
*00 See H olwerda 1955, pp. 18 and 64, and cf. H eidel 1909-10, D eichgraber 1939,
Heinim ann 1945.
*0* Thus he reserves judgem ent, for example, about the story o f Salmoxis (iv 94-6),
about whether the Athenians were right to claim that it was in response to their
prayers that the North W ind struck the Persian fleet (vn 189), and about whether
the M ag i were responsible for the w ind’s abating (vii 191); he rejects, for instance,
E gyptian fables about the phoenix (11 73), stories about men w ith go at’s feet and men
who sleep six months o f the year (iv 25) and Scythian tales about were-wolves (iv 105).
*0* T hus at I 167 he records that men and animals from A gylla becam e crippled and
palsied when they passed the place where the Agyllaeans had stoned certain Phocaeans
to d e a th ; at v i 98 he says that an earthquake on Delos was sent by god as a portent
o f the evils to come and at vii 129 he endorses, but rationalises, the ThessaUan story
that the vale o f T em pe was caused by Poseidon, a reasonable behef because Poseidon
is the earthshaker and it was an earthquake that caused the rift in the mountains.
C f. also I I9 ff, 138, 174, II i i i , v i 27, vii 133 and ix 100.
C f. also III 33, where he says that Cambyses becam e mad either because o f the
Egyptian god Apis (whose sacred ca lf Cambyses had killed) or because Cam byses
suffered from the sacred disease. It is clear that Herodotus here treats the sacred
disease prim arily as a condition o f the body, though one that can affect the mind also.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 31
w hich her body becam e infested w ith worms, Herodotus com m ents:
‘ thus, it w ould seem, over-violent hum an vengeance is hated b y the
g od s’ .*°"^ F inally a text in w hich he mentions the Scythian Enareis
(no doubt the same group as that called Anarieis in On Airs Waters
Places ch. 22) enables a direct comparison to be m ade between him
and the H ippocratic author. W hereas On Airs Waters Places directly
refutes the idea that the im potence o f the Anarieis is caused b y a
g o d ,’ °5 Herodotus reports that it was the men who pillaged the
tem ple o f H eavenly A phrodite at Ascalon - they and their descen­
dants - who were afflicted b y the goddess with the ‘ female sickness’ .
H e makes it clear that he had this story from the Scythians them ­
selves, but there is no hint o f his doubting or rejecting it (i 105).
T h e evidence in Herodotus shows that it was perfectly possible to
combine engaging in inquiries concerning the ‘ n atu re’ o f various
phenom ena w ith adherence to such beliefs as that diseases could be
brought about b y the gods. Such a b elief was not threatened b y an
interest in - even by quite sustained research into - the character o f
particular phenom ena, only b y the generalistion that all such pheno­
m ena have natural causes. W h at counted was not just any notion o f
the nature or character o f particular things - the term φύσις itself
I was already used, after all, in a passage in the where Hermes
indicates the ‘ n a tu re’ o f a plant to Odysseus^°^ - but rather the
" application o f that notion in the form o f a universal rule, that every
^ physical object has a nature, that is, it manifests, or conforms to,
certain regularities and has a determ inate physical cause or causes.
N ature m ay be thought o f as itself divine, as in On the Sacred Disease^^"^
B ut once it was believed that natural phenom ena form a set every
m em ber o f which has determ inate physical causes, then it was no
longer enough to cite a god or supernatural being as responsible for
events (either for a specific occurrence o f a phenom enon, or even for
a group o f phenom ena such as a type o f disease). T h e notion o f divine
intervention had, then, either to be abandoned or to be redefined:
if m aintained, it had now to be seen either as the suspension c f nature
'O'* ώξ άρα άνθρώποισι α1 λίην ΙσχυραΙ τιμωρίαι πρός θεών έττίφθονοι γίνονται (ιν 205). T h e ex­
cessive revenge that Pheretime had exacted on the people o f Barce is described at iv
202. Cf. above, p. 28.
Od. x 302ff; Odysseus says that Hermes offered him a ‘ d ru g ’ (φάρμοίκον) ‘ pulling it
from the earth, and he showed me its nature (καί μοι φύσιν σύτοΟ §δειξε): it had a black
root, but a flower like m ilk; the gods call it “ m o ly ” , laut it is difficult for mortal men,
at least, to dig u p ’ . φΟσι?, interpreted b y H olwerda 1955, p. 63, as ‘ appearance’ here,
m ay also have some o f the other prim ary sense o f ‘ gro w th ’, the natural form being
thought o f as the result o f growth.
C f. above, p. 26 on Morb. Sacr. ch. 18, p. 28 on Aer. ch. 22 and p. 11 n. 9 on the
evidence for the M ilesian philosophers.
32 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
(that is, in later term inology, a miracle) or as in addition to it (when
the event w ould be ‘ doubly determ ined’, brought about both b y gods
and b y natural causes, the former w orking through the l a t t e r ) .
THE PH ILO SO PH IC A L BACKGROUND
N ow the origins o f the idea that all natural phenom ena are law -like
are, fairly evidently, to be sought not in the m edical writers them ­
selves, so m uch as in the Presocratic philosophers, particularly in the
group whom Aristotle calls the φυσιολόγοι, ‘ the inquirers into
n a tu re ’ . T h a t some such general principle had been explicitly
form ulated by the time we come to the end o f the Presocratic period
can be affirmed on the basis o f Leucippus Fr. 2, w hich states that
‘ N othing comes to be at random , but everything for a reason and b y
n e c e s s ity .’ T h e question is, rather, how m uch earlier a similar
principle was expressed or at least used, and here the lack o f original
texts for most o f the earlier Presocratics proves a serious handicap.
As we noted at the outset (p. 11) our secondary sources ascribe to
Thales, A naxim ander and Anaxim enes a num ber o f theories and
explanations concerning a variety o f w hat we should call natural
phenom ena. W hat our sources report generally takes the form o f a
naturalistic account,^° one that refers the phenom enon to be explained
to a determ inate physical cause, and one in w hich personal deities
p la y no role. M oreover a high proportion o f the theories and exp la­
nations recorded relate to phenom ena such as lightning and thunder,
earthquakes or eclipses, that were either terrifying or rare or both
and that had often, in m ythology, been associated w ith gods. W e
cannot know how far that predom inance reflects the particular
interests o f our doxographic sources, rather than those o f the
108 There is, to be sure, an element o f ‘ double determ ination’ (the combination o f a
‘ n atu ra l’ and a divine cause) in the account of Pheretim e’s death in Herodotus iv 205,
though it is absent, for instance, from the story about the Scythian Enareis, where
divine displeasure alone is mentioned (i 105). W h at must remain in some doubt is the
extent to which Herodotus saw nature as a universal principle, and all natural pheno­
mena as law-like.
ούδέν χρήμα μάτην γίνεται, άλλά πάντα ίκ λόγου τε καΐ ΐπτ’ άνάγκηξ. O u r source for this,
Aetius, is, adm ittedly, late: nor can we say with confidence just how strictly Leucippus
intended the principle to be applied, although the double formulation, both negative
and positive (‘ nothing. . . ’ ‘ everything. . . ’) may, if original, suggest at least an attem pt
at emphasis.
“ 0 E.g. the theory of lightning and thunder ascribed to Anaxim ander by Aetius (iii 3.1,
D K 12A23), nam ely that these phenom ena happen when wind, enclosed in a dense
cloud, bursts out violently. Even the speculative cosmogony attributed to A n axi­
mander in pseudo-Plutarch, Strom. 2 (a 10) takes a similar, naturalistic, form.
There is a whole literature devoted to problem atic or marvellous phenom ena
stretching from the fourth (if not the fifth) century B.C. to late antiquity. A lready
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 33
M ilesians themselves, but at least we m ay presume that they paid
considerable attention to m arvellous phenom ena. Furtherm ore our
sole surviving fragm ent o f A naxim ander is generally and surely
rightly interpreted as conveying an idea o f the w orld-order through
the legal metaphors ofju stice and reparation for w r o n g - d o i n g , ” 2 and
if that is correct, then it m ay be that he had some conception o f
natural phenom ena as a totality as subject to determ inate physical
causes.*^3 Nevertheless w e must recognise that this is far from certain.
W h a t w ould help to remove doubt w ould be an explicit statement
either like that o f Leucippus Fr. 2 or - clearer still - like some
H ippocratic formulations, as w hen the w riter o f On Airs Waters
Places puts it, in connection w ith diseases, that ‘ each has a nature
and nothing happens w ithout a natural c a u s e o r the author o f
On the Art writes: ‘ indeed, upon exam ination, the reality o f the
spontaneous (τό αυτόματον) disappears. E verything that happens
w ill be found to have some cause, and if it has a cause, the spon­
taneous can be no m ore than an em pty nam e.’ ^^s But no such
assertion is to be found in our extant evidence for the M ilesians."^
M oreover when w e turn to the w ork o f some o f the later Pre­
socratics for whom our inform ation is both fuller and m.ore reliable,
we find further evidence^^^ o f the dangers o f assuming that engage­
m ent in the inquiry into nature was necessarily accom panied b y a
sceptical attitude towards traditional beliefs in, for exam ple, the
possibility o f wonder-working. Empedocles"® illustrates the point
Herodotus pays particular attention to striking natural phenomena, and Aristotle
devoted a treatise to problem atic phenom ena o f m any different kinds (though the
Problemata that passes b y his nam e is not authentic).
*** διδόνοι γάρ αύτά δίκην καΐ τίσιν άλλήλοις Tfjs άδικίας κατά τήν τοΟ χρόνου τάξιν (D K Ι2 Β ΐ)
‘ For they p a y the penalty and recompense to one another for their injustice according
to the assessment o f tim e.’ O n the differing interpretations o f this fragment, see, for
exam ple, K a h n i960, pp. i66fT, G uthrie 1962, p p. 76-83, Classen 1970, col. 56flF.
Thereafter ‘ necessity’ and ‘ju stice ’ are used to express the law-like behaviour o f the
cosmos in, for exam ple, Heraclitus (Fr. 94: though for him ‘ju stice’ is ‘ strife’, Fr. 80)
and Parm enides’ Way o f Seeming (Fr. io .6 f). T h e importance o f the notion o f ‘ necessity’
in particular in conveying the orderliness o f nature was especially stressed b y Cornford
19 1 2 , chh. I and 2 , who saw the idea as having pre-philosophical origins. It should,
however, be noted that general references to a principle o f necessity are not equivalent
to a statement o f a universal rule to the effect that all phenom ena have natural causes.
C h. 22, CM G I, I 74.17, cf. also 75.16.
C h. 6, C M G I, I 13.1-4.
Neither in the meagre citations, nor indeed in the secondary comments o f our ancient
sources.
” 7 In addition to that from Herodotus, considered above, pp. 29ff.
A dm ittedly Empedocles belongs to the W est Greek philosophical tradition and the
influences both o f Pythagoreanism and o f the doctrines o f Parmenides are clear from
his fragments. But though there are obvious broad distinctions between this and the
Ionian tradition represented b y the Milesians, Anaxagoras and the atomists, for
exam ple, the question at issue here is on a point where Empedocles shares an interest
34 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
dram atically. His place in the history o f physical theory is assured.
A fter Parmenides had denied the possibility o f change and rejected
the senses as unreliable, Empedocles reinstated sense-perception and
interpreted coming-to-be in terms o f the m ixing and separating o f
the four ‘ roots’, earth, water, air and fire. W ith this doctrine o f
‘ roots’ Empedocles was responsible for the first clear statement o f the
idea o f an element in the sense o f the simple substances into w hich
other things can be analysed, and the particular four-element theory
he put forward was to prove, in one version or another, the most
influential physical theory not only in antiquity but through the
M iddle Ages and right dow n to the seventeenth century. Y e t apart
from the work On Nature''·^'^ Empedocles wrote another poem called
the Purifications, Καθαρμοί, w hich was concerned w ith the dow nfall,
wanderings and eventual redem ption o f the δαίμων. In Fr. 112 (which
is reported to have come at the beginning o f the poem) he speaks o f
him self as coming to the people o f A cragas as ‘ an im m ortal god, no
longer m ortal’, and he describes how they throng to him ‘ asking
w here the w ay towards gain lies, some desiring oracles, others seeking
to hear the word o f healing for every kind o f disease’ . W hether this
‘ w ord o f h ealin g’ consisted o f the sort o f advice we find in such
H ippocratic works as On Regimen and On Ajfections, or w hether it was
a m atter simply o f spells or charms - έπωδαί - is not clear from the
text, but the fact that the term for ‘ w o rd ’ is βάξΐ 5 - used o f the pro­
nouncements o f oracles in particular - suggests that the latter is more
likely. Nor, it seems, is it only in the Purifications that such claims are
m ade. In another fragm ent ( 1 1 1 ) w hich appears to belong to the
poem On Nature^^^ he promises to teach φάρμακα (‘ dru gs’, or perhaps
m ore generally ‘ r e m e d i e s ’^21) that are a defence for ills and old age,
and he states that his listener w ill be able to control the winds and
rain and drought, and even w ill bring the dead back to life.
T h e relationship between the poem On Mature and the Purifications -
w ith the lonians and a direct comparison is possible between him and them, nam ely
on how the ‘ inquiry concerning n atu re’ was viewed.
ΤΤερΙ φύσεωξ. This title was attached rather indiscriminately (as K irk and R aven
pu t it) to works by early philosophers (including Anaxim ander, Xenophanes and
H eraclitus), but we have no good grounds to doubt its applicability to Em pedocles’
physical poem. A text in V M ch. 20, CM G i, i s i .io f , already implies, if genuine
(though cf. Dihle 1963, pp. I45ff), that Empedocles wrote περί φΟσεωξ (whether or not
that was the actual title of his work) and his physical poem is referred to as τ ά φυσικά
b y both Aristotle {Mete. 3 8 2 a!) and Simplicius [In Ph. 157.27, 300.20, 381.29: he
speaks o f the w ork in two books).
On Nature is addressed to Pausanias (Fr. i), the Purifications to the Acragantines
(Fr. 112). Since the addressee o f Fr. i i i is singular, there is at least a prim a facie
presumption that that fragm ent belongs to the work On Nature.
O n the range o f meaning o f the term, see below, p. 44.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 35
and m ore generally that between ‘ science’ and ‘ relig io n ’ in the
thought o f Em pedocles - are am ong the most controversial topics in
the interpretation o f Presocratic p h i l o s o p h y .^22 But in any case no
simple hypothesis - for exam ple that he had abandoned the views
and interests o f the one w ork w hen he cam e to compose the other -
w ill m eet the point that he appears to m ake claims as a w onder­
w orker in both poems. A s to how Empedocles him self saw the
relationship between those claims and his investigations into natural
phenom ena, we have no direct evidence, and in particular the exact
status o f the m arvellous effects he refers to is not clear. It is certain
that they are not thought o f as produced at the whim o f personal
divine agencies like the O lym p ian gods. R ath er they are brought
about b y the m an w ith special knowledge. But the question that
remains unresolved is w hether Em pedocles held that the wise m an’s
know ledge enables him to suspend natural laws (to perform m iracles),
or w hether the wise m an m erely exploits the hidden powers o f nature
to produce effects that are contrary to nature not in the sense o f the
supernatural, but only in the sense o f the extra-ordinary.^23 C o n ­
siderations m ight be suggested in favour o f each o f these views, and
in the final analysis it m ay be that - w hether deliberately or not * ^ 4 _
Em pedocles him self was am bivalent on the issue. O n the one hand the
poem On Nature was clearly largely devoted to how things are and
how they come to be it included accounts o f the m aterial constitu­
tions o f com pound substances and w ent into such problems as the
processes o f vision and respiration in some detail. *26 O n the other
hand the extravagant character o f the claims he m ade in Frr. 111
and 1 12 - and the language he m ad e them in - im m ediately tend to
align Empedocles w ith other wonder-workers.*
I f the M ilesians m ay be said to have initiated the inquiry into
natural phenom ena as a m ore or less systematic investigation, the
For a survey o f the views that have been put forw ard on this topic, see, for exam ple,
G uthrie 1965, pp. i22ff, i32ff.
**3 In the former case he would, in the latter he would not, have denied the principle
that all phenom ena are law-like.
It m ay be that the question had not occurred to Em pedocles: but it is a k o possible
that it had, and that he was deliberately hedging on the issue, even deliberately
allowing some o f his audience (at least) to be misled b y the language o f Frr. 111 and 112
(cf. the discussion of άποαή in G reek thought in Detienne 1967, especially ch. 6, and
Detienne and V ern ant 1978).
“ 5 A lthough he denies that there is any absolute coming-to-be, i.e. from nothing:
e.g. Fr. 8, where the term φύσι$ is now generally interpreted as ‘ b irth ’ .
Frr. 96 and 98 deal with com pound substances, Frr. 84 and 100 with vision and
respiration.
N ote particularly that Em pedocles suggests that the person whom he addresses will
be able to control the winds ‘ at w ill’ , Fr. 111.5.
36 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
aims and presuppositions w ith w hich that inquiry was undertaken
varied greatly from one Presocratic philosopher to another. It could
be, and often was, conducted by m en who did not m ake use of, and
m ay have intended directly to supplant,*2s traditional beliefs in
divine interventions in natural phenom ena, who sought determ inate
physical causes o f w hatever appeared striking or exceptional, and
w ho held that every physical phenom enon could be so explained.
A t the same time it was sometimes assumed that the knowledge
gained from the investigation could be used to bring about effects
that - at the least - run counter to the regularities o f nature herself
W hen Aristotle records the views o f the ‘ physiologists’, the emphasis
is very m uch on their accounts o f the m aterial causes o f things, o f
change and coming-to-be, and on their attempts to provide expla­
nations o f particular natural phenom ena . ^ ^ 9 A ga in Plato, in some o f
his comments on those who investigated nature,i 3 o p articularly
attacks those^^i whom he represents as atheists because they saw the
w orld as a w hole as the product o f ‘ n atu re’ and ‘ ch an ce’ as opposed
to ‘ reason’ ‘ g o d ’ and ‘ a r t’, w here ‘ n atu re’ stands prim arily for the
interplay o f m echanical causes and effects,*32 and where the ch ief
thrust o f P lato’s polem ic is that these theorists denied or neglected
the role o f a benevolent and divine creative intelligence.133 Y e t on
the other side Em pedocles can be taken as the prim e ^ ^ 4 representative
This m ay be thought likely in the case o f Democritus, in particular, if he saw belief
in the gods as in part a mistaken inference from terrifying natural phenom ena (Sextus,
M . IX 24, cf, above, p. 14). Cf. also his reported enthusiasm for αΐτιολογίαι (Fr. ii8 ,
together with the titles o f a series o f works in the list in Diogenes Laertius, ix 47).
T o Aristotle (as also to Plato, see below, n. 132) some o f the natural philosophers,
and especially the atomists, appeared as determinists, that is as having explained
everything in terms o f necessity, but this is chiefly because they denied teleology. H e
him self reinstates ‘ ch an ce’ , τύχη, as well as ‘ the spontaneous’, t o αύτόμοττον, against
those who denied that it existed at all {Ph. ig s b s G ff), but for him ‘ chance’ events are
themselves capable o f explanation in other terms {Ph. 11 chh. 4-6 especially). N ature is
a matter o f what happens ‘ always or for the most part ’ : but w hat happens παρά φύσιν,
contrary to nature, is w hat is unusual, irregular, not ‘ supernatural’ . Cf. e.g. W ieland
1962, pp. 256ff. >30 Especially Lg. x 888 e fT.
*3 * A gain it is likely that he had the atomists particularly in mind. T w o prominent
natural philosophers had, in fact, attem pted cosmologies in which reason, V0O5, plays
an im portant role, nam ely A naxagoras (Fr. 12, especially) and Diogenes o f Apollonia
(Frr. 3 and 5). But Plato makes Socrates complain that Anaxagoras failed to put his
principle to adequate use {Phd. 97 b ff ).
As is clear from the exam ple o f the interactions of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and
hard things, at Lg. 889 be.
’ 53 C f. Vlastos’ comment, 1975, p. 97 (cf. also p. 66), on the role o f the Craftsm an in
P lato’s own cosm ology: ‘ I f you cannot expunge the supernatural, you can rationalize
it, turning it paradoxically into the very source o f the natural order, restricting its
operation to a single prim ordial creative act which insures that the physical world
would be not chaos but cosmos forever after.’
But it m ay well be not the only one: see below, p. 37 and n. 135 on the evidence for
the Pythagoreans.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 37
o f a very different view , according to w hich the knowledge o f nature
m ight be used in some sense to transcend nature herself
H EA LIN G AND H E A L E R S IN T H E C LA SS IC A L PER IO D
I f we now turn back to On the Sacred Disease^ we can see that the
relationship between that treatise and the w ork o f those whom w e
conventionally group together as the Presocratic philosophers is an
intricate one. O n the one hand the insistence that all diseases have
natural causes m ay be com pared w ith similar assumptions underlying
the philosophers’ m ore general physical investigations and w ith
Leucippus’ statement o f the principle that everything happens for a
reason and b y necessity. O n the other, Empedocles has, from some
points o f view, more in com m on w ith the opponents o f the H ippocratic
author than w ith the H ippocratic author him self W here Empedocles
Fr. I l l talks o f raising and quelling the winds, and o f bringing rain
or drought, ^35 Qn the Sacred Disease attacks those who ‘ claim to know
how t o . . . m ake storms and fine w eather, rain and d rou gh t. . . and all
the rest o f their nonsense’ , calling them all ‘ impious rogues
M oreover am ong the prescriptions he attributes to his opponents
are some that can be paralleled in our adm ittedly late evidence for
Pythagorean beliefs.'^? Thus he says that the quacks recom m end not
eating certain fish, including the m ullet and the blacktail,^3S and we
find similar prohibitions in our sources for Pythagoreanism.*39 A gain
the quacks are said to recomm end avoiding black clothing,’' a n d
Diogenes Laertius, for exam ple, attributes to Pythagoras an associa­
tion o f black w ith evil.^^^
N ow despite w hat has sometimes been suggested,^'^^ the conclusion
'3s O u r secondary literature for Em pedocles contains a variety o f stories - most, if not
all, no doubt apocryphal - relating to his wonder-working, see, e.g., D .L . viii 59-61.
Pythagoras, too, was frequently represented as a wonder-worker, perhaps, indeed,
already by Empedocles (Fr. 129): see also Heraclides Ponticus in D .L . vm 4, T im on in
D .L . vm 36, as w ell as D .L . vm 11, 14, 21, 38, lam blichus, VP 6off, i34ff, i4 o ff (cf.
Porphyry, VP 23fT, 27ff), and cf. Burkert 1972a, pp. i36fT.
” 6 Morb. Sacr. ch. i paras. 29f and 31 (G) (L v i 358.i9ff·), see above, p. 19.
*37 C f. especially Burkert 1972a, pp. I76ff', who mentions other evidence relating, for
exam ple, to initiation rites and to the mystery religions.
>38 Morb. Sacr. ch. i para. 13 (G) (L v i 356.1).
*39 E.g. Diogenes Laertius vni 19 and 33, Porphyry, VP 45, lam blichus, Protr. 21 (5).
W ith the prohibition on eating certain birds, including the cock, mentioned at Morb.
Sacr. ch. i para. 15 (G) (L v i 356.4), one m ay com pare the Pythagorean prohibition
on eating or sacrificing a white cock (see D .L . vni 34, lam blichus, VP 84 and cf.
Protr. 21 (17)).
Morb. Sacr. ch. i para. 17 (G) (L v i 3s6.6f).
D .L . VIII 34.
See, for example, W ellm ann 1901, p. 29 n. i, Burnet (1892) 1948, p. 202, Jouanna
1961, pp. 46ofT, for a connection with followers o f Empedocles. For one with Pytha-
38 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
w e should draw from all this is not that the opponents o f On the
Sacred Disease are to be identified as Pythagoreans or as followers o f
Empedocles. O n the contrary, there are good grounds for resisting
any such hypothesis. First, some o f the similarities in question m erely
reflect popular G reek beliefs,^43 such as the association o f black w ith
misfortune. Secondly, whereas the H ippocratic w riter’s opponents
are suggesting remedies for a particular illness, the Pythagorean rules
are rules for general b e h a v io u r T h irdly, the idea that sufferers from
the sacred disease m ay be purified with b l o o d is one that E m pe­
docles himself, at least, w ith his horror o f blood-shedding, would
certainly have r e p u d i a t e d . Y e t if any such simple identifications
should be ruled out, the comparison between these texts certainly
illustrates the survival and systematisation o f certain popular or
traditional beliefs in parts o f Presocratic philosophy and shows that
on certain issues the H ippocratic author not only did not endorse, but
was concerned to expose, a view that can be exemplified in an
im portant natural philosopher.
W e have seen in considering Empedocles how com plex and
am bivalent the assumptions underlying the Presocratic ‘ inquiry
concerning n atu re’ could be. T h e writer o f On the Sacred Disease, for
his part, exemplifies only one o f the m any different strands that go
to make up G reek m edicine in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C .
A p art from the various kinds o f doctors represented in the H ippo­
cratic C o r p u s , m any others laid some claim to be able to alleviate
diseases. T h e y included people who w ould be known not as lorrpoi,
but as herb-collectors or ‘ root-cutters ’ (ρι^οτόμοι), ‘ drug-sellers ’
(φαρμακοπώλαι), m idwives and gym nastic t r a i n e r s , as w ell as
priests and attendants who practised ‘ tem ple-m edicine’ at the shrines
o f healing gods and h e r o e s , a n d the dividing lines between some o f
these broad categories were far from sharply defined. T here was, in
goreanism, see D elatte 1922, p. 232, Boyanc6 1937, pp. io6f, Burkert 1972a, p. 177
n. 87, but cf. the more cautious assessment in M oulinier 1952, pp. i34ff.
This emerges clearly from the analysis o f Greek popular assumptions concerning the
pure and the im pure in R . C . T . Parker 1977.
As was noted by Boyanc6 1937, p. 106.
'-♦s Morb. Sacr. ch. i para. 40 (G) (L v i 362.8ff).
See Em pedocles Frr. 128, 136 and 137 especially, and cf. also Heraclitus Fr. 5,
quoted above, p. 12. Contrast, e.g., A . Eu. 28ofF.
•^7 T he Corpus includes some treatises, such as de Arte and Flat., that are sophistic
displays and are probably not the work o f men who actually practised as doctors (see
further below, ch. 2, pp. 88f). M oreover the doctrinal positions of the authors who
did so practise varied enormously, see, for example, L loyd 19756, pp. i83fF.
Surgeon-barbers would be a later addition to this list.
T h e priests and attendants gave advice and suggested ‘ treatm ent’ usually on the
basis o f the interpretation o f the dreams and signs that supposedly came from the god
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 39
the ancient world, no equivalent to the modern, legally recognised,
professional m edical qualification. It was undoubtedly an advantage
to an ancient doctor - when dealing w ith certain types o f client or
em ployer - to have been associated w ith one o f the centres o f m edical
training, such as Cos or C n i d u s . ^so Y e t even if he could claim such an
association, a doctor’s title to practise m ight always be called in
question. A n accusation o f charlatanry (άλα^ονεία) was easy to m ake
and hard to rebut,i 5 i and, understandably, m any H ippocratic
authors were evidently m uch concerned to establish that m edicine,
as they practised it, is a true art, and to insist on the distinctions
between doctors and laym en on the one hand and between true
doctors and quacks on the other.*s2
In some cases there were, to be sure, certain fairly well-m arked
differences in the doctrines and procedures o f some o f the m edical
writers and those o f some o f the groups from w hich they w ere keen
to be dissociated. Y e t there was also, in practice, a considerable
to the faithful (see further below, pp. 4of). T h e y were, however, generally much more
closely integrated into the state religion than the purifiers attacked as ‘ vagabonds ’ in
Morb. Sacr. (that the latter did not take their patients to the temples seems to be implied
at Morb. Sacr. ch. i, paras. 4ifF (G) (L v i 362.ioflF), see below, p. 48 n. 209). W e should,
in fact, recognise differences and gradations within ‘ religious’ , as much as within
‘ rationalistic’, medicine. (I am grateful to Professor V ern ant for first stressing this
point to me.)
*50 T his is clear from the high proportion o f doctors from Cos who - at least from the
third century on - were given appointments as ‘ public physicians ’ : see Cohn-H aft
1956.
*** In some o f the (generally rather late) H ippocratic works that deal with medical
etiquette there are some interesting, and conflicting, evidences on the question o f the
sanctions exercised against the m edical profession. Thus the treatise Lex complains
that the only sanction used against bad m edical practice is that of dishonour (ch. i,
C M G I, I 7.5ff) and a similar view seems to be implied in Praec. ch. i {CMG i, i 30. i8 ff) .
Y e t in Decent, ch. 2 {CM G i, i 25-i4f) reference is made to the banishment o f corrupt
practitioners from certain states. A ntiphon iv 3.5 is one classical text that shows that the
law absolved the physician o f blam e if his patient died.
*52 A p art from the frequent references to these themes in the treatises dealing with
medical etiquette, the work de Arte is devoted to showing that medicine is a veritable
art (see, e.g., ch. 8, CM G i, i I4.23ff on the difference between true physicians and those
who are doctors only in nam e). T h e contrast between w hat is brought about by the art
and w h at is due merely to chance recurs, e.g., in Morb. i chh. 7 and 8, L v i 152.91?,
i54.5ff, Aff. ch. 45, L v i 254.9fT, and, especially, Loc. Horn. ch. 46, L vi 342.4ff. For the
distinction between the doctor and the laym an, see, e.g., Acut. ch. 1, L 11 224.3!?, ch. 2,
234.2ff, ch. I I, 3i6.i3flF, V M ch. 2, C M G i, i 37.7ff and I7ff, ch. 9, 42.6ff, ch. 21,
5 2 .17fT; for that between the doctor and the quack, see, e.g., Acut. ch. 2, L 11 236.4ff,
V M ch. 9, CM G I, I 41.25!?, Art. ch. 42, L iv i8 2 .i5 ff, ch. 46, i98.5ff, Fract. ch. i,
L III 414.1!?. References to bad practice are especially frequent in the surgical treatises,
see also Art. ch. i, L iv 78.5!?, ch. 11, i04.20f?, ch. 14, 120.7!?, Fract. ch. 2, L iii 418.1!?,
ch. 3, 422.12!?, ch. 25, 496.1 iflF, ch. 30, 5 18 .iff, ch. 31, 524.17!?, and cf. further below,
pp. 89f? and 91 n. 174. Interestingly enough the writer o f V M suggests that medicine
originated from dietetics (ch. 4, C M G i, i 38. 27!?) and he compares the doctor with
the gym nastic trainer to make the point that both arts are being continually improved
(ch. 4, 39.2!?).
 40 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 41

overlap both in ideas concerning the nature o f some diseases^ss and visions in ways w hich were in certain respects very similar to those
o f the doctors represented in our extant H ippocratic t r e a t is e s .^ ^ o
in techniques o f treatment. O nce again On the Sacred Disease provides
W h at we know o f the practice o f religious m edicine in later
evidence on the point. T h e author describes his opponents as not
periods confirms this picture. Thus the instructions that Aelius
m erely using charms or spells (επαοιδαί) and purifications (καθαρμοί)
Aristides claim ed to have had from the god (usually through dreams)
as remedies for the sacred disease, but also m aking certain dietary
include not only, for exam ple, a com m and to take a ritual m ud bath
and other recomm endations, although these were o f a negative sort,
and run three times round the temples at Pergam um (Or. x l v i i i 74f)
about w hat was to be avoided, rather than about w hat was to be
but also prescriptions concerning foods (e.g. x l v i i 45, x l i x 6, 24, 34,
taken. IS4 M oreover when reporting some o f their dietary rules, the
35, 37), and drugs (xLvm 13, w here the sign from the god is inter­
H ippocratic w riter sometimes adds his ow n glosses to the effect that
preted as referring to hellebore), the use o f poultices (e.g. x l i x 25)
the foods in question are indeed harm ful to the sick,iss thereby
and blood-letting (e.g. x l v i i i 47). But if Asclepius’ treatm ent is often
indicating that he saw some point in their recom m endations in these
strongly reminiscent o f that o f contem porary m edical men, there is
instances, even though he would p robably have given rather
this difference, that his diagnoses and cures are deem ed to be
different reasons as their justification.
infallible. Aristides is in no doubt as to whose advice to follow when,
A further aspect o f this overlap can be illustrated by referring to
as frequently occurs, m erely m ortal physicians, and the true,
the inscriptions relating to the cult o f Asclepius at E p i d a u r u s . i s 6
im m ortal healer are in disagreement.
These show that apart from cases where the treatm ent involved the
Conversely it was not m erely in a spirit o f conventional piety that
god touching a p atient’s body with a ring, for e x a m p l e , ^ s 7 god
some o f the m edical writers o f the classical period invoke divine
was sometimes represented as em ploying foods or drugs, for instance
patronage for their art. A pollo the healer, Asclepius, H ygieia
in one case an em etic, to heal the sick.^ss Indeed on several occasions
(Health) and Panacea (‘ A ll-H e a l’) are called as witnesses at the
the god appears in a vision or a dream in the role o f a surgeon, using
beginning o f the H ippocratic Oath\^^'^ the Law borrows the language
the knife to effect spectacular, in some cases quite fantastical, c u r e s . ^59
o f the m ystery religions when talking o f the secrets o f the a rt;’‘^^ and
C learly the faithful who attended the shrines o f Asclepius were used
On Ancient Medicine says that the art is rightly dedicated to a god.*^'^
to the god behaving - and they expected the god to behave - in
*60 Edelstein and Edelstein 1945, 11 p. 112 n. 4 (‘ it is interesting to observe again and
again how closely the concept o f the god resembles that o f the medical p ractitioner’).
*53 A s K udlien has suggested in relation to some o f the diseases discussed in the patho­
*®* See Behr 1968, pp. i68f, and cf. Ilberg 1931, p. 32, comm enting on a fragm ent of
logical treatise Morb. ii especially, for example the ‘ bad-sorrow ’ disease o f ch. 72 Rufus preserved in Oribasius x l v 30 {CM G vi, 2, i 19 1 .iff, R aeder, iv 83.iff, Busse-
(L VII io8.25fT) and the ‘ m urd er’ fever of ch. 67 (i02 .4ff), see K udlien 1968, pp. 326ff, m aker and D arem berg); ‘ Der G ott hat offenbar M edizin studiert, man sieht den
330 f. Einfluss der Wissenschaft a u f die Tem pelpraxis um 100 nach C h r.’
*54 E.g. the recomm endation to abstain from baths, ch. i para. 12 (G) (L v i 354.
*6* Jusj. 1, C M G I, I 4.2ff. A lthough m any of its ideals were w idely shared, the Oath as
20).
such probably belongs to a group o f practitioners, not to Greek doctors as a w hole:
*55 See ch. i para. 13 (G) ούτοι γάρ έττικηρότατοί ε!σι (‘ for these are most dangerous’,
certainly some o f the specific injunctions it contains, for exam ple not to operate ‘ even
cf. L VI 356.2) and para. 14 (G) (L vi 356.3f) ταΟτ« γάρ κρεών ταρακτικώτατά έστι τή5 for the stone’, run counter to common G reek m edical practices o f the fifth and fourth
κοιλίηξ (‘ for o f meats these most disturb the digestive organs’). T h e present indicatives
centuries b . c . C f. e.g. Edelstein (1943) 1967.
indicate that these statements contain the w riter’s own views. Contrast the infinitive in *®3 Lex ch. 5, C M G i, i 8 .l5 ff τά δέ Ιερά έόντα πρήγματα Ιεροϊσιν άνθρώποισι δείκνυται, βεβή-
para. 19 (G) (L v i 356.9) πάντα γάρ ταΟτα κωλύματα είναι (‘ for all these are im pedi­ λοισι δέ ού θέμΐξ, ττρίν ή τελεσθώσιν όργίοισιν έπιστήμης. ‘ H oly things are revealed only
ments ’) where he is reporting his opponents’ beliefs in oratio obliqua.
to holy men. Such things must not be m ade known to the profane until they are
*5®IG I V 951-953, IG 4^ I, 121-4. T h e inscriptions belong to the latter part o f the fourth
initiated into the mysteries o f knowledge.’
century b.c. T h e y have subsequently been edited by H erzog 1931, and cf. also Edelstein *64 yMch. 14, C M G i, i 4 5 .i7f. Cf. Viet, i ch. 11 (L v i 486.i4 f) which implies that men
and Edelstein 1945, i pp. 22iff.
learnt the arts from the gods, and Viet, iv ch. 93 (662.8f) where the writer says that
*57 As in case 62, where an epileptic patient is cured after seeing the god touching parts
his discoveries in regimen have been m ade with the help o f the gods. T o these passages
o f his body with a ring in a dream : see H erzog 1931, pp. 32 and i09ff.
m ay be added otheis whose interpretation is more obscure. In Decent, the writer,
*58 As in case 41 (Herzog 1931, p. 24). O ther cases where the god is represented in
having just spoken o f medicine as wisdom and of the physician as ‘ having most things’ ,
visions or dreams as using drugs are case 9 (to cure an eye com plaint, H erzog 1931,
says that knowledge o f the gods is entwined with medicine in the mind (ch. 6, CM G i,
p. 12) and case 19 (to cure baldness, H erzog 1931, p. 16). W hile that does not prove I 27.13, reading αύτη, as opposed to Littre’s αύτή). Nor is it clear precisely what the
that the temple treatment involved the actual use o f drugs in those cases, it is likely author o f Prog, had in m ind when he wrote that one o f the tasks of the doctor is to
enough, to jud ge from the later evidence in such writers as Aelius Aristides, that it learn whether there is anything divine in diseases (εί τι θείου ?νεστι έν τησι νούσοισι,
sometimes did so.
ch. I, L II i i 2 .5 fj cf. also Nat. MuL ch. i, L vii 3 12 .i f f and 9). T h e interpretation of
*59 As in cases 13, 21, 23, 25 and 27 (Herzog 1931, pp. 14-18 and cf. pp. 7sff).
 42 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
A lth ou gh m any popular remedies were im p lic i t ly ^ o r explicitly
rejected by certain o f the m edical writers, such questions as the
efficacy o f amulets (περίοπτα), o f spells and prayers, and o f music
continued to be m uch debated. Thus amulets^^^ were counted
am ong the ‘ natural rem edies’ by Rufus (Fr. 90), and even Soranus,
who rejects them, suggests that they should not be forbidden since
they m ay perhaps m ake patients more cheerful. 167 G alen, who is, in
general, c r i t i c a l , ^ offers a naturalistic explanation o f one am ulet
that he claims to have tested and found to be effective: either parts
o f the root used as the am ulet came o ff as effluences and were
inhaled, or the air round the root was itself m odified in some w ay .169
A lth ou gh incantations are firm ly rejected b y On the Sacred Disease,
the writer o f On Regimen iv first criticises those who rely on prayer
alone on the grounds that, while prayer is good, men should also help
themselves at the same time as they call on the gods,* 7 i but then
goes on to give some specific instructions about w hich gods to pray to
w hen the signs seen in dreams are favourable or u n f a v o u r a b l e . ^ ^ a
Stories about healing by music were common,i73 but although, o f the
later m edical writers, Soranus was critical o f the use o f music as a
remedy,*74 that was not the only view expressed. G alen, who w rote
that text (which some modern editors, such as K uhlew ein and Jones, have treated as an
interpolation) was already the subject o f dispute am ong the ancient commentators,
as we learn from G alen, who believed that ‘ d iv in e’ here must be taken to refer to
atmospheric influences {CM G v , 9, 2 205.28!?, K x v iii b iV.gff) (see most recently
K udlien 1966, pp. 38f, T hivel 1975 and Lain Entralgo 1975, pp. 3 i5 ff).
'*5 Thus the final aphorism {Aph. vii 87, L iv 608. iff) gives as possible types o f treatm ent
drugs, the knife and cautery (though the term for ‘ drugs’, φάρμακα, is capable o f a
wide extension, see below, p. 44).
Theophrastus is one non-m edical writer who is critical o f the use o f amulets, claim ing
that most o f w hat is said about them is the work o f men ‘ who wish to m agnify their
own a rts’ {HP ix 19.2-3). O n the whole subject see Stem plinger 1919, pp. Saff.
Gyn. Ill 10.42, C M G iv i2 i.2 6 ff, cf. i 19.63, CM G iv 47.i6ff.
E.g. K XI 792.i4ff.
A boy never had epileptic fits when he wore the am ulet in question, but did when it
was removed, only again to cease to have fits when he wore it once more: K x i 859.i2ff,
cf. also XII 573.5ff.
T h e uselessness o f incantations and purifications in the treatm ent o f epilepsy, insisted
on in Morb. Sacr., can be paralleled, outside m edical literature, by T hucydides’
remarking, in his account o f the plague at Athens, that supplications and oracles were
useless (though so indeed were all the other remedies tried, 11 47) and cf. Democritus
Fr. 234 (men seek health from the gods with prayers, but they do not realise that they
have power over it in themselves).
Viet. IV ch. 87, L VI 642.6ff.
172 Viet. IV ch. 89, L VI 6 5 2 . i 7 ff and ch. 90, 656.22-658.1.
>73 See, for example, Plutarch, De Musica 1146 be. Aulus Gellius (iv 13) quotes T h e o ­
phrastus as saying that ‘ m any men believe’ that flute-playing is good for pain in the
hip, and Democritus to the effect that flute-playing cures snake-bites and is good for
m any other sicknesses (cf. Athenaeus, x iv 624ab). lam blichus, VP 64, i i o - i i , 164
and Porphyry, VP 33, speak of a Pythagorean belief that music contributes to health.
A ccording to Caelius Aurelianus, Morb. Chron. v 23, cf. i i7 s f and 178.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 43
at length on the effects o f psychic disturbances on the body as also
on those o f bodily tem peram ent on the soul, attem pted to explain the
benefits obtained from music in naturalistic terms.'^s
A lthough it was generally recognised that dreams could be mis­
leading, it was not only those who advocated the practice o f incu­
bation in the temples^76 who saw dreams as indicators - w hether o f
the disease troubling the patient or o f its cure. T h e b elief that
dreams m ay be useful guides to diagnosis can be traced in a w hole
series o f m edical writers. In the H ippocratic collection the w ork
On Regimen iv is devoted to setting out a comprehensive theory o f
the interpretation o f dreams, and other treatises too acknow ledge
their role in d i a g n o s i s . *77 E xtraordinarily elaborate theories were
developed concerning the different categories o f d r e a m s . O f the
later m edical writers, H erophilus gave a com paratively simple
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 179 and G alen was prepared to take dreams seriously as
signs.^80 Thus at K x i 3 i4 .i8 ff he refers to a therapy suggested to him
b y a dream, and he sets out some systematic ideas on diagnosis from
dreams in his com m entary on book i o f the Epidemics}^^
F inally, as A rtelt and others have long ago shown,* ^2 there is a
deep-seated am biguity in m any o f the terms used b y the m edical
C M G v , 4, 2 i9.24ff., K VI 40.4ff.
*76 T h e classic study o f incubation is that o f D eubner 1900; cf. also H am ilton 1906 and
Edelstein and Edelstein 1945,11 pp. H Sff.
*77 E .g. Epid. I 10 (L II 670.8), Hum. ch. 4 (L v 480.17), Hebd. ch. 45, pp. 66f Roscher
(L IX 4 6 o .i7ff). Aristotle rejects the idea that dreams are sent b y the gods, though he
says they are δαιμόνια, giving as his grounds for this that nature herself is δαιμονία {Div.
Somn. 463 b 13ff). H e endorses the view he attributes to the more discerning doctors
according to which careful attention should be paid to dreams since they m ay provide
information about movements and changes occurring in the body, and he concludes
from this that some dreams m ay be both signs and causes o f future events, even though
most o f w hat were believed to be prophetic dreams are mere concidences {Div. Somn.
463a4-bii).
*78 O u r most extensive source on the subject, Artem idorus’ Onirocritica (second century
A .D .), distinguishes two m ain groups, ένύττνια, w hich include φαντάσματα (visions),
indicate w h at is the case and are not predictive, δνίΐροι, on the other hand, which
include όράματα and χρηματισμοί (dream-oracles), are signs o f w hat will come to be; they
comprise θίωρηματικοί and άλληγορικοΐ δνειροι, the former non-allegorical, as when the
events themselves seem to be seen in the dream , the latter allegorical or symbolic
dreams - and he distinguishes five species o f these (i chh. 1-2, pp. 3ff H ercher, 3.gff
Pack). But m any other classifications were suggested (see, for example, Behr 1968,
ch. 8, pp. 171-95).
*79 O n e o f his three classes o f dreams was the ‘ god-sent’ ; see Aetius v 2.3. C f. also Rufus,
Quaestiones Medicinales, C M G Suppl. iv 3 4 .i3 ff G artner, 205.3ff D arem berg-R uelle.
G alen tells us that his father decided that he should take up a m edical career after
a dream (e.g. K x 6og.8ff, x ix 59.gff).
18 * C M G V, 10, I 108.iff, K x v ii A 2 i4 .7ff; the short treatise on the diagnosis from
dreams that appears in K u h n ’s edition, v i 832ff, is thought to be a com pilation from
this passage.
*8* A rtelt 1937, cf. a k o W achter 1910, Pfister 1935, and Dodds 1951, e.g. pp. 35ff.
44 criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
writers and popularly for remedies for ‘ ills ’ o f one type or another,
whether diseases or other kinds o f misfortune.isa T h e term φάρμακον,
w hich is the regular w ord for ‘ d ru g ’ and - with or w ithout a
qualifying adjective - for ‘ poison’ in m edical literature and else­
where,* 84 is also used m ore generally o f any kind o f rem edy or
d e v i c e . A s M oulinier has illustrated in his exam ination o f classical
m aterial and as most recently M a ry D ouglas has emphasised in a
more general anthropological context, 186 notions o f the ‘ c le a n ’ and
the ‘ d ir ty ’ usually reflect fundam ental assumptions concerning the
natural, and the m oral, order, and the G reek terms for purification
and cleansing span both spheres and perm it no hard and fast
distinction between them. Thus καθαρμοί, the term w hich is used o f
the purifications criticised in On the Sacred Disease, b y Em pedocles
o f his religious poem concerning the salvation o f the δαίμων,^^β ^nd
elsewhere o f the rites used to remove pollution, for exam ple after the
shedding o f blood,*®^ is also used o f natural evacuations, as, for
instance, in Aristotle o f the prem ature discharge o f the am niotic
fluid in ch ildbirth . ^ 9 0 T h e term κάθαρσι$ covers a similar range. This
was the word used b y the doctors o f natural, or m edically induced,
evacuations from the body,*9i but it too could refer to ritual purifi­
cations after m oral pollution. *92
Just as νόσο; is used o f m any other types o f ill besides diseases, so conversely ντ/ιή; is used
generally o f ‘ the sound’ in m any other contexts besides m edical ones. In both cases the
degree to which these ‘ extended ’ uses were understood as metaphors is far from clear.
*84 φάρμακον is generally used in Hom er with a qualifying adjective, e.g. έσθλά and λυγρά
Od. IV 230, ήπια II. iv 218, όδυνήφατα II. v 401, ούλόμενον Od. x 394. For φάρμακον used
without a qualifying adjective to mean ‘ poison’, see, e.g., Thucydides 11 48, Plato,
Phd. 115 a .
As in Herodotus iii 85 (when Oebares says he has a trick to ensure that Darius will
become king). Cf. also, e.g., Hesiod, Op. 485, Euripides, Ba. 283, Plato, Phdr. 274c.
186 M oulinier 1952, Douglas 1966, and cf. R . C . T . Parker 1977.
Morb. Sacr. ch. i paras. 4, 12, 23, 25, 39, 42, 46, ch. 18 para. 6 (G) (L v i 352.8,
354-19^5 3 5 δ· 3 > 7 > 362.6, 13, 364.8, 396.8). See above, p. 34.
As in Aeschylus, Ch. 968, Eu. 277, 283, Sophocles, O T 99, 1228, cf. Euripides, Ba. 77,
and the practices referred to by Plato, R. 364 e f.
*’ 0 HA 5 8 7 b !. Cf. Plato, Sph. 226d ff where καθαρμό; is a generic term, the genus τό
καθαρτικόν εΙδο; being divided into two kinds, purgings - καθάρσει; - relating to bodies
(w hich include those brought about by gymnastics and medicine) and those relating
to souls.
E.g. o f the purging o f the menses, Aer. ch. 4, C M C i, 1 58.31, Aph. v 60, L iv 554.7,
Aristotle, HA 5 72 b2g, GA 7 7 5 b5, and o f the afterbirth, Aer. ch. 7, C M C i, i 60.35,
Aristotle, HA 574 b 4. T h e noun κάθαρσι;, like the verb καθαίρω, is regularly applied to
the action o f purgatives, e.g. Aph. 11 35 (L iv 480.13), Acut. ch. 7 (L 11 276.6 and 7),
cf. pseudo-Aristotle, Pr. 8 6 4 a 34. In Morb. Sacr. the term is used in connection with a
theory about the origin o f phlegm atic constitutions, which arise because o f inadequate
κάθαρσι; o f the brain before birth, ch. 5 paras. 1-9 (G) (L v i 368.1 off, e.g. 13).
As in Herodotus i 35, o f the purificatory rites used by Lydians and Greeks to remove
the pollution o f murder, cf. Plato, Lg. 872 c f. A t Cra. 405 ab Plato expressly links the
κάθαρσι; and καθαρμοί o f doctors and priests.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 45
T w o m ain points that emerge quite clearly from a considerable
body o f evidence are ( i ) that the methods o f healing used both in
w hat w e m ay call ‘ rationalistic ’ and in tem ple m edicine had m uch
in com m on - the priests had recourse to drugs, prescriptions con­
cerning diet, and p h l e b o t o m y , just as some o f the rationalistic
doctors did not rule out amulets and prayers; and (2) that in
describing w hat they were attem pting to bring about the rationalistic
doctors m ight em ploy some o f the very same terms (such as ‘ purifi­
catio n ’ ) that had a w ide analogous use in religious contexts. Prog­
nosis, explicitly recognised as an im portant means o f winning over
patients to accept treatm ent (see below, pp. gof), m ay w ell have
seemed to some a kind o f soothsaying. Indeed it is sometimes
referred to b y the doctors in terms that are obviously reminiscent
o f the role o f the prophet. Thus the w riter o f Prognosis recommends
that the doctor should ‘ tell in a d v a n ce’ ‘ the present, the past and the
fu tu re’ in the presence o f his patients,*^^ and so too does the w riter o f
Epidemics i ch. 5.^95
A t the same time, despite these im portant signs o f the overlap
between the different strands that go to m ake up G reek m edicine in
the fifth and fourth centuries e . g ., those strands rem ain, in certain
respects at least, none the less distinct, and indeed the practitioners
in question were evidently in direct com petition w ith one another.
Some o f the comm on features w e have identified appear to reflect a
desire not so m uch to compromise with other approaches, as to
outdo them. A theorist such as the author o f On Regimen iv does not
m erely accom m odate the traditional b elief in the predictive value o f
dream s: he produces a systematic fram ework for their interpretation
as diagnostic signs. Conversely, to be seen to be not ju st as good as,
but far better than, m ortal physicians, the god - through his priests
or interpreters - saw fit to incorporate m any o f their techniques, as
w ell as adding some special ones, such as tem ple incubation, o f his
‘ 93 Thus phlebotom y was practised on the god’s comm and in the time o f Aelius Aristides,
to ju d ge from x l v i i i 47 (cf. above, p. 41).
194 Prog. ch. I, L II i l o . 2 f: ιτρογιγνώσκων. . . καΙ προλέγων ττσρά τοϊσι νοσέουσι τά τε
Ίταρεόντα καί τά προγεγονότα καΐ τά μέλλοντα ?σεσθαι, cf., e.g., II. ι "JO on the prophet
C a lch a s: δ; ίιδη τά τ ’ έόντα τά τ ’ έσσόμενα πρό τ’ έόντα and cf. Hesiod, Th. 38.
Epid. I ch. 5, L 11 634.6f: λέγειν τά προγενόμενα· γιγνώοχειν τά παρεόντα· ττρολέγειντάέσόμενα.
C f. such other texts as Fract. ch. 35, L iii 538.6, Art. ch. 9, L iv 100.4 is the business
o f the doctor to foretell, καταμαντεύσασθαι, such things) and ch. 58, 252.14f (which speaks
o f ‘ brilliant and competitive — αγωνιστικά — forecasts’). O n the other hand Acut. ch. 3,
L II 242.3ff, insists that medicine should not be confused w ith divination, and Prorrh.
II chh. if, L IX 6 .iff, criticises doctors for ‘ m arvellous’ predictions: the author says he
w ill not him self engage in such divinations (έγώ δέ τοιαΟτα μέν οΰ μαντεύσομαι, ch. ι, 8.2,
cf. ·ιτρο(ί)^ηθήναι άνθρωττινωτέρω; ch. 2, 8 .1 1), and insists that his own predictions will be
based on signs, σημεία, e.g. ch. i, 8.2fF and ch. 3, io.23ff.
 46 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
own.^96 \Ye have considered in detail the attack m ounted b y the
author o f On the Sacred Disease against the ‘ purifiers’ : but w e also
have evidence that the practitioners o f tem ple m edicine w ere
critical o f ordinary doctors. Thus one o f the documents from Epi-
daurus describes a cure achieved by the god when the first instruction
the god gives the patient is to forbid him to follow the treatm ent
(cauterisation) that had been recom m ended by the doctors.^’ ^
Th ere is no question o f the practitioners o f tem ple m edicine not
claim ing to bring about w hat we can describe as practical results.
In the Epidaurus inscriptions this is precisely w hat is asserted: the
god is represented as tackling, and curing, an extraordinary variety
o f ailm ents,198 ranging from headaches and insomnia to cases o f
stone, worms, gout, dropsy, tumours, consum ption, blindness,
epilepsy and injuries from wounds o f different kinds. A lth ou gh in
some instances the question o f w hat counted as a successful treat­
m ent w ould obviously be h ighly debatable, in others there was less
room for doubt.^^9 O f course we cannot now say w hat - i f anything -
underlies the cures claim ed we are in no position to assess either
the workings o f suggestion on the patients,2°i or the elements o f
wishful thinking - or even plain fraudulence2°2 _ on the part o f the
T he fact that the Epidaurus inscriptions also record how the go d ’s advice proved
efficacious in some non-m edical cases as well (as in the consultations about finding
hidden treasure, case 46, or a lost child, case 24, or the recovery o f a deposit, case 63)
suggests another respect in which the priests o f the cult of Asclepius would claim
superiority to merely mortal m edical men.
*97 Case 48, H erzog 1931, p. 28. There m ay, o f course, have been a particular added
reason for the god to forbid a treatment that was generally recognised as being drastic
(cf. the remarks concerning the hazards and misuse o f cauterisation in Art. ch. 11,
L IV i04.22fT, and lam blichus’ report that the Pythagoreans avoided the use o f cautery,
VP 163, 244). From a later period Aelius Aristides provides m any examples where the
god overrules the diagnoses or therapies o f ordinary physicians, e.g. Or. x l v i i 61-4 ,
67-8, cf. 54-7, X L ix 7-9.
>98 As w ell as non-m edical problems, see above, n. 196.
*«9 In such ‘ su rgical’ cases as the extraction o f a spear from the ja w (case 12) there
could be little doubt about the end-result said to have been achieved. A gain in the
cases where a barren wom an consults the god in order to conceive (e.g. cases 31, 34, 42),
whether or not she had a child was fairly easily verifiable.
T h e various views that have been expressed by modern scholars on the cures claim ed
at Epidaurus and elsewhere in the ancient world are summarised in Edelstein and
Edelstein 1945, 11, ch. 3, especially pp. i42ff.
T h e need for faith, and the folly of doubting or scoffing at the god, are recurrent
motifs in the inscriptions (e.g. cases 3, 4, 9, 10, 35, 37; in case 36 the god punishes a
scoffer b y crippling him). From a later period we m ay com pare a text in which Galen
remarks on the psychological effects o f belief in divine healing. A t C M G v , 10 ,2,2 I99.4ff,
K XVII B i37.7ff, he observes that the faithful will submit to a course o f treatm ent they
would never norm ally agree to - from ordinary doctors - when they believe that the
god recommends it.
202 \Ye m ay note, at least, that the question of due recompense to the god is another
recurrent theme in the inscriptions (e.g. cases 4, 5, 8, 10, 25: in case 22 a m an who
was cured for blindness but om itted to make his thank-offering becomes blind again,
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 47
priests who had the inscriptions m ade. But that does not affect the
point that the inscriptions claimed practical results in a wide variety
o f cases: they were indeed in all probability set up in large part to
advertise w hat the god could do.
T h e im portance o f this becomes apparent when w e refer back to
the anthropologists’ debate on the general aims o f m agical behaviour
in traditional societies. As we noted at the outset (pp. 2f), the view
that such behaviour should be seen as expressive or affective, rather
than as would-be efficacious, has been argued forcefully, and
1 evidently w ith a good deal o f justification, since it provides a clearer
i understanding o f the m eaning and function o f m any m agical beliefs
‘ and practices. Y e t so far as our evidence for G reek m edicine o f the
fifth and fourth centuries b . c , is concerned, the practitioners o f
tem ple m edicine appear to have accepted a battle on the same
grounds as the H ippocratic doctors - in that both sides appeal to,
and look to be ju dged by, the practical results they achieved.
Further confirm ation o f the point comes from the data provided
b y our ch ief H ippocratic text. T h e sym bolic nature o f some o f the
recom m endations that are ascribed to the ‘ purifiers ’ in On the Sacred
Disease - for exam ple the prohibition against w earing black or
against crossing the hands or legs203 _ is clear enough. A t the same
time the burden o f one o f the m ain charges the H ippocratic w riter
brings against his opponents is that they neither know w hat causes
the disease nor treat it properly, and he evidently thinks o f them as
m aking claims on both scores. H e says that they pretend to have
superior knowledge, am ong other things about w hat causes and cures
the disease . ^ ° 4 T h rough out his opening polem ic he describes the
purifiers as attem pting to alleviate epilepsy b y the use o f charms and
the like,2os even though their ministrations are all useless, and most
im portantly he says that they take the credit should any o f those
whom they treat recover, although they guard themselves against
failure b y saying that the gods are to blame.^°^ A ll through his
attack, in fact, he treats the actions o f the purifiers as if they w ere to
although he is once again healed b y the god after incubation; in case 7 a man is
punished with marks on his face for not giving the god the m oney he had received from
a patient for being healed).
*03 Morb. Sacr. ch. i paras. 17 and 19 (G) (L v i 356.6f, 8f). A t ch. i paras. 33ff (G)
(L VI 3 6 o . i 3 ff) we have an outline sketch o f w hat m ay have been a quite elaborate
symbolic schema associating certain behaviour on the part o f the patient with parti­
cular deities, e.g. ‘ if he utters a higher-pitched and louder cry, they say he is like
a horse and blame Poseidon’ .
20·* See especially ch. i paras. 11, 20 and 27 (G) (L v i 354.15, 356.9!?, 358.13!^).
*05 E.g. ch. I paras. 4, 23?, 26 (G) (L v i 3 5 2 .?ff» SSS-iff, n f f ) ·
*06 C h . I para. 20 (G) (L w SsS.gfT), cf. above p. 18.
 48 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
be assessed not - or certainly not m erely - in terms o f their felicity
or appropriateness, but in terms o f the practical results that w ere
obtained.
A lth ou gh it has, in the past, often been argued that m agical
beliefs and practices are particularly comm on in relation to situations
beyond the technological control o f the group or society c o n c e r n e d ,
here too our G reek evidence provides grounds for caution. First, it is
not the case that the help o f the gods was invoked only, or even
m ainly, for particularly difficult or intractable cases. O n the con­
trary, to ju d g e from the cures claimed,^^^ it seems that the god was
consulted on w hat the Greeks themselves considered straightforward
cases (such as injuries from wounds) as w ell as on more difficult
‘ a cu te ’ diseases (such as c o n s u m p t i o n ) . 209 Conversely, and m ore
T his was M alinow ski’s view and it is one that figures prom inently in Evans-Pritchard’s
study o f the Zande (Evans-Pritchard 1937). One m ay compare, more recently, Horton
on the K alah ari (‘ Sometimes, however, the sickness does not respond to treatment,
and it becomes evident that the herbal specific used does not provide the whole
answer. T h e native doctor m ay rediagnose and try another specific. But if this produces
no result the suspicion w ill arise that “ there is something else in this sickness” . . .I t is
at this stage that a diviner is likely to be called in . . . U sing ideas about various spiritual
agencies, he will relate the sickness to a wider range o f circumstances — often to
disturbances in the sick m an’s general social life ’, Horton 1967, p. 60) and T am b iah
(‘ A lthough we should not jud ge their raison d ’etre in terms o f applied science, we should
however recognize that m any (but not all) m agical rites are elaborated and utilized
precisely in those circumstances where non-Western man has not achieved that special
kind o f “ ad van ced ” scientific knowledge which can control and act upon reality to
an extent that reaches beyond the realm o f his own practical know ledge’,T a m b ia h 1973,
p. 226, with a reference to Evans-Pritchard’s conclusion that Zande rites were most
‘ m ystical’ ‘ where the diseases they dealt with were the most acute and chron ic’),
but cf. also the critical remarks o f Thom as 1971, pp. 774!?, 785fF.
See above, p. 46. Sim ilarly Aelius Aristides invokes divine assistance for every kind
o f medical problem.
209 Xhe question o f whether a condition is beyond cure — even beyond treatm ent — is,
however, one that occupied several of the H ippocratic writers. De Arte even makes it
one o f the defining characteristics o f the art of medicine ‘ to refuse to undertake to cure
cases in which the disease has already won the mastery, knowing that everything is not
possible in m edicin e’ (ch. 3, C M G i, i 10.2iff). Cf. Fract. ch. 36, L m 54o.9ff on the
dangers attending the reduction o f the thigh and upper arm (‘ one should especially
avoid such cases if one has a respectable excuse, for the favourable chances are few
and the risks m a n y ’). F inally Prog., too, is aware o f the problem : ‘ by realising and
announcing beforehand which patients were going to die, he would absolve him self
from an y blam e’ (ch. i, L 11 i i2 .io f) . Y e t at no stage do any of these writers suggest
that in difficult, or hopeless, cases their patients should have recourse to temple medicine.
T h e one passage that has been taken to be an exception to this rule is in Morb. Sacr.
itself, ch. I , paras. 41 ff (G) (L vi 362.1 off) where the writer says that w hat the
charlatans should have done is not to treat the epileptics as if they had comm itted
sacrilege, but to ‘ take the sick into the temples, there by sacrifice and prayer to make
supplication to the go ds’, not to bury the καθαρμοί or throw them into the sea, but to
take them into the temples as offerings. Herzog 1931, p. 149, concluded from this that
the author himself actually approved o f temple medicine: yet he is, rather, merely
arguing that his opponents are inconsistent. W hat they should have done, i f the god
had been responsible for the disease, is to take the patients to the temples. But that
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 49
im portantly, the testimony o f On the Sacred Disease w ould tend to run
counter to any thesis to the effect that the underm ining o f m agical
beliefs follows an increase in the control that could be exercised over
the areas o f experience to w hich the beliefs in question related. It is
striking that our ch ief critical text deals w ith a topic - epilepsy -
w here the author himself, so far from having any effective means o f
treating the disease, was - should have s a id - ju s t as helpless as
the charlatans he attacks. T ru e, the w riter states that epilepsy, like
every other disease, is c u r a b l e . Y e t w e have only to consider how
he intended to treat it - that is, principally, b y the control o f the
tem perature and hum idity o f the body b y variations in the diet - to
appreciate that, as w ith the ‘ purifiers’ he was attacking, such
comfort as his patients derived from his ministrations must have been
very largely o f a psychological nature, and thanks to their confidence
in his ab ility or authority, rather than the result o f his having, in this
case, any real means o f cure at his disposal.
N o straightforward account, in w hich ‘ scien ce’ and ‘ philosophy’
together and in unison stand opposed to ‘ m a g ic ’ and the ‘ irra tio n a l’ ,
can be sustained in the face o f the evident com plexities both within
and between the theory and practice o f m edicine on the one hand and
those o f the investigation concerning nature on the other. O u r next
task is to go back to the two key concepts o f nature and o f cause to
exam ine w hat the different strands o f speculative, rationalistic
inquiry ow ed to pre- or at least non-speculative thought, as a first
step towards determ ining how far the former should be seen as
m arking a radical break w ith the latter.
T H E N O TIO N S OF NATURE AND CAUSE
T h e idea o f nature as im plying a universal nexus o f cause and effect
comes to be m ade explicit in the course o f the developm ent o f Pre-
socratic philosophy, though we have emphasised the dangers o f
representing the Presocratic philosophers as having a uniform set
o f beliefs and attitudes on the subject. Y e t an assumption o f the
regularity o f natural phenom ena is implicit in m uch o f hum an
behaviour. W hatever other factors the farm er m ay believe he has to
argum ent is based on a premiss - that the god is responsible for the disease - that the
H ippocratic writer him self rejects. As we have seen (p. 26), the only sense in which he
is prepared to say the disease is divine is that in which all diseases are divine — because
the w hole o f nature is.
Morb. Sacr. ch. 18 paras, iff, especially 6 (G) (L v i 3 9 4 -9 ff» 3 9 6 -5 ff). see above
pp. 2 if.
50 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
take into account in order to insure a good crop o f w heat, he knows
that he w ill have no crop at all unless he sows seed. T h e hunter takes
it that his arrows w ill norm ally fly straigh t: they w ill not be deflected
from their course; it is not as i f his chances o f m aking a hit are as good
i f he points his bow in any direction and takes no aim at all, as i f he
takes careful aim at his target. W e all take it for granted that stones
fall, fire and smoke rise, how ever imprecise our ideas about ‘ h e a v y ’
and ‘ lig h t’ m ay be. T o understand, let alone to learn from, ex­
perience at all presupposes some idea o f the regularity o f phenom ena,
although that idea m ay w ell be neither explicit nor universalised.^^i
It m ay be believed, for instance, that that regularity is subject not
ju st to exceptions,212 but to interference from divine powers. Indeed
the notion o f w hat takes place norm ally or regularly m ay be, and
often is, the basis o f inferences that such an interference has taken
place. A clear instance o f such an inference in H om er is T eu cer’s
reaction when his bow-string snaps when he aims at H ector at
IliadXV 458fF.2i3 T h a t a bow-string that he fitted new that m orning
(νεόστροφον, ττρώιον, 46gf) should have snapped, is taken as a sign
that there must be some δαίμων thw arting him, since new bow-strings
are not expected to break - and similar inferences that the hand o f
heaven is at work can, naturally, be paralleled extensively through­
out G reek literature.
Although, in Homer, w hat we should call natural phenom ena are often associated
with the gods, divine beings are not always invoked in their description, especially in
the similes, e.g. II. v 86^f, x iv i6if, x v 6i8 if, x v ii aGsfF.
O ne should distinguish cases where w hat is regular corresponds to what is always the
case (for exam ple that the sun rises in the East) from others where it admits o f excep­
tions (for instance the growth o f a crop o f wheat). ‘ N a tu re ’ for the Presocratic philo­
sophers and H ippocratic writers encompasses both types o f phenom ena, but they do
not distinguish explicitly between them as Aristotle was to do with the principle that
nature is w hat happens ‘ always or for the most part ’ (see above, p. 36 n. 129).
O ther notable occasions when the exceptional character o f an event is used as the
basis o f an inference that the gods are at work are II. v iii isg ff, xn i 68ff, x v agofT,
XVI 11 g if and x x iv sG sff (where Achilles infers that a god brought Priam through the
A chaean cam p, since without divine help he would not have dared to come) and even
more com m only the general run o f the battle is cited as evidence o f whom the gods are
favouring. C f. also Od. x v i ig4ff, x x gS ff (Zeus, asked for a sign, thunders from a
cloudless sky).
T o cite an exam ple from the classical period, at i 174 Herodotus notes that in the
digging o f the canal across the isthmus at Cnidus the workforce suffered an exceptional
num ber o f injuries, particularly in the eyes, from which they concluded that they should
consult D elphi to find out w hat was hindering them, τέροττα, portents or monsters,
were, o f course, generally interpreted as signs from heaven or expressions of divine
anger, though w hat was believed to be an exceptional phenomenon varied w ith the
state o f knowledge o f the individuals concerned at the time. Archilochus expresses
consternation at an eclipse o f the sun (Fr. 74, D ) : but the famous case o f the fatal
hesitation o f the Athenian arm y under Nicias when an eclipse o f the moon occurred in
their retreat from Syracuse in 413 b .c . (Th. vii 50) shows that such eclipses were still
generally feared in the late fifth century.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 51
This serves to illustrate both a connection, and a difference,
between natural philosophy and pre- or non-philosophical thought.
T h e connection is that the notion o f φύσι$ m ay be said to build
directly on ordinary experience o f the regularities o f nature in
particular inferences to divine interventions based on the breaching
o f those regularities presuppose a firm idea o f those regularities
themselves. But the difference lies in the fact that the idea that every
physical phenom enon has a natural cause is neither stated - nor, it
w ould appear, assumed - as a universal rule before philosophy. As
we saw, some idea o f nature does not, b y itself, exclude all beliefs in
personal divine i n t e r v e n t i o n s ,b u t once the notion o f nature as a
universal principle is grasped, then those interferences must be seen
either as ‘ m iracles’ - the suspension o f n a t u r e - o r as cases o f
‘ double determ ination’ - where the god works through physical
causes. T h e explicit expression o f a universalised concept o f nature
involves a corresponding developm ent or clarification in the notion
o f m arvels or m iracles: the category o f the ‘ supernatural’ develops,
in fact, pari passu w ith that o f the ‘ n a t u r a l E v e n in the philo­
sophers, indeed, as w e noted w hen discussing Empedocles, quite
intensive investigations o f nature m ay be com bined w ith a b elief in
the possibility o f wonder-working - although the exact status o f the
m arvellous effects that Empedocles claim ed could be produced is not
clear. 8
Y e t if there is a distinct am bivalence in the position o f some
philosophers and o f some m edical writers, in others the emphasis is
more clearly^i’ on the all-em bracing character o f the principle that
every physical event has a determ inate natural cause. W hile the
idea o f w hat is natural in the sense o f w hat is usual permits excep­
tions, the notion o f w h at is contrary to nature, πα ρά φύσιν, comes
to be used in that sense (the unusual, the irregular) not in a sense
that implies that such events either have no physical cause or have
causes that lie outside the dom ain o f nature. It is the conception o f a
dom ain o f nature encompassing all physical phenom ena that is -
eventually - developed b y some philosophers and that in some m edical
writers becomes the cornerstone o f the rejection o f the b elief in the
possibility o f divine intervention in physical conditions. ‘ M a rv els’
C f, Vlastos 1975, ch. i.
See above, pp. 2gff, especially 30, on Herodotus. ^
N ot only is the category o f the ‘ supernatural’ the correlative o f that o f the ‘ n atu ra l’,
bu t w h at are treated as ‘ m arvellous’ phenom ena come to be more clearly defined once
the senses o f ‘ n ature’ are distinguished.
*** See above, pp. 33ff.
In some cases, however, reservations are in order: cf. above, p. 32 n. 109 on Leucippus.
 52 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
(θοώμοχτα) and ‘ m onsters’ (τέροττα) then pick out phenom ena that
are unusual but in principle intelligible, even i f not yet understood
and on such a view ‘ double determ ination’ is otiose.
T h e second, related, key notion that w e identified as underlying
the attack on the purifiers in On the Sacred Disease is that o f cause.
H ere too there are certain apparent connections, as w ell as differences,
between the philosophical and m edical writers and earlier thought.
It is obvious that in the context o f hum an behaviour, especially, the
questions o f who initiated or performed an action, o f w hat hum an or
indeed non-hum an agent was at work and thus in some how ever
imprecise sense responsible or to blam e for it, are o f universal hum an
interest and concern, although the assumptions m ade about the
notion o f ‘ responsibility’ m ay differ profoundly from one society to
another, 2 2 i and in particular the idea that an event is due to some
god or to fate m ay w ell be combined w ith - rather than thought o f as
alternative to - the notion that a hum an or humans are to blam e. In
the context o f the developm ent o f Greek views on causation, it has
long been recognised that m uch o f the term inology, and some o f the
key ideas, originate in the hum an sphere. O f the words that cam e to
iXc
be applied to causation in general, α ιτία and the cognate adjective
aiTios are originally used prim arily in the sphere o f personal agency,
w here αίτία m ay m ean ‘ b la m e’ or ‘ g u ilt’ .222
M ythological ‘ aetiologies ’ are explanations only in a quite restricted
sense. T o attribute earthquakes to Poseidon is, from the point o f
view o f an understanding o f the nature o f earthquakes, not to reduce
the unknown to the known, but to exchange one unknown for
another. W hile Poseidon’s motives can be im agined in hum an terms
(providing an answer o f a kind to the question ‘ w h y ? ’), how an
earthquake occurs is not thereby explained nor indeed at issue. I f
there is no question o f assigning a historical origin to an interest in
causal explanations o f some kind, the deliberate investigation o f how
particular kinds o f natural phenom ena occur only begins with the
220 By the time w e come to Aristotle, at least, where τίροπα are seen as failures o f the final
cause (P L 199 b 4), they are said to be contrary to nature not in its entirety, but as
w hat occurs in the generality o f cases. ‘ As for the nature which is always and by
necessity, nothing occurs contrary to that: unnatural occurrences are found only
among those things which happen as they do for the most part, but which m ay happen
otherw ise. . . Even that which is contrary to nature is, in a w ay, in accordance with
n ature’ (GA 77 o b 9 ff),
2** T he slow developm ent o f a coherent notion o f responsibility in Greek thought has
been traced by Adkins 1960.
E.g. Pi. 0 . 1.35, cf. am osin the sense o f ‘ cu lp able’ in II. i 153. Some o f the residual
social and political associations o f Greek terms for causes are discussed briefly in
L loyd 1966, pp. 23of.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 53
philosophers: it was they who first attem pted to explain w hat
thunder, lightning, eclipses and the like are in terms o f more fam iliar
phenom ena and processes.
Nevertheless to docum ent the developm ent o f ideas about causa­
tion as such^ w e have, once again, to supplem ent our m eagre evidence
for the Presocratic philosophers from our other sources. T h e questions
o f establishing responsibility for an action, and o f m otivation and
intention, are o f recurrent concern both in the orators and, in certain
contexts, in the dramatists, and passages in H erodotus and T h u cy ­
dides show a developed interest in the problems o f isolating the causes
not just o f historical events , 2 2 3 but also o f certain physical pheno­
m e n a . 224 O n the latter question, however, it is again the m edical
writers who provide our richest mine o f inform ation.
T h e topics o f w hat brought about a particular illness or was
responsible for the am elioration in a patient’s condition - and m ore
generally o f the causes, and cures, o f particular types o f disease - are
repeatedly discussed in the H ippocratic Corpus. On Regimen in Acute
Diseases is one w ork that draws attention to the fact that the same
condition m ay have different causes.^zs On Regimen iii remarks that
‘ the sufferer always lays blam e - αίτιήται - on the thing he m ay
happen to do at the time o f the illness, even though this is not
responsible — ούκ αίτιον έόν’ .^^δ On Ancient Medicine also notes that ‘ if
the patient has done something unusual near the day o f the disease
such as taking a bath, or going for a w alk, or eating something
different (when such things are all rather beneficial than otherwise),
I know that most doctors, like laym en, assign the cause (αίτίη) [of
Thucydides’ views and comments on historical causation can be studied in m any
other passages besides those that deploy the terms αΙτία and ττρόφασίξ (as in the famous
and m uch discussed text i 23, on which see most recently D e Ste Croix 1972, pp. 52-8,
and R aw lings 1975). O ne passage o f special interest in relation to the question of the
survival o f traditional beliefs is 11 17, where he remarks that the oracle given to the
Athenians that ‘ it were better for the Pelasgian ground to be unoccupied’ cam e true
in the opposite sense to w h at was expected. It was not because of the unlawful occu­
pation o f the sanctuaries that the city suffered calamities, but rather it was because of
the w ar (and its calamities) that the sanctuaries were occupied.
Thus in Herodotus’ discussion o f the N ile’s flooding (11 2off) he argues against the
theory that the Etesian winds are responsible (αίτιοι) on the grounds [a) that the Nile
floods even when the Etesian winds do not blow , and {b) other rivers are not affected
in a similar w ay b y the Etesians.
“ 5 Acut. ch. I I , L II 3 i4 .i2 ff (cf. Theophrastus, H P ix 19.4). C f., e.g., Fract. ch. 25,
L III 496.1 iff, on the harm ful effects o f bad bandaging - which the physicians in question
do not recognise as the cause, αίτίη, 500.10, of the exacerbations - and the more
general discussion in de Arte chh. 4ff, C M G i, 11 .sff, concerning w hat is brought about
by the art, and w h at is m erely fortuitous, in disease and the recovery o f health. Flat.
ch. I, C M G I , I 9 i .i 6 f f is one text that points out the im portance o f kn ow in g what is
responsible (τό αίτιον) for diseases for determ ining effective remedies.
Viet. Ill ch. 70, L VI 6o6.2off.
54 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
the disease] to one o f these things, and in their ignorance o f the
responsible factor (αίτιον), they stop w hat m ay have been most
advantageous’ .227 T h e same treatise attacks the hypothesis that ‘ the
h o t’, for exam ple, is an im portant cause o f diseases by suggesting
that it is not ‘ the h o t’ itself, but the other powers it is com pounded
with, that brings about illnesses,228 and the w riter states the criteria
that he believes a cause must fulfil: ‘ W e must, therefore, consider the
causes (αίτια) o f each condition to be those things w hich are such
that, when they are present, the condition necessarily occurs, but
when they change to another com bination, it ceases.’229 T h e idea o f
a necessary condition is first expressed in the form o f the ‘ that
w ithout w h ich ’ (εκείνο άνευ ου) in Plato’s Phaedo.^^^ But w ithout any
special term inology,231 the author o f On Ancient Medicine certainly has
a working notion o f the distinction between causal and m erely con­
com itant factors and conceives the former in terms o f a set o f factors
that (as we should say) are together both necessary and sufficient
conditions o f the disease,232 W e should, however, add first that, like
most H ippocratic writers, he is, in practice, both vague and dogm atic
in his pronouncements on the causes o f diseases, and, secondly and
m ore im portantly, that neither he nor any other H ippocratic writer
engages in systematic testing in this context, varying the conditions
o f the patient or his treatm ent in an attem pt to isolate the causal
factors at work.
227 ch 21, C M G I, I sa.iyfF. Epid. 11 sec. 4 ch. 5, L v i2 6 .io ff is one text that implies
a distinction between treating the symptom and treating the underlying cause.
E.g. V M ch. 15, C M G I, i 46.i8ff. In chh. i6 ffh e argues that hot and cold have little
‘ p o w er’ in the body p artly on the grounds that heat is readily countered b y cold and
vice versa (48.1 of, 4 g.i6 ff, so .gff), and in ch. 17 he concludes that heat is merely a
concomitant ((τυμπάρεστι) in fevers (48.2iff, 49.2).
229 C M G I, I so.yff: cf. the insistence, in ch. 20, on knowing not merely
what a pain is but also w hy it comes about (διά τ(, 51.24, cf. oItios, 52.3).
^30 Phd. 99 ab, where Socrates denies that the ‘ that without w h ich ’ can truly be said to
be an αίτιον, for the αίτιου of an event must state w h y it occurs in terms o f the good
aimed at.
^3 " Rawlings, following W eidauer 1954, has argued that the H ippocratic writers develop
ττρόφασΐ5 as a special term (a lexeme from φαίνω, not from <ρημί) for the pre-condition of
a disease: ‘ a prophasis is b y its very nature. . .visible,. . .it is. . .from outside,. . .it
precedes a disease and can be useful in predicting the course of the disease’ (Raw lings
*9 7 5 ) P· 43)· this sense it is close to σημεϊον (and in certain contexts to αίτίη) but to
be firm ly contrasted with αίτιου (the term for a necessary or prim ary cause). Reserva­
tions must, however, be expressed both about how far the two lexemes remained
distinct, and about the extent to which the H ippocratic use was standardised and
specialised. G enerally used for an external sign or accessory cause, as opposed to
necessary cause, it is sometimes a synonym for αίτιον in the latter sense (as Rawlings
recognises to be the case at Mul. i ch. 62, L vni 126.14!?, though he explains this as a
later development).
It is perhaps not too far-fetched to see the principle stated in V M ch. 19 as a remote
ancestor to M ill’s Canons o f Agreem ent and Difference or at least o f Bacon’s Tabula
Essentiae et Praesentiae and his Tabula Declinationis sive Absentiae in proximo.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 55
Evidence o f reflection on the nature o f causation can be cited from
a num ber o f m edical texts. T h e im portance o f this for the criticism
o f traditional beliefs is clear when we turn back to some o f the
arguments that the author o f On the Sacred Disease brings against his
opponents. A t one point he m aintains that if the purifiers prohibit
certain foodstuffs and the w earing o f certain clothes on the grounds
that these are relevant to the sacred disease, then this conflicts w ith
their claim that the gods are at w ork: ‘ I f contact with or eating o f
this anim al generates and exacerbates the disease while abstinence
from it cures the disease, then no god can be blam ed (αϊτΐ05) and
the purifications are useless: it is the foods that cure and hurt, and
the idea o f divine intervention comes to naught.’233 From the H ippo­
cratic w riter’s point o f view it is w hat is regularly associated with the
disease that must be held responsible for it. N ow the purifiers them ­
selves m ight w ell remain unm oved by this argum ent, and m aintain
that divine causation operates in addition to the physical factors they
pick out as significant. M oreover there is an even greater difficulty in
positively excluding supernatural causes when the m ain ‘ evidence’
adduced that they are at w ork is the very events they are supposed to
bring about - when the causes are not known independently o f the
effects.234 Nevertheless the more that regular observable connections o f
physical causes and effects can be established in diseases, the easier
it w ill be for any doctor who chooses to do so to argue that the
invocation o f other factors is unnecessary and unjustified, and that
this is so whether the gods or divine beings are im agined as acting
according to m oral principles or quite capriciously, and whether the
divine is cited as the sole, or an additional, explanation o f diseases.
T h e H ippocratic w riter has an ad hominem argum ent against the
purifiers, that if eating certain foods brings about the disease and
abstention its cure, then to appeal to the gods is superfluous and
m istaken: and in general he evidently hopes or assumes that his
audience at least - if not his opponents themselves - w ill agree that
w hatever explanation is offered, it must consist in physical factors to
the exclusion o f any reference to divine or supernatural agencies.
W e m ay now try to take stock o f some o f the conclusions from this
233 Morb. Sacr. ch. i para. 23 (G) (L v i 358.iff) .
23+ W e m ay contrast the appeal to divine causes to explain a class o f phenom ena (such
as all cases o f epilepsy) with invoking such causes to account for exceptional individual
events (where what happens is unusual or abnorm al, and where that fact m ay even be
cited as evidence that the gods are at work, as in the case of T eu cer’s bowstring,
cf. p. 50 above).
56 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
first inquiry. W e have found that a num ber o f popular beliefs and
practices come to be challenged not only in the context o f religion
(from at least the sixth century) but also (from the late fifth) in the
dom ain o f medicine. ‘ M a g ic ’ and ‘ m a g icia n ’ are am ong the terms
em ployed to disparage some such practices and their practitioners.
T h e connotations and denotations o f these terms are not fixed (any
m ore than those o f ‘ ch arla ta n ’, άλα^ών, w e re ): rather they are used
o f w hat particular writers happen to disapprove of, the association
w ith a little known foreign tribe no doubt contributing to their
derogatory undertones.^3s Nevertheless the grounds for the rejection
o f one set o f such beliefs are m ade plain enough in the main text that
engages in a sustained polem ic against them. T h e writer o f On the Sacred
Disease has a conception o f nature, and a view o f w hat constitutes a
causal explanation, that rule out supernatural intervention in diseases.
T h e background o f debate to w hich the discussion in this treatise
belongs is an intricate one o f com plex relations both w ithin m edicine
and w ithin philosophy - and between the two. A lthough it is in the
context o f the philosophers’ inquiries that the key m ove - the
explicit expression o f the idea o f nature as a universal principle - is
m ade, it is out o f the question to represent all the Presocratic philo­
sophers as sharing precisely the same views on this topic - and out o f
the question, too, to see them all as having adopted a uniform ly
sceptical and critical attitude towards traditional beliefs. E qu ally on
m any theoretical and practical issues the dividing lines that separate
healers o f different kinds are anything but clear-cut.
T h e weaknesses and vuln erability o f the position o f the H ippocratic
rationalists are striking. This is firstly a m atter o f the insecure
dem arcations between different kinds o f m edical practitioners that
w e have just mentioned. Healers o f very varied persuasions shared
m any therapeutic and diagnostic practices and often used the same
terms to describe their aims. .Secondly, there is the inexact and
fanciful nature o f the actual anatom ical and physiological ‘ know­
le d g e ’ that the H ippocratic writers generally claim ed: w e have
illustrated this from On the Sacred Disease, and the H ippocratic
collection is full o f similar examples. Th irdly, although m any
commentators have connected the rejection o f m agic w ith an increase
in the effective technological control that could be exercised over the
phenom ena in question, we have seen reason to doubt this. In the
case o f epilepsy, at least, the claims that On the Sacred Disease makes
concerning the possibilities o f cure are wishful thinking.
Cf., e.g., M auss (1950) 1972, p. 31, on the connection between sorcery and foreigners.
The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature 57
Nevertheless it is on (am ong other things) the question o f practical
effectiveness that the H ippocratic writer finds a weak spot in his
opponents’ position. H e clearly represents them - and equally those
who set up the Epidaurus inscriptions represent their god - as
m aking claims concerning the cures effected, and this gives his attack
a purchase it w ould not otherwise have had. O nce battle was joined
on that ground, the H ippocratic writers and the purifiers were, and
could be seen to be, in direct com petition with one another.
But if the issue in m edicine was partly a m atter o f results, the
reasons offered for success or failure varied w ith the individuals or
groups concerned. I f neither the H ippocratic writers nor - w e m ay
im agine - the temple healers were unduly deterred by failures, this
was because each side had some confidence in the kind o f explanation
they proposed. A gainst the purifiers, the H ippocratic rationalists
insisted on aetiologies, and on treatments, that referred exclusively
to physical factors (though there was, as we have seen, plenty o f
disagreem ent about w hat cam e under that head). H ow far they
persuaded their own contemporaries was another m atter. Tem ple
m edicine, after all, not only continued to flourish, but actually
expanded, after the fifth century b . c . T h e H ippocratic writers
certainly had no knock-down refutation o f double determ ination,
particularly as a stubborn opponent m ight alw ays m ultiply ad hoc
explanations. M oreover the element o f over-optimism - or pure
b l u f f - i n the H ippocratics’ own position is clear: m any o f their
treatments were ineffectual and m any o f the correlations and causal
connections they announced as fact (such as restriction o f epilepsy
to those o f phlegm atic constitution) were im aginary. Y e t w hat they
could and did do was - negatively - to underm ine their opponents’
doctrines b y arguing that appeals to the gods are arbitrary and
superfluous, and that secondary elaborations were indeed just that,
excuses or screens for failure, and - positively - to offer an alternative
explanatory fram ework. I f some awareness o f the determ inate
characters o f things and o f the regularities o f natural causes and
effects is part o f all hum an experience, the plausibility o f the H ippo­
cratic rationalists’ view rested partly on the fact that it was an
extension or extrapolation o f that awareness, now m ade explicit,
universalised, and treated as the sole valid explanatory principle.
F inally while m any o f their proposed correlations m ight be chal­
lenged and overthrown, they could hope that their overall position
would be strengthened as more observable regularities were estab­
lished and successful explanations achieved.
58 The criticism o f magic and the inquiry concerning nature
T h e problem o f the social conditions that m ay have furthered or
allowed the developments we have described w ill be discussed in our
final chapter. T h e topic o f the growth o f observation and research -
o f the extension o f the em pirical base o f G reek science - will occupy
us in chapter three. W e have found that the strength o f some o f the
D I A L E C T I C AND D E M O N S T R A T I O N
writers who were at the centre o f the debate w e have considered in
this chapter lies in the modes o f argum ent, both constructive and
destructive, that they deployed, and this aspect o f the developm ent o f
SOME C O M P A R A T I V E CO N SID ERA T IO N S
G reek science w ill form the subject o f our next study.
T h ere can be few societies that do not, in some degree, prize skill in
speaking, and the variety o f contexts in w hich it m ay be displayed is
very great. A p art from in the arts o f the poet or story-teller^ and o f
the seer or prophet, eloquence m ay be exhibited in a num ber o f
other more or less formalised situations, including eulogies o f the
powerful^ and contests o f abuse such as the song duels reported from
the Eskimos . 3 G ood speaking and good judgem ent - and the two are
often not sharply distinguished - need to be shown wherever groups
o f individuals m eet to discuss matters o f consequence concerning the
running o f the society, its day-to-day life and internal affairs and its
relations with its neighbours.
In the context o f law and justice, especially, the members o f some
non-literate societies are considerable connoisseurs o f the speaking
skills o f litigants and judges, of, for exam ple, their ability to present a
case, to cross-examine witnesses and to give judgem ent. Thus in his
study o f Barotse law G luckm an reports a rich vocabulary o f terms
used in L ozi to ‘ describe different modes o f expounding arguments,
ju d icial and o th er’ . T h ey include separate single words for being ‘ able
to classify affairs’ , for being ‘ clever and o f prom pt decision’, for ‘ a
ju d g e who relates matters lengthily and correctly’, for ‘ a ju d g e who
has good reasoning power and is able to ask searching questions ’, and
again, am ong terms o f disapproval, for ‘ to speak on matters w ithout
com ing to the p o in t’, for ‘ to w ander aw ay from the subject when
speakin g’, for ‘ a ju d g e who speaks w ithout touching on the im portant

> T h e poets m ay, but need not be, specialists: see, for example, Finnegan 1977, pp. i7off.
* See, for exam ple, Finnegan 1977, pp. i88 ff on Zulu praise poems.
3 See Hoebel 1964, p. 93: ‘ Song duels are used to work off grudges and disputes o f all
orders, save murder. A n East Greenlander, however, m ay seek his satisfaction for the
murder o f a relative through a song contest if he is physically too weak to gain his end,
or if he is so skilled in singing as to feel certain o f victory. Inasmuch as East G reen­
landers get so engrossed in the mere artistry o f the singing as to forget the cause of the
grudge, this is understandable. Singing skill among these Eskimos equals or outranks
gross physical prowess.’
6ο Dialectic and demonstration
points at issue for ‘ a person who gets entangled in words ’ and so on ^
T h e L ozi are alert to the question o f consistency in evaluating the
testimony o f witnesses, they distinguish between different types o f
evidence (direct and hearsay), and they have an operational notion
o f proof beyond reasonable doubt, although the ideas o f consistency
and proof are not explicit, let alone made the subject o f self-conscious
analysis.^
W hile reason and argum ent are, in one form or another, universal,
we are prim arily concerned w ith their role in one particular dom ain,
that o f natural philosophy and science, and here it is naturally more
difficult to cite parallels to our G reek evidence from other ancient, or
from non-literate, societies. Y e t contests between wise men are
attested in m any societies,^ and some o f these contests relate to the
discussion o f w hat m ay loosely be called cosm ological topics. Thus
R u ben, in particular, has draw n attention, in his studies o f Indian
religion,^ to the debates between wise men that occur in some o f the
older Upanisads, notably the C handogya U panisad and the
B rhadaranyaka Upanisad.^ In the former there is a discussion between
three wise men in w hich they give their views on - am ong other
matters - the origins o f things, including the origin o f this w orld,’
and in the latter there is a com petition for the title o f wisest in w hich
the claims o f a sage nam ed Y ajn avalkya are exam ined at great length
b y a series o f questioners who pose problems on such topics as the
relations between the worlds o f the earth, the sun, the moon, the
stars and deities o f various kinds.^® In these meetings the contest
continues until either the questioner has no more questions to put,
* See G luckm an 1967, pp. 276f.
5 See G luckm an 1967, pp. io7fF, 137.
* T h e literature relating to contests o f riddles is extensive: see, for example, H uizinga
(1944) 1970, pp. I27ff (and for a suggested connection w ith philosophy, pp. i3 7 ff and
i7o ff) and Dundes 1975, e.g. pp. gsff. W e m ay com pare the evidence for such contests
between m antic seers in ancient Greece, for exam ple that between Mopsus and Calchas,
Strabo x iv 1.27.642 (Hesiod Fr. 278 M erkelbach and W est), and cf. the material
collected in O hlert 1912 and Schultz 1914, cols. 88ff.
7 See Ruben 1929 and cf. 1954, ch. 8.
®W hile it is generally agreed that these two are am ong the oldest extant Upanisads, the
question o f their absolute dates remains highly disputed. See K eith 1925, 11 p. 502:
‘ C ertainly it is w holly impossible to make out any case for dating the oldest even o f the
extant U panisads beyond the sixth century B.C., and the acceptance of an earlier date
must rest merely on individual fa n cy ’, and cf., e.g., R uben 1954, pp. 83f and H um e
1931, pp. vii f and p. 6 (‘ the best that can be done is to base conjectures upon the
general aspect o f the contents com pared with what m ay be supposed to precede and to
succeed. T h e usual date that is thus assigned to the Upanishads is around 600 B.C.,
just prior to the rise o f B uddhism ’).
® Chandogya U panisad i 8-9 (Hume 1931, pp. iS s f).
Brhadaranyaka U panisad iii 1-9 (Hume 1931, pp. 107-26, in part also in Zaehner
1966, pp. 49-60).
Dialectic and demonstration 61
or the answerer cannot r e p ly : the winner is the person who has the
last word. But although in one exchange the questioner refuses to be
satisfied with a reply that sim ply states a claim to know and he insists
that he is answered directly,” the ground on which some answers are
accepted, but others rejected, are not in general m ade c l e a r . These
are sages who claim to have access to sacred, esoteric wisdom, and
although they are cross-examined b y one another, the content o f that
wisdom itself is not called in question nor its validity tested.
This evidence shows that confrontation and debate on issues o f
‘ cosm ological ’ significance can be documented in the ancient world
outside G reece, even if, in the exam ple we have taken, the scale o f
such discussions is lim ited, and, m ore im portantly, the criteria for the
acceptance or rejection o f statements are not public: although such
criteria m ay be clear to the participants themselves, they are not so
to an uninitiated audience. By contrast, our G reek m aterial is far
richer and it includes cosm ological and natural scientific debates o f a
quite different order, if only because the evaluation o f the strengths
and weaknesses o f opposing positions is now, in principle, quite o p e n :
indeed in some cases the contest was adjudicated b y a lay public. In
the period from the si^ h to the fourth centuries b . g . there are
s t r i k i ^ and in some respects unprecedented, developm ents both in
the practice and in the theory o f argum entation. O u r task in this
chapter is to describe these in so far as they relate to the grow th o f
philosophy and science. W h at principal methods o f argum ent are em ­
ployed in the early stages o f the developm ent ofphilosophy and science?
H ow far does that developm ent appear to depend on the deploym ent
o f new techniques o f argum ent, or on the self-conscious analysis o f such
techniques? W ithin w hat is a very extensive field ofin vestigation,i 3 we
shall concentrate on two topics o f particular im portance, nam ely first
the developm ent and use o f dialectical m e t h o d s ,a n d secondly the
form ulation and application o f a rigorous notion o f demonstration.
“ Brhadaranyaka U panisad m 7.1 (‘ Anyone might say “ I know, I k n ow ” . Do you tell
w hat you k n ow ’ , Hum e 1931, p. 114, cf. Zaehner 1966, p. 53).
In particular, w hat appear as incom patible answers to the same question are allowed,
as when seven different answers to the question o f how m any gods there are are given,
each o f which is then expounded in turn (Brhadaranyaka U panisad in 9, Hum e 1931,
pp. iig f f, cf. Zaehner 1966, pp. 57f).
” Am ong the more useful general discussions of the growth of rhetoric and dialectic in
Greece are H. G om perz 1912, Solmsen 1929, Raderm acher 1951 and Kennedy 1963.
T h e nature of ‘ dialectic’ was, as we shall see, itself disputed by the Greeks. I shall
use the term to cover any investigation that proceeds by a critical exam ination of
opinions in a given field of inquiry, especially, but not exclusively, those that proceed
from probable premisses or com m only accepted opinions (as in Aristotle s definition
o f ‘ dialectical’ syllogisms, see below, p. 62: contrast Plato’s use of the term, below,
pp. lO lf).
62 Dialectic and demonstration
A R IS T O T L E S A N A LYSIS OF M ODES OF R E A S O N IN G
T h e earliest extant works entirely devoted to the analysis o f modes o f
argum ent and o f techniques o f persuasion in general are the treatises
in Aristotle’s Organon and his Rhetoric, at the end o f the period that
chiefly concerns us. A lthough in the De Sophisticis Elenchis he claims
originality for his w ork in the systematic analysis o f reasoning in
general, 15 both there and frequently elsewhere he makes clear his
debts to earlier writers on rhetoric, am ong whom he cites several who
were the authors o f treatises now lost on the ‘ art o f speaking
W hile Aristotle systematises the ideas o f his predecessors in some
areas, and modifies or goes far beyond them in others, it is useful to
start by rehearsing some o f the fundam ental points from his analysis
o f argumentation.
First there is his careful and quite com plex classification o f the
different kinds o f reasoning. A t the beginning o f the Topics, io o a 2 7 ff,
for instance, he distinguishes three types o f syllogisms, dem on­
strations (proceeding from premisses that are true and prim ary),
dialectical syllogisms (based on generally accepted opinions) and
eristic or contentious syllogisms, w hich are based on w hat appear to
be, but are not in fact, generally accepted opinions, or w hich m erely
appear to be based on w hat are or appear to be such o p i n i o n s .
Strict deductive argum ent is the subject-m atter o f the Prior and
Posterior Analytics, the former providing a form al exposition o f the
'5 SE i 8 3 b 3 4 - i 8 4 b 8 .
O n these lost Arts, see further below, p. 8 if. In a fragm ent of his lost dialogue, the
Sophist (Fr. 65), Aristotle is reported to have called Empedocles the founder of rhetoric,
Zeno that o f dialectic. Elsewhere the role of Socrates in the development of dialectic
is recognised [Metaph. I078b25ff: c f also 987 b 32 where Aristotle contrasts Plato with
the Pythagoreans). O ne major weakness in our sources for the early developm ent of
dialectic is the lack o f reliable evidence for the work of the so-called M egarians. W e
hear from Diogenes Laertius (11 io6flF) that Euclides of M egara (a younger contem­
porary o f Socrates and not to be confused with the mathem atician) founded a school
that was called first M egarians, then Eristics and then Dialecticians, acquiring the last
name because they put their arguments in the form o f question and answer, and one of
Euclides’ pupils, Eubulides, was, apparently, responsible for the first formulation o f a
number of im portant paradoxes, including the Liar. As R yle puts it (1966, p. 112),
‘ W e know very little about the M egarians, but we know that they had very sharp
noses for logical cruces.’
Elsewhere, for exam ple at S E i65a38ff, there is a four-fold division of arguments,
didactic, dialectical, ‘ peirastic’ (examination-arguments) and contentious. But
‘ peirastic’ is on other occasions said to be a part of dialectic (e.g. SE 16 9 b 25, 171 b4,
cf. also 171 b9, 172 3 2 1). A t Rh. 1355b i7 ff the sophist is distinguished from the
dialectician by his moral purpose, rather than by his faculty (cf. also Metaph. io o 4 b 2 2 ff),
and at SE I 7 ib 2 5 f f ‘ contentious’ reasoners are in turn distinguished from ‘ sophistic’
ones in that the former aim at victory itself, the latter at reputation (with a view to
m aking money). These broad distinctions are generally maintained, even though
Aristotle’s term inology shows some fluctuation.
Dialectic and demonstration 63
various figures and moods o f the syllogism, the latter presenting an
analysis o f the conditions o f dem onstration - where Aristotle m ain­
tains that demonstration proceeds from premisses that are themselves
indem onstrable and distinguishes three kinds o f such prim ary
premisses, ‘ axiom s’ ‘ definitions’ and ‘ hypotheses’ .^® D ialectic,
defined as the m ethod by w hich we shall be able to reason from
generally accepted opinions about any p r o b l e m , i 9 is dealt with in the
eight books o f the Topics, w hich lead in turn into the discussion o f
‘ sophistical’, or m erely apparent, refutations in the De Sophisticis
Elenchis
R hetoric, w hich is said to be the counterpart o f dialectic, shares
w ith it the feature that it is quite general, not confined to any
p articular subject-m atter.21 Interestingly enough, Aristotle suggests
at Rh. i354 a3fF that all men share in both, up to a point, since all
m en to some degree try to exam ine and uphold an argum ent, to
defend themselves and to accuse. H e defines rhetoric at Rh. I3 5 5 b 2 6 f
as the faculty o f discovering the possible means o f persuasion in
relation to any subject w hatever, and he distinguishes three m ain
branches, forensic (in the law-courts), deliberative (in the public
assemblies) and epideictic (cerem onial oratory, where the aim is to
praise or b la m e : here the audience does not adjudicate a legal dispute
nor arrive at a political decision, but m erely assesses the ability o f
the speaker).23 A lthough rhetorical proofs or arguments naturally
bulk large in his discussion, these are far from being the only
im portant consideration in persuasion. Indeed he complains that
most earlier accounts o f the subject had confined themselves to such
matters as the question o f arousing the prejudices, compassion or
anger o f the judges or a u d i e n c e , a topic he takes up for him self in
See further below, pp. i i i and 115.
See Top. lo o a i8ff. Dialectic is contrasted with ‘ philosophy’ in that the former conducts
examinations, the latter produces knowledge [Metaph. 1004 b 17-26), in that dialectic
reasons to opposite conclusions {Rh. I35 5 a3 3ff), is related to opinion, rather than truth
{Top. i0 5 b3 0 f) and is concerned with another party, while the philosopher conducts
his inquiry on his own {Top. I5 5 b 7 ff).
S E is often treated as a continuation of Top., as is suggested by the fact that the end o f
SE, i8 3 a3 7ff, contains a passage that serves as an epilogue for both works.
Rh. 1354a iff. Both are faculties, δυνάμεΐί, not branches o f knowledge, έτηστημαι (see
Rh. i356a32fF, 13 5 9 b i2 ff).
“ Rh. 1359 b 18ff summarises what men deliberate about under five heads, ways and
means, w ar and peace, the defence o f the country, imports and exports and legislation.
T h e importance, to the legislator, o f knowledge of such matters as the past history of
his country and the political constitutions o f other states is underlined at Rh. i36oa3off,
I365b22ff, even though such topics themselves belong strictly to politics, not rhetoric
(cf. Rh. I35 6 a25 ff).
23 Rh. I 3 5 8 b 2 ff.
Rh. 1354a I iff, especially i6ff.
 64 Dialectic and demonstration
book II, where he gives advice about, for exam ple, addressing
audiences o f different a g e - g r o u p s , ^ s about how to m ake your own
character look right and how to p ut your listeners in the appropriate
fram e o f m ind.26
He brings out the com petitive element in rhetoric - an element
w hich it shares w ith contentious reasoning, in contrast with dialectic
w hich is a jo in t endeavour, not one that aims at victory,^^ But both
the dialectician and the rhetorician must be able to recognise and
rebut apparent, as w ell as real, arguments, and both the Topics and
the Rhetoric contain advice about how to exploit certain tricks for
your own purposes as w ell as about how to deal w ith those that m ay
be used by your opponents,28 T h e Rhetoric covers such subjects as the
use o f examples, ‘ enthym em es’ and maxims,^^ how to bring ob­
jections to yo u r opponents’ arguments,^» how to conduct the exam i­
nation o f witnesses,3 i and w hat to include in a peroration,^2 T h e
Topics not only gives extensive rules about such matters as estab­
lishing, or objecting to, a definition, but also - in book viii especially-
discusses such aspects o f the practice o f dialectic as the different roles
o f the questioner and answerer,33 H aving briefly identified four m ain
kinds o f fallacious argum ent in Topics v iii, 3 + in the De Sophisticis
Elenchis Aristotle distinguishes no fewer than six methods o f apparent
refutation b y fallacies that depend on language and a further seven
*5 Rh. II 12-14, I3 8 8 b3iff,
Rh. II I, I377b24ff, 1378a isfF: the following chapters on the emotions are included in
large part for this purpose.
H e contrasts dialectical with competitive disputes at Top. viii 11 and stresses the join t
aims o f the former at i6 ia 3 8 f, cf. I59a32ff, SE iG sb g ff, i2ff.
See, e.g.. Top. ii 3 on the exploitation o f ambiguities and 11 5 on how to lead your
opponents into assertions that are easily refuted (said to be a sophistic, but sometimes
necessary, method, 111 b 3 2 ff), and cf. Top. vm i, e.g. I55b 23ff, is G a v ff on concealing
your purposes in putting your questions (again a practice said to be contentious but
necessary). Rh. 11 24 is devoted to apparent enthymemes or rhetorical syllogisms. See
R yle 1966, p. 131, on A ristotle’s ‘ tips in sheer eristic gam esm anship’, and cf. Owen 1968,
p. 107.
Rh. II 20-26 (the ‘ enthym em e’ or rhetorical syllogism is said to be based on probable
premisses or signs, Rh. 1355a6f, 1357a32f, APr. 70a io f).
30 Rh. II 25, I402a34ff, cf. Top. viii 10, 161 a iff, APr. n 26, 69a37ff.
3 * Rh. in i8, I4 i8 b 3 9 ff,
32 Rh. Ill 19, 1419 b loff.
33 Especially Top. vni 4, 159a 15!?, but cf. also, e.g., 156b i8ff, i59a38ff, i6 i a i 6 f f , and
note the references to the audience present at debates, e.g. at SE i6 9 b 3 i and I74a36.
Cf. M oraux 1968, and on the background see also R yle 1965 and 1966, pp. i lo ff and
igGff (‘ the organization of the eristic m oot’).
3+ Top. i6 2 b 3 ff. T h e four are (i) when an argument only appears to be brought to a
conclusion; (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion proposed;
(3) when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not b y the appropriate mode o f
inquiry; and (4) when the conclusion is reached from false premisses. He goes on in
Top. vm 13, i62b 34ff, to identify, for example, five types o f begging the question;
cf, also Top. l e i b i g f f .
Dialectic and demonstration 65
that do not, 3 s W hile the Prior and Posterior Analytics set out the first
systematic theory o f deductive argum ent, the Rhetoric, Topics and
De Sophisticis Elenchis together provide a comprehensive, highly pro­
fessional and practical discussion o f argum ent and persuasion where -
besides showing his logical acuteness and his gifts for analysis -
Aristotle is clearly draw ing on a wide experience o f the uses o f
different modes o f reasoning,
B y the m iddle o f the fourth century b , c , dialectic and rhetoric had
both developed into sophisticated disciplines, and we m ay be sure
that the Greeks’ interest in, and appreciation of, skill in those fields
were both keen and widespread. A lthough Aristotle was the first to
undertake the systematic form al analysis o f valid and invalid argu­
ment, reflection on aspects o f argum entation and on the techniques
o f persuasion had begun long before him. M oreover he and those who
wrote before and after him on the art o f rhetoric had a rich store o f
m aterial to draw on in early G reek literature, Homer, in particular,
was represented, in this as in so m an y other matters, as the teacher
o f the G reeks.37 T hus A ulus Gellius suggested that he provided
models for each o f the three m ain styles o f speaking, Ulysses o f the
grand, M enelaus o f the restrained and Nestor o f the interm ediate , 38
and Aristotle even said that H om er first taught men how ‘ to tell lies
in the right w a y ’ , for instance how to use paralogisms, illustrating
this b y finding an (implicit) exam ple o f the fallacy o f the consequent
in the conversation between Odysseus and Penelope in Odyssey
book X I X . 3 9 H om er provides plenty o f examples o f arguments
and inferences o f various types, as, for instance, when individual
heroes justify an inference that supernatural agencies are at
35 T h e six that depend on language are equivocation, am phiboly, combination, division,
accent and form o f expression: the seven that do not depend on language are accident,
the use o f words with or without qualification, ignoratio elenchi, petitio principii,
consequent, false cause and m any questions, SE i6 5 b 2 3 ff, i66b2off’. In several cases
the term by w hich the fallacy is still known ultim ately derives from Aristotle.
36 T h e importance of training and practice is mentioned, e.g. at ΛΛ. i 4 i o b 8 ,5 £ i7 5 a 2 3 ff,
and is a frequent theme in the Topics, e.g. xo8ai2iT, i6 ia 2 4 fF and especially vm 14,
i 6 3 a 2 9 ff·,
3’ T hus R. 606 e f is one o f m any passages in which Plato is critical of H om er’s influence
as educator of the Greeks, In /on 540 b if the idea that one can learn from Homer how
different types o f person should speak is attacked.
3* A ulus Gellius v i 14.7, cf. Cicero, Brut. 10,40, Quintilian, Inst, x i,46ff, x ii 10.64 ^nd
other passages cited by Raderm acher 19 5 1, pp, 6ff, gf.
39 Po. 1460a i8ff. A t Od. XIX i64 ff Odysseus tells Penelope he is a Cretan from Cnossos
w ho once entertained Odysseus on his voyage to T roy, and as evidence o f this he
describes Odysseus’ dress and companions. Penelope commits the fallacy of inferring
the truth o f the antecedent from that o f the consequent: i f his story were true, he would
know these details; he does know them ; so his story is true.
66 Dialectic and demonstration
workj-^o OP in other contexts where an im plicit appeal is m ade to
some notion o f w hat is - in general, or in particular circumstances -
probable or to be e x p e c t e d ,o r again where analogies, drawn from
experience or from m ythology, are cited either in reasoning to a con­
clusion or w ith the aim o f persuasion.
Y e t if a variety o f modes o f reasoning can be docum ented in our
earliest G reek literary sources - and there can clearly be no question
o f attem pting to assign an origin to techniques o f persuasion as such -
the problems we must pose relate to the types o f argum ent em ployed
in early G reek philosophy and science, and the interaction o f the
theory o f argum ent and its practice. O u r principal questions, as we
form ulated them, concern how far the developm ent o f philosophy
and science depends on the deploym ent o f new techniques o f argu ­
m ent or on their self-conscious analysis. W e m ay divide our discussion
into three m ain parts, first the use o f argum ent in the earliest period
o f G reek speculative thought, culm inating in the w ork o f Parm enides
and his followers, second the growth o f rhetoric and dialectic and
their influence on early G reek natural science, and third the develop­
m ent o f axiom atics and o f the theory and practice o f demonstration.
EARLY P H IL O S O P H IC A L A R G U M EN TA TIO N
For natural philosophers before X enophanes the lim itations o f our
inform ation impose severe restrictions on our discussion. Sometimes,
however, our secondary sources record reasoning that has some chance
o f going back to an original argument, w hether abstract or em pirical.
T w o such cases which have already been cited (p. 50 n. 213) are II. x x iv sGsfF and
Od. XVI i94fF. In the former, Achilles says he knows that some god guided Priam to
the A chaians’ ships: ‘ for no mortal, not even one in the prime o f life, would dare to
come to the cam p; nor would he escape the notice o f the guards, nor easily thrust back
the bolt o f our doors’ . In the latter, Telem achus, faced with a transformed Odysseus,
infers that a δαίμων is deceiving him: ‘ for no m ortal man could devise these things
with his own mind, at least. . .for just now you were an old m a n ’ . These cases m ay be
com pared with an indirect proof or reductio (see below, p. 76 and n. 87) in that the
speaker justifies a conclusion by rejecting the im plied alternative as being in conflict
with some feature of the given situation. Schem atically: A. For otherwise (i.e. if not A),
not B. But B. Thus the former argument can be recast in the form of a M odus Tollens,
although to do so is to reveal what is left implicit or what has to be supplied in the
original statement. ‘ (If a god did not help) no m ortal would dare. . . (But you dared).
So I know a god helped you .’
See, for instance, N ausicaa’s representation of what some o f the Phaeacians might say
if they saw her arrive in the city with Odysseus {Od. vi 273ff). Here there is no direct
reference to the probable as such: we may contrast the frequent explicit use o f the topic
o f probability in, for example, the orators (on which see, for instance, Dover 1968,
p. 57 and cf. below, p. 80 nn. 104 and 105 and p. 81).
T he use of arguments from analogy, including a fortiori arguments, in Homer was
considered briefly in m y 1966, pp. 38411.
Dialectic and demonstration 67
and w hile those that chiefly rely on em pirical considerations w ill
occupy us in the next chapter,^^ two instances o f abstract argu­
m entation, both concerning A naxim ander, are especially noteworthy.
T h e first concerns his principle, the boundless, itself A t Ph.
204b22fii' Aristotle refers to certain unnam ed thinkers who suppose
there to be an infinite body over and above the elements, so that the
other elements are not destroyed b y w hichever o f them is infinite.
T h ey are all characterised by oppositions, air being cold, for exam ple,
w ater w et and fire hot: so that ‘ if one o f these were infinite, the rest
w ould b y now have been d e s t r o y e d T h e r e must, then, have been
something different from air, w ater and the like, from w hich they -
and one m ay add everything else - came to be. Aristotle does not
mention A naxim ander b y name,4s but Sim plicius does in his com ­
m entary on the passage^^ and he elsewhere speaks o f the Boundless
in A naxim ander as being something separate and distinct from such
things as water, which cam e to be from it.^7 Both Aristotle and
Sim plicius have undoubtedly reform ulated the argum ent in their
own. Peripatetic, t e r m s . Y e t it m ay w ell be that - w hether or not
he was directly stimulated b y reflecting on T h ales’ choice o f w ater as
principle - A naxim ander was influenced in his own doctrine o f the
Boundless by considering a difficulty that arose from any such view,
nam ely how, if w ater was the origin o f things, fire could ever have
come to be. I f he recognised that a similar objection could be m ounted
against any cosmogony that took one o f the obvious natural sub­
stances or world-masses as its starting-point, then he had w hat we
m ay describe as indirect proof o f the conclusion that the origin o f
things must be something other than those natural substances.
T h e second argum ent is both more striking and better attested,
since Aristotle him self mentions A naxim ander b y name. This is in his
discussion o f his predecessors’ views on the shape o f the earth and on
w hy it is at rest in the De Caelo 11 13. A fter describing the doctrines
held b y a num ber o f other theorists, including, for instance, T h ales’
T h e use o f empirical evidence by the Presocratic natural philosophers is discussed in
ch. 3, pp. I39ff. M any o f their theories and explanations are derived from, or supported
by, fairly simple analogies: this was considered in some detail in m y 1966, chh. 4 and 5.
** Ph. 204b a8f.
“*5 A t Metaph. 1069b 22, however, he speaks of Anaxim ander as one o f a number of
thinkers who held that everything came to be from a state when ‘ everything was
togeth er’ : cf. also Ph. i87a2 of.
In Ph. 479.33 and 480.1.
In Ph. 24.i6fT.
N ot only in their use of the notion o f ‘ elem ents’ , but also, probably, in their analysis
of those elements in turn in terms of the prim ary opposites, hot, cold, wet and dry:
see Holscher (1953) 1970 and Lloyd (1964) 1970·
68 Dialectic and demonstration
idea th at the earth is at rest because it floats on w a t e r ,A r i s t o t le
goes on to say that some, including A naxim ander, held that it was
the earth’s ‘ indifference’ that was responsible for it rem aining where
it is.so T h eir argum ent was that that w hich is situated at the centre
and related sim ilarly to the extremes has no tendency to m ove in one
direction rather than in any other. M oreover it is impossible for it
to m ove in opposite directions at the same time. Therefore it neces­
sarily remains at rest. I f this was indeed A naxim ander’s reason-
in g , 5 i then we m ay see this as the first extant instance, in natural
science, o f the use o f w hat we m ay call the principle o f sufficient
reason.
A n y reconstruction o f the dialectical arguments used by the
Milesians must rem ain conjectural. But w ith later philosophers,
Xenophanes, H eraclitus and especially Parmenides, we are on firm er
ground. First the arguments that Xenophanes brought against
anthropom orphism provide good examples o f inform al attempts to
reduce that view to absurdity. T o attack the idea o f men picturing
the gods in their own im age he draws an analogy w ith animals
representing the gods as like themselves: ‘ I f oxen and horses and
lions had hands and could draw w ith their hands and produce works
o f art like men, horses w ould draw the forms o f the gods like horses,
and oxen like oxen, and they w ould m ake their bodies such as each
o f them had themselves.’52 I f the idea o f anim al representations o f
gods in the form o f animals was absurd,s 3 then - X enophanes
implies - the same should apply, b y parity o f reasoning, to hum an
conceptions o f gods in the form o f humans. T h en although the
extant fragments o f H eraclitus are m ore often suggestive and
elliptical or paradoxical, rather than explicit and deductive, there
are some notable examples o f hypothetical arguments in the thought
experiments o f Fr. 7 (‘ if everything becam e smoke, noses w ould
Cael. 294a 28ff. He also mentions Xenophanes’ view (that the roots o f the earth stretch
down indefinitely, Cael. 294a 2 i f f - a n idea criticised by Empedocles, Fr. 39, Cael.
294a24ff) and those o f Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus, Cael. 294b i3ff.
50 Cael. 295 b I off. T h e historicity o f this report has recently been questioned, though on
w eak grounds, by J. M . Robinson 1971.
5 ‘ A gain the possibility that Anaxim ander was prompted to his view by reflecting on the
difficulties present in that of Thales has long been recognised. Aristotle records as one
o f his own main objections to Thales that the same argum ent applies to the water
which is supposed to hold the earth up, as to the earth itself {Cael. 294a32ff) - though
we have no way of determining at what point that objection was formulated.
Fr. 15, cf. also Frr. 14 and 16: and cf. above, pp. iif .
53 No doubt in part because the animals are thought o f as responsible. It is not clear
whether Xenophanes knew (as Herodotus certainly did) that the Egyptians often
represented the gods in the form o f animals, but gods appear frequently in the guise
o f birds in Homer (e.g. Od. iii 3 7 if) .
Dialectic and demonstration 69
discrim inate th em ’ ) and Fr. 23 (‘ they w ould not know the nam e o f
Justice, i f these things did not exist
Such isolated examples o f arguments o f types m uch used in later
Greek philosophy and science are interesting, but they pale in
significance beside the developm ents that take place w ith P ar­
menides, who was - as all recognise - the first to produce a sustained
deductive argument. T h e interpretation o f m any aspects o f the W ay
o f T ru th is highly disputed, and it is not m y intention to engage in
a detailed analysis o f the issues that relate to the substance o f the
arguments i t c o n t a i n s . ss R ath er i t is the form and structure o f those
arguments that concern us, and here there can be no doubt about
two essential points, (i) that Fr. 2 sets out the starting-point for the
whole, and (2) that the conclusions o f Fr. 8 are established by
arguments linked in a strict deductive chain.
T h e starting-point is the apparently incontrovertible proposition
that ‘ it is ’ . This is stated, and established, in the stronger form - ‘ it
is and it is impossible for it not to b e ’ - in Fr. 2, which points out
that the alternative - ‘ it is not and it needs must not b e ’ - must be
rejected on the grounds that ‘ you could not know w hat is not, at
least,s6 nor could you declare i t ’,s7 for - as Fr. 3 goes on to say - ‘ it
is the same thing that can be thought and can b e ’ . T h e sense o f the
verb to be, the subject we must understand, and the nature o f the
alternatives presented, are all controversial issues, but that does not
affect m y m ain point here, w hich is that in fragm ent 2 Parmenides
was evidently attem pting to establish a starting-point that all would
have to accept. Thus on one plausible reading o f Fr. 2.6, one point
that he appeals to is that w e could not expect to learn anything from
any w ay o f inquiry that began w ith the statement that the object it
was inquiring into does not exist.s8
T h e starting-point once secure, Parmenides gives an articulated
argum ent in the long fragm ent 8 to show that it is ungenerated and
indestructible, not subject to m ovem ent or change, and both
5·* See also Fr. 99 (‘ if there were no sun, it would be night on account o f the other stars’)
and the testimony included as Fr. 4. C f. also the thought-experiment in Xenophanes
Fr. 38 (‘ if god had not created yellow honey, they would say that figs were much
sw eeter’ ).
55 A m ong the fundam ental recent studies the following m ay be mentioned in particular,
O w en (i960) 1975, M ansfeld 1964, T ardn 1965, Holscher 1968, pp. 9off, M ourelatos
1970. T h e nature o f the alternatives presented in Fr. 2 is discussed in m y 1966, pp. i03ff.
56 τό γε μή Ιόν (Fr. 2.7): an alternative translation would be ‘ it, at least if it were n o t’.
57 ούτ£ φράσαι$ (Fr. 2.8): not evidently in the sense that you could not pronounce the words
(the goddess just has), but that you could not assert it as true.
5 ®T akin g πανοπτευθέα as ‘ that from which nothing can be learned’ (cf. M ourelatos’ ‘ that
from which no tidings ever com e’) rather than ‘ unintelligible’ or ‘ inconceivable’, and
taking §στι as (at least prim arily) existential.
70 Dialectic and demonstration
spatially and tem porally invariant. A ga in m any points o f detail,
some o f them im portant ones, are obscure or disputed or b o th : but
the main structure o f the argum ent is fairly w ell agreed, and that it
has a rigorous deductive form is not in question. H e first sets out
w hat he is going to establish at Fr. 8.2ff,s9 and then proceeds to
demonstrate each point in turn in an argum ent that falls into four
m ain sections.^® In the first section, the denial o f 'it is n o t’ (established
already in Fr. 2) is used to show that ‘ it is ungenerated and in­
destructible’ . T h e arguments in each o f the later sections take over
conclusions from the earlier ones, which are cited as premisses picked
out in each case by a clause introduced w ith έπεί.^ι A lthough there is
plenty o f room for disagreem ent about the precise force o f particular
stretches o f argum ent, the overall tactics Parm enides uses in his
dem onstration are not in serious doubt. T h e fragm ent forms a care­
fully articulated whole in w hich the later sections build on the
conclusions o f the earlier in an orderly sequence o f argum enta-
ion.
T h e m ethod, then, no less than the content, o f the W a y o f T ru th
is revolutionary. W e have not only a set o f conclusions that com ­
pletely overturn comm on a s s u m p t i o n s those conclusions are
established b y an extraordinarily tightly knit chain o f a r g u m e n t s . ^ 3
M oreover am ong the individual arguments he uses, two deserve
particular notice. First we now have a far more certain exam ple than
in A naxim ander o f an appeal to w hat we m ay call the principle o f
sufficient reason. This is in the proof that ‘ it is ungenerated’ , at
Fr. S.gf, where the goddess dem ands: ‘ W h at need w ould have
59 There is disagreement both about the readings o f verse 4 (ουλον μουυογενέξ seems prefer­
able to ίστι γάρ ούλομελέ^ and either οΰδ’ στέλεστον or ήδέ τέλειον to ήδ’ άτέλεστον) and
about whether verses 5 and 6 continue setting out what is to be proved, or begin the
proof. But these issues do not substantially affect the central point that Fr. 8 begins
with a statement of wh at is to be demonstrated.
Fr. 8.5-21, 22-25, 26-33 and 42-49 (34-41 make points about the relation between
thinking and being that are similar to Fr. 2-7f, Fr. 3 and Fr. 6, but fall outside the main
structure).
Fr. 8.22, 27 and 42. T hus the proposition that ‘ it is not divisible’ is proved at Fr. 8.22ff
using the premiss that ‘ it is all u nqualifiedly’ (taking όμοϊον as adverbial, with O w e n ):
cf. ‘ it is com pletely’ established in the first section at Fr. 8 .1 1. ‘ It is unm oved. . .
without beginning, without e n d ’ is shown at Fr. 8.26ff using the premiss that ‘ coming
to be and passing a w a y ’ had been ruled out: c f Fr. 8.6ff and ig ff in the first section.
F inally ‘ it is perfected in all directions’ is shown at Fr. 8.42ff using the premiss that
‘ there is an uhim ate b o u n d ary’ : cf. Fr. 8.26 and 3of in the third section.
T h e incoherence o f the opinions of ordinary men is mentioned in Fr. 6.4ff (they
consider that ‘ being and not being are the same and again not the sam e’) and
Fr. 8.38ff (which rejects their use o f the terms coming-to-be and passing away, being
and not being, changing place and alteration of bright colour).
*3 T h e goddess who instructs Parmenides herself says: ‘ It is all one to me where I begin:
for I shall come back there a g a in ’ (Fr. 5).
Dialectic and demonstration 71
raised it to grow later or earlier, starting from nothing?’*^ I f no
cause can be adduced, or no explanation given, to account for the
universe com ing to be at one time rather than at any other, then we
m ay consider this an argum ent for rejecting the notion that it came
to be at a l l . 6s Secondly, the same disproof o f coming-to-be contains
a clear instance o f a reductio argum ent, in this case an im plicit M odus
Tollens where a thesis is rejected on the grounds that one o f its
consequents is false (‘ I f A, then B\ but not B\ so not A ’ ). ‘ I f it
cam e to b e ’ , the goddess says at Fr. 8.20, ‘ it is not.’ But - as we had
been shown - ‘ it is n o t’ must be denied; and so, as she concludes,
‘ com ing-to-be’ must also be r e j e c t e d .
T h e immense im pact that Parm enides had on subsequent G reek
philosophy derives as m uch from his methods as from his con­
clusions. H e is the first thinker to set up a fundam ental opposition
between the senses ^and abstracT argum ent or r e a s o n , ^ ^ and^ to
express an unequivocal judgem ent on the relative trustworthiness o f
μ each. In Fr. 7 the goddess tells Parm enides not ‘ to let habit, born o f
experience, force you to let w ander your heedless eye or echoing ear
or tongue along this road ’ : rather, he is to ‘ju d g e by Aoyos -
reasoned argum ent - the much-contested refutation, spoken b y m e’ .
W h at we m ay broadly call em pirical methods and evidence are not
m erely not u sed : they are ruled out. T h eir relevance is restricted to
the W ay o f δόξα - Seem ing or O pinion - the ‘ deceitful’ cosmology
‘ in w hich there is no true b e lie f’ , that the goddess offers Parmenides
after the end o f the W a y o f T ru th ‘ so that no judgem ent o f mortals
m ay outstrip y o u ’ .^^ Xhg W a y o f T ru th itself proceeds strictly
deductively from a single, incontrovertible starting-point, and it
served as a model o f a rigorous dem onstration for later philosophers.
A lth ou gh it was not until the fourth century that arguments cam e to
be analysed as such, several late fifth-century writers - w hether in
direct im itation o f Parm enides or not - exem plify patterns o f
reasoning that are very similar to his. T h e arguments in his own two
I.e., probably, at any one time rather than at any other.
T h e relevance o f this argum ent is not confined, of course, to such earlier Greek cosmo-
logists as Parmenides him self m ay have had in mind.
Verse 20 continues; ούδ’ εί ποτε μέλλει ?σεσθαι. T his might be taken either as im plying
a similar argum ent to deny that it w ill be (‘ nor is it, if it is coming to be in the futu re’),
or as part o f the consequent (‘ if it came to be, it is not - not even if it is going to b e ’).
T h e question o f the reliability o f the senses was, however, also broached by Heraclitus
Fr. 107 (but cf. Fr. 55), and cf. Xenophanes Fr. 34 on the limitations of human
knowledge in general.
** Fr. 8.61. T h e status of the W ay o f Seeming is much disputed. But it is sufficiently clear
from the goddess’ statement that ‘ there is no true belief’ in it (Fr. 1.30, cf. Fr. 8.5off)
that it is not intended to modify the conclusions o f the W ay o f Truth.
 72 Dialectic and demonstration
ch ief followers, Zeno and Melissus, especially, often resemble, though
in certain respects they m ay be said to advance on, those in the W ay
o f T ru th , and their use o f reductio arguments and o f the dilem m a is
p articularly noteworthy.
T h a t the whole o f Z en o’s principal treatise was intended to
support Parm enides’ position by reducing the views o f his opponents
to absurdity is suggested by w hat Plato tells us in the Parmenides.
Th ere (i2 8 cd) Zeno is m ade to say that his w ork
is in truth a kind of support for Parmenides’ argument against those who try to
make fun of it by saying that if there is one, then many absurd and contradictory
consequences result for his argument. This book, therefore, opposes those who
assert that there are many, and it repays them in the same coin - and with more -
aiming to show that their hypothesis, that there are many, is subject to far more
absurd consequences than the hypothesis that there is one, if one prosecutes the
inquiry sufficiently.
A ccording to this report, the strategic aim o f Zen o’s arguments was
to provide indirect proof o f ‘ the o n e ’ (Parm enides’ monistic position)
b y refuting the opposite^? hypothesis that ‘ there are m a n y ’ , and
although it has often been thought that he had particular pluralists
in m ind, the range o f application o f his destructive arguments appears
to be quite general and they seem to be designed to refute any version
o f a pluralist doctrine.^o
T h e m aterial from Sim plicius collected as fragments i and 2 in
D iels-K ra n z, and the four arguments against motion for w hich
Aristotle is our m ain (though adm ittedly rather unsatisfactory)
source, provide us with our best opportunities to see how this
strategy was im plem ented in practice.'^i T h e articulation o f Frr. i
and 2 can be reconstructed from Sim plicius’ introductory remarks.^^
T h e original argum ent appears to have had four m ain limbs, (i) T h e
first aim ed to establish that if there are m any, they have no size.
^ Following R a n u lf 1924, I argued in m y 1966, p. 107, that the hypotheses o f ‘ the o n e ’
and ‘ the m a n y ’ are treated by Zeno as if they were m utually exclusive and exhaustive
alternatives. A clear distinction between contraries and contradictories does not
antedate Plato: and the first full explicit analysis o f different modes of opposition is in
Aristotle.
Ό Against the views o f T an n ery 1887, pp. i24ff, and 1930, pp. 255ff, Cornford 1922 and
19235 Lee 1936 and R aven 1948, one m ay refer to Frankel (originally 1942), O w en
( i 9 5 7 “ 8 ) and Vlastos (1953) in A llen -F urley 1975 especially. T h e idea that Z en o’s
arguments are directed especially, if not exclusively, against the doctrine that Cornford
labelled ‘ num ber-point-atom ism ’ (the identification o f integers, geom etrical points and
physical atoms) suffers from the major disadvantage that there is no good evidence to
confirm that such a view was held before Zeno.
Fr. 3 and Fr. 4 (both antinomies) take a similar form to Frr. i and 2, but we have less
evidence on which to reconstruct the original arguments.
72 Note especially προδείξας at In Ph. 139.18 and at 141.1. T h e reconstrucdon adopted
here follows that o f Frankel (1942/1975) in the main.
Dialectic and demonstration 73
Sim plicius remarks, baldly, that this was shown from the admission
that ‘ each o f the m any is the same as itself and o n e ’ .'^^ T h e under­
lying argum ent has plausibly been suggested to have been that if
they have size, they have parts, and so are not (ultimate) units, but
collections o f units. But the m any in question cannot be (mere)
collections o f u n its: they must be the ultim ate units themselves. So
they can have no size . 7 4 (2) T h e second lim b o f the argum ent then
shows, on the contrary, that they must have size. For if they had no
size, they would not b e ; but they have been assumed to b e ; so they
must have size.^s (3) Zeno then explores the consequences o f saying
that they have size in an argum ent the conclusion o f w hich is that
‘ they are so large as to be u n lim ited ’ . (4) T h e overall conclusion
is then stated that, ‘ i f there are m any, they are so small as to have
no size, and so large as to be u n lim ited ’ .77
M an y problems o f interpretation rem ain disputed, and this is true
in particular o f the question o f whether, when Zeno concluded in (3)
that the m any are ‘ so large as to be u n lim ited ’ , this is a fallacy or
m erely a deliberate trick . 7 8 Y e t certain features o f the form and
overall structure o f the arguments are clear. First both the first and
the second limbs (as reconstructed) are indirect proofs or reductiones
that consist in im plicit M odus Tollens arguments. In (i) if they have
’3 In Ph. 139.19.
Cf. Frankel (1942) 1975, pp. i i o - i i .
’ 5 Simplicius, In Ph. 14 1.i f states that ‘ I f w hat is had no size, it would not be.’ T h e
argum ent is given at In Ph. 139.i i f f (Fr. 2). I f a thing has no size, then ‘ if it were
added to something, it would not increase i t ’ , and if it were subtracted from something,
it would not decrease it. But that which, when added or subtracted, causes no increase
or dim inution to w hat it is added to or subtracted from, is nothing.
T h e argum ent is given by Simplicius at In Ph. 141.2ff (Fr. i) . ‘ I f it exists, then each
necessarily has some size and bulk and one part of it stands out (or ‘ is distinct’ ,
άπέχειν) from another. A n d the same argum ent applies to the part that is in the lead
(or ‘ is before i t ’ , or ‘ projects’ , προύχουτο$). It too will have size and part o f it will be
in the lead .’ M oreover this process can be continued indefinitely. So they are ‘ so large
as to be unlim ited’ . O n the much debated sense of ιτροέχειν here, com pare Frankel
(1942) 1975, p. 118, O w en (1957-8) 1975, p. 146, Vlastos (1959) i 9 7 5 > P· 178 and
most recently Booth 1978.
77 T his conclusion is stated at SimpHcius, In Ph. 141.6ff.
78 T h e key to this is the sense o f the term translated ‘ unlim ited’ (άπειρα, In Ph. 141.8).
I f {a), as most o f the ancient commentators assumed, it means ‘ infinitely la rge’, the
argum ent is fallacious. Zeno has shown that there is an infinite number o f parts, but
not that w hat is is infinitely large - for the sum o f an infinite series m ay be finite. If,
alternatively {b), as Frankel has suggested, the sense is merely ‘ limitless’, the argum ent
goes through, but only troubles the pluralists if they do not spot the trick: he has shown
that the object has an indefinite num ber of parts, but uses a term that might suggest
they have infinite magnitude. See especially Vlastos (1959) 1975 and Frankel (1942)
1975 and cf. Furley 1967, pp. 68f, w ho points out (p. 77 n. 9) that on the latter inter­
pretation {b), the argum ent still retains some force as an antinom y (since there is still
a contradiction between ‘ of no m agn itu de’ and ‘ lim itless’ in the sense specified),
although its force as a dilemm a is removed (since the pluralists could accept one of the
alternatives presented).
74 Dialectic and demonstration
size, they are not units: but they are units; so they have no size. In
(2) if they have no size, they do not exist; but they exist; so they have
size. Secondly, and more strikingly, the four-fold argum ent as a
w hole is a carefully constructed antinom y. It reduces the assumption
that there are m an y to absurdity by draw ing incom patible con­
sequences from it, nam ely that they are both so small as to have no
size, and so large as to be unlim ited. Schem atically, the form o f the
argum ent is: if A, then both X and T\ but (it is assumed) not both
X and T ; and so (by im plication) not A.
T h e four arguments against motion reported by Aristotle^’ form a
further part o f Z en o ’s indirect proof o f the one. T h a t m uch is
reasonably clear, although m any o f the specific moves in these
arguments and their interrelationship are in doubt. A n exposition o f
the set would take us well beyond our present concerns,^® but we
m ay com m ent briefly on the m ain aspect o f their structure that is o f
particular interest in considering Zeno’s techniques o f argum ent,
nam ely the use o f the dilem m a. O n one interpretation that stems
from T an n ery the four arguments display a com plex symmetry, the
first pair, the Dichotomy^' and the Achilles, attacking m otion on the
assumption that space and time are infinitely divisible, and the
second, the F lying A rrow and the M oving Rows, doing so on the
assumption that space and time consist o f indivisible m inim a (atom ic
quanta). This view represents Zeno constructing a highly sophisti­
cated m ultiple dilem m a, but it runs into several m ajor difficulties,
the most dam aging o f which is that if the M oving Row s attacks a
clearly defined notion o f atomic quanta, then all the ancient com ­
mentators missed the point.^^
C hiefly Ph. 239b9ff, cf. also 233a 2 iff, 23gb5ff, 263a4ff.
T he modern literature on these arguments is immense, but apart from the items
already mentioned above (p. 72 n. 70), see especially Booth 1957a and b, Vlastos
(1966a) 1975, (19666) 1975 and Furley 1967.
Also called the Stadium (from Aristotle, Top. i6 o b 7 ff): but this m ay be misleading
as a stadium is also referred to in the fourth argum ent (the M oving Rows).
Aristotle reports the argum ent at Ph. 239b33ff (cf. also Simplicius, In Ph. ioi6 .9 ff,
from which the usual diagram is derived). T w o rows o f bodies (fis and Cs) are imagined
as moving past one another, and past a third stationary row (^s), in opposite directions:
A A A A
B B B B
^ C C C C
In this situation, each member o f row B passes two members of row C for every one o f
row A, and Aristotle states the conclusion as being that h alf the time is equal to its
double. W hat is not clear is whether the rows comprise bodies o f any kind, or whether
they are thought of as indivisible units moving in indivisible units of time. I f the latter
is the case, the paradox is undoubtedly more interesting. Y et none o f our ancient
sources takes it in that w ay, and Aristotle in particular refutes the argument sim ply by
pointing out that the speed o f a m oving object is relative to what it is measured against.
Dialectic and demonstration 75
Y e t even if it seems that these arguments are not the tightly knit
set that they have sometimes been m ade out to be, it is still probable
enough that - together with Frr. i and 2 - they exploit dilemmas to
show the incoherence o f any notion o f division. It m ay be that the
second pair o f arguments against motionS 3 does not attack a well-
defined conception o f atom ic quanta o f space and time, so m uch as
an unspecified notion o f discrete units o f some kind.®'^ But the first pair
clearly attack the idea o f the infinite divisibility o f space (at least).
T h e F lying A rrow , as reported by Aristotle at Ph. 2 39 bsff, appears to hinge on a
confusion between ‘ instant’ and ‘ in terval’ . Aristotle has clearly abbreviated the
argum ent, but the essential steps seem to be; (i) everything is always at rest when it is
‘ at a place equal to itself’ ; (2) the m oving object is always at a place equal to itself
‘ in the n o w ’ (έν τ ω vOv); therefore (3) the object m oving is always at rest (ΙστηκΕν,
Ph. 239b3o: contrast Ph. 239b7 where the conclusion is that it is unm oved, ακίνητον).
W hether or not Zeno himself used the expression έν τω vOv, ‘ in the n o w ’ in step (2)
is ambiguous, for it can be used either {a) of the durationless instant (the analogue, in
the continuum o f time, o f the geom etrical point) or {b) of an indefinitely small interval
or period of time. T h e argum ent can then be read in two quite different ways, de­
pending on which sense we take, (a ) I f we take it to mean ‘ durationless instant’ , then
proposition (2) is true, but the conclusion that follows is that the arrow is neither in
motion nor at rest. It is, we should say, meaningless to talk of either motion or rest
taking place in an instant, though we need to be able to talk of motion or rest measured
at an instant. But if (b ) the now refers to an interval, however small, then proposition
(2) is false. T he plausibility of proposition (2) depends on taking ‘ n o w ’ strictly as an
instant: but the conclusion in step (3) only follows if it is taken in the sense o f minimal
interval. It is, however, far from clear whether the confusion here was one that Z en o’s
real or im aginary opponents m ade or one that he himself did. It is possible that he was
exploiting an incoherence in the position o f anyone who tried to explain motion on the
assumption that time is m ade up o f ‘ now s’ without distinguishing the idea o f a duration­
less instant from that o f a minimal interval. But we cannot rule out the possibility that
Zeno him self simply failed to distinguish the two. T he distinction was only m ade
explicit for the first time by Aristotle, and once that distinction was available, anyone
w ho postulated atomic quanta o f time could block the paradox by pointing out that
such qu an ta are not of zero m agnitude (and so denying proposition (2)), although they
w ould still face the difliiculties raised by Zeno’s Frr. i and 2. It should, however, be
stressed that we have no reliable independent evidence that such a notion o f atomic
quanta o f time was held in the fifth century.
F u rley 1967, pp. 74f, suggests that the M oving Rows is directed against the distinction
betw een m oving and static: it depends not on indivisibles, but only on the idea that a
length can be divided into sections such that to traverse the length is to ‘ be opposite
t o ’ each section in turn for a period of time. T h e essential (fallacious) step is that since
a C and a B are opposite the same A for the same time, they are opposite each other for
that time. Cf. also O w en (1957-8) 1975, p· 164 n. 22.
O n w h at seems the more likely interpretation o f the D ichotom y, it uses an infinite
regress to suggest that motion cannot begin. Before a m oving object reaches any given
point, it must first reach a point h a lf w ay to it, and again to reach that point, it must
first reach a point h alf w ay to it. Since this process can be continued indefinitely, a
point can always be found between the point to be reached and the starting-point,
and so motion cannot begin. O n another interpretation (see Vlastos (19666) 1975) the
argum ent is designed to show not that no movement can begin, but that no movement
can be com pleted: to reach the end point in a movement, one must first reach a point
h a lf w ay to it, then a point h a lf w ay between that point and the end, and so on. O n that
version the argum ent would reduplicate the Achilles, which sim ilarly attacks motion on
the assumption that space is infinitely divisible. Here Achilles and his opponent (it is
the commentators who identify this as a tortoise) are imagined as moving, and at
7^ Dialectic and demonstration
A n d the alternative notion o f a division that terminates in ultim ate
units is dealt with and ruled out in Frr. i and 2, w hich show (as we
have seen) that no coherent account o f such units can be g iv e n : they
cannot have size, for they are ultim ate units; but no more can they
have no size, for they exist.
In Melissus, Parm enides’ other m ain fifth-century follower, we
have a further rich haul o f deductive arguments. T h e surviving
fragments^^ provide one instance after another where theses (in­
cluding some that conflict with Parm enides’ own doctrines) are
established by the m ethod o f indirect proof or reductio. Strictly, a
reductio proceeds by first assuming the contradictory o f the thesis to
be proved, and then refuting this by deducing either its contradictory,
or some pair o f contradictory propositions (as in an antinom y), or
some other statement known to be false (as in the general schema o f
M odus T o l l e n s ) . 8 7 Bearing in mind that MeHssus does not distinguish
between different modes o f opposition, and that, like both Parm enides
and Zeno before him, he often treats other pairs o f opposites - not
ju st strict contradictories - as m utually exclusive and exhaustive
a l t e r n a t i v e s , ς^η cite examples o f different kinds o f reductio
from his fragments.
Mehssus general strategy in Fr. 8 follows the first o f these three
types. H e there aims to establish that there is one by considering not
(it is true) the contradictory, but the contrary proposition, that there
are m any. A fter a series o f arguments he arrives at w hat he no doubt
took to be the self-contradictory conclusion that ‘ if there were m any,
they would have to be such as the one is ’ .^^ H e proceeds in a similar
different speeds. Even though Achilles is much faster than the tortoise, he will never
catch him. He must first reach the point from which the tortoise starts. W hen he has
reached that point, the tortoise will have advanced a certain distance, and Achilles
must then reach that point. A gain the process can be continued indefinitely, and so, as
Aristotle puts it {Ph. 239b ly f) , ‘ the slower necessarily always has a le a d ’ . A lthough
Aristotle sometimes reports the D ichotom y as if it too attacked the notion of traversing
a distance (e.g. Ph. 2 3 3 a a iff, a63a4ff, Top. iG o b y ff), in introducing the argum ent at
Ph. 2 3 9 b gff he speaks of it as concluding that there is no movement.
O u r secondary sources, especially Sim plicius’ paraphrase and the pseudo-Aristotelian
De Melisso, contain m any further examples of similar arguments, though we cannot tell
how far these have been reformulated.
Schem atically, to prove a proposition A, first assume not A. T hen show that, if not A,
then either (i) A (contradicting not A ) ; or (ii) both B and not B ; or (iii) C (some other
false statement), (i), (ii) and (iii) provide different means o f refuting the assumption
not A, and so o f establishing A.
This aspect of Eleatic argumentation was documented in m y 1966, pp. i03ff.
Fr. 8 (2)-(6). A lthough Melissus evidently thought of this conclusion as absurd, it has
often been pointed out that (whether or not they were consciously reacting to M elissus’
arguments) the Atomists adopted a position close to that rejected here, in that they
postulated a plurality o f entities, each of which has the characteristics that the Eleatics
attributed to the one alone.
Dialectic and demonstration 77
fashion in Fr. i , where he establishes that it is ‘ ungenerated ’ and that
‘ it alw ays was w hat it was and alw ays w ill b e ’ . T h e first part o f that
conclusion, that it is ungenerated, is shown b y considering the thesis
that it is generated, and then arguing that this thesis is self-contra­
dictory. ‘ I f it cam e to be, it is necessary that, before it came to be,
it was nothing. But if it was nothing, nothing could in any w ay come
to be from nothing.’
Perhaps the clearest exam ple o f a reductio via the contradictory o f
the proposition assumed comes w ithin Fr. 8. This contains an attack
on the senses where he first assumes (Fr. 8 (2)) that ‘ we see and hear
correctly’ . H e argues against this by first stating that w hat the
senses report is that things change (Fr. 8 (3)). ‘ But if it changed, then
w hat is was destroyed and w hat is not cam e to be.’ Here, as often
elsewhere, the link between the antecedent and the consequent, and
the (implicit) rejection o f the consequent, involve Parm enidean
assumptions that are open to challenge. But the conclusion he
arrives at is that ‘ we did not see co rrectly’ (Fr. 8 (5)). A ga in the
schema o f argum ent is : if A, not A ; and Melissus signals the self-
contradiction w ith the rem ark: ‘ so these things do not agree with
one an oth er’ (Fr. 8 (4)).
Elsewhere we find m any examples o f arguments o f the general
M odus Tollens type, not that these are always fully displayed in
w hat becam e the canonical form : ‘ if^ , then B ] but not so not .<4 ’ .
In particular the second premiss has sometimes to be supplied,
usually from previous stretches o f argument. Thus fragm ent 5 shows
that ‘ it is o n e ’ from its being boundless or hmitless. ‘ I f it were not
one, it w ill form a boundary in relation to something else.’ But (as had
been shown in Frr. 2, 3 and 4) it is limitless: so we must conclude
that it is one.91 Fr. 7 produces a long argum ent o f a similar kind to
show that ‘ it could not perish, nor becom e greater, nor be arranged
differently, nor does it feel pain, nor distress. For if any o f these
things happened to it, it w ould no longer be one.’ But once its unity
is taken to have been established, w e must rule out these modes o f
change. H e argues against its being altered in Fr. 7 (2); ‘ for if it is
altered, w hat is is necessarily not the same, but that w hich was before
perishes, and that w hich is not comes to b e ’ . Here the rejection o f the
consequent involves Parm enidean assumptions and is im plicit, but
later stretches o f argum ent are more fully articulated. A t Fr. 7 (4)
T his conclusion has to be rejected both as contrary to fact and as contrary to hypo­
thesis (if it is generated, nothing is generated),
e* Cf. also Fr. 6. In quoting Fr. 5, however, Simplicius also records Eudemus’ com plaint
against the vagueness o f the first premiss {In Ph. iio .6 ff). Melissus has not specified
how it would not be limitless, if it were m any.
 yS Dialectic and demonstration
he shows that ‘ it does not feel p a in ’ : one o f his arguments is that ‘ it
w ould not be the same, if it felt p a in ’, and he had earlier proved that
it must be ‘ the sam e’ . W hen it comes to showing that ‘ it does not
feel distress’, Melissus m erely notes in Fr. 7 (6) that ‘ the same
argu m en t’ applies. W e should certainly not assume that Melissus
him self had analysed, or was in a position to offer a formal analysis of,
these arguments. But w hat these and other^^ fragments show is the
increasing frequency and variety o f the use o f the reductio in philo­
sophical contexts.
Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus are the first considerable exponents
o f rigorous deductive argumentation. As we noted before, it is not
difficult to cite examples o f various kinds o f reasoning, including
arguments that can be recast as indirect proofs or reductiones, both
before and outside philosophy. Y e t with the Eleatics A o y o s -
reasoned argum ent - comes to be recognised explicitly as the m ethod
o f philosophical inquiry. Parmenides and Melissus both advance
arguments to suggest the invalidity o f sense-perception and all three
Eleatics practise w hat Parmenides preaches when he advocates a
method that relies on Aoyos alone. A ll three produce not ju st
isolated examples o f indirect proofs, but stretches o f sustained
deductive reasoning, and the influence o f the models they provided
on subsequent philosophy and science w ould be hard to exaggerate.
There is, as yet, however, no form al analysis o f different modes o f
argum ent as such, no attem pt expressly to define the distinction
between necessary and probable r e a s o n i n g , 9 3 or that between proof
and persuasion. T h ere can be no question o f ascribing to the Eleatics
themselves any sharp or explicit distinction between strict dem on­
stration and dialectic. I f there is a case for saying that Parmenides
was the first to set out to provide deductive demonstrations o f a set
Cf. also Frr. 9 and 10 which show that w hat is ‘ has no b o d y ’ (for ‘ if it had thickness,
it would have parts, and would no longer be o n e ’) and that ‘ it is indivisible’ (for
‘ if it were divided, it would move, and if it moved, it would not b e ’). H ow precisely
Melissus reconciled the three statements, that it is infinite in m agnitude (Fr. 3), ‘ fu ll’
(Fr. 7) and without body (Fr. 9) is a major crux in the interpretation of his philosophy
(see most recently R eale 1970, ch. 7), but it does not affect our analysis o f the forms of
argum ent he employed.
93 K n ow ing for certain and only surmising were already distinguished in Hom er (e.g.
Od. I 2 i5 f), and a contrast between clear knowledge and opinion or conjecture is used
by Xenophanes (Frr. 34-35), by Alcm aeon (Fr. r) and by Parmenides (Fr. i.28fF,
Fr. 8.5off) for whom the W ay of Opinion is a matter o f what is likely (έοικότα, Fr. 8.60),
while the W ay o f T ruth (in which w hat is is held fast by necessity, ανάγκη, Fr. 8.30,
but cf. also Fr. 10) is a w ay of true conviction (ττειθώ, Fr. 2.4, c f ττιστόν Fr. 8.50 and
πΙστΐ5 Fr. 1.30). Y e t not even in Parmenides is the conception of demonstration explicit,
or the contrast between necessary and probable reasoning defined.
Dialectic and demonstration 79
o f philosophical theses, we m ay recall that Aristotle is reported to
have described Zeno as the founder o f d i a l e c t i c , ’ ^ and two o f the
features that characterise the dialectical method, as conceived by
Aristotle, are indeed exem plified in Zen o’s arguments (as also to
some extent in those o f Melissus), nam ely (i) reasoning to opposite
c o n c l u s i o n s , 95 and (ii) arguing from com m only accepted premisses.’ *^
T h e Greeks eventually drew firm distinctions between different
modes o f reasoning, but the developm ents that led to those distinc­
tions are com plex ones. In the latter part o f the fifth century w e have
not only a rapid grow th in the actual practice o f argum entation both
inside and more especially outside philosophy, but also the first
conscious reflections on aspects o f persuasion and reasoning in the
context o f discussions o f the art o f speaking. T h e dom ain o f probable
arguments (generally including both rhetoric and d i a l e c t i c ^ ^ ) comes
increasingly to be distinguished from that o f dem onstration, and it
w ill be convenient to consider the two separately and in turn.
THE DEVELOPM ENT OF R H E T O R I C
T h e developm ent in both the practice and the theory o f rhetoric
from around the m iddle o f the fifth century B .C . is dram atic. A l­
though skill in speaking was already a prized quality in H om er,’ ®the
contexts in w hich such a skill could be - and even had to b e -
exercised were increased out o f all recognition in the fram ework o f
the institutions o f the city-state - particularly, but by no means
exclusively, in the democracies. W e shall be returning to this
question later , ’ 9 but the essential point, for our present purposes, is a
simple one, that as the degree o f involvem ent o f ordinary citizens
in the political life o f the city rose, so too did the value and im port­
ance o f the ability to persuade your fellow m en b y argum ent, w hether
in political debate in assemblies or on embassies, or in the various
kinds o f law-courts that proliferated in Athens, and to a lesser extent
also elsewhere, in the fifth century.
From A ntiphon around the m iddle o f the fifth century, through
Lysias, Andocides, Isocrates and Isaeus (late fifth, early fourth
century) down to Aeschines and Demosthenes, we have a w ealth o f
original m aterial by w hich to ju d g e the actual practice o f argu-
9·*Fr. 65, see above p. 62 n. 16.
95 Rh.
I355a33ff: cf., e.g., the antinom y o f Zeno Frr. i and 2.
96 E.g. Top. io o a i8 ff: cf. the arguments in both Zeno and Melissus starting from the
assumption that ‘ there are m a n y ’ .
97 O n the contrast between rhetoric and dialectic in, for exam ple, Plato, see further
below, pp. I oof.
98 E.g. II. IX 438-43, XVIII 249ff. 99 See further below, pp. 2 4 2 ff, 245ff.
 8ο Dialectic and demonstration
m entation o f the A ttic orators in each o f the three m ain modes o f
speech-m aking - forensic, dehberative and epideictic - identified
b y Aristotle.ioo M y aim here is not to attem pt a com plete typology o f
the techniques o f persuasion they d e p l o y e d , b u t rather m erely to
draw out the evidence that they and our other sources provide
concerning the increase o f awareness of, and interest in, reasoning
and persuasion as such.
First there is the grow th o f professionalism in the art o f speaking.
From around the m iddle o f the fifth century there were paid speech-
writers, λογογράφ οι, who composed speeches for others to deliver in
the law-courts^°2 and assembly. T h e m ajority o f Lysias’ extant works
are just such speeches, and although he won a reputation for the
sim plicity o f his style, his use o f w hat Aristotle called ‘ artificial
p r o o f s is sophisticated e n o u g h . M o r e o v e r some noted orators
and speech-writers wrote artificial speeches on im aginary law-suits
w ith the intention that these should serve as models to be im itated on
real-life occasions. W e have some early examples o f this in the Tetra­
logies ascribed to A ntiphon, sets o f four speeches, two for the pro­
secution and two for the defence, on fictitious c a s e s . As, perhaps,
a natural extension o f this, the art o f speaking cam e to be taught
professionally, that is by men who set themselves up as teachers o f
rhetoric and who took fees from their pupils in that capacity. T h e
first m an to charge for his instruction, at least according to Plato, was
Protagoras,io6 and most o f the m ajor sophists o f the late fifth and
Cf. above, p. 63.
For one attem pted typology, see Perelman and O lbrechts-Tyteca 1969.
'0 2 By custom, if not law , litigants conducted their own cases in Athens in the fifth and
fourth centuries, though they m ight be helped by a σννήγορο5 - advocate — w ho also
spoke on their behalf: see A . R . W . Harrison 1968-71, i p. 156.
'03 Rh. I35 5 b35ff: as opposed to άτεχνοι π(cΓτεls, such as witnesses, evidence produced
under torture, contracts and the like.
A p art from his skilful manipulation of emotive appeals - the denigration o f opponents’
characters, comm endation o f his own side and flattery o f his audience - he often attacks
the opposition on the grounds o f inconsistency (e.g. iii 24) or irrelevance (xii 38 draws
attention to the commonness o f this expedient to mask a failure to answer a charge).
Explicit appeals to what is probable (εΙκόζ) are frequent, as are arguments a fortiori
(e.g. VII 24), disjunctive or dilemma arguments (e.g. vii 14) and, especially, indirect
proofs, as in the disproof o f a point o f fact or of the im putation o f a motive or intention
by first considering w hat the likely consequences would be, if true, and then con­
trasting the known circumstances o f the case (see, e.g., i 40-2, iii 22-3, x x ii i i f f ) .
'05 As with Lysias, a rich variety of argum entative devices can be illustrated from the
works o f Antiphon. T h e y include explicit appeals to probabilities (particularly common
in the first T etralogy, see especially 11 i.9f, 2.8, 4.8 and 10), the use of the topic of
consistency (e.g. i 10, v 36f, 49f, 54), arguments a fortiori (e.g. 11 1.9), disjunctive or
dilemm a arguments (e.g. iii 3.8) and refutations that proceed by considering w hat the
likely consequences o f a thesis would be and (explicity or implicitly) contrasting the
known circumstances o f a case (e.g. 11 1.4, v 52).
106 Plato, Prt. 349a, Hp. M a. 282d.
Dialectic and demonstration 81
fourth centuries included rhetoric am ong the subjects they claim ed
to teach.
Y e t another sign o f this professionalism was the production o f
treatises or handbooks on the subject. T h e reconstruction o f their
contents is, to be sure, problematic.^o^ O f our earlier sources, Plato,
especially, writes from a point o f view that is not ju st unsym pathetic,
but positively hostile, to the art o f rhetoric as it was generally
practised, while the extent o f the first-hand inform ation available to
such later commentators as Cicero is uncertain.io^ W h at is in­
contestable, however, is that such treatises began to be w ritten in
some numbers from the m iddle o f the fifth century. T h e first we hear
o f to have done so are two Sicilians, C orax and Tisias, but they were
followed by m any others, including Gorgias, Thrasym achus,
Theodorus, Polus, Licym nius, Evenus and Alcidam as, to m ention
only some o f the writers on rhetoric for whom we have good early
evidence in Plato or Aristotle. Several o f these early Arts m ay have
taken as their ch ief theme the elements o f w hich the speech should
be composed: at Rh. 1354b i6 ff one o f Aristotle’s criticisms o f his
predecessors implies that they attem pted to lay down w hat each o f
the m ain parts o f the speech should contain.^°’ But that there were
discussions o f arguments, including especially those that appeal to
probabilities, is also clear. Thus Plato indicates that Tisias, T h eo­
dorus and Evenus dealt w ith aspects o f proof and refutation,” Oand
according to Aristotle C o ra x ’s Art largely consisted o f a treatm ent o f
how to m anipulate arguments based on either real, or w hat were
passed o ff as real, probabilities.” *
M any aspects o f the early history o f rhetoric as a conscious art
must rem ain obscure. But for one key figure at the beginning o f this
developm ent we have good original evidence that throws light not
only on the actual techniques o f argum ent he used, but also on his
views on persuasion and on the power o f the word. This is Gorgias,
who provides a bridge between those whom we conventionally
classify as sophists and the philosophers.” ^ First, in the work called
On What is Not or on G orgias exploits arguments that are
>07 T h e evidence is collected b y Raderm acher 1951.
10® It is generally agreed that most late commentators depended on such sources as
Aristotle’s work (now lost) the Collection o f Arts, rather than on the original treatises
themselves. Cf. also Plato, Phdr. 266d ff.
See Phdr. a66e-267a, 273a. Rh. i40 2a7-2 3·
Isocrates x 2-3 already compares Gorgias (and Protagoras) with Zeno and Melissus.
“ 3 O u r two main sources are Sextus Em piricus {M. vii Gsff, D K 82 B 3) and the pseudo-
Aristotelian De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia {De M X G ). O n the much debated question
of the purpose of the treatise, see, for exam ple, G igon 1936, K erferd 1955, Brocker 1958,
Sicking 1964, G uthrie 1969, pp. I92fl.
 82 Dialectic and demonstration
similar in kind to those w e have discussed from Parmenides, Zeno
and Melissus. T h e difference is that now Eleatic argum ents” ^ are
deployed against the Eleatics’ own theses, as w ell as against those o f
their opponents, to establish the entirely negative conclusion that
‘ nothing exists; but that if it exists, it is unknow able; and i f it exists
and is know able, it still cannot be indicated to others’ .” s T h e first
part o f that conclusion, that nothing exists, is established b y a m ulti­
stage dilem m a argum ent, com parable w ith Z en o’s. ‘ I f something
exists, either w hat is exists, or w hat is not, or both w hat is and w hat is
not.’ “ ^ Each o f these possibilities is then considered and rejected in
turn, in arguments that in some cases em ploy a further disjunction.
Thus to refute the subordinate thesis that ‘ w hat is ’ exists, he con­
siders the possibilities that it is either eternal, or generated, or both
eternal and generated,” ^ and these are rejected in turn, in one
instance in an argum ent that sets up yet another dilem m a: i f it is
generated, then it is generated either from w hat is, or from w hat is
not.” 8 A lthough there are m inor divergences between our two
sources for these arguments,"^ they agree in the m ain in the general
pattern o f reasoning they ascribe to G orgias: to refute a thesis, he
first subdivides it into a num ber o f subordinate theses one o f w hich
must be true i f the thesis itself is to be true, and then demolishes each
o f these subordinate theses in turn.
But while in On What is Not Gorgias applied Eleatic-style deductive
reasoning to ontological questions similar to those that the Eleatic
philosophers themselves investigated, we have other evidence for
G orgias’ use o f techniques o f persuasion in a m ore general, rhetorical
context in the three speeches that are ascribed to him, the frag­
m entary Funeral Oration, the Encomium o f Helen, and the Defence o f
P a la m e d e s These are, indeed, am ong our earliest extensive examples
o f G reek oratory, and all three exhibit the elaborate style (including
the studied use o f antithesis, anaphora and chiasmus) for w hich
Gorgias was f a m o u s . apart from the com plex form al design
De M X G 9 7 g a 2 2 ff remarks that Gorgias tries to prove some points ‘ like M elissus’,
and others ‘ like Z e n o ’ . Cf. also 9 7 9 b 22, 25, 37.
” 5 See Sextus, M . vii 65 and De M X G 979 a ΐ2ίϊ
Sextus, M . VII 66, cf. De M X G 979a35ff, bgf.
Sextus, M . VII 6 8 . T h e third possiljility, the conjunction both eternal and generated,
is not mentioned at De M X G 979b2off.
"8 Sextus, M . VII 71, De M X G 979b27ff.
Notably in that Sextus sometimes mentions, while De M X G omits, a third possibility,
consisting of the conjunction of the first two (as in vii 68, above n. 117).
•2° A lthough the authenticity of the Helen and the Palamedes has, in the past, often been
questioned, they are now generally accepted as genuine (see, for example, Segal 1962,
p. 100 and n. 10).
See, e.g., Diodorus Siculus xii 53.2ff.
Dialectic and demonstration 83
and literary polish o f these works, the Helen and the Palamedes are
both exercises in persuasion - their aim being to exonerate H elen
and Palamedes respectively from any guilt for the acts they are
alleged to have com m itted.
T w o features o f these speeches are particularly noteworthy. First
in both Gorgias employs disjunctive arguments that are strikingly
rem iniscent o f - though to be sure more inform al than - the dilem ­
mas o f On What is Mot.^^^ In the Helen, for instance, he distinguishes
four possible explanations o f w hy H elen acted as she did, nam ely
(i) she was com pelled by a god or fate, (ii) she was com pelled by
force, (iii) she was persuaded b y arguments, and (iv) she was
captivated by love, and he then claims that w hichever explanation
is adopted, H elen should not be held guilty.*^^ In the Palamedes,
too, Palam edes uses dilemm as, putting before his judges a series o f
possibilities relating to his case and then showing his innocence
w hichever o f these is e n v i s a g e d .124 In neither speech are the alter­
natives such as to be form ally m utually exclusive and e x h a u s t i v e .
Y et, as in the w ould-be strict dem onstrative reasoning o f On What
is Not, so also in the m ore general rhetorical context o f the Helen and
the Palamedes, G orgias uses arguments that derive their force from
the assumption that for a given thesis to be true, one or other o f a set
o f subordinate theses must be true.
Secondly, the speeches provide im portant evidence concerning
G orgias’ own reflections on the topic o f persuasion. In the Helen,
paras. 8ff, especially, when he argues that if H elen did w hat she did
because she was ‘ persuaded’ by λόγοι,ι^ό then she is not guilty, he
speaks about the power o f Aoyos in general. T o illustrate how it can
affect the emotions, he first adduces poetry (para. 9), referring to the
terror, p ity and yearning that the audience feels. ‘ Inspired incan-
” 2 O n the similarity between the argum entation in these speeches and in On What is Not,
see especially H. G om perz 1912, pp. 22ff, G igon 1936, pp. igof, Segal 1962, pp. 99
and 115, Solmsen 1975, p. 12 n. 3.
'^3 These four possibilities are set out in paras. 6 and 20.
Thus at paras, i i f he asks whether he was supposed to have comm itted the crime alone
or with accomplices, and suggests that both are implausible. T o undertake the crime
was not the work o f one man. T urn in g to the other possibility, he introduces a second
dilem m a: who were his accomplices, free men or slaves? I f free men, then his judges
should know about it themselves, and indeed be im plicated with him. O n the other
hand it is surely incredible that he used slaves as accomplices, for they would denounce
him either willingly, in the hope o f their freedom, or under compulsion. H aving shown
he could not betray the Greeks, he goes on to argue that even if he had been able to,
he had no motive to do so (paras, is ff).
>^5 T h e use o f pairs of opposites in the arguments in the Palamedes is discussed in m y 1966,
pp. i2of.
*26 λόγος is, throughout, ambiguous, covering ‘ w o rd ’ ‘ speech’ and ‘ argum ent’ .
84 Dialectic and demonstration
tations’ , too, have a ‘ p o w er’ that ‘ soothes and persuades and
transports the soul by its wizardry-’ '^? (para, lo ). T o be persuaded by
λόγοι, then, he claim s,'^8 equivalent to being abducted by force, and
to demonstrate the effects o f persuasion he says (para. 13): ‘ T h a t
persuasion, w hen added to Aoyos, impresses the soul as it wishes can
be learnt first from the λόγοι o f the m eteorologists,129 who, by
rem oving one opinion^ao and im planting another, m ake w hat is
incredible and invisible appear before the eyes o f op in ion ; secondly,
from the constraining trials that take place through λόγοι, in w hich
a single λόγοζ delights and persuades a whole crowd, when it is
composed with skill, not spoken with t r u t h a n d thirdly, from the
contests o f the λ ό γοι o f the philosophers, in w hich is revealed a
quickness o f thought that demonstrates the m utability o f b elief in
opinion.’ F inally (para. 14) he compares the power o f λόγο ζ over
the soul w ith the effect o f drugs on the body.
This is the first extended passage that attempts something ap ­
proaching a general statement concerning persuasion and the role o f
argum ent w ithin it. As in Xenophanes, Parm enides and others,^32
truth is contrasted w ith seeming or opinion, and h e r e ^33 the latter is
the sphere o f p e r s u a s i o n . ^34 T h e power o f λόγος to deceive and to
mislead is clearly ackn ow led ged: it is, after all, G orgias’ aim at this
point in the Helen to argue that she should be exonerated if she did
w hat she did because she was won over b y λόγοι. A t the same time
the examples given to illustrate the powers o f persuasion are rem ark­
able. W hilst the second o f the three examples refers to the use o f
argum ent in the assemblies and the law-courts, the first and third
relate to the w ork o f natural scientists (the ‘ m eteorologists’) and to
that o f the philosophers. W e could hardly have clearer indication o f
γοητείς«. O n the use o f this and other terms from m agical practices (e.g. έπωδαί, μαγεία,
φαρμακεύω and έκγοητεύω) to describe rhetoric in the Helen, see especially de R om illy 1975.
*28 T he beginning o f para. 12 is corrupt, but the general sense o f the argum ent is clear
enough.
μετεωρολόγοι, that is those who studied things in the heavens and things under the earth.
130 δόξα, which covers both ‘ opinion’ and ‘ seem ing’ ‘ sem blance’ .
' 3 · No doubt this refers to deliberative and forensic speeches.
*32 Xenophanes Frr. 34-35, Parmenides Fr. i-soff, Fr. 8.5off, see above p. 78 n. 93.
•33 W e m ay contrast Parmenides, in whom ιτειθώ is more often linked with αλήθεια (e.g.
Fr. 2.4) even though mortals are deceived in what they confidently take - ττεποιθότεξ - to
be true, Fr. 8.39.
‘ 34 T he truth/opinion distinction recurs in the Palamedes, especially para. 24, where
Palamedes accuses his prosecutor o f trusting opinion, not truth. Opinion is open to all
men and is unreliable: it is truth alone that should be trusted. T h e recognition o f the
negative or destructive possibilities of persuasion in the Helen contrasts with the position
ascribed to Gorgias in some passages in Plato, where he is made to claim the superiority
o f rhetoric to all other arts precisely because it is unconcerned with the truth and
confines itself to the task o f persuasion (e.g. Grg. 452 e, 454 c ff, 459 a -c, cf. Phlb. 58 a if).
Dialectic and demonstration 85
the recognition, on the part o f one notable orator, o f the role o f
persuasive arguments in other contexts besides those o f deliberative
and forensic speeches.
O u r survey has been brief, but there is, in any event, no need to
m ultiply evidence to support the uncontroversial general conclusion
that there was a rapid expansion in both the practice and the theory
o f public-speaking in various contexts in the fifth and fourth centuries.
H ow ever the question that must now be raised is the significance o f
these developm ents for our concerns, that is first for the criticism o f
traditional beliefs as a whole, and then m ore specifically for the
grow th o f natural science.
O n the first topic we m ay restrict ourselves to some general
remarks. It is evidently no m ere coincidence that the period which
sees the rise o f professionalism in the art o f speaking is also a period
o f radical criticism o f certain aspects, at least, o f G reek traditional
beliefs. This is already suggested b y the fact that the same individuals
sometimes figure prom inently in both developments. Several o f the
sophists who were am ong the first to offer to teach rhetoric also
gained a reputation as critics o f received opinions.^3S It would, it is
true, be absurd to suggest that all the sophists were such, or that their
criticisms extended to all such opinions. N or should we forget that in
some cases their doubts or objections had been anticipated b y earlier
w riters.^36 Nevertheless the exam ple o f Protagoras is instructive. N ot
only was he one o f the foremost teachers o f the art o f public speaking,
but he is said to have been the first to have suggested that there are
two opposed arguments on every issue. *37 Xhe ability to sustain
either side o f a question was part o f the training o f the orator, as
we can observe from the sets o f speeches for the prosecution and
for the defence in A ntip h on’s T e t r a l o g i e s But a precisely similar
C f. above, pp. I4f, on the views expressed b y Prodicus and Critias on the origins o f
beliefs in the gods.
*3* T hus Protagoras Fr. 4, w hich disclaims knowledge about the gods (‘ concerning the
gods I have no means o f knowing whether they are or are not or w hat they are like
in form : for there are m any hindrances to knowing, the obscurity o f the subject and
the shortness o f human life ’), m ay be com pared with Xenophanes Fr. 34 (‘ there never
was a man, nor will there ever be, w ho knows the certain truth about the gods and all
the other things about which I sp eak’), and cf. also Heraclitus Fr. 86.
Diogenes Laertius ix 5 1: cf. the title o f a work in two books, the Antilogiai, and the
tradition that he was one w ho claim ed to be able to make the worse cause appear the
better (e.g. Aristotle, Rh. I40 2a23ff).
“ 8 See above, p. 80. If, as M orrison 1961 cf. 1963 has argued, Antiphon the O rator is
one and the same man as Antiphon the Sophist, this would provide another exam ple o f
the connection between rhetoric and sophistic. T h e contents o f the Sophist’s work on
Truth, as revealed b y POxy. x i 1364, are, however, sufficiently dissimilar from the
86 Dialectic and demonstration
procedure was also deployed in the sphere o f m oral and political
beliefs.^ 39
H ere, apart from Protagoras him self and m any texts in Plato and
A ristotle,Ϊ40 m ay cite the Dissoi Logoi, or Double Arguments, a
docum ent from some time at the end o f the fifth or the beginning o f
the fourth century that sets out a series o f opposed theses on such
questions as good and evil, the beautiful and the shameful, the just
and the unjust, truth and falsehood and so on.^^i A gain although
Socrates is, in m any respects, a quite exceptional figure, 1^2 certain
aspects o f his practice o f elenchus m ay be view ed as, in part, a more
systematic and sustained version o f techniques that already had a
wide general application in the context o f deliberative and forensic
oratory. T h e cross-examination o f witnesses and the evaluation o f
evidence in general, the insistence that an account should be given -
λόγον διδόναι - and the assessment o f arguments put forw ard on
either side o f a disputed issue were all fam iliar enough to his inter­
locutors and audience from their experience o f the law-courts and
assembhes.i43 Socrates’ distinctive contribution was to turn the
searchlight o f his scrutiny on current m oral and political assump­
tions to expose - as he saw it - their shallowness and incoherence.
R H E T O R IC AND T H E D E V E L O P M E N T OF
N A T U R A L S C IEN C E
But it is one thing to relate the developm ent o f rhetoric to that o f
the criticism o f popular beliefs in general; it is quite another to
attem pt to argue that the former is directly relevant to the grow th o f
natural science. W hile m any scholars w ould agree that certain
rhetorical tricks and stylistic traits^'^'^ can be found in some writers
ideas we find expressed by, or attributed to, the O rator, to make the identification a
difficult one.
” 9 See the discussion o f arguments ‘ in utram que p a rte m ’ in Solmsen 1975, ch. i, and
cf. M oraux 1968, pp. 300ff, on their use in the A cadem y and b y Aristotle’s school, and
K udlien 1974 on their application in medicine.
Thus Aristotle notes {SE 173 a 7fT) that reference to the twin opposed moral standards
of ‘ n atu re’ and ‘ convention’ was a favourite com m onplace for generating paradoxes
(which ‘ all the ancients thought held g o o d ’), and at Top. i6 3 a 3 6 ffh e mentions the
usefulness o f exam ining arguments both for and against any thesis as a general training
in dialectic.
J-»' D K II 405ff: for a b rief discussion, see G uthrie 1969, pp. 3i6ff.
As a major point o f difference from the sophists, Socrates received no fees for his
instruction. Plato further insists that Socrates’ elenchus, unlike the contentious reasoning
of the sophists, was directed at discovering the truth, not at scoring victories nor at
mere entertainm ent: see further below, pp. loof.
'♦3 See below, pp. 249f, 252f.
T h e question o f how precisely these are to be defined and identified is, to be sure,
a difficult one. But am ong the traits that m ay be taken to characterise rhetorical pieces
Dialectic and demonstration 87
who are relevant to the developm ent o f early G reek natural science,
most w ould w ant to m aintain that there is no more to the connection
than that. In particular it w ould com m only be assumed that there is a
fundam ental contrast between the aims o f natural science on the one
hand and those o f rhetoric on the other, in that the former seeks the
truth in its dom ain, the investigation o f natural phenom ena, while
the latter is concerned only w ith persuasion - in its, quite diflferent,
field. Y et, as we shall see, too absolute a contrast between ‘ tru th ’
and ‘ persuasion’ oversimplifies and distorts a com plex situation.
O u r ch ief difficulty here, as so often elsewhere, stems from the
nature o f our evidence, the lack o f extended original texts in two o f
the three m ain areas that we m ight hope to investigate. First, too
little remains o f the later Presocratic natural philosophers for our
inquiry there to get far.i'^s Secondly, although we know that several
o f those whom we custom arily think o f prim arily as ‘ sophists ’ rather
than as ‘ natural philosophers’ also engaged in investigations con­
cerning nature*46 and in the field o f m a t h e m a t i c s , t h e dearth o f
original texts again means that our inquiry draws a blank. It is, then,
to the third m ain area o f pre-Aristotelian speculative thought that
w e must turn, nam ely to the substantial remains o f fifth- and fourth-
century medicine. 148
are a concern for the main divisions o f the work (including introduction and recapitu­
lation or peroration), the heavy use o f antithesis and the apostrophising o f an opponent
or objector.
*■♦5 T h e fragments do, however, contain some notable examples o f arguments o f a kind
similar to those we have found used in Parmenides and the later Eleatic philosophers.
Thus we m ay cite examples o f indirect proofs from Empedocles (Fr. 17.311?), A n axa­
goras (Fr. 12) and Diogenes o f Apollonia (Fr. 2) - though this is not to say that these
arguments were always modelled directly on those of the Eleatics themselves.
Ϊ+6 D ue caution must, it is true, be exercised in evaluating the testimonies o f some later
writers that certain sophists were natural philosophers or wrote treatises On Nature: the
fact that G orgias’ work On What is Not had as its subsidiary title On Nature shows that a
treatise with that name m ight w ell not contain any discussion relevant to the investi­
gation o f particular natural phenom ena. W e do, however, have good evidence for an
interest in physical questions for no less than four major sophists, nam ely Gorgias
himself, Hippias, Prodicus and A ntiphon. (i) G orgias’ interest in certain specific
problems connected with vision is attested by Plato {Men. 76 c ff) and by Theophrastus
{Ign. 13.73). (2) T h e range o f subjects that Hippias was prepared to teach was compre­
hensive: they certainly included both music and astronomy according to Plato {Hp.
M a. 285b ff, Prt. 3 15 c, 3 i8 d ff). (3) Galen ascribes not only a treatise on the nature o f
man, but also a specific theory o f phlegm to Prodicus {Nat. Fac. 11 1 1 , Scr. Min. iii
i95.i7flfH elm reich , K 11 130.41?, cf. K x v 325.1 iff) . (4) T h e second book o f A ntiphon’s
Truth evidently dealt with a variety o f cosmological topics: the fragments we have
cover a wide range of meteorological, geological and biological questions (Frr. 22-39).
Both Hippias and Antiphon did original work in mathematics and Protagoras was
evidently concerned to challenge the status o f mathem atics in Fr. 7 (see below,
p. 1x6 n. 299).
T h e roles o f rhetoric and dialectic in the H ippocratic writers have been a rather
neglected topic. See, however, Bourgey 1953, pp· io 9 ff (‘ les medecins sophistes et
theoriciens’). Lain Entralgo 1970, ch. 4, and K u d lien ’s pioneering paper, 1974.
88 Dialectic and demonstration
N ow it is generally recognised that some o f the treatises included in
the H ippocratic Collection are in the nature o f sophistic έπιδείξεΐ5,
exhibition pieces composed b y men who were almost certainly not
themselves m edical practitioners. T h e two outstanding exam ples o f
this are On the Art, w hich offers a defence o f the art o f m edicine
against its detractors, and w hich has sometimes been thought to have
been composed b y Protagoras or Hippias,^^? and On Breaths, w hich
sets out to prove that all diseases have a single cause, nam ely air.^so
N ot only is the m edical knowledge shown in these works superficial,
but both show considerable stylistic elaboration, for exam ple in
announcing the subject o f the present discourse in a proem or general
introductory s e c t i o n , i n the studied use o f antithesis,^52 and in
dealing w ith the objections o f im aginary o p p o n e n t s . T h e i r aim is
m erely to put a plausible thesis before some evidently quite inexpert
audience, and in doing so they have no com punction in ignoring or
drastically oversim plifying com plex m edical problems.
But these two examples m ight, perhaps, be taken to be very m uch
the exceptions that prove the rule: it m ight be argued that it is
precisely because o f the contrast between On the Art and On Breaths on
the one hand, and the bulk o f the H ippocratic treatises on the other,
that we should conclude that the latter show no im portant signs o f
having been influenced b y the developm ent o f rhetoric and o f the
techniques o f persuasion and argum ent that w e outlined above. T h a t
certain works are substantially free from such influences should be
acknow ledged im m ediately: this is true o f two groups o f treatises, in
particular, nam ely the books ο ϊ Epidemics and the aphoristic w o r k s ,
In his edition, Gom perz argued that Protagoras is the author (T. G om perz 1910,
pp . 22ff), but W . H . S. Jones, 1923-31, 11 p. 187, put it that ‘ almost as good a case
could be m ade out for considering the author to be H ip pias’ .
*50 T o these two Jones, for example, would add Decent, and Praec., as well as Nat. Horn.,
on w hich see below, pp. 92ff. Cf. Bourgey 1953, pp·
*51 T h e author o f de Arte speaks of the treatise as an άπόδειξις {CMG i, i io .i8 f, 1 1 .2f,
cf. ίπ1δειξΐ5 used of his opponents in ch. i, 9.4 and of those who know the art ch. 13,
I 9 . 6 f ) . After an introductory section that includes a definition of medicine (ch. 3,
lo .ig ff ) , the writer begins his demonstration in ch. 4, ii.s f f , by saying that ‘ the
beginning o f my speech is a point that will be agreed by a ll’ (cf. Diogenes o f Apollonia,
Fr. i). Flat. ch. i contains introductory remarks before the writer turns to ‘ the dis­
course that is to com e’ {CM G i, i 92.12). This writer too says that he will show (έπιδείξω,
ch. 5, 94.6) that all diseases come from air, and he ends his treatise by saying (ch. 15,
l o i .i y f f ) that this has now been shown, έττιδέδεικται, and that his ‘ hypothesis’ is true.
•52 Particularly prominent in de Arte, but present also in Flat.
*53 E.g. de Arte ch. 5, CM G i, i 11.20, έρεΐ δή ό τάναντία λέγων and Flat. ch. 10, CM G i,
I 97.10, ίσω^ δν τΐξ εϊποι, cf. 9 4 · ^5 ·
'S'* T he breathtaking hypothesis o f Flat. - that all diseases come from air - has already
been mentioned. De Arte ch. 7, C M G i, i i3 .io ff claims that the reasons for failures to
achieve a cure lie rather with the patient not obeying the instructions o f the doctor,
than with the doctor himself. E.g. Aph., Coac., Prorrh. i.
Dialectic and demonstration 89
Y e t there is, on the other hand, a large body o f treatises w hich
include some that no one w ould doubt to be the work o f experienced
m edical practitioners, and indeed that have been accounted am ong
the foremost examples o f m edical science in the fifth and fourth
centuries, w here such influences are unm istakable. T h e treatises
include On Ancient Medicine, On Regimen in Acute Diseases, On the
Nature o f Man, On Diseases i and some o f the principal surgical and
em bryological works, 156 as well as a group o f m inor, later writings. ^57
A lth ou gh On the Art and On Breaths are extreme cases, it can be
argued that the influence o f the developm ent o f rhetoric and dialectic
on some o f the finest instances o f H ippocratic m edical literature is
widespread.
W e m ay approach this topic first from the point o f view o f certain
aspects o f the doctors’ m edical practice. T w o features o f this clearly
involved the H ippocratic physician in a task ο ΐpersuasion. First he had
to prevail upon his patients to entrust themselves to his care - w hether
or not he considered him self in direct com petition w ith other doctors
or healers. Secondly there was a further opportunity - and need - for
persuasion in the context o f a jo in t consultation between doctors
about a case.
T h e problem o f w inning a clientele is often mentioned b y H ippo­
cratic writers. Several o f the so-called deontological treatises issue
warnings against attem pts to attract clients by ostentatious behaviour
o f various kinds. Precepts, for instance, tells the doctor to avoid
extravagant dress,is8 and Decorum implies a similar l e s s o n . T h e n
Prorrhetic 11 censures extravagant claims for diagnosis and cure.^^° T h e
surgical treatises, too, criticise the use o f elaborate m echanical
devices to impress patients, as also the practice o f fancy bandaging.
T hus Joints comments that attem pts to reduce hum p-back by
succussions on a ladder are useless:
Succu ssion s on a la d d e r n e v e r stra ig h te n e d a n y case, so fa r as I k n o w , a n d th e
p ra ctitio n e rs w h o use this m e th o d a re c h ie fly those w h o w a n t to m a k e th e v u lg a r
h e rd g a p e , for to su ch it seem s m a rv ello u s to see a m a n su sp en ded or sh a ken or
tre a te d in su ch w a y s ; a n d th e y a lw a y s a p p la u d these p erform an ces, n ev e r
tr o u b lin g th em selves a b o u t th e resu lt o f th e o p e ra tio n , w h e th e r b a d o r good.'®^
*5® Art., Fract., and Morb. iv will all figure below.
*57 E.g. Prorrh. ii and the deontological works, especially Praec. and Decent.
Praec. ch. lo, C M G i, i 33.32!? (reading θρύψιξ for τρϊψΐξ) which refers particularly to
the use of luxurious headgear and strange perfumes.
*59 Decent, ch. 2, CM G 1, 1 25.17!^, and ch. 3, 25.2off.
160 Prorrh. 11 ch. i, L ix 6 .iff, see above, p. 45 n. 195.
Art. ch. 42, L IV i8 2 .i4 ff, translation W ithington in W . H. S.Jones 1923-31, iii;
cf. ch. 14, i20.i5flf, ch. 44, i88 .i3ff, and ch. 62, 268.3ff. Y e t although the author
criticises m echanical devices used for effect, he sometimes has recourse to them himself:
see especially ch. 48, 2 12 .17ff and ch. 70, 288.11 ff (a description o f a mechanical method
go Dialectic and demonstration
T h e same author also castigates doctors who achieve nothing but a
display - the verb used is εττέδειξεν - in producing com plex, but
actually quite useless, bandages.^^^ Several writers deplore the fact
that the public is taken in b y new-fangled c u r e s , ^^3 or that they do
not look beyond the technical jargo n to the realities o f a therapy.^^^
W h at Joints,Precepts^^^ and Decorum}^'^ all inveigh against is the
h abit o f turning a consultation into a public lecture - an occasion
to make a display o f skill - and it is clear that this was sometimes
done.
Y e t although several writers thus point to the excesses that doctors
sometimes w ent to,^^^ the task o f persuasion remained. Prognosis is
explicit that one o f the essential aims o f prognosis is to persuade the
patient to entrust him self to the doctor’s care.
I f he is able to tell his patients in advance when he visits them not only about their
past and present symptoms, but also to tell them what is going to happen, as well
as to fill in the details they have omitted, he will increase his reputation as a medical
practitioner and people will have no qualms in putting themselves under his
c a r e . '* 9
A m ong the qualities that Decorum suggests the ideal doctor should
possess are that he should be ‘ severe in encounters’ (that is, no doubt,
in controversy), ‘ ready to reply, harsh towards opposition, , .silent
in the face o f disturbances and resolute in the face o f silences’ , and
that he should be able to set forth clearly and gracefully w hat he has
o f reducing a dislocation o f the hip that is said to be both natural and άγωνιστικόν).
C f. also Fract. ch. i6 , L iii 476.8!?on a technique that is described as ‘ plausible for the
laym an, and without blam e for the do ctor’, though it is ‘ less in conformity w ith the
a r t’, and Medic, ch. 2, C M G i, i 21.1 iff.
Art. ch. 35, L I V 158.4!?, cf. Medic, ch. 4, CM G i, i 21.32!?, Fract. ch. 2, L ni 4i8.8ff.
See, e.g., Acut. ch. 2, L 11 234.2-238.1, Fract. ch. i, L ni 414.7!?, and cf. Praec. ch. 5,
C M G I, I 31.26!?.
Cf. the observations o f Acut. ch. 2, L 11 238.1!?, and the defensive remarks in Prog.
ch. 25, L II 190.6!?, on the absence o f the names o f certain diseases in his account.
**5 E.g. Art. ch. I , L iv 78.9!? (referring to w hat was evidently an open debate, w ith both
physicians and laym en present, on w hat was thought to be a case of forward dis­
location o f the shoulder).
166 Praec. ch. 12, CM G i, i 34.5!?, vvith the particular, ironic, injunction to avoid quotations
from the poets.
See Decent, ch. 2, CM G i, i 25.15!? on the crowds that quacks gather round them. Cf.
from a later period Polybius xii 2 5d -e which laments the w ay in which rhetorical
skills m ay count for more, with the public, than practical m edical experience.
Epid. V I sec. 5 ch. 7, L v 318 .1-4, even refers to concealing a w ad of wool in the palm
o f the hand and pretending to remove it from the patient’s ear, in cases of ear-ache, so
that he believes that it has been discharged. T he author concludes the chapter with the
single word άττάτη, ‘ d eceit’ ‘ trickery’. But the passage is evidence (if evidence is
needed) that such tricks were used: nor is it clear whether the author himself condemns,
or whether he would condone, this deception.
169 Prog. ch. I , L II 1 10.2!? (translations after C hadw ick and M ann 1978), cf. also 112.6!?
(‘ in this w ay one would justly be wondered a t. . θοοίμά^οιτο. . .δικαίω?).
Dialectic and demonstration 91
demonstrated - a picture that the w riter states to be appropriate
not just to m edicine, but to wisdom in g e n e r a l . T h e G reek doctor
was given instruction not only about the questions he should put to
his patient,* but also on how to withstand the cross-examination to
which he him self would be subjected.*73 In a situation where several
doctors were present, it was up to each to sustain his point o f view
very m uch as if they were contending advocates , * 7 4
T h e treatise On Diseases i, especially, w hich contains a detailed
pathological theory, begins with a passage that explains that the whole
purpose o f the work is to provide guidelines both on how to put, and
answer, questions and on how to meet objections - where it seems
clear that the objections do not sim ply come from prospective
patients, but arise in the context o f a semi-formalised debate. ‘ H e
who wishes to ask questions correctly, and to answer the questioner,
and to debate (άντιλέγειν) correctly, on the subject o f healing, must
bear in m ind the following t h i n g s . ’*7s These turn out to include not
Decent, ch. 3, C M G i, i 25.25 to 26.6. It is noteworthy that the author states that
‘ m any cases require not reasoning - συλλογισμό? - but help - βοηθεΙη’ (ch. 11, 28.20?).
T his chapter recommends that the doctor should know w hat has to be done before
going in to the patient: ‘ You should forecast w hat will happen from your experience;
for that will add to your reputation and it is easy to learn ’ (ch. 11, 28.18-22).
Decent, ch. i, CM G i, i 25.2!?.
T his is a recurrent theme in m any diflferent treatises, e.g. Acut. {Sp.) ch. 9, L 11 436.8!?,
Aff. ch. 37, L V I 246.16!?, Morb. 11 ch. 47, L vii 66.4ff, Nat. Mul. ch. 10, L vii 326.3!?,
Mul. I ch. 21, L vni 60.15!?, Steril. ch. 213, L viii 410 .14?and ch. 230, 440.i3f, Prorrh. 11
chh. 27, 34, 41, 42, L IX 6o.iflF, 66.8!?, 70.22!?, 74.4!?. W hether the patient is telling
the truth or not is queried, ?or example, at Epid. iv ch. 6, L v 14 6 .11? (cf. 160.6
and 162.5), cf. Decent, ch. 14, C M G i, i 29.3? Mul. i ch. 62, L viii 126.12!?, draws
attention to the problem that doctors are sometimes deceived because women are
inhibited from speaking about conditions about which they are ashamed (and the
cases just mentioned from Epid. iv were all women). Conversely Praec. ch. 2, CM G i,
I 3 1.6!?, insists that the doctor should not himsel?, from mistaken professional pride,
hold back from asking laymen questions relevant to the case. In later Greek medicine,
the topic o f questioning the patient was further developed. O ne notable example of a
treatise devoted to the subject is Rufus’ Quaestiones Medicinales {CM G Suppl. iv
G artner).
See, for example. Decent, ch. 12, C M G i, i 28.25, which speaks of the need for the
doctor to show an ability to respond to objections, and V M ch. 15, C M G i, i 46.26!?,
w hich considers the questions that a hypothetical patient might put to a doctor.
T h e frequent references to incorrect medical practices that are such a feature o f such
treatises as Fract., Art., and Acut., should, no doubt, be seen in this light, as - in part at
least - polem ical or agonistic in purpose (cf. further D ucatillon 1977, pp. 229!?). As
Art. ch. I , L I V 78.1!?, 9!?, makes clear, the doctor had the lay public, as well as his
colleagues, to contend with, and Aff. ch. i, L vi 208.16!?, promises advice to the laym an
on w hat he can contribute in his discussions with doctors. T h e fact that doctors were,
for one reason or another, sometimes inhibited from calling in other doctors m ay be
inferred from Praec. chh. 7 and 8, C M G i, i 32.22!?, 33.5!?. In later medicine, as
K udlien 1974, pp. 187!?, has pointed out, the topic o f arguing on both sides of the
question is common: see, for example, Soranus, Gyn. i 7.30!?and i 1 1.42, CM G iv 20.2!?,
29.17!?, and the Δικτυοικά o? Dionysius of A egae (Duliere 1965), and cf. G alen’s
criticisms, K viii 56.4!?, Morb. i ch, i, L v i 140.1!?.
92 Dialectic and demonstration
only the origins and causes o f diseases, w hich are o f doubtful out­
come, their transformations and so on, but also
w h a t is sa id or d o n e c o n je c tu ra lly b y the d o cto r in re la tio n to th e p a tie n t, a n d b y
th e p a tie n t in re la tio n to th e d o c to r ; also w h a t is d o n e or said e x a c tly in th e a rt,
a n d w h a t is c o rrec t in it a n d w h a t is n ot c o rre c t; w h a t its b e g in n in g , its e n d a n d its
m id d le a re a n d a n y th in g else th a t has c o rre c tly b e e n sh ow n to exist o r n o t to exist
in it, b o th sm all th in gs a n d g re a t, a n d m a n y a n d fe w ; a n d th a t e v e ry th in g in th e
a rt is on e a n d th a t on e is e v e ry th in g a n d th e th in gs th a t a re possible for on e to
th in k a n d sa y a n d , i f n ee d b e, do, a n d those th a t a re n o t possible for o n e e ith e r to
th in k or to say o r to do.*’ ’
G uidance is also promised on w hich other arts it is like and w hich it
is not l i k e , ^78 w ell as on which parts o f the body are hot or cold or
dry or w et or strong or w eak or dense or rare. T h e writer con clu des:
on e m u st b e a r these p oin ts in m in d a n d re ta in th em in discourses. W h a te v e r
m istak e in these m atters a n y o n e m akes either in speaking or in asking questions or in
answering - i f he d escribes w h a t a re m a n y as few , o r th e g r e a t as sm all, o r the
im p ossible as p ossible, or w h a te v e r o th e r m istake h e m akes in his sp eech - on e
m a y , b e a rin g these th in gs in m in d , attack him in reply (έν τη άντιλογίτ]) in this
w a y . 179
M oreover as this last exam ple already indicates, it was not ju st in
connection with the discussion o f certain m edical practices that the
H ippocratic doctor sometimes found him self in a com petitive
situation that tested his skills in debate. This was also the case on
some occasions, at least, where w hat was at issue was not a m atter o f
diagnosis or therapy, but general theoretical questions in such fields
as pathology, physiology or em bryology. T h e best known evidence
for this comes from On the Nature of Man. This opens w ith a dis­
claim er : ‘ H e who is used to hearing speakers talk about the nature
o f man beyond its relevance to m edicine w ill not find the present
account suitable to listen to.’ T h e author im m ediately explains w hy:
I a m n ot g o in g to assert th a t m a n is a ll a ir, or fire, o r w a te r, or e a rth , o r a n y th in g
else th a t is n ot a m an ifest co n stitu en t o f m a n . B u t I le a v e such m atters to those w h o
w ish to sp eak a b o u t th em . H o w e v e r those w h o m a k e su ch assertions d o n ot seem to
m e to h a v e c o rrec t d iscern m en t. F o r th e y all h a v e the sam e o p in io n , b u t th e y do
n o t all sa y the sam e t h in g : y e t th e y g iv e the sam e re a so n in g for th eir o p in io n . F o r
th e y say th a t w h a t is is a single th in g, a n d this is th e on e a n d th e a ll, b u t th e y d o
n o t a gre e on th eir n am es for it. F o r on e o f th em says th a t this th in g, the on e a n d
th e a ll, is a ir, b u t a n o th e r says fire, a n o th er w a te r, a n o th e r e a rth , a n d e a c h a d d s to
his o w n sp eech e vid en ces a n d proofs w h ic h a m o u n t to n o th in g. F o r w h en th e y all
h a v e th e sam e o p in io n , b u t do n o t all sa y the sam e th in g, it is c le a r th a t th e y do
ότι άπαν έστίν έν cxOrfj έν, καί δτι εν πάντα. T h e H eraclitean and Elea tic associations of
the author’s use o f such opposites as one and m any, is and is not, great and small, are
obvious. *77 L VI 140.10-19.
' 7 * L VI 142.iff: cf. the references to other arts in de Arte, ch. i, CM G i, i g .i4 ff, and in
Flat. ch. I, CM G i, i 91. aff. L v i 142.7-12.
Dialectic and demonstration 93
n ot k n o w w h a t th e y a re ta lk in g a b o u t. O n e ca n d isco ve r this m ost e asily b y b e in g
presen t a t th eir d e b a te s - α ύτέο ισ ιν ά ντιλ έγ ο υ σ ιν . W h e n the sam e m en d e b a te w ith
e a c h o th e r in fro n t o f th e sam e a u d ie n ce , th e sam e sp eaker n ev e r w in s th re e tim es
in succession, b u t n o w on e does, n o w a n o th er, n o w w h o e v e r h a p p en s to h a v e the
glib b e st to n g u e in fron t o f th e c ro w d . Y e t it is rig h t to e x p e c t th at th e person w h o
says he has c o rrec t d isce rn m en t a b o u t these m a tters sh ou ld a lw a y s m a k e his o w n
a rg u m e n t p re v a il, i f he does k n o w the tru th a n d sets it fo rth c o rr e c tly . B u t su ch
m en seem to m e to u n d o th em selves in th e te rm in o lo g y o f th eir a rg u m e n ts th ro u g h
th eir ig n o ra n c e , a n d to e stab lish th e th e o ry o f M elissus [th a t is, th a t th e o n e is
u n c h a n g in g ].'8°
This text clearly indicates that even such, as we m ight suppose,
specialised or technical topics as the ultim ate constituents o f m an
were the subject o f public debates between contending speakers in
front o f a lay audience in the late fifth or early fourth century B .C .
T h e particular speakers the w riter has in m ind in chapter i are not
doctors: that becomes clear from the contrast he draws at the
beginning o f chapter 2.^^* But as that chapter goes on to show, there
were not only natural philosophers, but also m edical men, who
adopted similar monistic theories, even though they selected not air,
fire, w ater or earth, but such things as blood, bile and phlegm as the
basis o f their doctrines: ‘ they too add the same reasoning, that a
m an is one - w hatever each o f them chooses to name it - and that
this changes its form and power, being com pelled by the hot and the
cold, and it becomes sweet and bitter, w hite and black, and every
other k in d ’ .^®2 N ow the criticisms that the author o f On the Nature o f
Man levels against the lecturers he attacks m ight lead us to expect a
rad ically different, certainly a less abstract and superficial, approach
in his own discussion o f the question o f the constitution o f man. U p to
a point this m ay be so, in that he evidently makes some effort to
bring em pirical data to bear. Y e t the contrast between this H ippo­
cratic w riter and the theorists he criticises is not as great as m ight at
first be thought likely.
His principal com plaint is that they are m o n i s t s . ^ ^ s A lthough he
promises ‘ evidences’ and ‘ proofs’ o f his own pluralistic doctrine,
Nat. Horn. ch. i, L v i 32.1-34.7.
Nat. Horn. ch. 2, L v i 34.8ff.
'82 C h. 2, L VI 34.1 off.
A t the end o f ch. i (L v i 34.6f) he com plained that the monists ‘ establish the theory
o f M elissus’ : in ch. 2 (34.17^) we have the converse o f an argument in Melissus Fr. 7
(cf. also Diogenes of Apollonia Fr. 2). W hereas Melissus had argued that if it felt pain,
it would not be the same (but it is the same, so it does not feel pain, see above, p. 78),
Nat. Horn. ch. 2 argues that if man were one (that is, consisted of a single element), he
would not feel pain, as part o f an indirect p roof of the conclusion that man is a plurality:
since he evidently does feel pain, he cannot be one.
His own view is that man consists of four humours, phlegm , blood, yellow and black
bile, each o f which he associates with two of the four prim ary opposites, cold and wet.
94 Dialectic and demonstration
these bear a strong resemblance to the reasoning he attributes to his
opponents. H e believes they are influenced by seeing w hat a m an is
purged o f when he dies: sometimes he evacuates bile or, it m ight be,
phlegm , and they then conclude that the hum an body consists o f
this one thing, Y e t his ch ief demonstration o f his own four-hum our
theory takes a precisely similar form - only he identifies not just one,
but four different substances (each o f w hich is purged at different
times or by a different drug) as the fundam ental constituents o f the
body. * A lthough on certain purely m edical matters we m ay im agine
that the writer could lay claim to a certain expertise - or at least to
some experience - that distinguished him from the out and out
laym an, on the topic o f the constitution o f the hum an body his own
approach is not m arkedly different from that o f the lecturers whose
theories he dismisses as sterile. A lthough he castigates their con­
tentiousness and lack o f proof, his l e c t u r e ' too is a similar exercise in
persuasion, relying on some plausible (but quite arbitrary) argu­
ments supported rather thinly by actual em pirical evidence.
On the Nature o f Man is not the only text that throws light on the
open debates that were held particularly on topics where the interests
o f the m edical men overlapped with those o f the natural philo­
sophers. A m ong the points that On Diseases i promises to cover in its
advice on how to play the roles o f questioner and respondent are
which parts o f the body are hot or cold or dry or wet, w hich are
strong or weak, dense or rare.i^^ O ther treatises, too, reflect a context
o f debate when, for exam ple, they envisage, and deal with, objectors.
Thus the w riter o f On Regimen in Acute Diseases breaks o ff at one point
to consider w hat m ight be said in favour o f the opposite a r g u m e n t .
In On Fleshes, when the writer argues that the unborn em bryo
suckles, he considers w hat should be said in reply to someone who
asks how anyone can know about the behaviour o f the em bryo in the
w om b . ’' 9 0 T h e author o f On Regimen i bewails the fact that m any
hot and wet, hot and dry, and cold and dry respectively, and each o f which he says
comes to predominate in turn in the body according to the four seasons, winter, spring,
summer, autumn, chh. 4, 5 and 7, L vi 38.1911, 40.i5ff, 46.9ff.
>85 C h. 6, L VI 44.3if.
See further below, pp. i4 9 f on ch. 5, L v i 42.8ff, ch. 6, 44.1 iff, ch. 7, 46.i7ff, 48.ioff,
50.9lf: that the substances evacuated are the elem entary constituents o f the body is
simply assumed.
Note άκούειν in ch. i, L vi 32.3·
188 Morb. 1 ch. i, L v i 142.aff, see above, p. 92.
Acut. ch. I I , L II 302.6. T he beginning of the treatise engages in polem ic with the
authors, and revisers, o f the Cnidian Sentences, where, for once, it is clear that the attack
is directed at a written text, rather than a spoken discourse.
Cam. ch. 6, L viii 592.i6ff. Cf. also ch. 19, 6 14 .ioff, where he says that if anyone
wishes to scrutinise (Ιλέγξαι) what he has said about the seven-month embryo, it is
easy to do so - though this turns out to be just a m atter of consulting the midwives.
Dialectic and demonstration 95
people, when they have heard one exposition on a topic, thereafter
refuse to listen to anyone else speak about it,'^' and the writer o f
On Diseases iv says that he has expatiated on the subject o f w hether
drink goes to the lungs (a m uch debated issue) because o f the diffi­
culty o f persuading the listener to change his opinion with your own
argum ents.'
T h e general point can be made particularly clearly from a
consideration o f On Ancient Medicine, a treatise that concerns itself
especially with the problem o f the correct approach to the study o f
m edicine. T h e author’s polem ic against various kinds o f opponents,
both ‘ sophists’ and ‘ doctors’, envisages lectures as m uch as written
works. As he puts it in both ch. i and ch. 20, his subject is w hat is or
has been said or written about m edicine and about its relations with
natural philosophy at the end o f ch. i he refers explicitly to the
audience who - he says - cannot tell whether w hat is said on the basis
o f a hypothesis is true or not.'^^ A gain in ch. 2 he insists that those
who speak about the art o f m edicine should do so in a w ay that is
clear to the lay public,i^s and he concludes that chapter w ith the
rem ark that ‘ if anyone departs from w hat is popular knowledge and
does not m ake him self intelligible to his audience, he w ill miss the
truth. Therefore for this reason w e have no need o f a hypothesis.’
E vidently the vehicle o f com m unication he has in mind is the lecture
as m uch as, or even more than, the w ritten text. M oreover m uch o f
the later part o f the treatise is taken up with an im aginary debate
w ith those who em ployed ‘ hypotheses’ . A t one point he claims that
he has presented his opponent w ith a considerable άπορίη (quan­
dary) w ith the question that he puts to h im .'97 A t another he meets an
objection that his opponent m ight raise against him.'^s It is clear that
these are not ju st em pty stylistic tra its: rather they reflect the author’s
experience of, and they show that he remains close to, a situation o f
live dialectical debate.
Viet. I ch. I, L VI 466.i6ff.
Morb. IV ch. 56, L vii 608.14-21, reading άκούοντα, with R . Joly, at 608.20, rather
than Littre’s άκόντα (which stresses the reluctance of the author’s opponents to give up
their opinion).
193 V M ch. I, C M G I, I 36.2, ch. 20, 5 i.i2 f.
C h. I , C M G I, I 36.18-21 (note Tois άκούουσι at 19). Cf. further below, p. 135, on the
subject o f ‘ hypotheses ’ in this work.
*«5 C h. 2, C M G I, I 3 7 .gff: he adduces as a reason for this that medicine is about what
any hum an being suffers.
C h. 2, CM G I, I 3 7.17-19 ·
‘ ^7 C h. 13, CM G I, I 44.27f: οίμαι γάρ Ιγωγε-ττολλήν άπορίην έρωτηθέντι τταρασχεΐν. Cf. also
ch. 15, 46.26f, where he considers the question that an im aginary patient might put to
the doctor who bases his theory on hot, cold, wet and dry.
C h. 17, C M G I, I 48.21.
g6 Dialectic and demonstration
In the one area o f G reek natural science for which we have
extensive original texts from the late fifth and early fourth centuries,
there is a good deal o f evidence to suggest the role o f open, and often
com petitive, public debates. W hether or not we think o f a direct
influence from the sophists or others who were instrum ental in
bringing about the developm ents in rhetoric we outlined earlier, it is
clear enough that w hat we m ay broadly call sophistical or rhetorical
elements - not ju st stylistic traits, but also techniques o f argum ent
and question and answer - can be found in a substantial body o f
m edical writings. N ot only such topics as the art o f m edicine itself,
b ut also the origin o f diseases, the constitution o f the hum an body
and a wide range o f other problems in w hat we should call physio­
logy, biology and indeed physics, were, it seems, sometimes debated
openly. In such circumstances, it is not hard to see that the distinc­
tion between the exposition that a professional m edical practitioner
m ight give, and the έττίδειξις o f a professional sophist, m ight be a fine
one. T h e ‘ professional m edical p ractitioner’ and the ‘ professional
sophist’ were not, in any case, so readily identifiable as those terms
m ight suggest. A lthough there is a general distinction between those
who earned their livin g largely by m edical practice on the one hand,
and those who taught such subjects as the art o f speaking on the
other, neither category was at all sharply delineated. T h eir m em ber­
ship m ight overlap, and in two respects they found themselves in
analogous situations. A teaching function was common to both -
though some m edical practitioners no doubt confined their instruc­
tion to those who were going to practise the art themselves.
Secondly, both had to attract a clientele. As we have seen, some o f
the m edical authors w rite o f the need to exercise restraint in this
regard. Y e t the very fact that they did so indicates where the tem pta­
tions lay: any visit to a patient m ight be turned into an occasion
for a display o f skill or learning; a jo in t consultation m ight degenerate
into a dispute between contending experts.
F inally evidence from outside the H ippocratic Corpus confirms that
speculation on m edical topics was far from confined to m edical men
and illustrates the overlap in interest not just between the ‘ m edical
practitioners’ and the ‘ sophists’ , but also between the former and the
natural philosophers. Aristotle remarked that it is the business o f the
student o f nature (φυσικός) to ‘ inquire into the first principles o f
'99 T he H ippocratic Oath specifies: ‘ I will hand on precepts, lectures and all other
learning to m y sons, to those o f m y master and to those pupils duly apprenticed and
sworn, and to none oth er’ (C M C i, i 4·9ίΓ). This should not, however, be taken to be
uniform practice am ong all the doctors represented in the H ippocratic Corpus.
Dialectic and demonstration 97
health and disease. . . M ost o f those who study nature end by dealing
w ith m edicine, w hile those o f the doctors who practise their art in a
m ore philosophical m anner take their m edical principles from
n a tu re’,200 and elsewhere he distinguished three kinds o f persons who
had a claim to be able to speak on m edical matters, that is not just
the ordinary practitioner and the ‘ m aster-craftsm an’ , but also the
‘ m an educated in the a r t’ - the m an who has studied m edicine but
does not necessarily practise it.^oi T h e place that m edicine m ight
occupy in the interests o f others besides doctors can best be dem on­
strated b y the fact that, following several other philosophers who are
known to have tackled the topic o f the origin o f diseases,^^^ Plato
him self devoted a detailed six-page account to the subject in the
Timaeus,^^'^ w hile Aristotle too covered, or certainly aim ed to cover,
the question in a treatise On Disease and Health.^^'^
T h e H ippocratic doctor thus found him self in a com plex and
com petitive situation that often called for the exercise o f skills in
persuasion and debate. T h e im portance o f this for our understanding
o f the early developm ent o f G reek natural science is two-fold. First it
helps to explain the rather arid q uality o f m uch o f the extant litera­
ture, T h e superficiality o f some discussions o f intricate and difficult
questions, and a certain dogm atism - the tendency to argue single-
m indedly for one particular thesis and against all others - m ay some­
times reflect the nature o f the audience and the com petitive character
o f the agon. T h e rem arkable proliferation o f theories dealing w ith the
same central issues m ay w ell be considered one o f the great strengths
not only o f H ippocratic m edicine, but also o f Presocratic natural
philosophy. Y e t while the critical exam ination o f other doctrines is
sometimes w ell developed, this fertility in speculation is often not
m atched by a corresponding i^Z/'-criticism. In a situation o f competi-
Sens. 4 3 6 a i 7 - b i. T h e point is repeated in substantially the same terms at Resp.
48ob22ff.
Pol. 1282a iff. Cf. Thucydides (11 48) w ho, after noting that anyone, whether doctor
or laym an, might speculate about the causes o f the plague at Athens, sets out to give
a detailed description o f its course himself.
T h e general theories o f disease put forw ard by H ippon and by Philolaus are reported
in Anon. Lond. x i 22ff (where the name is an almost certain restoration), and x vm 8ff.
Particular pathological doctrines are attributed to A naxagoras (Aristotle, PA 6 η η 3 .φ )
and to Democritus (Soranus, Gyn. iii 17, C M G iv i0 5.2ff), who m ay, indeed, have
written works on ‘ prognosis’, dietetics and ‘ m edical ju d ge m e n t’ : the titles o f such
works are certainly recorded by Diogenes Laertius, ix 48, although their authenticity
has been called in question.
203 77. 8 ie - 8 7 b . In w hat is preserved of M en o’s history o f medicine in the papyrus
Anonym us Londinensis, more space is devoted to Plato’s theory of diseases (xiv 1 1 -
XVIII 8) than to that o f any other writer, including Hippocrates.
20·* N o such work is extant, but Aristotle refers prospectively to such a treatise at Long.
464b 32f, cf. PA 653 a 8f and Bonitz 1870, I04a47ff.
9» Dialectic and demonstration
tive debate, however, this is readily understandable. T h e speaker’s
role was to advocate his own cause, to present his own thesis in as
favourable a light as possible. It was not his responsibihty to scruti­
nise, let alone to draw attention to, the weaknesses o f his own case
w ith the same keenness w ith w hich he probed those o f his opponents.
G iven an interested but inexpert audience, technical detail, and even
the careful m arshalling o f data, m ight w ell be quite inappropriate,
and would, in any event, be likely to be less telling than the well-
chosen plausible - or w ould-be dem onstrative - argument.
Secondly, we must recognise the role o f such debates in providing
a fram ework o f discussion on a variety o f natural scientific problems.
Aristotle’s Lyceum was the first ancient institution that began to act
as something like a centre o f research in the natural sciences,^°s
although P lato’s A cad em y - on which the Lyceum was in part at
least m odelled - certainly anticipated it in fostering interest in certain
areas o f w hat we m ay call advanced studies, including the exact
sciences. Y e t in the late fifth or early fourth century B .C . those who
engaged in scientific inquiry, when not quite isolated individuals,
belonged, at most, to such loosely structured associations as the
m edical schools, such as those at Cos and Cnidus,2°6 or the P ytha­
gorean fraternities o f M agn a G raecia, M oreover, although by the
end o f the fifth century the m anufacture and production o f books
had begun to develop, and literacy was b y then established at least in
a small section o f the p o p u l a t i o n , t h e chief, even if no longer the
only, m edium for the propagation o f scientific, as for other kinds of,
knowledge was still, and was for long to rem ain, the spoken, not
the written, word. In these circumstances - w here no significant
institutional support for natural science existed, and in an intellectual
m ilieu w hich was still essentially oral, small-scale and face-to-face,
the sophistic-type έπίδειξις and the kind o f public debate alluded to
in On the Nature o f Man undoubtedly provided im portant vehicles for
the exchange and dissemination o f scientific ideas.
THE C R IT IC ISM OF R H E T O R IC
It has long been recognised that the advance o f rhetoric and o f the
sophistic m ovem ent contributed to a greater awareness o f the use o f
arguments and helped to lead, eventually, to their formal analysis.
This will be discussed in ch. 3, below, pp. 20iff.
^0* Both the extent of the doctrinal uniformity o f such ‘ schools’, and the nature o f their
organisation, are matters o f conjecture (see most recently Lonie 1978). W hile there is
no reason to doubt that teaching was one o f their functions, there is no evidence that
they attem pted to initiate programmes o f research on a corporate basis.
See further below, pp. 23gf.
Dialectic and demonstration 99
Y et, as again is well known, this advance m et with a hostile reception
in some quarters. Th ere is, to be sure, an element o f exaggeration in
some aspects o f the reaction the sophists provoked. Thus Aristo­
phanes’ hum our and abuse are directed somewhat indiscrim inately at
a wide variety o f targets, ranging from politicians and poets, through
astronomers, sophists and seers, to sexual deviants,^»^ and he had no
com punction in assimilating Socrates to the new learning. Y e t some
o f the basis o f the resentment felt towards the sophists is understand­
able enough. In that, in general, they m oved from city to city in
search o f pupils, they were on the periphery o f city-state society and
were easily, and to some extent correctly, identified as a focus for the
criticism o f traditional m orality. M oreover in the terms that he used
to describe the power o f rhetoric G orgias him self invites a com ­
parison with m agic and witchcraft,^°^ and so it is hardly surprising
th at the reception the sophists had was sometimes m arked w ith an
am bivalence similar to that w hich can be detected in popular
attitudes towards the purifiers whom we discussed in chapter i .
T h e key charge was that o f m aking the worse (or weaker) argu­
m ent appear the better (stronger). O u r sources report that Protagoras
claim ed to be able to teach this;^i° Aristophanes makes great play
w ith the theme in the Clouds, where he stages a m ock agon between
the just and the unjust Aoyos;^" and according to Plato it was one o f
the accusations brought against Socrates.212 X enoph on’s Ischo-
m achus is careful to distinguish practising the art o f speaking from
learning how to m ake the worse argum ent appear the better,213 and
Isocrates too protests indignantly at the calum ny levelled at him.^i^
T h e charge evidently becam e a standard one, and though often, no
doubt, distorted, it has at least this m uch foundation, that orators
were expected to be able to support either side o f a case: and as we
have seen this applied not only in straightforw ardly forensic contexts
(where A ntiphon’s Tetralogies provided a model) but also in more
208 J^u. 33 i f f is one typical passage where we find sophists grouped together with
θουριομάντειξ 1ατροτέχνα$ σφροτγιδονυχαργοκομήταξ, κυκλίων τε χορών φσματοκάμττταϊ fiv5 pas
μετεωροφένακαξ.
See above, p. 84 η. la y . T h e comparison recurs, but is turned against the sophists
in Plato, e.g. Sph. 234 ε f. Pit. 303 c, Euthd. 289 e f, though Plato also describes Socrates’
effect on his interlocutors as a bewitching, R. 358 b.
D .L . IX 51, cf. Aristotle, Rh. I402a23ff.
«« Nu. 88aff.
Ap. 18 be, 19 be (followed b y a reference to Aristophanes) and 23 d (where Socrates
implies this was a stock, glib, charge made against anyone who philosophised).
213 Oec. II. 23-25. A t Cyn. 13. 4 (cf. 8) X enophon represents the sophists as practising the
art o f deception.
XV i5f, cf. 2 5 gff. XIII is a general warning against the pretensions and deceits o f the
sophists, cf. also x iff.
 100 Dialectic and demonstration
general, m oral ones (as in the Dissoi Logoi) Suspicion o f rhetoric
was clearly widespread enough to m ake it advisable for the pro­
fessional speech-writer to conceal his traces, and early on it becam e
a com m onplace to insist on your ow n lack o f skill in speaking and to
represent your opponents as dangerously m isleading, and un­
scrupulous, m anipulators o f a r g u m e n t s .
As in Aristophanes, m oral disapproval is the prim ary elem ent in
P lato’s m ore intense and com plex reaction to the sophists. In such
dialogues as Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Phaedrus and Sophist
especially he develops a series o f contrasts between rhetoric, sophistic
and eristic on the one hand , ^ ^ 7 and dialectic on the other. T h e
sophists take p ay for their instruction: but true philosophy is not to
be bought or sold; rhetoric is not an art, but flattery aim ed at
gratification it seeks victory, not truth, and it deals w ith prob­
abilities, intent on persuasion, not on knowledge.^^^ G iven that his
ow n dialectical m ethod - throughout his life - owed m uch to
Socratic elenchus, it was clearly essential for Plato not only to under­
line the differences between dialectic and rhetoric or sophistic,^2o
b ut also to distinguish w hat he represented as the true m ethod o f
elenchus from the false. Thus in the Gorgias he explicitly contrasts the
correct m ethod w ith the type o f rhetorical elenchus practised in the
law -courts. 2 2 i T h e latter depends largely on the num ber o f witnesses
you can muster against your opponents: the form er is not a m atter o f
counting heads, but o f gaining the agreem ent o f one m an - the
person whose ideas are under exam ination ;222 it is not directed at the
m an himself, however, but at the subject under discussion.223 I f there
is a com petitive elem ent in the true m ethod, it is a rivalry to get to the
truth. 224
* '5 See above, pp. Ssf.
See, for example, A ntiphon v 1-7, Lysias x ii 86, x v ii i, Isocrates x v 42, cf. D over
1974, pp. 25ff.
T hough Plato distinguishes between rhetoric and sophistic, for exam ple, he also, on
occasion, assimilates them or emphasises their similarities as at Grg. 465 c, 520 a.
2'* As most famously at Grg. 464b ff, so a d e : contrast Isocrates x v I97ff.
See especially Grg. 452 e fF, 458e ff, Phdr. 259c ff, 272 d ff, Phlb. 58a ff, cf. Phd. 91 a.
T h e contrast between a sophistic έπίδειξίξ and dialectic is pointed up in both Prt.,
e.g. 328d ff, and Grg., e.g. 447 b ff. T h e great sophists are represented as claim ing to
be able not only to produce set speeches, but also to engage in question and answer
[Grg. 449bc, cf. 458de, Prt. 329b, c f 334e-335d), though their inadequacies in the
latter are exposed by their confrontations with Socrates.
Grg. 47ieflF. O ne m ay com pare Aristotle, Pol. I2 6 8 b 4 iff, who refers to w hat he
already considers an archaic system o f law, where w hat counts is the num ber o f
witnesses brought into court (c f Gernet (1948-9) 1968, p. 245 and 1955, pp. 6 1-8 1).
Grg. 471 e, 472 be, 474 a, 475e~476a, 522 d.
Grg. 4 5 7e, cf. 453c, 454c: at 473b we are told that the truth is never refuted.
See Grg. 505 e, cf. 45 7 d and Thrasym achus’ accusation at R. 336 c.
Dialectic and demonstration lo i
M oreover this general characterisation is supplem ented - though
adm ittedly unsystem atically - w ith m any specific remarks con­
cerning dialectical procedure. T hus in different contexts it is pointed
out that it is useless to talk about a subject w hich you have not
defined ;2 2 5 each person must take his turn at asking, and at answering,
the questions,226 not evading the questions b y play-actin g,227 nor by
descending to verbal abuse one must guard against am biguous 2 2 «
or com pound 2 3 o questions, and not specify in advance the kind o f
answer required.231 A b ove all there is an insistence on the need to
follow the argum ent wherever it leads and to accept its conclusions,
how ever un p alatab le , 2 3 2 and on the prim ary im portance o f con­
sistency ;233 indeed the principal type o f refutation is that in w hich it is
claim ed that a self-contradiction has been shown.234 A lthough Plato
was certainly not the first person to be interested in establishing w hat
w e m ay call the correct rules o f procedure for conducting a dialectical
inquiry, we have fuller observations on the subject from him than
from any earlier writer.23s
In these respects - in incorporating elenchus and in m aking
recomm endations concerning the technique o f question and answer -
Plato belongs to a long line o f critical inquiry that stretches far back
into earlier philosophy and science. ‘ D ia le c tic ’ is now redefined to
exclude rhetoric and sophistic.236 His ch ief criticisms o f the latter rest
on fundam ental distinctions between the sphere o f the ‘ p rob ab le’
and that o f the ‘ tru e ’, and between ‘ persuasion’ and ‘ p ro o f ’ . ^ 3 7
^*5 See Grg. 44Sde, Phdr. 263d, 270c fF, 277b6 .
226 See Prt. 338 de, 348 a, Grg. 458 ab, 462 a, 474 b, 506 c, R. 350 c-e.
*^7 Grg. 500 be. T h e seriousness of the enterprise (although it is treated by the young as a
form o f sport) is stressed at R. 539 b -d , cf. 336 c and Tht. 167 c in Protagoras’ ‘ defence’ .
It is the kind o f purely verbal trickery indulged in by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
that is a mere game, Euthd. 277d ff.
See Grg. 457 d, R. 343 a ff. Grg. 473 de points out that neither attempts to frighten
your opponent, nor m ocking him, constitute a refutation.
E .g. Euthd. 273d, cf. 2 7 7d f f , 295 be. A m biguity in general is a frequent source of
fallacious reasoning in Plato, although the extent to which he was conscious of fallacy
as such is disputed, see R . Robinson (1942) 1969, pp. i6ff, Sprague 1962. In Euthd.,
Socrates’ com plaint against the sophists is prim arily a moral one: he rejects their
arguments as much for their triviality as for their fallaciousness.
” 0 E.g. Grg. 466cd. E.g. R. 337 ab.
See, from Grg. alone, 454 c, 479 be, 480 a, 480 de, 497 b, 498 e-499 b, 503 cd, 509 e.
*33 A particularly prom inent theme in Grg., e.g. 457e, 4 6 o e -4 6 ia , 482be, 487b, 499b,
and in Prt., e.g. 333a, 339b -d , 361 a -c.
*34 O n the different modes o f elenchus (not always a refutation) see especially R . Robinson
1953, chh. 2-3.
235 C f R . Robinson 1953, R yle 1965 and 1966, ch. 4, especially.
*36 Cf. R . Robinson 1953, p. 85, w ho remarks: ‘ T h e reason w h y Plato constantly pillories
eristic and distinguishes it from dialectic is that in truth his own dialectic very closely
resembled eristic.’ Cf. also R yle 1966, pp. i26ff.
*37 In certain contexts and for some purposes, however, Plato has to content him self with
 102 Dialectic and demonstration
W hilst in m any o f his remarks on dialectical m ethod Plato remains
close to earlier traditions, in the m iddle and later dialogues his
criteria and requirements becom e stricter and m ore complex. T h e
dialectician must not only be able to conduct question and answer,
and to give and receive an a c c o u n t h e must also be ‘ syn op tic’,
able to grasp the connections between things and to determ ine the
true reality - that is, in the Republic, the transcendent Forms - under­
lying appearances.239 D ialectic comes to be seen particularly in terms
o f the ability to discern the similarities and differences between
t h i n g s , a n d it must be not only critical but rigorous. Thus in the
late Philebus its subject-m atter is still defined as w hat is unchanging,
and it is distinguished from the power o f persuasion by its clarity,
exactness and truth.241 W hilst Plato’s recom m endations on the
correct conduct o f an elenchus m ark a new and decisive turn in the
developm ent o f views on w hat ‘ dialectic ’ should consist in, he also
had an im portant, indeed crucial, contribution to m ake in the
developm ent o f a form al notion o f demonstration. It is to this, and to
the related, far m ore problem atic, question o f the grow th o f the
concept o f an axiom atic system, that we must now turn.
I First early G reek m athem atics is, already in the pre-Platonic
THE DEVELOPM ENT OF D E M O N S T R A T IO N
I period, rem arkably heterogeneous. W e can distinguish at least four
O u r first points must be negative ones. If, as we have seen, the first
extant sustained deductive reasoning appears in Parmenides, who is
also the first to have set up a fundam ental opposition between the
use o f the senses and abstract argument, he has no term for ‘ p ro o f’
and not necessarily any clear criteria for one. A lthough the orators,
for instance, em ploy an inform al notion o f proof that is perfectly
adequate for practical purposes - when, for exam ple, a claim is m ade
that either the facts o f a case, or the motives o f the agents, have been
sufficiently established^^i - neither they, nor any other o f the fifth
and early fourth century whom we have considered provide any
clear indication that the form al conditions o f proof had begun to be
a merely probable account, as notably in that o f the visible world in 7 7 . (see especially
29be), and cf., e.g., Grg. 523a, 524ab, Phd. io8de, Phdr. 245c and 246a ff.
These features are emphasised in the account o f dialectic as the supreme study in
Republic vii, e.g. 531 e, 533 c, 534b, 534d.
” 9 E.g. R. 531 cd, 532d ff, 534ab, 5 3 7 cd.
Especially Phdr. 265 de, Sph. 253 b-e. Pit. 285 ab.
Phlb. 5 S a-c, 5 9 a -c.
See especially the use o f άττοδείκνυμι (e.g. Antiphon 11 3.1, iv 3.7, 4.9, v 64, 81, Lysias
III 40, VII 43, XIII 49, 51, x v 11), {ττιδείκνυμι (Antiphon 11 4.3, iii 4.9, iv 2.7, v 19,
Lysias iv 12, xii 56, xiii 62) and άποφαίνω (Lysias xiii 51).
Dialectic and demonstration 103
analysed.243 In particular, although the m edical writers frequently
claim that they have dem onstrated some theory or opinion or use
the term ‘ necessity’ to describe the causal relations they assert to
hold, the ‘ proofs’ they adduce are generally quite inform al and their
criteria for such are evidently far from strict. 244
T h e most promising area for our inquiry is the one for w hich our
original sources are least adequate, nam ely m athem atics. A lthough
commentators on E uclid’s Elements identify for us the authors o f
particular theorems or groups o f theorems, and texts in both Plato
and Aristotle afford us some insight into the w ork o f their con­
tem poraries and predecessors, the reconstruction o f pre-Euclidean
m athem atics and o f the stages w hereby the m aterial that now appears
in the Elements^^^ was assembled is, inevitably, a desperately con­
jectu ral affair.246 O n one issue o f fundam ental concern to us, nam ely
the suggestion that the notion o f demonstration in m athem atics
originated from, or was the result o f the influence of, Eleatic philo­
sophy, it is as w ell to recognise at the outset that the direct evidence
by^ vhich such a thesis m ight be conclusively confirmed or refuted
is not forthcom ing.247 Nevertheless some relevant aspects o f the
developm ent o f G reek m athem atics are not in doubt.
m ain, as w ell as a large num ber o f subsidiary, branches o f theoretical
interests. 248 First, num ber-theory - including the division o f numbers
T hu s like the orators, the historians have no strict form al criteria for proof, even
though in their assessments of differing accounts of historical events they are frequently
alert to the distinction between w hat is merely a possible story and one that has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
^ Thus when the author o f JVat. Horn, promises to ‘ dem onstrate’ (άττοδείξω ch. 2,
L VI 36.12, cf. δεικνύναι 36.6, άττοδείκνυμι ch. 5, 44.2) and to ‘ show the necessities
(άνάγκαξ άττοφανώ) through which each thing is increased or decreased in the b o d y ’
(ch. 2, 3 6 .i5 f), this ‘ p ro o f’ rests m ainly on the evidence o f the substances drawn fiom
the body by certain drugs (see above, p. 94 and n. 186). W hile at ch. 3, 36.17, for
instance, ανάγκη is used to express the conclusion o f a reductio argument (cf. also ch. 2,
36.1), elsewhere the same term is used o f the author’s view of w hat happens to each
constituent o f the body after d e a th : ‘ again it is necessary that each thing returns to its
own n atu re’ (ch. 3, 38.1 of, cf. ch. 4, 40.6 and 12, ch. 5, 42.6, ch. 7, 50.3, ch. 8, 50.19).
Sim ilarly causal sequences are often described as necessary in such treatises as Aph.,
Aer., V M and Viet.
^“*5 Euclid’s Elements were composed - it is generally thought - some time around 300 B.C.
A full survey of the problem, w ith extensive references to previous views, has recently
been undertaken b y K n orr 1975.
T h e thesis has recently been m aintained b y Szabo 1964-6 and 1969.
T here is a pointed contrast between the utilitarian, and the non-utilitarian, justifi­
cations o f the study o f mathematics in different fourth-century authors. For the former,
see, for example, the views ascribed to Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. iv Τ-2- y , for the
latter, P lato’s account o f the role of mathem atics in the higher education o f the
guardians, R. 524d ff. Cf. also Isocrates x i 22f, x ii 26f, x v 26iff.
 104 Dialectic and demonstration
into odd and even, the investigation o f certain elem entary pro­
positions involving odd and even num bers, 2 4 9 the classification o f
‘ figu red ’ numbers and the generation o f such numbers b y the
application o f the ‘ gnom on’ ^so _ ^as evidently a m ajor preoccu­
pation o f some fifth- and fourth-century m athem aticians, particularly
but not exclusively Pythagoreans. Secondly, there is the so-called
H eronic tradition o f m etrical geom etry, characterised by its concern
w ith the solution o f problems o f mensuration, such as the determ i­
nation o f the areas o f plane figures o f various kinds.^si T h ird ly, there
is the non-m etrical geom etry that is represented, for exam ple, by
several o f the contributions to the three favourite pre-Platonic
special problems, (i) the squaring o f the circle, (ii) the trisection o f
an angle, and (iii) the duplication o f the cube, and, especially, by
the w ork o f H ippocrates o f Chios.^52 F inally there is a further
distinct area o f interest in the applications o f m athem atics to music
theory, leading up to the w ork o f A rchytas o f Tarentum , a con­
tem porary o f P lato.253
Reflecting, in part, the heterogeneity o f these areas o f study
themselves, the methods that were used, and the conceptions o f
‘ p ro o f’ that w ere operational, in different parts o f early G reek
m athem atics were far from standardised and varied ap preciab ly in
rigour. Thus when Proclus, for instance,^54 reports that Thales is said
to have ‘ p ro ve d ’ (σποδεϊξαι) the proposition that the diam eter
bisects the circle, w e m ay have doubts not only about the attribution
Several such propositions are collected in Euclid ix 21-34, e.g. that the sum o f any
m ultitude o f even numbers is even (ix 21), and that the product o f an odd num ber and
an odd num ber is odd (ix 29), though how far Eu clid’s presentation follows earlier
models is far from clear.
^50 T h a t is, the study o f the varieties o f plane numbers (triangular, square, oblong,
pentagonal, etc.) and o f solid numbers (cubic, pyram idal, etc.) obtained b y the
corresponding geom etrical arrangements of points: see, for example, H eath 1921,
I pp. 76-84. T he application o f the ‘ gnom on’ to generate series o f such numbers is
attested in, for example, Aristotle, PA. 20 3 aloff, cf. Cai. i^ a sg ff.
^51 Such m etrical geom etry can be extensively illustrated also in the extant remains of
both Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics (see, for example, N eugebauer 1957,
chh. 2 and 4, van der W aerden 1954, pp. 3 iff, 75ff)· W hile it is clear that the Greeks
drew on these other traditions some time before Euclid, let alone before H ero (first
century a .d .), the stages and tim ing of the transmission o f those aspects of Egyptian
and Babylonian mathem atics are largely a matter o f conjecture.
^5^ See further below, pp. io8ff.
253 A rchytas’ study of mean proportionals is one area of overlap between his interests in
music theory and his more general m athem atical work: see, for example, H eath 1921,
I pp. 2i3ff, pp. 246ff, Szabo, 1969 Part 11.
^54 Proclus, 7 n Buc. 15 7.lof. Elsewhere (e.g. /« Euc. 352.i4ff) Proclus claims to be
draw ing on the history o f Eudemus (fourth century B.C.) for his reports on Thales:
yet reservations m ay still be expressed about the information available to Eudemus,
when Thales m ay not have written anything, and when Aristotle himself is consistently
guarded in his remarks about T hales’ ideas.
Dialectic and demonstration 105
to T hales (about whom little definite inform ation survived to the
time o f Aristotle, let alone later), but also about the nature o f the
proof b y w hich such a proposition m ight have been established in the
early stages o f G reek m athem atics. O ne simple practical technique
that m ight w ell have been used in that context is that o f super­
position, w hich persists in the seventh com m on opinion o f Euclid,
the so-called ‘ axiom o f congruence’, that states that ‘ things w hich
coincide w ith one another are equal to one an oth er’ ,^55 and w hich is
applied in the proof o f Elements i 4, asserting the congruence o f two
triangles that have two equal sides and the angle contained b y them
equal. 256 A gain it is likely that the notion o f proof operational in early
studies o f odd and even numbers was a quite inform al one. Before
num ber theory itself was put on an axiom atic foundation, propo­
sitions such as that w hich states that the sum o f a m ultitude o f even
numbers is itself even were, we m ay presume, ‘ show n’ sim ply b y
direct reference to the unit or dot representations o f such num bers.^57
T h e famous passage in P lato’ s Meno in w hich Socrates has a slave
solve the problem o f constructing a square double the area o f a given
square affords some insight into early G reek geom etrical pro-
cedures.258 P lato’s own particular purpose is to establish the theory
o f recollection, but he does so b y taking a geom etrical illustration
that incorporates w hat were, b y then, clearly recognised as elem ent­
ary techniques. Socrates proceeds b y question and answer and claims
that he is not instructing the slave, although, as has often been
observed, the questions put are leading ones. T h e slave first tries
various incorrect solutions, and at one point it is suggested to him
that he m ight point to the correct line, if he is unable to number it.^s?
This no doubt alludes to the incom m ensurability o f the diam eter and
the side, but at the same time Socrates acknowledges that the slave
m ight resolve the problem m erely b y referring to the diagram . T h e
tw o features o f the eventual solution that are p articularly note­
w orthy are (i) that it depends entirely on the correct construction,260
25 SA similar notion m ay underlie the definition o f straight line as ‘ that w hich lies evenly
with the points on itself’ (i Def. 4), cf. Plato, Prm. 137c.
*56 I 4 (i I i.4 ff H S), cf. I 8 (i 16.1 i f f H S). H eath 1926, i pp. 224ff, 24Sff, arguing that the
seventh (or in his num bering fourth) common opinion m ay be an interpolation,
suggested that Euclid used the method o f superposition with some reluctance and m ay
have been aware o f objections to it as not admissible as a theoretical means o f proving
equality, only as a practical test o f it. But whatever is true of Euclid, the method was,
no doubt, used without qualms in parts of earlier Greek geom etry. Cf. especially von
Fritz (1959) 19 7 1, pp. 430ff.
*57 For a plausible reconstruction o f the types of method that m ay have been used in this
context, see Becker i936e, pp. 533ff.
*5® Men. 82 b-8 5d. ^^9 Men. 8 4 a !.
260 T h a t is, o f the square on the diam eter o f the original square. T h e close connection
 io6 Dialectic and demonstration
and (ii) th at once this construction has been carried out the solution
to the problem is treated as obvious on direct inspection.
In certain contexts, and for some purposes, early G reek m athe­
m aticians em ployed heuristic or practical methods and were content
w ith a loose, inform al notion o f ‘ pro o f’ . Y e t the first attempts to give
strict deductive demonstrations certainly go back into the fifth
century. T o illustrate this we need go no further than the well-
known exam ple o f the incom m ensurability o f the side and diam eter
o f the s q u a r e . 262 W hereas elsewhere it is often appropriate and
necessary to distinguish between the discovery o f a m athem atical
theorem and the discovery o f its proof , ^ ^ 3 a feature o f the incom ­
m ensurability o f the side and diam eter is that the justification o f this
result can only be based on logical deduction.264 W e are not in a
position to say for certain when or b y whom the p roof was first given,
nor w hich o f several possible methods was em ployed. Y e t w e m ay
infer from P lato’s report concerning the w ork o f Theodorus that the
result was already known to m athem aticians b y his time (and he
m ay be taken to have been active in the decade or so either side o f
400 B . C . ) and the same text in Plato also indicates that Theodorus
him self carried ou t further studies o f incom m ensurables u p to that
o f the side o f the seventeen foot square (or, as we should say,
M oreover although the question o f ju st how the incom m ensur­
ability o f the side and the diam eter was originally dem onstrated is
h otly disputed,266 it is clear from a text in Aristotle that one m ethod
between ‘ construction’ and ‘ p ro o f’ in G reek geom etry is further suggested b y the
fact that the term γράφειν continues to be used to cover b o th : see for instance in Plato,
Tht. i4 7 d , Aristotle, APr. 65a4ff, Top. I58b29ff.
*** T h a t the diameter bisects the square is asserted (not proved) at Men. 84e4ff.
T his was the form in w hich G reek mathem aticians treated what we should call the
problem of the irrationality o f -y/s.
C f., e.g., the report in the introduction to Archim edes’ Method (ii 430.iff) , that the
relations between the volumes o f the cone and cylinder, and between those o f the
pyram id and prism, were first discovered by Democritus, though their proofs were first
given by Eudoxus.
Approxim ations to yjz and ^3 are attested in Babylonian sources, but there is no
evidence that the Babylonians knew that i : ^2 cannot be expressed as a ratio between
integers, or that, if they did, they had grasped the significance o f that fact: see Neuge-
bauer 1957, p. 48.
^*5 Tht. i4 7d . T he fact that Theodorus began with the side o f the three foot square shows
that the case o f the two foot square was w ell known. T h e method that Theodorus
himself used has been much discussed; see, e.g., V o g t 1909-10, H eath 1921, i pp. aoaff,
von Fritz 19346, A nderhub 1941, van der W aerden 1954, pp. I42ff, Heller 1956-8,
pp . I3ff, Wasserstein 1958, Szabo 1962, pp. GgfT, K n orr 1975, chh. 3 and 4.
266 O n e interpretation has it that the discovery arose from the application of anthy-
phairesis (‘ reciprocal subtraction’), the algorithm set out for integers in Euclid
VII 1-3 (vii I states: ‘ T w o unequal numbers being set out, and the less being con­
tinually subtracted in turn from the greater, if the num ber which is left never measures
Dialectic and demonstration 107
proceeded by an indirect p ro o f A t APr. 4 ia 2 3 f f Aristotle takes as
an exam ple o f reasoning per impossibile the p roof that the side and
diam eter are incom m ensurable that first assumes that they are
com m ensurable and then deduces the impossible result that ‘ odd
numbers equal even num bers’ . A s every student o f G reek m athe­
m atics knows, a p roof o f this general form appears in the ‘ a p p en d ix ’
to E uclid X (App. 27, iii 231. io ff H S). In this, to paraphrase the
essential steps, the diagonal [AC) is first assumed to be commensur­
able w ith the side {AB) and a\bL· taken to be their ratio expressed in
lowest terms.267 T h a t is, A C \ A B = a\b. So AC^iAB^ = a^'.b^. But
(by Pythagoras’ theorem) AC^ = qAB^. S o = 2b^. So and
therefore also «, is even, and since a : b are the lowest terms, b is odd.
Since a is even, let a = 2c. So (from the previous step, a^ = 2b^)
4^2 2^2 Sq 2ίτ2 ^ ^2 Sq dyg since the original
assumption o f com m ensurability leads to the contradiction that b is
both odd and even, that assumption is false. N ow it is not certain that
this was the precise proof that Aristotle had in m ind - let alone that
it was the original m ethod b y w hich incom m ensurability was
established.268 Y e t we can be sure o f this, at least, that some proof o f
the one before it until a unit is left, the original numbers w ill be prim e to one ano th er’)
and for homogeneous magnitudes in x 2-4 (x 2 states: ‘ If, when the less o f two unequal
magnitudes is continually subtracted in turn from the greater, that which is left never
measures the one before it, the magnitudes will be incom m ensurable’). Thus, in
arithm etic, anthyphairesis can be used to show that two numbers have no common
factor: but when, in geom etry, the process o f subtraction continues indefinitely, the
magnitudes are incommensurable. It has been suggested that mathem aticians (usually
identified as Pythagoreans) discovered incommensurability when they realised either
that the anthyphairesis o f a line cut in m ean and extreme ratio continues indefinitely,
or that the algorithm applied to side and diameter numbers does. (The former has
been suggested in connection w ith studies o f the regular pentagon: the side and the
diagonal are in mean and extreme ratio, the intersection o f the diagonals forms another
regular pentagon and this process can be continued indefinitely: see, for exam ple, von
Fritz (1945) 1970, pp. 40iff, and H eller 1958, pp. gff. For the latter suggestion, see
Heller 1956-8, pp. 3ff and 1958, pp. i4 ff). But against this it m ay be, as K n orr 1975,
ch. 2 (following Heath) has argued, that in this context anthyphairesis was originally
used rather as a method o f approxim ating to the length of the diameter, than in order
to prove its incommensurability.
This is too strong a condition: all that is necessary is that not both a and b are even.
T h e p ro of in Euclid also includes a redundant step to show that A C is greater than one:
more correctly - given that some Greek mathem aticians are reported to have held that
one is both odd and even, Aristotle, Metaph. 986 a 19f - in the alternative (and more
general) version o f the p roof that follows in x A p p . 27 (iii 2 3 3 .i5 ff HS) a step is intro­
duced to show that A B is greater than one.
*68 A p art from the anthyphairesis interpretations (see above, p. 106 n. 266) two main
other possibilities are explored by K n orr (1975, chh. 2 and 6). (i) T h e first uses the
same diagram as M em 84 d ff, and assumes first that AG and D B both represent
integers. But AG FE , a square num ber, is even (it is double D B H I). A n d D B H I in
turn is double A B C D , and so it too is even, and this process, conceived geom etrically,
can clearly be carried on indefinitely. But if A G F E represents a finite num ber, its
successive division in h a lf must term inate. So the initial assumption, that both A G
io8 Dialectic and demonstration
incom m ensurability o f a strict type, taking the form o f a reductio, was
w ell known b y the fourth century.
M oreover it was not ju st that strict methods o f proof were used in
some areas o f early G reek m athem atics, for attem pts had also begun
to be m ade to systematise parts o f geom etry b y the end o f the fifth
century. W e have, to be sure, to rely in part on w hat the late com ­
m entators tell us, b u t the m ain point, at least, can be confirm ed b y
good original evidence. In the general inform ation that Proclus gives
us concerning E uclid’s predecessors, he reports that the first person to
have composed a book o f Elements was H ippocrates o f Chios, and
further that several other later m athem aticians, including A rchytas
and Theaetetus, ‘ increased the num ber o f theorems and progressed
towards a m ore scientific arrangem ent o f th em ’ .269 M eanw hile
Aristotle explains how the term ‘ elem ents’ itself was used; ‘ W e give
the nam e “ elem ents” to those geom etrical propositions, the proofs
o f which are im plied in the proofs o f all or most o f the others.’^7 o
A lthough the detailed reconstruction o f the contents o f these early
Elements cannot be attem pted with any degree o f confidence, we can
F
c \
D H
and D B represent integers, leads to an absurdity. (2) Secondly incommensurability
might have been discovered in the study o f right-angled triangles, using some simple
theorems concerning Pythagorean triples, nam ely {a) that if the largest num ber is
even, then all three numbers are even, and {b) that if one o f the numbers is odd, then
the largest num ber is odd, and one o f the other tw^o numbers is odd and the other even.
T akin g a right-angled isosceles triangle, w^hat are the numbers represented by the sides?
Let X be the num ber for the hypotenuse, and Y for the side. I f X is even, then by {a)
all three numbers are even. B y halving each side o f the triangle w e obtain another
right-angled isosceles triangle, and if its hypotenuse is even, the same applies. This
process can, if necessary, be continued indefinitely. But if it continues indefinitely, this
contradicts the assumption that ^ is a finite integer. Assume, then, alternatively, that
it is odd (or that we arrive at an odd num ber for the hypotenuse after bisection).
But if so, then by {b) one of the two other sides is odd, and the other is even, and this
contradicts the assumption that the triangle is isosceles.
In Euc. 66.7ff. Hippocrates’ w ork is generally dated to around 430 B.C. Theaetetus,
a slightly younger contem porary o f Plato, died in 369.
Metaph. gg S a a sff. T h a t the, or a, m athem atical use lies behind the distinction between
elements and complexes drawn by Plato at Tht. 201 e f f has been suggested, for
example, by M orrow 1970. T he term στοιχεΐον there, however, has its prim ary, literal
sense, ‘ letter’ .
Dialectic and demonstration 109
gain some idea o f H ippocrates’ methods and o f the state o f geo­
m etrical knowledge at the time from Sim plicius, who preserves an
extended passage from the second book o f Eudem us’ History o f
Geometry recording H ippocrates’ w ork on the quadrature o f lunes.271
Eudem us tells us that he
m a d e his startin g -p o in t, a n d set o u t as th e first o f th e th eo rem s u se fu l for his
q u a d ra tu re s, th a t sim ilar segm en ts o f circles h a v e th e sam e ratio s as th e sq u a res on
th eir bases. A n d this h e p ro v e d b y sh o w in g th a t th e sq uares on th e d ia m e te rs h a v e
th e sam e ra tio s as th e cirdes.^^z
T h e quadratures o f lunes w ith external circumferences th at are equal
to, greater than, and less than, a semi-circle are then set out in turn,
followed finally b y the quadrature o f the sum o f a lune and a circle.
Several fundam ental points emerge from a consideration o f this,
the most com plex and sustained piece o f fifth-century m athem atical
reasoning that has com e dow n to us. First H ippocrates uses strict
dem onstrative methods. 273 This is true not only o f the quadratures
themselves , 2 7 4 but also o f the prelim inary constructions; it is notable
that he is not content m erely to construct lunes w ith external
circum ferences greater, or less, th at a semi-circle, but in both cases
provides p roof o f these inequalities.27s Secondly, he presupposes a
large num ber o f geom etrical theorems, corresponding not only to
Euclid I and 11 (including, for exam ple, extensions o f Pythagoras’
theorem to obtuse and acute triangles), but also to m uch o fiii and iv
(dealing w ith the circle and inscribed polygons) and o f vi.276 W e
must repeat that we have no means o f determ ining the precise form
or the extent o f his Elements. But if, as is possible, it included a study
o f the geom etry presupposed in the quadrature o f lunes, that w ould
Simplicius, In Ph. 60.22-69.34. D iels’ edition distinguished between w h at he took to
be direct quotations from Eudemus and Sim plicius’ own additions, though some aspects
o f this question remain disputed. O n the problems o f interpretation, see especially
Bretschneider 1870, pp. ggff, R u dio 1907, H eath 1921, i pp. 183!?, and van der
W aerden 1954, pp. 13 iff.
Simplicius, In Ph. 61.5!?.
” 3 T h a t is not to say that every stage in his original reasoning is clear. In particular how
he established the theorem that circles are as the squares on their diameters is in doubt.
T h e quadrature o f the lune with external circumference greater than a semi-circle,
om itted b y Eudemus as obvious, is du ly supplied b y Simplicius, In Ph. 63.i9ff.
*75 T h e latter exam ple is also notable for the evidence it provides that Hippocrates was
fam iliar with the method o f νεϋσΐξ, inclination or verging, used at In Ph. 64.17!?. See
H eath 1921, i pp. I94ff.
A t In Ph. 6 i.i 2 f f ‘ similar segm ents’ are said to be those ‘ which are the same part of
the circles respectively, as for instance a semi-circle is similar to a semi-circle, and a
third part of a circle to a third p a rt’ . As H eath and m any others have noted, the idea of
‘ p a r t’ used here corresponds to the pre-Eudoxan notion o f proportionality (set out
in Eu clid v n Def. 21, 11 i04.25ff H S = H eath Def. 20) that, strictly speaking, applies
only to comm ensurable magnitudes.
 110 Dialectic and demonstration
im ply that a considerable body o f geom etrical theorems had already
been brought into some kind o f order b y the end o f the fifth century
B .C .
T h e systematisation o f geom etry thus initiated b y H ippocrates was
evidently o f outstanding im portance: indeed the notion o f strict
m athem atical dem onstration was, as is now generally recognised,
the distinctive achievem ent o f early Greek, as opposed to E gyptian
or B abylonian, m athem atics.^7? But the question o f the origin o f or
stimulus to this developm ent becomes all the m ore pressing. H ow far
should we see it as the result o f an interaction o f philosophy and
m athem atics, even, as has sometimes been suggested, the direct
outcom e o f Eleatic influences, or how far are w e dealing w ith an
independent developm ent? T h ere is no question o f being able to
pinpoint direct debts in the original texts themselves, but it is helpful
and necessary first to distinguish between two aspects o f the problem ,
that is on the one hand the question o f methods o f dem onstration and
on the other that o f the axiom atic foundations o f m athem atics. So far
as the form er goes, it seems probable enough - even when due
allow ance is m ade for the fragm entary nature o f our sources - th at
strict deductive proofs occurred in philosophy before they did in
mathem atics. T h ere is no reli?.ble evidence for rigorous dem on­
strations in m athem atics before the tim e o f Parm enides, and it was
the Eleatics who provided the first clear statement o f the key thesis
that serves as the epistem ological basis for any abstract inquiry such
as m athem atics, nam ely the insistence on the use o f reason (as
opposed to the senses) as the criterion. T h ere are, too, certain
obvious - and natural - similarities between some o f the ch ief modes
o f argum ent that we find in the Eleatic philosophers and those o f
early G reek m athem atics. This applies particularly to w hat was to
be one o f the m ajor types o f G reek m athem atical r e a s o n i n g ,
nam ely indirect p ro o f or the reductio, m uch used - as we have seen -
b y the Eleatics and exem plified in the strict demonstrations o f the
incom m ensurability o f the side and the diagonal. T h e possibility
that the m athem aticians were directly influenced by the Eleatic
philosophers in this regard^79 is, then, there, although (i) w e cannot
confirm this and (ii) m ore im portantly we must recognise that any
See further below, pp. aagf.
^78 Thus Itard 1961, p. 72, calculates that reductio ad absurdum is used in 14 propositions
(and sometimes several times in a single proposition) out o f 39 in Euclid v ii, in 6 out of
27 in vin and in 13 out o f 36 in ix.
*79 Szabo 1964-6 and 1969, pp. 328ff, for instance, argues for other influences as well,
n otably on the conception of unity and in the use o f the idea o f infinite divisibility: but
I am concerned here with the question o f modes o f deductive argument.
Dialectic and demonstration III
such influence was a lim ited one, being confined prin cipally to the
notion o f a strict deductive argum ent and not extending to such
distinctive m athem atical procedures as the reciprocal subtraction
algorithm , anthyphairesis (see above, p. io6 n. 266) or the appli­
cation o f areas, let alone m echanical techniques such as the use o f a
straight edge in solving a problem o f ‘ con vergin g’ .
T h e question o f w hether there were specific fifth-century philo­
sophical influences on the developm ent o f the notion o f the axio­
m atic foundations o f m athem atics is, however, another matter.^®°
By the time we come to E uclid him self clear distinctions are drawn
between three types o f first principles - the starting-points o f all
m athem atical reasoning - nam ely definitions, postulates and comm on
o p i n i o n s . A s is well known, these correspond in the m ain, though
not exactly, to the three kinds o f general indem onstrable starting-
points o f demonstrations identified b y A ristotle in his form al logic,
nam ely definitions, hypotheses and axiom s.^^2 Y e t a good deal o f
obscurity surrounds the earlier history o f the notion o f such prin­
ciples. P lato’s emphasis on the need for exact definitions in m athe­
m atics, as elsewhere, is not in doubt, and, as w e shall see, his
discussions o f hypotheses are o f fundam ental im portance in this
developm ent. M oreover the m athem atical excursus in the Theaetetus
authorises us to attribute a concern for the careful definition o f
m athem atical terms to Theaetetus.^®^ But the evidence for any
conception o f the first principles o f reasoning in the fifth century,
w hether in m athem atics or in philosophy, is very limited.
First it is doubtful w hether the Eleatics themselves had a clear
conception o f such starting-points. A lthough, beginning w ith Plato,^^'^
later comm entators spoke o f their notion that ‘ there is o n e ’ , and o f
C f., e.g., the discussions in Scholz (1930) 1975, pp. 5off, Lee 1935, Einarson 1936,
Szabo 1960-2, 1964-6 and 1969, M ueller 1969, and J . Barnes (1969) 1 9 7 5 , p p . 69!!.
R o ughly speaking, the comm on opinions are self-evident principles that apply to the
w hole o f mathem atics (thus the third states that ‘ I f equals be subtracted from equals,
the remainders are e q u a l’), while the postulates are the fundamental geom etrical
assumptions underlying E uclid’s geom etry: the first three relate to the possibility o f
carrying out certain constructions (e.g. ‘ to draw a straight line from any point to any
point ’) and the other two assume certain truths concerning geom etrical constructions,
nam ely that all right angles are equal and that non-parallel straight lines meet at a
point.
O ne of A ristotle’s axioms corresponds to E uclid’s third common opinion (see above,
n. 281). Aristotle’s hypotheses differed from the definitions as the assumptions o f the
existence or non-existence of the objects defined.
Tht. i4 7 d ff: the problem tackled there is that o f distinguishing and defining com­
mensurable and incommensurable lengths, or more strictly those that are commen­
surable in length from those that are so only in square. Cf. A ristotle’s remark. Top.
158 b 2gff, that in mathematics some things are not easily proved for w ant of a definition.
^ E .g. Prm. I28d5f, I36a4f.
 112 Dialectic and demonstration
the alternative idea o f their opponents th at ‘ there are m a n y ’ , as
hypotheses, there is no evidence that the Eleatics themselves used
that term, and indeed even i f they had, they w ould probably have
m eant no m ore b y it than some rough ly defined notion o f an
assumption. T h e fact that Aristotle singles out the search for general
definitions as one o f Socrates’ distinctive contributions^ss suggests a
relative lack o f concern in this regard on the part o f earlier philo­
sophers. M eanw hile there can be no question o f dating any attem pt
to form ulate general laws o f reasoning, such as the law o f contra­
diction or that o f excluded m iddle, before the fourth century.^86
So far as the fifth century goes, we have little reason to suppose
that philosophical influences were at w ork on the developm ent o f an
explicit conception o f the axiom atic foundations o f m athem atics.
But how far had the form ulation o f that notion progressed in m athe­
m atics itself before Plato? I t is notable th at in his report on H ip p o­
crates’ quadrature o f lunes Eudemus says that H ippocrates took as
his starting-point (άρχή) the theorem th at ‘ similar segments o f
circles have the same ratios as the squares on their bases’ , though he
goes on to add that H ippocrates proved this b y showing that the
squares on the diameters have the same ratios as the circles.287 W e
should not necessarily suppose that άρχή was H ippocrates’ ow n
term, but even i f it were, it is clearly not used here o f an ultim ate
principle o f m athem atical reasoning, but rather o f the starting-point
o f a set o f dem onstrations: the άρχή is a proposition that is used in
proving certain conclusions, but one that is itself estabhshed inde­
pendently. Y e t the systematisation o f a body o f geom etrical theorems
in books o f Elements b y H ippocrates and his successors itself implies
a distinction between m ore and less fundam ental propositions, and if
Aristotle is anything to go by, the term ‘ elem ents’, στοιχεϊον, itself
was used o f prim ary principles or starting-points o f some kind - even
though their nature m ay not y e t have been clearly specified. P arti­
cular assumptions, conceptions and indeed definitions used in early
G reek m athem atics are reported often enough in our sources, w hich
sometimes com m ent on their status z.'S, fundamental assumptions. Y e t
the very variety o f com peting definitions o f such terms as point and
num ber, for instance, is striking,288 and on the all-im portant question
*85 Metaph. loySbQyfT, cf. 9 8 7 b iff.
See, e.g., Lloyd 1966, pp. 139-41, 162-4.
See above, p. log.
2*® Com m enting on E u clid’s definition (i Def. i) o f a point as that which has no part,
Proclus (In Euc. 95.2if) says that ‘ the Pythagoreans’ defined the point as a m onad
having position, a definition that certainly antedates Aristotle since he refers to it at
de An. 40936, as also does the definition as the ‘ extrem ity o f a lin e ’ (Top. I 4 ib i9 f f,
Dialectic and demonstration 113
o f how such starting-points were com bined to form an adequate and
consistent set o f ultim ate principles to serve as the basis o f m athe­
m atics, our sources are generally uninform ative.^89
T h e evidence in Plato, in particular, throws im portant light on the
extent, and the lim itations, o f the idea o f the axiom atic foundations
o f m athem atics before him. In two o f the well-know n and m uch
discussed texts in w hich he treats o f the nature o f hypotheses he
refers to the use m ade o f them b y m athem aticians. W hen the term is
introduced in the Meno (8 6 e if) it is explained b y referring to the
procedure o f geometers. T h e y are represented as tackling such a
problem as the inscription o f a given area as a triangle in a given
circle ‘ b y means o f a hypothesis ’ w hich states that i f certain condi­
tions are fulfilled, then one result follows, but i f not, not.^^o H ere,
then, the hypothesis is in no sense an ultim ate assumption, but in
the Republic (510 c ff) , w hen Plato again uses a m athem atical
exam ple to illustrate a (though not the same) use o f hypothesis, he
says that the m athem aticians ‘ hypothesise the odd and the even, and
the figures and the three kinds o f angles, and other things like these
in each in q u iry ’ . T h e y ‘ do not give an account o f these either to
themselves or to others, as being clear to all, but beginning from
of. Metaph. g g a a i g f f an obscure passage where Plato is said to have rejected the
existence o f points and either (according to H eath 1949, p. 200) to have called points
the ‘ beginning o f a lin e ’ and to have posited indivisible lines, or (Ross) to have applied
the nam e ‘ the beginning o f a lin e ’ to indivisible lines). For a convenient survey o f the
rich variety o f definitions o f ‘ num ber ’ recorded in our sources from A ristotle onwards,
see K lein 1968, pp. 5 iff.
O n the other hand, the effect that the discovery o f incommensurability had on
subsequent G reek mathematics has often been exaggerated (see T an n ery 1887, p. 98,
Hasse and Scholz 1928, von Fritz (1945) 1970, but contra, for example, Freudenthal
1966, Burkert 1972a, pp. 455ff) and in particular the view that it effectively paralysed
work in mathematics for several decades cannot be sustained. T h e proponents of such a
view have generally dated the discovery early in the fifth (if not in the sixth) century,
but that is quite unlikely (Plato can still refer to a general ignorance o f incommensur­
ability in the fourth century, Lg. 8 i g d f f ) . Thus the idea o f a connection between
Z en o’s arguments and incommensurability (Hasse and Scholz, 1928, pp. lo ff) has
rightly been challenged (van der W aerden 1940-1, and c f O w en (1957-8) i975>
pp. i5 3 ff): those arguments evidently ignore incommensurability and tell, rather, for
the conclusion that it was not known. N or is it easy to explain that, in turn, b y appealing
to Pythagorean secretiveness (the subject o f m any fanciful stories in our late sources:
see further p. 228 and n. 5). Incom m ensurability certainly posed a problem for the
Pythagorean belief that ‘ all things are num bers’ : but so far as we can tell, it was far
from bringing m athem atical activity to a halt. From the time o f Hippocrates [c. 430)
at least, we have good evidence of continuous m athem atical investigations o f a high
order, some, but not all, o f which were directed to resolving what we m ay call founda­
tional problems.
*90 O n the hypothetical method in the Merw and the disputed questions o f its relations
{a) to διορισμό? (the determ ination of the conditions under which a problem is capable
o f solution, and o f those under w hich it is not) and (b) G reek geom etrical analysis, see
especially Cornford (1932) 1965, p p. 64ff, R . Robinson (1936) 1969, and 1953, ch. 8,
Bluck 1961, p p. 75ff, and M ah on ey 1968-9.
 114 Dialectic and demonstration
them they go through the rest consistently and end w ith w hat they
set out to investigate’ .
It is, once again, not certain w hether either o f these passages
reflects an actual use o f the term ύπόθεσις in earlier mathem atics.
B ut w hatever the original term inology, Plato clearly indicates the
use o f certain basic assumptions, treated as the self-evident starting-
points o f m athem atical deductions. His testimony is all the m ore
convincing in th at he is critical o f their use, being concerned here to
point out the inferiority o f this procedure (διάνοια) to that o f
νόησις, w hich takes nothing for granted, but proceeds upwards to an
‘ unhypothesised b egin n in g’, on the basis o f which the whole o f the
intelligible w orld - including the geom eter’s hypotheses them ­
selves - can be know n.292 But while this account o f διάνοια points to
the role o f certain prim ary principles in m athem atics, the precise
character o f those principles is still left, in certain respects, unclear.
Plato m entions ‘ odd and e v e n ’, the ‘ figures’ and the ‘ three kinds o f
angles’ . But it is an open questioners w hether for exam ple, these are
to be construed as - or to include - definitions (like the definitions o f
odd and even in E uclid v ii D e f 6 and 7), or existence assumptions
(corresponding to A ristotle’s h y p o t h e s e s ) 294 or - as seems possible in
the case o f the figures - as assumptions concerning the possibility o f
carrying out certain constructions (like the first three o f E uclid’s
postulates). Plato thus provides confirm ation o f w hat the existence
o f books o f Elements m ight already lead us to infer, nam ely the
recognition o f the need for incontestable principles o f some kind as
the foundation o f m athem atics, but he is also evidence for a con­
tinuing indeterm inacy in the conception o f those foundations.
A lthough our picture o f P lato’s w ork w ould, no doubt, be m odified
i f we had m ore inform ation about that o f the g a la x y o f m athe­
m aticians, ch ief am ong them E u d o x u s , who were associated with
T h e care with which ύπόθεσίξ is introduced and explained with the geom etrical
exam ple in the Meno suggests both that the term was generally unfam iliar and that it
m ay w ell have had some semi-technical use in mathematics (though on the latter
point doubts have been expressed by, for exam ple, Bluck 1961, p. 92). Vv^e know from
the H ippocratic treatise V M that ύττόθεσίξ was also used in medicine in the sense of
postulate, but the date o f its introduction in that context is disputed, see H. D iller
1952, L loyd 1963.
In this process the hypotheses are said to be treated not as starting-points, but ‘ really
as ύττοθέσεΐξ’ (literally w hat is placed under something) - steps to the unhypothesised
beginning [R. 5 1 1 b ). For a survey o f competing interpretations o f the procedure o f the
‘ upward p a th ’, see, for example, R . Robinson 1953, pp. i6off.
See, for example, Cornford (1932) 1965 and von Fritz (1955) 1971, pp. 36iff.
In which case we must contrast Plato’s statement with the view in Aristotle, APo.
76b6ff, where he insists that while arithmetic assumes the definitions o f odd and even,
it has to prove that they exist.
Eudoxus, who was probably some 20 years younger than Plato, was certainly one o f
Dialectic and demonstration 115
him, usually as members o f the Academy,^^^ we can h ardly doubt
that P lato’s own contribution was an im portant, perhaps even a
crucial one, not only directly in the developm ent o f the notions o f
proof and o f hypothesis, but also indirectly in stim ulating interest in
the problem o f foundations. Even so, it was not until Aristotle that
we have a full analysis o f the conditions o f dem onstration: arguing
against Plato, or at least against the apparent im plications o f the
Republic'^ notion o f an ‘ unhypothesised begin ning’ , Aristotle
insisted that not all true propositions can be dem onstrated, and that
the starting-points o f demonstrations are principles that are them ­
selves indem onstrable but known to be true;^^? and, as w e said, he
provides us w ith our first extant typology o f such indem onstrable
starting-points. W e have no reason to deny the im portance o f the
interaction o f philosophy and m athem atics in the developm ent o f
the notion o f the axiom atic foundations o f the latter, but this is a
fourth-, rather than a fifth-century phenom enon, a m atter o f the
im pact o f the w ork o f Plato and Aristotle, rather than o f that o f the
Eleatics.
IN T E R A C T IO N S OF D IA L E C T IC AND D E M O N S T R A T IO N
T h e strict notion o f proof deployed in both m athem atics and philo­
sophy was form ulated, in part, b y means o f a contrast w ith m erely
probable arguments. Y e t it w ould be a mistake to place G reek
m athem atics, even in the fourth century, com pletely on the side o f
the greatest mathem aticians in the history o f G reek science. H e was responsible, as is
generally agreed, for the theory o f proportion developed in Euclid, Elements v (see also
Proclus, In Euc. 67.2ff: this has the advantage over all earlier attempts at such a
theory that it is applicable to incommensurable, as w ell as to commensurable, m agni­
tudes), and for the method o f exhaustion, based on Elements x i, a type o f indirect
pro of which was one o f the most powerful and effective techniques used in Greek
mathematics. O ne simple application was to determine an unknown area by inscribing
successively greater regular polygons in it, as in the determ ination o f the area o f a
circle in Euclid, Elements x ii 2, and cf. Archim edes, On the Measurement o f the Circle,
Prop. I , I 232.iff, which also circumscribes successively smaller polygons: the figure
whose area is to be found is ‘ exhausted’ only in the sense that the difference between it
and the inscribed or circumscribed figure can be made as small as desired.
Thus apart from Archytas, Theaetetus and Eudoxus, Proclus (In Euc. Gy.Sff) mentions
particularly Am yclas, M enaechm us, Dinostratus, Theudius, Athenaeus of Cyzicus and
Philip o f M ende (or M edm a - sometimes identified with Philip o f Opus, who is thought
b y some to have been the author o f the Epinomis). T h e gradual extension and systematisa-
tion of the elements are clear from the remarks that Proclus makes on the work o f
Leodam as, A rchytas and Theaetetus {In Euc. 66.i4ff, cf. above, p. 108), on Leon
(66.2off), Eudoxus (Gy.aff), Am yclas, M enaechm us and Dinostratus (Gy.Sff) and
Theudius (67.i2ff) especially. In Euc. 72.23ff further shows that the term element,
στοιχεΐον, itself was a subject o f discussion, for M enaechm us distinguished between two
senses.
*97 APo. I chh. 1-3 especially.
 ii6 Dialectic and demonstration 117
Dialectic and demonstration
begin w ith perception.^»! B ut at Top. i 2 the claim is m ade that
‘ dem onstration’ as opposed to that o f ‘ d ia lectic’ in the A ristotelian
dialectic is useful in relation to the prim ary bases o f each science,
sense. 2 9 8 Plato provides some o f our best evidence for the distinction
the argum ent being that these cannot be discussed from the prin­
between necessary and m erely persuasive arguments, but some o f the
ciples peculiar to each science, since they are prim ary to them all.
texts in question indicate that the latter included not just rhetorical
Here the emphasis is not on perception or e x p e r i e n c e , ^ ® ^ but more
and sophistical, but also some m athem atical, examples. T w o
generally on the critical exam ination o f the generally accepted
passages are particularly revealing. In the Phaedo (92 d) Sim m ias is
o p i n i o n s .3 0 3
m ade to s a y : ‘ I am w ell aware that accounts that base their proofs
F inally when w e consider the specific prim ary principles adopted
on w hat is probable (διά τω ν είκότων) are im postors; unless one is
by E uclid himself, it is evident that some relate to questions that had
on one’s guard against them, they deceive one very badly, in
been the subject o f dialectical disputes in some cases going back into
geometry and in everything else’ . T h e m ention o f geom etry here is
the fifth century. Thus both the inclusion o f the eighth comm on
striking as it appears to be occasioned b y nothing in the context
opinion (‘ the whole is greater than the p a rt’ )304 and the assumption
(a discussion o f images used to describe the nature o f the soul).
o f the indivisibility o f the one^os are probably to be explained against
Secondly when, in the Theaetetus, Socrates, having criticised Pro­
a background that includes the argum ents on w hole and p art and on
tagoras’ M an M easure doctrine, comes to offer a defence on P rota­
the one and the m any between the Eleatics and their opponents.20^
goras’ behalf, he has Protagoras com plain ( i6 2 e ) : ‘ T here is no p roof
T h e most interesting exam ple is the famous parallel postulate itself.
nor necessity whatsoever in w hat you say, but you rely on w hat is
W e know from Aristotle that there were attempts to prove an
probable (τω είκότι); but if Theodorus or any other geom eter were
assumption concerning parallels in the fourth century, though the
to rely on that in doing geom etry, he w ould not be w orth anything
proofs w ere open to the charge o f circularity.307 Euclid him self (if
at a ll.’ It is a nice touch that Protagoras^o^ _ the teacher, par
not one o f his predecessors) must presum ably have deliberately
excellence, o f ‘ double argum ents’ - should here be made to insist on a
chosen to adopt the proposition that non-parallel straight lines meet
contrast between proof and mere probability, and again the reference
at a point as a postulate, and although this m ove was bitterly criticised
to geom etry was - w e m ay infer - not m erely otiose.
b y the ancient commentators,3°8 m ore recently the wisdom o f
In Aristotle, too, the Organon is rich in m athem atical examples
treating it as a postulate in the context o f the geom etry he constructed
used to illustrate not just features o f dem onstrative science in the
on its basis has been acknow ledged. T h ere is no evidence th at E uclid
Posterior Analytics, but also dialectical procedures in the Topics, for
or an y other G reek m athem atician envisaged the developm ent o f
instance points concerned w ith the correct or incorrect w ay o f givin g
non-Euclidean geometries: yet his Elements are not m erely an axio­
definitions. 300 M oreover although Aristotle’s own distinction between
m atic, but also an explicitly hypothetical system, in this sense at
‘ d ia lectical’ and ‘ dem onstrative’ syllogisms is, in general, a firm
APo. 9gb32ff. O n the m uch disputed questions o f the extension o f ‘ p rinciples’
one, it is well known that on the thorny question o f how the prim ary
(prim ary propositions or prim itive terms), the m eaning o f voOs and its relation to
starting-points o f dem onstrative science are to be obtained, there is a έττοΕγωγή, see most recently von Fritz (1964) 1971, pp.623ff, Kosm an 1973, Lesher 1973,
tension between the points o f view expressed in different parts o f the J . Barnes (1975), pp. H am lyn 1976.
30* C f. also APr. i 30, 46 a i7ff.
Organon. T h e famous last chapter o f the Posterior Analytics answers the 303 Top. I d a 3 6 -b 4 , see, for exam ple, O w en (1961) 1975, pp. i is ff, (1965) 1 9 7 5 »PP· 2gf,
question o f how we apprehend the principles in terms o f the exercise J. D. G . Evans 1977, pp. 3 iff, and cf. W eil (1951) 1975, pp. 88ff.
30·* T h e fifth common opinion in H eath’s num bering, i 6.4 H S.
ofvoOs (‘ reason’) in έτταγωγή (‘ in d u ction ’), a process that is said to 305 See VII Def. i, the definition o f the unit as that by virtue o f w hich each o f the things

In contrast to the sense that Plato sometimes gives it, where ‘ dialectic’ stands for that ^re is said to be one.
306 C f. Z en o’s M ovin g Rows argum ent, the conclusion o f which is reported b y Aristotle
the supreme, and most rigorous, study, see above, p. 102.
as that ‘ h a lf the time is equal to its d o u b le’ (p. 74 n. 82 above), and cf. the reference
^’ 9 A t Tht. 164c (of. i68e) Theodorus is called a ‘ trustee’ of Protagoras and this is
in Plato, R. 525 de, to m athem aticians w ho refuse to allow the one to be divided ‘ lest
usually taken to im ply that he was taught by him. W hether that teaching extended to
it should appear to be not one, but m any p arts’ .
mathematics, however, might be doubted. Aristotle {Metaph. ggSaQff, Fr. 7) reports
that Protagoras tried to refute the geometers on the grounds that a circle does not
307 APf, 65 a 4 ff.
308 T hus it was often objected that the postulate should be proved, and both Ptolemy
touch a ruler at a point, but we have no reason to suppose that Protagoras was
and Proclus were am ong those who attem pted this. It was, as is well known, an attack
interested in the practice o f m athem atical inquiry, as w ell as in the question o f its
ontological or epistemological basis. on this problem that eventually led, in the nineteenth century, to the developm ent o f
30° T h e most im portant passages are conveniently set out b y H eath 1949, p p . 76ff. non-Euclidean geometries.
 ii8 Dialectic and demonstration
least that it was one based on postulates and comm on opinions w hich
include propositions that he must have known to have been ques­
tioned or denied b y other G reek thinkers.
T h e nature o f dialectic and its relations w ith dem onstration were,
then, as w e have seen, themselves the subjects o f considerable
disagreement, and both P lato’s position, and A ristotle’s , u n d e r ­
w ent certain m odifications in their lifetime. T h ough Aristotle often
emphasised the contrast between dialectic and dem onstration-
particularly in contexts w here he was advancing an alternative to
P lato’s view o f dialectic as the supreme study - even in Aristotle the
distinction is not as absolute as m ight appear from some passages,
since dem onstration m ay be said to depend on dialectic for its
starting-points. 3 10 M oreover the dialectical exam ination o f current
opinions turns out to be a good deal m ore im portant and prom inent
in Aristotle’s actual scientific practice than the techniques for the
cogent presentation o f knowledge (especially the theory o f the
syllogism) th at he set out in his analysis o f dem onstration. 3 “
Nevertheless the form ulation o f rigorous criteria for dem onstration
was o f fundam ental significance for the subsequent developm ent o f
G reek science. From the fourth century on, a comprehensive theory
o f an axiom atic, deductive system was available in Aristotle’s logic,
and soon after 300 B .C . E uclid’s Elements provided an instance o f such
a s y s t e m s a p p lie d in practice in m athem atics. Beginning w ith a
statement o f the definitions, postulates and comm on o p i n i o n s , 3 i 3 he
proceeds to the dem onstration o f a massive array o f m athem atical
propositions, w ith very little redundancy and high standards o f
consistency.3 T h e aim w as not m erely the orderly presentation o f a
body o f knowledge, but also the certainty to be secured by an axio­
m atic, deductive m ethod.
As the prim e exam ple o f such a system, the Elements had an
immense influence not just on later m athem atics, but also on physical
science. T h e m athem atisation o f branches o f physical inquiry begins
O n the development of Aristotle’s views on the question o f the supreme science, see,
especially, O w en i960, pp. I75f, 1965 and (1965) 1975.
3 *° It is, too, through dialectic that trans-departmental laws o f reasoning are to be
established. T h o ugh the law o f contradiction, for exam ple, cannot be demonstrated
directly, an opponent who denies it can be refuted: see Metaph. 1006a5ff.
3 “ See further below, pp. i36ff and 202ff.
3Ϊ2 This is not to assert that Euclid was necessarily directly influenced by Aristotle (as
well as by earlier mathematicians) though it is possible that he was.
Those in Elements i are added to when fresh starts are made in v and vii,
3 J+ T he simplest instance o f redundancy is that of the inclusion o f certain definitions
(such as those o f ‘ ob lon g’ , ‘ rhom bus’ and ‘ rhom boid’) not thereafter used in the
Elements. But there are also more revealing discrepancies, such as that between the
notions o f proportion used in v and vii.
Dialectic and demonstration 119
before E uclid, to be sure. Indeed explicit discussion o f the relation­
ship between m athem atics and sensible phenom ena goes back before
Plato. As we noted, Protagoras insisted that the circle does not touch
the ruler at a point, a topic that was p robably the subject o f a treatise
by Democritus,3is -yvho also raised - though we do not know how he
resolved - the problem o f w hether the contiguous surfaces o f a
horizontal section o f a cone are equal or unequal.3^6 Plato in turn
had divorced knowledge from true opinion and claim ed (in his
m iddle period) that sensible phenom ena are the dom ain o f the latter,
not o f the former.^i^ W hile Aristotle developed a com plex, and not
entirely consistent, notion o f the hierarchy o f the sciences,3i8 he
distinguished μοτθημοτηκή from φυσική prim arily on the grounds that
while physical bodies contain volumes, surfaces, lines and points,
m athem atics studies these in abstraction from physical bodies. 3 Y e t
w hatever views they held on this im portant on-going controversy,
practising scientists in the fourth, i f not already in the fifth, century
had achieved a m athem atisation o f physical inquiry in two areas
especially, nam ely harmonicss^o and astronomy. From the time o f
Eudoxus, i f not before, the notion that some geometrical m odel is to
be used to explain the movem ents o f the heavenly bodies was
com m on ground to all theoretical astronomers, even w hile they
*** On the Difference o f Cognition or on the Contact o f Circle and Sphere: cf. Aristotle’s report
{Cael. 3 0 7 a i6 f, w ith Sim plicius’ comments. In Gael. 662.1 off) that Democritus treated
the sphere as a ‘ kind o f a n g le ’ (or ‘ all a n g le ’, Cael. 30732).
Democritus, Fr. 155. Another fifth-century thinker w ho m ay have discussed the
relation between mathem atics and sensible phenom ena is A ntiphon, whose attem pt to
square the circle by treating it as equivalent to an inscribed regular polygon with an
indefinitely large num ber o f sides (perhaps an anticipation of Eudoxus’ method o f
exhaustion) was held by A ristotle to be contrary to geom etrical principles (see Ph.
185a i6 f).
^'7 See, e.g., Phd. 6 5 b ff, R. 476 d ff, 523b, cf. T i. s i d f f , Phlb. 59a, and see further
below, pp. i3ifT·
T hus at Ph. I9 4 a 7 ff he calls optics, harmonics and astronom y ‘ the more physical o f
the μαθήματα’, yet he allows that certain questions in astronomy must be the dom ain o f
the natural scientist or φυσικ05 ( ig 3 b 2 5 ff). O n the hierarchy o f the sciences, see most
recently M cK ira h a n 1978.
E.g. Ph. I94a9ff. O w en 1970, pp. 256f, explores the tension that exists between
Aristotle’s use o f m athem atical abstractions (for exam ple, o f the assumption that the
centre o f the universe m ay be regarded as a point, Cael. 11 14) and his insistence that
mathem atics should be applicable to physical phenomena.
320 O u r somewhat lim ited information concerning Philolaus (e.g. Boethius, Mus. in 5,
276.i5ff, cf. Fr. 6) and A rchytas (Frr. i and 2, Ptolem y, Harm, i 13, 30.9ff, Boethius,
Mus. Ill I I , 285.9ff) can be supplemented b y the reports in Plato (/?. 530d f f , sec
below, pp. I44f) and in Aristoxenus (e.g. Harm. 11 32f, cf. 38ff). Aristoxenus, in parti­
cular, contrasts those who try to do w ithout demonstration with those, on the other
hand, who shun sense-perception as not exact and who construct intelligible causes. O n
the authority o f Aristotle, Ph. 194 a 7ff, optics m ay be added to harmonics and astronomy
as a third early exam ple o f m athem atisation: but our earliest extant treatise on this
subject is b y Euclid.
 120 Dialectic and demonstration
disagreed both on w hat m odel to adopt, and on the conditions
under w hich the ‘ phenom ena’ could be said to have been ‘ sav ed ’ .321
E uclid’s Elements provided a m odel o f rigour and systematisation
that was im itated or echoed m ore or less closely not only in w hat we
should call pure, but also in applied, m athem atics and in physics.
T h e initial statement o f such definitions and assumptions as were
necessary, followed b y the orderly deductive proof o f theorems,
becam e the canonical form in m any dom ains o f inquiry. It appears,
for exam ple, in such works o f pure m athem atics as A rchim edes’ On
the Sphere and Cylinder and Apollonius’ Conics (mid and late third
century B .C . respectively), in m echanical treatises such as Archim edes’
On the Equilibrium o f Planes, in optics in Ptolem y’s w ork on that
subject (second century a .d .), and in astronom y in Aristarchus’ On
the Sizes and Distances o f the Sun and Moon (early third century e .g .).322
Even when a Euclidean presentation was not adopted, the aim was
often a similar exactness and certainty, as we see very clearly, for
instance, from the contrast that Ptolem y draws at the beginning o f
the Syntaxis between m athem atics (including m athem atical astro­
nomy) on the one hand, and theology and ‘ physics’ on the other.323
M oreover such was the prestige o f m athem atics and the m athem atical
sciences that p roo f more geometrico was sometimes represented as a
desideratum in other fields o f inquiry as w ell, such as cosm ology or
physiology, as w e can see from the repeated remarks on the need for
such proofs in Proclus (fifth century a .d .) ,224 and from the claims that
G alen (second century a.d.) m ade for the relevance o f strict logical
demonstrations to medicine.32s
321 See further below, pp. i73fF, igSf.
32* T h e pattern continues in m any post-Classical works, from Jordanus’ De Ratione
Ponderis (c. 1250), for example, through Bradwardine’s Geometria Speculativa (fourteenth
century) and T artag lia ’s Nova Scientia (1527), to N ew ton’s Principia (1687) itself.
” 3 Syntaxis i i, li G.iifF: both theology and ‘ physics’ are conjectural, the one because o f
its obscurity, the other because o f the instability o f its subject-m atter: mathem atics
alone yields unshakeable knowledge, proceeding as it does by means o f indisputable
arithm etical and geom etrical demonstrations. In practice, however, in the body o f the
Syntaxis, Ptolem y expresses more doubts about aspects o f his investigations than one
m ight expect from these remarks in the Proem.
324 A recurrent them e in In T i., especially, e.g., i 226.26ff, 228.27, 236.i5ff, 258.12!?,
346.3 iff.
325 O n ly fragments o f G alen ’s major work On Demonstration, in 15 books, remain, and
m an y other logical treatises, such as that showing the superiority o f geom etrical
analysis to Stoic argument, are also lost (but see, for example, Inst. Log.). But he
frequently stresses the need for the doctor to be trained in, and to apply, strict logical
methods, including demonstration (e.g. Med. Phil. 3, Scr. Min. 11 6.1 off M uller,
K I 59-i5ff)> though he also draws attention to some o f the dangers, pointing out, for
instance, that large mistakes m ay stem from small errois in the principles (Mixt. i 5,
17.22 Helm reich, K i 536). M oreover a famous passage at the beginning o f the Ars
Parva, K i 305.iff, confirms that he believed that the - characteristically geom etrical -
methods of analysis and synthesis are applicable to medicine.
Dialectic and demonstration 121
T h e m odel o f an exact science was, as has alw ays been recognised,
one o f the ch ief achievem ents and legacies o f G reek science. Plato and
Aristotle contributed m uch to the theory and it was in the practical
applications that m any o f the greatest successes o f G reek science
were won, preem inently in astronomy (by Apollonius, H ipparchus
and Ptolem y), but also in m athem atical geography (Eratosthenes),
in statics and hydrostatics (Archim edes), and in optics (Euclid,
Archim edes, Hero, P tolem y). T h e notion o f the suprem acy o f pure
reason m ay thereby be said to have promoted some o f the triumphs
o f G reek science. But that same notion is also related to some o f its
predom inant weaknesses. T h e aim was often indisputability, rigour,
exactness: but these were sometimes bought at the price o f a certain
arbitrariness and dogm atism , 3 2 6 and in some contexts o f a certain
im poverishm ent o f the em pirical content o f the inquiry. T im e and
again G reek scientists interpret their subjects as far as possible as
branches o f pure m athem atics. This is true, for exam ple, o f A rch i­
medes’ treatises on statics and hydrostatics , 3 2 7 and o f Aristarchus’
w ork On the Sizes and Distances o f the Sun and Moon: it is notorious that
Aristarchus there takes as one o f his hypotheses a grossly inaccurate
value for the angular diam eter o f the m oon, and the reason for this
is not, in all probability, that he was incapable o f the crude obser­
vation necessary for a roughly correct approxim ation, but sim ply that
he was less interested in arriving at concrete results for the sizes and
distances (which in any case he expresses not as values but as pro­
portions) than in the pure geom etry o f his problem .328 Finally the
326 Even before Aristotle insisted on the varying degrees of exactness of different inquiries
(e.g. in a famous passage in E N i094b25flF), several fifth- and fourth-century medical
writers had pointed out the impossibility, or inappropriateness, o f exactness in m edicine:
see e.g. Prog. ch. 20, L 11 i68.i6fT, Fract. ch. 7, L in 440.2ff, Art. ch. 69, L iv 286.7flF,
Morb. I ch. 16, L v i i70.2fT, Viet, x ch. 2, L v i 470.i3fT, Viet, iii ch. 67, L v i 592.iff,
594.if, and especially V M chh. 9 -12 , e.g. C M G i, i 4i.2ofT, the author o f which is
particularly critical o f w hat he represents as dogm atic tendencies in medicine (see
further below, p. 135).
327 T hus in On the Equilibrium o f Planes most o f book i and the whole of book 11 deal with
the problems o f determ ining the centres o f gravity o f various plane figures, such as the
parallelogram , the triangle and (especially) parabolic segments. T he law o f the lever
is proved in i 6 and 7, 11 I32.i4ff, I3 6 .i8 ff H S, where it is shown first for commensur­
able, and then for incommensurable, magnitudes that two magnitudes balance at
distances that are reciprocally proportional to the m agnitudes: but the question of how
far Archim edes’ initial postulates are themselves independent o f experience or how far
the law o f the lever is presupposed in this p roof has been m uch debated, see M ach 1893
and D uhem 1905-6, i pp. g ff especially.
3*8 T h e value taken is 2°, that is about four times the correct figure - and indeed
Archim edes ascribes to Aristarchus the value o f for the (approxim ately equivalent)
apparent size o f the sun {Sand-Reckoner 11 222.6fT H S ). For varying interpretations o f
the discrepancy, see, for exam ple. T an n ery 1912-43, i pp. 375f, H eath 1913, pp. 31 iff,
Wasserstein 1962, pp. 5 7f and N eugebauer 1975, n pp. 634fF, 642f.
 122 Dialectic and demonstration
G reek preoccupation - some have said obsession329 _ ^ jth dem on­
stration is apparent also in the emphasis, in works o f pure and applied
m athem atics alike, on the synthesis or deductive proof o f the
theorems to the almost total exclusion o f the antecedent analysis or
their m ethod o f discovery; in our ch ief text where, exceptionally,
problems associated w ith discovery are discussed, nam ely A rch i­
medes’ Method, it is w ell known that he draws a sharp contrast
between heuristic and demonstrative procedures and insists that
the theorems that he has discovered b y the m ethod he sets out must
thereafter be given a strict geom etrical demonstration, using reductio
and the m ethod o f exhaustion. 3 3 o
B y the time we reach Archim edes’ Method or his strict E uclidean
presentation and demonstration o f a body o f propositions in statics
or hydrostatics, we have clearly come a long w ay from anything that
can be paralleled in non-literate or early literate societies. But we
m ay now pause to reflect on the character o f the developm ents we
have been tracing. A lthough the end-products are modes o f
reasoning o f considerable sophistication, they were arrived at after
long and com plex processes o f developm ent w hich have both
‘ externalist’ (that is, broadly, sociological) and ‘ internalist’ (intel­
lectual) features.
In part the developm ent o f argum entation within philosophy and
science can be related to more general developments, the grow th o f
a certain professionalism in the art o f speaking as a whole, w hich
itself must be understood at least in part as a response to certain
changes w ithin G reek society. W e shall be considering some o f the
social and political aspects o f the problem o f the developm ent o f
philosophy and science in chapter 4. But m eanwhile we m ay note
that the rise o f rhetoric had both a direct and an indirect influence
on that developm ent, first directly on the actual practice o f argum ent
in natural science (for which our m ain evidence is provided b y the
m edical writers) and then also indirectly, in that - in P lato’s case at
least - the developm ent o f a rigorous notion o f dem onstration owed
See M ach 1893, pp. 18 and 82, on what he called the Greek ‘ m a n ia ’ for demon­
stration, instancing Archim edes in particular.
330 See Method 11 428. i8ff, 438. i 6 ff HS. T h e method in question involves treating a plane
figure whose area is to be determined as composed o f a set o f parallel lines indefinitely
close together and then thinking of these lines as balanced by corresponding lines o f the
same m agnitude in a figure o f known area. T h e reason w hy Archim edes contrasts this
method with the subsequent geom etrical proof (despite the fact that the method yields
results that are correct) is, no doubt, not that it uses mechanical concepts, but that it
depends on infinitesimals, that is the assumption that areas and volumes m ay be treated
as composed o f their line and plane elements respectively.
Dialectic and demonstration 123
something to a hostile reaction to the deploym ent o f m erely persua­
sive argum entation.
Even when we m ake allowances for the fragm entary nature o f our
sources, the types o f argum ent used b y the earliest cosmologists,
scientists and even m athem aticians appear quite elem entary, and
several o f them (such as analogical arguments and appeals to
probability) can readily be paralleled in pre- or non-philosophical
contexts. W e can trace the extension o f the use, within philosophy,
o f the principle o f suflScient reason, o f reductio arguments, o f M odus
Tollens, the antinom y and the dilem m a, but the extension is a
gradual one; nor are such arguments confined to the philosophers.
E leatic argum entation marks, however, an im portant turning-point,
both in raising directly the epistem ological problem o f the relation
between reason and perception, and in practice in the developm ent
o f strict deductive arguments. Plato and Aristotle introduce further
m ajor changes both in the actual use o f arguments, and more
particularly in their theoretical analysis, in, for instance, the form u­
lation o f rules o f procedure in dialectical debate, in the distinction
between necessary and probable arguments, and especially in the
developm ent o f the notion o f an axiom atic system. Fifth- and fourth-
century m athem aticians, too, have their contribution to m ake, for
exam ple to the developm ent o f specifically m athem atical techniques
such as anthyphairesis and the m ethod o f exhaustion.
Y e t evidently - as these two last examples show - not all the types
o f argum ent actually em ployed in the various strands o f G reek
speculative thought in the fifth and fourth centuries can be directly
com pared w ith instances or anticipations in non- or pre-philo-
sophical texts from Greece or anywhere else. T h e question we must
turn to in conclusion is, then, th is; do the radical developm ents that
occur in either the practice or the theory o f reasoning in G reek
thought im ply any shift or transform ation in the underlying logic or
rationality itself? O r rather w hat light do those developm ents throw
on the problem o f w hat it w ould m ean to talk o f any such shift or
transformation? C ertainly new modes o f argum ent, some o f them
quite technical, can be said to have been invented. Im portant new
concepts - hypothesis, postulate, proof, axiom , definition itself - come
to be defined, and fundam ental distinctions are draw n between, for
exam ple, valid and invalid arguments, and between necessary and pro­
bable ones. M oreover the notions o f consistency, self-contradiction^^i
33* T hus R . Robinson 1953, pp. 26if, has pointed out the looseness with w hich the idea
o f ‘ contradicting oneself’ (οώτόχ αύτω έναντία λέγειν) is used in the early and middle
dialogues o f Plato. A t Grg. 482 be, for instance, ‘ contradicting oneself’ is treated not so
124 Dialectic and demonstration Dialectic and demonstration 125

and even truth^sa itself undoubtedly come to be grasped m ore clearly - T h e argum entative w eaponry that the G reek scientist eventually
and it is in terms o f truth and consistency that logic and rationality had at his disposal was impressive and was put to good effect both
themselves have to be defined. Y e t it is not the case that the logic itself is destructively - to underm ine and refute his opponents’ views or
modified b y being m ade explicit, except insofar as it is made explicit. com m on assumptions - and constructively, to advocate or attem pt
In the instances w e have taken we m ay speak o f an increase in to prove his own ideas. W e have suggested, however, that rigour
clarity, in explicitness and in self-consciousness: there is a corres­ was sometimes achieved at the cost o f em pirical content. W e have
ponding increase in confidence in the handling o f certain types o f considered some aspects o f the developm ent o f reason and argu m en t:
argum ent in certain contexts (though that point should not be w e have now to turn to observation, research and experim ent, to
exaggerated: fallacies continue to be com m itted after their various exam ine the factors stim ulating or inhibiting the extension o f the
types have been identified and defined). B ut the form alisation o f em pirical base o f G reek science.
logic consists - at least initially - in m aking explicit rules that are
already contained in language and that are presupposed b y intel­
ligibility in com m unication. Even the axiom atisation o f m athe­
matics is a m atter o f achieving greater explicitness in setting out
deductive relations between m athem atical propositions. T h e develop­
ments w e have been dealing w ith involve a change in the level o f
awareness o f aspects o f reasoning: and how such changes come
about - how it is that individuals w ithin a given society can come to
raise fundam ental questions concerning the basis o f their own
knowledge and the mechanisms o f their own reasoning - poses a
m ajor problem w e shall attem pt to discuss in chapter 4. But the
problem is one o f trying to understand how that occurred - that is
the conditions under w hich such second-order questions com e to be
asked - not one o f trying to explain the substitution o f one logic, or
rationality, for another.

much from the point o f view o f the relationship between the propositions asserted, as
from that o f the psychological disorders set up in the soul. A t R. 436 b8 ff Plato points
out that ‘ it is clear that the same thing will never submit to doing or suffering opposite
things, in the same respect, at least, and in the same relation and at the same tim e’ ,
but contradiction is not explicitly defined as a matter o f the relationship between
assertion and denial until Aristotle, who coined the term άντ(φασΐ5 in this sense, e.g.
Int. I7a3 3ff. But the deliberate use o f apparently self-contradictory statements in
writers before (or indeed after) Aristotle does not im ply an alternative logic in which
the law o f self-contradiction is suspended; any such suspension rules out intelligible
comm unication. R ather, like riddles and paradoxes, such statements must be under­
stood as challenges to the reader/listener to decipher the author’s hidden meaning.
T h e semantic changes that occur in the use o f the term άλήθενα in Greek have been
studied by Boeder 1959, Heitsch 1962, 1963, Krischer 1965 and Detienne 1967, for
exam ple: thus the suggestion that initially the chief antonym was not falsehood, but
λήθη, forgetfulness, receives some backing from an etym ology the Greeks themselves
proposed. But although in the development that ends with Aristotle’s clear statement
that truth and falsehood relate to propositions (e.g. Int. i6a9fF, cf. Plato, Sph. 261 d ff)
fundam ental epistemological and logical issues are clarified (for instance the criteria
that m ight be used to support a claim for knowledge, and the difference between truth
and valid ity), there is no question o f Aristotle thinking - or of it being the case - that
the conditions under which statements are true or false were themselves altered during
the course of this development.

T H E D E V E L O P M E N T OF E M P I R I C A L
RESEARCH
O B S E R V A T IO N AND R E S E A R C H
In our study o f On the Sacred Disease we rem arked on the accu racy o f
the w riter’s b rief description o f an epileptic fit, but also found that he
checked few, i f any, o f his anatom ical theories b y dissection, despite
the fact that he refers, at one point, to the possibility o f carrying out a
post-mortem exam ination on the brain o f a goat in order to throw
ligh t on the causes o f epilepsy. ^ This suggests, as a problem for
investigation, the use and developm ent o f em pirical research in early
G reek science, a topic on w hich a wide range o f divergent opinions
has been expressed. W here Burnet, for exam ple, wrote that ‘ the idea
th at the Greeks w ere not observers is ludicrously w r o n g C o r n f o r d
saw the philosophers (at least) as dogmatists, innocent o f ‘ the
em pirical theory o f kn ow ledge’ , although that theory was, in his
view , developed b y A lcm aeon and the m edical writers.^ M ore
recently there has been a similar confrontation between Popper, who
p u t it that most o f the ideas o f the early Presocratics, and the best o f
them , ‘ have nothing to do w ith observation’ , and K irk , who saw one
o f the prim e characteristics o f Greek thought as its com m on sense,
including its respect for observation and experience,^ and m any
others have attem pted general evaluations o f the em pirical w ork o f
G reek scientists.®
> See above, ch. i, pp. 21-2 and 23-4.
2 Burnet (1892) 1948, p. 26. Faced with the lack o f actual observations recorded for the
Presocratic philosophers, Burnet argued that this reflects the bias o f our sources: ‘ W e
are seldom told why any early philosopher held the views he did, and the appearance
o f a string o f “ opinions” suggests dogmatism. T here are, however, certain exceptions
to the general character o f the tradition ’ (Burnet goes on to refer to the ‘ biological and
palaeontological observations’ o f Anaxim ander and X enophanes); ‘ and we m ay
reasonably suppose that, if the later Greeks had been interested in the m atter, there
would have been m any m ore’ .
3 Cornford 1952, especially ch. 3. Cornford’s thesis was extensively criticised by, for
exam ple, M atson 1954-5 and Vlastos (1955) 1970 and 1975.
♦See Popper (1958-9) 1963, K irk (i960) 1970 and 1961 and c f Lloyd 1967.
s See, for exam ple, W . H. S. Jones 1923-31, iv pp. xxii fT, H. Gom perz 1943, Edelstein
(1952^) 1967, pp. 402flF, Bourgey 1953 and 1955, Sambursky 1956, pp. iff, 233ff,
C lagett 1957, pp. 28ff, Farrington 1957, Verdenius 1962, Guthrie 1962, pp. 37f,
D e Ste C roix 1963, pp. 8 iff, von Staden 1975.
The development o f empirical research 127
T w o prelim inary conceptual points are essential for our investi­
gation. First we must distinguish between observation and deliberate
research, although, no doubt, the one shades into the other. A cu te­
ness in observation, w hether o f the natural w orld or o f hum an
behaviour, is frequently reported from non-literate societies and is
often reflected, for exam ple, in com plex classification systems.^ But
such taxonomies, incorporated into natural languages, are not - at
least not generally - the products o f deliberate research. T h e latter
presupposes a particular m otivation, a desire to extend knowledge.
T h e same point can be am ply illustrated from pre-scientific G reek
literary texts. M an y o f H om er’ s descriptions o f aspects o f anim al
behaviour,^ or o f the effects o f different types o f wounds,^ for exam ple,
are both vivid and largely true to life. Y e t it w ould be absurd to
suggest that w hat lies behind them is deliberate zoological and ana­
tom ical investigation. A gain , Sappho’s famous account o f her
feelings when looking at the girl she loves’ is as detailed as some
descriptions o f a patient’s symptoms in the H ippocratic Corpus. B ut
such elements in that account as are not purely im aginary are the
product o f observation, not o f research - not, that is, o f observations
carried out purposefully w hether to obtain new data or to support or
underm ine hypotheses. G reek literature o f all periods is full o f
graphic descriptions that testify to an ability to observe: our subject
here is, rather, the developm ent o f deliberate observation in the rise
o f natural science. W hile our ch ief concern is w ith G reek m aterial,
we shall also refer to the evidence for sustained observations carried
®See especially L6vi-Strauss 1966.
’ Especially in such similes as that in which Odysseus, clinging to a rock, is compared
with an octopus, dragged from its lair, with pebbles sticking to its suckers (Od. v 432flF).
T h e knowledge o f animals shown in the Hom eric poems has been discussed by Buchholz
(1871-85), I part 2, K eller 1909-13, and K orner 1930, especially.
® O n e passage that Aristotle quoted in his description o f the great vein (vena cava) (//A
5 13 b 26ff) is the account o f the w ounding o f Thoon at Jl. x iii 545ff, where Antilochus’
spear ‘ severs the vein right through, w hich runs along the back to reach the n eck ’ .
Another notable passage is /I. x v i 503f w hich refers to the prolapse of the lungs on the
w ithdraw al o f a spear from the chest. T h e descriptions o f wounds in Hom er have been
studied by, for example, Darem berg 1865, Buchholz (1871-85), 11 part 2, pp. 247ff,
K orner 1929 and A . R . Thom pson 1952.
’ Poem 3 i.7 ffis thus translated by Page: ‘ For when I look at you a moment, then I have
no longer power to speak, but m y tongue keeps silence; straightway a subtle flame has
stolen beneath m y flesh, with m y eyes I see nothing, m y ears are hum m ing; a cold
sweat covers me, and a trem bling seizes me all over, I am paler than grass; I seem to
be not far short o f death.’ Page 1955, p. 27 went to to note ‘ the accurate description
o f [the] physical symptoms [of her passion]’ : ‘ the symptoms, one after another,
o f a com plex emotional state are delineated w ith exactitude and sim plicity’. O ne
should, however, distinguish between the status o f remarks concerning humm ing
ears, on the one hand, and that o f talk o f a subtle flame beneath the flesh on the
other.
 1 28 The development o f empirical research
ou t in such fields as astronomy and m edicine b y the Babylonians and
Egyptians long before G reek science began.
O u r second prelim inary point concerns the relationship o f obser­
vation to theory. Discussions o f the role o f observation in G reek
science have often reflected unexpressed, and in some cases in­
coherent, philosophical assumptions. In particular inductivist or
positivist beliefs concerning a realm o f ‘ raw ’ pre-theoretical data -
there for the observer to observe - have been, and in some quarters
continue to be, h ighly influential, although they should by now be
recognised to be open to fundam ental objections. O bservation-
statements use predicates that are all m ore or less well-entrenched in
a network o f theoretical assumptions. T h ere is no such thing as an
observation-statem ent that is not to some extent theory-laden,
though o f course the degree o f theory-ladenness varies. W e m ay
contrast, to use some examples from H esse," talk o f ‘ particle-pair
annih ilation’ in a cloud cham ber with talk o f ‘ two w hite streaks
m eeting and term inating at an a n g le ’ , or, again, the use o f the term
‘ epileptic f it ’ w ith the type o f description o f loss o f voice, foam ing at
the m outh, clenching o f the teeth and convulsive m ovements o f the
hands that we have in On the Sacred Disease.
W e can, as these examples illustrate, retreat from greater theory-
ladenness to lesser, b ut this retreat does not lead us to an ultim ate
refuge o f an entirely theory-free vocabulary in w hich raw sense-data
can be set down innocently o f all assumptions. N or is it only the
explicit inductivist or positivist who m ay m ake similar presumptions
concerning the pre-theoretical status o f w h at there is to observe.
Discussing certain differences between the ‘ m yth ica l’ , and our own,
perception o f the world, Frankfort, for exam ple, wrote that ‘ we
w ould explain, for instance, that certain atmospheric changes broke
a drought and brought about rain. T h e Babylonians observed the
same facts but experienced them as the intervention o f the gigantic
bird Im dugud w hich cam e to their r e s c u e . B u t the sense in w hich
the Babylonians can be said to have ‘ observed the same facts’ is
quite question-begging.
T h e distinction between observation and theory is a relative, not
an absolute, one, and our problem is not one o f how the Greeks
extended their m astery over a set o f data that were always there to
observe, so m uch as one o f studying first the varying interdiction o f
A recent clear statement o f the issue is in Hesse 1974, ch. i. Cf. also, e.g., Putnam (1962)
i 9 7 5 >PP· Suppe 1974, pp. 80-6, 192-9.
“ Hesse 1974, p. 24.
Frankfort 1949, p. 15.
The development o f empirical research 129
observations and theories or assumptions, and secondly the increasing
awareness o f that interaction and the gradual, though still in certain
respects quite lim ited, realisation o f the need to collect and extend
the range o f observational data. T h e inquiry falls into two m ain parts,
first w hat the Greeks themselves have to say about the role o f
observation and research, and secondly their actual practice, where
we must try to illustrate, even if h ighly selectively, both the strengths
and weaknesses o f their observational work.
THE EPIST EM O LO G IG A L D E B A T E
T h e terms in w hich the ancients discussed some o f the issues are, in
im portant respects, different from those o f the modern debate. In the
classical period there is no exact equivalent, in Greek, for our
‘ observation’ ;^^ the regular late G reek word, τήρησι^, is not used in
th at sense before the H ellenistic period. But although writers o f the
fifth and fourth centuries B .C . do not refer to ‘ observation’ as such,
they express a variety o f views about αϊσθησίζ, perception, about
φαινόμενα, ‘ things th at a p p ear’ , about evidence (for w hich they
develop an extensive v o c a b u l a r y ) and about inquiry or research.
Ιστορία (which, like our ow n ‘ research’, m ay include a good deal
m ore than w hat we should call empirical r e s e a r c h ) .F in a lly πεϊρα
and εμπειρία, from πειρασθαι ‘ m ake tr ia l’ , are used generally for
‘ experien ce’ .
T h e range o f m eaning o f two o f the m ain terms, αϊσθησΐ5 and
φαινόμενα, is wide. Both the verb αίσθάνεσθαι and the noun
αϊσθησις cover m uch m ore than ‘ sense-perception’ , being general
words for ‘ fe e l’ and ‘ feelin g’, including consciousness and self-
consciousness. φαινόμενα means not so m uch ‘ phenom ena’ in our
sense, as ‘ the things that a p p e a r’ . Sometimes it carries some o f the
T here is, however, a rich vocabulary o f words for ‘ see’ ‘ lo ok ’ ‘ rem ark’ ‘ attend to ’,
such as όραν, βλέττειν, σκοττΕΐν, σκέπτεσθαι, θεδσθαι, θεωρεΤν, άθρεΐν, λεύσσειν, δέρκεσθαι, νοεΙν
and their compounds. T h e last, w hich covers both ‘ see’ (‘ n otice’) and ‘ understand’,
is connected with voOs, ‘ m in d ’ ‘ reason’, and in certain contexts bridges the reason-
sensation dichotom y: see von Fritz 1943, 1945 and 1946.
T h e original, fifth- and fourth-century, sense o f the noun is guarding or protection, as,
e.g., in Aristotle, Pol. 1308a 30, P A 692a 7 : but the verb τηρεΙν is regularly used for
w atching closely (e.g. A r, Eq, 1145) and appears in Aristotle {Gael. 292 a 7-9 , GA
7 5 6 a 33) in connection with astronom ical and zoological observations.
** T h e ch ie f terms are σημεΐον (‘ sign ’ , cf. σημαΐνειν ‘ sign ify’), τεκμήριον and μαρτύριον
(‘ testim ony’ , cf. τεκμαίρεσθοι ‘ in fer’ , μαρτύρεσθσι ‘ call to witness’ , μαρτυρεΤν ‘ bear
witness’), the same vocabulary being used in natural scientific inquiry as in such other
contexts as legal proceedings and historical research, cf. below, pp. 252f.
C f. also other terms for ‘ search’ , such as 3ήτησΐ5 (cf, χήτημα w hat is sought, both
from 3ητεΙν seek), ?ρευνα (cf. έρευναν), σκέψιξ (cf, οχέτττεσβαι look) and cf. εύρημα, εΟρεσι^,
‘ discovery’ ‘ invention’ from εύρΙσκειν (find).
 130 The development o f empirical research
undertones o f m ere appearance or illusion, corresponding to the use
o f φαίνεσθαι w ith the infinitive (‘ appears b u t is n o t’), as opposed to
the use w ith the participle (‘ appears and is ’ ), although that distinc­
tion is not, at any period, a hard and fast one. M oreover as O w en
demonstrated in his analysis o f the A ristotelian u s a g e , φαινόμενα
m ay include m uch else besides w hat appears directly to the senses.
It can and often does refer to w h at is com m only thought or believed,
the Ινδοξα or received opinions, as it does notably in a famous
passage in the Mcomachean Ethics ( ii4 5 b 2 7 f) where Aristotle
criticises Socrates’ paradox that no one does w rong w illin gly for
being in plain contradiction w ith the φαινόμενα - that is not (despite
some translators) ‘ w hat is observed’ , but w hat appears in the sense
o f w hat is com m only believed to be the case.
T h e pejorative undertones in some uses o f these terms are reflected
in the epistem ological debates in which the ch ief issue was initially
presented as one between the senses on the one hand, and reason and
argum ent on the other. It is, however, im portant to recognise the
variety o f views m aintained already in the Presocratic period.
H eraclitus expresses his contem pt for ‘ m uch learn in g ’, πολυμαθίη,
in Fr. 40,*^ and the four individuals he names show that ‘ m uch
learn in g ’ must be taken to comprise a good deal apart from a
curiosity in regard to natural phenom ena: the four are the m ytho-
logist and didactic poet Hesiod, the historian H ecataeus, and the
philosophers Pythagoras and X e n o p h a n e s . But although H eraclitus
proudly proclaim s th at he ‘ sought him self’ (Fr. l o i ) , he does not
condem n the senses outright, but adopts, rather, an attitude o f
guarded, critical acceptance o f them. Fr. 55 says that ‘ things which
can be seen, heard, learned, these are w hat I p refer’, and Fr. l o i a
notes that the eyes are m ore accurate witnesses than the ears,
although Fr. 107 warns that ‘ eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men
i f they have souls that cannot understand their lan gu ag e’ .
F ar m ore rad ical attitudes towards the senses are expressed fir s t-
as w e saw in chapter 2^0 - b y Parmenides and Melissus, and then by
Plato. In the W a y o f T ru th , the goddess instructs Parm enides not ‘ to
let habit, born o f experience, force you to let w ander your heedless
O w en (1961) 1975.
‘ M uch learning does not teach sense: for otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and H ecataeus.’ Cf. also Frr. 35 and 129: the
latter fragment, whose authenticity is doubtful, states that Pythagoras practised Ιστορ(η,
and identifies his ‘ w isdom ’ (σοφίη) with ‘ much learnin g’ πολυμαθίη and ‘ bad a r t’
(κακοτεχνίη).
•9 T h e extent o f the Pythagoreans’ involvement in empirical research is discussed below,
p p. i44ff. O n Xenophanes, see below, pp. 133 and 143.
See above, ch. 2, pp. 71 and 77.
The development o f empirical research 131
eye or echoing ear or tongue along this r o a d ’ (Fr. 7), and in Fr. 8
Melissus develops a reductio th at starts from the assumption that w e
m ay accept the evidence o f sight and hearing. But since it seems to us,
w hen we use our senses, that things change,^! and yet it is clear (on
the usual E leatic grounds) 22 that change is impossible, it follows that
the senses are, after all, not to be trusted: ‘ it is evident, then, that we
did not see co rrectly ’ .
Further statements denigrating the senses appear in P lato’s m iddle
period dialogues, although several o f the views presented there are
m odified in his later works. Th u s in the Phaedo ~ in the context o f a
discussion o f the soul’s im m ortality during the last hours o f his life -
Socrates associates the senses w ith the body and w ith the world o f
particulars, in contrast to reason, associated w ith the soul and w ith
the Form s,23 and he argues that it is only when the soul is ‘ separated’
as far as possible from the body that it can grasp truth , * 4 that we
neither hear nor see anything e x a c t l y ,a n d that inquiry through the
senses is full o f deception.
In Republic v ii especially w e find a series o f comments on the role
o f perception in certain branches o f science that are o f cardinal
im portance for assessing G reek attitudes towards em pirical research.
In connection w ith astronomy, in particular, Plato makes a num ber
o f remarks that at first blush appear to am ount to a total condem ­
nation o f observational methods. First at 529 cd he says that although
the stars are ‘ the most beautiful and e x a c t’ o f visible things, they ‘ fall
far sh ort’ o f the truth, w hich is to be grasped by reason and thought
alone,27 and he develops an analogy between the stars and geo-
** T h e examples Melissus cites are far from being all straightforward cases o f w h at we
should consider direct sense-perception. ‘ For the hot seems to us to become cold, and
the cold hot, and the hard soft, and the soft hard, and the living to die and to come to be
from the not-living, and all these things are altered and w hat they were and w hat they
now are are in no w a y alike, but iron, being hard, seems to be rubbed aw ay b y contact
w ith the finger, as do gold and stone and everything else that seems to be strong, and
earth and stone seem to come to be from w ater.’
C han ge implies the coming-to-be o f w h at is not; see above, pp. 76f.
Especially Phd. 79 a fF. Contrast the reservations expressed concerning the beliefs of
the ‘ friends o f the Form s’ at Sph. 248 a ff. In the later dialogues Plato points out that in
perception it is the soul that grasps sense-objects through the senses (e.g. Tht. i84 bc,
Phlb. 33 c flf).
^ See, e.g., Phd. 64c ff, 6 6 d -6 7 b , 81 b. W hat hinders the soul, in its search for truth, is
not just the sensations, but also the passions, o f the body.
*5 See especially Phd. 6 5 b : ‘ D o sight and hearing have any truth in them for men, or,
as the poets are always telling us, do we neither hear nor see anything e x a ctly ? ’
(W here Melissus, Fr. 8, had used όρθώ?, ‘ correctly’, Plato here uses άκριβέξ, ‘ e x a ctly ’ .)
Phd. 83 a, cf. 65b and 79 c. Cf. also the contrast, at R. 523 b, between cases where
perception does not provoke thought, and cases where it does, since it ‘ yields nothing
sound ’ : cbs τήξ αίσθήσεω^ ούδέν OyUj ποιούση^.
*7 W h at the true student o f astronomy should aim to grasp is described in terms o f ‘ speed
132 The development o f empirical research
m etrical diagrams. ‘ A nyone experienced in geom etry who saw such
diagram s w ould grant that they are most beautifully constructed,
b u t think it absurd to exam ine them seriously as if one could find in
them the truth concerning equals or doubles or any other ratio . ’ * 8
H e concludes that ‘ it is by using p ro b le m s.. . as in geom etry, that we
shall study astronom y too, and we shall let the things in the heavens
alone, i f w e are to participate in the true astronom y and so convert
the natural intelligence in the soul from uselessness to a useful
possession’ .29
T h e interpretation o f this text is disputed,^» but one point seems
essential. W h at Plato is concerned w ith, in Republic v ii, is not
astronom y as such, so m uch as w hat astronomy, am ong other studies,
can contribute to the education o f his philosopher-kings. T h e overall
purpose o f the propaedeutic studies is to train these G uardians in
abstract thought, to m ake them cultivate reason rather than the
senses.3 i In that context, Plato naturally emphasises the distinction
between an observational, and an abstract, m athem atical, astronom y
and advocates the latter. 3 ^ Even so, several o f his remarks are
exaggerated or am biguous or both . 33 In the analogy between stars
and geom etrical diagram s, especially, there is an assimilation or
confusion o f two ideas that should have been kept distinct, the true
and obvious point that we cannot observe the m athem atically deter­
m ined courses o f the heavenly bodies as such , 3 4 and the h ighly
itself’ and ‘ slowness itself’ in ‘ true num ber’ . But whether these expressions should be
taken to refer to the absolute Forms themselves, or to Forms present in the movements
o f the heavenly bodies (cf. ‘ greatness in u s’ in Phd. 102d f) is far from clear.
529C3ff- A t 530b 1-4 he puts it more strongly still, that it is absurd in every w ay to
seek to grasp the truth o f the visible, corporeal stars: on the syntax and interpretation
o f this sentence, see Vlastos forthcom ing.
” R. 5 3 o b 6 ff.
30 I have attem pted an interpretation in m y 1968. T here is a helpful detailed analysis in
Vlastos forthcom ing : see also H eath 1913, pp. i35ff, Dicks 1970, pp. i03fT.
31 T im e and again in the passages that precede the discussion o f astronomy, the criterion
used to determine whether a study is suitable for the G uardians’ education is: does it
encourage abstract thought? See, e.g., R. 521 cd, 523ab, 523c, 52 5b -e, 526ab and cf.,
in our passage, 530 b8f,
3* It is clear from G lau con ’s remarks at R. 529C4fT and 5 3 0 c2 f that Plato saw the
astronom y he was advocating in the Republic as a radical departure from the usual
modes o f doing astronom y in his day.
Thus at R. 529b 7 -c I he says that ‘ there is no knowledge at a ll’ o f sensible objects.
Like other statements we have noted from Phd. (e.g. 6 5 b i f f ) and R. (523b), this
m ight stand for a variety o f theses, ranging from the unobjectionable point that is
m ade in Tht. and elsewhere, that knowledge cannot be identified with perception, to
the more extreme position that knowledge can in no w ay be derived from, or applied
to, the objects o f sensation.
T h e diagram s are necessarily imprecise: one does not get out a ruler to verify the
length o f the hypotenuse o f a right-angled triangle whose shorter sides are 3 inches and
4 inches, cf. Crom bie 1963, p. 187. From R. 53oa7~ b4 it is clear that, unlike Aristotle,
Plato did not assume the heavens to be com pletely unchanging.
The development o f empirical research 133
contentious (and misguided) thesis that it serves no use at all to
observe the heavenly bodies. 3 s In advocating the abstract, theoretical
study, Plato writes as if he thought it necessary not m erely to
distinguish it from observational astronomy, but to run the latter
dow n.36 U nderstandable as they m ay be in the discussion o f the
education o f the Guardians, such remarks as ‘ we shall let the things
in the heavens a lo n e ’, taken out o f context, w ere interpreted already
in an tiq uity 37 - as they have been again in m odern times - as a
ban on observational methods as a whole.
These and other texts show that the idea o f the untrustworthiness
o f the senses had powerful advocates in the ancient world. 38 Y e t these
passages represent only one side, even if at times the more articulate
side, o f the debate, and other positions were proposed and defended
both in the Presocratic period and later. W hen H eraclitus castigated
‘ m uch learn in g ’, he had something to attack, even if his target
included m ore than just w hat we should call em pirical research. O n e
o f those he singled out, Xenophanes, had indeed insisted that ‘ the
gods have not revealed all things to m en from the b egin n in g : b ut by
seeking (3 ητοΰντε 5 ) men find out better in tim e ’ . 3 9 A lcm aeon, too,
suggests that even though m en cannot obtain ‘ clear kn ow ledge’
about ‘ unseen things and m ortal th ings’ , they can at least m ake
inferences or conjectures.^®
M ore im portant, after Parm enides’ denial o f the valid ity o f the
senses, both Empedocles and A naxagoras reinstate them, even i f both
^5 T h a t this latter thesis does not correctly represent P lato’s intention can be argued, for
exam ple, from the high value set on sight in such passages as 7 7 . 47 ab. Indeed in our
passage itself he insists on using the stars at least as diagrams {R. 5 2 g d 7 ff). But w hat he
nowhere points out, or even recognises, is that observations o f the movements o f the
planets have - as geom etrical diagrams do not - the status o f evidence.
Sim ilar points can be m ade about the passage that follovra on acoustics {R. 530 d ff)
w here again Plato advocates a mathem atisation o f the science, but again argues (with
even less justification than in astronomy) against observational methods, categorising
them at R. 531 a 1-3 as useless labour. Here too in his zeal to criticise the empiricists
for not ascending to problems (cf. 5 3 1 c) Plato denies that em pirical methods have any
value at all for the purposes he has in mind.
E .g. by Proclus, Hyp. Proem, 2 .iff.
3* A p art from the philosophers we have already considered, several others are repre­
sented by the doxographers as having held that the senses are false: in Aetius iv 9.1
the list o f those who did so includes Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras,
Democritus and Protagoras, as well as Parm enides, Zeno, Melissus and Plato. But in
several cases, as w e shall see, our other evidence shows this to be a drastic over­
simplification.
” Xenophanes, Fr. 18. In Fr. 34 (cf. Fr. 35) he expresses the limitations o f human
knowledge - ‘ seeming is w rought over all things ’ - though we should note that the
first subject he mentions to illustrate this is religion: ‘ No man knows or ever will know
the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of.’
'*0 Alcm aeon Fr. i : ‘ concerning unseen things and m ortal things, the gods have clear
knowledge, but as far as men m ay infer (τεκμαίρεσθσι). . .
134 The development o f empirical research
express certain reservations about them. Thus although in the
obscure but suggestive Fr. 2 Em pedocles describes the means we
have o f grasping things as ‘ n a r r o w a t the end o f Fr. 3 he says:
Gome now, consider by every means of grasping how each thing is clear, neither
holding sight in greater trust than hearing, nor noisy hearing above what is made
plain by your tongue, nor withhold trust from any of the other limbs, by whatever
w ay there is a channel of understanding, but apprehend each thing in the w ay in
which it is clear.
A gain , although Anaxagoras^^ is reported to have said that ‘ we are
unable to ju d g e the truth because o f the w eakness’ o f the senses
(Fr. 21), in Fr. 2 ia he advocates using the ‘ things that a p p ea r’ as a
‘ visio n ’ o f ‘ the things that are obscure’ . This dictum - δψι$ άδηλων
τά φαινόμενα4 3 - was, w e are told, praised b y Democritus'^'^ who,
whilst he categorised the senses as ‘ bastard ’ knowledge as opposed to
the ‘ legitim ate ’ know ledge we have o f such m atters as atoms and the
void themselves,45 nevertheless acknow ledged that the m ind derives
its data from the senses.^^
This epistem ological debate was far from confined to the philo­
sophers and we have valuable supplem entary evidence on attitudes
towards the issue between reason and the senses in the m edical
writers especially. Several echo A naxagoras’ d i c t u m , '^7 and the
theme o f the im portance o f experience and research in m edicine is a
Fr. 2 goes on to emphasise the difficulties: ‘ thus these things are not to be seen nor
heard b y men, nor grasped by the understanding ’ .
·♦* A famous fragm ent o f Euripides (Fr. 910 N) on the happiness o f a life devoted to the
inquiry (Ιστορία) into the ageless order o f nature has often been taken to refer to
Anaxagoras. W hether or not that is correct, the fragm ent provides good evidence o f a
positive attitude towards that inquiry.
■♦3 O n the im portance o f this methodological principle in early Greek thought, see
Regenbogen 1931, H. D iller 1932, L loyd 1966, pp. 338-41, 353-5.
♦+ See Sextus, M . v ii 140. C f Clem ent, Strom, i 15.69 (Fr. 299) where - if the quotation is
authentic - Democritus refers to the travels he w ent on in his inquiries, Ιστορέων.
“*5 Fr. 11: ‘ There are two kinds of knowledge, one legitim ate, one bastard: to the bastard
belong all these, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch: but the other is legitim ate and
separate from these.’ T h e latter, he goes on to suggest, operates on objects too fine for
the senses to perceive. Elsewhere he puts it that the objects o f sensation exist ‘ by
convention’ (vdpcp) not ‘ in re a lity ’ (ίτεΓΐ), and that ‘ in reality we understand nothing
exactly, but as it shifts according to the disposition o f the body and o f the things that
enter and press on i t ’ (Fr. 9). These fragments indicate that despite such apparently
unqualified statements as Fr. 7 (‘ we know nothing truly about an yth in g’ , cf. Frr. 6, 8,
10, 117) Democritus maintains a modified, not an extreme, scepticism. A t the same
time the view that the senses yield only a ‘ bastard ’ form o f knowledge shows that
Aristotle’s repeated statement that the atomists found truth in appearance (e.g. GC
3 i5 b g ff) must be understood as an interpretative comm ent based on Aristotle’s own
conception o f the distinction between sensibles and intelligibles.
Fr. 125: the senses address the m ind: ‘ W retched mind, taking your proofs from us, do
you overthrow us? O u r overthrow is your fall.’
Eg. V M ch. 22, C M G I, i 53-i2f, Flat. ch. 3, C M C i, i 93.5, Viet, i ch. 11, L v i 486.12f,
cf. de Arte ch. 12, C M G i, i i8 .i4 ff. See also Herodotus 11 33Γ
The development o f empirical research 135
recurrent one.'^^ author o f On Ancient Medicine, in particular,
writes o f the tried and tested methods o f discovery in m edicine. In
chapter 2 he refers to the ‘ w a y ’ (όδός) o f m edicine, ‘ through w hich
m any and excellent discoveries have been m ade over a long period,
and b y w hich the rest w ill be discovered, if anyone is clever enough
to conduct his researches know ing the discoveries that have already
been m ade and taking them as his s t a r t i n g - p o i n t M o r e im portant
still, in chapter i he draws a distinction between m edicine and other
inquiries, for exam ple those about ‘ things in the sky or things under
the e a rth ’ . T h e former has no need o f ύποΟέσεΐ5, ‘ hypotheses’ or
‘ postulates ’ : 5 0 as for the latter, ‘ if anyone were to speak and declare
the nature o f these things, it w ould not be clear either to the speaker
him self or to his audience w hether w hat was said was true or not,
since there is no criterion to w hich one should refer to obtain clear
know ledge ’ .si H ere, then, is a dem and that physical theories, at least in
certain areas, must be verifiable, at any rate according to the w riter’s
ideas o f verifiability. W h a t he has in mind in m edicine itself can be
judged in part from a subsequent passage where he remarks that, in
determ ining treatment, the doctor has no other measure to refer to
than the feeling (αϊσθησι$) o f the body.52
M oreover if Parmenides and Melissus represent one extreme view
in their total rejection o f the senses, the opposite extreme view was
also discussed, at least b y the fourth century. T h e thesis that know ­
ledge is perceptions3 is one that Plato has Theaetetus propose in the
dialogue nam ed after him, w here Socrates represents it as following
from Protagoras’ dictum that ‘ m an is the measure o f all things’ .s-^
N ow how far Socrates’ interpretation o f that dictum should be taken
to correspond to the views o f the historical Protagoras is a vexed
question.ss Y e t it is enough, for our present purposes, to observe that
See, e.g., Flat. ch. i, C M G i, i 9 1.15 , Praec. ch. i, CM G i, i 30.3ff, Off. ch. i, L m
272.1-5. Sim ilarly the historians discuss the problems, and stress the laboriousness, o f
historical research, e.g. H dt. n 29, ni 115, T h . i i, 20 and 22.
« V M ch. 2, C M G I, I 3 7 .iff, cf. also ch. 3, 37.2off, ch. 8, 4i.8f, ch. 20, 5 i.i7 f f.
50 T h e writer has physical, not m athem atical, assumptions in mind. But on the possibility
that his opponents’ m ethodology m ay not be uninfluenced by the m athem atical use of
‘ hypotheses’ (on which see above, pp. 11 i f f and ii3 f f) , see L loyd 1963.
VM ch. I, CM G I, I 36.2ff, especially isff. 52 ch. 9, CM G i, i 4i.2off.
53 Cf. Aristotle’s remark, de An. 4 2 7 b 3, that some hold that all appearances are true:
however his frequent attribution to the atomists o f the view that truth lies in appearance
is open to question (see above, p. 134 n. 45).
Tht. 15 1c , 152a, cf. also Protagoras’ ‘ defence’, Tht. i6 6 a ff, e.g. i66d .
55 O ther later testimonies (such as Aristotle, Metaph. 1062b I 2 f f - c f . I 0 5 3 a 3 5 ff-a n d
Sextus, P. I 2i6ff, M . v ii 6of) report Protagoras’ view as being that the ‘ ap p earance’ is
the measure, but these m ay well be largely, if not wholly, dependent on P lato’s inter­
pretation. G uthrie 1969, pp. 181-92 provides a survey of views on the issue o f the
original meaning and application o f Protagoras’ dictum.
136 The development o f empirical research
the Theaetetus itself indicates that - whether or not it had any pre-
Platonic supporters - the identification o f sense-perception and
knowledge was at least discussed in the classical period.s^
F inally while Aristotle shared m any o f P lato’s epistem ological
doctrines, perception and experience are allotted a more positive,
indeed from some points o f view a basic, role in his theory o f know­
ledge. W hilst agreeing w ith Plato that knowledge is o f forms, he
disagreed w ith him, in certain fundam ental respects, on the nature o f
forms. W hereas in Plato they are transcendent, that is they can and
do exist independently o f particulars, in Aristotle forms do not, in
fact , 5 7 exist in separation from the particulars o f which they are the
forms. It is the particulars themselves, each a concrete w hole
analysable in terms o f form and m atter, that are, in the doctrine o f
the Categories, w hat prim arily exists.ss A gain , while Aristotle, like
Plato, insisted on certainty as a condition o f understanding in the
fullest sense,s 9 he drew a distinction between the m ethod o f proof
and the m ethod o f discovery. In the latter, the starting-point is not
‘ w hat is better known absolutely’, but ‘ w hat is better known to u s ’ :
this w ill vary according to the subject, but he describes it as w hat is
closer to perception and to the particulars (as opposed to the
universal).60 Thus w hile the Platonic elements in Aristotle’s ontology
and epistemology are considerable^ the emphasis is, at certain points,
very different, not only in the account he gives o f the status o f
particulars, but also in his analysis o f perception. This is now
accom m odated alongside reason as one o f the cognitive faculties o f
the soul,61 and its basic role comes out clearly in his account o f how
w e apprehend the prim ary, im m ediate starting-points o f dem on­
strations in the final chapter o f the Posterior Analytics. W e do so b y a
process he calls επ α γ ω γ ή , ‘ in du ction ’ , the origin o f w hich he traces
back to perception: this is a faculty com m on to men and animals,
but only a few animals have m em ory, and it is from m em ory that
5® Cf. also below, p. 138 n. 65, on the roles o f perception and the appearances in post-
Aristotelian philosophies.
57 εργω: they are, o f course, separable λόγφ or in thought. This rule applies to all sublunary
objects: in the superlunary sphere, however, Aristotle talks of pure actualities, ένέργειαι.
5® Cat. ch. 5, 2a I iff.
5® Understanding is o f what cannot be otherwise than it is, e.g. APo. 71 bgff.
*0 E.g. APo. 7 ib 3 3 ff, Top. 105a i3ff, Ph. i8 g a4 ff, Metaph. io i8 b 3 o ff, cf. APr. 68b35ff.
As reason is of the intelligible forms, so perception is of perceptible forms. W hilst he
recognises and analyses the possibility o f error in perceiving, for example, the common
sensibles (such as movement or size, e.g. de An. 4 28 b23 ff), and draws attention to the
deceptiveness o f appearances in his account of imagination (φαντασία) {de An. iii 3,
e.g. 428a I iff, i6ff, b 2 ff), he holds that perception o f the special objects o f the indi­
vidual senses (e.g. colours, sounds) is ‘ infallible or least subject to falsehood’ {de An.
4 2 8 b i8 f).
The development o f empirical research 137
experience, and from experience in turn that both ‘ a r t’ and under­
standing in the strictest sense, come.^^
Aspects o f his theory are picked up in certain recurrent themes in
the body o f his scientific work. H e often employs a broad distinction
between appeals to λόγοι, theoretical arguments, and appeals to the
φαινόμενα, or to the ‘ facts’ or the ‘ d a ta ’ , εργα or ύττάρχοντα, or
again to ‘ w hat happens’ , the γιγνόμενα or the συμβαίνοντα. W hat
counts as such ‘ d a ta ’ varies in different contexts, and - as has
already been noted for φαινόμενα - these terms encompass m uch
more than w hat w e should call the results o f observation. Thus to
cite one characteristic instance, when he castigates the Pythagoreans
for ‘ not seeking arguments and causes in relation to the φαινόμενα,
but trying to drag the φαινόμενα into line w ith certain arguments
and opinions o f their o w n ’ [Gael. 293 a 2 5 ff), the criticism is a general
one: in introducing their doctrine o f the ‘ counter-earth’ the
Pythagoreans violated ‘ w hat appears to be the case’ both in the
sense o f the comm on opinions and in the sense o f w hat is observed.
But the inclusion o f the latter is sometimes m ade clear by the addi­
tion o f the specification κατά την αϊσθησιν, w hat appears ‘ according
to percep tion’, as it is, for instance, in another text in the De Caelo
(297b23ff) where he turns from theoretical arguments establishing
the sphericity o f the earth to consider such points as the shape o f the
earth’s shadow in eclipses o f the moon and the changes in the
observed positions o f the stars at different latitudes.^^
Sim ilarly when, in the zoology, he discusses how to proceed in the
study o f animals and says that one must first view the φαινόμενα
concerning each kind o f anim al and then proceed to state their
causes,^'^ the φαινόμενα here include a good deal more than w hat is
directly observed. O n the other hand the role o f perception is once
again m ade explicit in a famous text in the De Generatione Animalium
(76 ob 27ff) w hich contrasts λόγοι, arguments or theories, not just
w ith φαινόμενα but also w ith αϊσθησι$. Com pleting his account o f
how bees reproduce, he w rites:
APo. 99b32flT (see also above, pp. i i 6 f ) , cf. Metaph. 98oa27fT; at APo. i o o a i 6 f f h e
states that while we perceive the individual (e.g. Callias), perception is of the universal
(man), cf. APo. 8 ib 6 f, 87b28ff, 37ff, de An. 4 i7 b 2 2 f, E N ii4 2 a 2 5 ff, ii4 7 a 2 5 ff. O n
the role o f experience in securing the starting-points o f different kinds o f inquiry, see,
for exam ple, APr. 46a4ff, i7ff.
*3 See below p. 206 and cf. also Ph. 253a32ff, Gael. 3o6a5fT, i6ff, GC 3 i5 a 3 ff, 325a i3ff.
PA 640 a i4f, cf. 639b8ff, referring to the parts of each anim al, with the protreptic to
the study o f all the parts of every kind o f anim al in PA i 5, e.g. 644b29fF, 645 a 6f, 2 iff,
where, however, he characteristically emphasises that the inquiry is directed to the
form al and final causes especially, e.g. 645a23ff, 33ff, b i3 ff. Cf. also HA 4 9 ia 9 ff
which describes the starting-point as the differentiae o f animals and τά συμβεβηκότα πσσι
- w h at is the case w ith all o f them.
138 The development o f empirical research
this then seems to be what happens with regard to the generation of bees, judging
from theory (λόγος) and from what are thought to be the facts (τά συμβαίνειν
δοκοΟντα) about them. But the facts (τά συμβαι'νοντα) have not been sufficiently
ascertained, and if they ever are ascertained, then we must trust perception
(αΐσθησις) rather than theories (λόγοι), and theories, too, so long as what they
show agrees with what appears to be the case (τά φαινόμενα).
This survey o f the positions adopted during the fifth and fourth
centuries on issues related to observation and researches has been
sum mary, but it suffices to show^ that there is no simple orthodoxy on
the question. Anti-em piricist views (including the denial o f the
valid ity o f perception) are expressed, sometimes w ith an elem ent o f
rhetorical exaggeration, by a num ber o f influential writers, several
o f whom are more concerned w ith the developm ent o f the notion o f
deductive dem onstration than w ith the analysis o f the em pirical
foundations o f k n o w l e d g e . ^ ^ g u t - obviously - other views are also
expressed that are a good deal less hostile to, and some that positively
recom m end, observation and em pirical research. T o put the point
negatively, it is not as if the practising scientists, including the natural
philosophers, worked against a background o f a consensus o f opinion
condem ning, or even consistently devaluing, the use o f the senses.
THE PR A C T IC E OF R E S E A R C H
W ith these points in mind we m ay now turn to our second and m ore
substantial topic, the actual practice o f G reek scientists in different
fields o f research. I f the epistemological debate I have review ed is
w ell known, the level o f com m ent on G reek scientific practice in the
m atter o f the use o f observation has sometimes been superficial. In
particular the differences in performance between - and w ithin - the
m ain areas o f natural scientific inquiry have often been ignored,
although they are in some cases quite m arked. W hile there are some
From the late fourth century the debate continues and develops. Both the Stoics and
the Epicureans took perception to be one - and the basic - source o f knowledge. But
against the ‘ dogmatists ’ o f ail kinds (including the Peripatetics) the Sceptics mounted
arguments to undermine both perception and reason - and indeed any criterion that
might be used as a foundation for knowledge: yet even the Sceptics referred to the
φαινόμενον38 a criterion for regulating conduct (though not as a basis for statements about
reality), see Sextus, P. i 2 iff. O nce again, the debate is not confined to those whom we
think o f chiefly as philosophers. Thus the view that ‘ one must call the φαινόμενα prim ary,
even if they are not so ’ is attributed to the Hellenistic biologist Herophilus in Anonymus
Londinensis x x i 22f, and the contrasting views of the three main medical schools, the
Dogmatists, the Empiricists and the Methodists, on the roles o f reason on the one hand,
and experience (ίμπειρία, πείρα) and the appearances (φαινόμενα) on the other, are
analysed at great length by Galen (e.g. Sect. Intr. and Opt. Doctr.) who himself advocates
a method that combines both criteria.
See above, ch. 2.
The development o f empirical research 139
excellent examples o f the practice o f em pirical research in early
G reek science, there are also areas where the use o f observation is
very lim ited, and we must attem pt to do justice to and explain these
discrepancies. W e m ay divide our study into four m ain sections, first
the Presocratic natural philosophers, second the H ippocratic writers,
third the developm ent o f em pirical research in geography and
astronomy, and finally its role in Aristotle. In the second and third
sections, especially, we shall need to refer to m aterial from later than
the fourth century B.C . in order to put the earlier stages in the
developm ent o f G reek science in perspective.
P R ES O C R A T IC N A T U R A L PH ILO SO PH Y
A nyone who studies the extant sources for the Presocratic natural
philosophers is likely to be struck by the almost total dearth o f
references to anything that looks like a deliberate observation.
A lthough well-known data from ordinary experience are used often
enough, the occasions in either the pre- or the post-Parm enidean
philosophers when em pirical research appears to have been carried
out on set purpose either to obtain new facts or to support or under­
mine hypotheses are rare. O n e consideration that im m ediately goes
some w ay to explain this relates to the kinds o f problems they
investigated. As w e have already remarked in another context,
m any o f the phenom ena they were interested in are frightening or
rare or both. T h e doxographers report theory after theory on such
questions as the nature or causes o f lightning, thunder, earthquakes,
comets and the stars, where the opportunities for direct^s em pirical
research are either restricted or non-existent. H ere the philosophers
generally proceeded b y draw ing on analogies w ith fam iliar objects,
as Anaxim enes, for instance, did w hen he attem pted to support an
explanation o f lightning as being due to the wind cleaving a cloud
by referring to the flash m ade b y an oar in w ater . ^ 9 Y e t this procedure
is in no w ay surprising, given that lightning is obviously not a
phenom enon that the Presocratics - or anyone else in antiquity -
could investigate directly, as in a laboratory. A nother m uch discussed
problem was w hat keeps the earth up, w here the explanations
proposed depend either on purely abstract a r g u m e n t ,o r on simple
analogies, such as T h ales’ reported view that the earth floats on
*7 See above, ch. i, p. 3 2 .
T h a t is o f the phenomena themselves, as opposed to real or assumed analogues for the
phenom ena.
69 Aetius m 3 . 2 , D K 1 3 a 1 7 , c f L loyd 1 9 6 6 , p p. 3 1 5 - 1 7 .
70 See above, ch. 2 , pp. 6yf, on A naxim ander’s theory.
 140 The development o f empirical research
w ater,71 or the theory attributed to Anaxim enes and others that it is
supported, as flat objects are, by air.’ ^ It is precisely in these areas
o f speculation, concerning ‘ things in the sky or things under the
e a rth ’, that - as the w riter o f On Ancient Medicine objected - ‘ there is
no criterion to w hich one should refer to obtain clear knowledge
In several o f the areas o f inquiry in w hich the earliest philosophers
were interested, the lack o f references to direct observation and
research m ay be said to reflect the nature o f the problems themselves.
Y e t they also attem pted theories on other topics where this no
longer holds, at least not to the same degree. In particular they put
forw ard a great variety o f doctrines concerning the fundam ental
constituents o f m aterial objects, and this provides something o f a test
case for the relation between observational data and theories in their
work.
T h e physical theories in question include different kinds o f
m onistic doctrines, according to w hich every type o f m aterial object
is seen as a m odification o f a single basic element, ^ 4 and o f pluralistic
ones, appealing to either a definite^s or an indefinite^^ num ber o f
elem entary substances - and we can supplem ent the fragments and
reports for individual Presocratic philosophers w ith the inform ation
from a num ber o f H ippocratic writers who also discuss the problem . ^ 7
T h e extent to w hich the theories in question were either suggested,
or supported, by em pirical evidence is extrem ely lim ited. T h e same
fam iliar ‘ data ’ - or w hat w ere assumed to be such - recur frequently
and in connection w ith w id ely differing theories.
O ne instance o f this is the group o f observed or supposed changes
Aristotle, Metaph. 983 b 2 if, Gael. 294a28ff, cf. L loyd 1966, pp. 3o6fF.
” Aristotle, Gael. 294b I3 ff (referring also to Anaxagoras and Democritus). Cf. Plato,
Phd. 99 b, where an unnamed earlier philosopher is said to prop up the earth like a flat
kneading-trough on air as its base. Cf. Hippolytus, Haer. i 7.4 (D K 13 a 7) on A n axi­
menes’ view o f w h at holds the stars up, and cf. on Em pedocles, Aristotle, Gael. 295 a 14ff,
on which see T ign er 1974.
73 V M ch. I , GM G I , i 36.2ff, is ff, see above, p. 135.
A p art from physical theories such as those o f Anaxim enes and Diogenes o f Apollonia,
based on air, or that o f H ippon on water, the atomists too explained the differences in
m aterial objects as being due ultim ately to modifications in the shape, arrangem ent and
position o f the atoms, which do not themselves differ in substance, although in addition
to the atoms they also postulated the void.
75 As in theories based on two elements, such as that in Parm enides’ W ay o f Seeming
(light and night) or on four (usually earth, water, air and fire), versions o f w hich
appear in Em pedocles, in Philistion (according to the report in Anon. Lond. x x 25ff)
and in the H ippocratic treatise Gam. (ch. 2, L vin 584.9ff) as w ell as in Plato, Aristotle
and m any later writers.
A s in Anaxagoras, see below, p. 141.
T hu s Nat. Horn. ch. 1 (L v i 32.3ff, cf. above, pp. 92f) refers to monistic physical
doctrines based on air or fire or water or earth (which the writer later com pares with
the theories of the physicians who maintain that man consists o f blood or bile or
phlegm ). C f further below, pp. i46ff, i49 ff on the H ippocratic writers’ own theories.
The development o f empirical research 141
involving air, cloud, water, earth and stones. First our sources
represent Anaxim enes as suggesting that everything else is a m odifi­
cation o f air, w hich becomes other things b y a process o f rarefaction
and condensation. Sim plicius, following Theophrastus in all prob­
ability, illustrates this b y saying: ‘ R arefying, it becomes fire, con­
densing, it becomes wind, then cloud, then condensing further w ater,
then earth, then stones and the rest come from t h e s e .H i p p o ly t u s
provides a similar list o f changes^’ and there is little reason to doubt
that some such examples represent the idea underlying A naxim enes’
original theory correctly. But then at the other end o f Presocratic
speculation, 8 o Anaxagoras cites similar ‘ d a ta ’ in connection w ith his
own quite different theory, that ‘ in everything there is a portion o f
everyth in g’81 and that apparent changes are to be explained in terms
o f changes in the proportions o f the different substances in the objects
we see.82 Fragm ent 16 o f A naxagoras states that ‘ from the clouds
w ater is separated off, and from w ater earth, and from earth stones
are condensed by the c o ld ’ .^3 O n the analogy o f fragm ent 10, which
puts the question ‘ H ow could hair come to be from not-hair? ’ and
implies the answer that hair must be present in some form in the
food w e eat and the w ater w e drink, A naxagoras presum ably held
that w ater contains the earth and the stones that are separated o ff
from it - and indeed every other kind o f natural substance.
It is especially striking that when, in fragm ent 8 , ^ 4 Melissus mounts
an argum ent against the senses on his opponents’ own assumptions -
where he w ould clearly avoid, so far as possible, any view that was
controversial or not com m only agreed - he too says that ‘ earth and
stones seem to com e to be from w a te r’ . N or is this particular set o f
examples confined to the Presocratic period, since (with one excep-
78 In Ph. 24.2gff, D K 13 A 5. 7» Haer. 1 7.3, D K 13 a 7.
H eraclitus, too, spoke o f w ater com ing to be from earth and o f earth as the ‘ death ’
o f water (Fr. 36) and in Fr. 31 refers cryptically to the ‘ changes of fire’ - ‘ first sea,
and o f sea h a lf is earth and h a lf πρηστήρ’ (perhaps thought o f as a form o f fire). Cf. also
the testimonies collected in ‘ F r.’ 76, though the authenticity o f these is doubtful since
they appear, anachronistically, to attribute to Heraclitus a doctrine of four simple bodies.
E .g. Frr. 6, 11 and 12 and cf. Fr. 4. A lthough mind is the one exception to this general
principle, the reference o f ‘ everything ’ is otherwise apparently quite unrestricted; it
includes not only every kind o f natural substance (gold, flesh, bark, etc.) but also the
opposites ‘ the h o t’ ‘ the co ld ’ ‘ the w e t’ ‘ the d r y ’ and so on (Frr. 4, 8, 12, 15). A lthough
m any aspects o f the interpretation o f A naxagoras’ physical theory are disputed, this
does not affect his use o f the examples in Fr. 16.
But, with the exception o f mind (Frr. 11 and 12), everything always has a portion of
everything else in it. As the end o f Fr. 12 puts it, each single thing is and was most
clearly those things it has most o f - that is, as Simplicius explains (e.g. In Ph. I55.23ff),
each thing acquires its character from w hat predominates in it. Thus w hat appears
to us as gold has most gold in it, though it has a portion of everything else as w ell - and
conversely every other object has a portion o f gold.
C f. also Simplicius, In Ph. 460. i3f, D K 59 a 45. 8+ See above, p. 131 and n. 21.
 142 The development o f empirical research
tion) they are to be found also in Plato,ss in connection w ith his
version o f the four-element theory, in w hich earth, water, air and fire
are represented as composed o f two basic kinds o f prim ary triangles.^^
H ere, then, the same assumed ‘ d a ta ’ - interpreted quite dif­
ferently - turn up in relation to divergent theories. First no attem pt
seems to have been m ade to scrutinise or check the ‘ d a ta ’ them ­
selves : it was ju st com m only supposed that not only clouds become
w ater, but also ‘ w a te r ’ ‘ e a rth ’, and ‘ e a rth ’ ‘ stones ’ . ^ 7 Secondly, the
data in question are - we should say - indifferent as between the
theories in relation to which they are cited, the theories being
sufficiently vague, or their em pirical content sufficiently thin, that
they are all equally w ell able to accom m odate the phenom ena. N ow
it is not as i f the very same examples are represented or assumed to
be proof o f each o f the theories concerned. A t the same time they are
not sim ply w hat was to be explained, for once incorporated into a
given theory, they were no doubt held to corroborate it. Provided a
theory could give some account o f these and a few other similar
fam iliar phenom ena, this was taken as an adequate em pirical basis
for that theory. T h e doctrines in question were certainly com peting
w ith one another, but they were ju d g ed - one must suppose - not
so m uch in terms o f the em pirical evidence that could be presented
in their support, or the range o f phenom ena they could explain or
predict, as first b y their econom y and consistency, and then b y their
a b ility to m eet certain general philosophical difficulties relating to
the nature, and indeed after Parmenides the possibility, o f change
and coming-to-be.
See, e.g., 7 7 . 56 c ff for the transformations of fire, air and water, and 60 b ff on the
form ation o f stones from a kind o f earth. In Plato’s theory, however, earth is composed
o f a different kind o f prim ary triangle from the other three simple bodies, and so
earth does not come to be from water or change into it. O n Plato’s physical theory,
see most recently Vlastos 1975, ch. 3.
8* Aristotle too speaks o f transformations between the simple bodies (e.g. GC 11 4) and
now, against Plato, includes earth in these changes. For him stones are compounds o f
water and earth in which earth predominates (e.g. Mete. 383 b 20).
For Empedocles, it is true, strictly speaking water (the element or as he calls it the
root) does not become earth (the element). But given the vagueness with which ‘ w a te r’
‘ e a rth ’ and so on were used, the issue between Empedocles, who denied changes
between the four elements, and Plato and Aristotle, who asserted them (though as we
have seen Plato held earth to be an exception), was not one that could be resolved by
appeal to fam iliar phenom ena - though that is not to say such phenomena were not
invoked in the debate (as notably by Aristotle against Plato at Gael. 306 a4f, see further
below, p. 207). W here Plato and Aristotle would say that ‘ a ir ’ became ‘ w a te r’ (e.g.
when rain fell) or ‘ w a te r’ ‘ a ir ’ (when water boiled), it was open to Empedocles to
say that this ‘ air ’ was not the root, but either a form of water or a compound containing
it. O u r own notions o f chem ically pure elements are thus quite anachronistic, and each
o f the terms ‘ e a rth ’ ‘ w a te r’ and ‘ a ir ’ is applied to a wide range o f substances (pre­
dom inantly, though not exclusively, solid, liquid and gaseous respectively).
The development o f empirical research 143
T h e element theories that the Presocratic philosophers proposed
were not o f a kind that could be decisively tested w hether b y new or
b y existing data,^» and as a general rule they m ade little or no
attem pt to conduct observations - let alone system atically to extend
the range o f data under discussion - in this field o f inquiry.®^ There
are, however, a few exceptions to that rule, such as Anaxim enes’ use
o f the fact that breath exhaled from compressed lips feels cooler than
from an open m outh to support a theory that the hot and the cold are
to be identified w ith the rare and the dense r e s p e c t i v e ly ,a n d
A naxagoras’ p roof o f the corporeality o f air b y referring to the
resistance it offers when trapped in inflated wine-skins or in the
clepsydra. 9 1 T o such examples can be added a handful o f other
instances o f w hat m ay be deliberate observations m ade by the P re­
socratic philosophers in other contexts. O n e o f the m ore notable is
X enophanes’ reported use o f the evidence o f fossils to support his
view that the relations between land and sea are subject to fluctuation
and that w hat is now dry land was once covered by the sea. A c ­
cording to H ippolytus he cited as proof o f this not only shells found
inland and on mountains, but also the impressions o f certain living
organisms in the quarries o f Syracuse, on Paros and on Malta.92 W e
cannot know how m uch o f this report to trust , 9 3 but i f it is at least
substantially correct, it is an interesting - i f quite unusual - instance
o f ίστορ ίη . 9 4
T h a t Presocratic physical theories were not vulnerable to refutation by simple appeals
to straightforward observations is a point that was successfully urged against Cornford’s
thesis (1952) by Vlastos (1955) 1970.
W e have to w ait until Aristotle for the first attem pt to collect and systematise informa­
tion concerning, for example, which substances are combustible, which fusible, which
soluble in w ater and other liquids and so on: see below, pp. 2ogf on Mete. iv.
Plutarch, de prim. frig. 7 . 9 4 7 F , D K 13 b i.
Aristotle, Ph. 2 i3 a 2 4 ff, D K 59 a 68, and cf. on the clepsydra, the account in the
pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, 9 i4 b 9 f f ( a 69), w hich notes that A naxagoras held air
to be the cause. In the Physics passage Aristotle refers to others (unnamed) who try to
disprove the void b y this means, and this has sometimes been taken to include Em pe­
docles, who certainly held that air is one o f the four ‘ roots’, and w ho cited the pheno­
m ena o f the behaviour o f air and water in a clepsydra, though in a different context -
nam ely his theory o f respiration - in Fr. 100. T his was, for example, suggested by
Burnet (1892) 1948, p. 229, but cf. the cautions expressed by G uthrie 1965, pp. 224Λ
Haer. i 14.5-6, D K 21 a 33. T h e living organisms appear to have included fish and a
bayleaf, and seaweed if, as seems likely, w e should read φυκών for the M SS (and D K )
φωκών ‘ seals’ . O n the text, see G uthrie 1962, p. 387 and notes 2-4, who also remarks
that similar observations can be paralleled in fifth-century authors, o f shells on
mountains in Herodotus (11 12) and o f fossils in X anthus o f L yd ia (Strabo i 3.4).
It is clear from Fr. 8, at least, that X enophanes had travelled extensively in the Greek
w orld.
T his was one o f Burnet’s two examples o f ‘ biological and palaeontological obser­
vations ’ (see above, p. 126 n. 2), the other being A naxim ander’s ‘ discoveries in marine
b io lo g y’, a reference to the group o f testimonies (D K 12 a 30, a 10, a 11 (6)) con­
cerning his ideas on the origin o f living creatures. O n e o f these texts, Plutarch, Quaest.
144 The development o f empirical research
These are, to be sure, all isolated examples o f observations. T h ere
is, however, one field in w hich more sustained em pirical research
appears to have been undertaken b y philosophers before Plato, nam ely
harm onics or acoustics. A dm ittedly m any o f the stories concerning
the w ork o f Pythagoras him self in this area must be discounted. Thus
several o f the experiments he is supposed to have conducted to
discover the num erical relations o f the m ain m usical intervals,
octave, fifth and fourth, must be rejected for the simple reason that
they do not, in fact, yield the results reported.’ s T h a t is not the case,
however, o f accounts relating to the measurements o f lengths o f pipe
corresponding to different notes or to investigations o f the m ono­
chord.’ 6 A lth ou gh we have every reason to be cautious about
Pythagoras’ own i n v o l v e m e n t , h a v e other evidence that tends to
confirm that em pirical investigations w ere carried out in this area at
least by the early fourth century.
First, in a fragm ent preserved by P orphyry,’ » A rchytas cites a
Conv. VIII 8 . 4 . 7 3 0 E f, illustrates a theory on the origin o f man with an allusion to γαλεοί
(if the usual em endation is accepted). These are dog-fish, one species o f which - as
A ristotle pointed out in a famous description H A v i lo , 565b i f f - i s rem arkable for
the placenta-like form ation b y which the young are attached to the fem ale parent.
But these evidences provide no firm basis for ascribing extensive, or indeed any,
biological observations to Anaxim ander. T h e stimulus to his theorising was a problem
(the origin o f living creatures and o f man) which was already the subject o f m ytho­
logical accounts (e.g. the story o f Pyrrha and D eucalion). T h e particular reference to
dog-fish is P lutarch’s (based ultim ately on Aristotle, no doubt), and even if, as seems
possible, A naxim ander him self knew and referred to viviparous sea-animals o f some
sort, that does not necessarily im ply that his knowledge cam e from personal obser­
vation (cf. on A ristotle’s sources o f information, below, pp. 21 iff).
This is true o f three o f the favourite stories in our sources, ( i ) that he made his discovery
b y weighing the hammers which produced different notes, (2) that he did so by
attaching weights to strings and noticing that the weights gave the num erical relations
o f the concords (but in fact the pitch will vary with the square root o f the w eight, not
with the weight itself), and (3) that he filled jars with water and discovered the con­
cords b y noting the relation beteeen the amounts o f water in the jars and the sounds
they gave when struck (but the concords would be revealed only if the columns o f air
in the jars, rather than the jars themselves, were vibrated). T h e m ain sources for these
stories (i) (2) and (3) are as follows: Nicom achus, Harm. ch. 6, 2 4 5 .i9 ff (i and 2);
T heon o f Sm yrna, sG.gff (2 and 3); Gaudentius, Harm. ch. 11, 340.4ff (i and 2);
Censorinus, de die nat. ch. 10, I 7 .i9 ff (2); lam blichus, VP iis f f , 6 6 .i2 ff (i and 2),
and In Nic. ch. 6, I 2 i.i3 f f ( i) ; M acrobius, Somn. Scip. 11 i.8ff, 583.28ff (i and 2);
Boethius, Mus. i chh. lof, ig 6 .i8 ff (all three); Chalcidius, In Ti. ch. 45, 94.i3fT (2),
T h e com bination o f the repeated clear references, in these sources, to the idea o f
varying the conditions o f the test, and the inaccuracy o f the results reported, is rem arkable.
O f the sources mentioned in the last note, Nicom achus, T heon, Gaudentius, Censorinus,
lam blichus and Boethius all mention one or both o f these methods, c f also Diogenes
Laertius viii 12. For investigations on wind-instruments, see also below, p. 145, on
A rchytas Fr. i, and c f ps-Arist. Problemata x ix ch. 50, 922b35ff.
T h e Pythagoreans tended to ascribe their doctrines to him out o f respect and to gain
the prestige o f his authority. O n the other hand we should recall H eraclitus’ attack on
Pythagoras b y nam e for his ‘ much learnin g’, Fr. 40 and cf. Frr. 35 and 129, above,
p. 130.
In Harm. 56.5ff, especially 57.2ff, I4ff, D K 47 b i. A rather inflated assessment o f the
The development o f empirical research 145
variety o f phenom ena in an attem pt to establish a theory relating the
pitch o f a note to its ‘ speed’ , and some o f the examples m ay suggest
first-hand observation. T hus he refers not only to the notes m ade by
different lengths o f pipe (which he interprets in terms o f variations
in the ‘ strength’, and so o f the speed, o f the air at the holes it comes
out o f), but also to the variations in the pitch o f the sound produced
b y a stick m oved at different speeds, and to similar changes in
the pitch o f the ρόμβοι or ‘ bull-roarers ’ swung in religious cere-
m onies . 9 9
Secondly, in a passage in Republic vii w hich we have already had
occasion to mention,i»°Plato too refers to em pirical investigations in
acoustics. Socrates introduces this discussion b y agreeing w ith the
view he attributes to the Pythagoreans that harmonics and astronomy
are sister sciences {R. 530 d), but he then goes on to criticise the
‘ useless la b o u r’ o f m easuring audible sounds and concords against
one another. G laucon, in turn, speaks o f those ‘ who lay their ears
alongside’ the strings, ‘ as i f trying to catch a voice from next door:
and some state that they can hear another note in between and that
this is the smallest interval to use as a unit o f measurement, while
others contest that the sounds are the same, both parties preferring
their ears to their m inds’ , whereupon Socrates develops a comparison
w ith the procedures used in the courts for exam ining witnesses by
torture: ‘ they torture the strings and rack them on the p e g s .. .
A lthough the Pythagoreans are then distinguished from the more
extreme type o f em pirical i n v e s t i g a t o r , t h e y too are criticised for
‘ looking for numbers in these heard harmonies, and not ascending
to problem s’ .
T h e evidence in Plato is all the m ore convincing, since he is here
objecting to such methods o f in q u i r y .N e v e r t h e l e s s we must
observe that, so far as the Pythagoreans themselves are concerned,
they had a quite special m otive for engaging in such investigations.
Aristotle reports that they held that ‘ all things are num bers’ or that
significance o f this fragm ent for the role o f experim ent in Presocratic, particularly
Pythagorean, philosophy is to be found in Senn 1929, pp. 2 7 iff. Cf. also the obscure
report from Aristoxenus, preserved in a scholium on Plato, Phd. io8 d, that Hippasus
constructed bronze disks o f varying thickness to produce certain harmonies (cf. also
T heon o f Sm yrna 57.7 on Pythagoras).
Archytas also develops several analogies to explain acoustical phenom ena, (i) with
w ater poured into vessels, to support a suggestion that some sounds m ay not be per­
ceptible because o f their extreme intensity, and (2) with missiles, where the force of
the missile is com pared with the intensity o f the sound.
R. 5 3o d ~ 53ic, c f above, p. 133 n. 36.
See R. 531 b 7.
>0* T h a t is, for the purposes he has in m ind in R. vii, where he is describing how to train
the Guardians in abstract thought: see above, pp. i32f.
 146 The development o f empirical research
‘ things im itate n u m b e r s a doctrine th at was evidently applied in
a wide variety o f contexts, including not only acoustics and astro­
n o m y , b u t also to such examples as justice (equated w ith the
num ber four, the first square number) and m arriage (equated w ith
the num ber five, the union o f m ale - identified w ith the num ber
three - and fem ale - tw o).'°s C learly acoustical inquiries w ere part o f
a general search for support for this overall principle that ‘ things are
num bers’ . It w ould be quite unwise to assume that the earlier
Pythagoreans drew any sharp distinction between, on the one hand,
those acoustical investigations, and, on the other, reflections about
the sym bolic associations o f certain numbers. O u r evidence certainly
suggests that w hat we m ight describe as em pirical research was
carried out in acoustics before P la to : b u t the context shows how rash
it w ould be to ascribe to the Pythagoreans themselves any clear idea
o f the value o f em pirical research in general, let alone any recognition
o f the role and conditions o f w h at we should call the experim ental
method. W e must recognise, therefore, that in the one m ajor case
where we have evidence o f philosophers engaging in em pirical
research before Plato, exceptional - and com plex - motives w ere at
work.
H IP PO C R A T IC M E D IC IN E AND
THE DEVELOPM ENT OF D ISSECTIO N
O u r second and m uch richer source o f inform ation for the study o f
the use and developm ent o f em pirical methods in early G reek science
is the H ippocratic Corpus. W here the observational support for the
philosophers’ speculations is generally acknow ledged to have been
thin, the m edical writers have often been represented as excellent
practitioners, indeed sometimes as the founders, o f the em pirical
method. O u r task in this section is to assess those claims, and we m ay
begin where a direct comparison is possible between some o f the
m edical writers and the natural philosophers. O u r extant H ip p o­
cratic treatises include m any discussions o f problems that are raised
in natural philosophy, notably such questions as the fundam ental
constituents o f physical objects in general or o f the hum an body in
E.g. Metaph. g S s b a s ff, 987b 11 f, ayff, lo g o a a o ff. O n the problems o f reconciling the
statements that things are, and that they imitate, numbers, see, for example, G uthrie
1962, p p. aagff.
See further below, pp. 173f.
'05 See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaph. g S sb a g ff, 990a i8ff, I0 7 8 b 2 iff, ps-Arist. M M 1182a i iff,
Alexander, In Metaph. sS .io ff. A t Metaph. 1093a i3 ff Aristotle is particularly scathing
in his objections to those w ho saw a special significance in the number seven and who
connected different instances o f sevens together.
The development o f empirical research 147
particular, and w ith the m edical writers we have the advantage that
we do not depend on quotations or interpretations, but can ju d g e
their arguments and evidence as they presented them.
As we have seen, On Ancient Medicine attacked the use o f a m ethod
based on ‘ hypotheses’ or ‘ postulates’ , where it is ‘ not clear either to
the speaker him self or to his audience w hether w hat was said was
true or n o t’,^®^ a procedure w hich the w riter evidently took to be
typical o f natural philosophy, even if his own prim ary concern is
to criticise the use o f this ‘ new-fangled ’ w ay o f inquiry in m edicine
itself But the question we must now ask is how far he im plem ented
his principles in practice in his ow n accounts o f such matters as the
constituents o f the body and the causes o f diseases. T h e physiological
and pathological theories he singles out for particular criticism are
those based on the hot, the cold, the w et and the dry, and he pays
particular attention to arguing that the hot and the cold are am ong
the weakest ‘ pow ers’ in the body.^°^ Y e t when he comes to present
his ow n view concerning w hat the body is composed o f and w hat
causes diseases, the constituents he identifies turn out to be such
things as the salty, the bitter and the sweet, the acidic, the astringent
and the insipid."® It is true that this doctrine is m ore com plex than
those he rejects: he insists that there are m any different components
that have ‘ powers ’ o f m an y different kinds, both in num ber and in
strength.*" Y e t it is otherwise open - we should say - to very similar
objections. T h e ‘ salty ’ , the ‘ b itte r’ and so on are left vague and ill-
or un-defined. A lth ou gh the w riter’s ideas about isolating the
operative factors in pathological conditions are adm irable, he
does not, in practice, follow his analysis through to the point where
he can show that the types o f constituents he refers to are indeed the
causes o f particular complaints. "3 H e sees that treatm ent must
106 ch. I, C M G I, i 36.i5ff, cf. above, p. 135.
See V M ch. 20, C M G i, i 5 i.6 ff, where he refers to those ‘ who have written about
nature ’ and (if our text is correct) mentions Empedocles by name in p a rticu la r: the
w riter’s argum ent at that point is that the correct w a y o f discovering ‘ about n atu re’
is from medicine.
See especially V M ch. 13, C M G i, i 44.8, and cf. also ch. i, C M G i, i 36.16 (where,
however, the reading is disputed).
109 chh. I and 13 -17 especially, C M G i, i 36.2!? and 44,8fl.
•'Ο V M ch. 14, CM G I, I 45.26fT. V M ch. 14, CM G 1, 1 45.28flf.
Especially V M ch. 19, C M G i, i 50.7ff, on w hich see above, ch. i, p. 54.
T hus in ch. 19 {CM G i, i 50.2ff) he observes that hoarseness, sore throats, erysipelas
and pneum onia are accom panied b y salty, w atery and pungent discharges, and that
when these discharges are ‘ concocted’ the fever and the other pains cease, in an
argum ent to show that the humours in question are instrumental in bringing about these
conditions. But he obviously fails to counter the possibility that the discharges are
m erely the symptoms, not the causes, o f both the onset, and the cessation, o f the condi­
tions. Cf. also a similar argum ent concerning the role o f yellow bile at ch. 19, 50.i4fF.
 148 The development o f empirical research
largely consist in the application o f fam iliar substances and the
control o f diet.” '^ Y e t his ow n interpretation o f the effective in­
gredients is, w e m ight say, almost as arb itrary and dogm atic as that
in terms o f the hot, the cold, the wet and the d r y ."s
T h e difficulties the w riter encountered, in attem pting to bring
evidence for his theories, emerge from two passages in particular.
First in ch. 15, to support his views concerning the diiferences
between the hot and astringent on the one hand, and the hot and
insipid on the other, he says he ‘ knows their effects to be quite
opposite’ ‘ not only in m an, but also in a leathern container or a
wooden vessel’ ."^ T h en in ch. 24, having suggested that the powers
o f the various humours must be exam ined, he takes an exam ple.
W h at w ill the sweet hum our change into, i f it changes its ow n nature
‘ by itself’, not b y adm ixture with something else? W ill it first
becom e bitter, or salty, or astringent, or acidic? H e answers his own
question by saying ‘ the acidic, I th in k ’, and again goes on to refer to
the possibility o f studying such changes outside the body. ‘ I f a m an
could light upon the truth by searching outside the body, he w ould
alw ays be able to select w hat is best.’ ” ^
T h e w riter o f On Ancient Medicine has, then, not ju st a general ideal,
that theories should be testable, but also a particular m ethod o f
approach in physiology. G iven th at it was not feasible to investigate
w hat goes on inside the body directly, he has an alternative pro­
cedure to propose, that o f studying the changes that take place in
substances outside the body and draw ing inferences - by analogy -
concerning w hat happens inside it. Y e t the gap between theory and
practice is still wide. I f he did indeed conduct investigations o f the
type he refers to in chh. 15 and 24, he does not report them ."^
M oreover, even i f he had carried them out, we m ay w onder w hat they
See chh. i3ff, especially ch. 15, CM G i, i 46.22ff, and cf. ch. 5, 39.2iff.
N or is it clear precisely how he would define ‘ strong’ and ‘ w e ak ’, although no doubt
in practice there was a fair measure o f agreement about w hat counted as ‘ strong’
foods (e.g. ch. 6, C M G i, i 3g.27ff). O ne of his objections to ‘ the h o t’ ‘ the c o ld ’ ‘ the
w e t’ and ‘ the d r y ’ is that those who appeal to them are unable to point to them
existing in a pure state (ch. 15, 46.2o ff): but it was obviously open to his opponents to
object that the same m ight also be said concerning his own ‘ sa lty ’ ‘ b itte r’ ‘ sw eet’
‘ astringent’ and ‘ insipid’ . A gain , he argues that if the hot is w hat causes pain, then
relief should be procured by the cold (ch. 13, 44.18ff): but while he asserts that condi­
tions are relieved when, for example, the salty is counteracted and concocted, how far
that was always true m ight be questioned.
"6 V M ch. 15, C M G I, I 47.5ff.
“ 7 V M ch. 24, C M G I, I 55.4ff. Cf. also the method recomm ended in studying the effect
o f different structures in the body, ch. 22, 53.i2ff, see below, pp. i58f.
In ch. 15, the verb οίδα, 47.6, m ay suggest past general experience, and in ch. 24
the optatives in the conditional sentence (55.12) m ight more naturally refer to hypo­
thetical, than to an actual, investigations.
The development o f empirical research 149
would have revealed. T h e w riter’s insistence on excluding arbitrary
postulates from m edicine, adm irable as it is as an expression o f the
need to challenge assumptions, represents a quite im practicable
ideal. In practice, the conceptual fram ework o f his own theories is
not m uch less purely speculative than that o f those o f his opponents,
and this w ould clearly have been the m ajor lim iting factor to the
usefulness o f the type o f em pirical investigations he envisaged.
T h e point can be further illustrated by reference to other treatises
that propose general physiological or pathological doctrines. In
several cases, to be sure, the em pirical support for such doctrines is
negligible. This is true not only o f such sophistic works as OnBreaths,^^^
but also, for instance, o f the treatise On Regimen. T h e w riter first
states that a knowledge o f the constitution o f m an is necessary for an
understanding o f dietetics, and then advances the view that the
elements o f w hich the body is composed are fire (which is hot and
dry) and w ater (cold and wet).^21 g ^ t although the bulk o f the
treatise contains a detailed account of, for exam ple, the effects o f
different foods, w hich, w hile being largely theoretical and schem atic,
appears also to draw on experience and perhaps even the w riter’s
own first-hand observations, ^22 general physiological theory o f the
opening chapters o f book i is asserted as baldly and dogm atically as
any doctrine attributed to the Presocratic philosophers. ^^3 C hapter 3,
in fact, contains neither evidence nor argum ent to establish its dualist
elem ent theory.
Y e t two other treatises make more serious attempts to offer
evidence in support o f general physiological doctrines. As w e have
already rem arked. On the Nature o f Man not only refutes monistic
elem ent theories w hether proposed b y philosophers or doctors, but
also promises to prove its ow n four-hum our doctrine. T h e m ain
H avin g promised to show that air is the cause o f every kind o f disease (ch. 5, C M G i,
I 9 4 .6 f, cf. above, p. 88 n. 151), the writer goes through some o f the more obvious
pathological conditions first establishing that air plays some role, and then claim ing
that it is the cause. Thus in chh. 6-8 (94.8ff) he argues that there are two kinds o f
fever, epidemic and sporadic. Epidem ic fevers are caused by the air we breathe (they
are common because all men breathe the same air). Sporadic fevers come from food,
but with the food we eat we also take in m uch air (as is ‘ c le a r’ from belching, 95.6fF),
and so air is responsible for these fevers too.
Viet. I ch. 2, L VI 468.6ff. Viet, r chh. 3 and 4, L v i 4 72 .i2 if, 474.8ff.
See especially Viet. 11 chh. 3gff, L v i 534.17ff.
**3 Viet. I chh. 4 and 5 (L v i 474.8ff), which contain several almost verbatim quotations
from Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaxagoras, show that the vsnriter is w ell aware of,
and has been influenced by, the work o f these philosophers.
See above, pp. 93f. In addition to the vocabulary o f ‘ dem onstration’ and ‘ necessity’
(άποδείκνυμι,άττοφαίνω, άνάγκη), discussed above, p. 103 n. 244, the writer makes extensive
use o f that o f ‘ eviden ce’ : see, for example, τεκμήριον at ch. i, L v i 32.13, ch. 2, 36.15,
ch. 7, 46.11, and μαρτύριαν at ch. i , 32.13, ch. 6, 44.10, ch. 7, 50.9.
150 The development o f empirical research
evidence the w riter adduces relates to the effects o f drugs, w hich he
goes into in some detail. H e first mentions that there are drugs that
draw out phlegm , and others that purge bile and black bile,i2s and
then points out, against the monists, that when a m an dies from
excessive purgation he does not vom it just one single hum our, but
when, for exam ple, he has ‘ drunk a drug w hich withdraws bile, he
first vomits bile, but then also phlegm , and then in addition to these,
under the constraint o f necessity, also black bile, and they end up
vom iting pure blood and that is how they d ie ’ .^26 Finally he argues
that the proportions o f the humours va ry in the body according to
the seasons,127 and for this too he suggests ‘ a most clear testim ony’ ,
nam ely that ‘ i f you w ill give the same m an the same drug four times
in the year, his vom it w ill be most phlegm atic in winter, most liquid
in spring, most bilious in summer and blackest in au tu m n ’ .128 W hile
the evidence cited reveals the presence o f certain substances in the
body clearly enough, the w riter asserts that they must be congenital
m erely on the grounds that they can alw ays be found in the body
and the drugs alw ays have the same effect. ^29 M oreover, apart from
the doubtfulness o f that inference, the w riter assumes, w hat he needs
to prove, that the humours in question are the sole constituents o f the
body.
T h en a second treatise that marshals evidence in connection w ith
a doctrine concerning the constitution o f the hum an body is On
Fleshes. A fter putting forward a version o f the four-elem ent theory in
ch. 2 , ^ 3 0 the w riter gives an account o f the form ation o f the parts o f
the body in w hich ‘ the glutinous’ (associated w ith the cold) and ‘ the
fa tty ’ (associated w ith the hot) p lay the ch ief role.^^i As ‘ clear
evidences’ (τεκμήρια. . .σαφέα) o f the distinction between these two
he proposes a simple test, that o f cooking the different parts o f the
body, when, he says, it will be found that the ‘ glutinous’ and
‘ sinew y’ parts do not cook easily, while the ‘ fa tty ’ parts do.^3^
'^5 Nat. Horn. ch. 5, L v i 42.8ff.
Nat. Horn. ch. 6, L v i 44.1 iff, cf. isfF.
Nat. Horn. ch. 7, L v i 46.i7fF, 48.1 off.
Nat. Horn. ch. 7, L v i so.gff.
Nat. Horn. ch. 5, L v i 42.iSff. It is true that the first reference to the effect o f drugs, in
that chapter, is m ade prim arily to estabHsh the differences between the humours (42.8ff):
yet no other proof is offered to support the assertion that man is blood, phlegm , yellow
bile and black bile, ‘ both by convention and according to n atu re’, let alone the claim
that this had been shown.
“ o Cam. ch. 2, L viii 584.gif.
“ I Cam. chh. 3ff, especially ch. 4, L vm 588.i4ff.
*32 Cam. ch. 4, L vni 588.25ff. In later chapters the author conducts simple tests with
blood, showing that it does not coagulate when shaken, though it does when it is
allowed to rest and goes cold (ch. 8, 594.i4ff: this is taken to support a theory that the
The development o f empirical research 151
As in On the Nature o f Man, the bid to muster evidential support for
a general physiological theory is apparent. Even though the question
o f the fundam ental constituents o f the body was both highly obscure
and m uch disputed, both treatises have suggestions to m ake about
how aspects o f the problem m ay be investigated em pirically. N ow
whether, or how far, the tests described were actually carried out is
again (as w ith On Ancient Medicine) problematic.^33 Y e t even if they
had been conducted system atically, they w ould have fallen far short
o f establishing the general theories in connection with w hich they
were suggested. In both cases the results o f the tests were interpreted
solely in terms o f the author’s ow n assumptions - when w hat was
needed was for those assumptions to be tested against others. T h e
function o f these tests was to corroborate the theories in question, not
to provide data to decide between com peting theories.
W here the m edical writers attem pted to conduct em pirical
research in relation to such problems as the fundam ental constituents
o f the body, their efforts m et w ith little success, although their
com parative ineffectiveness should not lead us to underestimate the
significance o f the fact that the efforts were m ade at all. T h e draw ­
back, in this field o f inquiry, was that their investigations were not
open-ended, but designed specifically to provide support for theories
that appear to have been adopted usually on the basis o f general,
often philosophical, considerations and arguments. It is, however,
rather in relation to other aspects o f their w ork that the H ippocratic
writers have been celebrated for their cham pionship o f em pirical
methods, particularly in connection with clinical observations and
prognosis. ^3 4
First w e have two extended accounts, in Prognosis and the first book
o f the Epidemics, that show that these authors, at least, held that
prognosis should be based on a very thorough exam ination o f the
patient. In Prognosis, w hich is particularly concerned w ith ‘ a cu te’
liver is form ed from the blood ‘ when the cold defeats the w a rm ’, 5 94.i2ff), and that if
the ‘ skin’ is rem oved from coagulating blood, another one is formed (ch. 9, sgS.gff,
this being taken to show that the skin o f the body itself is formed from the blood under
the effects of the cold and the winds). T his writer too appeals to visible effects outside
the body to explain processes within it.
” 3 In Nat. Horn. ch. 5, L v i 42.1 off, the protasis o f the conditional referring to the first
test is introduced b y ήν, with the verb in the subjunctive (the main verb is present
indicative): in Cam. ch. 4, L viii 590.iff, the protasis is introduced with el with the
optative, though the main verbs are, again, present indicatives.
•34 W here a modern doctor concentrates his attention on diagnosis, the ancient practi­
tioner focused, rather, on ‘ prognosis’, but this covered the past and present, as well
as the future, of the disease. Prog. ch. i, L 11 i io.2ff, shows that apart from predicting
the outcom e o f the disease, the doctor aimed to inform his patients also on their present
and past condition.
152 The deOelopment o f empirical research
diseases, that is those accom panied by high fever, such as pneum onia,
the w riter gives detailed instructions about how the doctor should
proceed. First he should exam ine the patient’s face, for exam ple the
colour and texture o f the skin, and especially the eyes, where he
should study w hether ‘ they avoid the glare o f light, or w eep in­
vo lu n ta rily’ , w hether ‘ the whites are liv id ’, w hether the eyes
‘ w ander, or project, or are deeply sunken’, and so on.*3s H e should
also inquire^36 ^qw the patient slept, about his bowels and his
appetite: he should take into account the p atien t’s posture, his
breathing and the tem peraturei 37 o f the head, hands and feet, and
separate c h a p t e r s a r e devoted to how to interpret the signs to be
found in the patient’s stools, urine, vom it and sputum. *39 T hus he
has this to say on the second o f these:
urine is best when there is a white, smooth, even deposit in it the whole time up to
the crisis of the disease. .. Sediment like barley-meal in the urine is b a d .. . Thin
white sediment is a very bad sign, and it is even worse if it resembles bran. . .So
long as the urine is thin and yellowish-red, the disease is not ripen ed .. .W hen a
patient continues to pass thin raw urine for a long time and the other signs indicate
recovery, the formation of an abscess should be expected in the parts below the
diaphragm. When grease forms patterns like cobwebs on the surface of the urine,
this constitutes a warning, for it is a sign of wasting. . .
O u r second, m ore sum mary, account o f the factors the doctor
should consider in prognosis is in Epidemics i ch. 10. This begins b y
noting that ‘ the nature o f m an in general and o f each individual,
and the characteristics o f each disease ’ should be learned and then
proceed s:
Then we must consider the patient, what food is given to him and who gives i t . . .
the conditions of climate and locality both in general and in particular, the
'^5 Prog. ch. 2, L II I i2 .i2 ff, the famous description o f the so-called H ippocratic ‘ facies’ .
Prog. chh. 3ff, L 11 ii8.7flF.
'37 Ju dged , no doubt, sim ply by touch, Prog. ch. 9, L n I32.6ff. Cf. Nat. Ham. ch. 5,
L VI 42.3fF, and ch. 7, 46.1 iff, V M ch. 18, C M G i, i 49.1 of, de Arte ch. 9, C M G 1,
^ Epid. Ill case 15 of the second series, L iii 142. i i f (cf. cases 6 and 8 o f the first
series and 5 o f the second, L iii 50.9, 56.9, 118 .11).
*3* Prog. chh. 11-14 , L II 134.13-146.15.
’ 39 T h e most notable absentee from the list o f things the doctor should consider is the pulse.
A lthough the phenom ena o f pulsation, throbbing and palpitation are referred to by
H ippocratic writers, the value o f the pulse in diagnosis was not appreciated until after
the date o f most o f the H ippocratic treatises. T h e first person to restrict the pulse to a
distinct group o f vessels, the arteries, and to recognise that it can be used as an indicator
o f disease, was p robably Praxagoras o f Cos, working around 300 B .C . Auscultation,
applying the ear to the chest, though not referred to in Prog., is clearly described
elsewhere in the H ippocradc Corpus, e.g. Morb. n ch. 61, L vii 94.i6f, Morb. in ch. 16,
L VII 152.2 if.
Prog. ch. 12, L II i3 8 .is ff (trans. C hadw ick-M an n 1978). It is notable that the w riter
ends: ‘ Y o u must not be deceived if these appearances result merely from a diseased
condition o f the bladder, for they m ay then indicate not a disease o f the whole body,
but merely o f that o rg a n ’ (i4 2 .i2 ff).
The development o f empirical research 153
patient’s customs, mode of life, pursuits and age. Then we must consider his
speech, his mannerisms, his silences, his thoughts, his habits of sleep or wakefulness
and his dreams, their nature and time.^+^Next we must note whether he plucks his
hair, scratches or weeps. W e must observe his paroxysms, his stools, urine, sputum
and vomit. We look for any change in the state of the malady, how often such
changes occur and their nature, and the particular changes which induce death
or a crisis. Observe, too, sweating, shivering, chill, cough, sneezing, hiccough, the
kind of breathing, belching, wind, whether silent or noisy, haemorrhages and
haemorrhoids. W e must determine the significance of all these s i g n s . 1+2
These accounts o f how to conduct a clinical exam ination display a
rem arkable appreciation o f the variety o f points to be considered,
and an acute sense o f the need for thoroughness and attention to
detail. M oreover the principles they set out were not just idealised
recomm endations, but - sometimes, at least - closely followed in
practice. A p art from the so-called ‘ constitutions’ (general descrip­
tions o f the outbreaks o f diseases concentrating on such matters as
the clim atic conditions), the first and third books o f the Epidemics
contain a total o f forty-two individual case-histories. These are
certainly not the first extant clinical reports in the history o f m edi­
cine; they are anticipated b y more than a thousand years in E gypt
b y the famous series o f surgical cases in the Edw in Sm ith p a p y r u s .
B ut whereas the Edw in Sm ith papyrus limits itself to b rief notes
under the five headings o f title, exam ination, diagnosis, treatm ent
and explanations o f terms, the H ippocratic treatises engage in
sustained and often m uch more detailed reports in w hich the progress
o f particular patients is recorded, generally day b y day, over quite
long periods. T h e entries under each day vary from a single rem ark
to an elaborate description o f some nine or ten lines, and in some
cases occasional observations continue to be set down up to the
120th d ay from the onset o f the illness. Thus, to illustrate from a
single exam ple, after briefer comments on the second and third
days’ symptoms, case 3 o f the first series in Epidemics iii proceeds:
Fourth day: vomited small quantities of yellow bilious matter and, after a while,
a small quantity of rust-coloured material. There was a small haemorrhage of pure
blood from the left side of the nose; stools and urine as before; sweating about the
head and shoulders; spleen enlarged; pain in the region of the thigh: a rather
W hat we should describe as psychological factors, such as, for example, despondency,
are also referred to, for instance, in case 6 o f the first series, and cases 2, 11 and 15 of
the second, in Epid. in, L lu 52.8f, i i s . i i f , I34.2ff, 142.6ff.
Epid. I, section 3, ch. 10, L n 668 .i4ff (trans. C hadw ick-M an n , 1978, ch. 23).
T his dates from around 1600 B .C ., but incorporates m aterial from a much earlier
period, see Breasted 1930. T h e Edwin Sm ith papyrus is exceptional, so far as our extant
evidence for the m edical practice in anj ancient N ear Eastern civilisation is concerned,
in being almost entirely free from m agic and superstition.
 154 The development o f empirical research
flabby distension of the right hypochondrium; did not sleep at night; slight
delirium,
In this case observations continue daily till the twenth-first day, and
further occasional entries are m ade up to the fortieth day w hen -
exceptionally 145 _ this patient reached a crisis and recovered.
These case-histories are undoubtedly one o f the star exam ples o f
detailed observations in early G reek science. T h e y were evidently
carried out w ith great care and thoroughness, and they contain few
interpretative comments and no explicit overall theory o f disease.
Y e t the terms used in the descriptions are, o f course, ‘ th eory-laden’,
and they reveal certain assumptions concerning the nature and
causes o f diseases. Thus although these treatises do not propose any
schem atic doctrine o f humours, such as we have in On the Mature o f
Man, they often refer - as our exam ple does - to the ‘ bilious ’ or
‘ p h legm atic’ m atter in the patients’ discharges.
T h e prim ary aim o f these case-histories is clearly to provide as
exact a record as possible o f the cases investigated. But we can and
should be more precise than this as to the writers’ m o t i v e s . F i r s t ,
the object o f assembling the collections o f case-histories was p robably
less to facilitate diagnosis, than to provide inform ation w hich w ould
help the doctor to predict the outcomes o f diseases, especially w hether
the patient w ould die or recover. Secondly, and more im portantly,
the writers have, as is b y now w ell known, a particular m otive for
carrying out and recording their observations daily - over and above
the laudable desire to be thorough in their w ork - nam ely that they
adhere to the comm on G reek m edical theory that the course o f
acute diseases is determ ined b y w hat were called ‘ critical d a y s’ ,
when m arked changes take place in the patient’s symptoms. Estab­
lishing the periodicity o f the disease was crucial in diagnosing it as a
‘ q u a rta n ’ a ‘ tertian ’ a ‘ sem i-tertian’ or even an ‘ irreg u la r’ fever,
for instance. M oreover several case-histories draw attention to the
fact that the pains or exacerbations occurred on the even days.^'^’
Epid. Ill, L III 38.7-44.8, especially 40.7ff.
*■*5 O f the 42 cases described, 25, or nearly 6 0 % , end in death.
But we m ay contrast the less ‘ theory-laden’ terms, such as the reference to ‘ rust-
coloured’ material, Ιώδεσ, in the discharges at L iii 40.8.
>“*7 I say ‘ w riters’ because although Epid. i and m as we have them form a continuous
whole, the observations they record m ay well be the work o f several different practi­
tioners.
Sim ilarly in Prog, the writer concentrates much of his attention on whether the ‘ signs’
he identifies are favourable or unfavourable.
*·♦’ E.g. Epid. I case i, L 11 684.9, Epid. in cases 3, 10 and 12 o f the second series, L iii
ii6 .i2 f , i32.4f, 136.13. T h e symbolic associations that odd and even m ight have for
some Greeks are clear from their inclusion in the Pythagorean T ab le o f Opposites,
The development o f empirical research 155
A concern to determ ine the pattern in the times o f crisis and relapse
is apparent in the generalisations in the third constitution in
Epidemics i,*so and in the final chapter o f that constitution w e find a
detailed table o f critical periods for diseases that had crises on even,
and those that had crises on odd, d a y s .^ s i
It w ould evidently be quite mistaken to represent w hat m otivated
these writers as sim ply some general idea o f the value o f careful
em pirical investigations. A t the same time these texts rem ain good
evidence o f a capacity for carrying out sustained and meticulous
observations when there were particular reasons for so doing, that is
when there was a general theory - in this case the doctrine o f
critical days - to prom pt them. T h e data are collected and set out
system atically and w ith care. M oreover although some o f the con­
clusions in the constitutions take the form o f sweeping generalisations
concerning the periodicities o f d i s e a s e s , ^ 5 2 m any are explicitly
qualified: the writers state w hat happened ‘ for the most p a r t’ or ‘ in
the m ajority o f cases’ and exceptions are noted.*S3 It is not the case
that the writers conducted their observations m erely to confirm rules
that they had alreadyformulated in detail. R ath er those detailed rules are,
in the m ain, generalisations w hich they arrived at on the basis o f
their particular observations*s 4 including, no doubt, m any others
besides those recorded in the case-histories as we have them.^ss
T h e case-histories in Epidemics i and iii provide clear testimony o f
the systematic observations that were undertaken, in certain circum -
reported b y Aristode, Metaph. 986a22ff, where ‘ o d d ’ is correlated with right, male,
light and good, ‘ even ’ w ith left, female, darkness and evil.
*5° E.g. ‘ There was, however, a change in the periods at which the crisis occurred, it
taking place usually on the fifth day from the beginning o f the illness. A remission of
four days would be followed by a relapse with the crisis on the fifth d a y . . . M ost of
those who behaved in this w a y were children, but it happened occasionally in adults.
In some cases a crisis occurred on the eleventh day, a relapse on the fourteenth and the
final crisis on the twentieth. But if shivering fits supervened about the twentieth day,
the crisis took place on the fortieth’ {Epid. i ch. 9, L 11 666.1 iff, ch. 22 C h a d w ick -
M ann). Epid. 1 ch. 12, L 11 e y S .sff (ch. 26 C hadw ick-M an n).
See especially Epid. 1 ch. 12, L 11 678.5ff (ch. 26 C hadw ick-M an n).
>53 As, for example, at Epid. i ch. 9, L 11 666.1 iff, 668.7ff, quoted above, n. 150. Earlier
in the same chapter, 66o.6ff, the remark is m ade that the crises were sometimes
similar, sometimes dissimilar, and this is followed b y a reference to the cases o f two
brothers who fell ill at the same time, but had their crises on different days; c f also
Epid. I ch. I I , L II 674.14-676.10, iii chh. 4 and 9, L in 70.14-76.4, 90.iff, and Prog,
ch. 20, L II i68 .i6 ff, where the author observes that critical periods cannot be calcu­
lated in whole days any more than the solar year or the lunar month can; c f also
Morb. I ch. 16, L v i 168.23-170.8.
C f D eichgraber 1933a, pp. 2 o f
>55 T hus the constitutions refer by name to several individual patients for whom there
are no corresponding case-histories in either Epid. i or iii. O n the disparities between
the accounts in the constitutions and those in the case-histories, see D eichgraber 1933a,
pp. I iff.
156 The development o f empirical research
stances, b y some H ippocratic physicians. Y e t if w e turn to other
subjects that they were interested in, the appUcation o f em pirical
techniques o f research was, in certain respects, severely lim ited. O n e
topic that offers a good opportunity to test this is the use o f dis­
s e c tio n . origin o f this method has sometimes been traced back
to A lcm aeon, that is to some time about the m iddle o f the fifth
century, but this is quite d u b i o u s . *S7 M uch o f the account in our ch ief
source, Chalcidius, must be taken to relate not to A lcm aeon, but to
another m uch iater anatomist whom he mentions, nam ely Hero-
philus, one o f the foremost A lexandrian biologists who undoubtedly
dissected, and m ay even have vivisected, not just animals, but also
hum an s u b je c ts .^ s ^ most we can infer from Chalcidius (as­
suming that his report has some basis in fact) is that A lcm aeon
excised, rather than dissected, the eye.^sp O u r other sources for him,
notably the account o f his theory o f the senses in Theophrastus, yield
no evidence that justifies the conclusion that he dissected, and some
grounds for believing that he did not.^^®
But w hile the m ethod should not be thought to have originated as
early as A lcm aeon, w e have good evidence, nevertheless, that the
idea o f opening animals to conduct certain investigations had
occurred to certain individuals in some contexts by the late fifth or
early fourth century. First there is the text in On the Sacred Disease
w hich we have already discussed, where the author mentions the
possibility o f carrying out a post-mortem dissection on the brain o f
certain animals - he specifies goats - in order to establish the causes
156 W hat follows is largely based on L loyd 1975a, to w hich I m ay refer for a detailed
analysis o f the evidence.
•57 A p art from L loyd 1975a, see also M ansfeld 1975. O n the date of Alcm aeon’s work
(more likely to be around 450 than early fifth or late sixth century), see Lloyd 1975a,
p. 114.
Cf. further below, pp. 165^
' 5® O f the three distinct investigations, (i) cutting out the eyeball, (2) dissecting the eye
itself, and (3) cutting open the skull to investigate the structures com m unicating with
the eye within the skull itself, Alcm aeon is much more likely to have undertaken (i)
than either (2) or (3), that is his investigation was probably confined to the orbit, to
reveal the structures leading off from the back o f the eye towards the b ra in : see L loyd
1975^» PP· ii 8 f f on Chalcidius, In Ti. ch. 246, 256.16-257.15.
160 Theophrastus, Sens. 25f, D K 24 A 5. This indicates that Alcm aeon was interested in
the elements in the eye (fire and water) but does not suggest that he had any clear
idea o f its internal structure. It also gives details o f his theory o f pores or channels
linking the senses with the brain, which he held to be the seat of consciousness. Y e t i f
he conducted em pirical investigations to support his theory, it is far more probable
that he did so by using a probe, than by carrying out dissections in the strict sense.
Indeed if he had explored the cranial cavity by dissection, it is surprising that he
continued to hold, for example, that there are channels leading directly from the ear
to the brain. O n this and our other evidence (especially Aristotle, HA 492ai4flF,
GA 752b25ff, Aetius v 16.3, 17.3 and 24.1, and Censorinus, de die nat. ch. 5, io .7 ff),
see Lloyd 1975a, pp. 121-8.
The development o f empirical research 157
o f the sacred d i s e a s e . T h en Aristotle, who often him self refers to
the results o f dissections, w hether carried out b y him self or b y his
associates, ^ provides clear testim ony to his predecessors’ use o f the
m ethod. A t H A 511 b isfF, especially, he criticises earlier w ork on the
blood-vascular system and remarks on the difficulties o f conducting
observations; ‘ Those who have exam ined dead bodies^^^ b y dis­
section have not observed the principal sources o f the blood-vessels,
w hile those who have exam ined very em aciated living men have
inferred the sources o f the blood-vessels from w hat could then be seen
e x t e r n a l l y . T h i s shows both that dissection had been used by
those w ho had attem pted to describe the blood-vessels before
Aristotle, and that it was not their only m ethod, since some investi­
gators apparently relied on observations o f em aciated hum an
subjects.
O n the authority o f these evidences we m ay accept that dissections
w ere sometimes performed in the period before Aristotle. Y e t the
occasions w hen w e can definitely confirm the use o f the m ethod for
the purposes o f a scientific inquiry in fifth- or fourth-century texts
are rare,i6s despite the fact that m any H ippocratic authors pro­
nounce on anatom ical and physiological questions to which dissection
was, or m ight be thought to be, relevant. Thus w e have already noted
that the author o f On the Sacred Disease m aintains some highly
fanciful notions on the courses o f the ‘ vein s’ in the body, notions
w hich were evidently neither based on, nor checked by, dissection.
O f our other m ain pre-Aristotelian accounts o f the blood-vascular
system, the three that Aristotle him self quotes and attributes to
Syennesis o f Cyprus, Diogenes o f A pollonia and Polybus*^^ bear out
O n Morb. Sacr. ch. 11 paras. 3-5 (G) L v i 382.6ff and e.g. H dt. iv 58, see above,
p. 24 and n. 79. See below, pp. i62fT.
T h e coni 'xt makes clear that he is talking o f animals, not men.
HA 5 iib 2 o iF , cf. 4 96 311 and b4ff.
'* 5 T h e infrequency o f dissection for the purposes o f research is all the more striking in
that, in another context, divination b y the inspection o f entrails or haruspicy, animals
were regularly opened and their parts examined, even if that examination was usually
confined to an inspection o f surface features of, for exam ple, the liver (see e.g. Cicero,
Div. II ΐ2.28ίΓ, cf. Plato, T i. 71 a if). But although we find occasional references to
anatom ical data learned from sacrificial victim s in our ‘ scientific’ authors (e.g.
Aristotle, HA 496b24ff, PA 667b iff, and cf. Cam. ch. 8 which refers to blood taken from
sacrificial animals), the contrast in the context and aims o f divination, and those of
anatom ical studies, were no doubt sufficiently marked to act as an effective barrier to
comm unication. Cf. Rufus, Onom. i58.5ff, who notes the irrelevance o f certain of the
terms used in haruspicy from the point o f view o f medicine.
See above, ch. i, pp. 20-4.
*67 HA in chh. 2f, 5 1 1 b 2 3 ~ 5 i3 a 7 . T h e report o f Syennesis corresponds to part of ch. 8
o f the composite treatise Oss., that o f Polybus to the longer accounts in Oss. ch. 9 and
Nat. Horn. ch. 11. O n the development o f notions o f the blood-vascular system, see
especially H arris 1 9 7 3 .
15^ The deOelopment o f empirical research
his general criticism s: such dissections as they carried out must have
been quite cursory or superficial. A n over-fondness for bilateral
sym m etry is a feature o f all three accounts, and to ju d g e from the
references to blood-letting in the theories o f Diogenes and o f Polybus,
their views seem to have been partly based on (and no doubt served
in turn to justify) current practices in venesection. *^8 i t is true th at
some o f the surgical treatises, such as Fractures and Joints^ show a fair
know ledge o f surface anatom y and o f osteology, but this was, in all
probability, gained through the actual treatm ent o f fractures, dis­
locations and wounds. T here is nothing in those works to suggest that
their authors attem pted to increase their anatom ical knowledge b y
dissecting animals or men.^^p
In other treatises the theories put forw ard concerning the inter­
relations o f the m ain organs in the body are bizarre. On Regimen i
chh. 9^*^° has a doctrine o f three ‘ circuits’ in the body corresponding
to the three circuits o f the heavenly bodies. On Diseases iv ch. 39
im agines that the four m ain sources o f the humours in the body,
heart, head, spleen and liver, all com m unicate directly w ith the
stom ach.*71 Even w here we have a reference, as in On the Nature o f
the Child, to the possibility o f investigating the developm ent o f an
em bryo chick by incubating a batch o f tw enty or m ore hen’s eggs
and opening one each day, the author does not in fact set out the
results o f the inquiry he proposes in any detail but confines him self
to a single observation concerning the membranes extending from the
u m b i l i c u s . 172 W hen such treatises as On the Art and On Ancient Medicine
discuss how to proceed to gain insight into the internal functionings
o f the body, neither author mentions dissection. On the Art suggests
that nature m ay be m ade to yield inform ation by the adm inistration
o f certain foods and drinks, for e x a m p l e , * 7 3 and the w riter o f On
Ancient Medicine, having noted the difficulty o f obtaining knowledge
about the internal structures o f the body, recommends his usual
procedure o f studying objects outside it.^^4 X he vagueness o f his
'6* E.g. H /4 5 i2 a 3 o f (Diogenes), b iy f f, 24ff (Polybus).
Art. chh. I and 46 (L iv 80.iff, ig e .ig ff) mentions surgical interventions that involve
dissection, but does so m erely as ‘ thought experiments ’ and with no intention o f using
such procedures in the treatments he is discussing.
*70 L V I 4 8 2 . i 3 f f , e s p e c i a l l y 4 8 6 . 3 f f .
>7 » He illustrates v^^hat he believes happens inside the body b y referring to w hat he takes
to be an analogue to it, nam ely the behaviour o f water in a system o f intercom m uni­
cating vessels, L v ii 556.17ff.
Nat. Puer. ch. 29, L v ii 530.1 off. W hen Aristotle undertakes a similar investigation
at HA 561 a4ff, his account o f his observations is much more detailed.
De ArU c h . 1 2 , C M G i , i i 8 . 3 f f .
F M c h . 2 2 , C M G I , I 5 3 . i f f , I 2 f f : c f . above, p. 1 4 8 .
The development o f empirical research 159
classification o f internal structures can be ju d ged from the fact that
the bladder, skull and w om b are said to be similar, nam ely ‘ broad
and tap erin g’, like a cupping-glass.
But i f the general impression given by most fifth- and early fourth-
century H ippocratic works^^s is that their authors’ knowledge o f
internal anatom y was extrem ely lim ited,*^6 two treatises provide
something o f an exception. Both On the Places in Man and On Fleshes
give quite detailed and in parts, at least, fairly accurate accounts o f
the sense-organs and the blood-vessels. Thus On the Places in Man
distinguishes three membranes in the eye, a thick outer one, a
thinner m iddle one and a third inner one ‘ that gtiards the moist
elem ent ’ : the w riter further identifies certain com m unications
between the eye and the brain, and distinguishes two membranes o f
the brain itself, a thick outer one and a thin one that touches the
brain. 177 In On Fleshes there is an account o f the blood-vessels in w hich
two m ain vessels com m unicating w ith the heart are clearly distinguish­
ed, the άρτηρίη (corresponding to the aorta and its branches) and
the hollow φλέψ (vena cava),*78 and the organs o f hearing, smell
and sight are described w ith some care in separate chapters.*79
W e should certainly not rule out the possibility that these accounts
were based, in part, upon dissection. Y e t even here w e cannot
establish this for certain. It is striking that w hile both authors refer
to the evidence to be gained from studying lesions,*®® neither does to
any dissection. On Fleshes ch. 19 is particularly rem arkable in that
T h e one H ippocratic treatise that refers extensively to dissection is Cord., w hich gives
a b rief but quite detailed account o f the anatom y o f the heart, including unmistakable
references to two o f the valves o f the heart, where both the structure and function are
correctly understood (chh. lo and 12, L ix 86.i3fF, g o .iif f ) . Y e t first A bel 1958, and
then Lonie 1973, have shown that this treatise is much later than most o f the H ippo­
cratic collection, being roughly contem porary w ith the w ork o f Herophilus and
Erasistratus (early third century B .C .) . Cord, is evidence for dissection, bu t for it s use
in the third, not the fifth or fourth, century.
A similar conclusion applies also to the natural philosophers. Diogenes’ account o f the
blood-vessels has already been mentioned (p. 158). Em pedocles’ theories o f vision and
respiration (Frr. 84 and 100) are based on analogies and are quite unlikely to have been
confirmed b y dissection: though they include references to the membranes o f the eye,
for instance, those references are quite vague and imprecise. A lthough Democritus
evidently had wide biological interests, and Theophriistus’ report of his account o f the
eye suggests he distinguished between its ‘ outer membrane ’ and its inner parte {Sens.
49ff), none o f our testimonies can be said to show conclusively that he had dissected
(cf. L loyd 1975a, pp. 13 if ) · O n Anaxagoras, see above, p. 24 n. 79 and below, p. r6 i,
n. 185. *77 Loc. Horn. ch. 2, L v i 278.i4ff: cf. ch. 3, 28 o.ioff on the blood-vessels.
‘ 78 Cam. chh. 5f, L viii 590. sff.
>79 Cam. chh. 15 -17 , L v iii 6 o 2 .i9 ff (see L loyd 1975a, p. 136)· Elsewhere, however, as
we have noted (above, p. 150), Cam. proposes highly speculative physiological theories.
Loc. Horn. ch. 2, L v i 28o.5f notes that in an injury of the eye when the m iddle mem­
brane is broken, it ‘ comes out like a bla d d er’ . Cam. ch. 17, L viii 6 o 6 .io ff says ‘ we
have often seen glutinous moisture oozing from an eye that has ru p tu red’.
 16ο The development o f empirical research
the author mentions w h at indeed he claims he has often seen, nam ely
an aborted hum an foetus. Y e t although he describes w hat this is like
‘ if you put (it) in w ater and inspect i t ’, there is no suggestion that
the foetus m ight be dissected. His account is confined to surface
features and there is no reference to any internal organ at all.^*^
T h e situation our analysis reveals poses an obvious question and
one that w ill now take us beyond the H ippocratic writers themselves.
E vidently it was not the case that, once dissection had begun to be
used in particular contexts, the m ethod cam e fairly rapidly to be
applied generally to a w ide range o f anatom ical topics, and w e m ay
w ell ask w h y this was so, w hile recognising that such suggestions as
w e can p u t forw ard on such an issue must be conjectural. First it is
clear from the w ay in w hich Aristotle sets out to justify the investi­
gation o f the internal parts o f animals^^z that some Greeks^^a felt a
certain squeamishness on the m atter. Indeed Aristotle him self writes
that ‘ it is not possible to look at the constituent parts o f hum an
beings, such as blood, flesh, bones, blood-vessels and the like,
w ithout considerable d i s t a s t e Y e t the im portance o f this factor
should not be exaggerated. T here can be no doubt that the general
p ublic felt a certain revulsion from the study o f internal a n a to m y ;
nor is there anything exceptional about the ancients here, since the
same holds true today. But how far that provides an answer to our
question is hard to ju d ge. A fter all, Aristotle him self was successful
in overcom ing his ow n expressed distaste so far as animals are
concerned, and w e have no reason to believe that as a general rule
the m edical practitioners (at least) w ould have been more inhibited
than Aristotle in this regard.
A more fundam ental factor concerns the assumptions that directed
dissection and the problems it was brought to bear on. It is all too
T h e foetus, he says (L viii 6 io .6 ff), ‘ comes out like flesh: if you p u t this flesh in
water and inspect it, you will find that it has all the members, and the places for the
eyes, and the ears and the lim bs; the fingers o f the hands, the legs, the feet and the toes,
the genitals and all the rest o f the body are clearly visible’ . Cf. a similar procedure
suggested at HA 5 8 3 b i4 ff by Aristotle, whose account also refers only to external
features: see below, p. 163 n. 194. A third text {Nat. Pmr. ch. 13, L v ii 488.22ff)
purporting to describe aborted ‘ seed ’ six days after intercourse, including its membranes
and w hat the author says looked to him like an umbilicus, is largely fanciful.
*** PA I chh. I and 5, see below, pp. i63f.
'*3 A lthough Aristotle probably has Platonists in particular in m ind in the protreptic
to research in PA i, the points he makes have a general application.
PA 645a28ff. A lthough Aristotle refers to the parts o f hum an beings in this text, his
point is a general one. T here were, no doubt, other, religious factors inhibiting the
dissection o f humans - though for all the ancients’ respect for the dead, there are
plenty o f cases recorded both in the classical period and later where the corpses o f
enemies were desecrated. But we are concerned, at this point, purely with the dis­
section o f animals.
The development o f empirical research i6 i
easy for us to underestim ate the difficulties the earliest researchers
faced. For a dissection to be carried out successfully requires not
only patience, attention to detail and practical skill, but also and
m ore im portantly a clear conception o f w hat to look for. T o advance
beyond a m erely superficial account of, say, the contents o f the skull
or the heart depends, above all, on an idea o f w hat there is to find.
In fact in two o f the references to the possibility o f opening the skull
that w e have con sid ered ^ ® ^ the aim was the strictly lim ited one o f
determ ining that an abnorm al condition had a natural cause. But
even if the investigators in question had attem pted a m ore general
exam ination, it is doubtful how m uch they w ould have seen, that is,
how m uch o f w hat they saw they w ould have understood. A gain , after
dissections had begun to be m ade on the heart, it was some time
before the valves, for instance, cam e to be recognised as such, as we
can docum ent b y a com parison between Aristotle’s accounts and
that in the treatise On the HeartJ^^ In the earliest history o f anatom y
experience in dissection undoubtedly contributed to the developm ent
o f both anatom ical and physiological doctrines: but practice its e lf-
the nature o f the dissections that were carried out - always depended
on, in the sense that it was prom pted and guided by, theory.
Before the m ethod was accepted as a m ore or less routine procedure
o f investigation, the im m ediate stimulus to undertake a dissection
had to come from a problem - a phenom enon to be explained or a
controversy to be resolved. O n e o f the keys to the slow developm ent
(as we see it) o f the use o f dissection lies, indeed, in the nature o f the
problems the Greeks were interested in and the w ay those problems
w ere form ulated. T w o contrasting examples illustrate this very
clearly. O ne o f the topics that both philosophers and m edical writers
tackled was sensation in general and the functioning o f each o f the
special senses. Y e t so far as sight was concerned, m any o f the earliest
G reek investigators were prim arily interested in the elementary
constituents o f the e y e , ^*7 rather than in its structure. It was com m only
*8s Morb. Sacr. ch. i i , l v i 382.6fF, and Plutarch, Pericles ch. 6, mentioned above, p. 24
and n. 79. Even though the latter story, o f Anaxagoras having the skull o f a one-horned
ram opened, m ay be apocryphal, it m ay be taken to illustrate the type o f exceptional
occasion when recourse m ight be had to dissection.
186 A ristotle’s principal discussions o f the anatom y o f the heart are in HA i 17, HA in 3,
PA III 4 and Somn. Vig. 4 5 8 a i5 ff. But while he mentions w h at he calls sinews (νεΟρα)
in the heart at HA 496313, 5i5a28fF, PA 666b i3f, he does not identify these as valves.
O n the account in Cord., where at least two valves are clearly described as such,
L IX S S .igff, go .iifF , cf. above p . 159, n. 175.
This is true o f Alcm aeon (Theophrastus, Sens. 2sf, above, p. 156 n. i6o) and cf.
A ristotle’s account o f his predecessors (especially Empedocles, Democritus and Plato),
and his own view, in Sens. 2, 437 a i9fl·.
 162 The development o f empirical research
assumed that vision was to be explained in terms o f some interaction
(such as that o f ‘ like to lik e ’ or between unlikes)^8s between funda­
m ental physical elements such as earth, water, air or fire. Y e t w ith
the possible exception o f ‘ w a te r’ none o f these elements could be
directly observed in the eye. Some theorists sim ply assumed, w hile
others inferred,^^’ their presence in the eye, b u t the com m on over­
riding concern was to bring their explanations o f sight into line w ith
their general physical and psychological doctrines. In that connection
the accounts that Were given o f the functioning o f the eye w ere often
not capable in practice, indeed in some cases not even in principle,*’ ®
o f direct verification.
T h e contrast w ith the controversy concerning the seat o f sensation
in general is illum inating. H ere too there were plenty o f theorists who
w ere content w ith purely speculative accounts. Y e t in this case there
was a clearer opportunity for advocates o f the two m ain views - that
the com m on sensorium is the heart, or that it is the brain - to
support their ideas b y direct reference to visible structures in the
body. Som e early investigators did ju st that: yet for the purposes o f
th at controversy all th at was necessary was to show some connection
between sense-organ and common sensorium, and in several cases it
appears that that was indeed where their demonstrations ended.
Just as w ith the valves o f the heart, the discovery o f the nerves as such
had to w ait for the right questions to be pressed, and in both cases
this did not happen until after Aristotle. *92
T h e w ay the problems were form ulated is relevant also to the scope
o f the use o f dissection on the second m ain topic where the m ethod
was em ployed, nam ely the blood-vascular system. H ere too some o f
the early accounts w ere far from being undertaken for purely
descriptive purposes, since venesection was clearly a practical concern
for the physicians. For those for whom blood-letting was an im ­
portant therapeutic procedure the question was to find links between
surface blood-vessels and deep structures in the body. H ow ever,
See Theophrastus, Sens, iff, where he lists Parmenides, Em pedocles and Plato as
having held that sensation comes about by the like, and the followers o f A naxagoras
and H eraclitus as having held that it comes about b y the opposite.
>89 As Alcm aeon inferred the presence o f fire from w hat happens when the eye is struck,
Theophrastus, Sens. 26, D K 24 a 5.
T hus for the atomists, the ultim ate explanation o f sensation lies in the interaction o f
atoms that differ in shape, size and position but arc not, in principle, observable. Even
in Em pedocles’ analogy o f the lantern (Fr. 84), the pores in the eye and in the lantern
itself are below the level o f what can be directly observed.
T his appears true not only o f Alcm aeon (above, p. 156 n. 160) but also o f Aristotle,
w ho asserted that the sense-organs are connected with the heart, e.g. Juv. 469 a i off;
see L loyd 1978a, pp. 222ff.
See further below, p. 165.
The development o f empirical research 163
although this generated interest in the subject o f the paths o f the
blood-vessels, it m ay also have acted as an inhibiting factor, in so far
as current practices in venesection m ay themselves have been taken
as evidence enough for vessels linking different parts o f the body.
Y e t i f a powerful specific m otive was a necessary, it was not a
sufficient, condition for recourse to dissection. A lth ou gh on several
topics where we m ight have expected dissection, w e find that the
problems were fram ed in such a w a y that the m ethod was incapable
o f resolving the issue, there are m any other occasions w hen oppor­
tunities to dissect were not taken.*’ 3 i t was not until A ristotle that
the m ethod cam e to be applied fairly generally, even though it was
still confined to animals, ^94 and m uch o f his w ork can still be criticised
as superficial. *95 Y e t Aristotle offers something that is missing from
the extant remains o f any earlier w riter, nam ely a statement setting
out w hat is to be gained from an inquiry into the anim al kingdom
w hich provides a rationale for the method in general. In P A i 5 he says
that animals are inferior to the heavenly bodies as objects o f study
in that the latter are unchanging, w hile the former belong to the
w orld o f change. B ut anim als h ave the advantage in that ‘ w e have
m uch better means o f obtaining inform ation’ about them and
‘ anyone who is w illing to take sufficient trouble can learn a great
deal concerning each o f their kinds [i.e. animals and p lan ts]’ .*’ 6
T h e investigation is directed to the four types o f causes, especially
form and finality, and involves m uch else besides dissection. B ut his
*«3 T hu s one o f the controversies that goes back to Alcm aeon and seems positively to
invite the use o f dissection was the question of which part of the embryo is formed first.
Censorinus {de die nat. ch. 6, lo .gff, cf. A et. v 17.1-6 ) cites the theories o f Empedocles,
Hippon, Anaxagoras, Diogenes o f A pollonia, Democritus, Aristotle and Epicurus on
this. Y e t there is no evidence that an y o f these, with the sole exception o f Aristotle,
tried to determine the answer w ith the help o f dissection - even though, as we have
noted (p. 158), an investigation of hen’s eggs is proposed in another context in jVai.
Puer.
H A 494 b 2 i f f shows that the possibility of dissecting a human body did not occur to
Aristotle; ‘ T h e inner parts of m an are for the most part unknown, and so we must
refer to the parts o f other animals w hich those o f m an resemble, and exam ine them ,’
(Cf. also H A 5 1 1 b i3ff, 5 13 a i2ff.) Some commentators, however, have suggested that
he m ay have dissected a human em bryo (O gle 1882, p. 149, Shaw 1972, pp. 366ff).
Y e t despite his considerable knowledge o f m am m alian embryos, this seems doubtful.
O ne striking passage that tells against the suggestion is HA 583 b i4ff, where he records
w h at happens when a male hum an em bryo, aborted on the fortieth d a y from con­
ception, is put into water. It holds together, he says, in a sort o f membrane, and if this
membrane is pulled to bits, the em bryo is revealed inside. O n this occasion, at least,
he appears not to have proceeded to a dissection - any more than the author o f Cam.
did, see above, pp. 159f - since his subsequent brief remarks are confined to surface
anatom ical points.
I have argued in m y 1978a, p. a i6ff, that this is true in particular in connection with
his psychological doctrines.
196 PA I 644 b22ff, especially b28ff.
 164 The development o f empirical research
protreptic not only justifies, but obliges him to undertake, the study
o f every kind o f anim al, *^7 including their internal as w ell as their
external parts, and their various vital functions.
W ith Aristotle, dissection can be said to become, for the first time,
an integral part o f a general program m e o f research w ith w ell
defined aims. T h e exact extent to w hich he and his co-workers used
the method is impossible to ju d ge, but apart from the m any more or
less detailed reports that give inform ation that could only have been
obtained from dissections in his zoological works, he refers to a
separate treatise (now lost) on Dissections. I n several contexts he
mentions the difficulties o f carrying out dissections and the mistakes
that m ay arise from carelessness.^«>9 A t H A 496agff, for instance,
when he notes that ‘ in all anim als. . . the apex o f the heart points
forw ards’, he adds: ‘ although this m ay very likely escape notice
because o f a change o f position while they are being dissected’ .
A gain in his account o f the m ale generative organs o f viviparous
land-anim als in general he remarks that the m em brane now known
as the tunica vaginalis must be cut to reveal the relation between the
ducts it encloses: ‘ T h e ducts that bend back again and those that
lie alongside the testicle are enclosed in one and the same m em brane,
so that they appear to be one duct, unless the m em brane is cut
open ’ {HA 5 1 o a 2 1 f f ) . T h e accuracy o f his descriptions o f some o f the
internal organs o f a w ide variety o f animals (the first time any such
systematic study had been attempted) is testimony to the effective
use m ade o f the m ethod by him and by those who worked w ith him
in the L yceu m .200
Y e t despite his successes, Aristotle’s dissections are, in certain
respects, still prim itive and crude com pared w ith those o f his
successors. A lthough as a first approxim ation his descriptions o f the
principal anatom ical features o f the main groups o f animals he iden­
tified are adm irable, his account o f certain organs are quite vague
and obscure. T o turn from his descriptions of, for exam ple, the eye,2oi
See especially P A 645 a 6 f and 21-3.
This appears to have contained, and m ay even have consisted in, anatom ical dia­
gram s: see e.g. H A 497a32, 525a8f, 566314!, GA 746a 14!, P A 684b4f.
P A 6 7 6 b 3 3 f is one passage that draws attention to the dangers o f generalising con­
cerning the whole species or group on the basis of observations o f one or a few specimens.
But see further below, pp. 2 i3 ff on certain limitations to his inquiry.
^0* T h e three main parts he usually identifies in the eye (e.g. H A 4 9 1 b aoff) are the
pupil, the ‘ so-called b la c k ’ (i.e. iris) and the white (i.e. the visible white surrounding
to the iris). T here are references to a membranous coat at de An. 420a i4ff. Sens.
438 b 2, G A 78 oa26ff and 781320, but no attem pt is m ade to identify its separate
components. O n the problems o f interpretation posed b y his references to com m uni­
cations leading from the eye to the brain (e.g. H A 495a i iff, Sens. 438b i3 f), see Lloyd
1978a, pp. 2i9f.
The development o f empirical research 165
the brain,202 and even the h eart,203 to the w ork o f H erophilus and
Erasistratus - difficult as this is to reconstruction - is to enter a
new world. A gain , w here Aristotle, like all earlier investigators, had
been content w ith only a very general account o f the transmission
o f m ovem ent and sensation, the H ellenistic biologists began to draw
fundam ental distinctions both between the different kinds o f nerve
(sensory and motor) and between the nerves proper and other tissues
that had also been called veOpov.^os
In part the achievem ents o f H erophilus and Erasistratus are
attributable to their having dissected - they m ay even have v iv i­
sected - humans as w ell as anim al s u b j e c t s . Y e t that is certainly
not the only, and it m ay not even have been the most im portant,
consideration. W hat marks out their w ork is, quite sim ply, the
com parative detail and precision o f their descriptions, and the w ay
in w hich the inquiry is pressed home, w hatever the subject under
dissection. A t this stage in the history o f anatom y m ajor advances
could be, and no doubt were, m ade even w ithout recourse to hum an
dissection, as w e can illustrate b y reference to the approxim ately
.contemporary treatise On the Heart. A lthough w e have it on G alen ’s
authority^o^ that it was Erasistratus who discovered the valves o f the
heart - that is, he was the first to recognise their true function - our
first extant account o f the semi-lunar valves at the base o f the aorta
and the pulm onary artery is, as we have noted, in On the Heart.
But w hile this author refers clearly to both dissections and vivisec­
tions, his investigations were evidently carried out on anim al sub-
202 Thus he asserts that the brain itself is bloodless and devoid o f ‘ veins’ (e.g. H A 4953417,
5 14 a i8fF, P A 652a35ff, but contrast P A 6 5 2 b 2 7ff and Sens. 444a lo ff), and that the
back o f the skull is em pty {H A 49133417, 494b33ff, P A 656b i2 ff). A lthough at H A
4 94b 29ff he distinguishes two membranes round the brain, 3t P A 652 b 30 3nd G A
7443 ID he spesks of 3 single membrane.
^3 O ne o f the chief puzzles relates to the idea that the heart has three chambers, a
doctrine that persists in all four o f his m ain accounts (see above, p. 161 n. 186) despite
their other divergences: see most recently Shaw 1972, pp. 3 5 5 ^» Harris 1973, pp. 12 iff.
It is particularly striking that the notion that the central cham ber is the άρχή for the
other two persists even when his views on the identity o f the three cavities changed (see
L loyd 1978a, pp. 227f, and cf. B yl 1968, pp. 467!?).
None o f the works o f the major Hellenistic biologists has survived: w e rely on the
fortunately often extended quotations in such writers as Rufus, Celsus and, especially,
G alen.
205 See Rufus, Anat. 184.15-185.7. G alen, while recognising the importance o f H ero­
philus’ work on the nerves, criticises it nevertheless on the grounds of incompleteness,
K VIII 2 i 2 . i 3 ff, cf. VII 605. 7 fF; Erasistratus’ interest in the problem of the origin o f the
nerves is clear, for exam ple, from K x v iii a 86.1 iff. T he classic account o f the discovery
o f the nerves is Solmsen 1961.
*0* Celsus, D e Medicina, Proem 23flf is our chief evidence. A lthough the veracity o f his
testimony has often been impugned, there seems no good reason to reject it.
w See G alen K v 548.8!?, especially 5 4 9 -517 , cf. N at. Fac. 11 i, Scr. M in . iii I56.24ff
H elm reich, K 11 77.4ff, K v 166.1 off.
i66 The development o f empirical research
jects.2o8 In fact the num ber and extent o f hum an dissections undertaken
b y H erophilus and Erasistratus m ay well not have been very great. 209
Y e t Herophilus was responsible for, am ong other things, the first
clear description o f the four membranes in the eye,210 for the identifi­
cation o f the ovaries, 2 ” and an impressive list o f other anatom ical and
physiological d i s c o v e r i e s , vv^hile G alen credits Erasistratus w ith
w hat was p robably the first clear account o f the several ventricles
o f the brain.213
Evidently the opportunities presented b y the use o f dissection only
began to be fully exploited in the H ellenistic period. O nce they were,
and thanks to the fact that they were, dram atic progress was m ade
not only in descriptive anatom y, but also in physiology, in, for
exam ple, the investigations o f the blood-vascular, the nervous and
the digestive systems. In each o f these three areas, several o f the
principal problems that occupied later physiologists not ju st in
antiquity but again in the early Renaissance and indeed in some
cases down to H arvey and beyond, were first form ulated either b y
the H ellenistic biologists or as a direct result o f their work.^i^ Y e t
although dissection continued, its use rem ained controversial, not
only among the lay public but also in the m edical profession. Celsus
reveals that one o f the three ch ief m edical sects o f the late H ellenistic
period, the Empiricists, rejected both vivisection and dissection as
irrelevant and superfluous for m edical practice,2is and texts in Rufus
*0* E.g. Cord. ch. 2, L ix 80. i3fF describes a vivisection on a pig to show (as the writer
claims) that drink goes to the lungs, cf. also ch. 8, 86.5f. T hough the dead creature is
not specified at ch. lo , 88.3fF, it was no doubt an anim al: cf. the clear reference to the
dissection o f a slaughtered anim al at ch. 11, go.sff.
A lthough we have good evidence of observation o f hum an subjects in, for example,
H erophilus’ nam ing o f the duodenum from its length in man (twelve finger’s breadths,
see below, n. 212), in his comparisons between human and anim al livers (Galen,
K II 570 .10 -5 7 1.4) and in Erasistratus’ between human and anim al brains { U P i
488.i4fF Helm reich, K iii 673.91^, K v 603.g if), those very comparisons suggest, w h at
w e would in any case have expected, that much o f their work was done with animals.
See Rufus, Onom. 154.iff, Anat. i70.gfF, Celsus, D e Medicina vii 7.13.
See G alen K iv 5g6.4ff, which gives an extended quotation from the third book o f
H erophilus’ work On Dissections.
*** E.g. o f the duodenum (Galen K viii 3g6.6f), the torcular Herophili [U P 11 ig .6 f
Helm reich, K in 708.14f), the calamus scriptorius (K 11 73 i.6 ff) and the prostate
glands { U P n 32i.8 ff Helm reich, K iv igo.afT).
See G alen K v 6o2.i8ff, especially 6o4.6ff, and cf. U P i 488.ΐ4ίΤ Helm reich, K in
673.gff. Another text in Galen (K 11 64g.5ff) indicates that Erasistratus m ay well have
been the first to describe the vasa chylifera in the mesentery.
This applies, for exam ple, to the question of the movements of blood - and, as some
maintained, o f air - in the heart and arterial and venous systems, to the tracing of
nerves controlling the various vital functions, and to the debate on how far the processes
o f digestion could be explained in purely m echanical terms.
D e Medicina Proem 27ff. T h e Empiricists argued that the inquiry about obscure
causes and natural actions is superfluous because nature cannot be comprehended.
R ejecting the use o f reasoning partly on the grounds that in theorising it is always
The development o f empirical research 167
and in G alen show that hum an dissection, if it did not quite die out
com pletely, was severely r e s tr ic te d .N e v e r th e le s s , as G alen him self
shows, the method continued in some quarters at least to be practised
extensively on animals, indeed sometimes w ith great skill and
sophistication. M uch as he owed to his distinguished predecessors,
G alen ’s ow n experim ental dissections and vivisections in connection
with the digestive and nervous systems2 i 7 are the high-water-m ark
o f the use o f the m ethod in the ancient world.
T h e history o f dissection is one in w hich an em pirical technique
was eventually applied w ith great success to a w ide range o f problems
in anatom y and physiology. Y e t it also clearly shows how hard won
those successes were. T h e slow developm ent - as we see it - o f the
m ethod cannot be put down sim ply to a reluctance to engage in
em pirical research, or even to a squeamishness about looking at some
unpleasant objects. Inhibitions about opening hum an bodies were an
obstacle, but generally a m inor one com pared w ith some other
assumptions that were m ade concerning the use o f the method. T h e
fruitful exploitation o f dissection depended on a com plex interaction
o f theories and observations. Initially applied - before Aristotle -
only to a few quite specific questions, the method had first to be
recognised, as it was b y Aristotle himself, to be one o f quite general
value and applicability. But that was only the first step. T h e next
was to use it as a far more open-ended tool o f research,^!» under­
possible to argue either side o f a question, they held that practical experience of
treatments is the sole source o f m edical knowledge. T here is no need to inquire how we
breathe, but only w h at relieves laboured breathing, no need to find out what moves the
blood-vessels, only w hat the various types o f movement signify (para. 3g). Dissection
is superfluous: and vivisection should be rejected on the further grounds that it is
cruel (paras. 4off).
*** Rufus, w ho was active around a .d . io o , indicates that he worked w ith anim al subjects
though he contrasts this w ith earlier anatom ical demonstrations on humans, which still
clearly represented the ideal, if an im practicable one {Onom. 134.1 off). G alen shows
that hum an subjects were still used at A lexandria in his day (second century a .d .)
in the teaching o f osteology {De Anat. Admin, i 2, K 11 220 .i4ff), though otherwise the
opportunities for hum an dissection were rare, and one passage {Aiixt. 11 ch. 6, 7 7 · *3 ^
Helm reich, K i 632.sff) rules out hum an vivisection. H e writes o f observations o f a
corpse from a grave exposed in a river flood, o f the skeleton o f a robber who had been
killed and whose body had been left unburied, and o f the dissection o f the body o f a
dead G erm an enemy (see D e Anat. Admin, i 2 and ni 5, K 11 22i.4ff, i4ff, 385.sff),
though most o f his own w ork was evidently done on animals.
See especially N at. Fac. iii ch. 4 {Scr. M in . iii 2 i 3 . i i f f Helmreich, K 11 I 5 5 . 6 f f ) and
D e Anat. Admin, ix i3 f (Duckworth 1962, pp. 2ofF).
It is no mere coincidence that an extended quotation from Erasistratus in Galen
{Consuet. ch. i, Scr. M in . 11 16.s ff M uller) provides us with an eloquent statement of
the need for determ ination and persistence in research: ‘ Those who are completely
unused to inquiry are, in the first exercise o f their mind, blinded and dazed and straight­
w ay leave off the inquiry from mental fatigue and an incapacity that is no less than
that o f those who enter races without being used to them. But the man who is used to
168 The development o f empirical research
taking dissections not m erely to substantiate a view on an ante­
cedently conceived problem , but in the recognition that the problems
themselves m ight need to be redefined in the light o f w hat the
prelim inary explorations suggested. Dissection was always guided by
theories and assumptions: but once one o f those assumptions was a
realisation that the problems themselves m ight be more com plex than
anticipated, the investigator was more open to the unexpected. Used
in such a w ay, dissection could and did generate w hat were effectively
new problems, w hich in turn - as we see most notably in the history
o f w ork on the nervous system - generated new programm es o f
research.
T h e study o f dissection has taken us far aw ay from the H ippocratic
physicians, but this digression helps to set their achievem ents in the
dom ain o f em pirical research into perspective. T h e claim that they
were, or were am ong, the founders o f the em pirical m ethod in G reek
science can be upheld only if certain all-im portant reservations and
qualifications are added. It is true in respect o f the m eticulous clinical
observations that some o f the doctors undertook, but there were
particular reasons for their sustained inquiries in that area, and their
successes there were not m atched in other fields. Several writers,
especially the author o f On Ancient Medicine, m ade im portant contri­
butions to the m ethodological debate, criticising the use o f arbitrary
assumptions, insisting on the need for theories to be testable, on the
im portance o f established methods o f discovery in m edicine and on
the use o f w hat is apparent as the vision o f the obscure. Y e t the gap
between stated ideal and actual practice was often wide. It is true
that alongside some theorists who m ake little attem pt to collect
detailed evidence, there were others who exercised considerable
ingenuity in seeking em pirical support for their general pathological
and physiological doctrines. Y e t the claims they m a d e - t h a t their
evidence clearly demonstrated their views - were generally excessive.
Such em pirical data as they appealed to - w hether observations or
simple tests - were regularly used to support their theories, not to
decide between them and their rivals. W hile the am bition to m arshal
evidence is clear - and this distinguishes some o f the m edical writers
from m any o f the philosophers - most o f the fundam ental issues they
tackled were not to be resolved b y the straightforward means they
brought to bear. M eanw hile the lim itations o f their perform ance as
inquiry tries every possible loophole as he conducts his mental search and turns in
every direction and so far from giving up the inquiry in the space o f a day, does not
cease his search throughout his whole life. D irecting his attention to one idea after
another that is germ ane to what is being investigated, he presses on until he arrives at
his g o a l’ ( l y . i i f f ) .
The development o f empirical research 169
practitioners o f the em pirical approach appear clearly in the field o f
anatom y, where the fifth- and iburth-century treatises take only the
first very hesitant steps in the use o f dissection,
ASTRONOM Y
T h e next m ain areas where we can study the use and developm ent o f
em pirical methods are geography and astronomy. O n the former we
can be b r ie f T h e obtaining and recording o f inform ation about the
known part o f the inhabited world^*’ is one o f the fields where
Ιστορία was practised at a very early stage. T h e first G reek map^^o
is that attributed to A naxim ander, though w e cannot reconstruct its
contents, and to ju d g e from Herodotus’ comments on early m ap-
makers,22i it is likely to have been h ighly schem atic. But it was another
M ilesian m ap-m aker, H ecataeus, who founded this branch o f
ιστορία, initiating the tradition that continued through H erodotus,
the w riter o f the treatise On Airs Waters Places and Eudoxus (who
wrote a lost yfjs περίοδος or ‘ circuit o f the e a rth ’) down to H ip ­
parchus, Posidonius, Strabo and Ptolem y. This w ork was im portant
both as providing the very first exam ple o f sustained research, and
for one o f its results - a greatly increased knowledge o f other peoples.
Y e t the aim o f early geographical accounts was largely descriptive,
and so o f far less im portance than astronomy in the developm ent o f
scientific theory. T h e Greeks themselves distinguished such inquiries,
called ‘ ch orograp h y’ , from the m ore strictly scientific m athem atical
g e o g r a p h y , 2 2 3 w hich included such topics as the determ ination o f the
size o f the earth and especially - from the H ellenistic period at least -
the problems o f projection or cartography. G eography understood in
the latter sense was essentially a branch o f applied m athem atics and
the use it m ade, or needed to m ake, o f em pirical data was limited.
Astronom y itself, however, like m edicine, provides an excellent
opportunity to study the relation o f observation and theory in G reek
science. A dm ittedly our sources, especially for the earlier periods.
Descriptions of foreign countries usually included accounts not only o f the main
geographical features such as rivers and mountains, but also o f the flora and fauna and
o f the customs of the inhabitants.
T his had been anticipated by earlier ancient N ear Eastern, particularly Babylonian,
maps, though most o f those known are local sketch maps, not attempts to relate all the
parts o f the known world in a single whole, as was the case with the maps referred to
in Herodotus iv 36.
Herodotus iv 36 criticises earlier map-makers on the grounds that they make the
w orld sym metrical, with Oceanus running round the earth as if drawn with a compass,
and Asia made equal to Europe. Cf. also the m ap referred to in Hdt. v 49.
See below, ch. 4, pp. 236ff.
2*3 A clear distinction between these two is drawn, for example, in the opening section of
Ptolem y’s Geography.
170 The development o f empirical research
leave m uch to be desired: for the Presocratic philosophers we rely
often, as usual, on second-hand reports, m any o f w hich are evidently
overenthusiastic in their attributions o f the discoveries o f astronomical
facts and theories to individual thinkers.224 Even so, we can gain a
general idea o f the level o f astronomical knowledge in the sixth and
fifth centuries. Thus whereas A naxim ander’s account o f the relations
betw een the heavenly bodies apparently ignored the difference
between planets and stars, 22s that distinction was grasped not long
after him, perhaps by Anaximenes,^^^ but certainly by some o f his
successors.227 V arious authors are credited w ith k n o w in g - o r them ­
selves indicate that they know - that the m oon shines w ith reflected
light,228 that the M orning Star and the E vening Star are one and the
same b ody,229 and that the interposition o f the moon and o f the
earth causes eclipses o f the sun and m oon respectively.2^0 A lth ou gh
T hus much sophisticated astronomical knowledge - for exam ple o f the equinoxes and
solstices - is ascribed to Thales, partly perhaps because o f Herodotus’ report o f his
foretelling an eclipse o f the sun. But even in that instance whereas Herodotus him self
says merely that he foretold this eclipse to within a year (i 74), later writers, such as
C lem ent {Strom, i 14.65, D K 11 a 5) and Diogenes Laertius (i 23, D K a i) drop that
qualification; yet at no stage were precise predictions o f solar eclipses within the
competence o f ancient astronomers. It is unlikely, too, that Thales had a very accurate
idea o f the sizes and distances o f the sun and moon when his successor, Anaxim ander,
apparently gave a quite schematic and in parts grossly aberrant, account (see next
note).
22s W hen we piece together the adm ittedly fragm entary reports o f his astronomy, it
appears that he pictured the heavenly bodies as disposed in three concentric circles,
the outermost containing the sun, the middle the moon and the innermost the stars
(see H ip. Haer. 1 6.4-5, D K 12 a i i, Aet. n 20.1, 2 1.1, 25.1, D K a 21-2). Since there is
no separate ring, or rings, for the planets, it is presumed that he included these with the
stars. It is true that this reconstruction is conjectural, but it is one that has the pre­
ponderance of such evidence as we have in its favour.
As H eath 1913, pp. 42f, suggested on the basis o f a corrupt passage in A et. 11 14.3-4,
D K 13 A 14, interpreted as distinguishing between the stars fixed like nails in the
crystalline, and the planets like ‘ fiery leaves’. But on the difficulties in this view, see,
for exam ple, G uthrie 1962, p. 135, Dicks 1970, p. 47.
Thus Aristotle, Mete. 342b27ff, reports that Aiiaxagoras and Democritus both held
that comets are due to the conjunctions o f planets: by the time we come to the Philolaic
system, at the end o f the fifth or beginning o f the fourth century, the five planets known
in the ancient world are assigned to separate circles, see below, pp. 173f.
This is stated, adm ittedly rather obscurely, in the fragments of Parmenides (Fr, 14),
Em pedocles (Frr. 43, 45) and Anaxagoras (Fr. 18). K now ledge o f this is also ascribed
to T hales (Aet. 11 28.5, D K u a 17b) and to Anaxim enes (Theon of Sm yra, 198.19-
1 9 9 -2 , D K 13 A 16) though we m ay be sceptical. O u r secondary sources also report,
however, that Anaxim ander, Xenophanes and A ntiphon all held that the moon shines
by its own light (Aet. 11 28.1 and 4, D K 12 a 22, 87 b 27).
This is ascribed alternatively to Pythagoras and to Parmenides, e.g. D .L . viii 14 and
IX 23, D K 28 A I.
It appears from Empedocles Fr. 42 (though the text is corrupt and the interpretation
problematic) that he m ay have known the true cause o f solar eclipses. Hippolytus,
Haer. i 8.9, D K 59 a 42, reports that Anaxagoras held both that solar eclipses are
caused by the interposition o f the moon and that the moon is eclipsed both by the
earth and by other bodies under the moon (a similar idea recurs in the Pythagorean
system described by Aristotle, who indicates that it was used to explain the greater
The development o f empirical research 171
our sources disagree about who precisely ‘ discovered ’ these facts (that
is w ho am ong the Greeks first recognised them), we m ay take it that
some at least o f those who engaged in astronomical speculation in the
late fifth and early fourth centuries were w ell aware o f them, even
though m any ordinary people, and indeed some educated writers,
rem ained extrem ely vague or ignorant concerning some elem entary
astronom ical data. Thus apart from the evidence o f popular fears
concerning eclipses provided by the famous account in Thucydides
(vii 50) o f Nicias delaying the retreat o f the Athenians from Syracuse
because o f the reaction am ong the soldiers to an eclipse o f the moon,
w e find the author o f On Breaths m aintaining that the w ind is
responsible for the movem ents o f the sun, moon and stars.
Y e t knowledge o f the points we have m entioned does not require
elaborate, or even very sustained, astronom ical observations -
certainly not m uch more sustained than those that were ordinarily
carried ou t for practical purposes. T h e m orning and evening risings
and settings o f some o f the m ajor constellations w ere closely noted
and used to m ark the seasons from an early period, as is clear from
H esiod’s Works especially.232 For evidence o f m ore systematic obser­
vations undertaken b y G reek astronomers w e have to turn to two
areas particularly, the determ ination o f the solar year and planetary
theory.
A lth ou gh none o f the writings o f M eton and Euctem on has
survived, we have good evidence concerning some o f their w ork
around the year 430 B.c.233 T h eir most notable achievem ent was the
nineteen-year cycle - now nam ed after M eton 2 3 4 _ that established a
correlation between the solar year and the lunar month. Nineteen
solar years were equated w ith 235 lunar months, n o o f them
‘ h o llo w ’ months o f twenty-nine days, the rem aining 125 ‘ fu ll’ ones
o f thirty, a total o f 6,940 days. This gives a m ean lunar m onth o f
frequency o f lunar eclipses - that is as observed from any given point on th e earth’s
surface, Cael. 293 b 23ff). Y e t other explanations o f eclipses continued to be pu t forw ard :
thus the idea that eclipses o f the moon are due to the tilting o f its bowl is ascribed to
Antiphon (as w ell as to Heraclitus and Alcm aeon) b y Aetius 11 29.3 (D K 87 b 28).
Flat. ch. 3, CM G i, i 9 3 .9 ^ Cf. H dt. 11 24 (which talks o f the sun being driven from its
course b y storms) and Hippolytus, Haer. i 8.9 (who ascribes to A naxagoras the view
that the air is responsible for the sun’s and the moon’s ‘ turnings’).
*3* It was not only astronomical phenom ena that were used to m ark the seasons, but
also, for exam ple, the movements o f birds, see, e.g.. Op. 564fF.
*33 T h e observation recorded by Ptolem y at Syntaxis iii i, li 205.151?, is o f 432 B.C., and this
is the presumed starting date for the M etonic cycle.
T h e same cycle was also introduced some time in the fifth century in Babylonia, but
it is not certainly attested there before M eton, and m ay have been either an inde­
pendent developm ent or even a case o f Greek influence on Babylonia (see N eugebauer
1957, p. 140, 1975, I pp. 354f and n pp. 622ίΓ, but cf., e.g., Toom er 1974, p. 339).
1 72 The development o f empirical research
2 9 |f days and a mean solar year o f 3653^ days.^^s N ow it is clear that
this cycle was in part - probably in large part - the product o f
com putation and extrapolation. B ut w e can be certain it had some
observational basis, even i f we cannot determ ine how extensive this
was. Ptolem y, who reports in the Phaseis that M eton and Euctem on
m ade observations at several different places in the G reek w orld,236
cites a particular observation o f the summer solstice o f 432 B .C . in
the Syntaxis?^’’ In the second-century b . c . astronom ical papyrus
known as the Ars Eudoxi w e find attributed to Euctem on figures for
the lengths o f the seasons o f the year determ ined by the solstices and
equinoxes.238 F in ally both M eton and Euctem on are often quoted in
the parapegm ata literature - alm anacs that set out astronomical and,
m ore especially, m eteorological data for each day o f the m onth - and
they m ay even have draw n up such an alm anac themselves.239
This constitutes our first good evidence for some fairly sustained
G reek astronom ical observations. But the context in w hich they occur
is clearly significant. A lthough the determ ination o f the solar year is
o f fundam ental im portance for theoretical astronom y in the con­
struction o f models o f heavenly m otion, there was an additional
purely practical m otive for w ork o f the type that M eton and Euctem on
undertook. T h e chaotic character o f the civil calendars o f Athens and
other G reek city-states - a subject with w hich Aristophanes makes a
good deal o f play^^o - is w ell known.241 U nlike the Egyptians, who
adopted a notional year o f 365 days,242 the G reek city-states relied
on luni-solar calendars with a thirteenth m onth intercalated in some
This gives an error o f 30' 1 1 ' for the mean tropic year, and o f not quite i ' 54" for
the m ean lunar month, according to H eath 1913, p. 294.
Phaseis 11 67.2ff. Ptolem y specifies Athens, the Cyclades, M acedonia and Thrace.
Syntaxis m i, li 205.i5ff.
Starting from the summer solstice, the figures are 90, 90, 92 and 93 days (the first
three are given in the papyrus, the fourth m ay be inferred from th em ): the errors,
com pared with a modern determ ination for the period, range from 1.23 to 2.01 days
(Heath 1913, p. 215).
O n the history o f parapegm ata, see especially R ehm 194 1. O u r two main examples,
Geminus, Isagoge and Ptolem y’s Phaseis, are both late, but both cite their authorities by
name (they include Democritus, as w ell as Euctem on and M eton, from the fifth
century). T h e conservative nature o f this literature can be jud ged by the fact that data
about the risings and settings o f constellations were copied out for use in places o f
quite different latitudes from those where the original observations were made. W e
can only guess at how the meteorological data - which were sometimes quite specific,
for exam ple about which wind blows on a particular d a y - were interpreted.
See, e.g., Nu. 6 i5 ff: cf. Thucydides’ dissatisfaction with time reckoning by archonships
(v 20).
T h e chief discussions are M eritt 1928, Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, Pritchett 1957,
van der W aerden 1960, M eritt 1961, Pritchett and van der W aerden 1961, Pritchett
1964 and 1970.
This was the year that was eventually adopted as standard for com putational ρυφθ5€8
b y Greek astronomers such as Ptolemy.
The development o f empirical research 1 73
years to keep the calendar m ore or less in step w ith the seasons. Y e t
the question o f when to intercalate a month was left to the magistrates
to resolve. T h eir decisions were evidently quite arbitrary, and
indeed they continued to be so even after M eton and Euctem on had
provided a reasonable basis on w hich a stable luni-solar calendar
could have been draw n up. Nevertheless for our purposes one con­
clusion is clear, that it was in part at least the problems that arose in
regulating the calendar that provided the stimulus for M eton’s and
Euctem on’s observations. O nce again, then, as w ith the case-histories
in the Epidemics^ we find that some o f the best early sustained obser­
vational w ork has a quite specific m otivation : here too it w ould be
rash to infer that the individuals concerned necessarily recognised the
value o f em pirical research o f this kind in astronom y in general.
T h e first comprehensive solution to the problems posed by
planetary m otion was Eudoxus’ theory o f concentric spheres, later
adopted and m odified b y C allippus and Aristotle. But two earlier
contributions must first be discussed, the so-called Philolaic system
and the astronom ical passages in Plato. In several texts Aristotle
attributes to certain unnam ed Pythagoreans 2 4 3 a theory in w hich no
less than ten heavenly bodies are distinguished, including the five
visible planets. As we noted earlier, Aristotle is highly critical o f the
w ay in w hich - as he thinks - the Pythagoreans did not ‘ seek
argum ents and causes in relation to the φαινόμενα’ but tried to ‘ drag
the φαινόμενα into line with certain arguments and opinions o f their
o w n ’ ,244 and elsewhere he objects that the doctrine o f the counter­
earth in particular sprang from the Pythagoreans’ desire to m ake the
num ber o f the m oving heavenly bodies total ten, the perfect num ber.^45
A lthough the reconstruction o f their doctrines is extrem ely pro­
blem atic - and it m ay be that the original system itself was not fully
consistent246 _ this was the first G reek astronomical theory for which
we have good early evidence in w hich each o f the planets, sun and
*^3 T h e attribution to Philolaus is m ade by Aetius: w e have no means of verifying this or
of dating the system more precisely than to the late fifth or early fourth century.
Cael. 293a25fF, see above, p. 137. Aristotle there also suggests that the Pythagoreans
shifted the earth from the centre o f the universe and gave that place to fire out of
considerations o f value: the most honourable place befits the most honourable thing
and fire is more honourable than earth. T his passage thereby incidentally confirms that
the idea that the earth is one of the planets had been suggested before Aristotle, though
not in connection with a heliocentric hypothesis.
*^5 Metaph. g86a8ff. T h e ten heavenly bodies are the fixed stars (counted as a single
sphere), the five planets, sun, m oon, earth and counter-earth (on this version o f the
system the central fire is a separate body at rest in the centre o f the universe, although
another view o f the central fire is also reported in our sources, that it is within the earth,
the earth itself being in the centre).
See the discussions in H eath 1913, ch. 12, van der W aerden 1951 and Dicks 1970,
ch. 4, especially.
 174 The deOelopment o f empirical research
m oon is assigned to a separate ring or sphere. T h is was the essential
prelim inary to any attem pt to investigate and explain their indi­
vidual motions, although we have no reliable means o f telling how
far the Pythagoreans themselves , ^ 4 7 or any other thinker before
P lato , 2 4 8 progressed in any such inquiry.
W ith Plato himself, however, we are already on m uch firmer
ground. In the m yth o f Er in the Republic he distinguishes between
two m ain m ovements, w hich in the Timaeus he calls the circles o f the
Sam e and o f the O ther, the westerly m ovem ent o f the Sam e being
responsible for the phenom ena we should ascribe to the d aily
rotation o f the earth on its axis, and the easterly movements o f the
O th er accounting for the movements o f the planets, sun and moon
along the e c l i p t i c . M o r e o v e r Plato clearly refers to the different
speeds o f revolution o f the various heavenly bodies, and although he
nowhere gives specific values for their periodicities, in both the
Republic and the Timaeus he gives the order o f their relative speeds ;^5o
the m oon is the fastest, then the sun. M ercu ry and V enus (these
three are thus given the same m ean easterly m otion), then M ars,
Ju p iter and Saturn in that order. H e also assigns different breadths
to the ‘ w horls’ in the ‘ spindle o f necessity’ in the Republic^ and this
m ay correspond to the different distances separating the bodies in
question, although once again he gives no definite figures but
contents him self with a statement o f their order.^si f jg draws back
from a detailed account, putting it, in the Timaeus, that to attem pt
such a discussion w ithout being able to consult visible models is
useless labour ;2S2 and Timaeus 39 cd provides clear evidence o f a
general lack o f inform ation, among his contemporaries, about the
periods o f the planets. ‘ E xcept for a fe w ’ ,2S3 he says, ‘ m en have not
grasped ’ their periods: ‘ they do not nam e them nor do they investi-
T h e late sources w ho ascribe elaborate systems concerning the harmonies o f the
heavenly spheres to the Pythagoreans are generally untrustworthy.
Thus Democritus, who is reported to have written a work on the planets, is said by
Lucretius (v 62 iff) to have held that the speeds o f the heavenly bodies decrease with
their distance from the outermost heavens, though there is no evidence that he gave
definite values to their various periodicities.
R. 6 17 a , cf. Ti. 36b ff. T h e Timaeus mentions, however, what the Republic ignores,
nam ely the obliquity o f the ecliptic (77. 3607).
25° R. 6 i7 a b , T i. 36d, 38de. 7 7 . 3 8 e-3 gb contrasts the speeds of the planets, sun and
moon relative to one another, w ith their apparent absolute speeds (i.e. in the direction
o f the motion o f the fixed stars).
*5 * R. 6 i6 d e . T i. 3 6 b -d however refers to the ‘ double and triple’ intervals, giving the
series i, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27, and this m ay correspond to P lato’s view o f the ratios between
these distances, though the point is disputed (Heath 1913, p. 164).
252 7 7 . 38 de, 40 cd. W hether he had some kind o f orrery in mind, or more sim ply a
celestial sphere, is disputed: see, for example, Cornford 1937, pp. 74ff, Dicks 1970,
pp. 120, 137 and n. 193.
Eudoxus, would no doubt, have been counted as one such exception.
The development o f empirical research 1 75
gate and measure them in relation to one another b y means o f
num bers.’ Y e t Plato’s own excursions into astronom y allow us to
infer that he had access to some quite com plex inform ation con­
cerning the m ain celestial m otions, and in particular he provides us
w ith our first definite extant reference to the phenom enon that was
thereafter to rem ain at the centre o f ancient astronom ical theory,
nam ely the retrogradations o f the planets. 2 S4
T h e general structure o f the theory that enabled Eudoxus to
suggest a resolution to that problem is not in d o u b t , b u t the two
m ain questions that concern us are first the extent o f the obser­
vational data on w hich his m odel was based, and secondly the author
or authors o f those observations. Sim plicius gives us definite figures
for the two m ain periodicities, that is the sidereal and the synodic
periods, and w ith the exception o f the synodic period o f M ars, they
are tolerably accurate.^56 neither Sim plicius nor any other source
provides us with precise inform ation on one point that is essential
for a reconstruction o f Eudoxus’ theory o f the planets, nam ely the
angles o f inclination o f the fourth sphere.^s? Xhis lacuna in our
evidence means that we do not know to w hat extent Eudoxus’ model
was indeed a fully quantitative one. Schiaparelli was the first in
modern times to attem pt a detailed reconstitution o f the m odel, but
his interpretation - like most o f those that have followed it^s® -
depends on supplying figures for w hich we have no ancient authority.
M oreover the figures that have usually been taken are those that are
most favourable to the theory’s success. Thus interpreters have
generally assumed that Eudoxus had accurate knowledge o f the
m axim um lengths o f the retrograde arc o f each o f the planets, and
they then take the true m odern determ inations o f those arcs as the
basis o f their reconstructions o f the relationships between the third
254 Ti. 40 c. Plato comes back to the problem o f the movements of the planets in a
puzzling passage in the Laws, 822 a, where he insists that each o f the heavenly bodies
moves with a single circular m ovem ent; either he is referring to the resultant motion of
(e.g.) the movements o f the Sam e and the O ther, or he believed that a simple model
can be given. O n general grounds it m ay be thought likely that the Laws was written
at a time when Plato was aware o f Eudoxus’ theory o f concentric spheres: but 822a
can hard ly be taken as an allusion to it.
255 See, for exam ple. H eath 1913, ch. 16. N eugebauer 1957, pp. i53f, M au la 1974, and
N eugebauer 1975, n pp. 675ff.
256 In Gael. 495.26^9, 496.6-9.
257 T h e third sphere has its poles on the ecliptic and rotates in an easterly direction in
the synodic period o f the planet. W e are told simply that the poles of this sphere are the
same for M ercu ry and Venus, but different for each o f the other planets. T h e fourth
sphere, which carries the planet itself, rotates on an axis inclined to that o f the third,
and in the same period but in the opposite direction.
258 See Schiaparelli 1877, and cf. D reyer 1906, H eath 1913: but contrast the fresh
attem pt at an analysis o f possible reconstructions in M au la 1 9 7 4 .
 1 76 The development o f empirical research
and fourth spheres. Even so the theory breaks down for M ars and
Venus, where the evidence given by Sim plicius already fails to
provide for retrogradation at all.^s9
W hile it is conceivable that Eudoxus gave all the necessary p ara­
meters for his model, this is far from certain. T h a t he gave some
definite param eters is suggested not only b y Sim plicius, but also by
the modifications later introduced b y Callippus.^^o But the short­
comings o f the theory are such that we cannot rule out - it m ay even
be considered m ore likely^^i - that it was not, in fact, fully deter­
m ined, and that once he had solved the problem s o f the stations and
retrogradations o f the planets q u alitatively and geom etrically, he did
not proceed to provide com plete param eters for the individual
planets.
T h e question o f who was responsible for such observational data as
were available to Eudoxus takes us im m ediately to a m ajor problem
th a t w e have y e t to broach, nam ely th at o f the transmission o f
B abylonian astronom ical records to G reece. A lth ou gh m any ancient
comm entators exaggerate both the antiquity, and the extent and
accuracy, o f Babylonian observations,262 astronomical cuneiform
tablets confirm that some detailed records o f a lim ited num ber o f
phenom ena had begun to be kept from at least the first h a lf o f the
second m illennium b .g .^^3 It must be stressed that the extant tablets
are often based as m uch on com putation as on observation: the
results have been schematised to conform to predeterm ined regu­
larities. Y e t there can be no doubt that quite extensive obser­
vations were undertaken. A t the same tim e it appears very unlikely
that the Greeks had access to such data in the fifth century, for if
they had, it is hard to explain their hesitant grasp o f such basic
*5® See, for exam ple, H eath 1913, p. 211 and cf. most recently, M aula 1974, pp. 73ff.
Aristotle tells us {Metapk. j o y s b s z f f ) that Callippus introduced extra spheres not
only for the sun and moon (the former presum ably to take account o f the inequalities of
the seasons, known already to M eton and Euctemon, but ignored by Eudoxus in his
model), but also for three o f the planets, M ars, Venus and M ercury: here C allippus’
purpose m ay well have been to try to meet some o f the difficulties Eudoxus’ model
encountered in attem pting to explain their retrogradations.
Gf. N eugebauer 197a, p. 248.
See, e.g., Cicero, Div. 11 46.97, Simplicius, In Cael. ι ι η . α φ , 4 8 i.i2 ff, 5o6.8ff. C on ­
trast, however, Ptolem y, who com plained o f the com parative lack o f reliable informa­
tion concerning the planets, Syntaxis ix 2, lii aoS.iaff.
O ne such early record relates to the appearances and disappearances o f the planet
V enus in the reign o f Am m isaduqa, c. 1600 B.C. For an authoritative assessment of
early Babylonian astronomy, see N eugebauer 1957 and 1975, i pp. 347ff.
Thus N eugebauer 1955, 11 p. 281 commented on ‘ the minute role played b y direct
observation in the computation o f the ephemerides. T h e real foundation o f the theory
is (a) relations between periods, obtainable from mere counting, and (b) some fixed
arithm etical schemes (for corrections dependent on the zo d ia c).’
The development o f empirical research 177
astronom ical data as the identity o f the planet V enus as both
M orning and E vening Star.^^s
B y the m id fourth century, how ever, w e begin to have direct
references to Babylonian and other Eastern astronomy in G reek
writings. First the author o f the Epinomis writes that the Egyptians
and Syrians initiated observations o f the planets, w hich thereafter
becam e availab le to the G reeks,^66 and then Aristotle reports both
that the occultations o f stars by planets had been observed b y the
Egyptians and Babylonians ‘ who have w atched the stars for very
m an y years past and to whom w e owe m any trustworthy grounds for
b elief about each one o f th em ’ ,^*^ and that the Egyptians had
observed the conjunctions o f planets, and o f planets w ith fixed
stars.268 T h e references in all three texts to Eg^pt are odd since our
direct evidence for E gyptian astronom y contains no hint that they
had carried out observations o f planetary movem ents before the
H ellenistic period. This m ay, no doubt, be due sim ply to the frag­
m entary nature o f our sources: or it is possible that knowledge o f
Babylonian w ork arrived in G reece in p art via E gyp t and that this
was the source o f some confusion, in G reek writers, on the origin o f
the data they were interested in.^69 In any event, so far as the B ab y­
lonians themselves are concerned, we cannot doubt that the Greeks
could have learned a great deal - and certainly in the H ellenistic
period did learn a great deal - from them .270
Y e t the question o f the precise extent o f Eudoxus’ debts to eastern
A lthough the doxographers claim ed that Anaxim ander ‘ discovered’ the gnomon
(evidences in D K 12 a i , 2 and 4) we hear from Herodotus (11 109) that this and the
polos cam e to G reece from Babylonia. Y e t we should distinguish between the use o f a
simple astronomical sighting instrument, and items of astronomical knowledge con­
tained in texts that would norm ally not be at all readily intelligible to the Greeks. Even
in such an apparently promising case as the origin o f the constellations, the differences
between G reek and Babylonian representations are as great as their similarities, and
independent developm ent cannot be ruled out (see Dicks 1970, pp. 164!, though
contrast van der W aerden 1954, p. 84).
Epin. 986 ε f. If, as is likely, this w ork w as not b y Plato himself, it was p robably b y
a pupil or close associate.
Cael. 292a7ff, cf. also 270b ιβίΓ.
^*8 Mete. 34 3bgff.
T his is not as im plausible as m ight at first appear. E gyp t remained a province o f the
Persian empire during m uch o f the fifth and fourth centuries, interm ittently revolting
from Persian rule, only again to be subjugated to it, and the sea voyage to E gyp t was
appreciably easier for the Greeks than the overland journey to Babylonia. M oreover
there is some direct evidence that Babylonian eclipse- and lunar-om ina arrived in
E gyp t in the reign of Darius, see R . A . Parker 1959.
T his is not to deny the fundam ental differences in the problems that interested the
original Babylonian astronomers on the one hand, and the Greeks on the other. T h e
former were not, while the latter undoubtedly were, chiefly concerned w ith con­
structing geom etrical models to explain the movements o f the heavenly bodies. See
further below, ch. 4, p. 230.
 1 78 The development o f empirical research
astronomical observations remains open. W e know that he w rote a
‘ circuit o f the e a rth ’ and our secondary sources refer to his travels,
for exam ple that he visited E gypt,271 and indicate that he had some
knowledge o f C haldaean astronomy/astrology.272 In view o f this,
and o f A ristotle’s testimony, it seems likely that some inform ation -
including perhaps data relating to the m ajor periodicities o f the
planets - w ould have been available to Eudoxus,273 But it w ould
certainly be rash to suppose that he had access to the extensive
astronom ical records to w hich Ptolem y refers, some at least o f w hich
w ere evidently availab le to H ipparchus.2^74 A lth ou gh a reference to
Saturn as ‘ the star o f the sun ’ (its B abylonian name) in Sim plicius’
report o f Eudoxus’ figure for its sidereal period has been taken as a
possible indication o f the B abylonian origin o f some o f his data,27s
it w ould appear from another passage in Sim plicius that records o f
Babylonian observations only began to reach G reece in considerable
quantities after the conquest o f A lexander - that is, too late for
Eudoxus . 2 7 6 As we have said, Eudoxus seems to have worked w ith at
most only very general data concerning the retrogradations o f the
planets. Even i f he knew the m axim um value for the retrograde arc
for each planet, his m odel cannot accom m odate variations in either
its length or shape, w hich are quite noticeable in such a case as that
o f M ars. Precise observations from w hich the retrograde arcs could
be plotted in detail were, then, either not available to him, or were
ignored b y his theory.
Sim ilar reservations must ap p ly not only to such data as Eudoxus
obtained from Babylonia, but also to his ow n observational work, the
general nature o f w hich can be inferred from our secondary sources.
First it is clear that, like M eton and Euctem on, he engaged in
investigations o f the parapegm a type, m aking astronom ical and
m eteorological observations for different days o f the m onth, for like
them he is often m entioned in the parapegm a literature. Secondly
the numerous fragments o f his Phainomena and Enoptron (‘ M irro r’ )
that are preserved by H i p p a r c h u s 2 7 7 show that those works not only
*71 Plutarch, D e Is. et Osir. 353 c, 354 de, Strabo x v ii 1.29-30, D .L . vin 87. A lthough in
general reports in late writers about the eastern travels o f Greek wise men should be
treated w ith caution, the circum stantial details of these (for exam ple the letter of
introduction to Nectanebis from Agesilaus) suggest they have some foundation in fact.
E.g. D .L . Proem i 8 and Cicero, Div. 11 42.87.
Y e t the order o f the planets in Babylonian astronomy differs from that in Eudoxus -
w hich rules out the possibility that he derived his ideas on their general arrangem ent
from that source: see, for example, Dicks 1970, p. 175.
See below, pp. 180 and 185.
*75 In Gael. 495.28-9, cf. Dicks 1970, p. 167. In Gael. 5o6.ioff.
*77 In his Commentary on Aratus (i 2. i f and frequently elsewhere) Hipparchus tells us that
A ratus’ poem was based on Eudoxus’ Phainomena.
The development o f empirical research 179
contained a detailed description o f the heavens but also set out a
good deal o f inform ation about, for exam ple, w hich constellations
rise and set together. A t the same time he lacked the division o f the
celestial globe into 360 degrees, 2 7 S and identified and located indi­
vidu al stars generally quite im precisely, w ith reference to the con­
ventional constellation figures.279 W e m ay conclude that he carried
out some, perhaps com paratively quite extensive, observations o f his
own.280 B ut w hat remains quite doubtful is w hether he undertook any
detailed investigations o f the courses o f the planets. A n y suggestion
to that effect m ay not be excluded, but is rendered unlikely, b y the al­
ready m entioned fact that his theory was incapable o f accom m odating
the variations in the lengths and shapes o f the retrograde arcs.281
A t the risk o f labouring the point we m ay refer to Aristotle for
supplem entary evidence concerning the type o f observation carried
out in the fourth century. W ith the exception o f some isolated earlier
references to particular eclipses, Aristotle provides us with our first
extant original records^s^ o f G reek astronomical observations.
Passages in the De Caelo and the Meteorologica especially refer to what,
he says, ‘ we have seen’ , w here the first person plural shows that it
is a question o f contem porary G reek observations, not Babylonian
records, even i f not necessarily observations m ade b y Aristotle
personally. Th u s he reports an occultation o f M ars b y the moon,2S3
describes the course o f a com et in the archonship o f N icom achus
(341/0 B . C . ) , 284 and the tail appearing o n o n e o fth e s ta rsin th e D o g , 2 8 s
and mentions the conjunction o f Ju p iter with one o f the stars in the
*78 A lthough b y the fourth century the idea o f the celestial sphere was w ell established,
it was not until later that the division into 360° was brought into Greek astronom y from
Babylonia. In the absence o f the notion o f degrees, proportions or ratios were used to
describe, for instance, the length of arc o f the summer tropic visible above the horizon
at a given latitude (i.e. the m axim um length o f daylight).
*79 For exam ple, ‘ beneath the tail o f the Little Bear lie the feet o f Cepheus, m aking an
equilateral triangle with the tip o f the ta il’ (Hipparchus i 2 .1 1). A p art from the
question o f the precision o f these descriptions, their correctness is often criticised by
H ipparchus (e.g. 11 2.37, 47, n 3-2f) who also notes certain discrepancies between the
Phainomena and the Enoptron (11 3.2gf).
280 W g (-an supplem ent the information from the parapegm a literature and the fragments
o f the Phainomena and Enoptron with occasional reports of other observations, such as
that o f Canopus recorded in Strabo (n 5.14, cf. also x v ii 1.30). M au la and others have
recently attem pted to reconstruct, on the basis o f remains found at Cnidus, an astro­
nom ical instrument which m ay represent, or at least be derived from, Eudoxus’
Arachne or Spider, mentioned at Vitruvius ix 8 .1: see M au la 1977 and cf. M au la
1975-6.
Y e t Sosigenes, quoted b y Simplicius, In Gael. 504.i7ff, suggested that Eudoxus’ theory
failed to ‘ save ’ some o f the ‘ phenom ena ’ that were known at the time, and one clear
exam ple o f this w hich w e have noted is that his model takes no account o f the inequality
o f the seasons, which had been discovered b y Euctem on and M eton.
*®* As opposed, that is, to observations reported in later writers.
Gael. 292a3fT. **♦ M ete. 345a iff. M ete. 3 4 3 b ! iff.
 18ο The development o f empirical research
T w in s.^86 It is true that Aristotle him self disclaims expert knowledge
in astronomical matters, *8? though he is clearly w ell-inform ed on the
subject. M oreover in these texts he is not concerned w ith the problems
o f constructing a planetary model, so m uch as (in most cases) with
certain physical questions. Y e t the vagueness o f his references is still
striking. H e has no satisfactory dating system : indeed on no occasion
does he date the observation he records m ore precisely than to the
archon-year and the m o n t h . N o r does he have - or at least he does
not use - a system o f celestial coordinates, w hether equatorial or
ecliptic, b y reference to w hich objects or events could be located
precisely.289
As w ith dissection, it w ill help to put the fourth-century investi­
gations into perspective i f we refer to some later work, p articularly to
that o f two o f the greatest G reek astronomers, H ipparchus (second
century b.g.) and Ptolem y (second century a .d .). 2 9 o T h ree prelim i­
nary points are fundam ental. First it is apparent that extensive
Babylonian ‘ d a ta ’ were available to, and used by, Hipparchus^’ i as
w ell as Ptolem y. Secondly, in addition to practical considerations
such as the regulation o f the calendar, a further powerful m otive for
undertaking astronom ical observations cam e to be o f increasing
im portance in G reece from the fourth century b.g. onwards, nam ely
the b e lie f in astrology, notably - eventually - in the form known as
genethlialogy, the casting o f horoscopes.292
2*6 Mete. 343b3ofF.
*87 As is w ell known, Aristotle often m erely uses w h at the ‘ m athem aticians’ say on
astronomical matters, or defers to them for a more exact account: see e.g. Metaph.
10 7 3 b lo ff, 1074a i4ff, Cael. 2gia29fF, bSflf, 2g7a2fF, 298aisfF.
288 W e jnay contrast Ptolem y’s use o f the first year o f Nabonassar’s reign (747 B.C.) as
epoch, and o f the conventional Egyptian calendar o f 365 days.
289 In I 5 where Aristotle contrasts the study o f the stars with that o f plants and
animals, he remarks on how little is clear to perception concerning the heavenly bodies,
PA 644132411.
*90 It was Apollonius o f Perga, working at the beginning o f the third century B.C., who
was responsible for the model o f epicycles and eccentrics that was used b y both H ipp­
archus and Ptolem y. W e have, however, no means o f determ ining the extent o f the
observational basis o f Apollonius’ theory.
*9 * As is clear, for exam ple, from Syntaxis iv 2 and 9, li 27o.i9ff, 332.14!?, and cf., e.g.,
A aboe 1955-6 and A ab oe and Price 1964.
C icero’s report, Div. 11 42.87, that Eudoxus held that Chaldaean astrological pre­
dictions are untrustworthy, suggests that Babylonian astrological lore had already
begun to penetrate G reece in the fourth century B.C., though at first this is more likely
to have related to general beliefs about heavenly omens than to genethlialogy. T o jud ge
from our extant evidence, Babylonian horoscopes were rare before about aoo b .c .
(Sachs 1952), nor should we underestimate the Greeks’ own role in turning the ‘ a r t’
into a universal system (see N eugebauer 1975,11 pp. 6 i3 ff). As regards H ipparchus and
Ptolem y themselves, it appears from Pliny [Nat. 11 24.95), for example, that H ipparchus
believed in astrology in some form, and Ptolem y wrote a treatise in foui books (the
Tetrabiblos) on it: in this he was careful to distinguish between on the one hand p re­
dictions concerning the movements o f the heavenly bodies, and on the other pre-
The development o f empirical research 181
T h ird ly w e can trace certain improvem ents in astronomical
instruments, again beginning in the fourth century b . g . First there
are m echanical models or orreries, designed to represent the m ove­
ments o f the sun, moon and planets.293 Secondly there are develop­
ments in sighting i n s t r u m e n t s . T h u s apart from the gnom on
H ipparchus was evidently fam iliar w ith the equinoctial (or equa­
torial) arm illary - a ring m ounted in the plane o f the equator from
w hich the equinoxes could be d e t e r m i n e d . M o r e o v e r H ipparchus
im proved (and m ay even have invented) the instrum ent P tolem y
calls the ‘ four-cubit rod d io p tra ’ , a horizontal bar with fixed back­
sight and m ovable foresight used to measure, for exam ple, the angular
diam eter o f the sun.296 in addition to these instruments Ptolem y
him self refers to four others in the Syntaxis, (i) the m eridional
arm illary, (2) the plinth or quadrant (these two were used to m easure
the m id day altitude o f the sun at the solstices, from w hich the
obliquity o f the ecliptic can be calculated) ,^9 v (3) the parallactic
dictions concerning their influence on hum an affairs, but while the former are more
certain than the latter, he claim ed that the latter too are possible, even if both difficult
and conjectural {Tetrabiblos i chh. 1-2). T h e classic work on ancient astrology is
Bouche-Leclerc 1899, but see also, e.g., C um ont 1912, Boll and Bezold (1917) 1931,
C apelle 1925, G undel and G undel 1966 and H . G . G undel 1968.
* ’ 3 A p art from Plato, Ti. 40 cd, on w hich see above, p. 174 n. 252, Archim edes is recorded
as having constructed an orrery (Cicero, Rep. 1 14.21-2, Tusc. i 25.63: Archim edes’
lost w ork On Sphere-Making m ay have dealt with this), and so too is Posidonius (Cicero,
Jsf.D. II 34-35.88). T h e first-century B.C. anti-K yth era instrument has now been shown
to be not a planetarium , but a calendrical computer, in w hich a sophisticated system
incorporating differential gearing is used to show the sidereal motions o f the sun and
m oon consistently w ith the phases of the latter: see Price 1974, who points out the
implications of this instrument for our understanding o f the technological capabilities
of the ancient world.
T here are brief surveys o f ancient astronomical instruments in Dicks 1953-4
Price 1957, and cf. A ab oe and Price 1964.
*’ 5 T his is clear from passages from H ipparchus’ On the Precession o f the Tropical and
Equinoctial Points quoted b y Ptolem y, Syntaxis in i , li i94.23ff, i96.8fF, in which
H ipparchus records several observations o f the equinoxes made on the ring in the
‘ so-called Square H a ll’ at A lexandria. A fter recording H ipparchus’ view that an error
o f up to a quarter o f a day m ight arise ‘ in observation and calculation ’ in determining
the exact time o f the solstices, Ptolem y him self notes that a deviation o f a mere 6
minutes o f arc from the equatorial plane in the setting of the instrument generates an
error of 6 hours in determ ining the time o f the equinox, and he adds that the equatorial
armillaries in the Palaestra at A lexandria were, in his own day, unreliable (Syntaxis
III I , li 1 9 7 ·4 ίΓ). Bruin and Bruin (1976) have recently reconstructed such an instrument
to investigate the systematic errors that m ay arise in its use.
See Syntaxis v 14, li 4 1 7 .i f f (where Ptolem y says that he himself constructed the
instrument described by Hipparchus). W e m ay compare the method that Archim edes
used to determine the angular diam eter o f the sun in the Sand-Reckoner 11 222.1 iff.
T h e meridional arm illary and the plinth are described one after another in Syntaxis
I 12, li 6 4 .i2 ff and 66.5ff, and although Ptolem y says ‘ we shall construct’ the former,
the fact that he states that the observations m ay be m ade more conveniently on the
latter (66.sff) suggests that he actually used the plinth. T h e possibility o f systematic
errors o f various kinds in the use o f this instrument to measure the zenith distance of
the sun has been discussed b y Britton 1969.
 182 The development o f empirical research
ruler,298 and (4) - the most com plex o f his astronomical instruments -
the arm illary astrolabe: this consisted in a nest o f concentric rings
representing the m ain circles o f the heavens, and it had the great
advantage that, once the instrument was set w ith reference to a
known point (e.g. the m oon or a bright star), the ecliptic coordinates
o f a heavenly body could be measured directly rather than deter­
mined from com plicated observations o f its position in relation to the
zenith and horizon.299 Finally although Ptolem y does not mention
the plane astrolabe in the Syntaxis, it has been thought likely that it
was known to him, i f not indeed also to H ipparchus; Ptolem y at
least appears to refer to it as the ‘ horoscopic instrum ent’ in the
Planisphaerium, a w ork w hich deals with the problems o f stereo-
graphic projection on w hich both the plane astrolabe and the
anaphoric clock are based.3 °°
Ptolem y is at some pains to give quite full details concerning both
the construction and the use o f most o f the astronomical instruments
m entioned in the Syntaxis.^^'^ Thus he sometimes (though far from
invariably) specifies their m inimum dimensions, and he issues
warnings concerning particular sources o f inaccu racy in their use.
Nevertheless the lim itations o f the instruments at his disposal are evi­
dent. First, although the elem entary laws ofoptics were w ell k n o w n , 302
This was essentially a vertical rod at the top o f w hich was hinged a second rod of
equal length fitted w ith sights (an alid ad e): the distance from the back o f the alidade
to the lower end o f the vertical rod was measured by a thin lath, and this measurement
then gave the chord o f the angle between the alidade and the vertical (and so the
angle itself could be obtained, using a T ab le o f Chords such as that in Syntaxis i 11).
Ptolem y sets out the details o f the construction o f the instrument at Syntaxis v 12,
li 403.gff, insisting that the two main rods should be ‘ not less than four cubits lo n g ’ and
thick enough to be rigid. T hough he refers to the instrument only in the context of
determ ining the m oon’s parallax, it could be used to measure the zenith distance o f any
star. Price 1957, p. 589, notes that it was ‘ perhaps the most serviceable o f Ptolem y’s
instruments and the only one used in similar form b y subsequent astronom ers’, in­
cluding Copernicus, and Dicks 1954, p. 81, estimates that it ‘ probably gave results to
an accuracy o f 5 '’ .
See Syntaxis v i, li 35i.5fF where Ptolem y says he constructed this instrument and
reports the discrepancies he found between the actual, and the predicted, positions of
the moon by using it. See also, e.g., vii 4, lii 35.1 iff, in connection with his star
catalogue.
300 Planisphaerium ch. 14, 11 249.igfF. See N eugebauer 1949 and cf. D rachm ann 1953-4
who believes that the anaphoric clock preceded the plane astrolabe rather than the
other w ay about. T h e plane astrolabe was also probably the subject o f a work by Theon
o f Alexandria on the ‘ little astrolabe’, the contents o f which are preserved in the
treatise by Severus Sebokht, and we have a book by Philoponus on the instrument
(see Hase 1839).
In m any cases Ptolem y’s own descriptions can be supplemented by those in T heon o f
Alexandria, Pappus and Proclus. Proclus especially shows, for a Platonist, a rem arkable
interest in, and knowledge of, astronomical instruments: see Hyp. ch. 3, 42.5-54.12,
ch. 4, 128.6-130.26, ch. 6, 198.15-212.6, and cf. 72.2off, iio .3 fi, I20.i5ff.
30^ Although atmospheric refraction is discussed at some length in Ptolem y’s Optics
V 23ff, the chief context in which its effects are mentioned in the Syntaxis is that of the
The development o f empirical research 183
neither he nor any other G reek astronomer tried to develop
sighting instruments that m agnified the visible object. Secondly,
the technological problems involved in constructing large examples
o f com plex instruments such as the arm illary astrolabe in m etal
were form idable, and, so far as w e know, the Greeks attem pted
nothing on the scale o f the massive bronze arm illary spheres
eventually built b y the C h i n e s e . 3 ° 3 T h irdly, for time-keeping at
night the Greeks relied principally on various versions o f the
constant-flow w aterclock (invented b y Ctesibius) and it is significant
that none o f the specific observations recorded b y Ptolem y is timed
more precisely than to one sixth o f an equinoctial hour. 3 °+
A fter these preliminaries, w e m ay confront the two interlocking
questions that chiefly concern us, nam ely first the extent o f the
observations that H ipparchus and Ptolem y carried out, and secondly
the relation between observation and theory in their work. O n the
first topic we m ay begin w ith the inform ation provided b y the star
catalogues they m ade. A lthough H ipparchus’ catalogue has not
survived, we have some inform ation concerning the num ber o f stars
he identified in most o f the m ain constellations from w hich it has
been estimated that it contained some 850 stars.3°5 Ptolem y’s own
catalogue, in Syntaxis v ii and viii, includes over 1,020 stars, giving
their longitudes and latitudes in degrees and fractions o f a degree 3 °^
and also their magnitudes. A lth ou gh the identification o f a few stars
is in doubt, a comparison between Ptolem y’s values and those calcu ­
lated for the year A.D. 100 b y the most recent editors o f the catalogue 3 0 7
apparent size of the heavenly bodies observed near the horizon (i 3, li ii.2 o ff, I3.3ff,
but cf. also IX 2, lii 209.16, 2 io .5 ff) and corrections for refraction are not m ade in the
body o f the work.
303 See Needham , Ling, Price i960 and J. Needham 1954-, in pp. 342ff, with the table,
pp. 344ff, giving the dimensions and dates o f the principal instruments.
304 Cf. Dicks 1954, p. 84, who concludes: ‘ it seems that the ancient astronomers could
tell the time at night to an accuracy o f within 10 m inutes’ . A much lower figure (one
minute) was given b y Schjellerup 1881, p. 39, based on a study of the constellations
whose risings were used to mark the hours, but this is unduly flattering. C f. also
Fotheringham 1915 and 1923.
305 See Boll 1901, who points out that figures such as 1,080 for the stars within the
recognised constellations alone (in Anonym us edited by M aass 1898, p. 128) are - like
the guess o f a total of 1,600 stars in Pliny, Nat. 11 4 1 .1 1 0 - q u it e untrustworthy, and
who attempts to work out the extent o f H ipparchus’ catalogue on the basis o f the
numbers of stars given for the m ain constellations in the list ascribed to him in the
fourteenth-century astrological M S S , Cod. Parisinus 2506 (reproduced b y Boll 1901,
pp. i8 6 f). It should, however, be stressed that that list is incomplete and the margin of
error consequently large (Boll himself gives upper and lower limits of 761 and 881 stars).
306 O n ly seven simple fractions are used, i, |, h f, f , i.e. 10', 15', 20', 30 , 40 , 45
and 50'.
307 Peters and K n obel 1915 (cf. the corrections in M oesgaard 1976). T h e actual date of
Ptolem y’s catalogue is a .d . 138, w hich increases the errors in longitude given by Peters
and ELnobel (where these are underestimates) by 32'.
184 The development o f empirical research
shows that the m ean error in longitude is about 5 1' and in latitude
about 26', In the great m ajority o f cases, however, the errors in
longitude are in the same direction, that is they are too small, and it
has been suggested that the reason for this is that - so far from working
from independent observations - Ptolem y has sim ply taken over
H ipparchus’ catalogue and corrected it for precession, using his own
figure for precession w hich underestimates it b y some 13" per year.^o^
T h e difficulties o f determ ining just how Ptolem y’s catalogue was
drawn up are form idable, but from one point o f view the question is
not an essential one. W hoever is responsible for it, the catalogue as
it stands is excellent testimony to some rem arkably sustained and
accurate observational w ork in G reek astronomy, and the m ore
Ptolem y’s part in this is dow ngraded, the m ore impressive H ip p ar­
chus’ contribution must be c o n s i d e r e d . Y e t the hypothesis that all
that Ptolem y has done is to copy H ipparchus w ith an adjustm ent for
precession is hard to sustain, (i) I f the estimate o f the contents o f
H ipparchus’ catalogue is sound, Ptolem y has evidently added some
170 stars that did not appear in it. (2) W here a direct comparison is
possible between H ipparchan longitudes (obtained mostly from the
data in his Commentary on AratusY^^ and Ptolem y’s figures, it emerges
that the differences are not constant, as we w ould have expected them
to be i f Ptolem y had sim ply added a figure to H ipparchus’ values. 3 ”
I f so, then it follows that w hile here as elsewhere Ptolem y m ay w ell
have used H ipparchus’ data as a starting-point, he did more than
m erely copy them w ith a simple num erical adjustment. It seems that
w e should conclude that Ptolem y’s own account o f how he set about
observing the fixed stars, using the arm illary astrolabe and trying to
obtain the positions o f as m any stars as possible up to those o f the
sixth magnitude,3i2 is not purely fictitious, although, to be sure, we
cannot verify in detail ju st how m any observations he carried out.3i3
308 See especially D elam bre 1817, i p. 183, 11 p. 264, T annery 1893, p. 270, N ewton
1977, pp. 237ff, but cf. Boll 1901, pp. 194-5, Dreyer 19 16 -17 and 1917-18 , V o g t 1925
and Pedersen 1974, pp. 252ff. T h e idea that Ptolem y had plagiarised an earlier
astronomer - nam ely M e n e la u s -w a s already suggested by A rabic astronomers, see
Bjornbo 1901, Dreyer 19 16 -17 , pp. 533ff and V o gt 1925, pp. 37f.
Ptolem y him self repeatedly expresses the highest adm iration for H ipparchus, and
there is no doubt that one o f H ipparchus’ major contributions was the discovery of
precession.
These data relate to equatorial coordinates (right ascension and declination) or to
mixed equatorial and ecliptic ones (the so-called polar longitude) far more often than
to ecliptic coordinates and show that, as Neugebauer put it (1975, i p. 277), ‘ at
Hipparchus’ time a definite system of spherical coordinates for stellar positions did not
yet exist’ .
See V o gt 1925, and cf. Pedersen 1974, PP· 255ff, N eugebauer 1975, i pp. 283^
See Syntaxis vii 4, lii 35.1 iff.
Various suggestions have been made on the sources o f systematic errors in Ptolem y’s
The development o f empirical research 185
This takes us already to our second and m ore com plex problem ,
that o f the relation between observation and theory, and again we
must concentrate on the evidence supplied b y the Syntaxis
Ptolem y him self is explicit about the sources o f m uch o f his infor­
m ation. H e not only tells us in general terms that he has astronomical
data from the Babylonians going back to N a b o n a s s a r , ^ i 5 but he also
cites several precisely observed lunar eclipses from the eighth,
seventh and sixth centuries B . C . 3 ^ 6 H e is evidently able to draw on
some quite detailed inform ation from previous G reek astronomers,
even though he expresses his doubts about the reliability o f some o f
their observations, especially those m ade before H i p p a r c h u s , 3 i 7 and
the Syntaxis includes exact reports o f some 35 observations that he
tells us that he carried out him self in A l e x a n d r i a . Nevertheless the
actual num ber o f observations deployed to resolve com plex problems
in his theories o f the sun, m oon and planets is quite small, and in
particular the authenticity o f those he claims to have m ade him self
has been called in question. M a n y years ago Delambre3i9 suggested
that w h at Ptolem y reports as his own observations are merely com puta­
tions from the tables he sets out, and one recent com m entator has
con clu d ed :
A ll o f his o w n o b servation s th a t P to le m y uses in th e Syntaxis a re fra u d u le n t, so far
as w e c a n test th em . M a n y o f th e ob serv atio n s th a t h e a ttrib u te s to o th e r astro ­
n om ers a re also frau d s th a t h e has c o m m itte d . . . T h u s P to le m y is n ot th e g rea te st
astro n o m er o f a n tiq u ity , b u t he is so m e th in g still m o re u n u s u a l: h e is th e m ost
successful fra u d in th e h isto ry o f scie n ce .320
M a n y aspects o f this longstanding controversy are obscure and,
catalogue: see Drayson 1867-8, Peters and K n obel 1915, p . 8, Dreyer 19 16 -17 ,
pp. 536ff, 1917-18 , p . 346, V o g t 1925, C zw alin a 1956-8 and N eugebauer 1975,
i I p p . 28off. Ptolem y him self says that he used certain bright stars as reference points,
1 whose positions had in turn been obtained w ith reference to the moon. T h e whole
I catalogue would therefore be affected b y the errors in the solar theory and the coordi­
nate system (see below, p. 186 and n. 322).
W hile Ptolem y takes over H ipparchus’ solar theory in all essentials, and uses his lunar
model as the starting-point o f his own discussion, he reports that Hipparchus did not
attem pt a detailed solution to the problems of planetary motion, but contented himself
w ith ‘ arranging the observations to make them more useful ’ - notably b y determining
the fundam ental periods - and w ith showing how the phenom ena conflicted with
current theories, Syntaxis ix 2 and 3, lii 2 io .8 ff and 2 i3 .i6 ff.
See Syntaxis in 7, li 254.1 iff.
These are conveniently collected in A ppendix A in Pedersen 1974, pp. 4o8ff.
See, for example, Syntaxis vii i and 3 and especially ix 2 (lii 3 .iff, 18.14!?, 209.5!?,
I7 ff), and contrast the remarks on H ipparchus’ own observations in v ii i and ix 2
(lii 3.8ff, 2io.8 ff).
These are set out in Pedersen 1974, pp. 46 iff. T h e y range from a .d . 127 (or possibly
125) to 141. Ptolem y is also able to draw on observations m ade at A lexandria by his
contem porary T heon (often identified w ith T heon of Sm yrna).
D elam bre 1817, i pp. xxv ff, 11 pp. 25ofF.
N ew ton 1977, pp. 378-9, cf. also Newton 1973, 1974a and 19746.
186 The development o f empirical research
despite m uch recent w ork, 3 2 i ^re still far from being able to give
definitive answers to all the questions it raises. In particular certain
errors in the fundam ental coordinate system and the basic p ara­
meters o f the solar model322 obliquity o f the ecliptic, the length
o f the tropical year, the rate o f precession and the eccentricity o f the
solar orbit) infect all his astronomical workings in such a w ay that
it becomes extrem ely difficult to diagnose the precise sources o f
mismatches between Ptolem y’s results and those obtained on the
basis o f m odern calculations.223 Nevertheless some points are not
in dispute. First the fewness o f the actual observations cited in
his detailed accounts o f the movements o f the planets in books ix
to X I is obvious and rem arkable. Thus for M ercu ry he uses some 1 7
precise observations, for Venus 11, and for M ars, Jup iter and Saturn
a mere 5 each. In each case he cites the absolute m inim um - or very
close to the m inim um - num ber o f observations that are necessary
to determ ine the param eters o f w hat are, even for the superior
planets, com plex m odels.324
H ow he proceeds can be illustrated b y considering the exam ple o f
Venus. First, even before he turns to the detailed discussion o f each
o f the planets in turn, he has set out a table giving their two m ain
periodicities, that is the ‘ m ovem ent in longitude ’ (interpreted as the
See, for exam ple, Pannekoek 1955, C zw alina 1956-8 and 1959, van der W aerden
1958, Petersen and Schm idt 1967-8, Petersen 1969 and G ingerich forthcoming.
322 In Syntaxis in i Ptolem y claims to confirm the param eters o f Hipparchus’ solar model
with observations o f solstices and equinoxes of his own which turn out to manifest a
systematic error o f about a day (see Rom e 1937, 1938, Petersen and Schm idt 1967-8,
Bruin and Bruin 1976). T h e m atch between the results he gives and the figures pre­
dicted by H ipparchus’ model is sufficiently close to suggest that Ptolem y has been
influenced by, and m ay even simply have worked back from, the latter - that is he
m ay have selected his cases to tally closely with the value o f the tropical year that he
takes over from Hipparchus (365 + i - ^ o day) and that he is convinced on indepen­
dent grounds to be, as he puts it, the ‘ nearest approxim ation possible’ (li 208.is f) .
But in ju d gin g this set o f results we should bear in mind first that Ptolem y particularly
emphasises the difficulty o f observation in this context, noting that there m ay be an
error o f up to a quarter o f a day in both solstice and equinox observations {Syntaxis
m I , li 197.iff·, cf. also I94.i2ff·, 195.iff"- quoting H ipparchus - 202.i4ff· and cf. above,
p. 181 n. 295), and secondly that w hat Ptolem y presents as his results here cannot all
be simple observations since they include a solstice calculated as occurring two hours
after m idnight (li 205.2iff': equally the ‘ most accurately observed’ H ipparchan autum n
equinox he takes as a point o f comparison at li 204. i f f is one calculated to have occurred
at midnight).
Thus N eugebauer (1975, i p. 107) concluded: ‘ In all ancient astronomy direct measure­
ments and theoretical considerations are so inextricably intertwined that every cor­
rection at one point aff’e cts in the most com plex fashion countless other data, not to
mention the ever present num erical inaccuracies and arbitrary roundings which
repeatedly have the same order o f m agnitude as the effects under consideration.’
324 T h e best brief exposition of Ptolem y’s planetary models is that in N eugebauer 1957,
A ppendix A , pp. igiff·; cf. also Pedersen 1974, chh. 9 and 10, Neugebauer 1975,
I pp. i 45f f .
The development o f empirical research 187
m ovem ent o f the epicycle’s centre on the eccentric deferent) and the
‘ m ovem ent in an om aly’ (interpreted as the m ovem ent o f the planet
itself on its epicycle). In Syntaxis ix 3, lii 2 i3 .i6 ff, he says he w ill set
out the periodic returns ‘ as calculated b y H ip p arch u s’ w ith cor­
rections that he obtained him self for w hich he w ill give some
justification in due course, but there is no mention o f the data
from w hich the original figures were derived: no doubt in most
cases they go back to Babylonian param eters, and it should be
rem arked that they are independent o f any particular geom etrical
m odel . 3 2 5
His general preliminaries to planetary theory incorporate four
further points o f im portance, (i) H e decides to ignore the latitudinal
movements o f the planets (deviations north and south o f the ecliptic)
in his exposition o f their longitudinal movements ;326 this is a problem
that he returns to in Syntaxis xiii, (2) W hile he observes that the
epicyclic and the eccentric models are both able to account for some
o f the phenom ena o f planetary motion327 (that is their first, or
zodiacal, anom aly, w hich in practice he w ill explain b y using an
eccentric deferent), he says that the anom aly in respect o f the sun32S
possesses a property that is incom patible w ith an eccentric m odel,
nam ely that the time from the greatest to the m ean m ovem ent is
alw ays longer than the time from the m ean to the least. This can,
however, be explained on the hypothesis o f an epicycle m oving in the
same sense as the eccentric deferent, and he therefore uses a com bi­
nation o f both models for each planet. But w hile he asserts that this
property is always found,229 he does not give the data themselves,
although the point is clearly fundam ental for his choice o f model.
(3) H e notes that the apogees o f the eccentric circles are fixed in
respect o f the tropic and equinoctial points, not in respect o f the fixed
stars: in other words precession has to be taken into account. 3 3 o
Finally (4) he introduces the notion o f an equant: the epicycle’s
centre is carried round on an eccentric circle, but its m otion is
uniform not w ith respect to either the centre o f the eccentric or w ith
respect to the earth, but with respect to a point on a line join in g these
two centres and at the same distance from the eccentric centre as the
Ptolem y points out, ix 3, lii 2i4.2ff', that approxim ate or uncorrected figures are
adequate for the exposition of his model.
See Syntaxis ix 2 and 6, lii 21 i.24ff', 254.3ff·.
In Syntaxis iii 3 Ptolem y, following Apollonius in all probability, demonstrates the
equivalence o f the two models in his exposition of the theory o f the sun.
It is the anom aly in respect o f the sun that produces the phenom ena of stations and
retrogradations.
Syntaxis ix 5, lii 250.i5ff·.
Syntaxis ix 5, lii 252.aff" and 11 S'.
 188 The development o f empirical research
earth. 3 3 i H ere, unlike the data underlying point (2), he w ill cite
some em pirical observations in the course o f his exposition o f each
planet in turn.
His discussion o f V enus in book x proceeds step b y step as follows.332
In the first chapter he cites two pairs o f observations in order to
determ ine the planet’s apsidal line - the diam eter o f the eccentric
circle through the apogee and the perigee. Both pairs o f observations
are o f the planet at equal greatest elongations on opposite sides o f the
sun (that is first as an evening, then as a m orning, star ) , 3 3 3 and using
a theorem previously established (ix 6 ), he obtains the apsidal line by
sim ply bisecting the angle between the two observed positions o f the
p lanet . 3 3 4 C hapter 2 then cites a further pair o f observations m ade
D iagram i
331 Syntaxis ix 5, lii 252.y ff and i8fF: in diagram i (from Syntaxis ix 6) E is the earth,
ΑΗΔΖΕΓΚ the apsidal line, Z the centre o f the eccentric circle HBK; Θ, the centre of the
epicycle, moves round the circumference of this circle, but its movement is^uniform not
with respect to Z, but with respect to Δ (the equant), that is the angle ΑΔΘ increases/
decreases uniformly.
33* C f. S ta h lm a n 19 5 3 , p p . 48ofF, P ed ersen 19 7 4 , p p . 298fT, N e u g e b a u e r 1 9 7 5 , i p p . i5 2 ff.
333 For the two inferior planets, which have maxim um elongations from the sun, the
centre o f the epicycle can be identified with the position o f the mean sun.
334 In diagram 2^ (from SyiUaxis ix 6) Λ and M are two positions o f the planet at greatest
elongation (ΒΛΖ and ΔΜΖ are right angles), Z is the earth, E the centre o f the ec-
The development o f empirical research 189
when [a) the sun was on the apsidal diam eter that has ju st been
determ ined, and {b) the planet was at greatest elongation from it.
This im m ediately reveals w hich end o f the diam eter is perigee and
which apogee. Ptolem y also asserts3 3 s (though he does not sub­
stantiate) that the sum o f the greatest elongations on opposite sides
o f the sun is never less than the sum obtained when the sun is at
apogee nor greater than the sum when the sun is at perigee - w hich
confirms that a unique apsidal line, w ith a single perigee , 3 3 6 has been
determ ined. M oreover the same observations enable him to obtain
both the m agnitude o f the epicycle (its radius being expressed as a
proportion o f the radius o f the eccentric circle) and the eccentricity
(the distance from the earth to the centre o f the eccentric circle,
again expressed in terms o f the radius o f that circle). 3 37 T h e next step
D iagram 2
Λ Λ
centric^and H the eqxwnt. In ^ntaxis ix 6 P to lem y first proves that when AHB = ΑΗΔ,
then HBZ is equal to ΗΔΖ and ΒΖΛ is also equal to ΔΖΜ (that is the two greatest elonga­
tions are equal). In x i he uses this theorem in reverse: when BZA and ΔΖΜ are equal,
the apsidal line ΑΗΕΖΓ can be found b y bisecting the angle ΛΖΜ (A and M being the
two given positions o f the p lan et).
335 Syntaxis x 2, lii 300. igff.
336 T his is true for all the planets except M ercury, where Ptolem y finds a double perigee
and adapts his usual m odel: the centre o f the eccentric circle itself moves in a circle
round a point on the line between the earth and the apogee.
337 In diagram 3 (from Syntaxis x 2), where Δ is the centre o f the eccentric circle^and E
the earth, the planet, at Z and H, is at m axim um elongation (so AZE and ΕΗΓ are
right angles) and ZA = ΗΓ (the radius o f the epicycle is assumed to remain constant). B y
190 The deOel&pment o f empirical research
is to determ ine the point round w hich the epicycle’s centre moves
uniform ly. For this he uses two further observations m ade when the
m ean sun was a q uadrant’s distance from the apogee and the planet
was at greatest elongation once as a m orning and once as an evening
star. Since the difference between the two elongations is tw ice the
zodiacal anom aly, the zodiacal anom aly itself can be o b t a i n e d , 3 3 »
and the result that Ptolem y reaches is that the centre o f uniform
m otion (the equant) is twice as far from the earth as from the centre
o f the eccentric circle. T h e last m ain step is to determ ine the planet’s
simple trigonom etry AZ can be found in terms AE (and that is ΑΔ+ΔΕ) and ΗΓ in
terms o f ΕΓ (and that is ΔΓ— ΓΕ), and so both AZ and ΔΕ in terms of the radius ΑΔ.
In diagram 4 (from Syntaxis x 3), Z and H are the two observed positions of the planet,
B the earth, Δ the equant, Θ the centre o f the eccentric circle and E the position o f the
centre o f the epicycle (which can be identified with that o f the mean sun, here at a
quad rant’s distance from the apogee: so ΑΔΕ is a right angle). BE is first found from the
angle EBH (which is h alf the sum of the two elongations, ZBH) and EH (the previously
determ ined radius o f the epicycle). But the diflference between the two elongations is
The development o f empirical research 191
mean m otion in anom aly. For this he uses two more observations^^?
separated b y a considerable time. T h e earlier rough approxim ation
had been that 5 cycles o f anom aly correspond to 8 Egyptian years
(of 365 days) ;34o using this and taking the difference between the
observed longitudes o f the planet on the two occasions he can arrive at
a more exact figure for the m ean d aily motion in anom aly by calcu ­
lating the total distance travelled in degrees and dividing b y the time
taken.
Several features o f this exposition call for comment. First he works
with a geom etrical m odel the m ain features o f w hich are taken for
granted. T h a t the problem was to find a com bination o f circular
movements to yield the resultant com plex m otion o f the planet had
been comm on ground to astronomers ever since Plato. It w ould be a
mistake to explain this purely in terms o f a quasi-religious respect for
double the zodiacal anom aly, ΔΕΒ: so ΔΕΒ can be found: and from BE and ΔΕΒ, ΔΒ
can be obtained.
A third observation is cited merely to indicate that the planet was not at maxim um
elongation on the first o f these two occasions.
See Syntaxis x 4, lii 314.1511, cf. ix 3, lii 2i5.5fT.
192 The development o f empirical research
the perfection o f the circle. T h e geom etry o f the circle is, after all,
far simpler than that o f any other curvilinear figure. M oreover the
fact that the m otion o f the sphere o f the fixed stars is circular could
be used to justify the applicability o f the circle to the problems o f
heavenly motions. T h e success o f either an eccentric or an epicyclic
model in giving a very close approxim ation to the m ovem ent o f the
sun m eant th at it was natural to use these models as a starting-point
elsewhere, and although, as we have seen, Ptolem y does not specify
all the grounds for his particular com bination o f eccentric and epi­
cyclic hypotheses, some com bination o f the two had the advantage
that the account given o f the second irregularity in the motions o f
the planets was both consistent w ith and analogous to the account
given o f the first. T h e m ain point at w hich he diverges from all
previous astronomers is in the introduction o f the equant, w hich,
since it broke the rule that m otion along the circum ference should be
uniform w ith respect to the centre o f the circle, was considered one
o f the m ajor scandals o f the Ptolem aic system down to Copernicus.
B ut this is, as w e h ave seen, one point where, in his account o f V enus
at l e a s t , 3 4 2 Ptolem y claims that the observed data themselves
necessitate the m odification.
Y e t w hile the geom etry o f the exposition o f the m odel is both
simple and elegant, the confrontation between theory and em pirical
data is kept to a m inim um . W e are given enough specific obser-
vations343 to determ ine the parameters, but very little m ore than the
absolute m inim um . In particular he does not check his results b y
subm itting them to further rigorous and extensive tests. M oreover
several aspects o f his workings are rem arkable. It is clear th at he
makes two types o f adjustments, first discounting m inor discrepancies
in the observational data that he reports, and secondly m aking
rounding adjustments in the course o f his calculations. Thus in the
But contrast N eugebauer’s judgem ent (1975, i p. 155) that the equant is ‘ probably
Ptolem y’s most im portant discovery in the theory o f planetary m otion’ .
T he argum ent for the equant is clearest in the case o f Venus (though even here no
justification is offered for the assumption that it is located on the apsidal line). For the
outer planets Ptolem y’s procedure is very dift'erent. T h e equant is not arrived at as
a conclusion from em pirical data, but Ptolemy first finds the equant circle and then
bisects the eccentricity o f the equant to find the centre o f the deferent. Pedersen 1974,
pp. 277ff, conjectures that this was the first step in an iterative procedure o f adjustment,
once Ptolem y had decided that the equant could not be the centre of the deferent, but
the Syntaxis gives no hint of the process by which he arrived at his conclusion. (If he
had already worked out the model for Venus, he may, o f course, have been influenced
b y i t : but w e do not know the order in which he tackled the planets.)
O n the difliculty o f correctly determ ining the maxim um elongations o f the planet and
on the inaccuracy o f Ptolem y’s reported positions, see especially C zw alina 1959,
N eugebauer 1975, i p. 153 n. i and p. 158, and cf. Newton 1977, p. 307.
The development o f empirical research 193
argum ent in Syntaxis x i that establishes that the apsidal line runs
through the points on the zodiac defined as 25° w ithin the Bull and
25° w ithin the Scorpion, the first pair o f observations gives the former
result precisely, but the second yields a figure o f 24° 58' in the
S co rp io n : nor can the explanation o f this be that we should m ake an
allow ance for precession, for (<2) the figures still do not come out
exactly, and [b] no such allow ance was m ade in evaluating the first
pair o f observations. W e should bear in m ind his warnings con­
cerning the difficulties o f exact observation, and the w ay his own
observations are presented here clearly reveals their imprecision.
Thus in the fourth observation in Syntaxis x i (lii 298.1 iff) he states
V enus’ position as ‘ nearly two-thirds o f a full m o o n ’ from a p arti­
cular fixed star. In this chapter, as often though not invariably else­
where, he signals the approxim ate nature o f his results by the use o f
the term έγ γ ισ τα - ‘ very n ea rly ’ ^ 4 4 _ though he does not specify
w hat he takes to be the m argin o f error to w hich they are subject.
In his m athem atical m anipulations rounding operations occur
frequently not only (i) in conversions from arcs to chords or vice
versa, using the table o f chords in Syntaxis i 11, and (2) in the process
o f renorm ing that is a recurrent feature o f his w orking w ith ratios
between lengths and w ith chords and arcs (where w e should use
sines and cosines), but also in other contexts. Thus in the w orking in
Syntaxis x 2, the chord o f arc 94° 40' is given as ‘ very nearly 8 8 p i3 ’ ,
w here the table yields 88pi4^ 12^^30^. T h e values he arrives at for
the distance from the earth [a) to the centre o f the eccentric circle,
and {b) to the equant, are ‘ very nearly i p i 5 ’ {Syntaxis-χ. 2, lii 302.17)
and ‘ very nearly 2 p3 o’ {Syntaxis x 3, lii 305.17), but taking his own
data, neither figure is correct to w ithin a sixtieth,34s and the neatness
o f his result - w ith one distance precisely tw ice the other - is
factitious. H e tells us in Syntaxis x 4 that he obtained the correction
to the m ean daily m otion o f the planet in anom aly from the obser­
vations he cites, putting it that ‘ju st about that m any degrees o f
surplus’ are obtained from the tables for the planet that he had set
out in IX 4. But if we divide the total num ber o f degrees travelled
(expressed sexagesim ally as 25,35,38° 25') b y the total num ber o f
Syntaxis x i, lii 299.2.
^♦5 T his is also true o f Ptolem y’s figure for the radius o f the epicycle (43pio), at least if
w e take his own figure of i p i5 for the eccentricity (from which we w ould obtain a
figure o f 43P9*2o“ 37® for the radius o f the epicycle). But this is a case where two
roundings cancel one another out: with the more accurate figure o f ip i6 for the
eccentricity, the result Ptolem y gives for the radius o f the epicycle is correct to a
sixtieth. C f. N eugebauer’s com putation, from Ptolem y’s data, o f an eccentricity of
ipi6*48“ and an epicycle radius of 43P 10*48“ (Neugebauer 1975, i p. 154).
 194 The development o f empirical research
days (41,30,52 ;o) the figure we obtain is o; 36* 59^ 25^* 4 9 8 ^
as against the figure given in the table346 o f o; 36* 59'^ 25^^’ 53*’^
11^ 28^.
In each o f the cases we have considered so far Ptolem y’s adjust­
ments are transparent. E ven though we cannot say we fully under­
stand the approxim ation and interpolation procedures he used, we
can determ ine the relationship between the data he reports and the
results he obtains. This does not tell us that the data are genuine, but
i f they were invented, they were not invented to correspond exactly
and in all cases w ith his stated conclusions. B ut the charge o f fudging
sometimes takes the form not that he invented the data (reporting
observations that he never undertook) b ut th at he selected them to
conform (exactly or approxim ately) to a preconceived theory. It
has been argued that this is the case, for exam ple, with his deter­
m ination o f precession, where the comparison between Ptolem y’s
discussion and the m odern analysis done by N ew ton (1974^)347 is
revealing.
In Syntaxis v ii 2 and 3 Ptolem y gives data concerning the decli­
nations o f eighteen stars observed b y Tim ocharis, H ipparchus and
him self and then cites six o f these where he says that the differences
in declination between H ipparchus’ time and his own correspond to
a difference o f 2§° in longitude (that is a rate o f precession o f about
36" a year). In his analysis N ew ton first asks how accurate Ptolem y’ s
reported declinations are^^Sand then com pares the figures for the
differences in declination for the stars P to lem y uses with those for
the stars he does not use. H ere N ew ton cites the form ula b y w hich
the longitude o f a star can be obtained from its declination and its
latitude, together w ith the obliquity o f the ecliptic,^^9 and he
produces a table setting out his results. H ow ever he first discards
four o f the stars that Ptolem y m entioned on the grounds that the
changes in declination are so small th at a reliable value for pre-
3 -**O ne o f the surprising features o f this table is that the figure for the yearly anom aly
differs by 6''5''* from that obtained by m ultiplying the daily anom aly by 365. I f
Ptolem y worked back from an already existing table, using the yearly figure for the
409 whole years between the two observations cited, and the daily figure for the
rem aining days, he would reach a figure for the total num ber o f degrees o f anom aly of
25,35,38° 27‘ 4 7 " 5 i ‘" i6 ‘’' 28'' i r * as against 25,35,38° 25* derived from his obser­
vations. C f other examples o f imprecise m athem atical manipulations mentioned by
N eugebauer 1975, i pp. 91 and 197.
3+’ Com pare also Pannekoek 1955, and two earlier workings, D reyer 1917-18 , pp. 347f
and D elam bre 1817, 11 p. 254.
34® T h ey are all correct to w ithin h a lf a d egree; but the error is on the same side for the
six stars he uses, on either side for the other twelve.
A(sin 5 ) = A(sin λ) cos β sin ε, where Δ denotes a change, δ is the declination, λ the
longitude, β the latitude and e the obliquity o f the ecliptic.
The development o f empirical research 195
cession cannot be inferred from them , and he then shows that in the
rem aining fourteen stars there is a m arked discrepancy between the
figure for precession for the six that Ptolem y uses and the figure for
the other eight. Indeed he concludes that the only six stars that yield
the conclusion that Ptolem y reached are the six he actually takes -
w hich cannot then have been the result o f a random selection from
the original set o f eighteen: the other eight in N ew ton’s table give a
figure o f 52".8 per year for precession w hich is close to the correct
va lu e . 3 5 0
N ow if Ptolem y proceeded in the w ay that N ew ton does, the
fraudulence is manifest. Y e t his workings m ay w ell have differed
from N ew ton’s in two ways. First there is no reason to think that the
four stars that New ton discards were discarded by Ptolemy.^si
Secondly and far m ore im portantly, Ptolem y does not tell us how he
proceeded in converting his declinations into l o n g i t u d e s . T h e
modern form ula enables exact calculations to be m ade, as set out in
N ew ton’s table. But Ptolem y’s w a y o f referring to his results tells
strongly against his using any precise ancient equivalent. A p art from
the fact that he sometimes qualifies his conclusions b y ‘ n ea rly ’ or
‘ alm ost’ ,353 roundings are in evidence at two points, (i) on one
occasion he rounds the figure for the shift in declination, 3 S4 and (2)more
significantly still he never refers to the longitudes o f the stars in
question precisely. T h e shift in declination o f i for the m iddle
star o f the Pleiads is, he says, nearly the same as the shift in longitude
o f 2§° that we get for ‘ stars at the end o f the R a m ’ . C ap ella has a
shift in declination that corresponds to one o f 2 f ° in longitude for
‘ stars in the m iddle o f the B u ll’ (but C ap ella ’s position is given as 25°
w ithin the Bull in Syntaxis v ii 5). A gain the star in the western
shoulder o f O rion has a shift in declination that corresponds to one
o f 2 f° in longitude for ‘ stars two-thirds w ithin the B u ll’ (and this
star’s position is given as 24° w ithin the Bull in Syntaxis v iii i). It
looks as i f Ptolem y is here working back from the assumed figure o f
3S0 G iven b y Pedersen 1974, p. 423 as 49".86, per year.
If, like Newton, he thought these four could yield no reliable value for precession
(because the shift in declination is so small), there is no reason for him to have cited
them in the first p la ce : however we do not know w h at conclusions he reached in their
case any more than we do for the other eight stars in his original list which he does not
consider further.
^52 T h e problem o f finding the declinations and right ascensions of points on the ecliptic
is discussed in Syntaxis 1 14 and 16 and the general case o f transformation from ecliptic
to equatorial coordinates considered in Syntaxis viii 5.
Syntaxis v ii 3, lii 23.23, 24.13 and 25.10.
^5+ A t Syntaxis vii 3, lii 2 4 .i2 f he takes the difference between a declination o f i| ° and
one o f 2 j° (i.e. 42') to be ‘ very n ea rly ’ (40')·
 ig6 The development o f empirical research
2 f ° for precession and - it m ay be - consulting tables for conversions
for quite broad intervals o f longitude.^ss
T h a t his conversions w ere rough and read y is further suggested b y
the w ay in w hich he turns from these data to a second group o f data
in the later p art o f v ii 3 from w hich he says the question under
discussion w ill be ‘ even c l e a r e r ’.3s6 H ere he cites figures that he
represents as the values for the longitudes themselves that follow
from observations o f the occultations o f stars b y the moon that were
carried out b y Tim ocharis, A grippa o f Bithynia and M e n e l a u s , 3 S 7
and these give a range o f rates o f precession, although, with the
exception o f one figure for a period that Ptolem y m ay w ell have
thought too short to yield a reliable value,3s8 they all come close to
his ultim ate conclusion o f about 36" per year.3S9
I f Ptolem y’s workings w ith the declination data were as approxi­
m ate as his descriptions o f their results suggest, then those data
w ould have been m uch less useful to him than they m ight have been.
It is possible that he had at his disposal a table o f precise results like
that provided by N ew ton, and that he then fraudulently mis­
represented them - although on this hypothesis w e w ould have to
suppose him not only fraudulent, but also very foolish in citing
evidence from w hich his deceit could be d e d u c e d . But a more
likely story is th at his workings were approxim ate and th at the
limits o f tolerance w ithin w hich he interpreted them were such that
he felt justified in the conclusion that he usually (though not, it is
true, invariably) expresses in the form o f a rate o f precession o f
‘ very nearly' i ° in 100 years. This was a figure that had some authority
from H ipparchus (though it was p robably his lower lim it for
precession) and it had the further advantage o f m athem atical
convenience: but there is no reason to think that Ptolem y did not
355 Cf. M anitius’ notes and reference to the table o f obliquities {Syntaxis i 15) in his
com m entary (1963, 11 pp. 2ofF) and Pannekoek’s table, 1955, p. 62.
356 lii 25.i3fF: cf. the w ay the use o f the plinth is introduced in the investigation o f the
obliquity of the ecliptic, above, p. 181 n. 297.
357 T he trouble here is that the longitudes are only obtained from the occultations by
using Ptolem y’s own lunar theory, which underestimates the mean lunar motion in
longitude. Fotheringham and Longbottom 1914-15, for example, already took this to
be the explanation for the low values for precession in these cases.
358 10' in 12 years, lii 30.i5ff.
359 T h e y vary from 35"37"' to 36"59"' per year.
360 Neither Delam bre nor Newton provides a motive for Ptolem y’s deliberate fraud, and
it is hard to see w h y he should have preferred a figure that he appreciated to be w idely
inaccurate: it is not the case that a better approxim ation to precession would have
threatened any p art o f his astronomical theories. A rguin g against Delam bre, Dreyer
19 17-18 , p. 347, put it that D elam bre’s own investigations furnished proof o f the
bona fides o f Ptolem y since the observations o f declinations do not agree witii Ptolem y’s
preconceived notion o f 36" per year.
The development o f empirical research 197
suppose that it was corroborated b y the evidence he had at his
d i s p o s a l . T h e m agnitude o f the error - m ore than 13" per year - is
no doubt surprising b y our standards o f accuracy, but it cannot be
emphasised too strongly how dangerous it is to transfer those
standards back to the ancient world.
Som e evidence from outside the field o f astronomy itself helps to
throw further light on Ptolem y’s attitudes to the relation between
theory and observation. This comes from the Optics, where we have
to rely on a L atin translation o f a lost A rab ic version o f P tolem y’s
work.362 Book v , which deals with the problem o f refraction, describes
in chh. 6 if detailed experiments to determine the refraction from air
to w ater, from air to glass, and from w ater to glass, and Ptolem y sets
out the results o f these in the form o f tables givin g - in degrees and
h a lf degrees - the angles o f refraction for angles o f incidence at 10°
intervals from 10° to 80^.263 In all three cases the first results are
introduced w ith the qualification ‘ n e a r l y ’,3^4 but the interesting
feature is that they all tally exactly w ith a general law taking the
form r = ai — bi^, w here r is the angle o f refraction, i the angle o f
incidence, and a and b are constants for the m edia concerned.
Both the sim ilarity and the difference between this set o f data from
the Optics and the astronomical examples we have considered should
be remarked. T h e sim ilarity is that Ptolem y signals the approximate
nature o f the observational results he reports. B ut the m ore im port­
ant difference is that the Optics - unlike the cases in the Syntaxis we
have discussed - presents results that have already been adjusted to tally
perfectly with the underlying general t h e o r y . 36s in this instance, it is
clear that the observations have been interpreted before Ptolem y
records them.
I f we now turn back to his planetary models, it is obvious that we
do not have enough evidence to reach confident conclusions con­
cerning some aspects o f his procedures. W e m ay presume that he had
other data besides those he quotes for each o f the planets, and that he
has therefore been selective in w hat he cites. But w e cannot be sure
about the principles on w hich his selections were made. H is approxi­
m ation and interpolation techniques are not those that we w ould use
36 *This m ay and probably did include other data besides the observations specifically
mentioned in v ii 2 and 3.
36* See Lejeune 1956.
3*3 In Ptolem y’s term inology the incident ra y is the ra y from the eye to the refracting
surface, the refracted one from the surface to the object, the angles in both cases being
measured to the perpendicular to the refracting surface.
364 See Lejeune 1956, p. 229.5, p. 234.2, p. 236.9.
365 T he form ula for the relationship between the angle o f incidence and the angle of
refraction is not, however, expressed anywhere in the Optics.
 igS The development o f empirical research
today, but how far he is prepared to adjust his data or to ignore
conflicting e v id e n c e -h o w far he system atically biases w hat he
records in favour o f preconceived conclusions - is in large part a
m atter o f guesswork. W h at is abundantly clear from the Syntaxis
itself, however, is that he does not submit his results to rigorous and
extensive controls.
H e uses a general m odel - and in m any cases specific param eters -
from earlier astronomy, and there can be little doubt that as a whole
he sought to confirm earlier results as far as possible, p articularly those
o f H ipparchus. A t the same time he is prepared to m odify the current
theory at certain points - to obtain a better fit w ith such evidence as
he had at his disposal. His introduction o f the equant is an exam ple o f
this, and so too are the extra circles he em ployed in his m odels o f
M ercu ry and o f the m o o n : in the last case he specifically says that this
m odification was a response to new data he had obtained concerning
the m oon’s positions in the first and third quarters. 3^6
T h e deductive nature o f his exposition is clear.367 It is an exercise
in geom etrical demonstration and that is where its great strength
l i e s . 368 But it is not sim ply and solely a piece o f pure mathem atics.
U nlike Aristarchus’ On the Sizes and Distances o f the Sun and Moon - at
least i f w e take it that Aristarchus allowed him self quite arbitrary
hypotheses369 - Ptolem y attem pted to provide a comprehensive and
true account o f the heavenly motions. A lthough, following Plato and
Aristotle, ancient commentators often distinguished sharply between
the m athem atical, and the physical, aspects o f astronomical i n q u i r y , 37o
there can be no doubt, in Ptolem y’s case, that his aim was not sim ply
to offer a m athem atical model from w hich the positions o f the
366 H aving set out H ipparchus’ lunar theory, based on eclipse data - i.e. when the moon
is at syzygy with the sun - in Syntaxis iv, Ptolem y remarks in Syntaxis v i and 2 on the
discrepancies between this theory and certain data that he obtained with the astrolabe
concerning the m oon’s positions in the first and third quarters. O n the superiority o f
his final lunar model, in v 5, to its predecessors, see Petersen 1969 and G ingerich
forthcoming.
36^ Pace K a ttsoff’s remarks (1947-8, pp. 2 if) concerning the prim ary consideration to
be given to the observations.
36® O ne should not be misled by the inaccuracies of some o f the parameters into under­
estimating the flexibility o f the astronomical model he works with.
36’ See above, p. 121 and n, 328.
3’ ° A ncient and modern commentators alike often speak vaguely of ‘ saving the pheno­
mena ’ as the aim o f ancient astronomical theory, but b y itself this slogan leaves open
the answers to two vital questions: (i) the exactness of the fit expected between pheno­
mena and theory if the latter is to be deemed to save the former, and (2) the status of
the theoretical entities themselves (often contrasted as ovrct with the mere appearances,
φαινόμενα). I have argued elsewhere (1978^) that it is mistaken to hold, as D uhem and
others have done, that ancient astronomers were, in general, interested purely in the
mathem atics o f their problems to the exclusion o f any concern with the truth of their
accounts or with questions relating to the underlying physical realities.
The development o f empirical research 199
heavenly bodies could be predicted. O ne o f his other astronomical
treatises, the Planetary Hypotheses, confirms that he hoped for a true
physical account, indeed one that covered not just the kinematics,
but also the dynam ics, o f heavenly movement.^^i In book 11 ch. 6
(11 i i y . i y f f ) o f that w ork the planets, sun and moon are im agined
as carried on tambourines or segments o f spheres, and in 11 ch. 7 the
dynam ics o f their m ovem ent is interpreted in vitalist terms, each
planet being said to possess a vital force and to im part m otion to the
bodies it is connected with. In the Syntaxis, too, his concern to
establish that the earth is at rest in the centre o f the universe shows
that he is far from indifferent to the physical aspects o f his inquiry,372
and in xiii 2 (lii 532.i 2ff), when he tells his reader not to be dis­
m ayed at the com plexity o f the hypotheses em ployed, his stand-point
is again not one o f indifference to the question o f whether his devices
represent the true system. W h y, after all, should he w orry over
purely m athem atical com plexity? T h e source o f his concern seems,
in part at least, to be the im plications o f those com plexities when
translated into physical terms. But even here he does not defend his
hypotheses solely on the grounds that they save the phenom ena:
rather he adduces physical arguments from the nature o f the sub­
stance o f the heavenly region (which is eternal, unchanging, hom o­
geneous and transparent) 373 to support the possibility o f the types o f
m otion he proposes.
It is true that his astronom ical m odel fails to deal adequately w ith
certain problems, some at least o f w hich he was evidently aware
of;374 and in the case o f the moon, in particular, the param eters he
adopted for the ratio o f the epicycle and the deferent are notoriously
at odds w ith experience in one respect, that one o f their consequences
should have been that the angular diam eter o f the moon should vary
by a factor o f almost two.37s Y e t w hatever the imperfections and
failures o f his system, he clearly tried for more than a purely m athe­
m atical account. M oreover as a m athem atical account it is fully
37 Ϊ M oreover he there gives absolute figures for the distances between the heavenly
bodies, postulating that the greatest distance o f one planet corresponds to the least
distance of the next higher planet: see Goldstein 1967 ^-nd N eugebauer I 9 7 5 > PP· 9 ^7 ^·
Syntaxis i 5 and 7, li i6.2o ff and 21.9!?.
” 3 Syntaxis ymi 2, lii 532.i6ff, 533.sff, isff·
374 T his seems clear from the embarrassment he expresses, in the passage just quoted
from Syntaxis xm 2 (lii 532.i2flF), concerning the com plexity of the hypotheses he has
to use. In other passages, e.g. Syntaxis in i a n d ix 5, li 2 o 8 .i3fan d lii 252.1 7f, he qualifies
his account by rem arking that his results are correct so far as present information goes.
375 T his was an objection brought by Copernicus, for example, in the D e Revolutionibus
IV 2. Sim ilar, though less striking, difficulties arise from the parameters chosen for the
epicycles o f Venus and M ars.
200 The development o f empirical research
determ ined: the observed positions o f the heavenly bodies can be
m atched against the predictions, even though Ptolem y is sometimes
less than energetic in subm itting his theories to such tests, or at least
in reporting the outcom e.
L ike dissection, astronomy provides clear evidence o f the tho­
roughness, range and accuracy o f the em pirical investigations carried
out by some G reek scientists, though - as w ith dissection - the early
steps were hesitant and it was not until some time after the fourth
century B .C . that the fullest researches were undertaken. T h e under­
lying general motives were, as we explained, com p lex: most investi­
gators believed that the study o f the heavenly bodies w ould enable
them not m erely to predict their movements, but also to foretell
future events on earth. M oreover Ptolem y’s approxim ation and
adjustm ent procedures contrast w ith those that we should adopt or
perm it nowadays. Nevertheless his and H ipparchus’ star catalogues
presuppose careful and sustained observational work. Furtherm ore
the epicycle-eccentric model used by H ipparchus for the sun and
m oon and then adapted and extended b y Ptolem y provides the out­
standing exam ple, from the ancient world, o f a theory that com ­
bined the m athem atical rigour that G reek scientists dem anded w ith
a detailed em pirical base. Even so Ptolem y at least shows more
confidence in the m athem atics o f his theory than in its em pirical
support, and while some o f that m ay be p ut down to his general
recognition o f the difficulty o f accurate observation and o f the
doubtful reliability o f his instruments, that is not the whole story.
W hile there can be no doubt that he saw the general im portance o f
obtaining trustworthy data, parts o f the Syntaxis show little awareness
o f the nee.d for the rigorous and repeated checking and control o f
results against accum ulated evidence - or o f the need for the m eti­
culous recording and presentation o f that evidence. As w ith dis­
section, so too in astronomy, there was no lack o f observational data,
but the observations were more often deployed to illustrate and
support theories than to test them.
A R IS T O T L E
O u r studies o f the biological sciences and astronomy show how, under
certain conditions and within certain limits, G reek scientists were
capable o f undertaking detailed and fruitful em pirical research. But
in both cases the contrast between the q u ality and extent o f the w ork
carried out in classical times and in the H ellenistic period is striking.
W e have seen the lim itations (as w ell as the achievements) o f
The development o f empirical research 201
H ippocratic research in the m edical sciences and o f w hat can
reasonably be attributed to fourth-century astronomers, notably
Eudoxus, and yet these two areas rank am ong the most promising
instances o f the em pirical approach in early Greek natural science.
W e have, however, yet to come to terms w ith Aristotle’s position in
this regard. V arious aspects o f his w ork - his general epistemological
theories, his use o f dissection and the q uality o f the astronomical
observations he reports - have been m entioned already. But we must
now attem pt an overview o f his significance in the developm ents with
w hich we are concerned.
T h e most im portant point is easily stated and uncontroversial.
A lthough groups o f H ippocratic physicians, even in certain respects
the Pythagorean communities, undertook em pirical inquiries in
particular fields, it was Aristotle - all are agreed - who was the first
to institute a comprehensive program m e o f research covering the
natural sciences as w ell as m any other disciplines. T h e school he
founded, the Lyceum , owed a good deal, to be sure, to P lato’s
A cad em y , 3 7 6 but while Plato certainly stimulated w ork in m athe­
matics and in the exact sciences, in political theory and m oral
philosophy, and in dialectic itself, the natural sciences played at most
a very lim ited and subordinate role in the interests o f the A cadem y.
T h e y did not figure in the program m e o f higher education in the
Republic, and although Plato conducted one, somewhat idiosyncratic,
foray into the field himself, in the Timaeus, he continued to stress,
there, the inferiority o f any account o f the world o f becoming.^^? T h e
Lyceum , on the other hand, brought together under the leadership
first o f Aristotle and then o f Theophrastus several o f the most
im portant figures in fourth-century natural science who worked in
collaboration on a w ide range o f topics both in that field and in
others. H ere for the first time in the ancient world we can talk o f a
corporate research effort, planned and im plem ented as a whole. First
there were w hat m ay be called histories o f thought, surveys o f the
m ain earlier physical doctrines and o f theories o f sense-perception
(both by Theophrastus), o f m edicine (by Meno) and o f m athem atics
and astronomy (by Eudem us). Secondly there was the great collection
o f histories o f the political constitutions o f particular states.378
T h irdly, in the dom ain o f the natural sciences, Aristotle’s own zoo­
logical treatises were com plem ented by Theophrastus’ botanical
works. In w hat we should call chemistry, the fourth book o f the
O n the differences in the legal status of the A cadem y and o f the Lyceum , see Cherniss
1945, Lyn ch 1972. E .g. Ti. a y d fF, 2gbc.
T here were 158 o f these, but only one, the Constitution o f Athens, has survived.
 'V
202 The development o f empirical research
Meteorologica^'^^ was supplemented by a detailed study o f minerals,
again by Theophrastus, the treatise On Stones. Even in statics and
dynam ics, where Aristotle has no systematic discussion, but m erely
introduces certain ideas on m otion and w eight in a variety o f
contexts in the Physics and De the author o f On Mechanics
produced a study o f the lever and o f three other simple machines,
the pulley, the wedge and the windlass, and the third head o f the
L yceum , Strato, appears to have been the first person to have
attem pted to carry out some adm ittedly prim itive em pirical investi­
gations on certain problems in dynamics, notably in connection with
the phenom ena o f acceleration.
Here then was an unprecedentedly ambitious series o f studies
encompassing most o f the m ain fields o f ancient φυσική and incor­
porating a good deal o f original em pirical research as w ell as
dialectical inquiries. Indeed apart from in the A lexandrian M useum ,
the scope o f natural scientific investigations undertaken in the
Lyceum was to rem ain unsurpassed in the whole o f antiquity. Since,
in general, it is undeniable that the lack o f w hat we m ay call an
institutional fram ework was one o f the m ajor obstacles to the
developm ent o f natural science in the ancient world, these exceptions
to that rule take on an added significance. A lthough, unlike the
M useum , the L yceum was self-financing and did not enjoy royal
patronage, it provided an opportunity for collaboration in research.
M oreover it is w ell known that in the m ain the inquiries o f the
Lyceum follow, and represent the full fruit of, A ristotle’s ow n
m ethodological principles. Thus the systematic histories o f previous
thought are a natural extension o f the surveys o f earlier views that
Aristotle so often presents in the extant treatises, though not, or
certainly not prim arily, for historical purposes, so m uch as in order to
set out the accepted opinions on a subject and to identify the ch ief
άττορίαι, difficulties, that require resolution, before proceeding to his
ow n discussion.
As w e noted before, the φαινόμενα that Aristotle generally posits
379 T h e question of the authenticity o f this work is disputed (see, for example, Hammer-
Jensen 1915, D uring 1944, Gottschalk 1961) but unlike On Mechanics its doctrinal
position is, on the whole, perfectly consistent with the views expressed in the indisput­
ab ly authentic works o f the Οοφηβ.
38® See below, pp. 203ff.
3*· This m ay reasonably be inferred from the quotations from his work On Motion that
are preserved by Simplicius in his discussion at /n ΡΛ. 9 16. i off, see 14ff, 2 1 ff. Strato, who
was nicknamed ό φυσικός, also wrote on other aspects o f physics, and on zoology,
pathology, psychology and technology, but with the exception o f some arguments
concerning the existence o f the void, preserved in H ero’s Pneumatics (see Gottschalk
1965)» very little o f this extensive output remains.
The development o f empirical research 203
as the starting-point o f his analysis are, even in the natural sciences,
far from being all the results o f observation. Y e t ‘ w hat appears to be
the case’, especially but not solely w ith the added specification
‘ according to perception’ , often includes w hat Aristotle takes to be
the observed facts. T h e range o f A ristode’s inquiries is not in doubt,
nor the fact o f his insistence on first obtaining the relevant data before
undertaking their explanation. But the questions we must now
confront are how far his actual practice in the natural sciences tallies
w ith his m ethodological pronouncements, and the nature and extent
o f his use o f observation and em pirical research.
In m any areas o f w hat Aristotle terms ‘ physics’ (the study o f
nature in general) the appeal to anything that could be described as
the result o f deliberate observation plays a m inim al role. M u ch o f
the treatise that has that tide consists in a highly abstract study o f
such concepts as time, place, infinity and the continuum . Here,
naturally enough, the strengths o f Aristotle’s discussion lie in his
scrutiny o f accepted views and assumptions, in his analysis o f aspects
o f com m on linguistic usage and careful distinctions between the
senses o f terms. T h e prom inent exam ple or paradigm atic c a s e -
whether a part o f common experience or a feature o f our w ay o f
talking about i t - o f t e n acts as the starting-point, and indeed the
key, to his own doctrine. Thus in his treatm ent o f place [Ph. iv
1-5)382 he flj-st distinguishes various senses in w hich a thing m ay be
said to be ‘ i n ’ another, taking the strictest sense to be that in w hich
a thing is said to be in a vessel (210 a 24). In the subsequent analysis,
w hich starts from a series o f assumptions such as that place is that
which contains that o f w hich it is the place, and that it is ‘ left
b eh in d ’ b y w hat occupies it (2 io b 3 4 if), the vessel exam ple recurs.
Place is indeed said to be a non-portable vessel at Ph. 212 a i 5 f as he
works towards an eventual definition o f it as the innermost static
boundary o f the container (2i2a2of),383 A gain his remarks on
certain relationships between the force exerted and the m ovem ent
caused are mostly based on such com m on experiences as that o f a
ship being hauled by a team o f men, explicitly cited to illustrate the
particular point that a single m an m ay not be able to m ove the
ship at a ll,384
Y e t while throughout his discussion o f physical problems he pays
Cf. O w en 1970, pp. 252ff, w ho illustrates A ristotle’s characteristic methods with this
and other examples: cf. also O w en (1961) 1975, pp. n s f f .
3*3 T his has, however, the unfortunate consequence that, strictly speaking, a point
cannot have a place, because a point is, and does not have, a boundary: see Ph.
20 9 a7ff and 2 i2 b 2 4 f.
384 Ph. 2 5 0 a ly ff, 253b 18.
204 The deOelopment o f empirical research
due attention to well-known data o f experience as w ell as to features
o f linguistic usage, most o f the data in question are clearly not the
product o f deliberate observation or research, Even when he draws
a contrast between a more abstract, logical or dialectical argum ent
and one that he describes as more ‘ p h ysical’, the latter m ay m ake
little use o f the results o f observation. Thus in Ph. m 5, w hen he
refutes the suggestion that there is an infinite sensible body, he first
adduces a ‘ lo g ic a l’ argum ent based on the definition o f body, ^86 and
then considers the m atter more from a ‘ physical ’ point o f view. This
argum ent takes the form o f a m ultiple dilem m a, but in the refutation
o f each o f the alternatives there is only one direct reference to ‘ w hat
ap pears’, when he rejects the possibility o f there being any other
infinite body besides the four elements (and none o f them, as he goes
on to show, can be infinite).387 A lthough he castigates those who deny
m ovem ent on the grounds that they ‘ ign o re’ or ‘ do aw ay w ith ’
perception,388 that criticism is a purely general one. Nor, on the
frequent occasions w hen he employs the expression ‘ w e see’ in
relation to w hat he m aintains, is it always the case that it is sim ply a
m atter o f the use o f the untutored eye or the mere faculty o f sight.
T h e range o f things w e are said to ‘ see ’ in the Physics alone includes,
for instance, such com paratively straightforward cases as seeing that
some things are sometimes in m ovem ent and sometimes at rest
(254^ 350 some things have the ab ility to m ove themselves
(259b i f f ) , but also some m uch more tendentious or ‘ in terp reted’
exam ples (as when he says that w e see that there is always some part
o f the anim al in m otion,389 or that we see that a given w eight or body
3*5 Some o f the complexities o f the phenom ena, or the inadequacies o f some o f Aristotle’s
generalisations about them, m ight have been revealed by em pirical investigations. Thus
Philoponus, who took some of Aristotle’s adm ittedly rather loose statements about
proportionalities (e.g. Ph. 216 a i5 f) to im ply that in free fall the speed varies directly
with the weight, was, notoriously, to complain that this is ‘ com pletely false ’ and that
‘ this can be established by w hat is actually observed more pow erfully than by any sort
o f demonstration by argum ents’ : see In Ph. 68 3.i6ff where he goes on to suggest an
experim ent o f dropping two different weights from a considerable height, when the
difference in the times w ill be found not to correspond to the difference in the weights.
3** Ph. 204b4ff. A body, being defined as bounded by a surface, cannot be infinite. T h e
argum ent, as O w en (1961) 1975, pp. i25f, notes, proves too much: ‘ starting from a
definition that applies to m athem atical as well as to physical solids, it reaches con­
clusions that apply to both sciences’.
3*7 Ph. 204b loff, especially 35. T h e infinite body must be either (a) compound (but
that is ruled out because the elements are finite in num ber and neither (i) one element
nor (ii) all the elements can be infinite) or ( b ) simple (but that too is rejected because
(i) it cannot be something other than the elements, and (ii) it cannot be one o f the
elem ents).
3®® Ph. 253a32ff, cf. 254a24ff: a similar charge is made again at GC 325a I3ff.
Ph. 253a I if. Ross explains this as a reference to growth and decay (though these are
scarcely easy to observe in the process of occurring) and respiration (though not all
The development o f empirical research 205
moves faster for two reasons, either because o f a difference in the
m edium traversed, or - other things being equal - because o f the
greater w eight or lightness o f the body)39o or even plainly erroneous
ones: at 2 42 b 59 ff (c f 24ff) he says that we see that w hat brings
about a m ovem ent is in all cases either in contact, or continuous,
w ith w hat it m oves. 3 9 i
In general the em pirical data m arshalled in the Physics am ount to
little m ore than some w ell-know n facts - or w hat were taken to be
such - from comm on experience. But in the other physical treatises,
especially in the De Caelo and the Meteorologica, there is a greater
deploym ent o f em pirical evidence, including some evidence
obtained, it w ould appear, from deliberate investigation. W e have
already m entioned some o f the astronom ical observations he cites
(whether or not he carried them out h im self).392 T w o other contexts,
particularly, enable us to study the interplay o f em pirical and other
factors in A ristotle’s arguments, nam ely first his proofs, in the De
Caelo, that the earth is at rest at the centre o f the universe, and that it
is spherical, and secondly his elem ent theory.
T h e m ain argum ent for the thesis that the earth is at rest at the
centre o f the u n i v e r s e 3 9 3 depends on the doctrine o f the natural
m ovements and places o f the elements. Aristotle assumes that w hat is
true o f individual parcels o f earth is true also o f the earth as a w h o le:
he takes it as a fact that earth alw ays and everywhere has a tendency
to move downwards towards its natural place (the centre) and once it
has reached this, it comes to rest. 3 94 So even i f the earth as a w hole were
transported to the moon, he says, separate parts o f it w ould not m ove
towards the whole, but towards the place where the earth is now . 3 95
Some attem pt is m ade to adduce specific em pirical grounds for this
thesis, but the attem pts are sketchy. First at Gael. 2 g6 a3 4 if he
develops a M odus Tollens argum ent based on an assumed analogy
between the earth and the planets. I f the earth as a whole moved,396
animals respire, see Resp. 470 b9f, and again one m ight object that this is sometimes
difficult to observe).
390 Ph. 2 i5 a 2 5 ff, cf. 216 a i3 ff (by ‘ other things being e q u a l’ Aristotle has in mind
differences in shape). Cf. O w en 1970, p. 254, who rightly concludes that ‘ it was. . .no
part o f the dialectic of his argum ent to give these proportionalities the rigor o f scientific
laws or present them as the record o f exact observation’.
39 ' Cf. also Ph. i8 g a2 9 , 203a24, 256b2off. ^92 See above, pp. i7gf.
393 T his discussion is one o f the occasions when he criticises his opponents (here the
Pythagoreans) for forcing the ‘ appearances ’ to fit arguments and opinions o f their own,
Gael. 293a25ff, see above, p. 137.
394 T h e point is often repeated: see Gael. 2 9 5 b ig ff, 296a3of, b6ff, 27ff, and cf. e.g.
27oa3ff, 276a2ff. 395 Cae/. 3 10 b sff, cf. 294a i7ff.
39* H e claim s that the same argum ent applies whether the earth is thought to move (like
a planet) about the centre o f the universe, or about its own axis: Gael. 296b2f.
2o6 The development o f empirical research
it w ould - like the planets - have a double motion. But i f that were
the case, the fixed stars w ould undergo ‘ deviations and turnings’ .3^7
B ut this does not appear to happen - the stars rise and set at the same
places on the earth. T h e point is not developed and seemingly not
thought through.398 Secondly, at Gael 2 9 7a 4 ff he m erely states that
his doctrine is supported by astronomy in that ‘ the appearances ’ o f
the regular changes in position o f the constellations are consistent
w ith the view that the earth is at rest at the centre, but again he does
not elaborate the point. Finally it is even m ore rem arkable that he
should cite as a piece o f evidence (σημεϊον) for his thesis that heavy
objects fall to the earth at the same angles,399 and not in parallel
lines. 4 o° This was not something that he could have verified inde­
pendently, but itself an inference from a point that he had not yet
proved, nam ely that the earth is spherical.
I f the em pirical supports adduced for the doctrine that the earth is
at rest are thin, those cited to establish its sphericity are m ore
impressive. After various arguments relating, for exam ple, to how
heavy things w ould conglom erate around the centre [Cael. 2 9 7 a 8 ff),
he turns to new considerations at 2 9 7b 2 3 ff w ith the words: ετι δέ
και διά τω ν φαινομένων κατά τήν αϊσθησιν. First, in eclipses o f the
moon, the shadow o f the earth is always c i r c u l a r . ^ o i Secondly, the
fact that the stars that can be seen from m ore northerly and from
more southerly positions on the earth differ shows both that the earth
is spherical and that it is o f no great size com pared w ith the distance
o f the stars.^°2 T h e end o f the chapter gives us our first recorded
estimate o f the size o f the earth, and although Aristotle does not tell
us how the ‘ m athem aticians’ he refers to calculated this, it is
perhaps a reasonable inference from the earlier mention o f the dif­
ferences in the positions o f the stars seen from diiferent latitudes that -
like Eratosthenes some generations later - that was their m ethod . -^03
397 τταρόδουξ Koi τροπά5, Cael. 29 6 b 4. O n the interpretation o f these terms here, see, for
example. H eath 1913, pp. 24of, Dicks 1970, pp. i96f.
39®Aristotle appears to assume that the second {x>stulated movement of the earth would
be oblique to the first and cause differences in the observed risings and settings o f the
fixed stars. T h e possibility of a simple axial rotation accounting for the diurnal move­
ment o f the heavens is neither mentioned nor considered.
399 T h a t is, at right angles to the surface of the earth.
+‘>0 Cael. 296b 18ff, cf. 297 b i8f.
■♦o* Cael. 297b24ff. Aristotle says this ‘ a lw ays’ happens. Given that lunar eclipses can
occur at any point along the ecliptic, this shows that the earth is not merely an annular
disk, but a sphere.
♦0^ Cael. 297b3off. A t 294a if f he points out that it is wrong to infer that the earth is flat
from the apparent straightness of the horizon (an instance where an appearance m ay be
misleading; see φαίνεται a 6, φαντασία a 7).
Cael. 298a i5ff, c f Mete. 365a29ff and 339b6ff. O n the history o f successive Greek
attempts to determine the size o f the earth, see for exam ple Berger 1903, H eath 1913,
The development o f empirical research 207
Aristotle’s element theory provides an even better opportunity to
com pare and contrast his approach w ith that o f his predecessors. In
discussing the use o f em pirical methods in Presocratic natural
philosophy we remarked that although most o f their theories about
the fundam ental constituents o f things attem pt to accom m odate
w hat were taken to be the known ‘ facts’, they do so only b y pre­
supposing a particular interpretation o f the facts concerned, and
little attem pt is m ade to obtain new data, let alone to set up a
situation in w hich the data m ight enable a decision to be m ade
between two com peting theories. O n several occasions Aristotle
criticises his predecessors’ doctrines for neglecting certain o f the
‘ appearances’ . Thus Plato is taken to task for excluding one o f the
four elements (earth) from the natural changes that aifect the other
three: this is neither reasonable nor in accordance with percep­
tion. 404 Em pedocles too is charged with proposing a theory that
contradicts both itself and the ‘ appearances’ .4°s Nevertheless
Aristotle’s fundam ental objections often depend not on any appeal
to w h at he took to be the evidence o f the senses, but on abstract
arguments and conceptual points. His refutation o f the atomists, in
particular, is based first on a distinction between actual and potential
divisibility,4o6 and secondly on further distinctions between coming-
to-be and mere association or dissociation and between these and
qualitative change and com bination.
As usual, his review o f earlier opinions leads towards his own
positive theory, w hich he sets out in a closely reasoned, but abstract
and schem atic argum ent in De Generatione et Corruptione. Com ing-to-be
and passing-away presuppose sensible bodies (328b32f) and these in
turn presuppose sensible contrarieties: for a body must be either light
or heavy, either cold or hot (329a io ff). But o f the possible types o f
pp. 147, 236, 339ff. In the Meteorologica Aristotle not only provides a good deal o f
geographical and geological data (concerning, for instance, the main rivers in the
inhabited part o f the world, i 13, and changes in the relation between sea and land
caused, for example, b y silting, i 14) but also outlines a theory o f the main zones into
w hich the earth’s surface can be divided {Mete. 362a32ff).
Cael. 3o6a3ff. Vlastos 1975, pp. 8 iff, has recently argued that this charge against
Plato is baseless: P lato’s theory, like those o f his predecessors, was not one that could
be refuted em pirically, and he would have denied that the change o f earth into water
or air or fire is something we see. W hatever the truth about P lato’s position, it is
evident, and important, that Aristotle at least treated earlier element theories as if
they were em pirically falsifiable.
♦05 GC 3 i5 a 3 ff. A gain the point is that he denied that one element can come to be from
another - a view w hich Aristotle holds he should have been comm itted to, since he
differentiated the elements by such qualities as white, hot, heavy and hard.
See GC 3 16 b i9 ff, 3 i7 a 2 ff, i2ff.
« 7 GC 3 2 5 a 2 3 ff, b2gff, 328a5ff.
2o8 The development o f empirical research
contrarieties, tangible contrarieties alone w ill be the principles o f
sensible bodies (byi f). A lready, therefore, the w ay he defines the
problem - the search for the principles o f sensible bodies - effectively
rules out any quantitative or m athem atical theory o f the elements o f
physical bodies. In the argum ent that follows he lists the tangible
contrarieties, such as rough and smooth, hard and soft, h eavy and
light, and then reduces these to two pairs o f prim ary opposites, hot
and cold, and w et and dry. A ll the other tangible contraries can, he
claims, be derived from these, though these cannot be further reduced
(33o a24 if), and he then proceeds to correlate his two prim ary pairs
w ith the four simple bodies.
T h e references to w hat we m ay call em pirical data in this argum ent
are lim ited, and there is not a single observation th at can clearly be
said to involve research. R ath er he builds on and appeals to certain
correlations suggested b y ordinary experience or b y the associations
o f G reek terms. H e is aware o f the am biguity o f hot and cold and dry
and w et in p a r t i c u l a r , b u t offers his own definition o f t h e s e , a n d
he does not consider alternative views o f the correlations o f the
prim ary opposites and the simple bodies although we know that
other opinions had been expressed.4 ” H e claims that the coming-to-be
o f the simple bodies out o f one another is evident to perception 2
yet it remains the case that in Aristotle, as in writers both before and
after him, the denotations o f ‘ eart h’ ‘ w a te r’ ‘ a i r ’ and even ‘ fire ’
are vague, and w hat is to count as a change from earth to w ater, for
instance, is interpreted quite loosely.
T hus far there w ould be little reason to contrast A ristotle’s
GC 33ob3ff. Fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and w et and earth
cold and dry.
409 E.g. G C 33oai2fF, and cf. PA 6 4 8 a2 iff, 36ff, 649b9ff.
410 H ot is ‘ that which combines things of the same kind ’, cold ‘ that which brings together
and combines homogeneous and heterogeneous things a lik e’, wet ‘ that which, being
readily delimited (i.e. by something else), is not determined by its own b o u n d ary’,
dry ‘ that which, not being readily determined (i.e. by something else), is determ ined by
its own boun d ary’, GC 329b26ff.
-♦n Thus Philistion is reported in Anon. Lond. (xx 2^ff) as having held a doctrine in
w hich each of the four simple bodies is associated with a single opposite, fire being hot,
air cold, water wet and earth dry. O n A ristotle’s theory, too, one o f the two opposites
associated with each simple body is prim ary, but on his view air is w et and water cold
(see G C 331 a 2 ff).
GC 331 a 8 f (though having said that these changes appear to occur according to
perception he adds an argum ent: otherwise there would be no qualitative change, for
that is change with respect to the qualities of tangible things). A t GC 3 3 ib 2 4 f, too,
he claims that his theory of fire com ing from air and earth is in agreement with
perception, arguing that flame is burning smoke and smoke consists of air and earth.
C f. also Cael. 302 a2 if f (fire and earth evidently come out o f flesh, wood and suchlike),
3 0 4b26f {we see fire and water and each o f the simple bodies undergo dissolution),
305 a g f and Mete. 34oa8ff·.
The development o f empirical research 209
approach to this set o f problems from that o f most o f his predecessors
even though he makes occasional direct appeals to the evidence o f
the senses. But if we m ay assume that the fourth book o f the Meteoro-
logica is, i f not by Aristotle, at least by one o f his close associates, we
there have, for the first time in G reek science, an attem pt to discuss
a quite w ide range o f physical changes and phenomena. T h e various
properties o f substances are listed and discussed and a large num ber
o f compounds are classified according to the simple body that pre­
dominates in them. W e are given an analysis, for exam ple, o f w hich
substances are com bustible, w hich incom bustible, w hich can be
m elted, w hich solidified under the influence o f either cold or heat,
w hich are soluble in w ater and other liquids. M ost o f the theories
proposed are extrapolations from prom inent phenom ena treated as
paradigm cases. Thus when we are told that substances that are
solidified b y cold (and are dissoluble b y f i r e ) 3 consist predom inantly
o f water, ice, w hich is cited at 388 b 11, is no doubt the, or at least a,
paradigm . W hen it is suggested that those substances that are
solidified b y heat have a greater proportion o f earth, potter’s cla y
figures as the most prom inent e x a m p l e . Y e t the theory is flexible
enough to take in a considerable num ber o f ordinary and some not so
ordinary substances, and m any o f the properties they exhibit and the
change they undergo.
[ T h e m ain strengths o f the discussion in Meteorologica iv lie in the
i fact th at it offers an account o f a far greater range o f phenom ena
I than had previously been dealt w ith in physical theory. T h e be-
I haviour o f a large num ber o f natural substances in various circum -
I stances is discussed, and the circum stances include not only some
com paratively com plex technological processes'^^s but also some
artificially contrived situations - where the data obtained are not
just fam iliar facts but the result o f fairly deliberate investigations
(whether or not it was Aristotle who carried these ou t). Thus am ong
the substances that are said to freeze solid w ith cold are not only
urine, vinegar, w hey and lye, but also serum and s e m e n . 6 Salt
and soda are said to be soluble in some liquids, but not in others,
where olive oil is specifically referred to ( 383bi 3f f ) . W e are told
that the blood o f certain animals, and blood that has had the fibres
removed, does not coagulate, 4 i 7 and different types o f wines are
See Mete. 383 a 3f.
Mete. 388b 12, cf. 3 8 3 a ig ff, b u f f , 23.
For exam ple iron-making at Mete. 383a32ff; cf. also the reference in GA 735 b i6flE' to
the flotation o f lead ore with a mixture of water and oil.
■*** See Mete. 384a i iff, 389a9ff, 22f, and contrast HA 523a i8ff, GA 7 3 5 a3 5 ff on semen.
See Mete. 384a26fF, 2gff, 389aigfT, cf. HA 52ob23fT, PA 65 0 b i4 ff.
210 The development o f empirical research
distinguished according to their com bustibility and their readiness
to freeze.
Y e t although a rem arkable num ber and variety o f observations are
explicitly referred to and even more are presupposed by the corre­
lations o f properties that are s u g g e s t e d , t h e data are, throughout,
interpreted in terms o f the underlying theory. In m any cases the
w ay the phenom ena are described already incorporates the theoretical
explanation, as when the curdling o f m ilk is represented as the
separating o f ‘ the earthy p a rt’ (384320!?). M ore im portantly,
deviant phenom ena are generally dealt w ith b y more or less ad hoc
adjustments to the theory. O live oil, we are told at 383 b 2off, causes
particular difficulty. I f it contained more water, cold should solidify
it, if more earth, fire should do so. In fact neither solidifies it, but
both m ake it more dense. But the explanation given is that it contains
more air - w hich is also w hy it floats on w ater (though this is not
represented as an independent test o f its containing air).^2o
It is not as i f the phenom ena as a whole are collected with a view to
criticising the overall theory o f the four prim ary opposites, the four
simple bodies and their principal modes o f interaction. T h e aim is,
rather, to show how a rational account o f the phenom ena can be
achieved w ithin the given framework. W e should certainly not
underestimate the im portance o f the attem pt to broaden the
em pirical basis o f physical speculation, but the role o f the data thus
collected in Meteorologica iv was to illustrate and support the theory,
not to put it to serious risk. W hile at the level o f the distinctions
between coming-to-be, qualitative change and com bination such
em pirical research exhibited the com plexities o f the phenom ena that
any reductionist doctrine had to take into account, that research left
the ch ief issues between quantitative and qualitative theories o f
m atter unresolved and the problems continue to be debated, in the
period after Aristotle, m ainly on general grounds connected with the
concepts o f divisibility and the continuum .
See Mete. 387b9fF, 388a33ff. Cf. also the reference in Meteorologica 11, 358 b iBfF, to
w h at happens when wine is evaporated (see Lloyd 1964, pp. 64f).
In chh. 6-9 especially, e.g. the discussion of the relationship between melting and
softening by water, Mete. 385 b lafl.
A similar difficulty is raised about the nature o f semen in GA 735a29ff, where, after
a comparison with olive oil, Aristotle concludes that semen, too, consists of water and
pneuma (explained as air endowed with a special form of heat, 7 3 6 a !, b 3 3ff).
Both the four-element theory, and atomism, its chief rival, were sufficiently indeter­
minate to be incapable o f conclusive corroboration or refutation by means o f practical
tests. In the debate between Epicureans and Stoics the empirical data cited are mostly
the usual well-known phenomena. A t the opposite extreme the vast array of ‘ facts’
about natural substances that are assembled in such a writer as Pliny fails to advance
the theoretical discussion materially. Nevertheless in certain areas im portant em pirical
The development o f empirical research 2 11
T h e range o f Aristotle’s investigations in zoology is such that our
discussion has to be even m ore drastically selective than ever. Y e t the
need to come to some assessment o f his performance in this field is all
the m ore pressing in that it has been subject to such divergent
judgem ents. Some o f the most extravagant praise, but also some o f
the most dam ning criticisms, have been directed at his em pirical
researches in z o o l o g y . ^ ^ z
T h e massive array o f inform ation set out in the m ain zoological
treatises ^ 2 3 can hardly fail to impress at the very least as a form idable
piece o f organisation. But both A ristotle’s sources and his principles
o f selection raise problems. As we have already noted in connection
w ith his use o f dissection, it is often impossible to distinguish
Aristotle’s personal investigations from those o f his assistants,
although, given the collaborative nature o f the w ork o f the Lyceum ,
that point is not a fundam ental one. It is abundantly clear from
repeated references in the text that he and his helpers consulted
hunters, fishermen, horse-rearers, pig-breeders, bee-keepers, eel-
breeders, doctors, veterinary surgeons, midwives and m any others
with specialised knowledge o f animals.'^24 But a second major source
o f inform ation is w hat he has read, ranging from H om er and other
poets, through Ctesias and H erodotus to m any o f the H ippocratic
authors.-^^s In general he is cautious in his evaluations o f all this
secondary evidence. H e points out, for exam ple, that hunters and
fishermen do not observe animals from motives o f research and that
work was done, even if it did not lead to major new theories. I have already noted
Theophrastus’ On Stones, w hich im plicitly raised the problem of the status o f earth as
a simple body (chh. 48ff especially) and in On Fire Theophrastus explicitly questioned
the nature o f fire and drew attention to certain im portant respects in which it differs
from the other simple bodies (notably in that it always exists in a substratum). A gain
on the question of the existence o f the void, Strato appears to have initiated empirical
investigations which were designed to provide experim ental demonstration that a
continuous vacuum can be created artificially (our chief evidence comes from H ero’s
Pneumatica: see i i6 .i6 ff especially). Some o f this research remains, to be sure, fairly
rudim entary, and too little use is m ade o f quantitative measurements (even though
the Greeks distinguished different kinds o f waters, and in some cases solids, by their
w eight, that is their specific gravity). But the main shortcoming of later G reek physi­
cal speculation was not so m uch a lack o f em pirical research, nor inadequately de­
bated theories, as a mismatch between the two, the failure to tailor the one to the
other.
Contrast the evaluations in, for exam ple, Bourgey 1955 and Lewes 1864.
♦^3 T h e authenticity of some of the later books o£HA (vii, viii and ix) is open to doubt, but
I shall treat the whole (with the exception of the patently anomalous x) as evidence for
work organised and planned by Aristotle, if not carried out by him.
There is a convenient analysis o f A ristotle’s principal sources in M an quat 1932,
pp. 3 iff, 49ff, 59ff. Cf. also Lones 1912, L e Blond 1939, pp. 223ff, Bourgey 1955,
pp. 73ff, Ssff, Louis 1964-9, I pp. xxxiv ff, Preus 1975, pp. 2 iff.
See M an qu at 1932, chh. 4 and 5, and cf. especially the analysis o f the relationship
between Aristotle and the H ippocratic treatises in Poschenrieder 1887.
212 The development o f empirical research
this should be borne in mind/^^ H e recognises, too, the need for
experience - a trained eye w ill spot things that a laym an w ill
miss427 _ though even experts m ake mistakes/^s H e frequently
expresses doubts about the reports he has received, emphasising that
some stories have yet to be verified,^^^ or flatly rejecting them as
fictions43o _ though understandably there are tall stories that he fails
to identify as such-^^i - and on some occasions the different degrees
o f acceptance exhibited in diiferent texts m ay suggest some vacilla­
tion on his part/32 H e is particularly critical o f some o f his literary
sources, describing Ctesias as untrustworthy^33 and Herodotus as a
‘ m ythologist ’ . 4 3 4 Y e t he sometimes records b aldly as ‘ w hat has been
seen’ something for w hich his principal or even his only evidence
m ay be literary. Thus when at HA 516 a i g f we read that an instance
‘ has been seen ’ o f a m an’s skull w ith no suture, his (unacknowledged)
source m ay be the famous description o f such a case on the b attle­
field o f Plataea in H erodotus (ix 83). W hen we are told that lions are
found in Europe only in the strip o f land between the rivers A chelous
and Nessus'^35 the authority for this m ay again be a passage in
H erodotus (vii 126) w hich makes a similar suggestion, though the
river Nessus appears by its alternative nam e Nesius.
A ristotle’s use o f these sources and o f his ow n personal researches
is, naturally, guided throughout by his theoretical interests and pre­
occupations. T h e very thoroughness w ith w hich he tackles the task
o f the description o f animals reflects his declared aim to assemble the
φαινόμενα, the differentiae o f animals and their properties, before
proceeding to state their causes.'^^^ As we have noted, this very
program m e obliges Aristotle to be comprehensive in his account, and
See, e.g., GA 756333.
See, e.g., H A 56636-8 (outside the breeding season, the sperm-ducts o f cartilaginous
fish are not obvious to the inexperienced), 573a i iff, 574b isff.
E.g. GA 7 s 6 b 3 ff.
+^9 E.g. H A 493 b i4ff, 580a 19-22. T h a t further research is necessary is a point repeatedly
made in other contexts as well.
“*30 E.g. HA 579 b2ff, 597a32ff. PA 673 a 10-31 is a careful discussion o f stories about men
laughing when w ounded in the m id riff: he rejects as impossible the idea that a head,
severed from the body, could speak (since voice depends on the windpipe) but accepts
that movement of the trunk m ay occur after decapitation.
'*3 · E.g. H A 552b i5 ff on the salamander extinguishing fire.
As in the notable case o f his reports on the phenom enon now known as the hecto-
cotylisation of one of the tentacles of the octopus, recorded without endorsement at
HA 5 4 ib 8 ff, cf. 544a i2f, and apparently accepted at 52 4 a sff, but rejected at GA
72ob32ff. Such divergences may, o f course, indicate not a change o f mind, but in­
authentic material in, or plural authorship of, the zoological works.
«3 h a 606 a 8.
■ *34 T he context suggests that the term μυθολόγο?, used o f Herodotus at GA 756 b6f, there
carries pejorative undertones. HA 5 7 g b 5 ff, cf. 6 o 6 b i4 ff.
♦36 See above, p. 137 and n. 64 on PA 63gb8ff, 640a I4f, HA 491 a g ff especially.
The development o f empirical research 213
certain features o f the w ay he implements it stand out. His stated
preference for the form al and final causes, rather than the m aterial,
dictates greater attention being paid to the functions o f the organic
and inorganic parts than to their m aterial composition, although the
latter is also discussed, indeed sometimes, as in the case o f b l o o d , ^^^7
at some length. M ore im portantly, the form o f the living creature is
its ψυχή, life or soul, and his psychological doctrines influence his
investigations not only in insuring a detailed discussion of, for
exam ple, the presence or absence o f particular senses in different
species o f animals in the De Sensu, o f the different modes o f loco­
motion in the De Motu and De Incessu, and o f the fundam ental
problem o f reproduction in the De Generatione Animalium, but also by
providing the general fram ework for his description o f the internal
and external parts o f animals in the Historia.
Thus at PA 6 55 b 2 9 ff and Juv. 4 6 8 a i 3 f f he identifies the three
m ain essential parts o f animals as ( j ) that b y w hich food is taken in,
(2) that by w hich residues are discharged, and (3) w hat is inter­
m ediate between them - where the άρχή or controlling principle is
lo ca te d : in addition animals capable o f locom otion also have organs
for that purpose, and in the corresponding passage in H A 1 2 and 3
he further adds reproductive organs where m ale and female are
d i s t i n g u i s h e d . '^ ^ s I n his detailed account o f the internal and external
parts o f the four m ain groups o f bloodless animals (Cephalopods,
Crustacea, Testacea and Insects) in HA iv 1-7 he evidently works
quite closely to this broad and simple schema. T hus he regularly
considers such questions as the position o f the m outh, the presence
or absence o f teeth and tongue or analogous organs, the position and
nature o f the stomach and gut and o f the vent for residue, as also the
reproductive organs and differences between males and females.
A series o f passages shows that he actively considered w hether or not
certain lower groups produced residue and attem pted to identify and
trace the excretory vent.^39 But w hile the w hole course o f the ali­
m entary canal is thoroughly discussed in connection w ith each o f
the bloodless g r o u p s ,440 he has little or nothing to say about the
E.g. PA II 4 and cf. the subsequent chapters on fat, m arrow, brain, flesh and bone.
PA II 2 discusses the problems posed by the am biguity o f hot and cold and stresses the
difficulty o f determ ining which substances are hot and which cold.
HA 488b2gff, especially 48ga8ff, and cf. also PA 65oa2ff.
See H A 530a2f, 5 3 ia i2 f f, b8ff.
HA 527b i f f concludes that the stomach, oesophagus and gut alone are common to
bloodless and blooded groups (the passage is considered suspect b y some editors, but it
sums up Aristotle’s position w ell enough). In the strictest sense in which the term
σττλάγχνον is reserved for red-blooded organs, the bloodless animals have no viscera at
all, but only w h at is analogous to them : H A 532b 7 f, PA 66sa28ff, 678a26ff.
214 The development o f empirical research
brain^'^i or about the respiratory (or as he would say refrigeratory)
system . 4 4 2 A gain while the external organs o f locom otion are care­
fully identified and classified, the internal m usculature is ignored
throughout . 4 4 3 It w ould certainly be excessive to suggest that his
observations are everywhere determined by his preconceived schem a:
y et the influence that that schema exercised on his discussion is
manifest.
In other cases too it is not hard to trace the influence o f his
theoretical preoccupations and preconceptions on his observational
work, not only - naturally enough - on the questions he asked, but
also - more seriously - on the answers he gave, that is on w hat he
represents as the results o f his research. His search for final causes is
an often cited exam ple, though it is not so m uch his general assump­
tion o f function and finality in biological organisms, as some o f his
rather crude particular suggestions, that are open to criticism : m ore­
over he is clear that not everything in the anim al serves a purpose 4 4 4
and that it is not only the final cause that needs to be considered. But
m any slipshod or plainly mistaken observations (or w hat purport to
be such) relate to cases where we can detect certain underlying value
judgem ents at work. T h e assumption o f the superiority o f right to left
is one exam ple that has been m entioned before. 4 4 s His repeated
references to the differences between m an and other animals, and
between males and females, are two other areas where errors and
hasty generalisations are especially frequent. M an is not only m arked
out from the other animals by being erect - b y having his parts, as
Aristotle puts it, in their natural positions 4 4 6 - and b y possessing the
largest brain for his size, hands and a tongue adapted for speech ;4 4 v
Aristotle also claims, more doubtfully, that m an ’s blood is the finest
■♦■♦
I In HA IV 1-7 the brain is mentioned only at 524 b 4 and in a probably corrupt passage,
5 2 4 b 32. Cf. H A 494b27ff, and PA 652b23ff.
In Resp. 4 75 b 7ff, however, he says that the Crustacea and Octopuses need little
refrigeration and at 476b3oflF that the Cephalopods and Crustacea effect this by
adm itting water, which the Crustacea expel through certain opercula, that is the gills
(cf. also HA 5 2 4 b 2 if ) .
-♦^3 This point can be extended also to his descriptions o f the blooded animals. A lthough
his account of the external organs of locomotion in I A is, on the whole, quite detailed,
he has almost nothing to say of the disposition and functioning o f the muscles. Sim ilarly
his osteology (with the exception of his description of the limbs) is in general crude:
even though he writes in praise o f the hand, remarking on the im portance o f the
opposition of thum b and fingers for prehension (see PA 68 7a7ff, b a ff, 69oa3ofF) he
limits his account of its bones to remarks on the num ber of fingers and toes in the fore­
limbs o f different species.
There is an explicit statement to this effect at PA 677 a i5fT, for example.
■
*“*5 T h e m a in e x a m p le s o f a n a to m ic a l d o ctrin es in flu e n c e d b y his beliefs th a t rig h t is
su p erio r to left, u p to d o w n , a n d fro n t to b a c k , a re c o lle c te d in L lo y d 19 7 3 .
E.g. PA 656 a I off, I A 706 a i9f, bgf.
♦47 See, e.g., PA 653a27fF, 687b2ff, 66oai7fT.
The development o f empirical research 2 15
and purest , 4 4 8 that his flesh is softest, 4 4 9 and that the m ale hum an
emits m ore seed, and the female m ore menses, in proportion to their
size.450
W hile his general distinction between m ale and female animals
relates to a capacity or incapacity to concoct the blood, 4 si he records
largely or totally im aginary differences in the sutures o f the skull, 4 S2
in the num ber o f teeth , 4 5 3 in the size o f the brain, 4 S4 and in the
tem perature, 4 5 s o f men and women. His view that in general males
are better equipped w ith offensive and defensive weapons than
females 4 5 6 is one factor that leads him to the conclusion that the
worker bees are m ale. 4 sr T o be sure, he sometimes notes exceptions
to his general rules, as when he remarks that although m ales are
usually bigger and stronger than females in the non-oviparous
blooded animals the reverse is true in most oviparous quadrupeds,
fish and insects,4 ss and while he goes along with the common b elief
that m ale embryos usually m ove first on the right-hand side o f the
wom b, females on the left, he remarks that this is not an exact
statement since there are m any exceptions. 4 S9 But although there are
certainly inaccuracies in his reported observations besides those that
occur where an a priori assumption is at work, those where th at is
the case form a considerable group. 4 6 o
W e can docum ent the influence o f his over-arching theories on
w hat he reports he has seen : but there are other occasions w hen the
theories themselves appear to depend on, and m ay in some cases
even be derived from, one or more observations (however accurate
or inaccurate) w hich accordingly take on a particular significance
for his argument. U ndoubtedly the most striking exam ple o f this 4 6 i
■♦48 See H A 52ia2fF, cf. PA 648a9ff, Resp. 477a2of.
PA 6 6 o a ii , cf. GA 7 8 ib 2 if.
‘‘SO See HA 5 2 ia 2 6 f, 582b28fT, 583a4ff, GA 7 2 8 b ΐ4ίΤ.
See GA 728 a i8ff, 765b8iT.
See HA 4 9 ib 2 ff, 5 16 a i8f, P A 653b i. See HA s o i b i g f f .
See PA 6 5 3 a a 8 f (on which see O gle 1882, p. 167).
■‘ 's E.g. GA 765b i6f, 7 7 5 a 5 ff·
«6 E.g. HA 538 b i5flr, P A 661 baSflr. «7 See GA 759b2fT.
■*** See H A 538a22ff, 5 4 0 b is f, GA 7 2 ia i7 f f .
See HA 583b2ff, and sfT, and cf. further below, p. 217, on GA 764a33ff. Cf. also
HA 584a i2fT on exceptions to the rule that women have easier pregnancies w ith male
children.
Another im portant group o f mistakes relates to exotic species (for which parts o f HA
especially show some predilection) where he was, no doubt, relying more on secondary
sources or hearsay. T hus m any o f his statements about the lion are erroneous (see
O gle 1882, p. 236). See also the mistakes mentioned by Bourgey 1955, pp. 84f (there
are inaccuracies in those listed b y Lewes 1864, pp. i64ff).
T w o others w ould be (i) his claim to have verified that the brain is cold to touch,
PA 652334/ (not true o f a recently dead warm -blooded animal) - which was no doubt
a major factor in contributing to his theory that the prim ary function o f the brain is to
2 i 6 The development o f empirical research
is his often repeated statement that the heart is the first p art o f the
em bryo to develop. This is introduced at 468b28fF as something
that is ‘ clear from w hat we have observed in those cases where it is
possible to see them as they come to b e ’ . A t PA 6 6 6 a i8 ff he says
that the prim acy o f the heart is clear not on ly according to argum ent,
b ut also according to perception,^^2 a^d in reporting his investi­
gation o f the grow th o f hen’s eggs in p articular he remarks that after
about three days the heart first appears as a blood spot that ‘ p alp i­
tates and moves as though endowed w ith life ’ /^a T h e circum stantial
detail o f this and other accounts show that they are based on first­
hand inspection, although the conclusion Aristotle arrived at is not
entirely correct: as O g le put it, ‘ the heart is not actually the first
structure that appears in the em bryo, but it is the first part to enter
actively into its f u n c t i o n s H o w e v e r the consequences o f A ristotle’s
observation were momentous. This provides the crucial em pirical
support for his doctrine that it is the heart - rather than say the
brain - that is the principle o f life, the seat not just o f the nutritive
soul, but also o f the faculty o f locom otion and o f the com m on
sensorium. As in the physical treatises, so too in his biology, Aristotle
often constructs a general theory largely b y extrapolation from a
slight - and sometimes insufficiently secure - em pirical foundation.
D estructively, however, his deploym ent o f observations to refute
opposing theories is often highly effective. This can be illustrated
first w ith some fairly straightforward examples, (i) T h e idea that
drink passes to the lungs is one that we know to have been w idely
heldj'^^s although it is attacked b y the author o f the H ippocratic
treatise On Diseases A t P A 664 b 6 ff Aristotle dismisses it
prim arily on the simple anatom ical grounds that there is no com-
counterbalance the heat o f the heart, and (2) his reported observation that a bull that
had just been castrated was able to impregnate a cow {GA 7 i7 b 3 ff, cf. HA 5 io b 3 f) -
which presum ably influenced his doctrine that the testes are mere appendages, not
integral to the seminal passages (e.g. GA ηιηΆ^,^^)·
462 A gain at GA 74oa3fF h e says that not only perception but also argum ent shows that
the heart is the first part to become distinct in actuality. Cf. also PA 666a8ff, GA
7 4 0 a i7 f, 741 b i5 f.
-►63 h a 5 6 ia 6 ff, i if , PA 665a33ff.
O gle 1897, p. n o n. 24, and cf. 1882, p. 193.
This we know from Morb. iv ch. 56, L v n 608.17iT. T h e view is found in Plato, Ti. 70 c,
is attributed to Philistion by Plutarch {Quaest. Conv. vii i, 698A ff at 699c) and after
Aristotle was the subject o f an attempted experim ental demonstration in Cord. ch. 2,
L IX 8o.9ff (see above p. 166 n. 208).
T he nine proofs, Ιστόρια, that this author adduces are a very mixed bag: they include
not only a reference to the epiglottis and its function (vii 6o8.23ff) but also arguments
that if drink went to the lungs, one would not be able to breathe or speak when full,
that another consequence would be that dry food would not be so easily digested, that
eating garlic makes the urine smell, and other often inconclusive or question-begging
considerations, see v ii 6o6.7ff.
The development o f empirical research 2 17
m unicating link between the lungs and the stomach (as there is
between the stomach and the m outh, nam ely the oesophagus), and
the confidence with w hich he rebuts the theory is clearly seen in his
concluding remarks: ‘ but it is,perhaps silly to be excessively parti­
cular in exam ining silly statem ents’ .^67 (2) A t GA 746a i gf f he refutes
the view that hum an embryos are nourished in the w om b by sucking
a piece o f flesh: if that were true, the same w ould happen in other
animals, but it does not, as is easy to observe b y means o f dissection.
A nd while that rem ark is quite g e n e r a l , h e follows it with a specific
reference to the m embranes separating the em bryo from the uterus
i t s e l f D i s s e c t i o n again provides the evidence to refute (3) those
who held that the sex o f the em bryo is determ ined by the side o f the
w om b it is on, 4 7 o and (4) the view that some birds copulate through
their mouths.'^^i
In such instances an appeal to easily verifiable points o f anatom y
was enough to underm ine the theory. But more often no such direct
refutation was possible, and Aristotle deploys a com bination o f
em pirical and dialectical arguments to attack his opponents’
positions. O ne final exam ple o f this is his extended discussion, in
GA I 17 and 18, o f the doctrine that later cam e to be known as
pangenesis, that is the view that the seed is draw n from the whole o f
the body.472 H ere most o f w hat passed as em pirical evidence was
agreed on both sides, and the strengths o f Aristotle’s discussion lie in
his acute exploration first o f the coherence o f his opponents’ doctrine,
and secondly o f the inferences that could legitim ately be drawn from
the available data.
O n e o f the principal arguments he mounts against pangenesis poses
a d i l e m m a :^73 the seed must be draw n either (i) from all the uniform
parts (such as flesh, bone, sinew) or (2) from all the non-uniform
parts (such as hand, face) or (3) from both. A gainst (i) he objects
-►
67 PA 664 b i8f.
Some o f Aristotle’s general appeals to w h at w ould be shown by dissection are clearly
hypothetical and were not followed up: thus at PA 6 7 7 a 5 ff he dismisses the view of
Anaxagoras’ followers that the gall-bladder causes acute diseases with the claim that
those who suffer from such diseases mostly have no gall-bladder and ‘ this w ould be
clear if they were dissected ’.
GA 746 a23 ff says that this is true for all embryos in animals that fly, swim and walk.
GA 764a 33ff, cf. 765 a 16ff: yet he is prepared to allow that males often move first on
the right-hand side {HA 583b2ff, cf. b s ff ) , and also that, given that the right-hand
side o f the body is hotter than the left, and that hotter semen is more concocted, seed
from the right side is more likely to produce males (GA 765a34ff, but cf. b 4 ff).
GA 756b i6ff, especially 27ff.
O u r principal original sources for the pangenesis doctrine are the H ippocratic
treatises, Genit., Nat. Puer. and Morh. iv. See Lesky, 1951, pp. 7off.
GA 722 a 16-722 b 3.
218 The development o f empirical research
th at the resemblances that children bear to their parents lie rather in
such features as their faces and hands, than in their flesh and bones
as such. But i f the resemblances in the non-uniform parts are not due
to the seed being draw n from them^ w hy must the resemblances in the
uniform parts be explained in that way? A gainst (2) he points out
that the non-uniform parts are composed o f the uniform ones: a
hand consists o f flesh, bone, blood and so on. M oreover this option
w ould suggest that the seed is not draw n from all the parts. H e
tackles (3) too b y considering w hat must be said about the non-
uniform parts. Resem blances in these must be due either to the
m aterial - but that is sim ply the uniform parts - or to the w ay in
w hich the m aterial is arranged or com bined. But on that view ,
nothing can be said to be drawn from the arrangement to the seed,
since the arrangem ent is not itself a m aterial factor. Indeed a similar
argum ent can be applied to the uniform parts themselves, since they
consist o f the simple bodies combined in a particular w ay. Y e t the
resemblance in the parts is due to their arrangem ent or com bi­
nation, and has therefore to be explained in terms o f w hat brings this
a b o u t , ^74 and not by the seed being drawn from the whole body.
A series o f further arguments follow, for exam ple that the seed
cannot be draw n from the reproductive organs at least, because the
offspring has only m ale or female organs, not both [GA 7 2 2 b 3 if),
and again that the seed cannot be drawn from all the parts o f both
parents, for then we should have two animals (b 6 ff). A t GA 722b3ofi'
he considers how the uniform and non-uniform parts are to be
defined, nam ely in terms o f certain qualities and functions respec­
tively. Thus unless a substance has certain qualities it cnnnot be
called ‘ flesh’ . But it is plain that we cannot call w hat comes from
the parent flesh, and we must agree that that comes from something
w hich is not flesh.'^^s But there is no reason not to agree that other
substances m ay do the same, so again the idea that all the substances
in the body are represented in the seed fails.
A t the same time it is notable that he not only challenges the scope
and significance o f the evidence his opponents cite, but also shows
some ingenuity in collecting other data that pose difficulties for them.
O n e o f the m ain arguments they used depended on the supposed fact
that m utilated parents produce m utilated offspring, and am ong the
evidences (μαρτύρια) they cited was that o f children born with scars
“*74 T h e semen has just such a function, as supplying the efficient cause, in Aristotle’s
own theory.
He is led from this to consider Anaxagoras’ theory that none o f the uniform substances
comes into being.
The development o f empirical research 219
where their parents were scarred, and a case at Chalcedon o f a child
o f a branded father born with a faint brand m a rk : it was claim ed, as
Aristotle puts it, that children resemble their parents in respect not
only o f congenital characteristics (τά (τύμφυτα) but also o f acquired
ones (τά ε π ί κ τ η τ α ) .^76 But this he counters simply b y pointing out
that not all the offspring o f m utilated parents are themselves
m utilated, just as not all children resemble their parents.+^y A m ong
the evidence he brings against pangenesis he cites (i) that m any
plants lack certain parts (they can be torn off, and yet the seed
thereafter produces new plant that is identical with the old, 722 a i iff),
and (2) that plant cuttings bear seed - from which he says it is clear
that even when the cutting belonged to the original plant the seed it
bore did not come from the whole o f that plant (723 b i6fF).
But the most im portant consideration, in his view , is (3) w hat he
claims to have observed in insects (723b ig ff). In most cases, during
copulation the female insect inserts a part into the m ale, rather than
the m ale into the female. This by itself looks quite inconclusive, but
Aristotle believes that in such cases it is not semen, but sim ply the
heat and the δύναμις (capacity) o f the m ale that brings about
generation b y ‘ concoctin g’ the fetation.478 H e remarks quite
cautiously that not enough observations have been carried out in
such cases to enable him to classify them b y kinds, and his rem ark that
the males do not have seminal passages is introduced w ith φαίνεται
in the tentative sense, ‘ appears’ rather than ‘ it is evid en t’ .479 Y e t this
erroneous observation is not only his ‘ strongest e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t
pangenesis, but also one o f the crucial pieces o f ‘ fa c tu a l’ support that
he cites for his own view that the role o f the m ale in reproduction is
to supply the efficient cause, not to contribute directly to the m aterial
o f the oifspring. 4 8 i the m ain the arguments mounted against
pangenesis are telling ones, and they draw on w ell known, and some
not so w ell known, data to good e ffect: even so, the ch ief point that
derives from Aristotle’s personal researches in these chapters is one
where, under the influence, no doubt, o f his general theories, he
assumed too readily that his observations yielded a conclusion that
supported them.
•♦76 GA 721 b i7 f f and 28fF.
GA 724a3ff, cf. HA sSsbssflF.
♦7® See especially GA 729 b 21-33, and cf. other references to species that do not emit seed
in copulation, 7 3 ia i4 f f, 7 3 3 b i6 ff.
See GA 7 2 13 12 , i4ff.
GA 723 b 19.
•*«1 See GA 729b 8 f and 2 if, where in both cases there is a contrast between λόγο? and ?ργα.
C f. also b 3 3 ff with some equally doubtful evidence such as the supposed fact that a
hen bird trodden twice will have eggs that resemble the second cock.
220 The development o f empirical research
It is apparent that m uch o f Aristotle’s biology - like his physics -
does not live up to his own high ideals. His draw ing attention to the
inadequacy o f certain data, and to the need to survey all the relevant
υ π ά ρ χ ο ν τ α , does not prevent him from being less than persistent
in his research in some areas, nor deter him from some highly
speculative theories in others. W here he remarks on other writers’
inexperience o f internal anatom y, for e x a m p l e , or charges them
w ith not taking w hat is fam iliar as the starting-point o f their
i n q u i r i e s / 8 4 -vvith generalising from a few cases or otherwise ju m pin g
to conclusions on inadequate evidence,4^s or with guessing w hat the
result o f a test w ould be and assuming w hat would happen before
actually seeing it,^S6 in each case similar criticisms could be levelled
at him to some - if not the same - extent.
Nevertheless two simple but fundam ental points remain. First, if
he does not always live up to his own m ethodological principles, at
least they are stated as the principles to follow. T h e end is defined in
terms o f giving the causes and resolving the difficulties in the com m on
assum ptions: he is no fact collector for the sake o f fact collecting. But
as means to his ends the appeal to the evidence o f the senses is
allotted its distinct role, alongside the reference to generally accepted
opinions and the use o f reasoned argum ent, and he makes it clear
that in certain contexts at least it is the first o f these that is to be
preferred. M oreover his is the first generalised program m e o f inquiry
into natural science: his doctrine o f causes identifies the kind o f
questions to be asked, and he provides an explicit protreptic to the
study o f each branch o f natural science as far as each is p o s s i b l e . ^87
Secondly the lim itations o f his observational w ork should not lead
us to ignore the extraordinary scope o f w hat he did achieve in the
various departments o f the inquiry concerning nature. A n analysis
o f w hat he says he has observed and o f how he uses this to support his
theories sometimes reveals the superficiality o f his em pirical research.
Y e t as the first systematic study o f animals, the zoological treatises
represent a form idable achievem ent, not only in the individual
discoveries that are recorded, but also in the patient and painstaking
amassing o f a vast am ount o f data concerning m any different species
and in the ingenious interplay o f data and arguments in his assault
on such obscure problems as those connected w ith reproduction.
A p art from PA 6 3 g b 8 ff and other passages mentioned above (p. 137 and n. 64) see
also, e.g., GA 73 5 byf, 748a i4iT. ‘**3 g jig^ 47ob8f, 4 7 ib 2 3 ff.
E.g. GA 747 b sf, 748 a8f, 765 b4f.
■
**5 E.g. PA 676b33fF, GA 756a2ff, b i6 ff, 78 8b! iff, i7ff. 765a 25-9.
PA I 5, 644b22ff: the study o f the heavenly bodies and of animals each has its own
attractions.
The development o f empirical research 221
Neither the proposition that most G reek scientists ignored em pirical
methods, nor that they were somehow endowed w ith an instinctive
grasp o f them, stands up to scrutiny. T here are im portant differences
in the performance both between and w ithin the various ch ief
strands o f G reek natural science - physics, astronomy, m edicine and
biology - and simple contrasts between ‘ dialectical ’ philosophers
and ‘ em pirical’ doctors w ill not do. A lthough some o f the obser­
vations in the m edical literature are systematic and meticulous, we
also find doctors engaging in uncontrolled and dogm atic specula­
tion - even while they criticised other theorists on precisely that
score. Conversely we have some evidence that the num ber-theory o f
the Pythagoreans stimulated some em pirical research in acoustics.
W e cannot attribute the infrequency o f sustained em pirical
research in pre-Aristotelian science to a general epistemological
interdiction, for although there were those who rejected or denigrated
the senses, that was no simple orthodoxy. T h e epistem ological
debate was a com plex one and the im portance o f ιστορία was
advocated b y several writers. Its fruitful practice in any more than a
purely descriptive context had, however, to be stimulated by a
particular theory, as we see in the case o f the H ippocratic doctrine o f
critical days. M oreover in both pre- and post-Aristotelian science
the overall theory that played that role was sometimes one that had
its m ystical or fantastical aspects, as we see from Pythagorean
num ber-theory before, and astrology after, him. Curiosity as such
was no prerogative o f m en who single-m indedly devoted themselves
to w hat u)e consider the lasting achievem ents o f G reek science, and
some o f those lasting achievem ents owed m uch to the com plex
m otivations o f their authors. I f the geom etry o f H ipparchus’ lunar
model m ay owe little to his astrological beliefs, the same is certainly
not true o f his discovery o f precession, the direct outcom e o f obser­
vations o f the stars we know to have been conducted in part with
astrological considerations in mind.
O bservation and research have always to be guided b y theories,
whether specific or general. But a particular recurrent feature o f the
case-studies we have exam ined is the w ay in w hich research served
the function o f corroboration. Observations are cited to illustrate and
support particular doctrines, as prim ary or supplem entary arguments
for them, almost, we m ay say, as one o f the dialectical devices
available to the advocates o f the thesis in question. T h e observations
are sometimes already interpreted in the light o f the theories they
were m eant to establish, and we find m any examples where the
degree o f support they lend those theories was m uch exaggerated.
222 The development o f empirical research
M ore seriously, there are occasions when, once the theory had received
some em pirical backing, the research was pursued no further. T h e
theories were not p u t at risk by being checked against further obser­
vations carried out open-endedly and w ithout prejudice as regards
the outcom e.
Furtherm ore a sim ilar point applies, too, to m any o f the tests and
experiments that are recorded. T h e lack o f experim entation is a
charge that has repeatedly been levelled at G reek s c i e n c e , ^88 b ut
m uch o f the criticism has been m isplaced and we must get clear
where the real weaknesses lie. First o f all it is worth rem arking th at
in the most general sense the conducting o f tests is certainly not
confined to, nor definitive of, natural science, Evans-Pritchard’s
report o f the operations o f the poison oracle b y the Zande - in w hich
poison is given to a chicken and specific questions, expecting yes or
no answers, are settled according to w hether the chicken lives or
dies 4®9 - is an exam ple o f a testing procedure for w hich no shortage
o f parallels, including G reek parallels, can be found. In such cases the
rules according to w hich the results are interpreted are predeter­
m ined : w hat w ill count as a yes or no answer is agreed beforehand.
It is notable that the Zande regularly check their results b y putting
the same question first in a positive and then in a negative form, or
b y following one test w ith a second questioning the va lid ity o f the
first.490 Y e t while individual answers are thereby tested, the valid ity
o f the whole procedure is not exam ined or called in question.^^i
A gain just as frequent in the anthropological literature and else­
where are tests that differ from the poison oracle in that they are
carried out directly on the substance or person about w hich or whom
the question is asked, but that share the characteristic that they are
used to settle issues concerning the particular case, not to arrive at
explanations o f classes o f physical phenom ena or events. O rdeals to
test the guilt or innocence o f individuals often take this f o r m ,492 and
w ould-be diagnostic tests of, for exam ple, w hether or not a w om an
can conceive, w hether she has done so, w hether she is pregnant w ith
a boy or girl, or w hether a m an’s semen is fertile or not, are com m on
Some o f the views that have been expressed on this problem are outlined and discussed
in my 1964: cf. subsequently von Staden 1975.
Evans-Pritchard 1937, pp. asSff.
Evans-Pritchard 1937, pp. aggff.
Cf. above, ch. i pp. 18f on the question o f the limits o f scepticism.
492 W e com pare also the type o f case illustrated by the story in Herodotus i 46ff,
w^here Croesus first tries out the Greek oracles to see whether they can answer a question
to which he knows the correct reply, in order to determ ine which oracle to consult on
the outcom e o f his expedition against the Persians. T h e fact that this story m ay w ell be
apocryphal does not alter its value as evidence for the idea of carrying out such a test.
The development o f empirical research 223
in all kinds o f m edical texts, including, from the G reco-R om an
w orld, not only writers such as Pliny, but also several o f the H ip p o­
cratic authors and A r i s t o t i e . ^ 9 3 Some o f the particular procedures
used on such occasions are better grounded than others: but they
have in com m on not only that the rationale o f the tests themselves
is not exam ined, but also that they are directed not to investigating
causes, but to resolving questions concerning individual cases.
But i f the practice o f testing m ay be seen as ju st one variety o f
universal hum an trial and error p r o c e d u r e s ,s c ie n t if ic experi­
m entation m ay be distinguished in the first place b y its aim , to
throw ligh t on the nature and causes o f physical phenom ena and
processes. W hile the m ajor extant+^s examples o f sustained and
systematic experim entation in G reek science come from late anti­
quity,-^56 the H ippocratic treatises and Aristotle especially provide
instances o f tests carried out in connection w ith physical and physio-
See, e.g., Aph. v 41 and sg, L iv 546.iff, 554.sff, Nat. Mul. ch. 96, L v n 4 i2 .i9 ff,
Steril. chh. 214 and 219, L vm 4 i4 .i7 ff, 422.233·, Super/, ch. 25, C M G 1,2, 2 8o.28fF, and
cf. Aristotle, HA ^2sa2^f, 583 a i4ff, GA 747a3ff, 7ff. Steril. ch. 215, L vin 4i6.8ff, i3ff,
is a typical instance where the H ippocratic writer moves from describing certain
aspects o f a w om an’s appearance that m ay be used as signs that she is pregnant, to
suggesting a deliberate intervention - with the administration o f drugs - that purports
to test for pregnancy. Cf. Soranus, Gyn. i 9.35, CM G iv 24.2off, for a sceptical and
critical response to some o f the tests that had been proposed to see whether a wom an
can conceive.
M an y o f the adm ittedly sporadic improvements made in various domains o f techno­
lo gy in the ancient world (for exam ple in navigation and corn-m illing: see Landels
1978 for a convenient survey) m ay be thought to presuppose the use o f such procedures.
In general, however, such testing was carried out b y men who left no written record of
their aims and methods. T h e chief exception to this is the series o f improvements in
m ilitary technology, notably in connection with the invention and perfection of
artillery o f various kinds, for w hich we have quite extensive evidence in such writers as
Philo (end o f third century b .c .) and H ero (first century a .d .) (see M arsden 1971).
Philo, in particular, contrasts early trial and error procedures in the construction of
artillery with the more systematic experiments carried out in A lexandria by craftsmen
who were ‘ heavily subsidised ’ by kings who were ‘ eager for fam e and well disposed to
the arts and crafts’ {Bel. 50.20ff and 37ff). T he circumstances in which such state
support for technological research was forthcom ing were, however, clearly quite
exceptional.
495 W hat w e know o f the research o f Strato and o f the Hellenistic biologists, Herophilus
and Erasistratus, suggests that the picture m ight be substantially altered if more of their
work had survived (see above, pp. iGsff, 167 n. 218 and 211 n. 421). O n e notable
instance of an experim ental procedure attributed to Erasistratus, for exam ple, is that
recorded in Anon. Lond. x x x iii 43!?, in which he attem pted to show that there are
invisible effluvia from animals by keeping a bird in a vessel without food for a period o f
time and then w eighing the bird and its visible excreta and com paring this with the
original weight: the loss in weight was taken to establish that a ‘ considerable emanation
had taken p la ce ’ . Cf. further von Staden 1975, pp. I7gff.
See above, p. 167, on G alen ’s experiments on the digestive and nervous systems, and
p. 197 on Ptolem y’s in optics. Cf. also p. 144 n. 95 for evidence that the idea o f
varying the conditions o f the test appears in some late authors even when they carried
out no such tests themselves.
224 development o f empirical research The development o f empirical research 225

logical theories before the end o f the fourth c e n t u r y . i t is true that research and in its practice. I f one o f the first contexts in w hich
the num ber o f such examples is not great, though we must recall that ιστορία is successfully practised is the history (in our sense) and
in several o f the topics and areas o f physical inquiry in w hich the geography o f G reece and neighbouring lands, other areas o f inquiry
Greeks were interested experiments were either sim ply not a practical were soon opened u p : the thorough and m eticulous collection o f data
possibility (as in astronomy and m eteorology) or incapable o f relating to the courses o f diseases in the H ippocratic Epidemics far
resolving the fundam ental issues (as in the debate between atomism surpasses anything in extant earlier G reek or non-Greek m edical
and continuum theory). It is also true that such experiments as were literature. I f in itially such studies w ere restricted to particular topics
conducted were often inconclusive. But m ore im portant than either and stimulated b y particular doctrines, the first generalised pro­
o f those two points (and part o f the explanation o f that inconclusive­ gram m e o f research, including em pirical research, into the various
ness) is the fact that m any tests - just like the simple observations o f departments o f the inquiry concerning nature is the w ork o f Aristotle,
w hich they can be seen as the natural extension - were used in a and elaborate and at least to some extent cooperative projects were
corroboratory, rather than a neutrally heuristic, role. Y e t that undertaken in his school and later in the A lexandrian M useum . T h e
generalisation, like so m an y others, must be qualified: w hile con­ histories o f dissection and o f G reek observational w ork in astronomy
structively observations and tests were often partial (because care­ illustrate how slow the full exploitation o f certain techniques was in
fully selected) witnesses summoned in support o f theories, destruc­ com ing about. Y e t the eventual successes were considerable and m ay
tively they could be deployed, as they were b y Aristotle especially, rightly be ranked am ong the outstanding achievem ents o f Greek
w ith great effect. science. Some o f the Greeks themselves saw exact science as the only
O u r study o f On the Sacred Disease in chapter i showed that the proper science: but if that idea and the concept o f an axiom atic
possession o f extensive em pirical data about the internal functioning system are two o f their im portant legacies to modern science, a third
o f the body, for exam ple, was not necessary to the rejection o f is certainly the notion o f em pirical research.
m agical beliefs about disease; that H ippocratic author confidently
bases his own explanation o f epilepsy on a very largely imaginary-
anatom ical theory. Conversely, examples o f quite sustained obser­
vations can be cited both outside, and before, G reek natural science.
Y e t in m any areas the developm ent o f G reek science depended in
part at least on the extension o f its em pirical base. No adequate
physiology, pathology or astronomy - let alone geography, anatom y,
zoology or botany - is possible w ithout detailed inform ation,
obtainable, in m any cases, only by careful and systematic observation.
W e saw in chapter 2 that m uch o f the strength o f G reek science
lies in its formal dialectical and dem onstrative techniques, and that
the definition and analysis o f an axiom atic, deductive system,
together w ith the developm ent o f the application o f m athem atics to
the understanding o f natural phenom ena, occupied a considerable
and productive intellectual effort. Y e t despite all the lim itations we
have draw n attention to, the Greeks were responsible for im portant
developm ents in em pirical methods as w ell, both in the theory o f

-*97 A m ong the examples we have mentioned are the tests on blood described in Cam.
(above p. 150 n. 132) and those on natural substances reported in Mete, iv (pp. aogf).
O n m any occasions H ippocratic tests incorporated an element of analogy: they w^ere
carried out not on the living natural substances themselves, but on others deemed to be
analogous to them, see Lloyd 1966, pp. 345ff.

GREEK SCIENCE AND G R E E K S O C I E T Y
THE EXPLANANDUM
W e began b y considering the problem posed b y the criticisms
advanced by certain ancient G reek writers against traditional and -
as they sometimes represent them - m agical beliefs and practices.
O u r investigation has taken us a long w ay round, via a discussion o f
the developm ent o f certain argum entative techniques and o f
em pirical research. But we m ay now return to our original question,
to consider now the social background to early G reek thought. H ow
far can w e go towards specifying the social and other conditions that
allowed or promoted the em ergence o f philosophy and science? I f we
are to m ake any h ead w ay on this exceptionally difficult and m uch
disputed problem , it is essential both to bear in mind the exact
nature, and the lim itations, o f the intellectual developm ents that
took place in Greece, and to press home the comparison and the
contrast between our G reek data and that from other societies.
T h e prim ary task, w e said, is to define the explanandum as clearly
as possible. For this we have first to recapitulate, and to m ake m ore
precise, some points that have come out o f our earlier investigations,
and secondly to come to terms more directly w ith the achievem ents
o f the Greeks’ N ear Eastern neighbours. T h e issue o f the debts o f
G reek science to E gypt and Babylonia has been, since antiquity, an
em otive topic; all too often it has been argued, b y ancient and
m odern writers alike, either that the Greeks ow ed everything, or that
they owed nothing, to Eastern wisdom, w hile fundam ental questions
relating to the processes o f transmission, and to the interpretation o f
w hat was transmitted, have been ignored.^ Aspects o f the problem
have been broached in previous chapters, but w e must shortly
attem pt a rather more systematic comparison o f G reek and Near
* Thus the circumstances in which a metallurgical technique m ay be transmitted from
one culture to another are quite different from those o f the transmission o f a religious
belief or myth, which differ in turn from those of an item o f astronomical lore, which
differ in turn from those o f a method o f cure. In particular the extent to which the
transmission must be m ediated through language differs, and so too does the extent to
w hich the transmission is effected between individuals who already possess specialised
knowledge.
Greek science and Greek society 227
Eastern investigations. In addition to, and in some respects more
especially than, traditional pre-literate societies, the major ancient
N ear Eastern civilisations m ay be used as a control b y which w e m ay
test hypotheses about the relation between G reek speculative thought
and the social, political and ideological factors that obtained in
G reece.
T h e ‘ emergence o f philosophy and science ’ is a convenient short­
hand term, but a vague one and one that carries the risk o f distorting
the focus o f the problem. W e have repeatedly stressed the im portance
o f the com plexity and heterogeneity o f the various divergent strands
o f early G reek speculative thought, and to deal m erely w ith those
aspects o f it that m ay correspond to our own notions o f developm ent
is to present a hopelessly onesided picture. W e m ay attem pt to
summarise the essential points under five heads.
( 1) A s w e said at the outset, popular and traditional beliefs -
including superstitions and ‘ m agic ’ - were not superseded: they
continued to be held not only (one presumes) b y most Greeks but in
particular b y m any h ighly articulate writers and they can be
exem plified in prom inent exponents o f ίστορίη such as Herodotus.
M oreover they m ay be said to grow or develop in a w ay analogous
to the developm ent o f science and philosophy, in that - partly under
the influence o f the m odels provided b y science and p h ilo so p h y -
they become elaborated and systematised, as was the case w ith dream-
interpretation and other forms o f divination, w ith astrology and w ith
‘ a lch em y ’.
(2) W h at the Greeks themselves identified as progress, or at least
claim ed as an integral part o f civilised life, could and often did
include those elaborations o f traditional beliefs ju st as m uch as other
disciplines that we accept more readily as crafts, arts or sciences.
T o cite just one notable instance, the benefits that Prometheus
claim s to have brought m ankind in Aeschylus’ p lay include not only
m edicine and navigation, but also divination divination is clearly
considered an im portant exam ple o f a successful τέχνη by the author
o f On Regimen,^ w hile Plato - and m an y others - held it to be a divine
gift . 4
(3) B y no means all those who contributed to the early develop­
m ent o f the various branches o f philosophical inquiry are rem arkable
* Pr. 484-499. C f., e.g ., Solon Poem i.5 3 ff Diehl.
^ In the w riter’s elaborate comparison between the τέχνοι and m an’s nature, Viet. 1,
chh. 12-24, ^ 488.1-496.19, divination is taken as the first exam ple, 488.2ff. Contrast
Acut. ch. 3, L II 240.8ff, where the disagreements among doctors are said to be a scandal
for the art and one that makes laym en think m edicine to be no better than divination.
* See, e.g., Pkdr. 244 a ff, T i. 71 e fT, cf. Ti. 24 c and contrast, R. 364 b ff.
228 Greek science and Greek society
for their sceptical, positivist attitudes. Such attitudes can - w ith some
reservations - be attributed to A naxagoras and Dem ocritus, for
instance, Pythagoras had the reputation o f being a wonder-worker,
and Empedocles laid positive claims in that direction for himself.
A lthough the secrecy and orthodoxy o f the Pythagorean sects have
been exaggerated b y our late secondary s o u r c e s , s it must be acknow ­
ledged that those sects were in some respects exclusive groups and
that they cultivated some esoteric doctrines and practices. I f open
argum ent can readily be illustrated in Presocratic philosophy, so too
can the deliberate exploitation o f am biguity and p a ra d o x : the lesson
that the practice o f persuasion merges with that o f άττοττή is one that
applies not just to rhetoric but also to aspects o f philosophy.^
(4) W ithin m athem atics, too, although we know so little about the
aims and m otivations o f m any fifth- and fourth-century m athe­
m aticians, it is clear that for some at least o f the Pythagoreans their
inquiries in this area were connected w ith, and stim ulated by, a
brand o f num ber mysticism - the b elief that numbers in some w ay
hold the key not just to w hat we recognise as quantitative relation­
ships but also to qualitative ones, including m orality.
(5) F inally the divergent strands w ithin early G reek m edicine are
particularly striking. This is a m atter not m erely o f the contrasts
between temple m edicine and popular m edicine on the one hand
and w hat we find in the H ippocratic Corpus on the other, but also o f
those between the H ippocratic writers themselves. T h e y differ not
only in their attitudes on such questions as the proper method in
m edicine and its relationship to philosophy and physical speculation,
b ut also on the fundam ental issue that concerns us here, that o f
openness. W hereas the author o f On Ancient Medicine insists that the
doctor should explain him self clearly to the layman,^ and several
treatises exhibit a com m endable frankness in acknow ledging mistakes
or failures in treatment,® the end o f the w ork Law echoes the language
5 T his applies especially to the stories in Plutarch, lam blichus, Pappus and elsewhere
concerning the punishment o f those who divulged Pythagorean mathem atical learn in g:
yet at one point where he speaks of Pythagorean secret doctrines lam blichus purports to
cite A ristotle’s lost treatise on the Pythagoreans as his authority ( FP 3 1 = Aristotle
Fr. 192). See the balanced assessment of the problem in Burkert 1972a, pp. 178flF, 454ff.
* See Gorgias, Helen, paras. 8 and 10 (cf. above, pp. 83f).
7 V M ch. 2, C M G I, I 37.9ff, i7fT. O n e m ay compare Plato’s dem and that the ‘ free’
doctor (at least) should converse with his freeborn patient, discuss his case with him
and obtain his consent for treatment, Lg 720 b ff, 857 c ff, though we should note that
P lato’s distinction between free doctors treating free men and slave doctors treating
slaves is contradicted by the evidence o f the case-histories in the Epidemics, where slaves
and free men and women were treated by the same physicians.
* T his is true especially o f the surgical treatises. Thus the author o f Art. describes his
own unsuccessful attem pt to reduce hum p-back by using an inflated bag, adding that
Greek science and Greek society 229
o f the m ystery religions to express the idea that m edical knowledge
should be revealed only to the initiated.’ W hile m any H ippocratic
works are adm irably clear and succinct, the obscurity o f others,
particularly o f some o f the aphoristic collections, appears to have
been deliberately cultivated the aphorisms in question are, one
presumes, shorthand form ulae w hich are not intended to be intel­
ligible in themselves, but only in relation to further, oral, teaching
w hich w ould be available to duly apprenticed students.
THE G R E E K S AND T H E N E A R EA ST
T o these reservations concerning the heterogeneous character o f
early G reek speculative thought must be added others when we set
the Greeks’ achievem ents in relation to those o f their ancient N ear
Eastern neighbours. A lread y in the third m illennium B .C . both
E gypt and M esopotam ia especially had com plex and sophisticated
civilisations characterised b y centralised, bureaucratic governm ent
and a com paratively high level o f technology. As already noted, the
question o f the debts o f G reek science to the East has often been
discussed superficially and polem ically, not least by ancient writers,
G reek and R om an, Christian and pagan, themselves. But thanks to
the m eticulous w ork o f Egyptologists and Assyriologists, m uch o f it
o f quite recent date, w e are now in a m uch better position to define
the contributions o f those civilisations.
T h e three m ain fields that concern us are m athem atics, astronomy
and m edicine, and in each case we can identify not only certain out­
standing advances m ade b y the Egyptians and Babylonians, but also
certain distinctions between their w ork and w hat we find in G reek
science. Thus m athem atical cuneiform tablets dating from the second
m illennium B .C . show that the Babylonians had already attained
he records this deliberately because much can be learned from mistakes, ch. 47,
L IV 2io.9ff. Epid. i and in show a similar readiness to record cases where all the
remedies tried were useless (e.g. Epid. iii case 9, first series, L in 58.7, and case 5,
second series, 1 18.8), as well as a high proportion o f cases ending in death (see above,
p. 154 n. 145). In the other books of the Epidemics, too, faulty diagnoses and treatments
are frequently referred to and sometimes, at least, it is clearly the w riter’s own per­
form ance that is in question, e.g. Epid. v 27, L v 226.10 (‘ it escaped m y notice that this
lesion needed trepanning’).
®L ·x ch. 5, C M G I, I 8.i5fT (see above, p. 41 n. 163). Cf. Decent, ch. 16, CM G i, i 29.13!?,
17fF, w hich tells the doctor to reveal nothing o f the patient’s condition to him for fear
that this w ill make him worse, and ch. 18, 29.32f, which cryptically remarks that things
that are ‘ glorious’ are closely guarded. Jusj., meanwhile, insists that medical knowledge
should only be handed on to specified classes of individual, C M G i, i 4.7!?.
T h e main examples are Alim., Hum., parts o f Decent, and parts o f Praec., but cf. also,
e.g., Epid. VI sec. 2, ch. i, L v 276.3!?. Cf. especially W . H . S. Jones 1923-31, iv pp. ix ff.
 η
230 Greek science and Greek society
considerable mastery over a range o f arithm etical and algebraic
techniques, for exam ple for the solving o f quadratic eq uations." T h e
extant remains o f E gyptian geom etry show a fair degree o f pro­
ficiency in the m anipulation o f certain elem entary, and o f some not so
elem entary, p r o c e d u r e s ,a n d the Greeks were sufficiently impressed
for m any o f them to m aintain that geom etry began in E g y p t . Y e t
as we have rem arked before, w hat is lacking from both E gyptian and
Babylonian m athem atics was the notion o f proof. Thus although we
know from a cuneiform tablet dating from around 1600 B .C . that
the Babylonians were fam iliar with ‘ Pythagorean triplets’ (numbers
in w hich the squares o f the first and the second equal the square o f
the t h i r d ) , t h e r e is no evidence o f any attem pt to prove w hat we
know as Pythagoras’ theorem geom etrically.
A similar point applies to astronomy, where we have com m ented
before on the antiquity o f Babylonian astronomical records and
discussed the problem o f the transmission o f these data to G reece.
T h e purposes for w hich the observations were originally undertaken
were often quite different from the use the Greeks eventually m ade
o f them. T h e Babylonians observed w hat they held to be significant
astronom ical phenom ena, such as the appearances and disappear­
ances o f particular heavenly bodies, prim arily because they believed
th at these phenom ena influenced or even determ ined events on
earth. T h e y constructed periodic tables from w hich astronomical
phenom ena m ight be predicted - and these tables must rank as, or
am ong, the very first systematic attempts to apply m athem atics to
the understanding o f com plex p h e n o m e n a but w hat they did not
do, at least not until the Seleucid period, and then almost certainly
under the influence o f G reek astronomy itself, was to attem pt to
construct geom etrical models o f the movements o f the heavenly
bodies. A gain the difference between the Greeks and the East centres
on the notion o f a rigorous demonstration.
In m edicine, too, certain contrasts not m erely o f degree but also o f
” See N eugebauer 1957, pp. 4 iff.
** See, e.g., van der W aerden 1954, pp. 3 iff.
*3 Herodotus, 11 109, and Aristotle, Metaph. 981 b23ff, are followed b y a long line of later
writers, including Diodorus, Strabo, Hero, lam blichus and Proclus (and from the
classical period, cf. Isocrates x i 23 and Plato, Phdr. 274cd). Herodotus and Aristotle
differ in their views on the stimulus to the developm ent o f geom etry, Herodotus
arguing that it arose from practical concerns (the measurement of the land after the
N ile’s flooding), Aristotle that it did so from theoretical interests. Such evidence as we
have suggests that Herodotus’ thesis is nearer the mark so far as Egypt is concerned.
Plim pton 322, see N eugebauer and Sachs 1945, pp. 38ff.
'5 O n the achievements o f Babylonian astronomy, and on the differences between its
aims and those o f G reek astronomy, see especially A aboe 1974, N eugebauer 1975,
I pp. 347ff, 397, II pp. 589ff, 6i3f.
Greek science and Greek society 231
kind m ay be remarked, even though these are less pronounced and
less clear-cut than in m athem atics and astronomy. M uch E gyptian
and more especially M esopotam ian m edicine is heavily m agical in
character. Y e t an exception to this is the Edw in Sm ith papyrus,
which we have cited^^ for the evidence it provides for the carrying
out o f clinical observations in E gyptian m edicine and which is almost
(though not quite) free from references to charms, spells and the
like. Both points are im portant and suggest a sim ilarity with w hat we
find in one strand in G reek m edicine. Y e t again there are differences.
E gyptian m edical papyri contain no deliberate arguments con­
cerning the nature o f diseases, their causes, and the constitution o f
the body, as a w h o le .M o r e o v e r no Egyptian, let alone any other
ancient N ear Eastern, m edical text contains the type o f direct attack
on m agical practices and beliefs that we find in the H ippocratic
Corpus. T h e E gyptian evidence shows quite clearly how even before
‘ m ag ic’ becam e an issue - as it did in G reece - the emphasis, in
practice, in m edicine m ay be very m uch at the em pirical end o f w hat
we m ay call the em pirical-m agical s p e c t r u m . B u t again the
conclusion must be that explicit attacks on m agic in m edicine are,
so far as our inform ation for the ancient M editerranean and N ear
East is concerned, an exclusively G reek phenom enon.
This b rief excursus into some o f the N ear Eastern data w ill serve
as a rem inder o f the misguidedness o f talking about the ancient origin
o f science as if this were a single clearly defined intellectual event.
T h e im portance o f the advances in m athem atical m anipulation that
took place in one or other or both great ancient N ear Eastern river
civilisations must be given full weight. T h e differences between
E gypt and B abylonia should not be underestim ated: the w ay
m athem atics developed in the two societies was far from uniform.
See above, p. 153.
Case nine, which is also exceptional in containing no diagnosis and hardly any exam i­
nation, ends with a reference to the charm that is to be recited to ensure that the
homeopathic remedy is effective: Breasted 1930, i pp. 2i7ff.
** T hus although Papyrus Ebers, for instance, contains an anatom ical and physiological
section, setting out a schematic account o f the vessels in the body (see Ebb 11 1937»
pp. I i4 ff), w hich can be compared with the also often fanciful doctrines in Morb. Sacr.
and other Greek writers (see above, pp. 2 if, I5 7ff), there is nothing in Egyptian medicine
to set beside the material in V M debating the relative importance o f different causal
factors in disease in relation to an explicit idea o f w h at counts as a cause (see above,
pp. 53f) or that in Nat. Horn, on the issue between monistic and pluralistic views o f the
constitution o f the human body (pp. 92ff).
Cf. G . Lewis 1975. In this im portant study o f G nau medicine Lewis has emphasised that
many minor illnesses are not treated as requiring explanation in terms o f spirits and
he has stressed that the reporting o f native accounts of illnesses in anthropological
monographs is often incomplete insofar as attention is focused exclusively on major or
striking conditions and minor or routine complaints are not discussed.
232 Greek science and Greek society
B ut both shared in certain advances in both ‘ p u re ’ and ‘ ap p lied ’
m athem atics: nor is it difficult to speculate on how certain practical
needs in the adm inistration o f kingdoms as large and as com plex as
ancient E gypt and Babylonia m ay have helped to stimulate the
developm ent o f certain techniques in arithm etical and geom etrical
calculation. It is not fortuitous that such examples as determ ining the
supplies o f food necessary for a work force consisting o f different
grades o f worker, or the numbers o f workers needed to transport a
given quantity o f bricks, or calculating the angles o f inclination o f
pyram ids or canals o f different dimensions, should figure prom i­
nently in E gyptian and Babylonian m athem atical texts.
M oreover in some fields we m ay talk if not o f a continuity or a
succession, at least o f a direct com parability, in the data from the
N ear East and from G reece. T h e undertaking and recording o f case-
histories in m edicine provide one instance,21 and the sustained
observation o f astronomical phenom ena (for w hatever motive)
another. Nor should we fail to notice how, in both cases, the pro­
duction o f written records transforms the situation as regards the
preservation, diffusion and utilisation o f the knowledge in question.22
So far as these three areas are concerned, some o f the distinctive
G reek contributions can be identified quite specifically. T h ey were
certainly not the first to develop a com plex m athem atics - only the
first to use, and then also to give a formal analysis of, a concept o f
rigorous m athem atical demonstration. T h ey were not the first to
carry out careful observations in astronomy and m edicine, only the
first - eventually - to develop an explicit notion o f em pirical
research and to debate its role in natural science. T h e y were not the
first to diagnose and treat some m edical cases w ithout reference to
postulated divine or daem onic agencies, only the first to express a
category o f the ‘ m a g ica l’ and to attem pt to exclude it from m edicine.
In each o f these three instances, these differences relate to new and
fundam ental questions about the aims, methods and assumptions o f
the investigation concerned. In astronomy, m athem atics and
m edicine, the Greeks preem inently bring into the open and discuss
second-order questions concerning the nature o f the inquiry itself.
See, for example, Peet 1923, e.g. pp. yyfF, gyff, N eugebauer and Sachs 1945, e.g.
pp. 76fT, 9 iff.
T h a t some pathological and therapeutic ideas, and m any medical recipes, cam e to
G reece from Egypt has been argued in Steuer and Saunders 1959 and in Saunders 1963
(cf. also Iversen 1939). T he difficulties of establishing this are, however, form idable:
independent development is often as likely a hypothesis as diffusion to explain the
similarities, especially where the parallelisms are not exact.
See further below, pp. 239f.
Greek science and Greek society 233
M uch as the Egyptians and Babylonians contributed to the content
o f these studies, the investigations only acquire self-conscious m etho­
dologies for the first time w ith the Greeks.
This point can be elaborated and extended when we take into
account other areas where the Greeks more obviously break quite
new ground. E gypt and Babylonia provide little or nothing to set
beside G reek w ork in the dom ain o f philosophy as such, including
first ‘ natural philosophy’ (cosmology and ‘ physics’ in the G reek
sense), epistemology and ontology, and then also eventually ethics
and form al logic. N ow not all that is included under the rubric o f
G reek philosophy is open and argum entative, and in certain fields,
especially psychology and cosmogony, the ideas o f the philosophers
owe m uch to religious b elief and to m yth, both Greek and non-
Greek. Y e t from early on there is a crucial difference in aim and
method between one (and usually the dominant) tradition or
approach in G reek philosophy on the one hand, and m yth and
religious belief^^ on the other, in the philosophers’ concern with the
question o f the grounds for the views and theories they advanced.
Story-tellers, to be sure, rival one another as story-tellers: but they
do not seek to be ju d ged according to w hether they produce an
account o f the subjects they deal w ith that is better in the sense o f
h aving stronger arguments or evidence to support its claims as
truth. W hile neither philosophers in general, nor G reek philosophers
in particular, invariably provide such justification, the readiness to do
so when challenged m ay be seen as one o f the marks o f the new type
o f inquiry initiated in G reek philosophy.
A n y attem pt to offer generalisations concerning Greek speculative
thought as a w hole must be deemed hazardous. T h e developm ent o f
, the critical approach has often been represented as its key feature,
and as a prelim inary statement this has the advantage both that it
applies to a num ber o f different fields o f inquiry,^^ and that it can
be argued to be true o f G reek thought in ways that appear to
distinguish it both from that o f their ancient N ear Eastern neigh­
bours, and from that o f traditional pre-literate societies. Y et im port­
ant reservations, qualifications and additions must be made. First
and most obviously, the critical approach cannot be said to charac-
I f one m ay distinguish between religious belief and systematic theology: the latter, like
philosophy, seeks to provide rational grounds for doctrines, but historically it is, in
G reece at least, a later developm ent than, and influenced by, philosophy.
I have mentioned those that relate to philosophy, natural science and medicine: but a
similar developm ent of critical inquiry m ay, o f course, be illustrated by referring to
ethnography, historiography and political theory.
 234 Greek science and Greek society
terise the whole o f G reek speculative thought, i f only because it has
its closed, secretive and exclusive aspects, its m ystical and m ythical
sides. Secondly, although m uch G reek w ork is critical in the sense
that the writers reject both popular assumptions and their colleagues’
opinions, it is often anything but self-critical; on the contrary there
is frequently a distinct incaution and dogm atism in the statement o f
the w riter’s own position, a failure not just to exam ine, but even to
recognise, its w eak points.
Nevertheless if the claim to be critical can be upheld only w ithin
certain well-defined limits, G reek philosophy, natural science and
m edicine are strongly characterised first b y the raising o f funda­
m ental issues - including particularly second-order questions con­
cerning the nature o f the inquiries themselves - secondly b y the
. . k - challenging o f basic assumptions and b y generalised, as opposed to
'jvih' particular, s c e p t ic is m ,a n d thirdly by an argum entative, com peti­
tive, even com bative quality, reflected not only in the rejection o f
rivals’ views, but also in over-sanguine self-justifications. T ru e, the
Greeks argum entative flair is - as we saw in chapter 2 - not unique
(though it is h ighly d evelo p ed ): but their dialectical skills are
deployed over a w ider range o f far-reaching topics than can readily
be paralleled elsewhere. It is this com bination o f the critical,
argum entative approach and the radicalism o f the questions to
w hich it is applied that provides our best characterisation not o f the
w hole o f G reek thought, but o f w hat is exceptional in it. Finally, the
very qualifications we must thus add point to a fourth, more general,
feature, the p lu ra lism that we have emphasised under the heading o f
the com plexity and heterogeneity o f each o f the m ain strands o f
inquiry.
SOME E X P L A N A T O R Y HYPOTHESES
But if we can describe some o f the developm ents that seem im portant,
how far can we go towards identifying the factors that m ay have
stim ulated or at least perm itted them? H ow far can such matters as
the emergence o f certain kinds o f inquiry in philosophy and science,
and the attack on certain traditional assumptions, be ‘ e xp la in ed ’ ?
It is as w ell to start w ith some disclaimers. I f the history o f ideas is
alw ays highly problem atic (and it should not be forgotten that ideas
themselves have no history), the study o f m ajor transformations in
belief-systems is m uch m ore intractable, even when we have direct
access to extensive first-hand evidence. I f the reconstruction o f the
events, let alone o f the causes, o f a well-docum ented tw entieth­
's See above, pp. i8f.
Greek science and Greek society 235
century political revolution is, to a greater or lesser degree, a
subjective and selective m atter, the discussion o f w hat happened, and
o f w h y it happened, in a revolution in thought is liable to far less
effective con trol; and where, as in our case, the revolution in thought
is deem ed to have occurred in the distant past, the situation is all too
obviously a desperate one. W e are reduced to speculation, and the
best w e can hope to do is to scrutinise possible suggestions as closely
as we can. Nevertheless at a certain rather low level o f explanation or
elucidation we can attem pt to use both other ancient civilisations and
prim itive societies as some sort o f check for some o f the hypotheses
that have been or m ay be put forward.
W e m ay begin w ith some b rief negative points. First, in discussing
the methods for dealing w ith epilepsy that were available to the author
o f On the Sacred Disease we have already given reason to doubt one
m uch canvassed hypothesis, nam ely that the criticism o f m agical
beliefs is to be directly associated w ith, or even stems from, an increase
in technological control. C ertainly the H ippocratic writer criticises
his opponents on the grounds that their remedies are useless, and in
this he is no doubt influenced b y ideas derived from his own general
m edical experience concerning w hat an effective treatm ent w ould be
like. Y e t despite his ow n claims to the contrary, he him self had -
should say - no means o f alleviating, let alone o f curing, epilepsy.26
Technological analogies and metaphors are undoubtedly im portant,
both in Presocratic philosophy and in H ippocratic m edicine, as a
means o f conveying the idea that nature in general, and particular
natural phenom ena or processes, are regular and o r d e r l y , although
Farrington’s thesis that the Presocratic philosophers were themselves
close to the arts and crafts seems exaggerated.^» But there is a further
overriding consideration underm ining any suggestion to the effect
that technological m astery is a sufficient condition for the develop­
m ent o f critical inquiry, and this lies in the fact that throughout the
crucial period from the sixth to the fourth centuries B .C . there is a
general uniform ity in the level o f technology throughout the eastern
M editerranean and the N ear East.29 M ajor technological advances
See above, pp. 48ff.
” See, e.g., Solmsen 1963, L loyd 1966, pp. 272ff.
Farrington (1944-g) 1961, pp. 4of, 8of, i04ff. His thesis, which has often been criticised,
e.g. by G . Thomson 1955, pp. ly if , derives little support from the adm ittedly limited
information we have about the lives o f the Presocratic philosophers. M oreover the
examples o f Plato and Aristotle - both of whom draw heavily on technological analogies
and metaphors to convey the idea o f the purposefulness o f nature - show that there is
no need to be close to the arts and crafts, or to think highly o f their practitioners, to
make extensive use o f im agery derived from these spheres.
See, for example, Finley 1965, Picket 1973.
 236 Greek science and Greek society
were m ade in this area in the third and second m illennia in m etallurgy,
pottery, textiles and, especially, agriculture, advances that com bined
to produce w h at G ordon C hilde termed the urban revolution. But
there was only lim ited further technological progress in the period we
are chiefly concerned w ith, and in particular there is no im portant
technological advance in Greece that can be held responsible for, or
even be connected w ith, its distinctive intellectual developments.
A similar argum ent tells also against an exclusively econom ic
interpretation. A lthough Aristotle associated the developm ent o f
speculative thought with the leisure produced by w e a l t h , a consider­
able econom ic surplus - derived from slave-based production - can
hardly be a sufficient (though it m ay w ell be a necessary) condition
o f the intellectual changes that took place in Greece. A gain E gypt
and B abylonia provide our controls, for they were, econom ically,
incom parably m ore powerful than any o f the Greek city-states in the
period up to the end o f the sixth century B .C . T h e invention o f coinage
some time in the seventh century was undoubtedly a most im portant
factor stim ulating trade and econom ic growth. Y e t not only was this
not a G reek invention (but a L yd ian one), 3 i again the fact that
in time coinage cam e into fairly common use in the eastern M editer­
ranean and N ear East shows that we cannot appeal to it alone to
explain the developm ent o f new kinds o f inquiry in one particular
area.
A third hypothesis w ill require rather m ore detailed consideration.
It has recently been argued that knowledge o f other societies and o f
other belief-systems is a m ajor determ ining factor in the grow th o f an
open and critical attitude towards the fundam ental assumptions o f
one’s own s o c i e t y . ^ ^ \γς draw on a good deal o f data concerning
w hat the Greeks knew, or im agined they knew, about other peoples.
T here is abundant m aterial in the H om eric poems that illustrates
both a quite extensive knowledge of, and a rem arkable speculative
interest in, non-G reek lands. So far as the former is concerned, it is
true that the picture is p atchy: a greater and firmer knowledge is
displayed about the eastern sea-board o f the M editerranean and
about E gyp t than about the western M editerranean or the hinter-
30 Metaph. 981 b ly ff, where he is speaking o f the developm ent o f the theoretical branches
o f knowledge, especially mathematics, which - as we have seen - he associates parti­
cularly with Egypt (see above, p. 230 n. 13).
3' T his idea, which was suggested b y Herodotus (i 94) and before him (if Pollux ix 83,
D K 21 B 4, is to be believed) by Xenophanes, has not been contradicted by the archaeo­
logical evidence.
See Horton 1967, pp. I55ff, on what - after Popper - he calls the ‘ closed’ and ‘ op en ’
predicaments, and his subsequent discussion o f ‘ differences connected with the presence
or absence of a vision o f alternatives’.
Greek science and Greek society 237
land o f A sia M inor or M esopotam ia . 33 But even w here, as so often
in the Odyssey, the account o f distant lands is predom inantly or even
purely fantastical, it is im portant to observe how deeply the topic o f
the contrasts between G reek and non-G reek societies exercised the
G reek im agination from a very early period. T h e tales o f the
Laestrygonians, the Lotus-Eaters and Cyclopes are ju st so m any
vehicles for affirm ing - b y im plicit or explicit contrasts - the values
o f H om eric society itself 34
A lthough m any o f the details are obscure, there can be no doubt
about the rapid expansion o f G reek knowledge about other societies
in the seventh and sixth centuries,3s and indeed that expansion
continued - w ith some fluctuations and interruptions 36 - down to the
H ellenistic period, when the conquests o f A lexander opened a new
era in G reek-B arbarian relations. O n certain points, to be sure,
caution is in order. T rad in g relations do not necessarily im ply a deep
m utual understanding between, or even m uch m utual curiosity con­
cerning, the societies in question , 3 7 and, as M om igliano has rightly
emphasised , 3 8 the Greeks in general showed little interest and ability
in learning foreign languages. M a n y o f the stories we find in late
authors about the extensive travels o f philosophers or political
leaders must be treated w ith scepticism, particularly w hen the
w riter is arguing a general thesis about the debts o f G reek wisdom to
the East.39
For contrasting views on the geographical knowledge displayed in the H om eric poems,
see, for example, Buchholz 1871-85, i Part i pp. 79ff and J. O . Thom son 1948, pp. igfF.
Cf. the classic studies o f G reek accounts o f m atriarchal and gynaecocratic societies in
Pembroke 1967 and V id al-N aquet 1970.
T h e upsurge in G reek colonisation begins in the eighth century B.C. T h e trading post
at N aucratis, which gave the Greeks lim ited access to Egypt, was active in the seventh
century, and the presence o f Greek mercenaries in Egypt in the late seventh and early
sixth centuries is attested not only b y Herodotus (e.g. 11 152 and 163 and cf. in 139
w hich mentions that some of the Greeks w ho accom panied Cam byses’ invading force
did so to trade or to see the country itself) but also by the well-known evidence o f the
graffiti at A b u Simbel (early sixth century). G reek penetration o f Babylonia was slower,
but contacts between Greeks and Persians increased once the Persians had conquered
the G reek cities o f the Asia M inor sea-board. O nce again we can supplement the
stories in Herodotus (e.g. Democedes in i3 iff, Histiaeus v 23ff and Scylax’s exploration
o f the Indus valley, iv 44) with inscriptional evidence, for example from Susa and
Persepolis (late sixth/early fifth century); see Scheil 1929, C arratelli 1966, Nylander
1970, and on the whole topic, M om igliano 1975, especially pp. 74ff, I23ff.
W est 19 7 1, for example, p. 239, has recently argued that there was a very sharp
decrease in communications between the Greeks and the East after the 480s: ‘ it was
as if [oriental influences] had been shut o ff with a ta p ’ . But that is to be far more
dogm atic than our evidence allows.
In m any cases where trade involved intermediaries, it was in the interests of those
intermediaries to withhold information about the parties concerned.
M om igliano 1975, pp. i48f.
C f. above, p. 226. T his applies to m any Christian polemicists such as Clem ent of
A lexandria who, in the Stromateis, sets out system atically to prove that G reek philosophy
 238 Greek science and Greek society
O n the other hand when such reports originate in the fifth or
fourth centuries b .c ./ ° even i f they do not always prove that the
actual visits they refer to occurred, they are at least good evidence o f
the fact that those who recounted the stories already assumed that
the wise m en o f G reece w ere inquisitive about, and had m uch to
learn from, non-G reek societies. W ith H erodotus, for one, 4 i w e are
on firm ground. His travels, conducted, he says, for the purposes o f
ίστορίη, research, into the lands he visited, were clearly extensive,
even i f not quite so extensive as he sometimes wishes his audience to
I believe.42 By the end o f the fifth century, w h a t the Greeks knew, or
' w hat at least they thought they knew, about other societies had
becom e a fund o f argum ent in the debate between ‘ n atu re’ and
‘ convention’,43 and again - as with the Odjssejy - the fact that some
o f w hat passed for knowledge is fantastical does not diminish its
im portance as evidence o f the Greeks’ fascination w ith the topic o f the
variety o f possible systems o f belief.
Y e t an interest in, and knowledge of, other peoples were far from
being confined to the Greeks.^s First the M edes and then the
Persians especially governed a wide variety o f races, the differences in
whose customs w ere remarked, no doubt, b y others besides Hero-
was anticipated by the wisdom o f the prophets and that G reek philosophers plagiarised
their ideas from the East. But the topic is not confined to Christians. A lready Diodorus
(i 96-8) quotes Egyptian priests as claim ing that a long list o f the most notable G reek
poets, law-givers, philosophers, scientists and artists visited Egypt and derived their
knowledge from it (they include O φ h eu s, Musaeus, M elam pus, Homer, Lycurgus,
Solon, Plato, Pythagoras, Eudoxus, Democritus and Oenopides). M oreover the theme
begins already in the classical period: for Herodotus, Egypt was the source o f m uch
Greek religion (e.g. 11 43, 49-50, 123, cf. above, p. 14 n. 26), Isocrates (xi 2 if) thinks
m edicine and philosophy originate there, and Plato ( Ti. 2 1 e ff) too assumes an
Egyptian origin for im portant G reek beliefs.
■
w E.g. Isocrates x i 28 reports that Pythagoras visited E gypt (cf. H dt. 11 81 and 123) and
cf. Plato Ti. 2o d ff and Criti. io 8 d ff on Solon.
H ow w idely his predecessor Hecataeus had travelled is doubtful, but Herodotus
(n 143) speaks o f his having gone to Thebes (cf. Pearson 1939, pp. 84, 93). Outside the
historians, Aeschylus, in particular, already showed a m arked interest in non-Greek
lands in Pr. and Suppl. especially.
O n the extent o f Herodotus’ own travels, see, for exam ple, Rawlinson 1880, i pp.
8ff.
T h e origins o f this debate, and the com plex forms it took, have been studied by, for
example, Heinim ann 1945, Pohlenz 1953 and G uthrie 1969, Part i ch. 4.
See especially the famous discussion o f the relativity o f customs in H dt. in 38. B y the
fourth century Aristotle recommends the study o f yfjs ττερίοδοι as useful for the legislator,
who m ay derive information from them on the νόμοι o f different races {Rh. i36oa33ff,
cf. i365b22ff, and cf. his own series o f Constitutions).
♦5 W e have both archaeological and literary evidence o f the movements, within the
Eastern M editerranean basin, of craftsmen and artisans of all kinds, including, for
example, doctors, in the sixth and early fifth centuries. O n the latter, see, for instance,
H dt. Ill I (Cyrus sends to Amasis for an eye-doctor) and in i2 9 ff (Darius calls in
Egyptian physicians, and then his prisoner Democedes, for his dislocated foot).
Greek science and Greek society 239
dotus.46 O f the ancient N ear Eastern societies, the Phoenicians, in
particular, were famous as traders and colonisers, and the C a rth a ­
ginian H anno was one o f the most notable early e x p lo r e r s .S o m e
interest in exploration m ay also be attributed to the E gyptians and
to the Persians. H erodotus reports that Necho, in the seventh century,
dispatched a Phoenician expedition to circum navigate A frica, 4 ^ and
also that X erxes sent Sataspes on a sim ilar expedition with a ship
and crew he obtained from Egypt.^^ H ere too, then, the control
offered by N ear Eastern societies suggests that we should qualify our
conclusions concerning the Greeks, and that knowledge o f other
peoples was at most a necessary, not a sufficient, condition o f the
specific intellectual developm ents that w e have identified as taking
place in Greece.
A fourth and evidently more promising suggestion relates to the
developm ent of literacy. T h e significance o f changes in the technical
means b y w hich ideas can be com m unicated and recorded has been
the subject o f seminal studies b y G oody and others who have shown
precisely how these means m ay influence and even in certain ways
determ ine the nature o f w hat is communicated.so W ritten records
make possible the developm ent o f a distinct kind o f critical evalua­
tion o f the past and w hat G oody calls the accum ulation o f
scepticism in this and other regards. T h e use o f tables and lists helps
to provoke an interest in certain types o f question, particularly
classificatory ones. T h e consciousness o f form al procedures in rhetoric
m ay depend largely on the availab ility o f texts that can be studied at
leisure.
G ood y’s work has, as we noted, undoubtedly contributed to u nder­
m ining an y simplistic presentation o f the so-called ‘ G rand D ich o­
tom y ’ between ‘ prim itive ’ and ‘ advanced ’ societies, and two funda­
mental points must be acknowledged. First the intellectual achieve­
ments o f the great early N ear Eastern societies evidently owe m uch
to, and in m any cases presuppose, the existence o f particular means
See H dt. v ii 6 iff. A t i 135 Herodotus comments on the Persians’ fondness for adopting
foreign customs. T h e trilingual inscription at Susa published b y Scheil 1929 (the so-
called foundation charter o f Darius) indicates at least a desire to impress other peoples:
the languages o f the inscription are O ld Persian, Elam ite and Babylonian.
A fragm entary G reek version of his ‘ periplous ’, written, it is generally thought, before
480, has survived: see C . M uller 1855-61, i pp. 1-14 , Ram in 1976.
H dt. IV 42; whether or not they succeeded is still disputed, but the fact that the
explorers reported - to Herodotus’ disbelief - that the sun passed to their right hand,
i.e. northwards, shows, if true, that they penetrated south of the T rop ic o f Cancer.
H dt. IV 43: before that, as I have already noted, Darius had sent Scylax to explore the
Indus valley, H dt. iv 44.
G oody and W att 1968, Finnegan 1977 and G oody 1977 (see especially ch. 5, ‘ W h a t’s in
a list?’ and ch. 8 ‘ T h e G ran d D ichotom y reconsidered’).
 240 Greek science and Greek society
o f com m unication, especially w ritten records o f various types.
Secondly, in the com plex series o f changes in the modes o f com m uni­
cation that took place in the ancient N ear East a m ajor advance that
occurs not long before the period that chiefly concerns us is the
invention o f alphabetic systems o f w r i t i n g . T h i s developm ent
eventually facilitated the expansion o f literacy beyond the lim ited
classes o f professional scribes to w hich it had generally been confined
in E gypt and Babylonia. Y e t here too reservations are needed.
A lth ou gh w e can h ard ly doubt that the spread o f critical thought
depended in part on the availability o f texts and o f people to read
them , 5 2 w e have emphasised before th at in the fifth and fourth
centuries - and long after - the com m unication o f ideas was still
I m ediated principally through the spoken, rather than the written,
word, even though written texts were there to be consulted. Neither
the degree nor the relevance o f literacy in classical G reece should be
i exaggerated: nor, correspondingly, should the contrasts between
; Greece and other ancient civilisations. Like coinage, the alphabet is
not a G reek invention,s3 nor was its use b y any means confined to
Greece. W hile the study o f changes in the means o f com m unication
is clearly fundam ental for the understanding o f the intellectual
developments that took place in the ancient N ear East as a whole,
this can at best provide no more than a part o f the solution to the
problem posed by the rise o f the particular kind o f radical and
critical investigations undertaken by the Greeks.
PO L IT IC A L D EV ELO PM EN TS
T o advance our inquiry further we must turn to other areas, and most
obviously to social and political developm ents, especially those
associated w ith the rise o f the city-state. It is here that the contrast
between the G reek world and the rest o f the ancient N ear East is
generally most marked,54 and the significance o f these differences
5* A lphabetic systems are thought to occur first in the west Sem itic group o f languages,
and the G reek alphabet to have been developed from the north Sem itic script some time
about the middle o f the eighth century b .c . See, for example, Jeffery 1961, pp. 2 iff,
Snodgrass 1971, pp. 348f, Coldstream 1977, pp. 295ff, and c f D river 1976.
52 O n the spread o f literacy in Greece, and the changing relative importance o f the
written as opposed to the spoken word, see Kenyon 1951, Turner 1951, Davison 1962,
H arvey 1966, Reynolds and W ilson (1968) 1974 and Pfeiffer 1968, Part i, ch. 2, but
contrast H avelock 1971 and 1976 and cf. Finley 1977, especially pp. 61 off.
53 Pace H avelock 1976. T h e distinctive features o f the Greek alphabet are set out by
Coldstream 1977, p. 300.
54 This holds true as a general rule, even though one Phoenician city, C arthage, at least,
developed political institutions that the G reek themselves treated as com parable w ith
those o f their own city-states: see Aristotle, Pol. 11 ch. 11 especially.
Greek science and Greek society 241
must be carefully examined. Since the m ain features o f the grow th
o f the city-state are w ell known, they m ay be rehearsed quite briefly.
In the late archaic and classical periods - roughly from the seventh
to the fourth centuries - sovereignty lodged, in the G reek w orld, in
a large num ber o f autonomous and often politically dynam ic, not to
say unstable, units. T h e form ation o f small independent political
entities was, no doubt, favoured b y geographical factors in the
A egean area, and even in H om eric society the kings who fought with
Agam em non as their com m ander-in-chief enjoyed a fair measure o f
autonom y. But whereas H om eric society - as described in the Iliad
and Odyssey at least - operates w ithout any strictly formalised legal,
let alone constitutional, framework,ss the period from the seventh to
the fourth century is one o f unprecedented activity, throughout the
G reek w orld, in the form ulation, discussion, revision and, at times,
overthrow, o f legals^ and constitutional codes.
So far as legal codes are concerned, the Greeks had, to be sure,
been anticipated b y m an y centuries b y the m ajor ancient N ear
Eastern states, several o f whose codes are extant. T h e best known o f
these is that o f H am m urabi, king o f Babylon from 1792 to 1750 B . C . ,
but some codes are m uch older still.s 7 T h eir significance is two-fold:
first, from the point o f view o f the central authority, they m ade the
adm inistration o f the laws easier; secondly, from the point o f view o f
members o f the society concerned, justice becam e a som ewhat less
arbitrary m atter, even though the interpretation o f the code still
rested w ith individuals who in turn depended ultim ately on the
favour o f the king. Y e t w hat these legal codes did not cover is as
significant as w h at they did. T h e y were essentially legal,®^ not
constitutional, charters. W hile the civil and crim inal laws o f both
E gyp t and Babylonia underw ent certain changes w hich can be
docum ented in our sources, their political systems rem ained very
*5 T hus on the Shield o f Achilles, the city at peace includes a scene in which a case is
heard in an assembly o f the people (άγορή) before some elders; the disputants speak
before the people, w ho applaud both sides, and there is a prize set aside to be awarded
to the elder who ‘ speaks the straightest δίκη’ {II. xviii 497-508). O n the relationship
between early informal, and form al, law, between pr^droit and droit, see the classic
papers o f Gernet, notably those collected as section iii in G ernet 1968.
Fragm entary G reek codes exist dating back to the seventh century; the first major
code to have been preserved fairly com pletely (the G ortyn code) dates only from about
450, but this is thought to incorporate m uch earlier material. See G ernet 1955,
pp. 5 1-9 , W illetts 1967.
Some o f these are readily accessible in an English version in Pritchard 1969. For an
analysis o f H am m urabi’s C od e and Letters, see, for exam ple, G add 1973. C f. also,
more generally. Diam ond 1971.
5* M oreover even when considered pu rely as practical legal codes, they display m any
inadequacies and omissions and their relation to existing legal documents is, to say the
least, problem atic.
242 Greek science and Greek society
largely static. Each state was governed b y an autocratic (sometimes
divine) king, supported by a strong central bureaucracy and sub­
ordinate regional authorities. But although the relationship between
the king and his advisers m ight vary, and was certainly influenced by
the personalities o f the individuals concerned, the system o f rule was
substantially unaffected. A change o f governm ent m eant, in general,
m erely a change o f personnel, or at most m inor modifications in the
roles o f those at the top o f the chain o f com m and, not a m odification
in the constitutional position. T h e extant N ear Eastern codes do,
indeed, deal with the relationships between slaves (of various kinds)
and free persons. But none o f them covers the political, as distinct
from the legal, rights o f the free (such questions as the right to speak
or vote in assemblies) and so one cannot, strictly speaking, talk o f a
constitution as such at a l l .5 9
In G reece, b y contrast, there is a veritable proliferation o f consti­
tutional forms, ranging from constitutional m onarchy, through
oligarchy, to extreme dem ocracy, and from the seventh century
m any G reek states underwent several m ajor constitutional u p ­
heavals, those at Athens being both the most striking, and the best
docum ented, e x a m p le .T h e r e were, to be sure, G reek autocrats -
tyrants who seized power and held it by force. But tyranny was, in
most G reek states, a transient, as w ell as being a small-scale, pheno-
menon,6i ^nd in that it tended to underm ine the power o f the
traditional ruling families, its long-term effect was often to favour the
eventual introduction o f more broadly-based constitutions.
T h e citizens o f the em erging G reek city-states were accustomed
both to participate fully in the actual governm ent o f their country
and to engage in active deliberation o f constitutional issues.
59 It was, as Finley 1973a, pp. 13-14, has recently put it, the Greeks who discovered not
only dem ocracy, but also politics.
T h e openness o f the political and constitutional situation in other Greek states too - at
least at particular junctures in their history - is illustrated by m any stories in Herodotus.
T hus III 142-3 describes w h at happens at Samos on Polycrates’ death: M aeandrius
calls an assembly o f the townspeople, speaks against tyranny and proclaims equal rights,
only afterwards to change his mind when he is denounced by Telesarchus and he
concludes that if he were to give up power, someone else would make himself tyrant.
See also iv 161 (Dem onax gives Gyrene a constitution), v 37-8 (Aristagoras gives the
Milesians equal rights, at least λόγω) and v ii 164 (Gadmus gives power to the Goans),
while the continued factional struggles o f the late fifth century are a recurrent theme
in Thucydides (see especially m 82). As V ernant 1962, pp. 12 iff, 1965, pp. 167!?, and
L eveq ue and V id al-N aquet 1964 have rightly emphasised, the key development is often
that power should be, as the Greeks put it, ‘ placed in the m id dle’ , is μέσον or κοινόυ,
an idea that is expressed not just in the historians and political philosophers but also in
notable passages in Greek tragedy, as, for example, in Aeschylus, Supp. 5 16ff, cf. Gooff,
Euripides, Supp. 403ff, 426ff.
Aristotle noted that most Greek tyrannies were short-lived, Pol. v 12, 1 3 1 5 b iiff .
** See most recently Finley 1973a, especially pp. i9 f and 25.
Greek science and Greek society 243
A lread y Solon’s poems testify to his concern w ith the question o f how
best to balance the rights o f different groups w ithin the state.^a T h e
abolition o f existing debts, the Seisachtheia, and that o f debt-slavery
w ere undoubtedly two o f his most im portant measures. But even
more im portant, from the point o f view o f its consequences, was the
fact that he extended the rights o f the lowest class o f citizens, the
Thetes. In addition to taking part in meetings o f the Assem bly, they
now had the right to participate in - and appeal to - the popular
court, the H eliaea, constituted by panels o f jury-m en chosen by lot
from the entire citizen body. Solon speaks o f Justice and G ood R ule
in his poems but these concepts now include w hat we should call
the political, as w ell as the m ore general legal, rights o f the citizen
body. As Aristotle puts it succinctly, in relation to appeal to the ju ry-
courts or dicasteries in particular, ‘ Being master o f the vote, the
people becam e master o f the constitution’ .^s
B y the end o f the fifth century, w hat was generally expected o f a
citizen o f Athens can be illustrated b y referring to the exceptional
case o f Socrates, who in P lato’s Apology feels that he has to defend,
or at least explain, his behaviour in not engaging in politics.^^ Y e t
even Socrates served on the C ouncil, and shared executive power
w hen it was the turn o f his tribe to be P r y t a n e i s . ^ ^ Three features o f
the A thenian constitution insured a very high level o f participa­
tion in the political life o f the city. First, appointm ent to the great
m ajority o f offices was b y lot;^^ secondly, most offices could not be
held more than once,^^ and thirdly p ay was instituted for ju ry
Especially Poems 5 and 24 Diehl. See, for example, Poem 3 Diehl.
Ath. 9.1. Aristotle also reports {Ath. 8.5) that Solon w ent so far as to pass a law to make
it com pulsory for every citizen to join forces with one or other faction when the city
suffered stasis. Ap. 3 ic -3 2 a .
Plato {Ap. 32a-c) and Xenophon {HG i 7.15) both report that Socrates was the only
Prytaneus to vote against the illegal proposal to try the generals en bloc after Arginusae.
68 W riting o f the fourth century, Aristotle reports that m ilitary officers were elected b y
show o f hands, but that, w ith the exception of the Treasurer o f M ilitary Funds, the
Commissioners o f the T heoric Fund and the Superintendent o f Wells, all the magistrates
concerned w ith the routine administration o f the city - as w ell as the G ouncil o f Five
Hundred itself - were chosen b y lot {Ath. 43). These included the Archons, the
Treasurers o f A thena, the Gommissioners o f Public Contracts, Public Receivers,
Auditors and Assessors o f Accounts, the Commissioners for the R epair o f Tem ples,
City-Comm issioners, M arket Commissioners, Controllers o f W eights and Measures,
C orn Commissioners, Port-Superintendents, the Eleven (in charge o f the State prison).
Introducers o f Cases, the F orty (local magistrates), the H ighw ay Commissioners and
their Auditors, the Overseers o f Rites and the Commissioners o f Sacrifices. Even when
we make due allowance for the fact that the group am ong w hom lots were drawn was
sometimes restricted, either by class (as the Treasurers o f A thena to pentakosio-
medim noi, Ath. 47.1, cf. 8.1) or to a previously elected group (as the Archons to a
panel o f 40 under Solon, or to one o f 500 under Cleisthenes, Ath. 8.1 and 22.5), the
list o f offices that any citizen m ight find him self holding is impressive.
See again Aristotle on the fourth century: ‘ m ilitary offices m ay be held any num ber of
244 Greek science and Greek society
service, public office and membership o f the Council.^o In general,
then - and this is a point we shall be returning to - we m ay presume
that most A thenian citizens had ample opportunity to gain political
experience, not only in the Assem bly and serving as jurors in the
various kinds o f courts, but also in the C ouncil and in one or other
office or m agistracy, and this is before w e take into account w hatever
private law-suits they m ay have conducted.^i
A keen interest in constitutional forms, and an insistence on the
value both o f freedom (ελευθερία) in general and o f free speech
(ίσηγορία) in particular, can be docum ented in a wide range o f
fifth- and fourth-century texts. T h e points are so fam iliar that they
inevitably lose some o f their im pact: yet they are o f fundam ental
significance w hen w e draw comparisons w ith w hat we know o f
ancient N ear Eastern societies. Paradoxically, one o f the best early
exam ples o f a debate on the varieties o f possible constitution is an
extended passage in Herodotus (iii 80-3) in w hich he professes to
report a discussion o f the relative merits o f dem ocracy, oligarchy and
m onarchy held b y D arius and the Persian leaders w hen they had ju st
w on power. A lth ou gh the context o f this exchange, in Herodotus, is
Persian, the style o f the discussion, and the w hole idea o f holding
such a debate, are typ ically G reek - as Herodotus him self perhaps
acknowledges when he introduces his account b y saying that at this
council ‘ words were spoken w hich to some Greeks seem in cred ible’ .72
Thereafter G reek theoretical analyses o f constitutional forms becom e
increasingly com plex and sophisticated, as w e can see from w hat we
can reconstruct o f Protagoras’ political philosophy,’ ^from Isocrates,’ 4
times, but none o f the others more than once, except membership o f the C ouncil which
m ay be held tw ice’ {Ath. 62.3).
See, for example, Aristotle, Ath. 24 and 27.4 (it was Pericles who instituted paym ent
for the dicasts): the situation in iburth-century Athens is set out at Ath. 62. T h e
im portance o f paym ent as a factor that insured that the poor exercised their rights is
repeatedly emphasised b y Aristotle, w ho strongly disapproved o f this developm ent:
see Pol. 1293 a iff, 1300 a iff, 13 17 b 3 iff. T h e converse anti-democratic devices were to
make attendance at the Assembly compulsory for the rich (as in Plato, Lg. 764 a,
cf. Aristotle, Pol. i2 6 6 a g ff) or to fine them for non-attendance as dicasts in the courts,
Po/. i294 a37ff, i 2 9 7 a 2 iff, I2 g 8 b i7 ff.
O n the A thenian’s reputation for litigiousness, see below, pp. 25off.
H dt. Ill 80; cf. also v i 43.
T h e so-called ‘ great speech’ put into the mouth o f Protagoras in P lato’s dialogue
nam ed after him {Prt. 320 c ff) contains the first, and one of the few, extended extant
statements o f the key principle underpinning the democracies, nam ely that all men
alike have a share in ττολιτική τέχνη. In that respect, at least, (though not, no doubt, in
others) this speech appears faithfully to represent Protagoras’ own position. W hile the
interpretation o f the original significance o f the famous dictum that ‘ man is the measure
o f all things’ is highly controversial, we can hardly doubt that it had, and that Pro­
tagoras knew it had, am ong other things, an application in the political field.
T h e questions o f the classification of constitutions, and the differences between two
kinds o f equality, are broached, for example, in iii i4ff, v ii 2off, and xii i3off.
Greek science and Greek society 245
and m ore especially from Plato’ ®and Aristotle’ ^ themselves. M ore­
over the discussions that took place on this subject were far from being
all purely theoretical, for the ideas expressed could and did find
practical application not only in the reform o f existing constitutions,
but also in fram ing the constitutions o f new states.’ ’
Ισηγορία, like ισονομία, was, to be sure, a rallying-cry used by the
advocates o f dem ocracy in p articular.’ ^ Demosthenes uses the term
in this w a y ; ’ 9 Herodotus attributes Athens’ rise to power to ίσηγορίη
especially and w hat the dem ocrats applauded as ισηγορία was
castigated b y their opponents as unbridled licence o f t o n g u e . B u t
oligarchic cities also deliberated on afiairs o f state, even though
those deliberations were restricted to those w ith full political rights,
such as those known as the δμοιοι, ‘ eq uals’ or ‘ peers’ , for exam ple at
Sparta. Th u s Thucydides reports one such discussion among the Lace-
daim onians at i ygff, where he specifies that their m ethod o f arriving
at a decision was not b y voting (ψήφορ) but b y acclam ation
Especially the brilliant characterisation o f the m ain types o f constitution (aristocracy,
tim ocracy, oligarchy, dem ocracy and tyranny) and o f the corresponding types o f man,
in Republic viii and ix. A lthough most G reek political analysis is set firm ly in the
fram ework o f the actualities o f G reek social experience, Plato, for one, is quite radical
in his readiness to consider such possibilities as the com m unity o f wives or o f property.
Aristotle puts forward two m ain classifications of constitutions in Pol. A t I2 7 g a 2 2 ff he
proposes a six-fold schema, m onarchy, aristocracy and ‘ constitution’ together with
their three ‘ deform ed’ counterparts, tyranny, oligarchy and dem ocracy; but at
1290 a 13ff he uses the popular classification into two m ain types, oligarchy and
dem ocracy, and iv 4-6 shows some sophistication in analysing the different forms of
these. Following his usual practice o f reviewing earlier opinions on the problems he
discusses, Aristotle provides extensive information on the range o f contem porary
controversies in this area, not m erely in his survey o f ideas on the best constitution (in
book 11) but throughout.
” As in the famous exam ple o f the foundation o f T h u rii in 443 B.C., where, according to
Heraclides Ponticus (in D .L . ix 50), Protagoras was asked to draft the laws (though cf.
Diodorus Siculus x ii lo f). Such cases form p art of the background to Plato’s discussion
o f the ideal state in both the Republic and more especially the Laws, which envisages the
setting up o f a state in M agnesia: P lato’s own interests in practical politics, culm inating
in his disastrous experiences as adviser to Dionysius o f Syracuse, are recorded in the
Seventh Letter (which m ay be used as a source whether or not it is authentic).
O n Ισονομία and Ισηγορία see especially Ehrenburg 194®» Vlastos 1953 I 9 ^4 >
Griffith 1966, J. D. Lewis 1971, M om igliano 1973 and Finley 1975^·
E.g. XV 18, cf. XX 16, x x i 124, Lx 28; cf. Ισονομία e.g. at T h . iii 82, iv 78, and Ισονομεΐσθαι
at T h . VI 38-9.
V 78; cf. the Athenians’ claims at T h . i 77, Eupolis Fr. 291, Socrates in Plato, Grg. 461 e,
and Demosthenes at ix 3.
See, for exam ple, Plato, R. 5 6 id e , 562b~563b. T h e term παρρησία was often used to
express this (see Isocrates v ii 20, cf. Plato, R. 557 b), but also occurs vkdthout distinct,
or any, pejorative undertones (e.g. Euripides, Hipp. 421-3, Ion 670-2): cf. Scarpat 1964,
M om igliano 1973, pp. 259ff.
T h . I 87. Cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1272a i o f who notes that in oligarchic Crete all the citizens
shared in the Assembly, though this only ratified the decisions of the elders and the
Cosmoi (but cf. Aeschines i i8 o f). T h e critical account of oligarchy given b y Darius in
H dt III 82 incorporates the idea that each o f the ‘ few ’ w ill try to prevail in his opinions:
 246 Greek science and Greek society
Furtherm ore the idea that freedom in general, especially political
autonom y, the right to self-government, is precisely w hat marks
out the Greeks from most Barbarians is com m only expressed in the
fifth and fourth centuries.®^ O ne w riter who does so who is neither a
historian, nor a practising politician, nor even chiefly concerned w ith
political analysis, is the H ippocratic author o f On Airs Waters Places,
who explains the less w arlike and more gentle character o f A siatic
peoples (as he represents them) partly in terms o f the clim ates o f
their countries,^'^ but partly also in terms o f their customs and
institutions. It is because they are mostly ruled by despots that they
lack courage and spirit.^s T h e fact that in certain respects this
writer, like m any others, exaggerates the contrasts between Greeks
and non-Greeks does not diminish the value o f his testimony as
evidence o f the w ay the Greeks themselves saw those contrasts: as he
views it, the ch ief distinguishing characteristic o f G reek political life
is that the Greeks are their ow n masters.
THE RELEVANCE OF P O L I T I C S TO S C I E N C E
It w ill read ily be agreed both that the period from the seventh to the
fifth centuries was one o f a high level o f political activity and involve­
m ent in Greece, and that the constitutional fram ework o f the G reek
city-states diifers m arkedly, in certain ways, from that o f the great
ancient N ear Eastern river civilisations: indeed some o f the institu­
tions o f the dem ocracies, such as ostracism, are unprecedented and
unparalleled outside Greece. But the question o f the possible
jl· relevance o f these points to our own inquiry is problem atical. T w o
·η1«^ suggestions, one com paratively simple, the other m ore com plex,
• "', I.
m erit particular consideration.
.tv .) cf. also the use o f the adjective Ισόνομο? with όλιγαρχία at T h . iii 62 (on which see Vlastos
\ 1964, p p. i3 ff).
" 5 V'i4.*_- V
■
See, e.g., H dt. v ii 103-4 135 (on the Spartans in particular) and 147 (on the
Greeks in general) and c f the m any texts developing the idea that the Greeks fought
for their freedom against the Persians (e.g. v 2, 49, vi 11, 109 and cf. Aeschylus, Pers.
241 if, 402ff, Plato, M x. 239 a ff especially) a theme that recurs in the different contexts
o f the Peloponnesian w ar in Thucydides (e.g. i 69, 11 8, iii 59, iv 85-6, v 9) and o f the
confrontation w ith Philip in Demosthenes.
H e appeals especially to the ‘ uniform ity’ in the seasons: see Aer. ch. 16, C M G r,
I 7 o . i 3 ff, and cf. ch. 23, 7 5 . 2 8 ff.
*5 E.g. ‘ W hen men do not govern themselves and are not their own masters, but are ruled
by despots, they do not w orry so much about m ilitary exercises as about not appearing
w a rlik e’ (ch. 16, C M G i, i 70.2iff) , and as evidence for this thesis he asserts that such
Asiatics as are not so governed, are most warlike (ch. 16, 7 i.2 ff): c f ch. 23, 7 6 .i7 ff
‘ W here men are ruled by kings they are necessarily most cow ard ly. . . for their souls are
enslaved and they are unwilling to risk their own lives gratuitously for another’s
aggrandisement. O n the other hand, those who govern themselves will w illingly take
risks because they do it for themselves.’
Greek science and Greek society 247
First, as several scholars have remarked from rather different
points o f view,^^ the spheres o f law and justice provide im portant
models o f cosmic order. T h e notion that the w orld-whole is a cosmos,
that natural phenom ena are regular and subject to orderly and
determ inate sequences o f causes and effects, is expressed partly^? b y
means o f images and analogies from the legal and political dom ain.
O n this view , it was the experience o f regulated legal institutions that
provided the necessary background against w hich the conception
that the world as a whole is ordered could develop.
N ow this suggestion seems straight aw ay to run into a difficulty,
in that - as we have seen - com plex legal systems are not confined to,
nor do they originate in, Greece. C ertain differences in the possible
attitudes towards the nature and basis o f law should, however, be
noted. Insofar as the ultim ate sanction for the code is still the god or
his representative the king - as is generally the case in the ancient
N ear East^^-justice to that extent continues to depend upon a
personal authority. W hile m any G reek codes are named after their
authors,®^ and we find Solon, for exam ple, invoking Zeus in his
poems,®o there is a shift in emphasis: the notion o f the abstract,
impersonal character o f the law , to w hich the law giver him self is
subordinate, gains ground. D ivine vengeance m ay still be m entioned;
but the gods tend increasingly to becom e depersonalised as mere
personifications o f the rule o f law itself T h e idea that there is a
I h i g h e r s a n c t i o n or authority for the laws is underm ined as the
llaw s themselves become the subject o f open debate and depend upon
Ipublic consent. T h e contrast between φύσις, nature, and νόμος,
m ^ - m a d e la w and convention, underlines the point, but long before
that contrast had become a com m onplace at the end o f the fifth
century, Solon shows that he knew very w ell that the fate o f his
constitution rested w ith the sovereign people.’ ^
See H irzel 1907, H . Gom perz 1943, G ernet (1955) 1968, p. 19, Vlastos (1947) 1970
1953 and 1975, V ernant (1957) 1965, pp. 304f and 1962, pp. 87ff, and V idal-N aquet
1967.PP.58ff. . . . . .
T hough this is far from being the only vehicle for the expression of this idea: see
Solmsen 1963 and L loyd 1966.
See, for example, Pritchard 1969, pp. 1 5 9 f f '· Lipit-Ishtar speaks o f himself a? son of
Enlil and invokes U tu ; and pp. i64ff, where H am m urabi says ‘ when M arduk com­
missioned me to guide the people a righ t’ .
For exam ple D raco, Solon and in the semi-mythical past Lycurgus.
See Poem i Diehl, especially 17ff (which also illustrates how Solon connects, or rather
^ does not clearly distinguish between, the moral/legal and the natural order of the
' world) and Poem 3.1. C f also his invocation o f Earth in Poem 24, and further references
to the gods in Poem 23.18 and to Zeus in Poem [28].
T his is illustrated by the report (Aristotle, Ath. 7) that he attem pted to block future
change by passing a law to make the laws unalterable for a hundred years. Solon’s own
248 Greek science and Greek society
T h e thesis can, then, be upheld, though it is worth underlining two
other fam iliar points. First, it is not ju st the num ber o f legal and
political images that are to be found in the scanty remains o f early
G reek philosophy that is striking, but also their variety.^^ T h e cosmos
is sometimes conceived in terms o f a balanced relationship, even a
contract, between equal opposed forces ,*^>3 but it is also view ed, on
occasions, as a m onarchy (though the king who controls the cosmos
is now seen not as an arbitrary divine power, but as the personifi­
cation o f a quite impersonal justice) and the world m ay even be
seen in terms o f a state o f constant aggression or strife (though since
this strife is norm al, it can also be described as w hat is just, the divine
law , w hich makes the world a world-order or c o s m o s ).S e c o n d ly ,
reflection on the idea o f political and legal order is a source o f models
not just in cosmology, but in other areas o f inquiry as well, p articu­
larly in m edicine and physiology,^^ where the functioning, and the
m al-functioning, o f the hum an body were often conceived in terms
o f the interrelations o f opposing factors, health and disease being
seen as, for exam ple, a state o f equal rights, ίσονομία, or a lack o f it,
betw een these factors.^^
Th e second m ore com plex suggestion relates to the radical exam i-
nation to w hich both the fram ework o f political relations, and that of
beliefs about natu ral phenom ena an<^idhejiJLQrld> .we
Just as one o f the notable features o f Greek political experience is the
w ay in w hich, from the sixth century onwards, the questions o f how
society should be regulated and o f the merits and demerits o f
different kinds o f constitutions cam e to be a subject for open - and
not merely theoretical - discussion, so too the possibility o f challenging
deeply held assumptions about ‘ nature ’ and o f debating such issues
as the origin o f the world is a prom inent characteristic o f G reek
Poem 8 D iehl em phatically states that the Athenians should not blam e the gods for
their own troubles, which they are responsible for themselves (cf. also Poem S-Sff), and
the political poems as a whole m ay be seen as an exercise in persuasion, justifying his
policies to the Athenians. See L loyd 1966, pp. 21 off.
See, for exam ple, A naxim ander Fr. i, Parmenides Fr. 9, and Empedocles Fr. 17.27!?
and Fr. 30.
See Heraclitus Fr. 53, A naxagoras Fr. 12, Diogenes o f Apollonia Frr. 5 and 8, and
cf. Plato, 7 7 . 47 e f, Phlb. 28 c and Lg. 896 de, 904 a.
’ 5 See Heraclitus Frr. 30, 80, 94 and 1 14.
9 * C f., e.g., Vlastos 1953, pp. 363f, V idal-N aquet 1967, p. 58.
«7 This idea is already expressed in Alcm aeon Fr. 4, and it becomes a comm onplace in
the H ippocratic Corpus (e.g. V M ch. 14, CM G i, i 45.18!?); c f also, for example,
Eryxim achus in P lato’s Smp. i8 6 d ff.
T he theme that G reek rationality in general is the product o f the city-state has been
developed forcefully in works by G ernet 1917 and (1955) 1968, Vernant (1957) 1965»
pp. 285!?, and 1962, V idal-N aquet 1967, and Detienne 1967, pp. 99!?. W hat follows
is much indebted to these studies.
Greek science and Greek society 249
speculative thought. Stated thus, there is at least a certain parallelism
between the two developments. But we can perhaps go further. In
some respects we appear to be dealing not just w ith two analogous
developm ents, but w ith two aspects o f the same developm ent.
Despite the im portant continuities between the bronze age, the
archaic period and the classical period, the city-state called for the
exercise o f new skills o f leadership, and since these included especially
skills o f persuasion that w ere deployed in relation to a wide audience,
those audiences themselves cam e to be keen judges o f this ability.
T h e very variety o f ‘ wise m en ’ active in the seventh and sixth
centuries is rem arkable. A p art from a Solon or a Thales (both o f
whom figure in the earliest list o f the Seven W ise M en we have -
Plato’s^^) there w ere m any others, not just other statesmen o f
differing political persuasions, such as Pittacus and Periander,*oo but
seers, holy men and wonder-workers, such as Epimenides o f Crete,
Aristeas o f Proconnesus, the Scythian A baris and H erm otim us o f
Clazomenae.i®^ M uch o f our inform ation about these men and their
activities is late and unreliable. But w hile the details are often unsure,
we cannot discount the tradition o f the emergence o f new kinds o f
‘ wise m en ’ during these transitional centuries as a whole, and
evidently the category o f ‘ wise m an ’ was a w ide one and spanned
: both w hat we should call political, and religious and intellectual,
leadership - not that the Greeks themselves drew any such hard and
fast distinctions.
W e m ay presume that those who gained a reputation for ex­
ceptional wisdom did so on a variety o f grounds and appealed to
different groups am ong their contemporaries. Some no doubt relied
on a certain personal charism a: others on an im plicit or explicit
claim to esoteric knowledge. Y e t equally clearly in certain contexts at
f least, both inside the political dom ain and outside it, proposals and
ideas were far less likely to be accepted simply or even prim arily on
the say-so o f some particular individual relying on his personal
prestige or authority. This is easy to see in the political sphere. Far
more than an Agam em non - let alone than a Darius, an Amasis or a
Croesus - Solon and Cleisthenes knew that they had to gain and
Prt. 3 4 3 a. D .L . I 4 i f records contrasting traditions about the membership of the Seven.
These two, the one a deposer o f tyrants (though him self later an αίσυμι/ήτη^ or elective
monarch), the other a tyrant himself, figure in most lists of the Seven (though Periander
not in Plato’s ) : see D .L . i 4 iff, 74ff, 94!?.
Epimenides is mentioned as a θείος άνήρ by Plato, Lg. 642 de, cf. 677 d e ; for the tradition
that he ‘ pu rified’ Athens, see Aristotle, Ath. i, Plutarch, Solon 12, D .L . i n o , cf. 112.
These last three have figured prom inently in the debate on the question o f ‘ shamanism ’
in G reece; see M euli 1935, Gernet (1945) 1968, pp. 42iff, Dodds 1951, ch. 5, pp. 135!?,
Vernant (1957) 1965, pp. 297ff, Burkert 1972a, pp. i2off.
250 Greek science and Greek society
m aintain consent for w hat they proposed from their fellow-citizens.
It was their votes that counted and they had to be won by persuasion
and argument.
But a similar point is applicable also in m edicine and even in
philosophy. W e have noted before the com petitive situation that
developed in G reek m edicine, not just between individuals who
shared the same general approach, but between those w ith radically
different approaches, one o f the H ippocratic writers, as it m ight be,
and one o f the priests o f Asclepius. But a doctor who could present
plausible arguments and evidence for his theories was in a stronger
position than one who was not prepared to do so - at any rate sofa r as
some o f his potential patients, and some o f the potential audience for his
lectures, were concerned. A similar point is true also o f those who put
forward physical, physiological or cosm ological doctrines, w hether or
not they were in direct com petition for pupils to t e a c h . W h a t
passed as a plausible argum ent, indeed w hat passed as ‘ evid en ce’,
varied considerably from one group to another: and the cases o f
Epim enides and Aristeas - and the whole history o f the rise o f the
cults o f Asclepius - show that there were quite other means o f
gaining a reputation as a wise m an or as a healer. Y e t the deploy­
ment o f arguments and evidence o f some kind cam e, in certain circles
at least, to be w hat counted in other spheres o f ‘ w isdom ’ besides that
o f statesmanship.
T h e degree o f political involvem ent had im portant and widespread
repercussions on intellectual life as a whole. T h e constitutional
fram ework that guaranteed such involvem ent has been outlined
above. In Athens, especially, where the Assem bly and dicasteries
w ere open to all citizens, and where appointm ent to m any offices was
b y lot and m any could not be held more than once, participation was
particularly extensive. It was also particularly intense, as emerges
from the frequent comments in classical literature that suggest how
preoccupied the Athenians becam e not just w ith their political roles
and responsibilities but also w ith the exercise o f their legal rights.
T h e topic is a recurrent one in Aristophanes. In the Clouds Strepsiades
doubts that the place pointed out on a m ap can be Athens: ‘ I don’ t
believe it: I see no dicasts sitting.’ ^^^'^ In the Wasps we are given a
103 W e should, however, distinguish between different modes o f competition. U nlike
medicine, where how to treat the sick always presented an urgent practical problem,
competition between educators only began in earnest when Greek education itself had
begun to expand with the sophistic movement. It is therefore hardly surprising that
medicine is the field best represented in our sources for the confrontation between
‘ science’ and ‘ m a gic’ : cf. above, ch. i.
*04 TV'u. 2o6ff. Cf. also Eq. 1317 (the dicasteries are w hat the city delights in), Pax 505
Greek science and Greek society 251
graphic picture o f Philocleon as a φιληλιαστη5 quite besotted with
judging.los T h e whole p lay pokes fun at the dicasteries: yet in doing
so Aristophanes faces a difficulty, for he knows that the dicasts are
the people themselves. In the Epirrhem a [V. 1071-90) it becomes
clear that the dicasts are the autochthonous citizens o f Athens,
typified b y the heroes o f M arathon.
Prose writers m ake similar points. In the Memorabilia X enophon
refers to C riton’s view that life was difficult at Athens for a m an who
w anted to m ind his own b u s in e s s .S o c r a te s , who in P lato’s Apology
tells the ju r y that this is the first time he has appeared in a law -court,
is, again, evidently an exception that illustrates, by contrast, w hat the
usual experience was.^*^7 in Thucydides (i 77) the spokesman o f the
Athenians refers to their city’s reputation for litigiousness - φιλο-
δικεϊν -- and they offer a defence rather than a denial. In the Funeral
Speech (11 40) Pericles asserts that at Athens even those engaged in
business know about politics: in Athens alone a m an who takes no
part in public affairs is considered not harmless, but useless, and
Pericles claims that the Athenians are all sound judges o f policy. In
the M ytilenean debate, b y a nice stroke o f artistry, Cleon him self is
m ade to chide his audience on the grounds that they are easily
m isled: everyone, he says, wants to be an orator and is reluctant to
yield to anyone else in quickness o f wit, praising sharp remarks
before they are out o f someone’s m ou th ; the trouble is that they do
not treat serious matters sufficiently seriously, but rather behave
more like those sitting at a performance o f sophists than like people
deliberating about affairs o f state.
Finally there are passages that explicitly oppose dom ination by
force and dom ination b y reason or a r g u m e n t . T h e continuation o f
the A thenians’ speech at Thucydides i 77 is perhaps particularly
(the Athenians do nothing but ju d ge cases), Av. i694ff and m any other passages
collected in D e Ste Croix 1972, p. 363 nn. 8 and 10.
V. 88ff; he hardly sleeps, and when he does his mind flutters in his dreams round the
water-clock; he wakes with his fingers in the gesture of voting; while other lovers write
the names o f their beloved on walls, the name of his loved one is ballot-box (κημό$: the
top o f the urn that held the votes); to insure he has enough pebbles for voting he has
a whole beach-full at hom e. . . . Xenophon, Mem. 11 9. i .
Plato, Ap. 1 7 d I fF. Sim ilarly Isocrates protests his own - exceptional - lack of
experience o f the law-courts, while engaging in a passionate attack on the prejudices o f
juries and their gullibility in failing to see through the corrupt informers by whom they
are surrounded (x v 15-38). A t x v a g s f Isocrates goes on to describe Athens, with its
exceptional opportunities for the practice of rhetoric, as the teacher of orators from all
over Greece.
III 37ff, especially 38.7 (and cf. 38.4).
Cf. above, p. 84 and n. 128 on Gorgias, Helen para. 12. T h e contrast between ττειΟώ
(‘ persuasion ’) and βία (force) is a recurrent theme in Greek traged y: see, for example,
Detienne 1967, pp. 6ofF, Buxton 1977.
 252 Greek science and Greek society
significant. T h ere they contrast the A thenian empire w ith one based
simply on m ihtary superiority. T h e alHes, they claim , are used to
dealing with Athens on equal terms (άπό του ίσου), b ut'w h en they
do not get their w ay they are aggrieved - for men resent injustice
more than violence - w hen they should, on the contrary, be grateful
to the Athenians for their m oderation. T h e Athenians do not conceal
the fact that Athens rules from a position^of superior strength,” ^
but they develop an im portant opposition between settling disputes
by violence and doing so b y argum ent.” ^ In a different context,
Aristotle, too, contrasts the situation in the past, when tyrants ruled
b y m ilitary force, with w hat he says happens in his own day, where
it is those who are skilled in speaking who lead the people, but their
inexperience in m ilitary matters prevents them, for the most part,
from attem pting an arm ed coup .” ^
T here are, o f course, elements o f exaggeration and o f rationalisa­
tion in most o f these texts. But when we have discounted these, we are
still left with good evidence for some im portant conclusions. First and
most obviously, testing arguments, w eighing evidence and adjudi­
cating between opposing points o f view were, as we have s a id ,^
com m on part o f the experience o f a considerable num ber o f A thenian
Λ citizens.“ 3 In the context o f law and politics, when they acted as
' judges and voted in the assemblies, they were no mere spectators,
but themselves took the effective decisions. A ccou ntability is
m entioned in H erodotus m 80 as one o f the three ch ief marks o f a
d e m o c r a c y , a n d the critical evaluation o f testimony was a central
feature not just o f ordinary law-suits, but also in particular o f the
institutions o f the δοκιμασία (which m ight be concerned, for exam ple,
w ith testing a candidate’s eligibility for office) and the ευθυνα (the
scrutiny o f a m agistrate’s tenure o f office, directed prim arily, though
not alw ays exclusively, at its financial aspects).
T h a t political and legal testing and scrutiny were sometimes seen
as paradigm atic o f testing and scrutiny o f any kind is suggested first
Cf. C leon ’s remarks at T h . in 37.2.
Cf. also Diodotus’ remarks at T h . iii 42, where he claims that a good speaker should
win his case by argum ent not by intimidation, a point often echoed in the orators.
Pol. 1305 a I off.
Cf. Vernant, 1962, pp. 43 and 74 especially.
T he other two are the election of magistrates by lot, and the referring of policy
decisions to the general assembly.
“ 5 There were m any different kinds o f δοκιμασία (they included one concerned with the
enrolm ent of ephebes). From the political point o f view, the most important were those
o f the incoming Council and of the Archons, the former undertaken by the existing
Council, the latter a double δοκιμασία by the Council and the Ju ry-C ou rt: see, for
exam ple, Aristotle, Ath. 45 and 55.
Greek science and Greek society 253
b y the linguistic data. N atu rally enough, G reek term inology for
evidence and its exam ination draws h eavily on words w ith prim ary
m eanings in the political or legal sphere. O f the words used generally
for ‘ evid en ce’ μαρτύριαν is directly derived from the G reek w ord for
‘ w itness’ , μάρτυς.” ^ O f the terms used for testing an idea or hypo­
thesis, ελεγχος and έλέγχειν have as their prim ary senses in the
classical period"^ the cross-exam ining o f witnesses and the exam i­
nation - or more especially the refutation - o f an opposing speaker’s
case.” ®O th er terms with a technical legal or political application
that are used more generally o f testing or exam ining ideas are
βάσανο^ and βασανί^ειν,"^ and δοκιμασία and its cognates^^® (in
both cases the extent to w hich these general usages were felt as ‘ live ’
metaphors is problem atic), w hile the most com m on expression for
‘ giving an a cco u n t’ , λόγον διδόναι, was used particularly o f
rendering a financial account, as in the ευθυνα.
M oreover we have good evidence that the p arallelisms betw een
political and legal d eb a t^ o ji the one hand, a.nd philosophical and
sophistic discussions on the other, w ere explicitly recognised b y some
] a n c k n t writers. A ll these discussions could be referred to as aycovEs,
I contests, and the ‘ agonal ’ or ‘ agonistic ’ features o f m uch classical
I literature - the balancing o f speech and counter-speech, for instance,
not ju st in Thucydides, who presents idealisations o f actual debates,
but also in epic and dram a - are w ell k n o w n . *^2 ^an be more
τεκμήριον, derived from τέκμαρ, goal, end, and so token, sign, and σημεΐον, derived from
σήμα, mark, both have extensive application in the legal context in the classical period.
” 7 In Homer, however, the nouns ?λεγχο5 and έλεγχείη are used in the sense o f blam e or
reproach or a cause for such, e.g. Od. x iv 38, x x i 329.
T h e general classical use o f terms with this root can be illustrated b y H dt. 11 23 (the
view that the N ile floods because it flows from O cean is obscure and ούκ 2χει ϊλεγχον) and
T h . I 21 (the stories o f the logographers are incapable o f being tested - άνεξέλεγκτα).
βάσανοξ, used already in T h gn . 417 of the touchstone, was the regular term for the
procedure w hereby slave witnesses were tortured in G reek trials. But both the noun
and the verb are also used more generally o f testing hypotheses, e.g. Plato, Ti. 68 d
(the proportions o f compound colours cannot be determ ined by testing) and Aristotle,
GA 747a 3, and 7 (testing the fertility of semen, and o f wom en), and cf. such H ippo­
cratic passages as Liqu. ch. i, CM G i, i 85.16 and Aer. ch. 3, CM G i, i 5 7 .1 1.
’ ^0 For δοκιμά^ειν, δοκιμασία and διαδοκιμά^ειν used generally of testing outside the p arti­
cular sphere o f the institutions of the δοκιμασία, see, for exam ple, T h . in 38, Aristotle,
Ε β ί I i5 7 a 2 2 , 1162a 14, X enophon, Oec. 19.16. For εΟθυνα/εύθύνειν used in a medical
context, see, for example, Aristotle, Pol. 1282 a i f f (cf. Plato, Pit. 299a) and in a general
one, Aristotle, de An. 407b27ff.
E.g. Lysias x x iv 26. Cf. also the use of λογιστής and έξεταστής (from έξετά^ω, examine)
for the auditors of public accounts, e.g. Aristotle, Pol. 1322 b 11.
T h e im portance o f these elements in Greek culture as a whole has been emphasised by
Burckhardt 1898-1902, and by Ehrenburg 1935, pp. 63ff, especially (and cf., e.g.,
Duchem in 1968 on tragedy in particular). T h e reservations of H uizinga, who questions
how exceptional G reek culture is in this respect, should, however, be noted: see
H uizinga (1944) 1970, pp. 9 iff.
 254 Greek science and Greek society
specific. First we saw that Gorgias juxtaposes political and legal
contests with the arguments o f the ‘ m eteorologists’ and the philo­
sophers in order to illustrate different aspects o f the pow er o f
p e r s u a s i o n . 123 A gain when Cleon in T hucydides m 38 chides the
A thenian assembly for behaving like an audience at a perform ance o f
sophists, the rebuke is revealing. Both types o f occasion generated the
same eager expectations on the part o f the audience, who evidently
^prided themselves on their connoisseurship o f the w itty thrust or the
I telling argum ent. But more than th a t: given that it was the same
body o f m en who constituted the Assem bly and who formed the bulk
o f the audience at the dram atic performances in the t h e a t r e , 124 and
who - w ith their counterparts from other states - attended the great
Pan-H ellenic festivals at w hich public lectures were g i v e n , there was
a natural progression from political debate to sophistic performance.
O nce again the point can be extended to m edicine. W e do not
know precisely how those who served as public physicians - δημο-
σιεύοντες - were a p p o i n t e d , ^^t the sophist Gorgias claims, in
P lato’s dialogue, that the trained orator w ill be more successful than
the doctor not only at persuading patients to submit to treatment,
but also at convincing the Assembly or any other meeting that he should be
chosen as physician. 127 Indeed Gorgias m aintains that there is no
subject at which the orator will not outdo the ordinary craftsman when
speaking at a mass m eeting. This m ay be - we m ay think - rather
to exaggerate the difference between the orators and some doctors,
at least to ju d g e from the rhetorical skills displayed by quite a num ber
o f the m edical writers. ^28 But it suggests that there were overlaps not
just between the doctor and the sophist in the giving o f public
lectures, but also between the doctor and the politician, in that if
the former desired appointm ent as a public physician, he m ight well,
Helen, para. 13, see above, p. 84.
Cf. Demosthenes v 7-8, who remarks that the A thenian Assembly listened to Neopto-
lemus with as much indulgence as if they had been attending a play (a comparison that
has added point as Neoptolemus was an actor and playw right himself, as well as being
an active politician).
'^5 See, for example, Plato, Hp. M i. 363 cd, 364 a (cf. 368 cd ), Isocrates iv 45, and cf. Dicear-
chus’ report (in Athenaeus x iv , 62od, cf. D .L . viii 63) that a recitation of Em pedocles’
poem the Purifications was given at O lym pia. See Cohn-H aft 1956, pp. 56ff.
'^7 Grg. 456bc, cf. also 452e, 4 5 ga -c, 5i4<i fF. Xenophon, Mem. iv 2.5, also envisages a
prospective public physician addressing the Athenian assembly. Cf. Socrates’ remarks,
at Prt. 3 19 b f, on how the Athenians, collected in an Assembly, call in experts in building
and ship-building to advise them when they debate matters in those fields (where his
point is to contrast taking ‘ professional’ advice on technical matters with the practice
o f allowing anyone to speak in political discussions concerning the administration o f the
state). A t Pit. 297c flf Plato draws an elaborate picture of the consequences of allowing
everyone an equal voice on such subjects as medicine and navigation, where the context
is again that o f an Assembly (298C2f). See above, ch. 2, pp. 88ff.
Greek science and Greek society 255
like the latter, have to exercise his skills o f persuasion before a large
lay audience.
V F inally there is, as it were, a qualitative point to add to the quanti­
tative one. It is not just the frequency o f the experience o f debate, but
also the radical nature o f w hat m ight be debated, that are im portant.
In the political sphere, as we have seen, the subjects regularly
discussed b y the Assem bly covered ev ery m ajor issue o f public pQjicy,
including questions o f w ar ^ d peace, and the laws and the consti­
tution themselves. W here the topic o f how the state should be
governed could be debated openly b y the citizen body as a whole,
there were, we m ay presume, fewer inhibitions - at least in some
quarters - to challenging deep-seated assumptions and beliefs about
‘ natural phenom ena’, the gods or the origin or order o f things. T h e
fate o f Socrates is a rem inder not to exaggerate the limits o f per­
missible radical dissent: nor was he by any means the only intellectual
leader who, for one reason or another, was prosecuted or threatened
w ith prosecution, though we have reason to be sceptical about some
o f the more fanciful, late stories o f trials for i m p i e t y . ’‘^9 But w hile free
speech and free speakers came under attack in Athens as often as, or
even m ore often, than e ls e w h e r e ,^ 3 o the scope for criticism and
dissent was - norm ally - very w ide i n d e e d .
O n e o f the first to be tried for im piety (presumably under the decree o f Diopeithes)
was Anaxagoras, though according to some o f our sources this move was directed in
part at discrediting Pericles through Anaxagoras (see Plutarch, Pericles 32, cf. D .L . 11 12,
Diodorus Siculus xn 39): thus although A naxagoras was exiled (or left Athens before
the outcome of his trial was known) he was evidently honoured by the people of
Lampsacus, where he spent the last part of his life. W e know from Aristophanes {Av.
10 7iff) that Diagoras, who was regularly represented as an ‘ atheist’, was condemned to
death in absentia. But the reliability of some of our information about the trial of
Protagoras has been doubted (particularly the report, e.g. in D .L . ix 52, that his books
were burnt, and the story that he was exiled ‘ from the whole e arth ’ by the Athenians,
I Philostratus, F 5 i 10.3). M en could be, and sometimes were, charged w ith ‘ im p iety’ :
but [a) the motives for such trials were often quite general, to silence or remove political
rivals or undesirable characters, {b) the definition o f ‘ im p iety’ was anything but precise,
and (c) some famous ‘ atheists’ were apparently never charged (see below, p. 257 n. 138).
O n the whole topic, see D echarm e 1904, ch. 6, Lipsius 1905-Ί5,11 pp. 358ff, D rachm ann
1922, Derenne 1930, especially pp. 257!^, M orrow i960, pp. 47off, and D over 1975.
no jsJqj much need or should be made of the statement in ps.-Xenophon, Ath. 2 .i8 f that
the people disapproved of attacks on itself by the comic poets, but a scholium to Ach. 67
refers to a decree of 440 banning comedy, though this was only a tem porary measure
(connected, presum ably, with the political situation after the Sam ian revolt), since the
decree was rescinded three years later. A gain Aristophanes himself tells us that Cleon
indicted him for defaming the state in the presence o f foreigners {Ach. 502fF, referring
to his lost play the Babylonians) - though that certainly did not put an end to his attacks
I on Cleon. It was under the T h irty that the most concerted effort at suppression o f free
I speech seems to have occurred. A t least Xenophon reports that Critias m ade it illegal
to teach the art of speaking {Mem. 1 2.31), a move that X enophon interprets as being
made against Socrates, though it m ay well have had a more general aim.
As Finley 1973a, pp. 9 7 ff> rightly stresses; cf. also M om igliano 1973 and Finley 1975^·
256 Greek science and Greek society
O nce again it is useful to compare the city-state, at least when
under constitutional governm ent, with the situation that obtained
outside Greece. A n y m em ber o f the entourage o f an autocratic ruler
(whether G reek or non-Greek) was in danger as soon as he fell from
favour. This applied not only to political advisers, but also to others
who m ight be consulted on a wide range o f matters, the priests and
diviners, and even the doctors called in to give treatment. It is not
ju st a Pythius or even an Artabanus who was at risk for crossing
X erx es Herodotus also reports that the Egyptian doctors who had
failed to cure D arius’ dislocated foot w ould have been im paled, but
for Democedes’ intercession on their b e h a l f ^33
N ow the charge was often levelled at the dem ocracies that the
sovereign people was, collectively, just as arbitary and revengeful as
any tyrant. Thus Diodotus complains, in Thucydides, that w hile
individual speakers are accountable, the people themselves are not,
a theme taken up b y m any other w r i t e r s . A g a i n although the
A thenian dem ocracy, in particular, was generally notably lenient
to its political enemies,i^s the first M ytilenean debate and the treat­
m ent o f the generals after Arginusae show that it could also be
vindictive. Nevertheless even those decisions were arrived at after
being debated in full Assem bly - indeed in both cases the Assem bly
m et twice to consider the issue. ^ ^ 6 'phe institution o f ostracism was one
method at Athens b y which the problem or threat posed by powerful
spokesmen o f m inority views was dealt with. But short o f situations
where ostracism m ight be invoked, there were plenty o f occasions
when those who lost one particular vote m ight live in hopes o f having
the decision subsequently reversed.
It is true that m any political leaders were not just exiled, but done
aw ay w ith, in dem ocracies and oligarchies a lik e : even so a rem ark-
H dt. VII 38f (Pythius) and cf. the council o f war, vii 8ff. A t viii 68f Herodotus refers
to the risks Artem isia was assumed to run in expressing her views freely to Xerxes,
though on this occasion Xerxes adm ired her the more for her frankness. These stories
are told from a G reek perspective, to be sure; but this detracts from, rather than
com pletely negates, the general moral they convey about the wilfulness o f absolute
monarchy.
H dt. Ill 132: this story too has a Greek slant, but it has more or less gruesome echoes
down the centuries.
T h . Ill 43, cf., e.g., Aristophanes, V. 587-8. A t Pol. 1292 a i s f f Aristotle draws a direct
comparison between one kind of dem ocracy and tyranny. W e should, however, bear
in mind that most o f those who emphasise such points write from a position that is either
critical of, or indeed bitterly opposed to, democracy.
’ 35 Especially on the restoration of the democracy, where the treatment o f those who had
overthrown it has been hailed as the first example of a political amnesty (Acton, cited
by Finley 1973a, p. 90). ’ 36 f h . iii 36ff, Xenophon, HG i 7·4ίΓ and gff.
” 7 Later A ttic orators were not slow to remind their audiences that the people had made
rash decisions that they had later repented: see, for exam ple, Isocrates x v 19.
Greek science and Greek society 257
able degree o f divergence o f political opinion existed in m any states.
E qu ally w hile m any intellectual leaders cam e under threat, others -
including some w ith reputations for ‘ im p iety’ - were able not simply
to hold their views, but also to express and teach them, both in
Athens and e l s e w h e r e . ^ 38 o f Anaxagoras and the execution
o f Socrates indicate that there were adm ittedly quite ill-defined limits
to w hat a dem ocracy w ould tolerate. Y e t on the other side the plays
o f Aristophanes, several o f w hich launch sustained attacks on the
dem agogue Cleon at the height o f his power, show how far it was
possible to go in criticising those who were in positions o f great
influence in the A s s e m b l y . ^^9 From Pericles onwards, the popular
leaders themselves could not, for their part, afford to neglect public
opinion, or at least to antagonise their own supporters. In this
situation the critic o f those in power was, com paratively speaking,
m uch less disadvantaged than in most societies before or since.
P olitical leaders in the dem ocracies were frequently reminded that
the days o f their influence were nu m bered: more im portant still, the
critic had potentially, and even sometimes in practice, equal access to
the sovereign people in the Assem bly, in the m arket-place and in the
festivals, i f not also in the t h e a t r e ,
In the adm ittedly speculative business o f attem pting to elucidate w hy
it was that certain kinds o f intellectual inquiry cam e to be initiated
in ancient G reece, we must first take stock o f certain o f the economic,
‘ 38 Those who were often labelled ‘ atheists’ included Prodicus, Critias and H ippon:
there is no record that the last two were prosecuted for their religious views and only
untrustworthy evidence (Schol. in Plato, R. 600 c and the Suda) that Prodicus was
executed for corrupting the young (an obvious confusion w ith Socrates). Critias, one
o f the T hirty, was killed in the revolution that overthrew him, but was not, so far as we
know, attacked for his views on the gods. N ear contem porary sources report Prodicus
visiting Athens quite freely and being in no w ay restricted in his teaching activi­
ties.
*39 T h e political courage and radicalness o f Aristophanes should not be exaggerated: Pax
was performed only very shortly before the conclusion o f the peace treaty in 421 (though
he also attacked the w ar in the less favourable climate o f opinion o f 425 in Ach. and in
4 1 1 in Lys.). O n the other hand, Eq. (in 424) and V. (in 422) both attack Cleon soon
after the apparent vindication of his policy against Sphacteria (cf. also Ach. Gsgff), and
\ bear out, at least to some extent, Aristophanes’ own claim {Nu. 549f) that he ‘ struck
; Cleon in the belly at the height o f his p ow er’. M oreover it was not just in times of
success or prosperity, but also at moments of crisis or considerable gloom in the fortunes
o f the city, that Aristophanes produced comedies satirising not only public figures, but
also the gods (as Dionysius in Ra. in 405).
T h e licence allowed comic poets was, no doubt, exceptional (as Isocrates, viii 14, for
one, points out when he complains that it was only they and the most reckless speakers
who could criticise the dem ocracy). Y e t even critics o f the dem ocracy, such as Plato,
acknowledge that there was - along with the licence - more freedom of speech, έξουσία
■ToO λέγειν, in Athens than anywhere else (as Socrates says when encouraging Polus to
take up G orgias’ case, Grg. 461 e).
258 Greek science and Greek society
technological and other factors we mentioned earlier as affecting not
only G reece itself, but also one or more o f her ancient N ear Eastern
neighbours, notably (i) the existence o f an econom ic surplus and o f
m oney as a m edium o f exchange, (2) access to, and curiosity about,
other societies, and (3) changes in the technical means o f com m uni­
cation and the beginnings o f literacy. W ithout the first o f these, the
developm ent o f the institutions o f the city-state - so expensive in
time and m anpow er - is inconceivable. T h e second had its positive
contribution to m ake to the w idening o f m ental, as well as geo­
graphical, horizons, while w ithout the third it is hardly an exaggera­
tion to say that the new knowledge (which must in any case have
been expressed quite differently) would have been stillborn.
Nevertheless the distinctive additional factors that must also be
taken into account are, broadly speaking, political. A ncient G reece is
m arked not ju st by exceptional intellectual devdopm ents, but also by
w hat is in certain respects an exceptional political sityation : and the
two appear to be connected. In ibur fundam ental ways aspects o f
G reek political experience m ay be thought either to have directly
influenced, or to be closely mirrored in, key features o f the intellectual
developm ents w e are concerned with. First there is the possibility o f
radical innovation, second the openness o f access to the forum o f
debate, third the habit o f scrutiny, and fourth the expectation o f
justification - o f giving an acm u n t - and the^rem ium set on rational
methods o f doing so.
T h e factors that m ay be held responsible for the developm ent o f the
particular institutions o f the city-state themselves present com plex
problems that lie w ell beyond the limits o f our inquiry here: apart
from general econom ic and social considerations such as the grow th
o f .population and the agrarian crisis it provoked, the increase o f
w ealth and the expansion oTtraJe and industry, it has been thought
that modifications in the techniques and sociology o f w arfare - the
so-called ‘ ho plite reform ’ - h a v e special bearing on the gradual
transformation o f archaic society into the city-state. T h e group on
whom the defence o f the state depended cam e to demand full and
equal political rights, although we must add (i) that intensive
Indeed acknowledging G ood y’s point concerning the relationship between the means
o f expression and the content of w hat is expressed (see above, pp. 23gf), we m ay go
further and say that it would have been different knowledge.
See, for example, Andrewes 1956, pp. 3 iff, Vernant 1962, pp. 53ff, Snodgrass 1965,
Detienne 1968, Vidal-N aquet 1968, Finley 1970. O ne of our most important literary
documents is Aristode, Pol. isg y b a a ff, the implications of which are, on the whole,
borne out by the material evidence for the development of the hoplite panoply and the
tactics o f hoplite warfare.
Greek science and Greek society 259
involvem ent in politics presupposed leisure and so an econom ic
surplus guaranteed b y slave production, the revenues o f subject states,
or b o t h , 143 and ( 2 ) that the units in w hich those rights were exercised
w ere themselves to some extent determ ined b y geographical factors
favouring the emergence o f small autonomous s t a t e s . * ^ 4 But from our
point o f view it is enough to rem ark that the political upheavals in
this transformation created opportunities for innovation not ju st in
the field o f politics (in both practical and conceptual experim enta­
tion w ith constitutional forms) but in other areas as well.^^s There
had, in any case, been no rigid religious orthodoxy in H om eric
society, and with the advent o f ‘ wise m e n ’ o f m an y different kinds
from the seventh century there is a high degree o f pluralism in G reek
religious and intellectual, as well as political leadership.
But in the com petitive situation that arose those who cultivated
the art o f speaking and who were prepared to put their case like
statesmen before an Assem bly, or like advocates in a court o f law,
were evidently more likely to succeed in persuading certain audiences.
W hile w hat seemed plausible always reflected the particular pre­
conceptions o f the individuals concerned, in some quarters at least
those who could deploy evidence and arguments that appealed to
com m on e x p e r i e n c e had obvious advantages. Privilege and
authority in any o f their manifestations came to be open to challenge.
T h e view that anyone was entitled to a voice and to an opinion not
ju st on political, but also on other, matters, can be illustrated by
characteristic texts from philosophy, history and medicine. X en o­
phanes insists that the truth is not revealed, but is found by search­
i n g . 147 Herodotus remarks that aU m en have the same degree o f know­
ledge - or ignorance - about the gods,*'*^ and the w riter o f On Ancient
Aristotle repeatedly points out the importance of economic factors for the question of
who participated in government and how intensive that participation was. See, for
example, Po/. I292b25ff, 1293a iff, 1320a lyfT. A t I2 5 5 b 3 5 ff he puts it that those who
can put the m anagem ent o f their affairs in the hands o f stewards, do so in order to devote
themselves to either politics or philosophy.
T h e idea that the size o f the state should be lim ited is a recurrent theme in Greek
political philosophy. Plato specified 5,040 households in the Laws, 737 c ff, and Aristotle
said that the citizens should not be too m any for a herald to address, Pol. vii 4, e.g.
I326b5ff.
*‘*5 A direct analogy between innovation in medicine and other branches of knowledge on
the one hand, and in politics on the other, is draw n for exam ple by Aristotle, Pol.
I268b34ff, though he insists on the differences between the two cases ( i2 6 9 a ig ff)
(cf. also Plato, Pit. 296be). A num ber o f texts indicate that the Greeks generally
believed that Egyptian medicine (for example) was much more rule-bound than their
own: see Aristotle, Pol. 1286a i2ff, Diodorus i 82, and cf. Plato, Lg. 656d f, on Egyptian
music.
As we have seen is the case, im plicitly, w ith arguments connected with the concepts o f
‘ n atu re’ and ‘ causation’, above, ch. i, pp. 4gff.
Fr. 18, see above, p. 133. H dt. 11 3.
 26ο Greek science and Greek society
Medicine even insists that the doctor should express him self in such
a w ay as to be clearly understood b y l a y m e n . ^^9
Intellectual dissenters, like political ones, sometimes cam e to grief;
but thanks in part perhaps to the close personal relationships w ithin
each city-state, and thanks more particularly to the num ber o f such
states, the G reek w orld tolerated a rem arkable degree o f divergence
o f opinion on m any fundam ental issues. W hile there was no strict
I analogue to ostracism as a means o f defusing hostility in their case,
I philosophers or sophists who, for one reason or another, becam e
' persona non grata in one state could norm ally m ove to another. This is
w hat A naxagoras and D iagoras did, w hat Aristotle also was to do in
the face o f anti-M acedonian feeling in Athens after the death o f
A lexander in 323,^50 and indeed w hat Socrates him self had been
expected b y some people to do after his trial to escape execution.
But if it seems possible to argue that the developm ent o f critical
inquiry owed something to G reek political experience, and even that
the very instability o f the political situation contributed to the
dynam ism o f that developm ent, this thesis faces a num ber o f obvious
primafacie objections. T h ree in particular must be discussed, (i) T h e
thesis m ight lead one to expect critical philosophical and scientific
inquiry to be h eavily concentrated in, i f not confi.ned to, the dem o­
cracies, instead o f being a quite widespread phenom enon w here the
= m ain proponents cam e from, and lived in, city-^ates.. o f varyin g
political c o n s t i t u t i o n s . (2) It m ight be objected that the rise o f
149 γ Μ ch. 2, C M G i, i 37.9ff, see above, p. 95. Conversely Thucydides was in no w ay
inhibited by being a laym an from giving his own detailed description o f the plague at
Athens.
\ ^50 ‘ T o save the Athenians from sinning twice against philosophy’, as it is put by Aelian,
I VH III 36, and in the lives o f Aristotle {Vita Marciana, see G igon 1962, p. G .iSsf, the
Vita attributed to Amm onius, see Rose 1886, p. 440. i2f, and the Latin Vita, see Rose
1886, p. 449.18f).
'51 See P lato’s Crito. O n the whole question o f the freedom o f the intellectual in Greece,
see D over 1975.
*5^ Im portant philosophers, mathem aticians, sophists and doctors o f the sixth and fifth
centuries (to go no further) cam e from M iletus, Ephesus, Samos, Colophon, Elea,
Croton, Clazom enae, Acragas, Athens, Cos, Cnidus, Apollonia, A bdera, Leontini, Ceos,
Elis, Cyzicus and Tarentum , and we know not only that m any o f the sophists and doctors
travelled extensively, but also that some o f the philosophers (such as Xenophanes)
did and that others (such as Pythagoras and Anaxagoras) did their principal work in
a city other than their birthplace. But no overall pattern can be said to emerge from an
analysis o f our limited information concerning the political constitutions o f the cities
that produced, or that offered a home to, the thinkers we are chiefly interested in, and
several o f the cities in question had, in any case, a chequered history o f stasis and
revolution during those two centuries. From about the middle of the fifth century,
however, Athens came to be the main centre of work o f an increasing proportion o f the
\ most notable philosophers and scientists. Y e t that m ay have had as much to do with the
general power and prestige o f the city as with its dem ocratic institutions or reputation
- for free speech: at least it continued to attract teachers and thinkers not only through
Greek science and Greek society 261
speculative thought antedates the full developm ent o f the institutions
o f the city-state, for exam ple those introduced at Athens by the
reforms o f Cleisthenes in 508. (3) I f correct, the thesis m ight be
thought to prove too m uch. I f general features o f G reek political and
social life are invoked to help account for the emergence o f critical
and radical inquiry, then the continued survival o f m agical practices,
unchallenged religious beliefs or other aspects o f the irrational after,
say, the fifth century, m ight seem hard to explain.
E ach o f these three points does not so m uch underm ine the general
thesis as enable us to qualify it and make it more precise. O n ( i ) it
can be argued that although certain institutions, such as ostracism,
existed only in certain dem ocratic cities, the diiferences between
dem ocracies and oligarchies that relate to points that concern us
were, in the m ain, a m atter o f degree. W hile the accountability o f
magistrates was taken as a special m ark o f the dem ocracies in
H erodotus iii 80, it was not confined to t h e m . '‘s3 T h e experience o f
deliberation on affairs o f state was less widespread in the oligarchies,
since those who participated in governm ent formed a smaller
percentage o f the total population. But such deliberation occurred.
W e have m entioned T h ucydides’ report o f one such debate am ong the
Lacedaim onians at i ygif, and Aristotle, in his theoretical discussion
o f constitutional types, sometimes distinguishes different kinds o f
oligarchy precisely by reference to the w ay the class o f those who
shared in deliberation was constituted and d e f i n e d .
Such definite inform ation as we have - and it is very lim ited -
suggests that the political leanings o f individual philosophers, m athe­
m aticians, doctors and sophists varied. T h e y included some, such as
Em pedocles, who, w e are told, favoured d e m o c r a c y , but others,
such as Plato, who were its im placable opponents. But w hatever
their ow n political inclinations, they were m ostly - we m ay assume -
w ell aw are o f the character and institutions o f the m ain types o f
existing co n s titu tio n -ju s t as they were also usually fam iliar w ith
one another’s philosophical or scientific i d e a s . *56 A gain m any,
the varying fortunes o f the dem ocracy at the end o f the fifth and beginning o f the fourth
century, but even after it lost its political independence after Chaeronea in 338.
*53 See, for exam ple, Aristotle, Pol. 1271 a6ff, on the accountability of Spartan magistrates
to the Ephors.
*5·^ See especially Po/. I298a34ff, cf. I2 9 7 a i7 ff.
*55 See, for exam ple, D .L . viii 63-4 and 72.
•56 T his is generally true not just o f the doctors and sophists, who often travelled for, as
it were, professional p uφ oses, but also of the philosophers. Thus Parm enides’ ideas
evidently soon becam e fam iliar not just to his fellow-townsman Zeno, but also to
Melissus o f Samos, to Empedocles in A cragas and to Anaxagoras at Athens. A m ong the
most im portant regular occasions for the exchange o f ideas were the major festivals, as
262 Greek science and Greek society
indeed most, prom inent philosophers and scientists, w hether dem o­
crats or oligarchs, themselves belonged to a more or less distinct
elite, though, as we noted, there is an im portant difference betw een
the situation o f most o f the philosophers and sophists and that o f the
practising physicians. T h e pupils o f the former were no doubt draw n
m ainly from the r ic h : the latter attem pted to exercise their powers o f
persuasion in relation not just to pupils or lecture audiences, but also
to a potential clientele that extended far beyond the educated
m i n o r i t y . *57 Y e t doctors, philosophers, sophists and m athem aticians
alike were all, to some degree, exposed to and influenced b y the
expectations o f rational discussion that were part o f the com m on
experience o f the G reek city-state. It can be represented that both
the intellectual and the political changes we have been dealing w ith
were general, even though they were not uniform, developm ents,
affecting the whole o f the G reek world to a greater or lesser extent.
As to (2) it is true that the w ork o f the first two M ilesian philo­
sophers, Thales and A naxim ander, is approxim ately contem porary
w ith that o f Solon and Pisistratus respectively and so antedates the
introduction o f the full dem ocracy at Athens under Cleisthenes. But
firstly we have noted that m any o f the features o f later political
discussion are already present in, or foreshadowed by, the poems o f
Solon, who is at pains to defend and justify his own policies and who
emphasises both the openness and public nature o f his measures and
that the Athenians themselves are masters o f their fate.^ss Secondly
and conversely we have stressed the lim ited nature o f the achievem ent
o f M ilesian, and other sixth-century, speculative thought. M an y
im portant areas o f physical, m athem atical and especially m oral
inquiry only begin to be extensively debated towards the m iddle or
end o f the fifth century. This is true, for instance, o f the controversy
between ‘ n atu re’ and ‘ convention’, and our ch ief text that explicitly
criticises m agical beliefs in m edicine dates from the end o f the fifth
century at the earliest. T h e conclusion we should draw is that the
developments we have considered are in both cases gradual ones,
w hich certainly took time to gather momentum and did not do so
w ithout suffering interm ittent setbacks.
(3) T h e most im portant qualification to the thesis relates to the
third difficulty or objection W e have argued that the experience o f
radical, critical debate in the fields o f politics and law both paralleled,
w e can see, for instance, from P lato’s account o f the visit that Parmenides and Zeno
made to Athens for the Panathenaea {Prm. I27ab).
>57 See further below, pp. 263^
158 See especially Poems 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 23-4 Diehl, and cf. above, pp. 243, 247 and n. 91.
Greek science and Greek society 263
and contributed to, the developm ent o f sim ilarly radical, critical
inquiry in other areas o f thought. Y e t the existence o f certain political
institutions, and o f a general clim ate o f opinion that allowed and even
prom oted fundam ental criticism, does not m ean, o f course, that the
entire gam ut o f popular beliefs would be so scrutinised or that every
m anifestation o f the irrational - including those in philosophy and
m edicine themselves - w ould be exposed. T hree reservations are
relevant here. First we should remind ourselves that the power o f
rational arguments to uproot deepseated convictions is only a lim ited
one. Secondly we noted that the very success o f the new profession­
alism in the art o f speaking provoked hostile reactions from such
writers as Aristophanes and Plato. T h e citizens o f Athens had ample
opportunity to exercise their connoisseurship o f skilful argu m en t: but
b y the end o f the fifth century they were also being frequently
w arned, b y different speakers and in different contexts, not just
against those who set out to m ake the worse appear the better cause,
but also more generally against rhetoric itself.
T h ird ly and m ore fundam entally we must recognise that there
were more general restrictions to the spread o f critical inquiry. W e
have seen that, in the political dom ain, public debate on affairs o f
state and on the best constitution was possible. Y e t even in the
extreme dem ocracies that right did not extend beyond the adult male
citizens. But in contrast to issues o f practical politics, which were, by
definition, the concern o f the enfranchised alone, m any o f the ideas
that the philosophers and the doctors attem pted to com bat or
supplant were genuinely popular beliefs shared by men and women,
free and slave, alike. T h e revolution in critical inquiry represented
by some o f the philosophers and H ippocratic writers is a phenom enon
circum scribed b y the still form idable barriers to com m unication that
existed w ithin G reek society, barriers created b y social and political
divisions as w ell as by illiteracy or lack o f education. T h e plausi­
bility o f the arguments in On the Sacred Disease is (as we have already
had several occasions to stress) audience-specific: it was not that
everyone in the G reek world w ould find them persuasive, and the set
o f those who fell ill was far m ore extensive than the set o f those who
participated in the political life o f the city-state. T h e explanandum
is not, in any case, the victory o f rationality over m a g ic : there was no
*5’ T here were obstacles to comm unication in either direction, as we can see from the
inhibitions o f some women patients in talking to doctors about their com plaints: see
Mul. I ch. 62, L vm I26.i2ff, and cf. Soranus, Gyn. iii Pref. 3, C M G iv 95.8f, which
shows that the problems o f comm unication between doctors and women patients
persisted.
264 Greek science and Greek society
such victory: but rather how the criticism o f m agic got some purchase.
T h e context o f the attack b y the H ippocratic author is a situation
where one kind o f healer is in competition with another. B ut there
were m any traditional beliefs w hich w ere unlikely to provide the
occasion for such a confrontation, and m any others - such as the
b elief in the superiority o f the right-hand side - cam e to be ration­
alised and incorporated into natural philosophy, H ippocratic
m edicine, or both. M oreover while the arguments used b y On the
Sacred Disease w ere o f a kind that seemed persuasive in some quarters,
that did not m ean that either the purifiers, or the exponents o f
tem ple m edicine, were put out o f business. Some o f the weaknesses o f
some o f their claims were exposed b y writers who were highly
vulnerable to a variety o f other types o f objection them selves: but
ju st as we should not underestimate the exceptional nature o f this
achievem ent, so w e should not exaggerate the extent to w hich the
radical, critical approach was typical o f the whole o f G reek thought.
I em pirical methods w ith great effectiveness, and on occasions both
CO N C LU SIO N S
Som e concluding remarks m ay help to draw together the threads o f
our investigations as a whole. T h e developm ent o f philosophy and
science in ancient G reece is a unique turning-point in the history o f
thought. So far as the W estern world goes, our science is continuous
w ith, and m ay be said to originate in, that o f ancient G reece.
Elsewhere W estern science has been imposed on (or at least im ported
into) other cultures from outside, even w here, as in C hina, those
cultures already possessed their ow n highly developed cosmologies
and technologies. Even though the m aterials for the study o f the
transformations that occurred w ithin G reek thought are lim ited -
and they dictate an approach that differs in m any respects from that
o f the field anthropologist - we can go some w ay towards defining
the character, and the limits, o f those changes and the circumstances
in w hich they took place. T h e com parative evidence shows that w hat
is exceptional is, first and foremost, the developmen^of_generalised
sceptjcism and o f critical inquiry directed at fundam ental issues - not
that that happened all at once or across the board, or that the whole
o f w hat w ould norm ally be included in G reek philosophy and science,
let alone the rest o f G reek thought, is radical and critical in spirit.
T h e growth o f philosophy and science m ay be seen as depending
partly on developm ents in the use (including the more self-con­
scious use) o f ‘ reason’ and ‘ experience’ , the elaboration o f argu­
m entative procedures and o f techniques o f em pirical research. B ut in
Greek science and Greek society 265
both cases the gradualness o f the developm ents we have traced is
striking. A lthough epistemological questions, and in particular the
com peting claims o f reason and o f sensation to be the basis o f know ­
ledge, begin to be aired w ith Parm enides and H eraclitus, argum ents
themselves do not come to be explicitly analysed and evaluated
before Plato, and we have to w ait until Aristotle for the first form al
logic. T h e practice o f m athem atical demonstration begins in the late
fifth century, but again the contributions o f Plato and Aristotle in the
fourth are fundam ental to the developm ent o f the concept o f an axio­
m atic system. O bservation not only in physics, but also in astronomy
and in biology (especially the use o f dissection) was slow to develop,
and the first extensive planned program m e o f em pirical research in
natural science is A ristotle’s.
M oreover the formal continuities between philosophical/scientific
and earlier thought are as rem arkable as the discontinuities. I f G reek
philosophers and scientists eventually exploit arguments and
deliberately and system atically, these were developments that built
on w hat already existed. A facility in deploying arguments o f various
types, and an ab ility to observe, even to engage in sustained obser­
vations and in trial and error procedures, are patently as old as
hum an society itself This part o f our inquiry into the intellectual
tools deployed in early G reek science, as also our discussion o f w hat
the explicit ideas o f nature and causation owed to earlier implicit
assumptions, exhibit the com m on ground between the w ork o f the
philosophers and scientists and earlier thought. O n this score, at
least, w e have no cause to invoke - indeed w e should rule out
invoking - any talk o f a different m entality, a different logic, or a
totally different conceptual fram ework. A p art from the philosophical
difficulties o f such a hypothesis, it fails to account for the form al
continuities we can observe.
But w hile philosophy and science did not involve a different
m entality or a new logic, they m ay be represented as originating
from the exceptional exposure, criticism and rejection o f deep-seated
beliefs. W hereas lim ited scepticism about traditional schem ata can
be paralleled in other societies readily enough, the generalised
scepticism about the validity o f m agical procedures we find in ancient
Greek authors was unprecedented. I f the concepts o f ‘ n atu re’ and o f
‘ causation’ develop from certain im plicit assumptions, those ideas
had, again, to be m ade explicit and generalised. These conceptual
moves sound simple: but they could not be m ade w ithout allow ing
fundam ental aspects o f traditional beliefs to come under threat.
 266 Greek science and Greek society Greek science and Greek society 267
Philosophy and science can only begin w hen a set o f questions is tion o f their ideas, the Greeks provided science w ith its essential
substituted for a set o f vaguely assumed certainties. It is true that, fram ework, asserting the possibility o f the inquiry and initiating the
the questions once posed, the answers given w ere sometimes not just debate that continues today on its aims and methods. Y e t several o f
schem atic, but contained (as w e have seen) elements o f pure bluff. the shortcomings o f G reek science correspond closely to its strengths.
Y e t while the Greeks’ confidence in the rightness o f their methods T h e quest for certainty in an axiom atic system - itself in part a
often outran their actual scientific performance - p articularly in the reaction against w hat was represented as the seductiveness o f m erely
m atter o f the collection o f em pirical data - those m ethodological plausible arguments - was sometimes bought at the cost o f a lack o f
ideals not only perm itted, but positively prom oted the further grow th em pirical content. M ore generally, the w ay in which evidence and
o f the inquiry. T h e investigability o f nature was explicitly recognised, ‘ experim ent’ were often used to support, rather than to test, theories,
j even w hile the epistemological debate covered a w ide spectrum o f a certain over-confidence and dogm atism , above all a certain failure
opinions on the character, aims and limits o f that investigation. in self-criticism, m ay all be thought to reflect the predom inant
T h e society in w hich these inquiries were first pursued was far tendency to view scientific debate as a contest like a political or a
from a prim itive one. T h e level o f technology and that o f econom ic legal agon. Aristotle noted in the De Caelo (294 b7ff) that ‘ we are all
developm ent w ere far in advance o f those o f m any modern non­ in the habit o f relating an inquiry not to the subject-matter, but to
industrialised societies; above all literacy presejij:a.-a--4 ififepe^ not our opponent in argu m en t’. This remains true, no doubt, today, but
just o f d ^ r e £ b ^ o f kind. Y e t a comparison w ith G reece’s ancient the observation appears especially relevant to early G reek science.
' N ear Eastern neighbours suggests that none o f these three factors T h e sterility o f m uch ancient scientific work is, we said, often a result
individually, nor all o f them collectively, can be used to account fully o f the inquiry being conducted as a dispute w ith each contender
for the developm ents we are interested in. So far as an additional single-m indedly advocating his ow n point o f view. This is easy to say
distinctively G reek factor is concerned, our most promising clue (to w ith hindsigh t: but an exam ination o f the G reek evidence suggests
put it no more strongly) lies in the developm ent o f a particular that this very paradigm o f the com petitive debate m ay have pro­
social and political situation in ancient Greece, especially the vided the essential fram ework for the grow th o f natural science.
experience o f radical political debate and confrontation in small-
scale, face-to-face societies. T h e institutions o f the city-state called for
new qualities o f leadership, put a premium on skill in speaking and
produced a public who appreciated the exercise o f that skill. Claim s
to particular wisdom and knowledge in other fields besides the
political were sim ilarly liable to scrutiny, and in the com petition
between the m any and varied new claim ants to such knowledge those
who deployed evidence and argum ent were at an advantage com ­
pared w ith those who did not, at least ~ to repeat our proviso once
again - so far as some audiences and contexts were concerned.
M oreover if this hypothesis helps to account for the strengths o f
G reek science, it also throws some light on some o f its weaknesses.
A lthough eventually G reek scientists produced lasting (if often ele­
m entary) results in areas o f astronomy, m athem atical geography,
statics and hydrostatics, anatom y and even physiology, G reek science
down to Aristotle is more notable for its achievem ents in second-order
inquiries, in epistemology, logic, m ethodology and philosophy o f
science, in, for instance, the developm ent o f the concepts o f an axio­
m atic system and o f an exact science, and in that o f the notion o f
em pirical research. W hatever their lim itations in the im plem enta­

BIBLIOGRAPHY
T h e bibliography aims first to provide details o f all the books and articles that are
cited in m y text, and secondly to refer the reader to other works w hich, though not
m entioned in m y discussion, bear directly on the issues raised. T h e list o f such
works makes no claims to be com prehensive w ithin the field o f classical studies,
and has necessarily been drastically selective outside that field, in such areas as
anthropology and the philosophy and sociology o f science.
A abo e, A . (1955-6) O n the Babylonian origin o f some H ipparchian param eters’,
Centaurus TV, 122-5.
(1956-8) O n Babylonian plan etary theories’, Centaurus v , 209-77.
(1964-5) ‘ O n period relations in Babylonian astronom y’ , Centaurus x , 2 13 -3 1.
(1974) ‘ Scientific astronom y in a n tiq u ity ’, in The Place of Astronomy in the
Ancient World, edd. D . G . K en d a l and others (O xford), pp. 2 1-42.
A abo e, A . and Price, D. J . de S. (1964) ‘ Q,ualitative m easurem ent in a n tiq u ity ’ ,
in UAventure de la science (M elanges A . K oyre) (Paris), V o l. i, pp. 1-20.
A b el, K . (1958) ‘ D ie Lehre vom Blutkreislauf im Corpus H ip p ocra ticu m ’ ,
Hermes lx x x v i , 192-219 (reprinted in Flashar 1971, pp. 121-64).
A chinstein, P. (1963-4) ‘ T heoretical terms and partial in terpretation ’ , British
Journal for the Philosophy o f Science xrv, 89-105.
(1965) ‘ T h e problem o f theoretical term s’, American Philosophical Quarterly n.
193-203.
(1968) Concepts of Science (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore).
A ckerknecht, E. H . (1971) Medicine and Ethnology (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore).
Adkins, A . W . H . (i960) Merit and Responsibility (O xford).
(1972) Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (London).
Agassi, J . (1964) ‘ T h e nature o f scientific problem s and their roots in m eta­
physics’ , in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, ed. M . Bunge
(London), pp. 18 9 -2 11.
A lbrigh t, W . F. (1972) ‘ N eglected factors in the G reek intellectual revo lu tio n ’ .
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society c x v i, 225-42.
Alexanderson, B. (1963) Die hippokratiche Schrift Prognostikon, Vberlieferung und Text
(Studia G raeca et L atin a G othoburgensia 17, G 5 teborg).
A llan , D .J . (1965) ‘ C ausality, ancient and m odern ’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplements x x x ix , 1-18 .
(1970) The Philosophy of Aristotle (ist ed. 1952), 2nd ed. (O xford).
A llen , R . E. (ed.) (1965) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London).
A llen , R . E. and Furley, D .J . (edd.) (1975) Studies in Presocratic Philosophy V o l. 11
(London).
A llm an , G . J . (1889) Greek Geometryfrom Thales to Euclid (D ublin and London).
A nderh ub, J . H . (1941) ‘ G enetrix Irratio n aliu m ’ , in Joco-seria aus den Papieren
eines reisenden Kaufmanns (W iesbaden), pp. 159-222.
Anderson, P. (1974) Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London).
A ndrew es, A . (1956) The Greek Tyrants (London).
Bibliography 269
A nnequin, J . (1973) Recherches sur faction magique et ses representations (Annales
litteraires de I’U niversite de Besan^on, Paris).
A nton , J . P. and Kustas, G . L . (edd.) (1971) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy
(State U n iversity o f N ew Y o rk Press).
Apostle, H. G. (1952) Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics (University o f C h icago Press).
(1958) ‘ M ethodological superiority o f A ristode over E u c lid ’, Philosophy of
Science XXV, 13 1-4 .
A rnim , H . von (1905-24) Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. (L eipzig).
A rtelt, W . (1937) Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe ‘ Heilmittel’ und 'G ift’ (L eipzig).
A ustin, J . L . (1962a) How to do things with words (O xford).
(1962^») Sense and sensibilia (O xford).
Bachelard, G . {igy2) La Formation de Vesprit scientifique (ist ed. 1947), 8thed. (Paris).
Balm e, D . M . (1939) ‘ G reek science and mechanism . I A ristotle on N ature and
C h a n c e ’ , Classical ζlμarterly xxxxii, 129-38.
(1941) ‘ G reek science and mechanism . Π T h e A tom ists’ , Classical (Quarterly
XXXV, 23-8.
(1961/19 75) ‘ A ristotle’s use o f differentiae in zo o lo g y ’ (in Aristote et les pro-
bUmes de methode, ed. S. M ansion (L ouvain and Paris, 1961), 195-212) in
Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji 1975, pp. 183-93.
(1962a) ‘ γένος and είδοξ in A ristotie’s b io lo g y ’. Classical Quarterly N S x ii, 81-98.
(1962^») ‘ D evelopm ent o f biology in A ristotle and Theophrastus: theory o f
spontaneous gen eration ’ , Phronesis v ii, 9 1-10 4 .
Balss, H . (1923) ‘ Praeform ation und Epigenese in der griechischen Philosophie’ ,
Archivio di Storia della Scienza rv, 319 -2 5.
( 1936) ‘ D ie Zeugungslehre und Em bryologie in der A ntike ’, Quellen und Studien
zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin v , 2, 193-274.
Bam brough, R . (ed.) (1965) New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London).
Barnes, J . (1969/1975) ‘ A ristotle’s theory o f dem onstration ’ {Phronesis xrv (1969),
123-52) in Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji 1975, pp. 65-87.
(1975) Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (O xford).
Barnes, J ., Schofield, M ., and Sorabji, R . (edd.) (1975) Articles on Aristotle,
I Science (London).
Barnes, S. B. (1969) ‘ Paradigm s, scientific and so cial’, Man N S iv, 94-102.
(1972) ‘ Sociological explanation and natural science: a K u h n ian reapp raisal’ .
Archives Europeennes de Sociologie x iii, 3 73 -9 1.
(1973) ‘ T h e com parison o f belief-system s: A n o m aly versus falsehood’, in
H orton and Finnegan 1973, pp. 182-98.
(1974) Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (London).
Baum ann, E . D . (1925) ‘ D ie heilige K ra n k h e it’, Janus x x ix , 7-32.
Beare, J . L (1906) Greek Theories o f Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle
(O xford).
Becker, O . (19 31). Die diairetische Erzeugung derplatonischen Ideelzahlen (Q p ellen und
Studien zur G eschichte der M athem atik, A stronom ic und Physik b , i , 4,
B erlin), pp. 464-501.
(1933^) Eudoxus-Studien I. Eine voreudoxische Proportionenlehre und ihre Spuren bei
Aristoteles und Euklid (Q,uellen und Studien zur G eschichte der M athem atik,
A stronom ie und Physik b , 2 , 4 , Berlin), pp. 3 1 1 - 3 3 .
(1933^) Eudoxus-Studien //. Warum haben die Griechen die Existenz der vierten
Proportionale angenommen? (Q,uellen und Studien zur Geschichte der M ath e­
m atik, Astronom ie und Physik B, 2, 4, Berlin), pp. 369-87.
( 1936a) Eudoxus-Studien HI. Spuren eines Stetigkeitsaxioms in der Art des Dedekind'schen
zur Z^it des Eudoxus (Q uellen und Studien zur Geschichte der M athem atik,
A stronom ie und Physik b, 3, 2, Berlin), pp. 236-44.
270 Bibliography
(19366) Eudoxus-Studien IV. Das Prinzip des ausgeschlossenen Dritten in der griechi-
schen Mathematik (Q uellen und Studien zur G eschichte der M athem atik,
Astronom ic und Physik b , 3, 3, Berlin), pp. 370-88.
( 1936c) Eudoxus-Studien V. Die eudoxische l^hre von den Ideen und den Farben (Q uellen
und Studien zur G eschichte der M athem atik, Astronom ie und Physik b , 3, 3,
Berlin), pp. 389-410.
(ig^ed) ^ur Textgestaltung des eudemischen Berichts iiber die Quadratur der Mondchen
durch Hippokrates von Chios fQ,uellen und Studien zur Geschichte der M a th e­
m atik, Astronom ie und Physik b , 3, 3, Berlin), p p . 4 1 1 -1 9 .
(1936^) Die Lehre vom Geraden und Ungeraden im neunten Buck der euklidischen
Elemente (Q uellen und Studien zur Geschichte der M athem atik, Astronom ie
und Physik b , 3, 4, Berlin), pp. 533-53.
(1957) Das mathematische Denken der Antike (G ottingen).
Behr, G. A . (1968) Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Am sterdam ).
Benveniste, E. (1945) ‘ L a doctrine m edicale des Indo-Europeens’ , Revue de
Vhistoire des religions c x x x , 5 -12 .
Berger, H . (1903) Geschichte der wissenschqftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen, and ed.
(L eip zig).
Berka, K . (1963) ‘ Aristoteles und die axiom atische M eth o d e’ , Das Altertum ix ,
200-5.
Berthelot, M . (1885) Les Origines de Valchimie (Paris).
Bertholet, A . (1926-7) ‘ Das W esen der M a g ie ’ , Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der
Wissenschaften zu Gottingen (Phil.-hist. K l. 1926-7 G eschaftliche M ittei-
lungen), pp. 63-85.
Berti, E. (1977) Aristotele: Dalla Dialettica alia Filosofia Prima (Padova).
Bidez, J . and Gum ont, F. (1938) L·s Mages Hellenises, 2 vols. (Paris).
Bjornbo, A . A . (1901) ‘ H a t M enelaos aus A lexan d ria einen Fixsternkatalog
verfasst?’, Bibliotheca Mathematica, D ritte Folge 11, 196-212.
Black, M . (1959) ‘ L inguistic relativity: the views o f Benjam in L ee W h o rf’,
Philosophical Review Lxvra, 228-38.
(1962) Models and Metaphors (Gom el! U niversity Press, Ith aca, N ew Y o rk ).
Blass, F. (1865) Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis auf
Augustus (Berlin).
(1887-93) Die attische Beredsamkeit (ist ed. 1868-80), 2nd ed., 3 vols. (L eip zig).
Bluck, R . S. (1961) Plato's Mena (C am bridge).
Bluh, O . (1949) ‘ D id the Greeks perform experim ents?’, American Journal of
Physics x v ii, 384-8.
Boas, G . (1959) ‘ Som e assumptions o f A ristotle’, Transactions of the American
Philosophical Society N S x l i x . Part 6.
(1961) Rationalism in Greek Philosophy (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore).
Bochner, S. (1966) The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science (Princeton U n i­
versity Press, Princeton, N ew Jersey).
Boeder, H . (1959) ‘ D er fruhgriechische W ortgebrauch von Logos und A le th e ia ’ ,
Archiv fUr Begriffsgeschichte iv, 8 2 - 1 12.
(1968) ‘ D er U rsprun g der “ D ia lek tik ” in der T heorie des “ S eien d en ” .
Parm enides und Z e n o n ’ , Studium Generale x x i, 184-202.
Bohannan, P. (1957) Justice and Judgment among the Tiv (O xford).
Bohannan, P. (ed.) (1967) Law and Warfare (New Y o rk).
Boll, F. (1894) ‘ Studien iiber Glaudius Ptolemaus. Ein Beitrag zur G eschichte der
griechischen Philosophic und A strologie’ , Jahrbiicher fur classische Philologie,
Suppl. Bd X X I , 49-244.
(1899) ‘ Beitrage zur Ueberlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen Astrologie
und A stronom ie’, Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und der histori-
Bibliography 271
schen Classe der k. b. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Miinchen (1899, i) , pp.
77-14 0 .
(1901) ‘ D ie Sternkataloge des H ipparch und des Ptolem aios’, Bibliotheca
Mathematica, D ritte Folge 11, 185-95.
Boll, F. and Bezold, G. ( 19 17 / 19 3 1) Sternglaube und Sterndeutung. Die Geschichte und
das Wesen der Astrologie (is t ed. 1917), 4th ed. (ed. W . G undel) (L eip zig and
Berlin).
Bollack, J . (1965-9) Empedocle, 3 vols. in 4 (Paris).
Boncom pagni, R . (1970) ‘ Em pirism o e osservazione diretta nel ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑ 1ΤΗΣ
del Corpus Hippocraticum\ Physis xii, 109-32.
Bonitz, H . (1870) Index Aristotelicus (Berlin).
Booth, N . B. ( 1957a) ‘ W ere Z en o ’s argum ents a reply to attacks upon Parmenides? ’ ,
Phronesis 11, 1-9.
(19576) ‘ W ere Z en o ’s arguments directed against the P ythagoreans?’, Phronesis
Π , 90-103.
(1978) ‘ T w o points o f interpretation in Z e n o ’ , Journal of Hellenic Studies x c v iii,
157-8.
Bostock, D. (1972-3) ‘ Aristotle, Zeno and the potential in fin ite’. Proceedings o f the
Aristotelian Society N S l x x i i i , 3 7 -5 1.
Bouche-Leclercq, A . (1879-82) Histoire de la divination dans Vantiquite, 4 vols.
(Paris).
(1899) UAstrologie grecque (Paris).
Bourgey, L . (1953) Observation et experience chez les medecins de la collection hippo-
cratique (Paris).
(1955) Observation et experience chez Aristote (Paris).
Bourgey, L . and Jouanna, J . (edd.) (1975) La Collection hippocratique et son rdle dans
Vhistoire de la medecine (L eiden ).
Bouteiller, M . (1950) Chamanisme et guerison magique (Paris).
Boyance, P. (1937) Le Culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs (Biblioth^que des
ecoles fran^aises d ’Ath^nes et de R om e 141, Paris).
Bratescu, G . ( 1 9 7 5 ) ‘ Elem ents archaiques dans la m edecine h ip p ocratiqu e’ ,
in B ourgey and Jouan n a 1 9 7 5 , pp. 4 1 - 9 .
Breasted, J . H . (1930) The Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus, 2 vols, (U niveisity o f
G hicago Press).
Bretschneider, G. A . (1870) Die Geometrie und die Geometer vor Euklides (L eipzig).
Britton, J . P. (1969) ‘ Ptolem y’s determ ination o f the obliquity o f the e clip tic’,
Centaurus x iv , 29-41.
Brocker, W . (1958) ‘ G orgias contra Parm enides’ , Hermes l x x x v i , 425-40.
Bruin, F. and Bruin, M . (1976) ‘ T h e equator ring, equinoxes and atm ospheric
refraction ’ , Centaurus x x , 8 9 -1 1 1 .
Brunschvicq, L . (1949) VExperience humaine et la causalite physique (ist ed. 1922),
3rd ed. (Paris).
Brunschwig, J . (1967) Aristote, Topiques, V o l. i (Paris).
(1973) ‘ Sur quelques emplois d ’ O Y I Z ’, in ^etesis (Festschrift de Strycker),
(A ntw erp), pp. 24-39.
Buchholz, E. (1871-85) Die homerischen Realien, 3 vols. (L eipzig).
Burckhardt, J , (1898-1902) Griechische Kulturgeschichte, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Berlin and
Stu ttgart).
Burkert, W . (1959) ‘ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ. Eine semasiologische S tu d ie ’, Philologus cm ,
167-97·
(1962) ‘ ΓΟΗΣ. Z u m griechischen “ Scham anism us ” Rheinisches Museum c v ,
36-55·
(1963a) R eview o f Frankel 1962, Gnomon x x x v , 827-8.
272 Bibliography
(1963^) ‘ Iranisches bei A naxim an dros’ , Rheinisches Museum c v i, 97-13 4.
(1968) O r p h e u s und die Vorsokratiker. Bem erkungen zum D erveni-Papyrus
und zur pythagoreischen Zah len leh re’ , Antike und Abendland x iv , 9 3 -114 .
(1970) ‘ L a gen6se des choses et des m ots’, Les Etudes Philosophiques ( i 97 o> 4)>
443- 55 ·
(1972a) Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, revised translation, E. L . M in ar,
o f Weisheit und Wissenschaft (1962), (H arvard U n iversity Press, C am brid ge,
M ass.).
(19726) Homo Necans (Berlin).
(1977) Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassichen Epoche (Stuttgart).
Burnet, J . (1892/1948) Early Greek Philosophy (is t ed. 1892), 4th ed. (London,
1948).
(1929) Essays and Addresses (London).
Burnyeat, M . F. (1978) ‘ T h e philosophical sense o f T heaetetus’ m ath em atics’ ,
/ίίί L xix, 489-513.
Buxton, R . G . A . (1977) ‘ Peitho: its place in G reek culture and its exploration in
some plays o f Aeschylus and Sophocles’ (unpubl, P h.D . dissertation, C a m ­
bridge, 1977).
B yl, S. (1968) ‘ N ote sur la place du coeur et la valorisation de la ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ
dans la biologie d ’A ristote’ , U Antiquite Classique x x x v ii, 467-76.
( 1977) ‘ Les grands traites biologiques d ’Aristote et la Collection hippocratique ’ ,
in R .J o ly 1977, pp. 313-26.
Calogero, G . (1927/1968) Ifondamenti della logica aristotelica (ist ed. 1927), 2nd ed.
(Firenze).
(1932) Studi sulVeleatismo (Rom a).
Cam biano, G . (1967) ‘ II m etodo ipotetico e le origini della sistemazione euclidea
della geo m etria’, Rivista di Filosofia (Torino) Lvm , 115-49.
(1977) ‘ L e m edecin, la m ain et P artisan ’ , in R .J o ly 1977, pp. 220-32.
C an tor, M . (1880-1908) Vorlesungeniiber Geschichte der Mathematik, 4. \ o h . (L eipzig).
C ap elle, W . (1925) ‘ A lteste Spuren der Astrologie bei den G riech en ’ , Hermes l x ,
373- 95 ·
C arn ap, R . (1956) ‘ T h e m ethodological character o f theoretical con cep ts’, in
The Foundations o f Science and the Concepts o f Psycholog)/ and Psychoanalysis
(M innesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, i) , ed. H . F eigl and M .
Scriven (M inneapolis), pp. 38-76.
C arratelli, G . P. (1966) ‘ G reek inscriptions o f the M iddle E a st’ , East and West
XVI, 3 1-6 .
Carteron, H . (1923) La Notion de force dans le syst^me d'Aristote (Paris).
C a rd ed ge, P. (1977) ‘ H oplites and H eroes: S p arta’s contribution to the technique
o f ancient w a rfa re ’ . Journal o f Hellenic Studies x c v ii, 1 1-27.
C assirer, E . (1 9 4 1 ) Logos, D ike, Kosmos in der Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophic
x lv ii , 6, G o t e b o r g ) .
( G o te b o r g s H o g sk o la s Arsskrift
(1946) Language and M yth (trans. S. K . L an ger o f Sprache und Mythos, Berlin,
1925), (N ew Y o rk).
The Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms (t r a n s . R . M a n n h e i m ο ΐ Philosophie der
( 1 9 5 3 —7)
symbolischen Formen, B e r l i n , 1923-9), 3 v o l s . ( N e w H a v e n ) .
C h adw ick, H . M . and C h adw ick, N . K . (1932-40) The Growth o f Literature, 3 vols.
(C am bridge).
C h adw ick, J . and M ann , W . N . (1978) ‘ M e d icin e ’, in Hippocratic Writings, ed.
G . E. R . L lo yd (originally in C h adw ick and M ann , The M edical Works o f
Hippocrates, O xford , 1950), (London).
C h adw ick, N. K . (1942) Poetry and Prophecy (C am bridge).
Cherniss, H . (1935) Aristotle's Criticism o f Presocratic Philosophy (Baltim ore).
Bibliography 273
(1944) Aristotle's Criticism o f Plato and the Academy, V o l. i (Baltim ore).
(1945) The Riddle o f the Early Academy (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
(1951) ‘ T h e characteristics and effects o f Presocratic p hilosop hy’, Journal o f the
History o f Ideas x ii, 319-45.
C h ild e, V . G ordon (1942) What Happened in History (London).
(1956) M an M akes H im self (ist ed. 1936) 3rd ed. (N ew York).
(1958) The Prehistory o f European Society (London).
C lagett, M . (1957) Greek Science in Antiquity (London).
Clarke, E. (1963) ‘ Aristotelian concepts o f the form and function o f the b ra in ’ ,
Bulletin o f the History o f Medicine x x x v ii, 1-14 .
Clarke, L . W . (1962-3) ‘ G reek astronom y and its debt to the B abylon ian s’ ,
British Journal fo r the History o f Science i, 65-77.
Classen, C . J . (1959) Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen
Philosophierens (Zetem ata 22, M unchen).
(1970) ‘ A n axim an dros’, in Pauly-W issowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, Suppl. Bd x ii, cols. 30-69.
Cohn-H aft, L . (1956) The Public Physicians o f Ancient Greece (Sm ith College Studies
in H istory 42, N ortham pton, M ass.).
Coldstream , J . N . ( 1 9 7 7 ) Geometric Greece (London).
Cole, F. J . (1930) Early Theories o f Sexual Generation (O xford).
Cole, T . (1967) Democritus and the sources o f Greek Anthropology (A m erican Philo­
logical Association, Philological M onographs 25, W estern R eserve U n i­
versity Press).
Cornford, F, M . (1912) From Religion to Philosophy (London).
(1922) ‘ M ysticism and science in the Pythagorean T radition , i ’ , Classical
Quarterlyx.yi, 137-50.
(1923) ‘ M ysticism and science in the Pythagorean T radition . 11’ , Classical
Q uarterlyxvn, 1-12.
(1932/1965) ‘ M athem atics and dialectic in the Republic V I - V H ’ {M ind N S x l i
(1932), 37-52 and 173-90) in A llen 1965, pp. 6 1-9 5 .
(1937) Plato’s Cosmology (London).
(1938) ‘ G reek natural philosophy and m odern scien ce’, in Background to Modern
Science, ed. J . N eedham and W . Pagel (C am bridge), pp. 3-22.
(1950) The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays (C am bridge).
(1952) Principium Sapientiae (C am bridge).
Crom bie, I. M . (1962) An Examination o f Plato’s Doctrines, V o l. i Plato on M an and
Society (London).
(1963) An Examination o f Plato’s Doctrines, V o l. 11 Plato on Knowledge and Reality
(London).
Cum ont, F. (1912) Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans (N ew Y o rk
and London).
C zw alin a, A . (1956-8) ‘ O b er einige Beobachtungsfehler des Ptolemaus und die
D eutun g ihrer U rsach en ’, Centaurus v , 283-306.
(1959) ‘ Ptolem aeus: D ie Bahnen der Planeten Venus und M e rk u r’ , Centaurus
VI, 1 - 3 5 ·
D arem berg, C . V . (1865) La Medecine dans Homire (Paris).
Davidson, D . and H intikka, J . (edd.) (1969) Words and Objections. Essays on the work
o f W . V. Quine (D ordrecht).
Davison, J . A . (1962) ‘ Literature and literacy in ancient G re e ce ’, Phoenix x v i,
14 1-56 and 219-33.
D echarm e, P. (1904) La Critique des traditions religieuses chez les grecs (Paris).
Deetjen, C . (1934) ‘ W itchcraft and m ed icin e’. Bulletin o f the Institute o f the History
o f Medicine 11, 164-75.
274 Bibliography Bibliography 275
D e Fidio, P. (1969) ‘ Α ΛΗ Θ ΕΙΑ: dal m ito alia ra gio n e’, La Parola del Passato x x iv , (1970) Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle (London).
308-20. Diels, H . (1879) Doxographi Graeci (Berlin).
D eichgraber, K . (1930) D ie griechische Empirikerschule: Sammlung und Darstellung (1884) ‘ G orgias und E m pedokles’, Sitzungsberichte der koniglich preussischen
der Lehre (Berlin). Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Ja hrgan g 1884, Berlin), pp. 343-68.
(1933a) D ie Epidemien m d das Corpus Hippocraticum (A bhandlungen der preus- (1893a) ‘ t ib e r die Excerpte von M enons la trik a in dem Londoner Papyrus 13 7 ’ ,
sischen A kadem ie der Wissenschaften, J ah rgan g 1933, 3, phil.-hist. K L , Hermes x x v iii, 407-34.
Berlin ). (1893Ζ») Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis latricis Menoniis et aliis medicis Eclogae
(19336) ‘ D ie arztliche Standesethik des hippokratischen E id es’ , (^uellen und (Supplem entum Aristotelicum iii, i, Berlin).
Studien zur Geschichte der J^aturwissenschqften und der M edizin in, 2, 7 9 - 9 9 (1900) Aristotelis qui fertur de M elisso Xenophane Gorgia (A bhandlungen der
(reprinted in Flashar 1971, pp. 94-120). koniglichen Akadem ie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, phil.-hist. K I., Berlin,
(1933c) ‘ ΠΡΟΦΑΣΙΣ: Eine terminologische S tu d ie ’, Quellen und Studien zur 1900). _ N
Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der M edizin in , 4, 209-25. D ieterich, A . (1888) ‘ Papyrus M agica M usei Lugdunensis B a ta v i’, Jahrbiicherfiir
(1935) Hippokrates, Ober Entstehung und Aufbau des menschlichen Korpers (περί classische Philologie, Suppl. Bd x v i, 747-829.
σαρκών) (L eipzig). D ihle, A . (1963) ‘ K ritisch-exegctische Bem erkungen zur Schrift O b er die A lte
(1939) ‘ D ie SteUung des griechischen A rztes zur N a t u r D ie Antike x v , 1 16-38. H eilkun st’ , Museum Helveticum x x , 135-50.
D e Jong, H . W . M . (1959) ‘ M edical prognostication in B a b ylo n ’, Janus x lv iii, D iller, A . (1949) ‘ T h e ancient measurements o f the e a rth ’, Isis XL, 6-9.
252-7. Diller, H . (1932) ‘ δψις αδήλων τά φαινόμενα’ , Hermes lx v x i, 14-42 (reprinted in
D elam bre, J . B .J . (1817) Histoire de Vastronomie ancienne, 2 vols. (Paris). Kleine Schriften zur antiken Literatur (M iinchen, 1971), pp. 1 19-43).
D elatte, A . (1915) Etudes sur la litterature Pythagoricienne (Bibliotheque de I’ecole (1934) Wanderarzt und Aitiologe (Philologus Suppl. Bd 26, 3, L eipzig).
des hautes etudes 217, Paris). (1942) R eview o f Pohlenz 1938, Gnomon x v iii, 65-88 (reprinted in D iller 1973,
(1922) L a vie de Pythagore de Diogine Laerce (M em oires de Γ A cadem ic R o yale de pp. 188-209).
Belgique, Classe des Lettres, Serie 2, vol. 17, Bruxelles). (1952) ‘ Hippokratische M ed izin und attische Philosophic’ , Hermes l x x x ,
(1961) Herbarius: Recherches sur le ceremonial usite chez les anciens pour la cueillette des 385-409 (reprinted in D iller 1973, pp. 46-70).
simples et des plantes magiques (M em oires de I’A cadem ie R o yale de Belgique, (1964) ‘ Ausdrucksform en des m ethodischen Bewusstseins in den hippo­
Classe des Lettres, Serie 2, vol. 54, 4, 3rd ed., Bruxelles). kratischen E p idem ien ’, Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte ix , 133-50 (reprinted in
D erenne, E. (1930) Les Proems d ’ impiete intentes aux philosophes a Athtnes au F"*® et au D iller 1973, pp. 106-23).
siicles avant J .- C . (Bibliothdque de la Faculte de Philosophic et Lettres (1971) ‘ D e r griechische N aturbegrifF’ in Kleine Schriften zur antiken Literatur
de rU n iversite de Lifegc, 45, Li^ge and Paris). (M iinchen), pp. 144-61.
D e Ste C roix, G . E. M . (1963) ‘ C o m m en tary’, in Scientific Change, ed. A . C . (1973) Kleine Schriften zur antiken M edizin (Berlin).
Crom bie (London), pp. 79-87. Dodds, E. R . (1951) The Greeks and the Irrational (U niversity o f California Press,
(19 7 2 ) The Origins o f the Peloponnesian War (L o n d o n ). Berkeley and Los A ngeles).
D etienne, M . (1963) D e la pensee religieuse ά la pense'e philosophique: La Notion de D ouglas, M . (1966) Purity and Danger (London).
Da'imdn dans le Pythagorisme ancien (Bibliotheque de la Factdte de Philosophic (1970) Natural Symbols (London).
et Lettres de I’U niversite de L iege, 165, Paris). (1975) Implicit Meanings (London).
(1967) Les Maitres de verite dans la grke archaique (Paris). Douglas, M . (ed.) (1970) Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations (London).
(1968) ‘ L a Phalange; Probl^mcs et controverses’ in ProbUmes de la guerre en (1973) Rules and Meanings (London).
Gr^ce ancienne, ed. J . P. V ern an t (Paris and T h e H ague), pp. 1 19-42. D over, K . J . (1968) Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (U niversity o f California Press,
D etienne, M . and V ern an t, J .-P . (1978) Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Berkeley and Los Angeles).
Society (trans. J . L lo yd o f Les Ruses de Γ intelligence: la metis des grecs, Paris, (1974) Greek Popular Morality in the time o f Plato and Aristotle (O xford).
1974), (Hassocks, Sussex). (1975) ‘ T h e freedom o f the intellectual in G reek S o cie ty ’, Talanta (Proceedings
D eubner, L. (1900) D e Incubatione (Leipzig). o f the D u tch A rch aeological and Historical Society) vii, 24-54.
(19 10 ) ‘ C h a r m s a n d A m u le t s ( G r e e k ) ’ , in Encyclopaedia o f Religion and Ethics, D rabkin, L E. (1938) ‘ Notes on the laws o f motion in A risto d e ’, American Journal
ed. J. H a s tin g s , V o l . m (E d in b u r g h ), p p . 4 3 3 -9 . o f Philology L ix, 60- 84.
D ia m o n d , A . S. ( 1 9 3 5 ) Primitive Law ( L o n d o n ) . D rachm ann, A . B, (1922) Atheism in Pagan Antiquity (London and Copenhagen).
(19 71) Primitive Law Past and Present ( L o n d o n ) . (1953-4) ‘ T h e plane astrolabe and the anaphoric clo ck ’ , Centaurus in, 183-9.
D i Benedetto, V . (1966) ‘ T en denza e probabilita n ell’antica m edicina g r e c a ’ , (1967-8) ‘ A rchim edes and the science o f physics’ , Centaurus x ii, i - i i.
Critica Storica v , 3 15-68. Drayson, W . W . ( 1867-8) ‘ Rem arks on the stellar longitudes assigned by Ptolem y ’ ,
( 1 9 5 3 - 4 ) ‘ A n c i e n t a s t r o n o m i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s ’ . Journal o f the British
D ic k s , D . R . Monthly Notices o f the Royal Astronomical Society x x v iii, 207-10.
Astronomical Association l x i v , 77-85. D recker, J . (1927-8) ‘ Das Planisphaerium des Claudius Ptolem aeus’ , Isis ix,
(1959) ‘ T h a le s ’ , Classical Quarterly N S ix, 294-309. 255-78.
(1960) The Geographical Fragments o f Hipparchus (London). (1928) ‘ Des Johannes Philoponos Schrift viber das A stro la b ’ , Isis x i, 1 5 - 4 4 .
(1966) ‘ Solstices, equinoxes and the Presocratics’ , Journal o f Hellenic Studies D reyer, J . L . E. (1906) History o f the Planetary Systems from Thales to Kepler (C am ­
L x x x v i, 26-40. bridge).
276 Bibliography
Bibliography 277
(19 16 -17 ) O n the origin o f Ptolem y’s catalogue o f stars’ , Monthly Notices o f the
the Institute o f the History o f Medicine v (1937), 201-46), in Edelstein 1967,
Royal Astronomical Society l x x v i i , 528-39.
pp. 205-46.
(19 17-18 ) ‘ O n the origin o f Ptolem y’s catalogue o f stars’ , Monthly Notices o f the
(1943/1967) The Hippocratic Oath (Supplements to the Bulletin o f the H istory o f
Royal Astronomical Society l x x v i i i , 343-9.
M edicine, i, Baltim ore, 1943), in Edelstein 1967, pp. 3-63.
D river, G . R . (1976) Semitic Writing (ist ed. 1948), revised ed. (London).
(i952fl/i967) ‘ T h e relation o f ancient philosophy to m ed icin e’ {Bulletin o f the
D ruart, T .-A . (1975) ‘ L a stoicheiologie de P la to n ’ , Revue Philosophique de Louvain
History o f Medicine x x v i (1952), 299-316), in Edelstein 1967, pp. 349-66.
Lxxm , 243-62.
(1952A/1967) ‘ R ecen t trends in the interpretation o f ancient science’ {Journal
Dubs, H . H . (1927) Hsuntze, The Moulder o f Ancient Confucianism (London).
o f the History o f Ideas x m (1952), 573-604), in Edelstein 1967, pp. 401-39.
(1928) The Works o f Hsuntze (London).
(1967) Ancient Medicine, edd. O . and G. L . T em kin (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore).
D ucatillon, J . (1977) Polemiques dans la Collection Hippocratique (Lille and Paris).
E hrenburg, V . (1935) Ost und West (Schriften der philosophischen F akultat der
D uchem in, J . (1968) L ’ AfOON dans la tragedie grecque (ist ed. 1945), 2nd ed.
deutschen U niversitat in Prag, 15, Briinn).
(P aris).
(1940) ‘ Isonom ia’ , Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen Altertums-
D uchesne-Guillem in, J . (1953) Ormazd et Ahriman, Vaventure dualiste dans Γ antiquity
wissenschafi, Suppl, Bd v ii, cols. 293-301.
(Paris).
( 1946) Aspects o f the Ancient World (O xfo rd ).
( 1 9 5 6 ) ^Persische W eisheit in griechischem G ew ande? ’ Harvard Theological Review
(1973) From Solon to Socrates (ist ed. 1968), 2nd ed. (London).
X L I X , 115-2 2 .
Einarson, B. (1936) ‘ O n certain m athem atical terms in A ristod e’s lo g ic ’, American
(1962) La Religion de VIran ancien (Paris).
Journal o f Philology l v i i , 33-54 and 15 1-7 2 .
D uckw orth, W . L . H . (1962) Galen On Anatomical Procedures, The Later Books trans.
E itrem , S. (1941) ‘ L a m agie com m e m otif litteraire chez les grecs et les rom ains’ ,
W . L . H . D uckw orth, edd. M . C . Lyons and B. Tow ers (C am bridge).
Symbolae Osloenses x x i, 39-83.
D uring, L (1944) Aristotle's Chemical Treatise, Meteorologica Book I V (Goteborgs
E liade, M . (1946) ‘ L e problem e du cham anism e’ , Revue de Γ histoire des religions
Hogskolas Arsskrift l , G o tebo rg).
c x x x i, 5-52.
(1961) ‘ A ristotle’s m ethod in b io lo g y ’, in Aristote et les problkmes de methode, ed.
( 1964) Shamanism : Ancient techniques o f ecstasy (trans. W . R . T rask o f Le Chamanisme
S. M ansion (L ouvain and Paris), pp. 2 13 -2 1.
et les techniques archdiques de I'extase, Paris, 1951) (London).
(1966) Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens (H eidelberg).
Elias, J . A . (1968) ‘ “ S o cratic” vs. “ P la to n ic” D ia lectic’ , Journal o f the History o f
Duhem , P. (1905-6) Les Origines de la statique, 2 vols. (Paris).
Philosophy v i, 205-16.
( 190B) ‘ ΣΟΟΖΕΙN TA Φ Α ΙN OME NA ’ , Annales de Philosophie Chretienne v i, 1 1 3-39,
Essertier, D . (1927) Les Formes infirieures de I’explication (Paris).
277-302, 352-77. 482-514, 561-92. Eucken, R . (1872) D ie Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin).
(1954a) The Aim and Structure o f Physical Theory (trans. P. P. W iener o f 2nd ed. o f
Evans, J . D . G . (1975) ‘ T h e codification o f false refutations in A ristotle’s D e
La Theorie physique: son objet, sa structure, Paris, 1914) (Princeton U niversity
Sophisticis Elenchis ’ , Proceedings o f the Cambridge Philological Society N S x x i, 42-52.
Press, Princeton, N ew Jersey).
(1977) Aristotle’s Concept o f Dialectic (C am bridge).
(1954^) Le Systhme du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon ά Copemic,
Evans, M . G . (1958-9) ‘ C ausality and explanation in the logic o f A risto d e ’,
Vols. r and 11, 2nd ed. (Paris).
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research x ix , 466-85.
Duli^re, W .-L . (1965) ‘ Les “ D ictya q u es” de Denys d ’Egee ou les dilem m es du
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1937) Witchcraft, Oracles and M agic among the Azande
“ sic et n o n ” de la m edecine antique. H istoire d ’un procede d ia lectiq u e ’,
(O xfo rd ).
V A n tiquite Classique x x K iv , 506-18.
(1956) N uer Religion (O xford).
Dundes, A . (1975) Analytic Essays in Folklore (T he H ague and Paris).
Farrington, B. (1939) Science and Politics in the Ancient W orld (London).
D urkheim , E. (1912/1976) The Elementary Forms o f the Religious L ife (trans. J . W .
(1944-9/1961) Greek Science (ist ed. 2 vols. 1944-9) revised ed. (London 1961).
Sw ain o iL e s Formeselementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1912), 2nd ed. (London).
(1953-4) ‘ T h e rise o f abstract science am ong the G reek s’, Centaurus iii, 32-9.
D urkheim , E. and Mauss, M . (1901-2) ‘ De quelques formes prim itives de classifi­
(1957) ‘ T h e Greeks and the experim ental m eth o d ’, Discovery x v iii, 68-9.
c a tio n ’, U Annee sociologique v i, 1-72.
Festugi^re, A . J . (1944-54) La Revelation d'Herm is trismegiste, 4 vols. (Paris).
East, S. P. (1958) ‘ D e la m ethode en biologie selon A ristote’ , Laval Theologique et
(1948) Hippocrate, VAncienne midecine (Etudes et commentaires, 4, Paris).
Philosophique xrv, 2 13 -3 5.
Feuer, L . S. (1953) ‘ Sociological aspects o f the relation betw een language and
Ebbell, B. (1937) The Papyrus Ebers (Copenhagen and London).
philosop hy’, Philosophy o f Science x x , 85-100.
Edelstein, E .J . and Edelstein, L. (1945) Asclepius, 2 vols. (Johns Hopkins,
F eyerabend, P. K . (1961) Knowledge without Foundations (O berlin).
B altim ore).
(1962) ‘ Explanation, reduction and em piricism ’ , in Scientific Explanation, Space,
Edelstein, L . (1931) ΠΕΡΙ AEP 63N und die Sammlung der hippokratischen Schriften
and Time (M innesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, 3), edd. H . F eigl
(Problem ata, 4, Berlin).
and G . M a xw ell (M inneapolis), pp. 28-97.
( 19 3 2 -3 /1967) ‘ T h e history o f anatom y in antiquity (originally ‘ D ie G eschichte
(1965) ‘ Problem s o f em piricism ’, in Beyond the Edge o f Certainty, ed. R . G .
der Sektion in der A n tik e ’ , Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissen-
C olodn y (Englewood Cliffs, N ew Jersey), pp. 145-260.
schaften und der M edizin in , 2 (1932-3), 100-56), in Edelstein 1967, pp. 247-301.
(1970a) ‘ Problems o f em piricism . Part H ’ , in The Nature and Function o f Scientific
(1935) ‘ H ip p okrates’ , Pauly-W issowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen Altertums-
Theories, ed. R . G . C olodn y (U niversity o f Pittsburgh), pp. 275-353.
wissenschaft, Suppl, Bd v i, cols. 1290-1345.
(19706) ‘ A gainst M eth od: O u d in e o f an anarchistic theory o f kn ow ledge’ , in
(1937/1967) ‘ G reek m edicine in its relation to religion and m a g ic’ {Bulletin o f
Analyses o f Theories and Methods o f Physics and Psychology (M innesota Studies in
278 Bibliography
the Philosophy o f Science, 4), edd. M . R adn er and S. W inokur (M inneapolis),
pp. 17-130.
(1975) Againt M ethod (London).
Field, G . G. (1930) Plato and his Contemporaries (London).
Filliozat, J . (1943) M agie et mSdecine (Paris).
Finley, M . I (1954/1977) The World o f Odysseus (is t ed. 1954), 2nd ed. (N ew Y o rk ,
1977)·
(1965) ‘ T ech n ical innovation and econom ic progress in the ancient w orld ,
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., x v in 29-45.
(1970) Early Greece: the Bronze and Archaic Ages (London).
(1973a) Democracy Ancient and Modem (London).
(1973Ζ») The Ancient Economy (London).
(1974) ‘ A then ian D em agogu es’ {Past and Present x x i (1962), 3-24) in Studies in
Ancient Society, ed. M . I F inley (London), pp. 1-25.
(1975a) ‘ M yth , m em ory and history’ {History and Theory iv ( i 964“ 5 )j 281-302)
in The Use and Abuse o f History (London), pp. 1 1-33.
(1975^) ‘ T h e freedom o f the citizen in the G reek w o r ld ’, Talanta (Proceedings
o f the D utch A rchaeological and Historical Society) v ii, 1-23.
(1977) ‘ Gensura n ell’antichit^ classica’ , Belfragor x x x ii, 605-22.
Finnegan, R . (1977) Oral Poetry (G am bridge).
Flashar, H . (ed.) (1971) Antike M edizin (D arm stadt).
Forke, A . (1907) Lun-Hing, Part I: Philosophical Essays o f Wang Cheung (L eip zig).
( 1 9 1 1) Lun-Hing, Part H : Miscellaneous Essays o f Wang Ch'ung (Berlin).
Fotheringham , J . K . (1915) ‘ T h e probable error o f a w ater-clo ck’, Classical
Review x x ix , 236-8.
(1922—3) ‘ T h e secular acceleration o f the m oon’s m ean m otion as determ ined
from occultations and conjunctions in the Almagest: (a co rrectio n )’. Monthly
Notices o f the Royal Astronomical Society l x x x i i i , 370-3.
(1923) ‘ T h e probable error o f a w ater-clock’ . Classical Review x x x v ii, 166-7.
(1928) ‘ T h e indebtedness o f G reek to G haldaean astronom y’ , The Observatory u ,
3 0 1-15 (also in (^uellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie und
Physik, B , 2, I ( 1 9 3 2 ) , Berlin, 1933, p p . 28-44).
Fotheringham , J . K . and Longbottom , G . ( i 9 14 -15 ) ‘ T h e secular acceleration o f
the m oon’s m ean m otion as determ ined from the occultations in the A lm a ­
ge st’, Monthly Notices o f the Royal Astronomical Society l x x v , 377“ 94 ’
Foucault, M , (1972) The Archaeology o f Knowledge (trans. A . M . Sheridan Sm ith
o f UArcheologie du savoir, Paris, 1969) (L ondon ).
Frankel, H . (1930/1975) ‘ Studies in Parm enides’ (originally ‘ P arm enidesstudien’,
Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen (Phil.-hist. K l.
1930)), in A llen and F urley 1975, pp. 1-47.
(1942 /1975) ‘ Zeno o f E lea’s attacks on p lu ra lity ’ {American Journal o f Philology
Lxm (1942), 1-25 and 193-206), in A llen and F urley 1975, pp. 102-42.
( 1960) Wege undFormenfriihgriechischen Denkens ( ist ed. 1955), 2nd ed. (M u n ch en ).
(1962/1975) Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy (trans. M . H adas and J . WUlis o f
2nd ed. o f Dichtung und Philosophic des friihen Griechentums, M unchen, 1962)
(O xford, 1975).
Frankfort, H . (1948) Kingship and the Gods (G hicago).
Frankfort, H . (ed.) (1949) Before Philosophy (ist ed. The Intellectual Adventure o f
Ancient M an, G hicago, 1946), 2nd ed. (London).
Frazer, J . G . (1 9 1 1 - 1 5 ) The Golden Bough, 12 vols., 3rd ed. (London).
Frede, M . (1974) D ie stoische Logik (G ottingen).
Fredrich, G. (1899) Hippokratische Untersuchungen (PhUol. Untersuch. 15, Berlin).
Freudenthal, H . (1966) ‘ Y avait-il une crise des fondements des m athe-
Bibliography 279
m atiques dans I’antiquite? ’, Bulletin de la Sodite Mathematique de Belgique x viii,
43- 55 ·
Friediander, P. (1958-69) Plato (trans. H . M eyerhoiF o f 2nd ed. o f Platon, Berlin,
1954-60), 3 vols. (London).
Frisk, H . (1935) ‘ Wahrheit’ und ' Liige' in den indogermanischen Sprachen (Goteborgs
Hogskolas Arsskrift x l i , 3, G oteborg).
F ritz, H . von (1934a) 'Th.ea.itetos \ Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, 2nd ser. 10 H albban d, v . 2, cols. 1351-72 .
(1934^) ‘ T h eod oro s’, Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen Altertums­
wissenschaft, 2nd ser. 10 H albban d, v,2 , cols. 18 11-2 5.
(1943) ‘v 0os and νοεΐν in the H om eric poem s’ . Classical Philology x x x v in , 79-93.
(*945) ‘ voOs, νοεϊν and their derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding
A naxagoras). I ’ , Classical Philology x l , 223-42.
( 1945/1970) ‘ T h e discovery o f incom m ensurability b y Hippasus o f M eta-
p o n tu m ’ {Annals o f Mathematics, 2nd ser., x l v i (1945), 242-64), in Furley and
A llen 1970, pp. 382-412.
( 1946) ‘ voOs, νοεϊν and their derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding
A naxagoras). I I ’, Classical Philology y m , 12-34.
(*9 5 5 /1971) ‘ D ie APXAI in der griechischen M a th em a tik ’ {Archiv fu r Begriffs-
geschichte i (1955), 13-10 3), in von F ritz 1971, pp. 335-429.
(^959/1971) ‘ G leichheit, K o n gru en z und A hnlichkeit in der antiken M a th e­
m atik bis a u f E u k lid ’ {Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte iv (1959), 7 -8 1), in von
F ritz 19 7 1, pp. 430-508.
(i960) ‘ M athem atiker und Akusm atiker bei den alten P ythagoreern ’ , Sitzungs-
berichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phii.-hist. K l., i960, 11,
M unchen.
(1964/1971) ‘ D ie ΕΠΛΓύύΓΗ bei A ristoteles’ {Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. K l., 1964, 3, M unchen, 1964), in
von F ritz 1971, pp. 623-76.
( 19 7 1) Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft (Berlin and N ew Y o r k ).
Furley, D. J . (1967) Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton U n iversity Press,
Princeton, N ew Jersey).
Furley, D . J . and A llen , R . E. (edd.) (1970) Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, V o l. i
(London).
G adam er, H . G ., Gaiser, Κ ., G undert, H ., K ram er, J ., and K u h n , H . (1968)
Idee und Z M (H eidelberg).
G add , G .J . (1973) ‘ H am m urabi and the end o f his d yn asty’ , Cambridge Ancient
History, 3rd ed. V o l. n, i, ch. 5 (G am bridge), pp. 176-227.
G an dt, F. de (1975) ‘ L a Mathesis d ’A ristote: Introduction aux Analytiques seconds'.
Revue des sciences philosophiques et thiologiques l i x , 564-600.
(1976) ‘ L a MathJsis d ’A ristote: Introduction au x Analytiques seconds', Revue des
sciences philosophiques et thdologiques l x , 37-84.
G atzem eier, M . (1970) D ie Naturphilosophie des Straton von Lampsakos (M eisenheim ).
G ellner, E. (1962/1970) ‘ Goncepts and so ciety’ (from The Transactions o f the F ifth
World Congress o f Sociology, 1962) in W ilson 1970, pp. 18-49 (also reprinted in
Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, edd. D . Em m et and A . M acIn tyre,
L ondon, 1970, pp. 115-4 9 ).
(1973) ‘ T h e savage and the m odern m in d ’ , in H orton and Finnegan 1973,
pp. 162-81.
G ent, W . ( 1966) ‘ D er B egriff des W eisen ’, Zeitschriftfiirphilosophische Forschung x x ,
7 7 -1 1 7 .
G ernet, L . (1917) Recherches sur le dheloppement de la pensee juridique et morale en
Grhce (Paris).
28ο Bibliography
(1955) Droit et sociiti dans la Grice ancienne (P a ris).'
(1945/1968) ‘ L es origines de la philosophic’ {Bulletin de Venseignement public du
Maroc CLXXxnr (1945), 1-12 ) in G ernet 1968, pp. 415-30.
(1948-9/1968) ‘ D ro it et prέdΓoit en Grfece ancienn e’ {VAnrUe sociologique,
1948-9 (Paris 1951), 2 1-1 1 9 ) in G ernet 1968, pp. 175-260.
(1955/1968) ‘ L ’anthropologie dans la religion grecq u e ’ {Anthropologie Religieme,
ed. C . J . Bleeker, Supplem ents to N U M E N , vol. 2, L eiden, 1955, 49-59) in
G ernet 1968, pp. 9 -1 9 .
(1956/1968) ‘ Choses visibles et choses invisibles’ {Revue philosophique cxLVi
(1956), 79-86), in G ernet 1968, pp. 405-14.
( 1968) Anthropologie de la Grice antique (Paris).
G halioungui, P. ( 1963) Magic and Medical Science in Ancient Egypt (L ondon ).
G igon , O . (1936) ‘ G orgias “ O b e r das N ichtsein ’ ” , Hermes UiXi, 186-213.
(1946) ‘ D ie naturphilosophischen Voraussetzungen der antiken B io lo gie’ ,
Gesnerus m , 35-58.
(1962) Vita Aristotelis Marciana (Berlin).
(1968) Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie (is t ed. 1945), 2nd ed. (Basel).
(1973) ‘ D e r B e g riif d e r F reiheit in d er A n tik e ’ , Gymnasium l x x x , 8-56.
G ilbert, O . (1907) Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums (L eipzig).
(1910) ‘ Spekulation un d V olksglaube in der ionischen Philosophie’ , Archiv fiir
Religionswissenschaft x in , 306-32.
G illespie, C . M . ( 1925) ‘ T h e A ristotelian Categories ’ , Classical Quarterly x ix , 75-84.
G ingerich, O . (forthcoming) ‘ W as Ptolem y a fra u d ? ’ , Journal o f the Royal
Astronomical Society.
G ladigow , B. (1965) Sophia und Kosmos (Spudasm ata, i, H ildesheim ).
{1967) ‘ Z u m M akarism os des W eisen ’ , Hermes x c v , 404-33.
G luckm an , M . (1965) Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (O xford).
(1967) The Judicial Process among the Barotse o f Northern Rhodesia (is t ed. 1955),
2nd ed. (M anchester U niversity Press).
(1972) The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence (is t ed. 1965) 2nd ed. (M anchester
U n iversity Press).
G otze, A . (1923) ‘ Persische W eisheit in griechischem G ew an d e: Bin B eitrag zur
G eschichte der M ikrokosm os-Idee’ , Z^itschrift fiir Indologie und Iranistik 11,
60-98 and 16 7 -7 7 .
G ohlke, P. (1924) ‘ D ie Entstehungsgeschichte der naturwissenschafdichen
Schriften des A ristoteles’ , Hermes l i x , 274-306.
(1936) Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik (Berlin).
G oldschm idt, V , (1947a) L · Paradigme dans la dialectiqueplatonicienne (Paris).
(i947Z>) Les Dialogues de Platon: structure et methode dialectique (Paris).
(1970) Questions Platoniciennes (Paris).
Goldstein, B. R . (1967) ‘ T h e A ra b ic version o f Ptolem y’s Planetary Hypotheses',
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society l v i i , 4.
G oldstein, B. R . and Sw erdlow , N . (1970) ‘ Plan etary distances and sizes in an
A nonym ous A ra b ic treatise preserved in Bodleian M S M arsh 621 ’ , Centaurus
XV, 135-70.
G oltz, D . (1974) Studien zur altorientalischen und griechischen Heilkunde, Therapie,
Arzneibereitung, Rezeptstruktur (Sudhoffs A rch iv Beiheft 16, W iesbaden).
G om m e, A . W . (1945-70) A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 4 vols. (V o l. iv
w ith A . A ndrew es and K . J . D over) (O xford).
G om perz, H . (1912) Sophistik und Rhetorik (L eipzig).
(1943) ‘ Problems and methods o f early G reek scien ce’ , Journal o f the History o f
Ideas rv, 16 1-76 .
G om perz, T . (1910) Die Apologie der Heilkunst, 2nd ed. (L eipzig).
Bibliography 281
Goody, J. (1977) The Domestication o f the Savage Mind (Cambridge).
G ood y, J . and W a tt, L P. (1968) ‘ T h e consequences o f lite ra cy ’, in Literacy in
Traditional Societies, ed. J . G o od y (C am bridge), pp. 27-68.
G ottschalk, H . B. (1961) ‘ T h e authorship o f Meteorologica, Book i v ’. Classical
Quarterly N S x i, 67-79.
(1965) Strato of Lampsacus: Some texts (Proceedings o f the Leeds Philosophical
and L iterary Society, L itera ry and H istorical Section x i (1964-6), Part v i,
1965)·
G ourevitch, D . (1969) ‘ D eontologie m edicale; quelques probl^mes, i ’ . Melanges
d'Archeologie et d'Histoire L xx x i, 519-36 .
(1970) ‘ D eontologie m edicale: quelques probl^mes, 11’, Milanges d'Archeologie et
d’Histoire L xxxn , 737-52.
G ranet, M . (1934) La Pensie chinoise (Paris).
Grensem ann, H . (1968) Die hippokratische Schrift ‘ Ober die heilige Krankheit' (Ars
M ed ica, A b t. 11 Bd i , Berlin).
G riffith, G . T . (1966) ‘ Isegoria in the assem bly at A th en s’, in Ancient Society and
Institutions (Studies presented to V . Ehrenburg) (O xford), pp. 115-38.
G rim aldi, W . M . A . (1972) Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric (Hermes
Einzelschriften 25, W iesbaden).
G ueroult, M . (1963) ‘ L ogique, argum entation, et histoire de la philosophie chez
A risto te ’, Logique et Analyse v i, 431-49.
G uterbock, H . G . (1962) ‘ H ittite m ed icin e’, Bulletin of the History o f Medicine
x x x v i, 109-13.
G ullini, G . (1972) ‘ T radizion e e originality neU’architettura Achem enide a
P asargad e’ , Parola del Passato x x v ii, 13-39.
G un del, H . G . (1968) Weltbild und Astrologie in den griechischen Z^uberpapyri
(M u n ch en ).
G un del, W . (1922) Sterne und Stembilder im Glauben des Altertums und der Neuzeit
(L eipzig).
(1936) Neue astrologische Texte des Hermes Trismegistos (AbhandJungen der
bayerischen A kadem ie der W issenschaften, phil.-hist. A b t., N F 12, 1935,
M u n ch en ).
G un del, W . and G un del, H . G . (1966) Astrologumena: Die astrologische Literatur in
der Antike und ihre Geschichte (Sudhoffs A rch iv Beiheft 6, W iesbaden).
G undert, H . (1971) Dialog und Dialektik: Struktur des platonischen Dialogs
(A m sterdam ).
(1973) ‘ “ Perspektivische T a u sc h u n g ” b e i Platon und die P rinzipien lehre’ , in
Zetesis (Festschrift de Strycker) (A ntw erp), pp. 80-97.
G uthrie, W . K . G. (1950) The Greeks and their Gods (London).
(1962) A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, The Earlier Presocratics and the
Pythagoreans (C am bridge).
(1965) A History o f Greek Philosophy, Vol. II, The Presocratic Tradition from
Parmenides to Democritus (C am bridge).
(1969) A History o f Greek Philosophy, Vol. I ll, The Fifth-Century Enlightenment
(C am bridge).
H ahm , D . E. (1972) ‘ Ch rysipp us’ solution to the D em ocritean dilem m a o f the
co n e ’, Isis Lxm , 205-20.
H alliday, W . R . (1913) Greek Divination (London).
(^936) ‘ Som e notes on the treatm ent o f disease in a n tiq u ity ’, in Greek Poetry and
Life (Essays presented to G . M urray) (O xford), pp. 277-94.
Hamblin, C . L . (1970) Fallacies (London).
Hamelin, O . (1907) Essai sur les SUmentsprincipaux de la representation (Paris).
(1931) Le Systime d’Aristote (ist ed. 1920), 2nd ed. (Paris).
282 Bibliography
H am ilton, M . (1906) Incubation or the cure o f disease in pagan temples and Christian
churches (St A ndrew s and London).
H am lyn, D . W . (1961) Sensation and Perception (London).
(1976) ‘ A ristotelian E p ag o ge ’ , Phronesis x x i, 167-84.
Ham m er-Jensen, L (1915) ‘ Das sogenannte I V . Buch der Meteorologie des
A ristoteles’ , Hermes l , 113 -3 6.
Hanson, N . R . (1958) Patterns o f Discovery (C am bridge).
H are, R . M . (1965) ‘ Plato and the M ath em atician s’ , in Bam brough 1965,
pp. 21-38 .
H arig, G . (1977) ‘ Bem erkungen zum V erhaltnis der griechischen zur altonen-
talischen M e d izin ’ , in R . J o ly 1977, pp. 77~94 ·
H a r r is , C . R . S . ( 1 9 7 3 ) The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine
from Alcmaeon to Galen (O x fo r d ).
Harrison, A . R . W . (1968 -71) The Laws o f Athens, 2 vols. (O xford).
Harrison, J . E. (1908) Prolegomena to the Study o f Greek Religion (ist ed. 1903),
2nd ed. (C am bridge).
H artner, W . (1968) Oriens-Occidens (Hildesheim ).
H arvey, F. D . (1966) ‘ L iteracy in the A then ian D e m o cra cy ’ , Revue des itudes
grecques L xx ix , 585-635·
H ase, H . (1839) ‘ Joannis A lexan drini, cognom ine PhUoponi, de usu astrolabii
ejusque constructione lib ellu s’ , Rheinisches Museum v i, 12 7 -71.
Hasse, H . and Scholz, H . (1928) D ie Grundlagenkrisis der griechischen Mathematik
(Berlin) (also in Kant-Studien x x x iii (1928), 4-34).
H avelock, E. A . (1963) Preface to Plato (O xford).
(1966) ‘ Pre-Literacy and the Pre-Socratics’ , Bulletin o f the Institute o f Classical
Studies X I I I , 44-67.
(1971) Prologue to Greek Literacy (U niversity o f Cincinnati).
(1976) Origins o f Western Literacy (O ntario Institute for Studies in E ducation 14,
T oronto).
H eath, T . E. (1913) Aristarchus o f Samos (O xford).
(1921) A History o f Greek Mathematics, 2 vols. (O xford).
(1926) The Thirteen Books o f Euclid's Elements, 3 vols. (ist ed. 1908), 2nd ed.
(C am bridge),
( 1 949) Mathematics in Aristotle (O x fo r d ).
H eiberg, I. L . (1925) Geschichte der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften im Altertum
(M iinchen).
H eidel, W . A . (1909-10) ‘ περί φύσεωξ: A study o f the conception o f nature am ong
the P re-Socratics’, Proceedings o f the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences x l v ,
77-133·
(1933) The Heroic Age o f Science (Baltim ore).
(1937) The Frame o f the Ancient Greek M aps (N ew Y o rk).
(1940) ‘ T h e Pythagoreans and G reek m athem atics’ , American Journal o f
Philology l x i , 1-33.
(1941) Hippocratic Medicine: its spirit and method (N ew Y o rk).
H eim , R . (1893) ‘ Incantam enta M agica G raeca L a tin a ’, Jahrbucher fu r classische
Philologie, Suppl. Bd xrx, 463-576.
H einim ann, F. (1945) Nomas und Physis (Schweizerische Beitrage zur Altertum s-
wissenschaft i, Basel).
(1961) ‘ Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τ έχ ν η ’ . Museum Helveticum x v n i,
105-30,
(1975) ‘ M a s s - G e w i c h t - Z a h l ’, Museum Helveticum x x x ii, 183-96.
H eitsch, E. (1962) ‘ D ie nicht-philosophische Α Λ Η Θ Ε ΙΑ ’ , Hermes x c , 24-33,
(1963) ‘ W ahrheit als E rin n erun g’ , Hermes x c i, 3&-52.
Bibliography 283
(1970) Gegenwart und Evidenz bei Parmenides (Akadem ie der Wissenschaften und
der L iteratur, M ainz, A bhandlun gen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen
Klasse, J ah rgan g 1970, 4, W iesbaden).
(1974) ‘ E videnz und W ahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen bei Parm enides’ , Hermes cii,
4 1 1 -1 9 .
H eller, S. (1956-8) ‘ Eine Beitrag zur D eutung der Theodoros-Stelle in Platons
D ialog “ T h e a e te t” ’, Centaurus v , 1-58.
( 1958) T>ie Entdeckung der stetigen Teilung durch die Pythagoreer (A bhandlungen der
deutschen A kadem ie der Wissenschaften zu B eilin, K lasse fiir M athem atik,
Physik und T ech nik, J ah rgan g 1958, 6, Berlin).
(1967) ‘ Theaetets Bedeutung als M ath em a tik er’, Sudhoffs Archiv l i , 55-78.
H em pel, C . G . (1958) ‘ T h e theoretician’s dilem m a: a study in the logic o f theory
construction’, in Concepts, Theories, and the M ind—Body Problem (M innesota
Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, 2), ed. H . Feigl, M . Scriven and G .
M a xw ell (M inneapolis), pp. 37-98.
(*973) ‘ T h e m eaning o f theoretical terms: a critique o f the standard em piricist
con strual’, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy o f Science, iv, ed. P. Suppes and
others (Am sterdam and N ew Y o rk), pp. 367-78.
H em pel, C . G . and O ppenheim , P. (1948) ‘ Studies in the logic o f exp lan ation ’ ,
Philosophy o f Science x v , 135-75 350-2.
H enrichs, A . ( 1 9 7 5 ) ‘ T w o doxographical notes: Dem ocritus and Prodicus on
religio n ’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology l x x i x , 93-123.
H erter, H . (1963) ‘ D ie kulturhistorische Theorie der hippokratischen Schrift von
der alten M e d izin ’ , M aia x v , 464-83.
H erzog, R . (1931) D ie Wunderheilungen von Epidauros (Philologus Suppl. Bd x x ii, 3,
L eip zig).
Hess, W . (1970) ‘ Erfahrung und Intuition bei A ristoteles’ , Phronesis x v , 48-82.
Hesse, M . (1961) Forces and Fields: The Concept o f Action at a Distance in the history o f
physics (London).
(1963) M odels and Analogies in Science (London and N ew Y o rk).
(1974) The Structure o f Scientific Inference (London),
H intikka, J . (1972) ‘ O n the ingredients o f an A ristotelian science ’, Nous v i, 55-69,
( ^ 9 7 3 ) Time and Necessity (O xford).
(1974) Knowledge and the Known (D ordrecht and Boston).
H intikka, J . and Rem es, U . (1974) The M ethod o f Analysis (Boston Studies in the
Philosophy o f Science 25, D ordrecht and Boston).
H irzel, R , (1903) “Α γραφοί Νόμο$ (A bhandlungen der phiJ,-hist. Classe der
koniglich sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften x x , i, 1900, L eip zig,
1903)·
(1907) Themis, D ike und Verwandtes (L eipzig).
H ocutt, M . (1974) ‘ A ristotle’s F our Becauses’ , Philosophy x l i x , 385-99.
H oebel, E. A dam son (1964) The Law o f Primitive M an (H arvard U niversity Press,
C am brid ge, M ass.),
H olscher, U , (1953/1970) ‘ A naxim an der and the beginnings o f G reek philo­
so p h y’ (originally ‘ A naxim an der und die A nfange der Philosophie’, Hermes
L xx x i (1953), 2 57-77 and 385-418), in F urley and AJlen 1970, pp. 281-322.
( 1968) Anfdngliches Fragen (G ottin gen ).
H offm ann, E. (1925) D ie Sprache und die archaische Logik (Tubingen).
H ofm ann, J . E. (1956-8) ‘ E rganzende Bem erkungen zum “ geometrischen ”
Irrationalitatsbew eis der alten G rie ch e n ’, Centaurus v , 59-72.
H oijer, H . (1954) ‘ T h e S a p ir-W h o rf hypothesis’, in Language and Culture, ed.
H . H oijer (U niversity o f C h icago Press), pp. 92-105.
H olw erda, D . (1955) ΦΥΣΙΣ (G roningen).
284 Bibliography
H opfner, T . (1925) Orient undgriechische Philosophie (L eipzig).
(1928) ‘ M a g e ia ’ , Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopddie der classischen Altertums-
wissenschaft, 27 H albban d, x iv , i, cols. 301-93.
(1937) ‘ T ra u m d e u tu n g’ , Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopddie der classischen Altertums-
wissenschaft, 2nd ser., 12 H albban d, v i, 2, cols. 2233-45.
H orne, R . A . (1966) ‘ A ristotelian C h em istry’, Chymia x i, 2 1-7 .
H orton, R . (1967) ‘ A frican traditional thought and western scien ce’ , Africa
XXXVII, 50-71 and 155-87 (abbreviated version reprinted in W ilson 1970,
pp. 1 3 1 -7 1 )·
H orton, R . and Finnegan, R . (edd.) (1973) Modes o f Thought (London).
H ubert, H . (1904) ‘ M a g ia ’ , in Dictionnaire des antiquites grecque.s et romaines, ed.
C . D arem berg, E. Saglio, E . Pettier, V o l. m (Paris), pp. 14 9 4 -1521.
H udson-W illiam s, H . L . (1950) ‘ C onventional forms o f debate and the M elian
d ia lo g u e ’ , American Journal of Philology l x x i, 156-69.
H uizin ga, J . (1944/1970) Homo Ludens (trans. R . F. G. H ull o f 1944 G erm an
edition (original D u tch 1938), 2nd ed. London, 1970).
H um e, R . E . (1931) The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (ist ed, 1921), 2nd ed.
(O xfo rd ).
Hussey, E. (1972) The Presocratics (London).
Ilberg, J . (1931) Rufus von Ephesos. Ein griechischer Arzt in trajanischer Z'^it (A bhand-
lungen der phil.-hist. K lasse der sachsischen A kadem ie der W issenschaften
XLi, I, 1930, L eip zig, 1931).
Itard, J . (1961) Les Livres arithmetiques d'Euclide (Paris).
Iversen, E . (1939) Papyrus Carlsberg No. VIII (D et kgl. Danske Videnskabernes
Selskab. Historisk-filologiske M eddelelser x x v i, 5, Copenhagen).
Jacobsen, T , (1949) ‘ M esop otam ia’ , in Frankfort 1949, pp. 137-234.
J aco b y , F . (1923-58) Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Berlin 1923-30,
L eiden 1940-58).
Jaeger, W . (1939-45) Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. G . H ighet, 3 vols.
(O x fo rd ).
(1947) The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (G ifford Lectures 1936), tians.
E. S. Robinson (O xford).
(1948) Aristotle: Fundamentals o f the History o f his Development, trans, R . Robinson
(is t ed. 1934), 2nd ed. (O xford).
Janssens, E , (1949-50) ‘ Platon et les sciences d ’observation ’ . Revue de VUni-
versite de Bruxelles 11, 249-68.
J arvie, I. C . (1976) ‘ O n the lim its o f sym bolic interpretation in an th ropology’ .
Current Anthropology x v ii, 687-91,
J arvie, L C , and Agassi, J , (1967/1970) ‘ T h e problem o f the rationality o f m a g ic’
{British Journal o f Sociology x v iii (1967), 55-74 ), in W ilson 1970, pp. 172-93.
Jeanm aire, H . (1939) Couroi et Courites (Lille).
J effery, L . H . (1961) The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece (O xford).
Joach im , H . H . (1904) ‘ A ristotle’s conception o f chem ical com bin ation ’ . Journal
of Philolog)) XXIX, 72-86.
(1922) Aristotle, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away (O xford),
Johan n , H ,-T . (1973) ‘ H ippias von Elis und der Physis-N om os-G edanke’,
Phronesis x v iii, 15-2 5,
J o ly , H , (J974) Le Renversementplatonicien: Logos, Episteme, Polis (Paris).
J o iy , R , (1966) Le Niveau de la science hippocratique (Paris).
(1968) ‘ L a biologie d ’A ristote’, Revue philosophiqie CLViii, 219-53.
J o ly , R . (ed,) (1977) Corpus Hippocraticum (Editions Universitaires de M ons, Serie
Sciences Hum aines iv, U niversite de M ons),
Jones, J , W . (1956) Lau) and legal theory of the Greeks (O xford).
Bibliography 285
Jones, W . H . S. (1923-31) Hippocrates, Loeb. ed. 4 vols. (V ol. m w ith E. T .
W ithington) (London and Cam brid ge, M ass.).
(1946) Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece (Suppl. to the Bulletin o f the
H istory o f M edicine 8, B altim ore).
(1947) The Medical Writings o f Anonymus Londinensis (C am bridge).
J op e, J , (1972) ‘ Subordinate dem onstrative science in the Sixth Book o f A ristotle’s
Physics \ Classical Quarterly N S x x ii, 279-92.
Jou an n a, J . (1961) ‘ Presence d ’E m pedocle dans la C ollection H ip p ocra tiq u e’,
Bulletin de VAssociation Guillaume Bude (1961), 452-63.
Jiirss, F. (1967) ‘ IJber die G run dlagen der A stro lo gie’, Helikon vii, 63-80.
Ju n ge, G . (1958) ‘ V o n Hippasus bis Philolaus. Das Irrationale und die geo-
metrischen G ru n d begriffe’, Classica et Mediaevalia x ix , 4 1-7 2 .
K a h n , C . H . (i960) Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (N ew Y o rk).
(1966a) ‘ Sensation and consciousness in A ristotle’s p sych ology’ , Archiv fiir
Geschichte der Philosophie x lv ii i, 43-81.
(1966^) ‘ T h e G reek verb “ to b e ” and the concept o f b e in g ’, Foundations of
Language n, 245-65.
(1970) ‘ O n early G reek astron om y’. Journal of Hellenic Studies x c , 9 9 -116 .
(1971) ‘ R eligion and natural philosophy in Em pedocles’ doctrine o f the so u l’
{Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie x l i i (i960), 3 -35), in A nton and K ustas
1971» PP· 3-38·
(1973) Verb '‘ Be’’ in Ancient Greek (Foundations o f L an guage Suppl. 16,
D ordrecht).
K a p p , E, (1931/1975) ‘ Syllo gistic’ (originally ‘ Syllogistik’ , in Pauly-Wissowa
Real-Encyclopddie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, 2nd ser,, 7 H albban d,
IV I (1931), cols, 1046-67), in Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji 1975, pp, 35-49,
(1942) Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic (N ew Y o rk).
K attsoff, L . O . (1947-8) ‘ Ptolem y and scientific m eth o d ’, Isis x x x v iii, 18-22.
K e ith , A . B. (1925) The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads, 2 vols.
(H arvard U niversity Press, C am brid ge, M ass.).
K eller, O . (1909-13) Die antike Tierwelt, 2 vols. (L eipzig).
K en n ed y, G . (1963) The Art o f Persuasion in Greece (London).
K en yo n , F . G . (1951) Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome (ist ed. 1932),
2nd ed. (O xford).
K erferd, G . (1955) ‘ G orgias on N ature or that w hich is n o t’, Phronesis i, 3-25,
(1956-7) ‘ T h e m oral and p olitical doctrines o f A ntip hon the sophist. A recon­
sideration ’ , Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society N S iv, 26-32,
Kerschensteiner, J , (1945) Platon und der Orient (Stuttgart),
(1962) Kosmos: quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu den Vorsokratikem (Zetem ata 30,
M iin ch en ).
Kessels, A . H . M . (1969) ‘ A n cien t systems o f dream -classification’, Mnemosyne
4th ser. x x ii, 389-424.
K irk , G . S. (1960/1970) ‘ Popper on science and the Presocratics’ {Mind N S
L xix (i960), 318 -39), in F urley and A llen 1970, pp. 154-77.
(1961) ‘ Sense and common-sense in the developm ent o f G reek p h ilosop h y’.
Journal of Hellenic Studies lx x x i , 10 5-17.
K irk , G . S. and R aven, J . E. (1957) The Presocratic Philosophers (C am bridge).
K lein , J . (1968) Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra (trans. E. Brann
o f Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra, Q uellen und Studien
zu r G eschichte der M athem atik, A stronom ic und Physik b 3, i (1934),
pp. 18 -10 5 arid B 3, 2 (1936), pp. 122-235) (M .I.T . Press, C am bridge, M ass.).
K leingiinther, A . (1933) ΠΡΟύΤΟΣ ΕΥΡΕΤΗΣ Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer
Fragestellung (PhUologus, Suppl. Bd x x v i, i, L eip zig).
286 Bibliography
K low ski, J . (1966) ‘ D er historische U rsprung des K au salp rin zips’ , Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophie x l v i i i , 225-66.
(1970) ‘ Z u m Entstehen der logischen A rgu m en tatio n ’ , Rheinisches Museum cx iii,
1 1 1 -4 1 .
K n e a le , W . a n d K n e a le , M . (19 6 2 ) The Development of Logic (O x fo r d ).
K n o rr, W . R . ( 1 9 7 5 ) The Evolution of the Euclidean Elements (D ordrecht and Boston).
K n u tzen , G . H . (1964) Technologie in den hippokratischen Schriften περί διαίτης όξέων,
περί σγμώ ν, περί άρθρων εμβολής (y^cademie der W issenschaften und der
L iteratur, M ain z, A bhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen
Klasse, Jah rga n g 1963, 14, W iesbaden, 1964).
K o n ig, E . ( 1970) ‘ Aristoteles’ erste Philosophie als universale Wissenschaft von der
APXAI’, Archiv fUr Geschichte der Philosophie l i i , 225-46.
K o rn er, O . (1929) Die arztlichen Kenntnisse in Ilias und Odyssee (M unchen).
(1930) Die homerische Tierwelt (ist ed. 1880), 2nd ed. (M unchen).
K o ller, H . (1959-60) ‘ Das M odell der griechischen L o g ik ’ , Glotta x x x v iii, 6 1-7 4 .
K ollesch, J . (1974) ‘ D ie M edizin und ihre sozialen A ufgaben zur Z e it der
PoUskrise’, in Hellenische Poleis, V o l. iv, ed. E. C . W elskopf (Berlin), pp. 1850-
7 ^·
K osm an , L . A . ( 1 9 7 3 ) ‘ U n d e r s t a n d in g , e x p la n a tio n , a n d in s ig h t in th e
Analytics', in Exegesis and Argument, e d . E . N . L e e , A . P . D . M o u r e la to s a n d
R . M . R o r t y (A sse n ), p p . 3 7 4 -9 2 .
K ran z, W . (1938a) ‘ G leichnis und V ergleich in der friihgriechischen Philosophie ’ ,
Hermes l x x i i i , 99-122.
(19386) ‘ Kosm os und M ensch in der V orstellu ng friihen G riechentum s’ ,
Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen (phil.-hist. KJ.
N F II, 1938), pp. 12 1-6 1.
(1938—9) ‘ Kosm os als phUosophischer BegriflFfriihgriechischer Z e it ’, Philologus
x ciii, 430-48.
K rischer, T . (1965) ‘ ΕΤΥΜ ΟΣ und Α Λ Η Θ Η Σ ’ , Philologus c ix , 16 1-74 .
K ro ll, W . (1897) Antiker Aberglaube (H am burg).
(1940) ^ur Geschichte der aristotelischen Zoologie (A kadem ie der W issenschaften in
W ien, phil.-hist. K l., Sitzungsberichte, 218, 2, W ien).
K ucharski, P. ( 1 9 4 9 ) Les Chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon (Paris).
(1 9 6 5 ) ‘ S u r r e v o l u t i o n d e s m e th o d e s d u s a v o ir d a n s la p h ilo s o p h ie d e P l a t o n ’ ,
Revue philosophique c l v , 427-40.
K u d lien , F. (1964) ‘ H erophilos und der Beginn der m edizinischen Skepsis’,
Gesnerus x x i, 1-13 (reprinted in Flashar 1971, pp. 280-95).
(1966) R eview o f Alexanderson 1963, Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen c c x v iii, 36-42.
(19 6 7) Der Beginn des medizinischen Denkens bei den Griechen ( Z u r i c h a n d S tu ttg a r t).
(1968) ‘ E arly G reek prim itive m edicin e’ , Clio Medica iii, 305-36.
(1974) ‘ D ialektik und M edizin in der A n tik e ’ , Medizinhistorisches Journal ix,
187-200.
K u h n , J .-H . (1956) System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum (Hermes
Einzelschriften 11, W iesbaden).
K u g l e r , F . X . (1900) Die babylonische Mondrechnung ( F r e i b u r g ) .
(1907-35) Stemkunde und Stemdienst in Babel, 4 vols. w ith supplements (ed.
J . Schaum berger) (M unster).
K u h n , T . S. (19 5 7) The Copernican Revolution ( H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P re s s, C a m b r i d g e ,
M a s s .) .
(1962/1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (ist ed. 1962), 2nd ed. (U n i­
versity o f Ch icago, 1970).
(1970a) ‘ Postscript-1969’ , in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.
(U niversity o f C h icago ), pp. 174-210.
Bibliography 287
(19706) ‘ Reflections on m y critics’ , in Lakatos and M usgrave 1970, pp. 231-78.
(1974) ‘ Second thoughts on p aradigm s’ , in The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed.
F. Suppe (U niversity o f Illinois, U rban a, C h icago), pp. 459-82.
K u llm an n , W . (1974) Wissenschaft und Methode: Interpretationen zur aristotelischen
Theorie der Naturwissenschaft (Berlin and N ew Y o rk).
K u rz, D . (1970) ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ: Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den Griechen bis Aristoteles
(G op pin gen).
K utsch, F. (1913) Attische Heilgotter und Heilheroen (Religionsgeschichtliche V er-
suche und V orarbeiten xii, 3 (19 12 -13 ), Giessen, 1913).
Lam m li, F. (1962) Vom Chaos zum Kosmos (Schweizerische Beitrage zur Altertum s-
wissenschaft 10, Basel).
L ain Entralgo, P. (1970) The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity (trans.
L . J . R a th er and J . M . Sharp o f La curacion por la palabra en la Antigiiedad
cldsica, M adrid, 1958) (N ew H aven and London).
(^975) ‘ Q uaestiones hippocraticae disputatae tres’ , in Bourgey and Jou an n a
i 975 >PP· 305-19·
Lakatos, L (1970) ‘ Falsification and the m ethodology o f scientific research
program m es’ , in Lakatos and M usgrave 1970, pp. 9 1-1 9 5 (reprinted in
Posterior Lakatos 1978a, pp. 8 -10 1).
(1976) Proofs and Refutations (revised version o f British Journal for the Philosophy
o f Science-XXV (1963-4), 1-25, 120-39, 221-4 5, 296-342) edd. J . W orrall and
E . G . Z a p ar (C am bridge).
(1978a) The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers,
V o l. I, edd. J . W orrall and G . C u rrie (C am bridge).
(19786) Mathematics, Science and Epistemology, Philosophical Papers, V o l. 11, edd.
J . W orrall and G . Currie (C am bridge).
Lakatos, I. and M usgrave, A . (edd.) (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knovoledge
(C am bridge).
L an ata, G . (1967) Medicina Magica e Religione Popolare in Grecia (R om a).
Landels, J . G . (1978) Engineering in the Ancient World (London).
L an za, D . and V egetti, M . ( 1975) ‘ L ’ideologia della c i t t ^ (^adernidiStoria n, 1-37.
Lasserre, F. (1964) The Birth o f Mathematics in the Age of Plato (trans. H . M ortim er)
(London).
(1966) Die Fragmente des Eudoxos von Knidos (T exte und K om m entare 4, Berlin).
L e Blond, J . M . (1938) Eulogos et Vargument de convenance chez Aristote (Paris).
(1939) Logique et methode chez Aristote (Paris).
(1945) Aristote, Philosophe de la vie (Paris).
Lee, H . D . P. (1935) ‘ G eom etrical m ethod and A ristotle’s account o f first
p rin ciples’, Classical Qmrterly'xxxi, 113-24.
(1936) Ζβηο of Elea (C am bridge).
(1948) ‘ Place-nam es and the date o f A ristotle’s biological w orks’ . Classical
Quarterly x l i i , 6 1 -7 .
(1962) Aristotle, Meteorologica, Loeb. ed. (ist ed. 1952) 2nd ed. (London and
C am brid ge, M ass.).
Lejeune, A . (1956) UOptique de Claude Ptolemie (Louvain).
(1957) Recherches sur la catoptrique grecque (M em oires de I’A cadem ie R o y a le de
Belgique, Classe des Lettres, Serie 2, vol. 52, 2, 1954, Bruxelles, 1957).
Lesher, J . H . (1973) ‘ T h e m eaning o f ΝΟΥΣ in the Posterior Analytics', Phronesis
x viii, 44-68.
Lesky, E. (1951) Die ^eugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken
(Akadem ie der Wissenschaften und der L iteratur, M ainz, A bhandlungen der
geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, J ah rgan g 1950, 19, W iesbaden,
195O·
288 Bibliography
Leszl, W . (1972-3) ‘ K n o w ledge o f the universal and knowledge o f the p articular
in A ristotle’, Review o f Metaphysics x x v i, 278-313.
Lev^que, P. and V id al-N aqu et, P. (1964) Clisthine VAthinien (Annales Litteraires
de rU n iversite de Besan9on) (Paris).
Levi-Strauss, C . (1963) Structural Anthropology (trans. C . Jacobson and B. G .
Sch oepf o f Anthropologie structurale, Paris, 1958) (N ew Y o rk and London).
(1966) The Savage Mind (trans. o f La Pensie Sauvage, Paris, 1962) (London).
(1973) Anthropologie structurale Deux (Paris).
Levy-B ruhl, L . (1923) Primitive Mentality (trans. L . A . C lare o f La Mentalite
primitive, Paris, 1922) (London).
(1926) How Natives Think (trans. L . A . C lare o f Les Fonctions mentales dans les
sociStes infirieures, Paris, 1910) (London).
(1936) Primitives and the Supernatural (trans. L . A . C lare o f Le Sumaturel et la
nature dans la mentalite primitive, Paris, 1931) (London).
(1947) ‘ Les Carnets de L ucien L ev y-B ru h l’, Revuephilosophique c x x x v n , 2 57-8 1.
Lew es, G . H . (1864) Aristotle: A chapterfrom the history of science (London).
Lew is, G . (1975) Knowledge of Illness in a Sepik Society (London).
Lew is, J . D . (1971) ‘ Isegoria at Athens. W hen did it b e g in ? ’ , Historia x x , 129-40.
L iao , W . K . (1939) The Complete Works of Han Fei Τζύ, V o l. i (London).
(1959) The Complete Works of Han Fei Τζύ, V o l. 11 (London).
Lichtenthaeler, G. (1948) La Midecine Hippocratique: I Mithode experimentale et
methode hippocratique (Lausanne).
(1957) ‘ D e I’origine sociale de certains concepts scientifiques et philosophiques
grecs’ , in La Midecine Hippocratique n - v (Neuch^tel), pp. 9 1 - 1 14.
Lienhardt, G . (1961) Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka (O xford).
Linforth, I. M , (1941) The Arts of Orpheus (U niversity o f California, Berkeley and
Los A ngeles).
Lippm ann, E. O . von (1910) ‘ Chemisches und Alchem isches aus A ristoteles’,
Archiv fur die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik 11 (1909-10),
233-300.
(1 9 19) Entstehung und Ausbreitung der Alchemic (Berlin).
Lipsius, J . H . (1905-15) Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, 3 vols. (L eipzig).
L ittre, E. (1839-61) Oeuvres compUtes d'Hippocrate, 10 vols. (Paris).
L lo yd , G . E. R . (1963) ‘ W h o is attacked in On Ancient Medicine!’ , Phronesis v iii,
108-26.
(1964) ‘ Experim ent in early G reek philosophy and m ed icin e’ . Proceedings of the
Cambridge Philological Society N S x , 50-72.
(1964/1970) ‘ H ot and cold, dry and w et in early G reek th o u gh t’ {Journal of
Hellenic Studies l x x x i v (1964), 92-106) in F urley and A llen 1970, pp . 255-80.
(1966) Polarity and Analogy (C am bridge).
(1967) ‘ Popper versus K ir k : a controversy in the interpretation o f G reek
scien ce’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science x v iii, 21-38.
(1968) ‘ Plato as a N atu ral Scientist’ , Journal of Hellenic Studies l x x x v i i i , 78-92.
(1973) ‘ R ig h t and left in G reek p hilosophy’ {Journal of Hellenic Studies l x x x i i
(1962), 56-66) in Right and Left, ed, R . N eedham (C hicago), pp. 167-86.
(1975a) ‘ A lcm aeon and the early history o f dissection’, Sudhoffs Archiv l i x ,
113-47·
(1975^) ‘ T h e H ip pocratic Q u estio n ’, Classical Quarterly N S x x v , 17 1-9 2 .
(1975c) ‘ Aspects o f the interrelations o f m edicine, m agic and philosophy in
ancient G re e ce ’ , Apeiron ix , 1-16 .
(1978a) ‘ T h e em pirical basis o f the physiology o f the Parva Naturalia', in
Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, edd. G . E . R . L lo yd and G . E. L . O w en
(C am bridge), p p. 2 15-39.
Bibliography 289
(1978^») ‘ Saving the appearan ces’ . Classical Quarterly N S x x v in , 202-22.
Lones, T . E. (1912) Aristotle's Researches in Natural Science (London).
Long, A . A . (1966) ‘ T hin kin g and sense-perception in Em pedocles: M ysticism or
M aterialism ?’ , Classical Quarterly N S x v i, 256-76.
L ongrigg, J . (1963) ‘ Philosophy and m edicine, some early interactions’, Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology l x v i i , 14 7-75.
( 1 9 7 5 ) ‘ Elem entary Physics in the L yceum and S to a ’ , Isis l x v i , 2 1 1 - 2 9 .
L onie, I. M . (1973) ‘ T h e paradoxical text “ O n the H e a r t” ’ , Medical History
XVII, 1 -1 5 and 136-53.
(1978) ‘ Cos versus Cnidus and the historians’ . History of Science x v i, 42-75
and 77-92.
Lorenzen, P. (i960) Die Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften (Berlin, G ottingen,
H eid elberg).
(1975) ‘ L ’etablissement constructif des fondements des sciences exactes’ ,
Bulletin de VAssociation Guillaume Budi (1975), 467-77.
Louis, P. (1945) Les Metaphores de Platon (Paris).
(1955a) ‘ Rem arques sur la classification des anim aux chez A ristote’ , in Autour
d'Aristote (receuil d ’etudes. . .o f f e r t iM . A . M ansion) (Louvain), pp. 297-304.
(1955A) ‘ L e m ot ΙΣ Τ Ο Ρ ΙΑ chez A ristote’ , Revue de Philologie x x ix , 39^44.
(1956) Aristote: Les Parties des animaux (Paris).
( 19 6 1) Aristote: De la Generation des animaux (Paris).
(1964-9) Aristote: Histoire des animaux, 3 vols. (Paris).
(1967) ‘ Les anim aux fabuleux chez A ristote’ , Revue des etudes grecques l x x x ,
242-6.
(1973) Aristote: Marche des animaux, Mouvement des Animaux (Paris).
(1975) ‘ Monstres et monstruosites dans la biologie d ’A ristote’ in Le Monde
Grec, Hommages ά Claire Priaux, edd. J . Bingen, G . Cam bier, G . N achtergael
(Bruxelles), pp. 277-84.
L ovejoy, A . O . (1909) ‘ T h e m eaning o f Φύσι$ in the G reek physiologers’ . Philo­
sophical Review x v iii, 369-83.
Lukasiew icz, J . (1957) Aristotle’s Syllogistic (ist ed. 1951), 2nd ed. (O xford).
Lukes, S. (1967/1970) ‘ Some problem s about ra tio n a lity’ {Archives Europeennes de
Sociologie v iii (1967), 247-64) in W ilson 1970, pp. 194-213.
(1973) the social determ ination o f tru th ’ , in H orton and Finnegan 1973,
pp. 230-48.
L uria, S. (1932-3) Die Infinitesimaltheorie der antiken Atomisten (Q uellen und Studien
zur G eschichte der M athem atik, Astronom ic und Physik b, 2, 2 (1932),
Berlin, 1933), pp. 106-85.
(1963) Anfdnge griechischen Denkens (Berlin).
Luther, W . (1935) “ Wahrheit” und Liige” im altesten Griechentum (G ottingen).
(1958) ‘ D er fruhgriechische W ahrheitsgedanke im L ichte der S p ra ch e’ ,
Gymnasium l x v , 75-10 7.
Lycos, K . (1964) ‘ A ristode and Plato on “ A p p e a rin g ” ’, Mind NS l x x i i i , 496-514.
L yn ch , J . P. (1972) Aristotle’s School (U niversity o f California Press, Berkeley and
Los A ngeles).
Maass, E. (1898) Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquiae (Berlin).
M acD erm ot, V . (1971) The Cult of the Seer in the Ancient Middle East (London).
M ach , E. (1893) The Science of Mechanics (trans, T . J . M cC orm ack o f 2nd G erm an
edition 1888) (C hicago).
M acIn tyre, A . (1967/1970) ‘ T h e idea o f a social scien ce’ {Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society Suppl. x l i (1967)) in W ilson 1970, pp. 112-30.
M cK e o n , R . (1947) ‘ A ristotle’s conception o f the developm ent and the nature o f
scientific m ethod ’, Journal of the History of Ideas viii, 3-44.
2go Bibliography
M a cK in n e y, L . (1964) ‘ T h e concept o f isonomia in G reek m edicin e’, in Isonomia,
edd. J . M au and E. G . Schm idt (Berlin), pp. 79-88.
M cK irah an , R . D . (1978) ‘ A ristotle’s Subordinate Sciences’ , British Journal for the
History o f Science x i, 197-220.
M acran , H . S. (1902) The Harmonics of Aristoxenus (O xford).
M ahoney, M . S. (1968-9) ‘ A nother look at G reek geom etrical analysis’ , Archive
for History of Exact Sciences v , 318-48.
M anetti, D . (1973) ‘ V a lo re semantico e risonanze culturali della parola ΦΥΣΙΣ’ ,
La Parola del Passato x x v iii, 426-44.
M anitius, K . (1963) Ptolemaus Handbuch der Astronomic, ed. O . N eugebauer, 2 vols.
(Leipzig).
M annheim , K . (1936) Ideology and Utopia (trans. L . W irth and E. Shils) (London).
M anqu at, M . (1932) Aristote naturaliste (Paris).
M ansfeld, J . (1964) Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt (Assen).
(1971) The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡ1 Έ ΒΔΟΜ ΑΔύύΝ ch. 1-11 and Greek
Philosophy (Assen).
( 1975) ‘ A lcm a e o n : “ Physikos ” or Physician? ’, in Kephalaion (Studies. . . offered
to C . J . de V o gel), edd. J . M ansfeld and L . M . de R ijk (Assen), pp. 26-38.
M ansion, A . (1946) Introduction ά la physique aristotelicienne (ist ed. 1913), 2nd ed.
(Louvain and P aris).
(1956) ‘ L ’objet de la science philosophique supreme d ’apr^s Aristote, M e ta ­
physique E, 1 ’ , in Melanges de Philosophic grecque offerts ά Mgr Diis (Paris),
pp. 151-68.
M ansion, S. (1946) Le Jugement d'existence chez Aristote (Louvain and Paris).
(1969) ‘ L ’objet des m athem atiques et I’objet de la dialectique selon P la to n ’ ,
Revue philosophique de Louvain l x v i i , 365-88.
M arcovich, M . (1967) Heraclitus editio maior (M erida, V en ezuela).
M arign ac, A . de (1951) Imagination et dialectique (Paris).
M arrou, H . L (1956) A History of Education in Antiquity (trans. G . Lam b) (London).
M arsden, E. W . (1969) Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development (O xford).
(19 71) Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises (O xford).
M arshall, L . (1957) ‘ “ N !o w ” ’ , Africa-ioivii, 232-40.
M arten, R . (1965) Der Logos der Dialektik (Berlin).
(1968) ‘ D ie M ethodologie der platonischen D ia lek tik ’ , Studium Generale x x i,
218-49.
M asson-Oursel, P. (1916) ‘ L a Sophistique: etude de philosophie co m p aree’ .
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale x x n i, 343-62.
(1917a) ‘ Etudes de logique com paree. I: evolution de la logique in d ien n e’,
Revu£ philosophique L xxxiii, 453-69.
(1917^) ‘ Etudes de logique com paree, II : evolution de la logique chinoise’ .
Revue philosophique l x x x i v , 59-76.
(1918) ‘ Etudes de logique com paree. I I I : confrontations et analyse com para­
tiv e ’ , Revue philosophique l x x x v , 148-66.
M asterm an, M . (1970) ‘ T h e nature o f a p arad ig m ’, in Lakatos and M usgrave
1970, pp. 59- 89 -
M ates, B. (1961) Stoic Logic (U niversity o f California, Berkeley and Los A ngeles).
M atson, W . I. (1952-3) ‘ T h e naturalism o f A n a x im an d er’ , Review of Metaphysics
VI, 387-95·
(1954-5) R eview o f Gornford 1952, Review of Metaphysics viii, 443-54.
M a u , J . (1954) Problem des Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten (Berlin).
M aula, E. (1974) Studies in Eudoxus' Homocentric Spheres (Helsinki).
(1975-6) ‘ T h e spider in the sphere; Eudoxus’ A ra ch n e ’ ,PAz7oio/)Aiav-vi, 225-57.
(1977) ‘ M a n ’s orientation in time and p lace: the discovery o f the relation
Bibliography 291
betw een tem poral and geographical m easurem ent’ , in Abstracts of Scientific
Section Papers of XVth International Congress of the History of Science (Edinburgh,
1977), P· 7 ·
Mauss, M . 0950/^972) A General Theory o f Magic (trans. R . Brain, from Sociologie
et Anthropologie, Paris, 1950, originally ‘ Esquisse d ’une theorie generale de la
m a g ie ’ (with H . H ubert) in VAnnie Sociologique v ii (1902-3) 1904, 1-146)
(London, 1972).
M ead , H . L . (1975) ‘ T h e m ethodology o f Ptolem aic astronom y: an aristotelian
v ie w ’, Laval Thiologique et Philosophique x x x i, 5 5 - 74·
M eautis, G . (1922) Recherches sur le Pythagorisme (Neuchatel).
M eritt, B. D . (1928) The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century (H arvard U n i­
versity Press, G am bridge, M ass.).
(1961) The Athenian Year (U niversity o f California, Berkeley and Los A ngeles).
M erlan, P. (1953) ‘ A m biguity in H eraclitus’ , Proceedings of the nth International
Congress of Philosophy (Bruxelles, 1953), vol. x ii (L ouvain -A m sterdam ),
pp. 56-60.
(1963) Monopsychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness (Archives Internationales
d ’laistoire des idees 2, T h e H a g u e ).
(1968) From Platonism to NeoPlatonism (ist ed. 1953), 3rd ed. (T he H ague).
M euli, K . (1935) ‘ S cy th ica ’ , Hermes l x x , 12 1-76 .
M eyer, J . B. (1855) Aristoteles Thierkunde: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der -ζ'οο/o^ie.
Physiologic und alten Philosophie (Berlin).
M eyerson, I. (1954) ‘ Tham es nouveaux de psychologie objective: I’histoire, la
construction, la structure’ , Journal de Psychologie normale etpathologique (47-51
Years) (1954), 3 -19 ·
M eyer-Steineg, T . (1912) Chirurgische Instrumente des Altertums. Ein Beitrag zur
antiken Akiurgie (Jenaer medizin-historische Beitrage i, Jen a).
M ich el, P.-H . (1950) De Pythagore ά Euclide (Paris).
M ichler, M . (1962) ‘ Das Problem des westgriechischen H eilkun de’ , Sudhoffs
Archiv fur Geschichte der Medizin und der JVaturwissenschaften x l v i , 137-52.
M ign ucci, M . (1965) La teoria aristotelica della scienza (Firenze).
(1975) Uargomentazione dimostrativa in Aristotele (Padova).
M ilh au d , G . (1900) Les Philosophes-GeomHres de la Grice (Paris).
(1903) ‘ Aristote et les m athem atiques’ , Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie N F
IX, 367-92.
( 1906) Etudes sur la pensee scientifique chez les Grecs et chez les modemes (Paris).
M iller, H . W . (1952) ''Dynamis and Physis in On Ancient Medicine', Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association l x x x i i i , 184-97.
(1953) ‘ T h e concept o f the divine in De Morbo Sacro\ Transactions and Pro­
ceedings of the American Philological Association L xxxrv, 1-1 5 .
(1966) ‘ Dynamis and the seeds’ . Transactions and Proceedings o f the American
Philological Association x c v n , 281-90.
M iller, J . Innes (1969) The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire sg B.C. to A.D. 641
(O xford).
M in ar, E. L . (1942) Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory (Baltim ore).
M ittelstrass, J . (1962) Die Rettung der Phanomene (Berlin).
M oesgaard, K . P. (1976) ‘ T h e bright stars o f the zod iac: a catalogue for historical
u se’ , Centaurus XX, 129-58.
M om igliano, A . (1930) ‘ Svd pensiero di A ntifonte il Sofista’ , Rivista difilologia e di
istruzione classica, N S, viii, 129-40.
(1973) ‘ Freedom o f speech in a n tiq u ity ’ , in Dictionary of the History of Ideas,
ed. P. P. W iener, V o l. 2 (N ew Y o rk ), pp. 252-62.
(1975) Alien Wisdom: the Limits of Hellenization (C am bridge).
292 Bibliography
M ondolfo, R . (1936) Problemi delpensiero antico (Bologna).
(1956) Ulnfinito nel pensiero deWantichitd classica (ist ed. Ulnfinito nel pensiero dei
Greet, 1934), 2nd ed. (Firenze).
M oraux, P. (1968) ‘ L a jo u te dialectique d ’apr^s le huiti^me livre des Topiques\
in ed. O w en 1968, pp. 2 7 7 -3 1 1.
M oreau, J . (1959) ‘ L ’d o g e de la biologic chez A risto te ’, Revue des etudes anciennes
Lxi, 57-64·
(1968) ‘ A ristote et la dialectique platonicicnn e’, in ed. O w en 1968, pp. 80-90.
M orrison, J . S. (1941) ‘ T h e p lace o f Protagoras in A th en ian p ublic life (460-
415 B .C .) ’ , Classical (Quarterly x x x v , 1-16 .
(1961) ‘ A n tip h o n ’ , Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society N S v ii, 49-58.
(1963) ‘ T h e Truth o f A n tip h o n ’ , Phronesis viii, 35-49.
M orrow , G . R . (i960) Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton U niversity Press, Princeton,
N ew Jersey).
(1970) ‘ Plato and the m athem aticians: an interpretation o f Socrates’ dream in
the Theaetetus (201 e-2o6 c) Philosophical Review l x x i x , 309-33.
M oulinier, L . (1952) Le Pur et Vimpur dans la pensee des Grecs d’Homire ά Aristote
(Etudes et com m entaires 12, Paris).
M ourelatos, A . P. D . (1967) ‘ A ristotle’s “ Pow ers” and m odern em piricism ’ ,
Ratio I X , 97-104.
( 1970) TTie Route of Parmenides (Y ale U niversity Press, N ew H aven and L on d o n ).
M uller, C . (1855-61) Geographi Graeci Minores, 2 vols. (Paris).
M uller, C . W . (1965a) Gleiches zu Gleichem. Ein Prinzip friihgriechischen Denkens
(W iesbaden).
(1965^) ‘ D ie HeUung “ durch das G leich e ” in den hippokratischen Schriften
De morbo sacro und De locis in homine ’, Sudhoffs Archivfur Geschichte der Medizin und
der Naturwissenschaften xLrx, 225-49.
(1967) ‘ Protagoras iiber die G o tte r’ , Hermes x c v , 140-59.
M ille r , F. M a x (1879) The Upanishads, Part I {Sacred Books o f the East, V o l. i)
(O xford).
(1884) The Upanishads, Part II [Sacred Books of the East, V o l. x v ) (O xford).
M ueller, L (1969) ‘ E u clid ’s Elements and the A xiom atic M e th o d ’, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science x x , 289-309.
(1974) ‘ G reek m athem atics and G reek lo g ic ’, in Ancient logic and its Modern
Interpretations, ed. J . Corcoran (Dordrecht and Boston), pp. 35-70.
M ugler, C . (1948) Platon et la recherche mathematique de son epoque (Strasbourg-
Z u rich ).
(1973) ‘ Sur quelques points de contact entre la m agie et les sciences appliquees
des anciens ’, Revue de Philologie x l v i i , 3 1-7 .
M ure, G . R . G . (1975) ‘ Cause and because in A ristotle’, Philosophy l , 356-7.
N eedham , J . ( 1 9 5 4 - ) Science and civilisation in China (in progress) (C am bridge,
1 9 5 4 “ ) (V ol. I , Introductory Orientations, 1 9 5 4 , V o l. 11, History of Scientific
Thought, 1 9 5 6 , V o l. I l l , Mathematics and the Sciences of the Heavens and the Earth,
1 9 5 9 , V o l. V , 2 , Chemistry and Chemical Technolog)!, 1 9 7 4 ) .
(1959) A History of Embryology (is t ed. 1934), 2nd ed. (C am bridge).
Needham , J ., L in g, W ., and Price, D. J . de S. (i960) Heavenly Clockwork (C am ­
bridge) .
N eedham , R . (1973) Right and Left, Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification (C hicago).
Nelson, A . (1909) Die hippokratische Schrift περί φυσών, Text undStudien (U ppsala).
Nesde, W . (1903) ‘ K ritia s ’ , Neue Jahrbiicherftir das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und
deutsche Literaturyii, 8 1-10 7 and 178-99 (reprinted in Nestle 1948, pp. 253-320).
(1922) ‘ D ie Schrift des G orgias “ iiber die N atu r oder iiber das N ichtseien de’ ,
Hermes l v i i , 551-6 2 (reprinted in Nesde 1948, pp. 240-52).
Bibliography 293
(1938) ‘ H ip p o cra tica ’ , Hermes l x x i i i , 1-38 (reprinted in Nestle 1948, pp. 5 1 7 -
66 ).
(1942) Vom Mythos zum Logos, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart).
( 1948) Griechische Studien (Stuttgart).
N eugebauer, O . (1928) ‘ Z u r G eschichte des pythagoraischen L ehrsatzes’ ,
Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, m ath.-phys. K l.
(Berlin), pp. 45-8.
(1942) ‘ E gyptian plan etary texts’ . Transactions of the American Philosophical
Society N S x x x ii, 2, 209-50.
(1945) ‘ T h e history o f ancient astronom y: problem s and m ethods’ . Journal of
Near Eastern Studies iv, 1-38.
(1947) ‘ T h e w ater-clock in Babylonian astronom y’ , Isis x x x v ii, 37-43.
(1949) ‘ T h e early history o f the astrolabe’, Isis x l , 240-56.
(1953) the “ hip p op ed e” o f E udoxus’ , Scripta Mathematica x ix , 225-9.
(1955) Astronomical Cuneiform Texts, 3 vols. (Princeton).
(1957) The Exact Sciences in Antiquity (is t ed. 1952), 2nd ed. (Providence, R .L ) .
(1959) ‘ T h e equivalence o f eccentric and epicyclic motion according to
A pollonius ’, Scripta Mathematica x x rv , 5 - 2 1.
(1972) ‘ O n some aspects o f early G reek astronom y’, Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society c x v i, 2 4 3 -5 1.
(1975) A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, 3 vols. (Berlin and N ew Y o rk ).
N eugebauer, O . and van Hoesen, H . B. (1959) Greek Horoscopes (A m erican
Philosophical Society, M em oirs 48, Philadelphia).
N eugebauer, O . and Sachs, A . (1945) Mathematical Cuneiform Texts (A m erican
O riental Series 29, N ew H aven).
N ew ton, R . R . (1973) ‘ T h e authen ticity o f Ptolem y’s parallax data. Part I ’ ,
(^arterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society x iv , 367-^8.
(1974a) ‘ T h e authenticity o f Ptolem y’s p arallax data. Part Π ’, Quarterly
Journal o f the Royal Astronomical Society x v , 7-2 7.
(19746) ‘ T h e authenticity o f Ptolem y’s eclipse and star d a ta ’ , (^arterly Journal
of the Royal Astronomical Society x v , 10 7-21.
(1977) The Crime o f Claudius Ptolemy (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore).
Nilsson, M . P. (1907) Die Kausalsdtze im griechischen bis Aristoteles (W iirzburg).
(1940) Greek Popular Religion (N ew Y o rk).
(1955-6 1) Geschichte der griechischen Religion, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (M iinchen).
Nittis, S. (1940) ‘ T h e authorship and probable date o f the H ippocratic O a t h ’,
Bulletin of the History of Medicine v m , 10 12 -2 1.
N ock, A . D . (1972) Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, 2 vols. (O xford).
N ock, A . D . and Festugi^re, A . J . (1945-54) Corpus Hermeticum, 4 vols. (Paris).
N orenberg, H . W . (1968) Das Gottliche und die Natur in der Schrift iiber die heilige
Krankheit (Bonn).
N ylan der, C . (1970) lonians in Pasargadae (A cta U niversitatis U p salien sis-B oreas-i,
U ppsala).
O ’Brien, D . (1969) Empedocles* Cosmic Cycle (C am bridge).
( 1977) ‘ H eav y and ligh t in Dem ocritus and A risto d e : two conceptions o f change
and id e n tity ’, Journal of Hellenic Studies x c v ii, 64-74.
O gle, W . (1882) Aristotle on the Parts of Animals (London).
(1897) Aristotle on Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration (London).
O hlert, K . (1912) Rdtsel und Rdtselspiele der alten Griechen (ist ed. 1886), 2nd ed.
(Berlin).
O nians, R . B. (1951) The Origins o f European Thought (C am bridge).
O ppenheim , A . L eo (1962) ‘ M esopotam ian m edicin e’, Bulletin of the History of
Medicine x x x v i, 97-108.
294 Bibliography
(1964) Ancient Mesopotamia. Portrait of a Dead Civilisation (C hicago).
O ppenheim er, J . M . (1971) ‘ Aristotle as a biologist’, Scientia cv i, 649-58.
O sier, W . (1947) The jPrinciples and Practice o f Medicine, i6th ed. (ed. H . A .
Christian) (N ew Y o rk and London).
OstwaJd, M . (1969) Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (O xford).
O w en , G . E. L . (1953/1965) ‘ T h e place o f the Timaeus in P lato’s dialogues’
{Classical Quarterly N S in (1953), 79-95) in A llen 1965, pp. 313-38.
(1957/1965) ‘ A p ro o f in the περί Ιδεών’ {Journal of Hellenic Studies l x x v i i
(1957), 10 3-11) in A llen 1965, pp. 295-312.
(1957-8 /1975) ‘ Zeno and the M ath em atician s’ {Proceedings o f the Aristotelian
Society N S Lvm (19 57-8 ), 199-222) in A llen and F urley 1975, pp. 143-65·
(i960) ‘ L ogic and metaphysics in some earlier works o f A ristotle’, in Aristotle
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, edd. L D urin g and G . E . L . O w en (G ote-
borg), pp. 163-90.
(1960/1975) ‘ E leatic questions’ {Classical (Quarterly N S x (i960), 84-102) in
A llen and F urley 1975, pp. 48-81.
(1961/1975) ‘ T ith en ai ta p hainom ena’ {Aristote et les probUmes de methode, ed.
S. M ansion (L ouvain and Paris, 1961), pp. 83-103) in Barnes, Schofield,
Sorabji 1975, pp. 1 13-26 (also in Aristotle, ed. J . M . E. M oravcsik, London,
1968, pp. 167-90).
(1965) ‘ Aristotle on the snares o f on to lo gy’ , in Bam brough 1965, pp. 69-95.
(1965/1975) ‘ T h e Platonism o f A ristotle’ {Proceedings of the British Academy l i
(1965), 125-50) in Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji 1975, pp. 14-34·
(1968) ‘ D ialectic and eristic in the treatm ent o f the F orm s’, in ed. O w en 1968,
pp. 103-25.
(1970) ‘ A ristotle: M ethod, Physics, and C osm ology’ , in Dictionary o f Scientific
Biography, ed. C . C . G illispie (N ew Y o rk ), V o l. i, pp. 250-8.
(1976) ‘ Aristotle on tim e ’ , in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, edd. P. K .
M acham er and R . G . T u rn bu ll (O hio State U n iversity Press), pp. 3-27.
O w en, G . E. L . (ed.) (1968) Aristotle on Dialectic (O xford).
Page, D . L . (1955) Sappho and Alcaeus (O xford).
(1959) R eview o f O xyrhynchus Papyri x xrv. Classical Review N S ix , 15-23.
Palter, R . ( i 970-1) ‘ A n approach to the history o f early astronom y’ . Studies in
History and Philosophy o f Science i, 93-133.
Pannekoek, A . (1955) ‘ Ptolem y’s precession’, in Vistas in Astronomy, ed. A . Beer,
V o l. I (London and N ew Y o rk ), pp. 60-6.
Parker, R . A . (1959) A Vienna Demotic Papyrus on Eclipse- and Lunar-Omina (Brown
E gyptological Studies 2, Providence, R .L ) .
Parker, R . C . T . (1977) ‘ M iasm a: Pollution and purification in early G reek
R e lig io n ’ (unpubl. D .P h il. diss. O xford).
Patzig, G . (1968) Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism (trans.J. Barnes o i Die aristotelische
Syllogistik, 2nd ed. 1963) (D ordrecht).
Pearson, L . (1939) Early Ionian Historians (O xford).
Peck, A . L . (1937) Aristotle, Parts of Animals, L oeb ed. (London and C am brid ge,
M ass.).
(1943) Aristotle, Generation o f Animals, Loeb ed. (London and C am bridge, M ass.).
Pedersen, O . (1974) A Survey of the Almagest (Odense U n iversity Press).
Pedersen, O . and Pihl, M . (1974) Early Physics and Astronomy (London and N ew
Y o rk ).
Peet, T . E. (1923) The Rhind Mathematical Papyrus (London).
Pem broke, S. (1967) ‘ W om en in charge; the function o f alternatives in early
G reek tradition and the ancient idea o f m a triarch y ’ , Journal of the Warburg
and Courtauld Institutes x x x , 1-35.
Bibliography 295
Penn, J . M . (1972) Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas (Paris and T h e H ague).
Penwill, J . ( 1 9 7 4 ) ‘ A lkm an ’s cosm ogony’ , Apeiron v i i i , 1 3 - 3 9 .
Perelm an, C . (1970) Le Champ de Γargumentation (Bruxelles).
Perelm an, C . and O lbrechts-T yteca, L . (1969) The New Rhetoric. A treatise on
argumentation (trans. J . W ilkinson and P. W eaver o f La nouvelle rhetorique,
Paris, 1958) (U niversity o f N otre D am e Press, Notre D am e and London).
Peters, C . H . F. (1877) ‘ U eber die Fehler des Ptolem aischen Sternverzeichnisses’,
Vierteljahrsschriften der astronomischen Gesellschaft, 12 Jah rgan g (1877), 296-9.
Peters, C . H . F. and K n o bel, E. B. (1915) Ptolemy's Catalogue of Stars: A Revision of
the Almagest (Carnegie Institution o f W ashington).
Petersen, V . M . (1969) ‘ T h e three lunar models o f P to lem y’ , Centaurus x iv ,
14 2 -71.
Petersen, V . M . and Schm idt, O . (1967-8) ‘ T h e determ ination o f the longitude
o f the apogee o f the orbit o f the sun according to H ipparchus and P to lem y’ ,
Centaurus xii, 73-96.
Pfeiffer, R . (1968) History of Classical Scholarship from the beginnings to the end of the
Hellenistic age (O xford).
(1976) History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1830 (O xford).
Pfister, F. (1935) ‘ K ath arsis’ , Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, Suppl. Bd. v i, cols. 146-62.
Philip, J . A . (1966) Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism (Phoenix Suppl. 7, T oronto).
Plam bock, G . (1964) Dynamis im Corpus Hippocraticum (Akadem ie der Wissen-
scaften und der L iteratur, M ainz, A bhandlun gen der geistes- und sozial-
wissenschaftlichen Klasse, J ah rgan g 1964, 2, W iesbaden).
Platt, A . (1912) Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, O xford trans. in The Works of
Aristotle translated into English, ed. W . D . Ross, V o l. v (O xford).
(1921) ‘ A ristode on the h e a rt’ , in Studies in the History and Method of Science,
ed. C . Singer, V o l. 11 (O xford), pp. 521-32.
Pleket, H . W . (1973) ‘ T ech nology in the G reco-R om an w orld; a general re p o rt’,
Talanta (Proceedings o f the D utch A rch aeological and Historical Society) v ,
6- 47 ·
Plochm ann, G . K . (1953) ‘ N ature and the livin g thing in A ristod e’s b io lo g y ’ .
Journal of the History of Ideas x iv , 167-90.
Pohle, W . (1971) ‘ T h e m athem atical foundations o f P lato ’s atom ic physics’,
Isis Lxii, 36-46.
Pohlenz, M . (1937) ‘ H ippokratesstudien’, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der
Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, phil.-hist. KJ., N F 11, 4 (Gottingen, 1937),
pp. 6 7-10 1 (reprinted in Kleine Schriften, V o l. 11, ed. H . Dorrie (Hildesheim,
1965), pp· 175-209).
( 1938) Hippokrates und die Begriindung der wissenschaftlichen Medizin (Berlin).
(^939) ‘ H ip p okrates’, Die Antikexv, 1-18 .
(1953) ‘ Nomos und Physis’ , Hermes lx x x i, 418-38 (reprinted in Kleine Schriften,
V o l. II, ed. H . Dorrie (Hildesheim , 1965), pp. 341-60).
Pokora, T . (1962) ‘ T h e necessity o f a more thorough study o f philosopher W an g
C h ’ung and o f his predecessors’ , Archiv Orientalni x x x , 231-57.
(1975) Hsin-Lun {New Treatise) and Other Writings by Huan T'an {43 B .C .-
28 A.D.) (M ichigan Papers in Chinese Studies 20, A nn A rbor).
Popper, K . R . (1958-9/1963) ‘ Back to the Presocratics’ {Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society N S l i x (1958-9), 1-24), in Conjectures and Refutations
(London, 1963), pp. 136-65 (also reprinted in F urley and A llen 1970,
pp. 130-53)·
(1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (trans. J . and L. Freed o f Logik der
Forschung, 1935) (London).
296 Bibliography
(1962) The Open Society and its Enemies, 2 vols. (ist ed. 1945), 4th ed. (London).
(1963) Conjectures and Refutations (London).
(1970) ‘ N orm al science and its dangers’ , in Lakatos and M usgrave 1970,
pp. 5 1-8 .
(1972) Objective Knowledge: an evolutionary approach (O xford).
Poschenrieder, F. (1887) Die naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles in ihrem
Verhaltnis zu den BUchern der hippokratischen Sammlung (Bam berg).
Prauss, G . (1966) Platon und der logische Eleatismus (Berlin).
Preaux, C . (1973) La Lune dans la pensee grecque (A cadem ic R o yale de Belgique,
M em oires de la Classe des Lettres, 2nd ser. 61, 4, Bruxelles).
Precope, J . (1954) Medicine, Magic and Mythology (London).
Preisendanz, K . (1973-4) Papyri Graecae Magicae, 2nd ed., ed. A . Henrichs
(Stuttgart).
Preus, A . ( 1975) Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works (HUdesheim and
N ew Y o rk ).
Price, D . J . de S. ( 1957) ‘ Precision instrum ents; to 1500’ in A History of Technology,
V o l. Ill, edd. C . Singer and others (O xford), pp. 582-619.
(1964-5) ‘ T h e Babylonian “ Pythagorean T ria n g le ” T a b le t’ Centaurus x ,
1-13 .
( 1974) ‘ Gears from the Greeks. T h e A ntikythera M echanism - a calendar
com puter from ca. 80 b .c .’ , Transactions of the American Philosophical Society N S
LXIV, 7.
Pritchard, J . B. (1969) Ancient Near Eastern Texts (is te d . 1955) 3rd ed. (Princeton).
Pritchett, W . K . (1957) ‘ Calendars o f Athens A g a in ’ , Bulletin de correspondance
Hellenique l x x x i , 269-301.
(1964) ‘ Thucydides v 20’ , Historia x iii, 21-36.
(1970) The Choiseul Marble (U niversity o f California Publications: Classical
Studies 5, Berkeley and Los A ngeles).
Pritchett, W . K . and N eugebauer, O . (1947) The Calendars of Athens (H arvard
U niversity Press, Cam brid ge, Mass.).
Pritchett, W . K . and van der W aerden, B. L . (1961) ‘ T hucydid ean tim e-reckon­
ing and E uctem on’s seasonal ca len d ar’ . Bulletin de correspondance Hellenique
L x x x v , 17-52.
Putnam , H . (1962/1975) ‘ W h at theories are n o t’ (in Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science, edd. E. N agel and others (Stanford U niversity Press,
1962), pp. 240-51), in Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers,
V o l. I (C am bridge, 1975), pp. 2 15-2 7 .
Q,uimby, R . W . (1974) ‘ T h e G row th o f Plato’s perception o f R h eto ric’ , Philo­
sophy and Rhetoric v ii, 71-9 .
Q uine, W . V a n O . (1953) From a Logical Point of View (H arvard U niversity Press,
C am brid ge, M ass.).
(i960) Word and Object (M .L T . Press, Cam bridge, M ass.).
R aderm acher, L . (1951) Artium Scriptores (Osterreichische Akadem ie der Wissen-
schaften, phil.-hist. K l., Sitzungsberichte 227, 3, A bhandlung, W ien).
R adin , M . (1927) ‘ Freedom o f speech in ancient A th en s’, American Journal of
Philology x l v i i i , 215-30.
R am in, J . (1976) Le Periple d'Hannon (B A R Supplem entary Series 3, O xford ).
R am n ou x, C . (1970) Etudes Presocratiques (Paris).
R an d all, J . H . (i960) Aristotle (New Y o rk).
R anu lf, S. (1924) Der eleatische Satz vom Widerspruch (Copenhagen).
R ap h ael, S. (1974) ‘ R hetoric, dialectic and syllogistic argum ent: A ristotle’s
position in Rhetoric i - i i ’ , Phronesis x ix , 153-67.
R aven , J . E. (1948) Pythagoreans and Eleatics (C am bridge).
Bibliography 297
Raw lings, H . R . (1975) A semantic study of PROPHASIS to 400 B.C. (Hermes
Einzelschriften 33, W iesbaden).
R aw linson, G . (1880) The History of Herodotus, 4th ed., 4 vols. (London).
R eale, G . (1970) Melisso, Testimonianze e frammenti (Firenze).
R egenbogen, O . (1931) Eine Eorschungsmethode antiker Naturwissenschaft (Q uellen
und Studien zur Geschichte der M athem atik, A stronom ic und Physik, b, i, 2
(1930) Berlin, 1931), pp. 131-82 (reprinted in Kleine Schriften (M iinchen,
1961), pp. 141-94).
Regis, L .-M . (1935) VOpinion selon Aristote (Paris and O ttaw a).
R ehm , A . (1899) ‘ Z u H ipparch und Eratosthenes’ , Hermes x x x iv , 2 51-79 .
(1938) ‘ Z u r R olle der T ech nik in der griechisch-rom ischen A n tik e ’, Archiv fiir
Kulturgeschichte xxvui, 135-62.
(1941) Parapegmastudien (A bhandlungen der bayerischen Akadem ie der Wissen-
schaften, phil.-hist. A bteilun g, N F 19, M iinchen).
R ehm , A . and V o gel, K . (1933) Exakte Wissenschaften, 4th ed. (L eipzig and Berlin).
R eiche, H . A . T . (i960) Empedocles' Mixture, Eudoxan Astronomy and Aristotle's
Connate Pneuma (A m sterdam ).
R eidem eister, K . (1949) Das exakte Denken der Griechen (H am burg).
R einh ardt, K . (1916) Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn).
(1926) Kosmos und Sympathie (M iinchen).
R e y , A . (1930-48) La Science dans I'antiquite, 5 vols. (Paris).
R eym ond, A . (1927) History of the Sciences in Greco-Roman Antiquity (trans. R . G . de
B ray o f ist ed. o f Histoire des sciences exactes et naturelles dans I'antiquite greco-
romaine, Paris, 1924) (London).
Reynolds, L . D . and W ilson, N . G . (1968/1974) Scribes and Scholars (ist ed. 1968),
2nd ed. (O xford, 1974).
Rhodes, P. J . (1972) The Athenian Boule (O xford),
R ich ard, G . (1935) ‘ L ’im purete contagieuse e t la m agie dans la tragedie g recq u e ’,
Revue des etudes anciennes x x x v ii, 3 0 1-2 1.
R ichardson, N .J . (1975) ‘ H om eric professors in the age o f the Sophists’, Pro­
ceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society N S x x i, 65-8 1.
R ich ter, G . M . A . (1946) ‘ Greeks in P ersia’, American Journal of Archaeology l ,
15-30·
R iondato, G . (1954) ‘ Ιστορία ed εμπειρία nel pensiero aristotelico’ , Giornale di
Metafisica ix , 303-35.
R obin , L . (1928) Greek Thought (trans. M . R . Dobie) (London).
Robinson, J . M . ( 19 7 1) ‘ A naxim an der and the problem o f the earth’s inunobility ’,
in A nton and Kustas 1971, pp. 1 1 1 -1 8 .
(1973) ‘ O ri G o rgia s’, in Exegesis and Argument, edd. E. N . L ee, A . P. D .
M ourelatos, R . M . R o rty (Assen), 49-60.
Robinson, R . (1936/1969) ‘ Analysis in G reek G eo m etry’ {Mind N S x l v (1936),
464-73) in Essays in Greek Philosophy (O xford, 1969), pp. 1-15 .
(1942/1969) ‘ P lato’s consciousness o f fa lla c y ’ {Mind N S l i (1942), 9 7 -114 ) in
Essays in Greek Philosophy (O xford, 1969), pp. 16-38.
(1953) Plato's Earlier Dialectic (ist ed. 1941), 2nd ed. (O xford).
R oebuck, C . (1959) Ionian Trade and Colonization (New Y o rk).
R ohd e, E. (1925) Psyche (trans. W . B. Hillis) (London).
R om e, A . (1937) ‘ Les observations d ’equinoxes et de solstices dans le chapitre i
du livre 3 du Com m entaire sur I’Alm ageste par T heon d ’A lexan drie, I ’,
Annales de la societe scientifique de Bruxelles, Ser. i. Sciences m athem atiques et
physiques l v i i , 213-36.
(1938) ‘ Les observations d ’equinoxes et de solstices dans le chapitre i du livre 3
du Com m entaire sur I’Alm ageste par T heon d ’A lexan drie, II ’, Annales de la
298 Bibliography
societe scientifiqm de Bruxelles, Ser. i, Sciences m athem atiques et physiques
LVIII, 6-26.
R om illy, J , de (1956) Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (Paris).
(1971) La Lai dans la pensee grecqm des origines ά Aristote (Paris).
( 1975) Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (H arvard U niversity Press, C am brid ge,
M ass.),
Roscher, W . H . (1913) Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl in ihrer vierfachen
Vberlieferung (Studien zur Geschichte und K u ltu r des Altertum s 6, Paderborn ).
Rose, V . (1886) Aristotelis quiferebantur librorumfragmenta (Leipzig).
Rosenm eyer, T . G . (1960/1971) ‘ P lato’s hypothesis and the upw ard p a th ’
{American Journal of Philology l x x x i (i960), 393-407) in A nton and Kustas
19 7 1, pp. 354-66.
Ross, W . D. (19 24 /1953) Aristotle, Metaphysics, 2 vols. (ist ed. 1924) revised ed.
(O xford).
(1936) Aristotle, Physics (O xford).
(1953) Plato's Theory of Ideas (ist ed. 1951) 2nd ed. (O xford).
Rostagni, A . (1924) II verbo di Pitagora (T orino).
R othschuh, K . E. (1962) ‘ Idee und M ethode in ihrer Bedeutung fur die geschicht-
liche Entw icklung der Ph ysiologic’, Sudhoffs Archiv fiir Geschichte der Medizin
und der Naturwissenschaften XLVi, 9 7 -119 .
R uben, W . (1929) ‘ O b er die D ebatten in den alten U p anisad’s ’, Z^itschrift der
deutschen morgenldndischen Gesellschaft N F viii, 238-55.
(1954) Geschichte der indischen Philosophic (Berlin).
(1971) Die Entwicklung der Philosophic im alten Indien (Berlin).
(1973) ‘ D er C h arak ter der W eltanschauung im alten Ch ina, in Indien und in
G r i e c h e n l a n d Klio Lv, 5 -4 1.
R u dio, F. (1907) Die Bericht des Simplicius iiber die Quadraturen des Antiphon und des
Hippokrates (L eip zig).
Riische, F. ( 1930) Blut, Leben und Seek (P aderborn).
R y le , G . (1965) ‘ D ialectic in the A c a d e m y ’, in Bam brough 1965, pp. 39-68.
(1966) Plato's Progress (C am bridge).
Sachs, A . (1948) ‘ A classification o f the Babylonian astronomical tablets o f the
Seleucid p erio d ’. Journal of Cuneiform Studies 11, 271-90.
(1952) ‘ Babylonian horoscopes’, Journal of Cuneiform Studies vi, 49-75.
(1974) ‘ Babylonian observational astron om y’ , in The Place of Astronomy in the
Ancient World, edd. D . G . K endal and others (O xford), pp. 43-50.
Sachs, E. (1917) D iefiinf platonischen Korper (Philol. U ntersuch. 24, Berlin).
Salm on, J . (1977) ‘ Political H o p lites?’ , Journal o f Hellenic Studies xcvir, 84 -10 1.
Salm on, W . C . (ed.) (1970) Zeno's Paradoxes (Indianopolis and N ew Y o rk ).
Salom on, M . ( 1 9 1 1) ‘ D ie BegrifF das Naturrechts bei den Sophisten’ ,
der Savigny-Stiftungfiir Rechtsgeschichte (Rom anistiche Abteilung) x x x ii, 129-67.
Sam bursky, S. (1956) The Physical World of the Greeks (trans. M . Dagut) (London).
(1958) ‘ C on ceptual developm ents in G reek atom ism ’ . Archives Internationales
d'Histoire des Sciences x i, 2 5 1-6 1.
(1959) Physics of the Stoics (London).
(1961) ‘ Atom ism versus continuum theory in ancient G re ece ’ , Scientia x c v i,
3 76 -8 1.
(1962) The Physical World of Late Antiquity (London).
(1963) ‘ Conceptual developments and modes o f explanation in la te r G reek
scientific th o u g h t’ , in Scientific Change, ed. A . C . Crom bie (London), pp. 6 1 -
78.
( 1966) ‘ Phanom en und T heorie. Das physikalische D enken der A ntike im L ich t
der modernen P h ysik’, Eranos-Jahrbuch xxxv , 303-48.
Bibliography 299
Santillana, G . de (1953) Galileo Galilei'. Dialogue on the Great World Systems in the
Salusbury translation (C hicago).
Sapir, E. (1949) Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality
(U niversity o f California Press, Berkeley and Los A ngeles).
Sarton, G . (1954) Ancient Science and Modern Civilization (London).
Saunders, J . B. de C . M . (1963) The Transitionsfrom ancient Egyptian to Greek Medicine
(U niversity o f Kansas Press, L aw rence).
Sayre, K . M . (1969) Plato's Analytic Method (C hicago).
Scarpat, G . (1964) Parrhesia: storia del termine e delle sue traduzioni in latino (Brescia).
Schaerer, R . (1938) La Question platonicienne (M em oires de I’U niversite de Neu-
chatel 10, N euchatel).
(1958) UHomme antique et la structure du monde interieur d'Homire a Socrate (Paris).
Scheffler, I. (1956-7^) ‘ Prospects o f a modest em piricism ’ , Review of Metaphysics x ,
385-400 and 602-25.
(1956-7^) ‘ Explanation, prediction, and abstraction ’ , British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science v ii, 293-309.
(1967) Science and Subjectivity (Indianopolis and N ew Y o rk).
Scheil, V . (1929) Inscriptions des Achemenides ά Suse (M em oires de la Mission
A rcheologique de Perse 21, Paris).
Schiaparelli, G . V . (1873) I precursori di Copernico nelVantichith (M em orie del reale
istituto L om bardo di scienze e lettere, Classe di scienze m atem atiche e
naturali, V o l. x ii (Ser. 3, V o l. iii) (M ilano), pp. 381-432) (reprinted in
Scritti sulla storia della astronomia antica. Part i, V o l. i, Bologna, 1925, pp. 3 6 1-
458).
(1877) Le sfere omocentriche di Eudosso, di Callippo e di Aristotele (M em orie del
reaie istituto L om bardo di scienze e lettere, Classe di scienze m atem atiche e
naturali, V o l. x m (Ser. 3, V o l. iv) (M ilano), pp. 1 17-79) (reprinted in Scritti
sulla storia della astronomia antica. Part i, V o l. 11, Bologna, 1926, pp. i - i 12).
Schjellerup, H. C . F. C . (1881) ‘ Recherches sur I’Astronom ie des Anciens, Γ ,
Urania 11, 25-39.
Scholz, H . (1928) ‘ W aru m haben die G riechen die Irrationalzahlen nicht auf-
g e b a u t? ’, Kant-Studien x x x iii, 35-72.
(1930 /1975) ‘ T h e ancient axiom atic th eory’ (originally ‘ D ie A xiom atik der
A Jten’, Blatter fiir deutsche Philosophic iv (1930), 259-78) in Barnes, Schofield,
Sorabji 1975, pp. 50-64.
Schram m , M . (1962) Die Bedeutung der Bewegungslehre des Aristoteles fiir seine beiden
Losungender zenonischenParadoxie (Philosophische A bhandlungen 19, Frankfurt).
Schuhl, P. M . (1949) Essai sur laformation de la pensee grecque (ist ed. 1934), 2nd ed.
(Paris).
Schultz, W . (1914) ‘ Ratsel ’, Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der classischen Altertums-
wissenschaft, 2nd ser., i H albban d, i, i, cols. 6 2 -12 5.
Schum acher, J . (1963) Antike Medizin, 2nd ed. (Berlin).
Scoln icov, S. (1975) ‘ H yp oth etical m ethod and rationality in P la to ’ , Kant-Studien
L xv i, 157-62.
Scot, R . (1584/1964) The Discoverie of Witchcraft (1st ed. L on don 1584), intro­
duced by H . R . W illiam son (A rundel, 1964).
Seeck, G . A . (1964) iJber die Elemente in der Kosmologie des Aristoteles (Zetem ata 34,
M iinchen).
(1965) "Nachtrage' im achten Buch der Physik des Aristoteles (Akadem ie der Wissen-
schaften und der L iteratur, M ain z, A bhandlun gen der geistes- im d sozial-
wissenschaftlichen KJ., Jah rgan g 1965, 3, W iesbaden).
Segal, C . P. (1962) ‘ G orgias and the psychology o f the L ogo s’ , Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology l x v i , 9 9 -155.
300 Bibliography
Seidl, H . (1971) Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (M eisenheim ).
Senn, G . (1929) ‘ IJber H erkunft und Stil der Beschreibungen von Experim enten
im Corpus H ip p ocraticu m ’, Sudhoffs Archiv fur Geschichte der Medizin x x ii,
217-89.
(1933) Die Entwicklmg der biologischen Forschmgsmethode in der Antike und ihre
grundsatzliche Forderung durch Theophrast von Eresos (V eroffendichungen der
schweizerischen GeseUschaft fiir Geschichte der M edizin und der N atur-
wissenschaften 8, A a ra u and L eip zig).
Sesonke, A . (1968) ‘ T o m ake the w eaker argum ent defeat the stron ger’ , Journal
o f the History o f Philosophy v i, 2 17 - 3 1.
Shapere, D . (1964) ‘ T h e structure o f scientific revolu tion s’, Philosophical Review
Lxxiii, 383-94.
(1966) ‘ M ean in g and scientific ch a n ge’ , in Mind and Cosmos, ed. R . G . C olodn y
(U niversity o f Pittsburgh Press), pp. 41-8 5.
Shaw , J . R . (1972) ‘ M odels for cardiac structure and function in A risto tle ’,
Journal of the History o f Biology v , 355-88.
Sheppard, H . J . (1970) ‘ A lch em y: origin or origins?’ , Ambix x v ii, 69-84.
Shorey, P. ( 1927) ‘ Platonism and the H istory o f Science ’ , Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society l x v i , 159-82.
Sichirollo, L . (1966) LxcxKiyBaQax-Dialektik (H ildesheim ).
Sicking, C . M . J . (1964) ‘ G orgias und die Philosophen’ , Mnemosyne, 4th ser. x v n ,
225-47.
Sigerist, H . E. (19 5 1-6 1) A History of Medicine, 2 vols. (O xford).
Singer, C . ( 1928) From Magic to Science (L ondon).
Skorupski, J . (1976) Symbol and Theory (C am bridge).
Snell, B. (1924) Die Ausdriicke fiir den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philo-
sophie (Philol. U ntersuch. 29, Berlin).
(1953) The Discovery o f the Mind (trans. T . G . Rosenm eyer o f Die Entdeckung des
Geistes, 2nd ed. H am burg, 1948) (O xford).
Snodgrass, A . (1965) ‘ T h e hoplite reform and h isto ry’ . Journal of Hellenic Studies
L x x x v , 110 -2 2 .
(1971) The Dark Age o f Greece (Edinburgh).
Solmsen, F. (1929) Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Neue
Philol. U ntersuch. 4, Berlin).
(1931) Platos Einfluss auf die Bildung der mathematischen Methode (Q uellen und
Studien zur G eschichte der M athem atik, Astronom ic und Physik b, i, i
(1929), Berlin, 1931, pp. 9 3-10 7).
(1940) ‘ Plato and the unity o f scien ce’ , Philosophical Review XLIX, 56 6 -71.
(1955) ‘ Antecedents o f A ristotle’s psychology and scale o f bein gs’ , American
Journal of Philology l x x v i , 148-64.
(1957) ‘ T h e vita l h e a t, the i n b o rn p n e u m a a n d the a e t h e r ’. Journal of Hellenic
Studies Lxxvir, 119-23.
(1960) Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Cornell U niversity Press, Ith aca,
N ew Y o rk).
(1961) ‘ G reek Philosophy a n d the Discovery o f the N erves’ , Museum Helveticum
XVIII, 150-67 a n d 169-97.
(1963) ‘ N ature as craftsman in G reek th o ugh t’. Journal of the History of Ideas
XXIV, 473-96.
(1968) ‘ D ialectic w ithout the Form s’ , in ed. O w en 1968, pp. 49-68.
(1975) Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton U niversity
Press, Princeton, N ew Jersey).
Sorabji, R . (1969) ‘ A ristode and O xford philosop hy’ , American Philosophical
Quarterly VI, 129-35.
Bibliography 301
(1972) ‘ A ristode, M athem atics, and C o lo u r’, Classical Quarterly N S x x ii,
293-308.
Souilhe, J . (1919) Etude sur le terme δύναμις dans les dialogues de Platon (Paris).
Souques, A . (1935) ‘ Connaissances neurologiques d ’H erophile et d ’Erasistrate’ ,
Revue neurologique lx iii, 145-76.
Spengel, L . (1828) Σ ΥΝ Α Γ 60ΓΗ TEXNCON sive artium scriptores (Stuttgart).
Sprague, R . K . (1962) Plato’s Use of Fallacy (London).
Sprute, J . (1962) Der Begriff der D O XA in der platonischen Philosophie (H ypo-
nm em ata 2, G ottingen).
Staden, H . von (1975) ‘ Experim ent and experience in Hellenistic m ed icin e’,
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies xxxi, 178-99.
Stahlm an, W . D . (1953) ‘ A n astronom ical note on the two system s’ , in G . de
Santillana 1953, pp. 475-96.
Stannard, J . (1965) ‘ T h e Presocratic origin o f explanatory m eth o d ’, Philo­
sophical Quarterly x v , 193-206.
Starr, C . (1968) ‘ Ideas o f truth in early G re ece ’ , La Parola del Passato x x n i,
348-59·
Stein, W . (1931) Der Begriff des Schwerpunktes bei Archimedes (Q uellen und Studien
zur G eschichte der M athem atik, A stronom ic und Physik b, i , 2 (1930),
Berlin, 1931, p p. 221-44).
Steinm etz, P. ( 1964) Die Physik des Theophrastos von Eresos (Bad H om burg, Berlin,
Z u rich ).
Stem piinger, E. (1919) Sympathieglaube und Sympathiekuren in Altertum und Neuzeit
(M iinchen).
(1922) Antiker Aberglaube in modemen Ausstrahlungen (Das E rbe der A lten 7,
L eip zig).
(1925) Antike und moderne Volksmedizin (Das Erbe der A lten 10, L eip zig).
Stenzel, J . (1921) ‘ O b er den Einfluss d er griechischen Sprache a u f die philo-
sophische Begriffsbildung’, Neue Jahrbiicher fUr das klassische Altertum, Ge­
schichte und deutsche Literatur x l v i i , i 52-64.
(1931) Zur Theorie des Logos bei Aristoteles (Q^ueUen im d Studien zur G eschichte
der M ath em atik, A stronom ic und Physik b, i , i (1929), Berlin, 1931,
pp. 34-66).
(1940) Plato's Method of Dialectic (trans. D .J . A lla n o f Die Entwicklung der
platonischen Dialektik, 2nd ed., L eip zig, 1931) (O xford).
Steuer, R . O . and Saunders, J . B. de C . M . (1959) Ancient Egyptian and Cnidian
Medicine (U niversity o f California Press, Berkeley and Los A n geles).
Sticker, G . (1933) ‘ H iera N ousos’, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Natur-
wissenschaften und der Medizin iii, 4, 347-58.
Stiebitz, F. (1930) ‘ O b er die K ausalerklarun g der V ererbun g bei A ristoteles’,
Sudhoffs Archiv fiir Geschichte der Medizin x x iii, 332-45.
Stokes, M . C . (1962) ‘ H esiodic and M ilesian cosmogonies, Γ , Phronesis v ii, 1-37.
(1963) ‘ Hesiodic and M ilesian cosmogonies, I I ’, Phronesis viii, 1-34.
(1971) One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (W ashington).
Stratton, G . M . (1917) Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psycholog)/ before
Aristotle (London).
Suppe, F. (1974) ‘ T h e search for philosophic understanding o f scientific theories’ ,
in The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. F. Suppe (U niversity o f Illinois Press,
U rb an a , C h icago ), pp. 2 -2 41.
Sw erdlow , N . (1969) ‘ H ipparchus on the distance o f the su n ’, Centaurus x iv ,
287-305.
Szabo, A . (19 51-2 ) ‘ Beitrage zur Geschichte der griechischen D ia lek tik ’, Acta
Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae i, 377-406.
 302 Bibliography
(1954a) ‘ Z u r G eschichte der D ialektik des D enken s’, Acta Antiqua Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 11, 17-5 7.
(19546) ‘ Z u m Verstandnis der E lea ten ’, Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 11, 243-86.
(19 5 5 ) ‘ E le a tic a ’, Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae iii, 6 7 - 1 0 2 .
(1958) ‘ δείκνυμι, alsm athem atischer Term inus fur “ bew eisen” ’,A ia ia x , 10 6-31.
(1960-2) ‘ A n ian ge des euklidischen Axiom ensysterns’, Archive for History of
Exact Sciences i, 3 7-10 6.
(1964-6) ‘ T h e transform ation o f m athem atics into deductive science and the
beginnings o f its foundation on definitions and axiom s’ , Scripta Mathematica
XXVII, 27- 48 a and 113 -3 9.
( 1966) ‘ Theaitetos und das Problem der Irrationalitat in der griecliischen M athe-
m atikgeschichte’, Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae x iv , 303-58.
(1969) Anfdnge der griechischen Mathematik (W ien and M iinchen).
(1970) ‘ Ein L ob a u f die altpythagoreische G eo m etric’ , Hermes x c v m , 405-21.
T am b ia h , S. J . (1968) ‘ T h e m agical pow er o f w ord s’, Man N S iii, 175-208.
(1973) ‘ Form and m eaning o f m agical acts: a point o f v ie w ’, in H orton and
Finnegan 1973, pp. 199-229.
T am bornino, J . (1909) De antiquorum daemonismo (Religionsgeschichdiche V er-
suche und V o rarbeiten vii, 3 (1908-9), Giessen, 1909).
T an n ery, P. (1887) La Geometrie grecque (Paris).
(1893) Recherches sur Vhistoire de Vastronomie ancienne (Paris).
(1912-43) Memoires scientifiquesy 16 vols. (Paris).
(1930) Pour Vhistoire de la science Helline, 2nd ed. (Paris).
T aran , L . (1965) Parmenides: A Text with translation, commentary, and critical essays
(Princeton U n iversity Press, Princeton, N ew Jersey).
T asch , P. (1947-8) ‘ Q μ an titad ve measurements and the G reek atom ists’, / i i i
x x x v n i, 185-9.
T ay lo r, A . E . (1928) A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (O xford).
T ay lo r, G. G. W . (1967) ‘ Plato and the M athem aticians: an exam ination o f
Professor H a re ’s v ie w s’. Philosophical Quarterly x v ii, 193-203.
T e m k in , O . (19 3 3 a ) ‘ V ie w s o n e p ile p s y in th e H ip p o c r a t ic p e r io d ’ . Bulletin of the
Institute of the History of Medicine i, 4 1-4 .
(19336) ‘ T h e doctrine o f epilepsy in the H ip p ocratic w ritin gs’, Bulletin of the
Institute of the History of Medicine i, 277-322.
(19 71) The Falling Sickness (ist ed. 1945), 2nd ed. (Baltim ore and L ondon).
T h eiler, W . ( 1924) Z^r Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles
(Zurich ).
(1967) ‘ H istoric und W eish eit’, in Festgabe H. von Greyerz (edd. E. W alder and
others) (Bern), pp. 69-81 (reprinted in T h eiler 1970, pp. 447-59).
(1970) Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur (Berlin).
T h iv el, A . (1975) ‘ L e “ d iv in ” dans la m edecine h ip p ocratiqu e’, in Bourgey and
Jou an n a 1975, pp. 5 7 -76 .
Thom as, K . (1971) Religion and the Decline of Magic (London).
Thom pson, A . R . (1952) ‘ H om er as a surgical anatom ist’. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Medicine x l v (Section o f the History o f M edicine), 765-7.
Thom pson, D ’A . W . (1910) Aristotle, Historia Animalium, in The IVorks o f Aristotle
translated into English (ed. W . D . Ross), V o l. iv (O xford).
(1913) On Aristotle as a Biologist (O xford).
(1940) ‘ A ristode the N a tu ra list’, in Science and the Classics (London), pp. 3 7-78 .
(1942) On Growth and Form (is t ed. 1917), 2nd ed. (C am bridge).
T hom pson, R . C am p bell (1923-4) ‘ Assyrian m edical texts’, Proceedings o f the Royal
Society of Medicine x v ii, Section o f the H istory o f M edicine, 1-34.
Bibliography 303
(1925-6) ‘ Assyrian M edical tex ts’, Proceedings o f the Royal Society o f Medicine
x ix , Section o f the H istory o f M edicine, 29-78.
Thom son, G . (1946) Aeschylus and Athens (ist ed. 1941), 2nd ed. (London).
(1954) Studies in Ancient Greek Society, I The Prehistoric Aegean (ist ed. 1949),
2nd ed. (London).
( 1955) Studies in Ancient Greek Society, II The First Philosophers (L ondon ).
Thom son, J . O . (1948) History of Ancient Geography (C am bridge),
Thoren , V . E. ( 19 7 1) ‘ Anaxagoras, Eudoxus, and the regression o f the lu n ar nodes ’ ,
Journal for the History o f Astronomy 11, 23-8.
T horndike, L . (1923-58) A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols. (New
Y o rk).
T hram er, E. (1913) ‘ H ealth and Gods o f H ealing (G re ek )’, in Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics, ed. J . Hastings, V o l. v i (Edinburgh), pp. 540-53.
T ign er, S. (1974) ‘ Em pedocles’ tw irled ladle and the vortex-supported e a rth ’ ,
Isis L xv, 433-47·
T o ep litz, O . (1931) Das Verhaltnis von Mathematik und Ideenlehre bei Plato (Q uellen
und Studien zur Geschichte der M ath em atik, Astronom ic und Physik b,
I, I (1929)» Berlin, 1931, pp. 3-33).
T oom er, G . J . (1967-8) ‘ T h e size o f the lunar epicycle according to H ip p arch u s’ ,
Centaurus xii, 145-50.
(1973-4) ‘ T h e chord table o f H ipparchus and the early history o f G reek trigo­
n om etry’ , Centaurus x v iii, 6-28.
(1974) ‘ M e to n ’ , in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, ed. C . C . Gillispie, V o l. ix
(N ew Y o rk ), pp. 337- 4 °·
(1974-5) ‘ H ipparchus on the distances o f the sun and m o o n ’. Archivefor History
of Exact Sciences x iv , 126-42.
(1975) ‘ P to lem y’ , in Dictionary o f Scientific Biography, ed. C . C . Gillispie, V o l. x i
(N ew Y o rk ), pp. 186-206.
T ra cy , T . (1969) Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle
(Studies in Philosophy 17, T h e H ague, and Paris).
T u rn er, E. G . (1951) ‘ A thenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B .C .’
(Inaugural lecture, U n iversity C ollege London).
U n gu ru, S. (1975-6) ‘ O n the need to rew rite the history o f G reek m ath em atics’ .
Archive for History of Exact Sciences x v , 6 7 -1 14 .
U sener, M . (1896) Gotternamen (Bonn).
V eg etti, M . (1973) ‘ N ascita dello scien zato ’, Belfragor xxvin, 641-63.
V erdenius, W .J . (1962) ‘ Science grecque et science m odern e’, Revue Philoso-
phique CLii, 3 19-36.
(1966) ‘ D er LogosbegrifFbei H eraklit und Parm enides’ , Phronesis x i, 81-98.
(1967) ‘ D er L ogosbegriff bei H eraklit und Parm enides’ , Phronesis xii, 9 9 -11 7 .
V ern an t, J . P. (1957/1965) ‘ L a form ation de la pensee positive dans la Gr^ce
a rch a iq u e’ {Annales yin (1957), 183-206), in V ern an t 1965, pp. 285-314.
(1962) I^s Origines de la pensee grecque (Paris).
(1963/1965) ‘ G eom etric et astronom ic spherique dans la prem iere cosmologie
g recq u e ’ {La Pensee c ix (1963), 82-92), in V ern an t 1965, pp. 145-58·
(1965) Mythe etpensSe chez les grecs, 2nd ed. (Paris).
(1970) ‘ Thetis et le po^me cosm ogonique d ’A lc m a n ’ , in Hommages ά Marie
Delcourt (Collection Latom us 114, Bruxelles), pp. 38-69.
V ia n o , C . A . (1958) ‘ L a dialettica in A ristotele’ , Rivista di Filosofia (Torino) x l i x ,
154-78.
(1965) ‘ R etorica, m agia e natura in P la to n e’ , Rivista di Filosofia (Torino) l v i ,
411-53·
V ica ire , P. ( 1970) ‘ Platon et la d iv in a tio n ’ , Revue des itudes grecques lx x x iii, 333-50.
304 Bibliography
V id a l-N aq u et, P. (1967) ‘ L a raison grecque et la cit6 ’ , Raison Prisente n, 5 1 -6 1 .
(1968) ‘ L a tradition de I’hoplite ath en ien ’ , in ProbUmes de la guerre en Grkce
ancienne, ed. J . P. V ern an t (Paris and T h e H ague), pp. 16 1-8 1.
(1970) ‘ Esclavage et gynecocratie dans la tradition, le m y the, I’u to p ie ’ , in
Recherches sur les structures sociales dans VantiquitS classique, edd. C . N icolet and
C . L ero y (Paris), pp. 63-80.
Vlastos, G . (19 4 7 /1970) ‘ E q u ality and justice in early G reek cosm ologies’
{Classical Philology x u r (1947), 156-78), in F urley and A llen 1970, pp. 56 -9 1.
(19 52 /1970) ‘ T h eolo gy and Philosophy in early G reek th o u g h t’ {Philosophical
(Quarterly n (1952), 9 7-12 3 ), in Furley and A llen 1970, pp. 92-129.
(1953) ‘ Isonom ia’, American Journal o f Philology L x x i v , 337-66,
(^953/1975) R eview o f R a ven 1948 {Gnomon x x v (1953), 29-35) in A llen and
Purely 1975, pp. 166-76.
(^955/1970) R eview o f Cornford 1952 {Gnomon x x v ii (1955), 65-76) in F urley
and A llen 1970, pp. 42-55.
(*959/1975) ‘ A note on Zeno B i ’ (from Gnomon x x x i (1959), 193-204) in A llen
and F urley 1975, pp. 177-83.
(1964) ‘ Ισονομία π ο λ ιτικ ή ’ , in Isonomia, edd. J . M a u and E. G . Schm idt
(Berlin), pp. 1-35.
(1966a/1975) ‘ A note on Z en o ’s a rro w ’ {Phronesis x i (1966), 3-18 ) in A lle n and
Furley 1975, pp. 184-200.
(1966^/1975) ‘ Z en o ’s R ace C o u rse’ {Journal of the History of Philosophy iv
(1966), 95-108), in A llen and F urley 1975, pp. 201-20.
(1975) Plato's Universe (O xford).
(forthcoming) ‘ T h e role o f observation in P lato’s conception o f astron om y’ , in
Science and Sciences in Plato, ed. J . P. A nton (N ew Y o rk).
V o gel, C . J . de (1966) Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism (Assen).
V o gel, K . (1936) Beitrdge zur griechischen Logistik (Sitzungsberichte der m athe-
m atisch-naturwissenschafdichen A b teilu n g der bayerischen A kadem ie der
W issenschaften zu M iinchen, Jah rgan g 1936, M iinchen, pp. 357-472).
V o g t, H . (1908-9) ‘ D ie G eom etric des P ythagoras’ , Bibliotheca Mathematica,
D ritte Folge ix , 15-54.
(1909-10) ‘ D ie Entdeckungsgeschichte des Irrationalen nach Plato und
anderen Q^uellen des 4 Jah rh u n derts’, Bibliotheca Mathematica, D ritte Folge x ,
97-155·
(1915) ‘ Z u r Entdeckungsgeschichte des Irratio n alen ’ , Bibliotheca Mathematica,
D ritte Folge x iv , 19 13 -14 (19 15), 9-29.
(1925) ‘ V ersuch einer W iederherstellung von H ipparchs Fixsternverzeichnis’ ,
Astronomische Nachrichten c c x x iv , 17-54.
W achter, T . (1910) Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult (Religionsgeschicht-
liche Versuche und V orarbeiten ix , i (1 9 10 -1 1), Giessen).
W aerden, B. L . van der (i 940-1) ‘ Zenon und die G rundlagenkrise der griechischen
M a th em a tik ’ , Mathematische Annalen cx v ii, 14 1-6 1.
(1947-9) A rithm etik der P ythagoreer’ , Mathematische Annalen c x x , 127-53
and 676-700.
(1951) Die Astronomie der Pythagoreer (V erhandelingen der koninklijke N eder-
landse A kadem ie van W etenschappen, A fd elin g N atuurkunde, x x , i,
A m sterdam ).
(1954) Science Awakening (trans. A . Dresden) (G roningen).
(1958) ‘ D rei um strittene Mondfinsternisse bei Ptolem aios’, Museum Helveticum
XV, 106-9.
(i960) ‘ G reek astronom ical calendars and their relation to the A th en ian civil
ca len d ar’, Journal of Hellenic Studies l x x x , 168-80.
Bibliography 305
(1965-7) ‘ V ergleich der m ittleren Bewegungen in der babylonischen, griechi­
schen un d indischen A stronom ie’ , Centaurus x i, 1-18 .
(1970) ‘ Berichtigung zu meine A rb eit “ V ergleich der m ittleren Bewegungen
in der babylonischen, griechischen und indischen A stronom ie’ ” , Centaurus
XV, 2 1-5 .
W aschkies, H .-J. (i 9 70-1) ‘ Eine neue H ypothese zur Entdeckung der inkommen-
surablen Grossen durch die G rie ch e n ’ , Archive for History of the Exact Sciences
VII, 325-53.
W asserstein, A . (1958) ‘ T heaetetus and the history o f the theory o f n um bers’ .
Classical Carterly N S v iii, 165-79.
(1962) ‘ G reek scientific th o u g h t’ . Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
N S VIII, 51-63.
(1972) ‘ L e role des hypothέses dans la m edecine grecq u e ’. Revue Philosophique
CLXii, 3 -14 .
W atkins, J . W . N . (1957) ‘ Between analytic and em p irical’. Philosophy x x x ii,
1 12 -3 1.
W edberg, A . (1955) Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics (Stockholm ).
W eidauer, K . (1954) Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schrifien (H eidelberger
Forschungen 2, H eidelberg).
WeU, E. ( 19 51/1975) ‘ T h e place o f logic in A ristod e’s th o u g h t’ (originally ‘ L a
place de la logique dans la pensee aristotelicienne’ , Revue de metaphysique
et de morale l v i (19 51), 283-315) in Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji 1975, pp. 88-
112.
W einreich, O . (1909) Antike Heilungswunder (R eligionsgeschichdichen V ersuche
und V o rarbeiten VIII, x (1909-10), Giessen, 1909).
W eiss, H . (1942) Kausalitat und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Basel).
W ellm ann, M . (1895) Diepneumatische Schule (Philol. U ntersuch. 14) (Berlin).
(1901) Die Fragmente der sikelischen Arzte Akron, Philistion und des Dickies von
Karystos (Berlin).
(1929) ‘ D ie Schrift περί ίρής νούσου des Corpus H ip p ocraticu m ’ , Sudhoffs
Archiv fur Geschichte der Medizin x x ii, 290 -312.
W est, M . L . (1963) ‘ T h ree Presocratic cosm ologies’ . Classical Quarterly N S x in ,
154-76.
(1967) ‘ A lem an and P yth agoras’ , Classical Quarterly N S x v ii, 1-15 .
(1971) Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (O xford).
W horf, B. L . (1956) Language, Thought, and Reality (M .L T . Press and N ew Y o rk
and London).
W ielan d, W . (1962) Die aristotelische Physik (G ottingen).
(1972) ‘ Z eid ich e Kausalstrukturen in der aristotelischen L o g ik ’, Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophie Lrv, 229-37.
W ilam ow itz-M oellendorff, U . von (1901) ‘ D ie hippokratische Schrift m p l ipfjs
νούσ ου’, Sitzungsberichte der koniglich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin (Berlin, 1901), 2-23 (reprinted in V o l. iii o f Kleine Schriften, Berlin,
1969, pp. 278-302).
(1929) ‘ D ie καθαρμοί des Em pedokles’ , Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. A"/., Jah rgan g 1929 (Berlin), 626-61 (reprinted in
V o l. I o f Kleins Schriften, Berlin, 1935, pp. 4 73 -52 1).
W ilcox, S. (1942) ‘ T h e scope o f early rhetorical instruction’ , Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology \Λ\ι,
W illetts, R . F. (1967) The Law Code of Gortyn (Kadm os Suppl. i, Berlin).
W ilpert, P. (1956-7) ‘ Aristoteles und die D ia lek tik ’ , Kant-Studien XLVin, 247-57.
W ilson, B. R . (ed.) (1970) Rationality (O xford).
W ilson, J . A . (1949) ‘ E g y p t’ , in Frankfort 1949, pp. 39-138·
3o6 Bibliography
(1962) ‘ M edicine in ancient E g y p t’ , Bulletin of the History of Medicine x x x v i,
114-23.
W inch, P. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science (London).
(1964/1970) ‘ U nderstanding a prim itive so ciety’ {American Philosophical
Quarterly i (1964), 307-24) in B. R . W ilson 1970, pp. 7 8 -1 1 1 .
W olff, H . J . (1970) Normenkontrolle' und Gesetzesbegriff in der attischen Demokratie. I N D E X OF PASSAGES R E F E R R E D T O
Untersuchungen zur γραφή παρανόμων (Sitzungsberichte der H eidelberger
A kadem ie der W issenschaften, phil.-hist. K l., Jah rgan g 1970, 2, H eidelberg).
W oodbury, L . (1965) ‘ T h e date and atheism o f D iagoras o f M elo s’ , Phoenix x ix ,
17 8 -2 1 I . AELIAN
(1976) ‘ Aristophanes’ Frogs and A thenian literacy: Ran. 52-53, 1 1 1 4 ’, Trans­ VH (ra 36), 260 n. 150
actions of the American Philological Association c v i, 349-57. AESCHINES
W right, L . (1973-4) ‘ T h e astronom y o f Eudoxus. G eom etry or p hysics?’ Studies in I (i8 o f), 245 n. 82
History and Philosophy of Science iv, 165-72. A E S C H YL U S
W ussing, H . (1974) ‘ Z u r Grundlagenkrisis der griechischen M a th em a tik ’ , in
A. ( io i9 f f) , 29 n. 98
Hellenische Poleis, V o l. iv , ed. E. C . W elskopf (Berlin), pp. 1872-95.
Zaehner, R . G. (1966) Hindu Scriptures (London and N ew Y o rk).
Ch. (968), 44 n. i8g
Zeller, E. and M ondolfo, R . (1932-74) La Filosofia dei Greet nel suo sviluppo storico Eu. (277), 44 n. 189; (28off), 38 n. 146; (283), 44 n. 189; (649f), 29 n. 98
{Die Philosophie der Griechen, translated, edited and enlarged by R . M ondolfo) Pers. (2 4 iff), 246 n. 83; (402ff), 246 n. 83
3 Parts (Firenze). Pr. (484-99), 227 n. 2
Zeuthen, H .-G . (1896) ‘ D ie geometrische Construction als “ E xistenzbew eis” in Supp. (5 i6 ff), 242 n. 60; (6ooff), 242 n. 60
der antiken G eo m etric’ , Mathematische Annalen x l v i i , 222-8. A ETIUS
(1910) ‘ Notes sur I’histoire des m athem atiques, V I I L Sur la constitution des I (3.4), I I n. 9; (7.13), I I n. 9
livres arithm etiques des Elem ents d ’Euclide et leur rapport k la question de
II (14.3 -4), 170 n· 226; (20.1), 170Π. 225; (2 1.1), 170 n. 225; (25.1), 170 n. 225;
I’irration alitd’, Oversigt over det kongelige Danske Videnskabemes Selskabs Forhand-
(28.1), 170 n. 228; (28.4), 170 n, 228; (28.5), 170 n. 228; (29.3), 171 n. 230
linger, 395-435·
III (3.1), 32 n. n o ; (3.2), 139 n. 69
(1913) ‘ Sur les connaissances geometriques des grecs avant la reforme platoni-
cienne de la geo m etric’, Oversigt over det kongelige Danske Videnskabemes IV ( i .i S ) , 30 n. 99; (9.1), 133 n. 38
Selskabs Forhandlinger, 4 3 1-73 . V (2.3), 43 n. 179; (16.3), 156 n. 160; (1 7 .1 -6 ), 163 n. 193; (17.3), 156 n. 160;
(1915) ‘ Sur I’origine historique de la connaissance des quantites irration elles’ , (24.1), 156 n. 160
Oversigt over det kongelige Danske Videnskabemes Selskabs Forhandlinger, 333-62. A LC M A E O N
Zilsel, E. ( 1941-2) ‘ T h e sociological roots o f scien ce’, American Journal of Sociolog)/ fr. ( i) , 78 n. 93, 133 n. 40; (4), 248 n. 97
x l v i i , 544-62. A LC M A N
(1942) ‘ T h e genesis o f the concept o f physical la w ’ , Philosophical Review Li,
fr. (5), ID n. 5
245-79· A L E X A N D E R OF APH R O D IS IA S
(1945) ‘ T h e genesis o f the concept o f scientific progress’. Journal o f the History
In Metaph. (38.1 o ff), 146 n. 105
of Ideas v i, 325-49.
Zin ner, E. (1950) ‘ C l. Ptolem aeus und das A stro la b ’ , Isis x l i , 286-7. ANAXAGORAS
Z u bov, V . P. (1959) ‘ Beobachtung und Experim ent in der antiken W issenschaft’ , fr, (4), 141 n. 8 1; (6), 141 n. 8 1 ; (8), 141 n. 8 1; (10), 14 1; (1 1), 141 nn. 81
Das Altertum v , 223-32. and 82; (12), 36 n. 131, 87 n. 145, 141 nn. 81 and 82, 248 n. 94; (15), 141
Z u n tz, G . (1971) Persephoru (O xford). n. 8 1; (16), 14 1; (18) 170 n. 228; (2 1), 134; (2 1a ), 23 n. 76, 134
A N A X IM A N D E R
fr. ( i) , 33 n. 112 , 248 n. 93
ANAXIM ENES
fr. ( i) , 143 n. 90; (2), II n. 9, 20 n. 51
ANONYMUS LONDINENSrS
(xi 22ff), 97 n, 202; (x iv I i- x v r a 8), 97 n. 203; (xvra 8 ff), 97 n. 202; (x x 2 5ff),
140 n. 75, 208 n. 4 1 1 ; (x x i 22f), 138 n. 65; (x x x n i 4 3 ff), 223 n. 495
A N T i P H O N (O rator)
I (10), 80 n. 105
Π (1.4), 80 n. 105; ( i . g f ) , 80 n. 105; (2.8), 80 n. 105; (3.1), 102 n. 242; (4.3),
102 n. 242; (4.8), 80 n. 105; (4.10), 80 n. 105
 Index o f passages 309
3o8 Index o f passages
SE (i65a38fT ), 62 n. 17; (i65b9 fF ), 64 η. 27; (16 5 b i2 ff), 64 η. 27; (i6 5 b 2 3 ff),
A N T I PH ON {continued)
65 n. 35; (i6 6 b 2 o ff), 65 n. 35; (i6 9 b 2 s ), 62 n. 17; (i6 9 b 3 i), 64 n. 33;
III (3.8 ), 80 n. 105; (4.9), 102 n. 242
( i 7 i b 4 ) , 62 n. 17; ( i 7 i b 9 ) , 62 n. 17 ; ( i7 i b 2 5 f f ) , 62 n. 17; ( i7 2 a 2 i) , 62
IV (2 .7 ), 102 n. 242; (3 .5 ), 39 n. 1 5 1 ; (3 .7 ), 102 n. 242; (4.9), 102 n. 242
n. 17; ( i7 3 a 7 f f ) , 86 n. 140; (i7 4 a 3 6 ), 64 n. 33; (i75a2 3 fF ), 65 n. 36;
V ( 1 - 7 ) , 100 n. 2 16 ; (19 ), 102 n. 242; (sGf), 80 n. 10 5; (4 g f), 80 n. 10 5; (52),
(i8 3a3 7fF ), 63 n. 20; (i8 3 b 3 4 -i8 4 b 8 ), 62 n. 15
80 n. 105; (54), 80 n. 10 5; (64), 102 n. 242; (8 1), 102 n. 242
Ph. ( i8 5 a i6 f ) , 1 19 n, 316; (i8 7 a 2 o f), 67 n. 45; (i8 9 a4 fF), 136 n. 60; (i8 9 a2 9 ),
A N T IPH O N (Sophist)
205 n. 3 91; (i9 3 b 2 5 ff), 119 n. 318; ( ig 4 a 7 ff) , 119 nn. 318 and 320;
frr. (2 2 -3 9 ), 87 n. 146; (27), 170 n. 228; (28), 171 n. 230
(i9 4 a 9 ff), 119 n. 319; (114 -6 ), 36 n. 129; (i9 5 b 3 6 ff), 36 n, 129; (199^ 4).
A R C H ILO C H U S
52 n. 220; (2 0 3 a i0 ff), 104 n. 250; (203a24), 205 n. 391; (2 0 3 b i3 ff), 11
fr. (7 4 ), 50 n . 2 1 4
n. 9; (m 5), 204; (204b4fF), 204 n. 386; (204b io ff), 204 n. 387; (204b22fF),
ARCH IM ED ES (cd d . H e ib c rg -S ta m a tis )
67; (204b28f), 67 n. 44; (204b35), 204 n. 387; (iv 1-5 ), 203; (2 o g a 7 ff),
I (2 3 2 .i f f ) , 11 5 n. 295
203 n. 383; (2 io a 2 4 ), 203; (2 io b 3 4 ff), 203; (2 12 a I5 f), 203; (2 i2 a 2 o f), 203;
II ( i 3 2 . i 4 i f ) , 121 n. 3 27; ( i3 6 .i8 f f ) , 121 n. 3 2 7 ; (222.6fF), 121 n. 328;
(2 i2 b 2 4 f), 203 n. 383; (2 i3a24fF ), 143 n. 9 1; (215325^·), 205 n. 390;
( 2 2 2 .i i f f ) , 181 n. 296; (4 2 8 .i8 ff), 122 n. 330; ( 4 3 0 .iff), 106 n . 263;
(2 i6 a i3 fF ), 205 n. 390; ( 2 i6 a i5 f) , 204 n. 385; (2 3 3 a 2 iff), 74 n. 79, 76
(438. i 6 i f ) , 122 n. 330
n. 85; (2 3 9 b 5ff), 74 n. 79, 75 n. 83; (2 3 9 b7), 75 n. 83; (2 3 9 b9ff), 74 n. 79,
ARCH YTAS
76 n. 85; (2 3 9 b i7 0 ), 76 n. 85; (239b3o), 75 n. 83; (239b33ff), 74 n. 82;
fr. ( i ) , 119 n. 320, 144 n n . 96 a n d 98 ; (2), 119 n. 320
(2 42b24ff), 205; (2 42b59ff), 205; (2 5 o a i7 ff), 203 n. 384; ( 2 5 3 a iif ) , 204
ARISTID ES
n. 389; (2 53 a32 ff), i3 7 n. 63, 204 η. 388; (2 5 3 b i8 ), 203 n. 384; (2543248·),
XLVII (45), 4 1 ; ( 5 4 -7 ), 46 n. 19 7 ; (6 1 -4 ), 46 n. 19 7 ; (6 7 -8 ), 46 n. 197
204 n, 388; (2 54 3 3 50 , 204; (2 56b2 off), 205 n. 391; (2 5 9 b iff), 204;
X Lviii (13 ), 4 1 ; (47), 4 1 , 45 n. 193; (74 f), 41
(263a4flF), 74 n. 79, 76 n. 85
XLix (6), 4 1 ; (7 -9 ) , 46 n . 19 7 ; (24), 4 1 ; 25), 4 1 ; (34), 4 1 ; (35), 4 1 ; (37), 41
Gael. (2 7 o a 3 ff), 205 n. 394; (2 7 o b i3 ff), 177 n. 267; (2 76 a 2 ff), 205 n. 394;
A R ISTO PH AN ES
(2 g ia 2 9 ff), 180 n. 287; (2 gib8 fT ), 180 n. 287; (2 g 2 a 3 ff), i7 g n. 283;
Ach. (50 2 ff), 255 n. 130; (659fF), 257 n. 139
(2 g 2 a 7 -g ), i2 g n. 14; (2 g 2 a 7ff), 177 n. 267; (11 13), 67; (2 g3 a2 5ff), 137,
(9 5 8 -9 1), 17 n. 4 1 ; ( l o y i f f ) . 255 n. 129; ( i6 9 4 ff) , 251 n. 104
173 n. 244, 205 n. 3g3; (2g3b23fF), 171 n. 230; (2 g 4 a ifr ), 206 n. 402;
Eq. ( i i s f f ) , 17 n. 4 1 ; (loosff), 17 n. 4 1 ; ( 1 1 4 5 ) , 129 n. 14; ( 1 3 1 7 ) , 250 n. 104
(2 g4 a6 ), 206 η. 402; (2 g4 a 7 ),2 o 6 n. 402; (2g4a i7 ff), 205 n. 395; (2 9 4 a 2 iff),
JVu. (2 o 6 ff), 250 n. 104; ( 3 3 if f) , 99 n. 208; (54 9 f), 257 n. 139 ; ( G is ff) , 172
68 n. 49; (294a24ff), 68 n. 4g; (2g4 a28ff), 68 n. 4g, 140 n. 71; (2 g4 a3 2ff),
n. 240; (8 8 2 ff), 99 n . 2 11
6 8 n . 5 1 ; (2 9 4 b 7ff), 267; (2 g 4 b i3 ff), 68 n. 49, 140 n. 72; (2 9 5 a i4 ff), 140
Pax (505), 250 n. 104; ( 1 0 4 5 -1 1 2 6 ), 17 n. 41
n. 72; (2 g 5 b io ff), 68 n. 50; ( 2 g 5 b ig ff), 205 n. 3g4; (11 14), 119 n. 319;
V. (88fF), 251 n. 10 5; (58 7-8 ), 256 n. 134; (1 0 7 1 -9 0 ), 251
(296330 0 , 205 n. 394; (296334!?), 205-6; (2 g 6 b 2 0 , 205 n. 3g6; (2g6b4),
S ch o lia Ac/i. (67), 255 n. 130
206 n. 3g7; (2 g6 b 6 ff), 205 n. 394; (2 g 6 b i8 if), 206 n. 400; (2 g6 b 2 7ff),
A R IST O T L E
205 η. 3g4; ( 2g 732 ff), 180 n. 287; (2 g7 3 4 ff), 206; (2 g7 a8 if), 206; (2 9 7 b 18O,
Cat. (5, 2 a i i f f ) , 136 n. 58; ( i5 a 2 9 fF ), 104 n. 250
206 n. 400; (2 97b2 3 ff), 137, 206; (2 g7 b 2 4 if), 206 n. 401; (2 g7 b 3 o ff), 206η.
Int. ( i6 a 9 fF ), 124 n. 332; ( i 7 a 3 3 f f ) , 124 n. 331
402 ; ( 2g 8 3 i 5ff), 180 n. 287, 206 n. 403; (30232 ifT), 208 n. 412; (304 b 26f),
APr. ( 4 i a 2 3 f f ) , 10 7; (4 6 a4 fF ), 137 η. 62; (i 30, 4 6 a 1 7 f f ) , 1 1 7 η. 302, 137 η. 6 2;
208 n. 4 12 ; (30 53gf), 208 n. 4 12 ; (30633^*), 207 n. 404; (30 6340 , 142 n. 87;
(5 3 b I i f f ) , 25 n. 84; ( 6 5 a 4 ff) , 106 n. 260, 1 1 7 n. 307; ( 6 8 b 3 5 ff), 136 n. 60;
(3o635fF), 137 η. 63; (3 0 6 3 i6 ff), 137 η. 63; (3 0 7a 2 ), i i g n . 3 15; (3073 16O,
(11 26, 6 9 a 3 7 ff ) , 64 n. 30; ( 7 0 a lo f ) , 64 n. 29
119 n. 3 15 ; (3 io b 3 fF ), 205 n. 395
APo. (i 1 - 3 ) , 1 15 n. 297; (71 b g f f ) , 136 n. 5 9 ; (71 b 3 3 ff ) , 136 n. 60; ( 7 6 b 6 ff ) ,
GC (3 i5 3 3 ff), 137 n. 63, 207 n. 405; (3 i5 b g ff) , 134 n. 45; (316b ig ff), 207
1 1 4 n. 294; ( 8 i b 6 f ) , 137 n. 6 2; (8 7 b 2 8 ff) , 137 n. 62; ( 8 7 b 3 7 ff) , 137 n. 62;
n. 406; (3 i 732 ff), 207 n. 406; (3 173 12 8 ·), 207 n. 406; (3 2 5 3 i3 ff), 137 n. 63,
(99b3 2fT ), 1 1 7 η. 30Γ, 137 ” · ^2; ( l o o a i 6 f f ) , 137 n. 62
204 n. 388; (325323ff), 207 n. 407; (3 2 5b 2 gff), 207 n. 407; (32835!?),
Top. ( i o o a i 8 f f ) , 63 n. 19, 79 n. 96; ( io o a 2 7 f f ) , 6 2 ; (i 2), 1 1 7 ; ( i o i a 3 6 - b 4 ) ,
207 n. 407; (328b32f), 207; (32g 3 io ff), 207; (3 2 g b 7 ff), 208; (32gb26iF),
1 1 7 n. 303; ( i 0 5 a i 3 f f ) , 136 n. 60; ( io 5 b 3 o f ) , 63 n. 19; ( i o 8 a i 2 f f ) , 65 n. 36;
208 n. 410; (3 3 0 3 i2 ff), 208 n. 409; (3303248*), 208; (33ob3fF), 208 n. 408;
(11 3), 64 η. 28; (ii 5, 11 1 b 3 2 ff ) , 64 n . 28; (141 b ig fF ) , 112 n. 288; (v iii), 64;
(33 i 32 ff), 208 n. 4 1 1 ; (114), 142 n. 86; (3 3 13 8 0 , 208 n. 412; ( 33 i b 2 4 0 ,
(v iii i ) , 64 n. 28; ( i 5 5 b 7 f f ) , 63 n. 19; ( i5 5 b 2 3 f f ) , 64 n. 28; ( i 5 6 a 7 f f ) , 64
208 n. 412
n. 28; ( i 5 6 b i 8 f f ) , 64 n. 33; ( i5 8 b 2 9 ff ) , 106 n. 260, i i i n. 283; (v iii 4,
Mete. (3 3 gb 6 ff), 206 n. 403; (34038!?), 208 n. 412; (342b27fF), 170 n. 227;
1 5 9 a i 5 f f ) , 64 n. 3 3 ; ( i5 9 a 3 2 f f ) , 64 n. 2 7 ; (i5 9 a 3 8 fF ), 64 n. 33; ( i6 o b 7 fF ) ,
(343bgflF), 177 n. 268; ( 3 4 3 b iif f ) , I7g n. 285; (34 3b3off), 180 n. 286;
74 n. 8 r, 76 n. 8 5; (v m 10, i 6 i a i f f ) , 64 n. 30; ( i 6 i a i 6 f f ) , 64 n. 33;
(3 4 5 3 if f ) , 179 n. 284; (i 13), 207 n. 403; (i 14), 207 n .4 0 3 ; (3 5 8 b i8 ff),
(i6 ia 2 4 flF ), 65 n. 36; (v m 1 1 ) , 64 n. 2 7 ; ( i 6 i a 3 8 f ) , 64 n . 2 7 ; ( i G i b i g f f ) ,
210 n, 418; (3623328·), 207 n .4 0 3 ; (3653298·), 206 n .4 0 3 ; (iv), 209-10;
64 η. 34; ( i 6 2 b 3 f f ) , 6 4 n . 34 ; (vm 13, i6 2 b 3 4 f f) , 64 η. 3 4 ; (v iii 14, i6 3 a 2 9 f f ) ,
(3 8 2 3 1), 34 n. i i g ; (iv 6-9 ), 210 n. 4 19 ; (3 8 3 3 3 0 , 209 n .4 1 3 ; (3 8 3 a ig ff).
65 n. 36; ( i6 3 a 3 6 f f) , 86 n. 140
310 Index o f passages Index o f passages 311
A R IS T O T L E {continued) (59 7aS2ff), 212 η. 4 3 o ; ( 6 o 5 3 4 f f ) , 29 η. g 8 ; (60 63 8), 2 12 n. 4 3 3 ; ( 6 0 6 b I4 ff),

209 n. 4 1 4 ; ( 3 8 3 a 3 2 f f ) , 209 η . 4 1 5 ; ( 3 8 3 b i i f f ) , 209 n. 4 1 4 ; ( 3 8 3 b i 3 f f ) , 2 0 9 ; 2 12 n. 435

( 3 8 3 b 2 o ) , 142 n. 8 6 ; ( 3 8 3 b 2 o f f ) , 2 1 0 ; ( 3 8 3 b 2 3 ) , 209 η. 4 1 4 ; ( 3 8 4 3 1 i f f ) , 209 PA (i i ) , 1 6 0 n . 1 8 2 ; ( 6 3 g b 8 f f ) , 1 3 7 n . 6 4 , 2 1 2 n . 4 3 6 , 2 2 0 n . 4 8 2 ; ( 6 4 0 3 1 4 O ,

n. 4 1 6 ; (384a2off), 210; (384a26ff), 209 n. 4 1 7 ; ( 3 8 4 a 2 g f f ) , 209 n. 4 1 7 ; 137 n. 64, 2 1 2 n. 4 3 6 ; (i 5 ) , 1 6 0 n . 1 8 2 , 1 6 3 - 4 , 1 8 0 n . 2 8 g ; ( 6 4 4 b 2 2 f f ) , 163

(385b i2ff), 210 n. 4 1 9 ; (38 7b9ff), 210 n. 4 1 8 ; ( 3 8 8 a 3 3 f f ) , 2 1 0 n. 418; n. ig 6 , 220 n. 4 8 7 ; (644b24 ff), 180 n. 28g; (64 4b28 ff), 163 n. i g 6 ;

(388 b 11), 209; ( 3 8 8 b 12 ), 209 n. 4 1 4 ; (389a9ff), 2 0 9 11.4 16 ; (3 8 9 aigff), (6 4 4 b 2gff), 137 n. 6 4 ; (64 536 0 , 137 n. 64, 164 n. 19 7 ; (6 4 5321-3), 164

209 n. 4 1 7 ; ( 3 S 9 a 2 2 f ) , 209 n. 4 1 6 n . 1 9 7 ; ( 6 4 5 3 2 i f f ) , 1 3 7 n. 6 4 ; ( 6 4 5 3 2 s f f ) , 1 3 7 n. 6 4 ; ( 6 4 5 3 2 8 f f ) , 160 n. 1 8 4 ;

deA n. ( 4 0 7 b 2 7 f f ) , 2 5 3 n . 1 2 0 ; ( 4 0 9 3 6 ) , 1 1 2 n . 2 8 8 ; ( 4 1 1 a 8 ) , 1 1 n, 9 ; ( 4 i 7 b 2 2 f ) , (64 5333ff), 1 3 7 n. 6 4 ; ( 6 4 5 b i 3 f f ) , 1 3 7 n. 6 4 ; (11 2 ) , 2 1 3 n . 4 3 7 ; ( 6 4 8 3 g f f ) ,

1 3 7 n. 6 2 ; (420 a i4 ff), 1 6 4 n. 2 0 1 ; (ill 3 ) , 136 n. 6 1 ; (42?b3), i35 n. 5 3 ; 2 1 5 n. 4 4 8 ; ( 6 4 8 a 2 i f f ) , 208 n. 4 o g ; ( 6 4 8 3 3 6 f f ) , 208 n. 4 o g ; ( 6 4 g b g f f ) , 208

(428a I iff), 1 3 6 1 1 . 6 1 ; ( 4 2 8 a i 6 f f ) , 1 3 6 1 1 . 6 1 ; (4 2 8 b 2 f f ) , 1 3 6 η. 6 1 ; (428b i8 f), n. 40 9; (65032ff), 213 n. 4 3 8 ; (n 4 ) , 213 n. 4 3 7 ; (650 b i4 ff), 2 o g n. 4 1 7 ;

136 n . 6 1 ; ( 4 2 8 b 2 3 f f ) , 1 3 6 n . 61 (652334O , 215 n. 4 6 1 ; (6 52335ff), 165 n. 2 0 2 ; (652b23ff), 214 n. 4 4 1 ;

Sens. ( 4 3 7 a i 7 - b i ) , 9 7 n . 2 0 0 ; (2, 4 3 7 a i g f f ) , 161 n. 1 8 7 ; ( 4 3 8 b 2 ) , 16 4 n. 2 0 1 ; (6 52b 27ff). 165 n. 2 0 2 ; (652b3o), 165 n. 202; (65338O , 97 n. 204;

( 4 3 8 b 1 3 Q , 1 6 4 n . 2 0 1 ; ( 4 4 4 a l o f f ) , 1 6 5 n . 2 02 (6 53a27ff), 214 n. 4 4 7 ; (653328O , 215 n. 4 5 4 ; (653 b i), 215 n. 4 5 2 ;

Somn. Vig. ( 4 5 8 a i 5 f f ) , 16 1 n. 186 ( 6 5 5 b 2 g f f ) , 2 1 3 ; ( 6 5 6 a l o f f ) , 2 1 4 n. 4 4 6 ; ( 6 5 6 b i 2 f f ) , 165 n. 2 0 2 ; ( 6 6 0 3 1 1 ) ,

D iv. Somn. ( 4 6 3 a 4 - b i i ) , 43 n. 1 7 7 ; ( 4 6 3 b i 3 f f ) , 43 n. 1 7 7 215 n. 4 1 9 ; (6603 i7 ff) , 214 n. 4 4 7 ; (6 6 ib 28 ff), 215 n. 4 5 6 ; (66 4b6ff),

Long. ( 4 6 4 b 3 2 f ) , 9 7 n. 204 2 16 -17; (6 6 4 b 1 8 O , 2 1 7 n. 4 6 7 ; (ill 4 ) , 161 n. 186 ; ( 6 6 5 3 2 8 f f ) , 2 1 3 n. 4 4 0 ;

Juv. ( 4 6 8 a i3 f f) , 2 1 3 ; (4 6 8 b 2 8 ff), 2 16 ; ( 4 6 9 a lo f f) , 162 n. 191 (6 6 5 3 3 3 f f ) , 2 1 6 n . 4 6 3 ; (6 6 6 3 8 f f ) , 2 1 6 η. 4 6 2 ; (6 6 6 3 i 8 f f ) , 2 1 6 ; ( 6 6 6 b i 3 f ) ,

R^sp. ( 4 7 o b 8 f), 220 n . 48 3; ( 4 7 o b g f ) , 205 n. 389; ( 4 7 ib 2 3 f f ) , 220 n. 4 8 3 ; 161 n. 1 8 6 ; ( 6 6 7 b i f f ) , 1 5 7 n. 1 6 5 ; ( 6 7 3 3 1 0 - 3 1 ) 5 2 1 2 n. 4 3 0 ; ( 6 7 6 b 3 3 0 , 164

( 4 7 5 b 7 ff ) , 2 14 n. 4 4 2 ; ( 4 7 6 b 3 o ff) , 2 14 n. 4 4 2 ; ( 4 7 7 a 2 o f) , 2 15 n. 448; n. 1 9 9 ; ( 6 7 6 b 3 3 f f ) , 220 n. 4 8 5 ; ( 6 7 7 3 5 f f ) , 9 7 n . 202, 2 1 7 n. 4 6 8 ; ( 6 7 7 3 i s f f ) ,

( 4 8 o b 2 2 ff), 97 n. 200 2 1 4 n. 4 4 4 ; (6 78 a26ff), 213 n. 440; (684b40, 164 n. 19 8 ; (68 737ff), 214

H A (i 2 - 3 ), 2 1 3 ; (488b 2 g ff ) , 2 13 η . 438 ; ( 4 8 9 a 8 ff), 2 13 n . 438 ; ( 4 9 i a g f f ) , 137 n. 443; (6 8 7 b 2 f f ) , 2 1 4 n n . 4 4 3 3 n d 4 4 7 ; (6 9 0 3 3 0 f f ) , 2 1 4 n . 4 4 3 ; (69237),

n. 64, 212 n. 4 3 6 ; (491 a 3 4 ff) 165 n. 202; (491 b 2 ff ) 2 15 n. 4 52 ; (491 b 2 o f f) , 12 9 n. 14

164 η . 2 0 1; ( 4 9 2 a i4 ff ) , 156 n. 160; ( 4 9 3 b i4 ff ) , 212 n . 429 ; ( 4 9 4 b 2 iff ) , 163 lA ( 7 0 6 3 1 9 O , 2 1 4 n . 4 4 6 ; (7 o 6 b 9 0 , 2 1 4 η. 446

n. 194 ; ( 4 9 4 b 2 7 ff), 2 14 n. 4 4 1 ; (4 9 4 b 2 9 ff), 165 n. 202; (4 9 4 b 3 3 ff), 165 GA (7i73 34 ff), 216 n. 4 6 1 ; (7i7b 3 ff), 216 n. 4 6 1 ; (72ob32ff), 212 n. 4 3 2 ;

n. 202; ( 4 9 5 a 4 ff) , 165 n. 202; ( 4 9 5 a i i f f ) , 164 n. 2 0 1; (i 17 ), 161 n, 186; (721312), 219 n .4 79 ; (72 iai4 ff), 219 n .4 7 9 ; (72 iai7ff), 215 n .4 5 8 ;

( 4 9 6 a g ff), 164; ( 4 9 6 3 1 1 ) , 157 η . 164; (4 9 6 3 13 ), i 6 i n . 18 6; ( 4 g 6 b 4 ff), 15 7 (i 1 7 - 1 8 ) , 2 1 7 - 1 8 ; ( 7 2 i b i 7 f f ) , 2 i 9 n . 4 7 6 ; ( 7 2 1 b 2 8 f f ) , 2 1 9 n . 4 7 6 ; ( 7 2 2 3 i i f f ) ,

n. 164; (4 9 6 b 2 4 ff), 15 7 n. 16 5 ; (4 9 7 3 3 2 ), 164 n. 198 ; ( s o i b i g f f ) , 2 15 2 1 9 ; ( 7 2 2 3 i 6 - b 3 ) , 2 1 7 n. 4 7 3 ; ( 7 2 2 b 3 f f ) , 2 1 8 ; ( 7 2 2 b 6 f f ) , 2 1 8 ; ( 7 2 2 b 3 o f f ) ,

n. 4 5 3 ; ( 5 i 0 3 2 i f f ) , 164; ( 5 i o b 3 f ) , 2 1 6 1 1 .4 6 1 ; ( 5 i i b i 3 f f ) , 15 7, 163 n. 19 4 ; 2 1 8 ; ( 7 2 3 b i 6 f f ) , 2 i 9 ; ( 7 2 3 b i g ) , 2 1 9 n. 480; ( 7 2 3 b i g f f ) , 2 i g ; (7 2 4 S 3 ff) , 2 19

(ill 2f, 5 i i b 2 3 - 5 i 3 3 7 ) , 15 7 n. 16 7 ; ( 5 i i b 2 o f f ) , 157 n. 164; ( s i 2 3 4 f f ) , n. 4 7 7 ; ( 7 2 8 a i 8 f f ) , 2 1 5 n. 4 5 1 ; ( 7 2 8 b i 4 f f ) , 2 1 5 n. 4 5 0 ; ( 7 2 g b 8 0 , 2 i g n. 4 8 1 ;

21 n . 6 3; (5 i 2 3 g f f) , 21 n. 6 3; ( 5 i 2 a 2 g ff) , 21 n. 6 3 ; ( 5 i 2 3 3 o f) , 158 n. 168 ; (72 gb 2 i0 , 2 ig n. 4 8 1 ; (7 2 gb 2 i-3 3 ), 2 ig n. 4 7 8 ; (72gb33ff), 2 ig n. 4 8 1;

(1113), 161 n. 186; ( 5 i 2 b i 7 f f ) , 1 5 8 n. 168; ( 5 i2 b 2 4 f f ) , 1 5 8 η . i6 8 ; ( 5 i2 b 3 2 f f ) , (73 i3 i4 ff), 219 n. 4 7 8 ; (7 3 3 b i6 ff), 219 n. 4 7 8 ; (7 3 5 3 2 g ff), 210 n. 4 2 0 ;

21 n . 6 3; ( 5 i 3 3 i 2 f f ) , 163 n. 194; ( 5 i3 b 2 6 ff ) , 127 n. 8 ; ( 5 i 4 a i 8 f f ) , 165 (735a35ff), 209 n. 4 1 6 ; (7 3 5 b 7 0 > 220 n. 4 8 2 ; (73 5b i6 ff), 209 n. 4 1 5 ;

n. 202; ( 5 i4 3 3 2 f f) , 21 n. 6 3 ; ( 5 i4 b 3 f f ) , 21 n. 6 3 ; ( 5 i5 3 2 8 f f) , 161 n . 18 6; (73631), 210 n. 4 2 0 ; (736 b 33ff), 210 n. 4 2 0 ; (74 0 33ff), 216 n. 4 6 2 ;

( 5 1 6 3 1 8 0 ,2 1 5 1 1 . 4 5 2 ; ( 5 i 6 3 i g f ) , 2 12 ; ( 5 2 o b 2 3 ff) , 209 n . 4 1 7 ; ( 5 2 i 3 2 f f ) , (740 317O , 216 n. 4 6 2 ; (7 4 i b i 5 0 , 216 n. 46 2 ; (74 4310 ), 165 n. 2 0 2 ;

2 15 n. 448; ( 5 2 1 3 2 6 0 , 2 15 n. 450 ; ( 5 2 3 a i8 f f ) , 209 n. 4 1 6 ; ( 5 2 3 3 2 5 0 , 223 (746314O , 164 n. 198; (74 6 aigff), 2 17; {η φ ζ.< ζο β ), 217 n .4 6 g; (747»3),

n· 4 9 3 ; (iv i - 7 ) , 2 i 3 , 2 14 η. 4 4 1 ; ( 5 2 4 3 5 f f ) ,2 i 2 n . 4 3 2 ; (5 2 4 b 4 ), 2 14 n. 4 4 1 ; 2 5 3 η· 1 1 9 ; (7 4 ? a 3 f f ) , 223 n .4 g 3 ; ( 7 4 7 a 7 ), 253 n. 1 1 9 ; (7 4 7 a 7 f f ) , 223

( 5 2 4 b 2 i 0 , 21411.442; (5 2 4 b 32 ), 2 1 4 η . 4 4 1 ; (5 2 5 3 8 O , 1 6 4 η . ig 8 ; ( 5 2 7 b i f f ) , n. 4 9 3 ; ( 7 4 7 b 5 O , 220 n. 4 8 4 ; ( 7 4 8 3 8 O , 220 n. 4 8 4 ; ( 7 4 8 3 i 4 f f ) , 2 2 0 η . 4 8 2 ;

2 13 n . 440; ( 53 O 3 2 0 , 2 13 n . 4 3 g ; ( 5 3 i a i 2 f f ) , 2 13 n. 4 3 g ; ( 5 3 ib 8 f f ) , 2 13 (752b25ff), 156 n. 16 0 ; (7 5 6 3 2 ff), 2 2 0 n. 4 8 5 ; (756333), 12 9 n. 14, 212

n - 4 3 9 ; ( 5 3 2 b 7 0 , 2 13 n. 440; (5 3 8 3 2 2 ff), 2 15 n. 4 58 ; ( 5 3 8 b i s f f ) , 2 15 n. 4 2 6 ; ( 7 5 6 b 3 f f ) , 2 1 2 n. 4 2 8 ; (7 s 6 b 6 0 , 2 1 2 n. 4 3 4 ; ( 7 5 6 b i 6 f f ) , 2 1 7 n. 4 7 1 ,

n. 4 5 6 ; (54 0 b 1 5 0 , 2 1 5 η. 458 ; (541 b 8 ff ) , 2 i2 n. 4 3 2 ; ( 5 4 4 3 1 2 0 ,2 1 2 η . 432 ; 220 n. 4 8 5 ; (756b27ff), 217 n. 4 7 1 ; (75gb2 ff), 215 n. 4 5 7 ; (76ob27ff),

( 5 5 2 b i 5 f f ) , 212 Π .4 3 1 ; ( 5 6 i 34 f f ) , 158 n . 17 2 ; (5 6 i 3 6 f f ) , 2 16 n .4 6 3 ; 1 3 7 - 8 ; ( 7 6 4 3 3 3 f f ) , 2 1 5 η . 4 5 g , 2 i 7 n . 4 7 0 ; ( 7 6 5 3 i 6 f f ) , 2 1 7 n. 4 7 0 ; ( 7 6 5 a 2 5 ~

( 56 i 3 i i f ) , 2 16 n . 4 6 3 ; (vi 10, 5 6 5 b i f f ) , 144 n . 9 4 ; (5 6 6 3 6 -8 ), 2 12 n . 4 2 7 ; g), 220 n. 486; ( 7 6 5 3 3 4 f f ) , 2 1 7 n. 4 7 0 ; (7 6 5 b 4 0 , 220 n. 48 4; ( 7 6 5 b 4 f f ) , 2 1 7

( 5 6 6 3 i4 f f) , 164 n. ig 8 ; ( 5 7 2 b 2 g ), 44 n. i g i ; (5 7 3 3 iiff) , 2 12 n. 4 2 7 ; n. 4 7 0 ; ( 7 6 5 b 8 f f ) , 2 1 5 n. 4 5 1 ; ( 7 6 5 b 1 6 O , 2 1 5 n. 4 5 5 ; ( 7 7 o b g f f ) , 52 n. 2 2 0 ;

( 574 b 4 ) , 4 4 n. 1 9 1 ; (5 7 4 b i5 f f ) , 212 n. 4 2 7 ; ( 5 7 g b 2 ff ) , 212 n. 430 ; ( 5 7 9 t>5f f ) , (7 7 5 a 5 f f ) , 2 i 5 n· 4 5 5 ; (7 7 5 b 5 ) , 4 4 n. 1 9 1 ; ( 7 8 o a 2 6 f f ) , 1 6 4 η . 2 0 i ; ( 7 8 1 3 2 0 ) ,

212 n. 4 3 5 ; ( 5 8 o a ig - 2 2 ) , 2 12 n. 4 2 g ; ( 5 8 2 b 2 8 ff), 2 15 n. 45 0 ; (5 8 3 3 4 ff), 164 n. 2 0 1 ; (78 ib 2 i0 , 215 n. 4 4 9 ; (788b i iff), 220 n. 4 8 5 ; (788b i7ff),

2 15 n. 450 ; ( 5 8 3 a i4 ff ) , 223 n. 4 g 3 ; ( 5 8 3 b 2 ff), 2 15 n. 459, 2 1 7 n. 4 70 ; 220 n. 48 5

( 5 8 3 b 5 ff), 2 15 n .4 5 9 , 2 1 7 n .4 7 0 ; ( 5 8 3 b i4 f f ) , 160 n. 18 1, 163 n. ig 4 ; Pr. ( 8 6 4 3 3 4 ) , 4 4 n. igi; (g i4 b g ff), 143 n. 9 1 ; ( x i x 50, g 2 2 b 3 5 f f ) , 144 n.

( 5 8 4 3 i2 f f ) , 2 15 n .4 5 9 ; ( 5 8 5 b 3 5 ff), 2 19 n .4 7 7 ; ( 5 8 7 b i) , 44 n. 190; 96
312 Index o f passages Index o f passages 313
A R IST O T L E {continued) A RTEMID ORUS
D e M X G ( 9 7 9 a i2 f ) , 82 n. 1 1 5 ; (9 7 9 a 2 2 ff), 82 n. 1 1 4 ; (979a35flF), 82 n. 1 1 6 ; I ( 1 - 2 ) , 43 n. 178

(979b9f)> 82 n . 1 1 6 ; ( 9 7 9 b 2 o ff) , 82 n. 1 1 7 ; ( g 7 9 b 2 2 ) , 82 n. 1 1 4 ; (9 7 9 ^ 2 5 ), ATHENAEUS

82 n. 1 1 4 ; ( 9 7 9 b 2 7 ff) , 82 n. 1 1 8 ; (979b37)> 82 n. 1 1 4 XIV (620d ), 254 n. 12 5; (6 2 4 a b ), 42 n. 173

Metaph. (9 8 o a 2 7 if), 137 n. 6 2 ; ( 9 8 i b i 7 i f ) , 236 n . 30; ( 9 8 ib 2 3 f f) , 230 n. 13 ;

( 9 8 3 b 2 if ) , 140 n. 7 1 ; (98 5b 2 3fF ), 146 n. 10 3; (9 8 5 b 2 9 ff), 146 n. 10 5; BO ETHIUS
(9 8 6 a 8 ff), 173 n. 2 4 5 ; ( 9 8 6 a i9 f ) , 107 n. 2 6 7 ; (9 8 6 a 2 2 ff), 155 n . 149; M u s. (i l o f , i 9 6 . i8 f l F ) , 1 4 4 n . 9 5 ; (iii 5 , 2 7 6 . i 5 f F ) , 1 1 9 n . 3 2 0 ; (iii 1 1 , 2 8 5 . 9 f F ) ,

(9 8 7 b iff) , 112 n. 28 5; ( 9 8 7 b i i f ) , 146 n. 103; (9 8 7 b 2 7 ff), 146 n , 10 3; 1 19 n. 320

(9 8 7 b 3 2 ), 62 n . 16 ; ( 9 9 o a i8 f f ) , 146 n. 10 5; ( 9 9 2 a i9 ff ) , 113 n. 288;

(9 9 8 a 2 ff), 1 16 n. 299; ( g 9 8 a 2 5 ff), 108 n. 270; ( lo o o a g f ) , 10 n. 4 ; (10 0 4 b 1 7 - CAELIUS A URELIANUS
26), 63 n. 19 ; ( io o 4 b 2 2 fF ), 62 n. 1 7 ; ( lo o G a s f f) , 118 n. 3 10 ; ( io i8 b 3 o fF ) , M orb. Chron. (i i 7 5 f ) , 4 2 n . 1 7 4 ; (i 1 7 8 ) , 4 2 n . 1 7 4 ; ( v 2 3 ) , 4 2 n. 1 7 4

136 n . 60; ( i0 5 3 a 3 5 f f) , 135 n. 5 5 ; ( i o 6 2 b i 2 f f ) , 135 n. 5 5 ; ( io 6 9 b 2 2 ) , 67 CELSUS

n . 4 5 ; (10 71 b 2 6 f) , 10 n . 4 ; (10 7 3 b lo f f ) , 180 n . 28 7; ( io 7 3 b 3 2 f f ) , 176 n . 260; P r o e m (2 3 i T ), 1 6 5 n . 2 0 6 ; ( 2 7 f f ) , - i 6 6 n . 2 1 5 ; ( 3 9 ) , 1 6 7 η . 2 1 5 ; (4 ofT ), 1 6 7 η . 2 1 5

( i0 7 4 a i4 ff), 180 n . 28 7; ( io 7 5 b 2 6 ) , 10 n. 4 ; ( i0 7 8 b 2 ifF ) , 146 n . 105; VII (7-13)5 i 66 n . 2 10

(io 7 8 b 2 5 iF ) , 62 n. 16 ; (io 7 8 b 2 7 fF ) , 112 n. 285; ( io 9 o a 2 o ff ) , 146 n. 10 3; CENSORINUS
( i 0 9 i a 3 3 f f ) , 10 n. 4 ; ( 1 0 9 3 a i3 ff ) , 146 η. 105 de die not. (5, i o . 7 f F ) , 1 5 6 n . 1 6 0 ; (6, lo.gf lF) , 1 6 3 n . 1 9 3 ; ( 1 0 , i 7 . i 9 f f ) , 1 4 4 η . 9 5

Ε Ν ( io 9 4 b 2 5 ff ) , 121 n. 326; ( ii4 2 a 2 5 ff) , 13 7 n. 62; ( ii4 5 b 2 7 f) , 130 ; CHALCIDIUS

( i i 4 7 a 2 5 f f ) , 137 n. 6 2; ( i i 5 7 a 2 2 ) , 253 n. 120 ; ( 1 1 6 2 a 14 ), 253 n . 120 In T i. ( 4 5 , 9 4 .i 3 f lT ), 1 4 4 n . 9 5 ; (2 4 6 , 2 5 6 . 1 6 - 2 5 7 . 1 5 ) , 1 5 6 n . 1 5 9

MM ( 1 1 8 2 a I i f f ) , 146 n. 105 CIC ERO

Pol. ( i 2 5 5 b 3 5 f f ) , 259 n . 14 3 ; ( i2 6 6 a 9 fF ), 244 n . 70 ; (i2 6 8 b 3 4 fF ), 259 n. 14 5 ; Brut. ( 1 0 . 4 0 ) , 6 5 n. 3 8

( i2 6 8 b 4 ifF ) , 100 n . 2 2 1 ; ( i2 6 9 a i9 fF ) , 259 n , 14 5 ; (12 7 1 a 6 ff ) , 261 n. 15 3 ; D iv . I (5 2 .1 1 8 ), 19 n. 47

( 1 2 7 2 a l o f ) , 245 n . 8 2; ( 1 1 1 1 ) , 240 n. 54; ( i2 7 g a 2 2 f f ) , 245 n. 76 ; (12 8 2 a i f f ) , II (I2 .2 8 ff), 157 n. 165; (4 2 .8 7 ), 178 n. 272, 180 n. 292; (4 6 .9 7 ), 176

97 n. 201, 253 n . 120; ( i 2 8 6 a i 2 f f ) , 259 n. 14 5 ; ( i 2 9 o a i 3 f f ) , 245 n . 76 ; n. 2 6 2

(rv 4 - 6 ) , 245 n. 7 6 ; ( i 2 9 2 a i 5 i f ) , 256 n. 13 4 ; (i2 9 2 b 2 5 fT ), 259 n. 14 3 ; JV.D. I (10 .26), II n. 9 ; (4 2 .11 8 ), 15 n. 29

( 1 2 9 3 a i f f ) , 244 η . 70, 259 η · 143; ( i2 9 4 a 3 7 fT ), 244 n. 70; ( 1 2 9 7 a i7 flf) , 261 H (3 4 -3 5 *8 8 ), 181 n. 293

n . 15 4 ; ( i2 9 7 a 2 if F ) , 244 n. 70; ( i2 9 7 b 2 2 f f) , 258 n . 14 2 ; ( i2 9 8 a 3 4 ff) , 261 Rep. I ( 1 4 . 2 1 - 2 ) , 181 n. 293

n. 15 4 ; (i2 9 8 b i7 flF ), 244 n. 70; ( i3 0 0 a ifT ) , 244 n. 70; ( i 3 0 5 a i o f f ) , 252 Tusc. I (2 5 .6 3 ), 181 n. 293

n . 1 1 2 ; ( i3 o 8 a 3 o ) , 129 n . 14; ( v 12, i 3 i 5 b i i f F ) , 242 n . 6 1 ; ( i 3 i 7 b 3 i f T ) , CLEMENT OF A LE X A N D R IA

2 4 4 η . 7 o ; (13 2 0 a i7 flF ), 259 η. 14 3 ; ( 1 3 2 2 b i i ) , 253 η . i 2 i ; (V114, i3 2 6 b 5 f f ) , Strom. I ( 1 4 .6 5 ), 1 7 0 n. 2 2 4 ; (1 5 -6 9 ), I 3 4 " - 4 4

259 n· 144 CR IT IA S
Rh. ( i 3 5 4 a i f F ) . 63 n. 2 1 ; (i35 4 a3 flF ), 6 3; ( 1 3 5 4 a i i f f ) , 63 n . 24; ( i 3 5 4 a i 6 f f ) , fr. ( 2 5 · 9 ί Τ ) , 1 5 n . 3 0

63 n. 24; ( 1 3 5 4 b i6 f f ) , 8 1 ; ( i3 5 5 a 6 f ) , 64 n. 29; ( i 355 a 33ff). 63 n. 19, 79

n. 9 5 ; ( i3 5 5 b i7 f f ) > 62 n . 1 7 ; ( i3 5 5 b 2 6 f) , 6 3 ; ( 1355 ^ 35 ^ ) . 80 n . 103; DEMOCRITUS
( i3 5 6 a 2 5 fF ), 63 n. 22; ( i3 5 6 a 3 2 fT ), 63 n. 2 1 ; ( ΐ 3 5 7 » 32 θ> 64 n . 29; fr. (6 ), 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ; ( 7 ) , 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ; (8 ), 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ; ( 9 ) , 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ; ( 1 0 ) , 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ;

( i3 5 8 b 2 ff ) , 63 n. 23; ( i3 5 9 b i2 fT ) , 63 n. 2 1 ; (i3 5 9 b i8 flF ), 63 n. 22; (11), 1 3 4 n . 4 5 ; (30), 1 4 η . 2 8 ; ( i i 7 ) , 13 4 η . 4 5 ; ( i i 8 ) , 36 n. 1 2 8 ; ( 1 2 5 ) , 13 4

( i3 6 o a 3 o ff ) , 63 n. 22; ( i3 6 o a 3 3 f f ) , 238 n. 4 4 ; (i3 6 5 b 2 2 flr), 63 n. 22, 238 n. 4 6 ; (155)» 119 n. 3 1 6 ; (166), 14 n. 2 8 ; (234), 42 n. 1 7 0 ; (299), 134
n. 4 4 ; (111, i3 7 7 b 2 4 fF ) ,6 4 n . 26; ( i 3 7 8 a i 5 i F ) , 6 4 η . 2 6 ;( ii 1 2 - 1 4 , i3 8 8 b 3 ifF ) , n .4 4

64 n. 25; (11 2 0 -6 ), 64 n. 29; (11 24), 64 n. 28; ( i4 0 2 a 7 - 2 3 ) , 81 n. 1 1 1 ; DEMOSTHENES

(i4 0 2 a 2 3 fF ), 85 n. 137, 99 n. 210 ; (11 25, I4 0 2 a3 4 flf), 64 n. 30; ( i 4 i o b 8 ) , V ( 7 - 8 ) , 2 5 4 n. 124

65 n. 3 6 ; (ill 18, I 4 i8 b 3 9 f f ) , 64 n. 3 1 ; (iii 19, 1 4 1 9 b l o f f ) , 64 n. 32 IX ( 3 ) , 2 4 5 n . 80

Po. ( 1 4 6 0 a i8 ff ) , 65 n. 39 XV (18), 245 n. 79

Ath. ( i ) , 24.9 n. l o i ; (7), 247 n. 9 1 ; (8 .1), 243 n. 68 ; (8.5), 243 n. 6 5 ; (9 .1 ), XX ( 1 6 ), 2 4 5 n. 7 9

243 η . 6 5 ; (22-5), 243 n. 68; (24), 2 4 4 η . 70; (2 7.4 ), 2 4 4 η . 70; (43), 243 η. 68; XXI (12 4 ), 245 n. 79

(45), 252 η. 1 1 5 ; ( 4 7 ·ΐ) . 243 η. 68; (55) 252 η. 1 1 5 ; (62), 244 η. yo; (6 2 .3 ), XXV ( 7 9 - 8 0 ) , 29 n. 98

244 η· ^9
LX ( 2 8 ) , 2 4 5 n. 7 9

fr. (36). 13 η· 2 ο ; (65), 62 η . ι6 , 79 " · 94; (19 2 ), 228 η. 5 DIO DORUS SICULUS
ARISTOX ENU S I ( 8 2 ) , 2 5 9 n . 1 4 5 ; ( 9 6 - 8 ) , 2 3 8 n . 39

Harm. (11 32Ο, 119 η. 320; (π 38ίΤ), ι ΐ 9 «· 32θ XII ( l o f ) , 2 4 5 n . 7 7 ; ( 3 9 ) , 2 5 5 n . 1 2 9 ; ( 5 3 -2 f f ) , 8 2 n . 1 2 1

314 Index o f passages Index o f passages 315
DIOGENES OF APO LLONIA Nat. Fac. {Scr. Min. m ) (11 i , i 5 6 . 2 4 f f ) , 1 6 5 n . 2 0 7 ; (11 1 1 , I 9 5 . i 7 f f ) , 8 7 n . 1 4 6 ;

fr. ( i ) , 88 n. 1 5 1 ; (2), 87 n. 145, 93 n. 18 3; (3), 36 n. 1 3 1 ; (4), 20 n . 5 1 ; (ill 4 , 2 1 3 . 1 i f f ) , 1 6 7 n . 2 1 7

(5), 20 n. 5 1 , 36 n. 13 1, 248 n. 94; (6), 21 n. 6 3 ; (8), 248 n. 94 UP (i 4 8 8 . i 4 f f ) , 166 n n . 209 and 213; (11 ig.6 f), 166 n. 2 1 2 ; (11 3 2 i . 8 f f ) ,

DIOGENES L A E RT IU S 166 n. 2 1 2

I (8), 178 n, 2 7 2 ; (23), 170 n. 224; ( 4 iff ) , 249 n n. 99 a n d 100; ( 74 f f ) , 249 n. 100;
CMG V, 4 , 2 ( i 9 -2 4 f f ) , 4 3 n. 1 7 5
(9 4 ff), 249 n. 100; ( n o ) , 249 n. l o i ; (1 1 2 ) , 249 n . l o i CMG V, 9, 2 ( 2 0 5 . 2 8 f f ) , 2 9 n . 98 , 4 2 n . 1 6 4
II (12 ), 255 n. 129; (io6fF), 62 n. 16 CMG V, 10, I ( 1 0 8 . i f f ) , 4 3 n. 181
VIII (4), 37 η . 13 5 ; ( i i ) , 37 η. 13 5 ; ( i2 ) , 1 4 4 1 1 .9 6 ; (14 ), 37 n. 135, 170 η. 229; CMG V, 10, 2, 2 ( i 9 9 . 4 f f ) , 4 6 n . 2 0 1
( i9 ) , 37 n. 139 ; (2 1), 37 n. 135; (33), 37 n. 139 ; (34), 37 nn. 139 a n d 1 4 1 ;
(36), I I n. 1 2 ,3 7 η. 13 5 ; (38), 37 η. 135 ; ( 5 9 -6 1 ), 37 η. 13 5 ; (63), 254 η. 12 5 ; K i (5 9 - i 5 f f ) , 1 2 0 n. 3 2 5 ; (3 0 5 .iff), 120 n. 3 2 5 ; (536), 1 2 0 n. 3 2 5 ; (632.sff),
1 6 7 n. 2 1 6
(6 3 -4 ), 2 6 i η . 15 5 ; ( 72 ), a 6 i η. 15 5 ; (87), 178 η. 271
K II ( 7 7 -4 f f ) , 1 6 5 n . 2 0 7 ; ( i 3 0 . 4 f f ) , 8 7 n . 1 4 6 ; ( i 5 5 . 6 f f ) , 1 6 7 n . 2 1 7 ; ( 2 2 0 . i 4 f f ) ,
IX ( 23 ), ι? ο η. 22 9 ; (47 ), 3 ^ η. 128; (48), 97 η . 2θ2; (50), 245 η. 7 7 ; ( s O , 85
1 6 7 η . 2 i 6 ; ( 2 2 i.4 ff), 1 6 7 η . 2 i 6 ; ( 2 2 i . i 4 f f ) , 1 6 7 η . 2 i 6 ; (385.5 ff), 1 6 7 η . 2 i 6 ;
η· 137, 99 η . 2 ΐ ο ; (52), 255 η. 129
( 5 7 0 . 1 0 - 5 7 1 . 4 ) , 166 n. 209; (6 4 9 .5 ff), 166 n. 2 1 3 ; ( 7 3 i . 6 f f ) , 166 n. 2 1 2

EMPEDOCLES K III ( 6 7 3 . 9 f f ) , 1 6 6 n n . 2 0 9 a n d 2 1 3 ; ( 7 0 8 . i 4 f ) , 1 6 6 n. 2 1 2

K IV ( 1 9 0 . 2 f f ) , 1 6 6 n. 2 1 2 ; ( 5 9 6 . 4 f f ) , 1 6 6 n. 2 1 1
fr. (ι), 34 η. ΐ2ο; (2), 134; (3), ^3 4 ; (8), 35 "· 125; ( i 7 -27ff), 248 η. 93;
K V (i6 6 .io ff), 165 n. 20 7; (548 .8ff), 165 n. 2 0 7 ; (54g.5ff), 165 n. 2 0 7 ;
(i7 .3 iff), 87 η. 145; (3θ), 248 η. 9 3 ; (39 ), 68 η. 4 9 ; (42 ), 17° η. 230;
( 6 o 2 . i 8 f f ) , 1 6 6 n . 2 1 3 ; ( 6 o 3 . g f f ) , 1 6 6 n. 2 0 9 ; ( 6 o 4 . 6 f f ) , 1 6 6 n . 2 1 3
(43), ι?ο η. 228; (45), ΐ7ο η. 228; (84), 35 η. 126, 159 η. 176, 162 η. 190;
K VI ( 4 0 . 4 f f ) , 4 3 n. 1 7 5 ; ( 8 3 2 f f ) , 4 3 n . 1 8 1
(96), 35 η. 126; (98), 35 «· 126; (ιοο), 35 «· 126, 143 η. 91, ΐ59 η. 176;
K VII (6 0 5 .7 f f ) , 165 n. 205
( ι ι ι ) , 34-5, 37; (ιΐ 2), 34~5; (128), 38 η. 146; (129), 37 η. 135; (136),
K VIII ( s 6 . 4 f f ) , 9 1 n . 1 7 4 ; ( 2 i 2 . i 3 f f ) , 1 6 5 n. 2 0 5 ; ( 3 g 6 . 6 f ) , 1 6 6 n . 2 1 2
38 η. 146; (137), 38 η. 146
K X ( 6 o 9 . 8 f f ) , 4 3 n. 18 0
E UCLID
K XI ( 3 i 4 . i 8 f f ) , 4 3 ; ( 7 9 2 . i 4 f f ) , 4 2 n . 1 6 8 ; ( 8 5 g . i 2 f f ) , 4 2 n . 1 6 9
Elements (Heiberg-Stamatis)
K x ii (5 7 3 .5 f f ) , 42 n. 169
I (Def. i ) , 112 n. 288; (Def. 4), 105 n. 2 5 5; (Post. 1 - 5 ) , i n n. 2 8 1; (Post. 5 ),
1 1 7 ; (Comm. O p. 3 ), I I I n n. 281 a n d 282; (Comm. Op. 7), 10 5; (Comm. K XV (3 2 5 .1 i f f ) , 8 7 n. 146

Op. 8 , 1 6.4), 117 a n d n. 304; (4), 10 5; (4, i i i . 4 f f ) , 105 η. 2 56; (8, i i6 .iif f ) , K xviiA ( 2 i 4 . 7 f f ) , 4 3 n . 18 1
105 n. 256
K xviiB ( 1 3 7 . 7 f f ) , 4 6 n . 2 0 1
VII (Def. i ) , 1 1 7 n. 30 5; (Deff. 6 - 7 ) , 11 4 ; (Def. 2 1, 11 I04.25flf), 109 n. 2 7 6 ; K xviiiA (8 6. 1 i f f ) , 1 6 5 n . 2 0 5
( 1 - 3 ) , 106 n . 266
K xviiiB ( i 7 . g f f ) , 2 9 n . 98 , 4 2 n. 16 4

K XIX ( s g . g f f ) , 4 3 n . 1 80
IX (2 1), 104 n. 249; ( 2 1 -3 4 ), 104 n. 249; (29), 104 n. 249
X ( i ) , 11 5 n. 295; (2 -4 ), 107 n. 266; (App. 27, iii 2 3 i.io flF ), 10 7; (App. 27, De Anat. Admin, ix ( i3 f ) ,( D u c k w o r th ) , 167 n. 2 1 7
GAUDENTIUS
III 233 . i 5i f ) , 107 n. 267
XII (2), 11 5 n. 295
Harm. ( 1 1 , 3 4 0 .4 ff), 14 4 n. 95

G E L L IU S
E U P O L IS
IV (1 3 ), 42 n. 1 7 3
fr. (2 9 1), 245 n. 80
VI ( 1 4 .7 ) , 65 n. 38
E U R IP ID E S
GORGIAS
Ba. (7 7 ), 44 n. 18 9; (283), 44 n. 185
fr. 3 {On What is Not), 8 1 - 2
Hec. ( 799 f f ) , H n . 26
Hipp. (7 f), 27 n. 9 1 ; ( 4 2 1 -3 ), 245 n. 81 fr. II {Helen), 8 3 - 5 ; ( 6 ) , 8 3 n. 12 3; (8) , 228 n. 6 ; (8ff), 83; (9 ), 83; (10),

13 n. 20, 8 4 , 2 2 8 n. 6 ; (12), 8 4 n. 128, 251 n. l o g ; ( 1 3 ) , 84 , 254 n. 1 2 3 ;

Ion (6 70 -2 ), 245 n. 81
( 1 4 ) , 1 3 n. 20, 8 4 ; ( 2 0 ) , 8 3 n . 1 2 3
Or. ( i4 9 6 ff) , 13 n . 20
Supp. (40 3ff), 242 n. 60; (4 26 ff), 242 n. 60 fr. i i a (Palamedes), 8 3 ; ( i i f ) , 83 n. 1 2 4 ; ( i 3 f f ) , 83 n. 1 2 4 ; (24), 8 4 n. 134

fr. (910 ), 134 n. 42

H E R A C L IT U S
fr. (i), 12 n. 1 3 ; (2 ), 12 n. 1 3 ; (4 ), 6 g n. 5 4 ; (5) 12, 38 n. 1 4 6 ; (7), 6 8 - 9 ;
GALEN
( 1 4 ) , 1 2 - 1 3 ; ( 1 5 ) , 1 2 ; ( 1 7 ) , 1 2 n. 1 3 ; ( 2 3 ) , 6 9 ; ( 2 4 ) , 1 3 n. 2 1 ; ( 2 7 ) , 1 3 n . 2 1 ;
Consuet. {Scr. Min. 11) ( i , i6 .5 ff ) , 167 n. 2 18 ; ( 1 7 . i i f f ) , 168 n. 218
( 2 9 ) , 12 n . 1 3 ; (3 0) , 2 4 8 n. 9 5 ; ( 3 1 ) , 1 4 1 n . 8 0 ; ( 3 2 ) , 1 3 n. 2 1 ; ( 3 4 ) , 12 n. 1 3 ;
Med. Phil. {Scr, Min. 11) (3, 6 .io f f ) , 120 n. 325
( 3 5 ) , 1 2 n . 1 3 , 1 3 0 n . 18 , 1 4 4 n . 9 7 ; ( 3 6 ) , 1 3 n . 2 1 , 1 4 1 n . 8 0 ; (4 0) , 1 2 n. 1 3 ,
Mixt. (i 5, 17.2 2 ), 120 n. 32 5 ; (11 6, 7 7 .i 3 f ) , 167 n . 216
3 i 6 Index o f passages Index o f passages 317
H E R A C L IT U S {continued) H I P P O C R A T IC CORPUS
130, 1 4 4 n. 9 7 ; (42), 12 n. 13 ; (45), 13 n. 2 1 ; (53), 13 n. 2 1, 248 n. 94 ; Acut. (περί δ ιαίτη ς όξέων) ( i , L 11 2 2 4 - 3 f f ) , 3 9 n. 152 ; (2, 2 3 4 - 2 f f ) , 3 9 n . 1 5 2 ;

(55), 71 n. 6 7 , 130; (56), 12 n. 1 3 ; (57), 12 n. 1 3 ; (62), 13 n. 2 1 ; (63), 13 (2, 2 3 4 . 2 - 2 3 8 . 1 ) , 90 n . 1 6 3 ; (2, 2 3 6 . 4 f f ) , 3 9 n . 1 5 2 ; (2 , 2 3 8 . i f f ) , 90 n . 1 6 4 ;

n. 2 1 ; (6 7 ) , 1 3 ; (69 ), 12 n. 1 7 ; (7 6 ) , 14 1 n. 8 0 ; ( 7 7 ) , 13 n. 2 1 ; (78), 13 n. 2 1 ; (3 , 2 4 0 . 8 f f ) , 2 2 7 n . 3 ; (3 , 2 4 2 . 3 f f ) , 4 5 n . 1 9 5 ; ( 7 , 2 7 6 . 6 ) , 4 4 n . 1 9 1 ; ( 7 , 2 7 6 . 7 ) ,

( 7 9 ) , 1 3 n. 2 1 ; (8 0) , 3 3 n . 1 1 3, 2 4 8 n . 9 5 ; (8 3 ), 1 3 n . 2 1 ; (8 6 ), 1 3 n. 2 1 , 8 5 n . 1 3 6 ; 4 4 n. 1 9 1 ; ( 1 1 , 302.6), 9 4 n. 189 ; ( 1 1 , 3 i 4 . i 2 f f ) , 5 3 n. 2 2 5 ; (11, 3 i6 .i3 ff),

(88 ), 13 n. 2 1 ; (94), 33 n. 1 1 3 , 248 n. 9 5 ; (98), 13 n. 2 1 ; (9 9 ) , 6 9 n . 5 4 ; 39 n . 152

(loi), 130; ( lo ia ) , 130; (102), 13; (104), 12 n. 1 3 ; (106), 12 n. 1 3 ; (107), Acut. Sp. (ττερί δισίτης όξέω ν (νόθα)) (g, L 11 4 3 6 .8 ff), g r n. 172
71 n. 6 7 , 1 3 0 ; ( 1 1 4 ) , 13 n. 2 1 , 248 n. 9 5 ; (115), 1 3 n, 2 1 ; (129), 1 3 0 n . 18 , Aer. (ττερΙ άέρων ύ δ ά τω ν τό π ω ν ) (3, C M G ι, ι 57 - Ι 0 , 253 η . 1 1 9 ; (4 , 58 · 3 θ>
14 4 n. 9 7 44 η. i g i ; (7, 60 .35), 44 η. i g i ; (8), 27 η . 9 1 ; ( ι6 , 70 .13 ^ ), 246 η. 84;
HERO ( ι6 , 7 o .2 if f ) , 246 η. 8 5 ; ( ι6 , 7 i- 2 ff ) , 246 η. 85; (22, 7 4 ·ΐο - 7 5 ·2 5 ) , 27 η. 9 1 ,
Pneumatica (i i 6 . i 6 i F ) , 2 1 1 n . 4 2 1 28 η. 9 3; (22, 74-17), 33 «· ^ 4 ; (22, 75-5ff), 28 η . 94; (22, 7 5 ·ΐ3 - ΐ7 ) ,
HERODOTUS 28 η. 9 4 ; (22, 75 · ΐ 6 ) , 3 3 η . 114 ; ( 23 , 75 -2 8 ff), 246 η. 84; (23, 7 6 .i 7 f f ) , 246 η. 85
I ( i 9 f F ) , 30 n . 1 0 2 ; (35), 44 n. 192; (46ff), 222 n. 4 9 2 ; (74), 1 7 0 η . 2 2 4 ; (9 4 ) , Aff. (περί παθώ ν) ( ι , L ν ι 2 o 8 .i6 ff) , 91 ^74 ; (37 , 2 4 6 .i6 ff), 91 η. 17 2 ;
2 3 6 n. 3 1 ; (lo i), 13 n. 2 0; ( 1 0 5 ) , 3 1 , 32 n . 1 0 8 ; (107), 13 n. 2 0; (120), 13 (4 5 , 2 5 4 - 9 f f ) , 3 9 «· 152

n. 2 0; (128), 13 n. 20; (132), 13 n. 2 0 ; (1 3 5 ) , 23 9 n. 4 6 ; (13 8 ), 30 n. 10 2 ; Aph. ( ά φ ο ρ ισ μ οί ) (ιι 3 5 , L ι ν 4 8 0 .13), 4 4 η. 1 9 1 ; (ν 4 ΐ, 5 4 6 - iff). 223 η. 4 9 3;

( 1 4 0 ), 13 n. 2 0 ; ( 1 6 7 ) , 30 n . 1 0 2 ; ( 1 7 4 ) , 30 n. 102, 50 n. 2 1 4 ( v 59 , 554 -3ff), 223 n. 493 ; ( ν 60, 554 -7), 4 4 η. 191; (νπ 8 7 ,6o8.iff), 42 η. 165
II (3 ), 1 4 n. 23, 2 5 9 n. 14 8 ; (12), 143 n. 9 2 ; (2 o ff), 29, 53 n. 2 2 4 ; (23), 2 53 Art. (περί άρθρων εμβολής) (ι, L ιν 78.iff), 9 ^ ^74 ; (ι, 78 -5ff)j 39 η. 152;
n. 1 1 8 ; (24), 1 7 1 n. 2 3 1 ; (29), 13 5 n. 4 8 ; (3 3 f), 1 3 4 n. 4 7 ; (43), 2 3 8 n. 3 9 ; (ι, 78.9ff), 90 η. ι65, 9ΐ η. 174; (ι, 8 o .iff), 158 η. i6g; (9, 100.4), 45 η. ΐ95;
(4 3ff), 14 n. 2 6 ; (49-50 ), 238 n. 3 9 ; (5 0 ), 14 n. 2 6 ; (6 8 ), 30; (71), 30; ( ι ι , i04-20ff), 39 η. 152; ( η , i04-22ff), 46 η. 197; (Η, I20.7ff), 39 η. 152;
(73 ), 30 n , l o i ; (81), 14 n. 26, 238 n. 4 0 ; (82), 6 n. 20; (104), 14 n. 26; (ΐ4, I20.i5ff), 89 η. ι6 ι; (35, is8.4ff), 9° «· 162; (42, i82.i4ff), 89 η. ι6 ι;
( 1 0 9 ) , 1 7 7 n. 2 6 5 , 2 3 0 n . 1 3 ; ( i l l ) , 3 0 η . 102,· ( 1 2 3 ) , 1 4 η . 2 6, 2 3 8 n n . 3 9 a n d (42, i8 2 .i5 ff),3 9 n . 152; (44> i88 .i3ff), 89 η. ι6 ι; (46, i96.i9ff), 158 η. i6g;
40 ; (143), 238 n. 4 1 ; (1 5 2 % 2 3 7 n. 3 5 ; (1 6 3 ), 2 3 7 n, 35 (46, i98.5ff), 39 η. 152; (47, 2io.9ff), 229 η. 8; (48, 2 i2 .i7 ff), 89 η. ι6 ι;
III ( i ) , 238 n. 4 5 ; (33), 30 n. 10 3 ; (3 8 ) , 2 3 8 n . 4 4 ; (8 0) , 2 4 4 n . 7 2 , 2 5 2 , 2 6 1 ; (58, 252.ΐ4 θ , 45 η. 195; (62, 268.3ff), 89 η. ι6 ι; (6g, 286.7ff), 121 η. 326;
(8 0 -3), 244; (8 2 ) , 245 n. 8 2 ; (85), 44 n. 185; (115), 135 n. 4 8 ; (i29 ff), (70, 288.1 iff), 89 η. ι6 ι
238 n. 4 5 ; ( i 3 i f f ) , 2 3 7 n. 3 5 ; (132), 256 n. 13 3; (1 3 9 ), 2 3 7 n. 3 5 ; (142-3), de Arte (περί τέχνης) (ι, C M G ι, ι 9 -4 ), 88 η. 151; (ι, 9 -i 4ff), 92 η. 178;
2 4 2 n . 60 (3, io .i8 f), 88 η. 151; (3, lo .ig ff), 88 η. 151; (3, io .2 iff), 48 η. 209;
IV ( 2 5 ) , 3 0 n . 1 0 1 ; ( 3 6 ) , 1 6 9 n n , 2 2 0 a n d 2 2 1 ; ( 4 2 ) , 2 3 9 n . 4 8 ; ( 4 3 ) , 2 3 9 n . 4 9 ; (3, ii.2 f), 88 η. 151; (4, n.5ff)> 53 η. 225, 88 η. 151; (5, ιΐ·2 θ ), 88 η. 153;
(4 4 ) , 237 n. 35, 239 n . 4 9 ; (58), 2 4 n. 79, 157 n. 1 6 1 ; (94-6), 30 n. l o i ; (6, 13.1-4), 33 η. 115; (7, i3-ioff), 88 η. 154; (8, H- 23ff), 39 η. 152;
(105), 30 η . l o i ; (161), 242 n. 60 ; (202), 31 n. 104; (205), 31 n . 104, (9 , i 5 -9ff), 152 η. 137 ; (ΐ2, i8.3ff), 158 η. 173; (ΐ2, i 8 . i 4 ff), ΐ 34 η - 4 7 ;
32 n . 1 08 ( ΐ 3 , i 9 -6 f), 88 η. 151
V (2 ), 2 4 6 n. 8 3 ; (2 3 f f ) , 2 3 7 n. 3 5 ; ( 3 7 - 8 ) , 242 n. 60 ; (49), 16 9 n. 221, 246 n. 83; Cam. (περί σαρκών) (2, L νιιι 584 -9ff), Ηο η. 75, ΐ5 ° η. 130; (sff), 150 η. 131;
(78), 2 4 5 n. 80 (4 , 588 .i 4 ff), 150 η. 131; (4 , 588.25!?), 150 η. 132; (4, 590 -iff), 151 η. 133;
VI ( 1 1 ) , 246 n. 8 3 ; (2 7 ), 30 n. 1 0 2 ; (43), 2 4 4 n. 7 2 ; (75), 30; (84), 3 0 ; (98), (5f, 590-5ff)> 159 η. 178; (6, 592-i6ff), 94 η. igo; (8), 157 η. 165; (8,
3 0 n . 1 0 2 ; ( 1 0 9 ) , 2 4 6 n . 83 594 . i 2f f ) , 151 η . 13 2 ; (8, 594 -i4 ff)5 150 η . 132 ; (g, 596 .g ff) , 151 η. 13 2 ;
vn (8ff), 2 56 n. 1 3 2 ; (19), 13 n. 20; (37), 13 n. 20 ; (38f), 256 n. 13 2 ; (43), ( 1 5 - 1 7 , 6 o 2 .ig ff ) , i 5 g η. i 7 g ; ( 1 7 , 6 o 6 .io f f) , i5 g n. i8 o ; (19 ), 15 9 -6 0 ;
13 n. 2 0; ( 6 i f f ) , 23 9 n. 4 6 ; ( 1 0 3 - 4 ) , 246 n. 8 3 ; ( 1 2 6 ) , 2 1 2 ; (1 2 9 ), 30 n. 10 2 ; (19 , 6 io .6 ff ) , 160 n. 18 1; (19 , 6 i 4 . i o f f ) , g4 n. ig o
(1 3 3 ) » 3 0 n . 1 0 2 ; ( 1 3 5 ) , 2 4 6 n . 8 3 ; ( 1 4 7 ) , 2 4 6 n . 8 3 ; ( 1 6 4 ) , 2 4 2 n . 6 0 ; ( 1 8 9 ) , Cord, (περί καρδίης) (2, L i x 8 o .g ff), 216 n. 4 6 5 ; (2, 8 o .i3 ff ) , 166 n. 208;
30 n. l o i ; ( 1 9 1 ) , 30 n. l o i (8, 86.5 f) , 166 n. 208; (10, 8 6 .i3 ff ) , i5 g n. 175 , 161 n. 186; (10, 8 8 .3 ff),
v i n (68f), 256 n. 132 166 n. 208; ( 1 1 , g o .5 ff), 166 n . 208; (12, g o . i i f f ) , i5 g n. 175 , 161 n. 186
IX (83), 2 1 2 ; (10 0 ), 30 n. 102 Decent, (περί εύσχημοσύνης) ( i , C M G i , i 2 5 - 2 ff) ,g i n. 1 7 1 ; ( 2 ,2 5 .i4 f ) ,3 g n. 1 5 1 ;
HESIOD (2, 2 5 .i5 ff ) , g o n. 16 7 ; (2, 2 5 .i 7 f f ) , 8g n. i 5 g ; (3, 25 -2off), 8g n. i 5 g ;
Op. ( i 0 2 f f ) , 2 9 n . 9 8 ; ( 2 4 0 - 5 ) , 2 9 n . 9 8 ; ( 4 8 5 ) , 4 4 n . 1 8 5 ; (5 6 4 !^ ), 1 7 1 n. 232 (3, 2 5 .2 5 -2 6 .6 ), g i n. 170 ; (6, 2 7 .1 3 ), 41 n. 164; ( 1 1 , 2 8 .18 -2 2 ), g i n. 170 ;
T h. (iff), ID n . 3 ; ( 2 2 f f ) , 10 n. 3 ; (38), 4 5 n . 19 4 ( 1 1 , 2 8 .2 o f), g i n. 170 ; (12 , 28 .25), g i n. 17 3 ; (14 , 2 g .3 f), g i n. 17 2 ; (16,
fr. ( 2 7 8 ) , 60 n . 6 2 g .i3 f f ) , 22g n. g ; (16 , 2 g .i 7 f f ) , 22g n. g ; (18, 2 g .3 2 f), 22g n. g
HIPPARCH US Epid. I (έπιδημίαι) (5, L 11 6 3 4 .6 ^ , 45 n. i g 5 ; (g, 6 6 o .6 ff), 155 n. 15 3 ; (g,
In Aral. 1 ( 2 . i f ) , 1 7 8 n . 2 7 7 ; ( 2 . 1 1 ) , 1 7 9 n. 2 7 9 6 6 6 .i i f f ) , 155 nn. 150 a n d 15 3; (g, 6 68 .7 ff) , 155 n. 15 3 ; (10, 6 6 8 .i4 ff),
Π (2.37), 179 n. 2 7 9 ; (2.47), 179 n. 2 7 9 ; (3.2f), 179 n. 2 7 9 ; (3-29f), 179 1 5 2 - 3 ; (10, 670.8), 43 n. 1 7 7 ; ( 1 1 ,6 7 4 .1 4 - 6 7 6 .1 0 ) , 155 n. 15 3 ; (12 , 6 7 8 .5 ff),
n. 2 79 155 n n, 151 a n d 15 2 ; (13 , case i , 6 8 4 .g ), 154 n. i4 g
3 i 8 Index o f passages Index o f passages 319
3 5 6 . 9 ) , 4 0 n . 1 5 5 ; (2 0, 3 5 6 . g f f ) , 1 8 n . 4 3 , 4 7 n n . 2 0 4 a n d 2 0 6 ; (2 0, 3 5 6 . 1 0 )
H IP P O C R A T IC CORPUS {continued)
26 n. 88 ; (2 0, 3 5 6 . 1 3 ) , 26 n. 8 8 ; (21, 3 5 6 *1 5 ), 26 n. 8 8 ; (2 2 , 3 5 6 - i 5 f f )
Epid. II (4 , 5 , L V 12 6 .1 o f f ) , 54 n. 227
2 5 n. 8 1 ; (23, 3 5 8 . i f f ) , 5 5 n. 2 3 3 ; (23, 3 5 8 .3 ), 2 6 n . 88 , 4 4 n . 1 8 7 ; (23f
Epid. Ill ( i s t series, case 3, L iii 38. 7- 4 4 .8), 153- 4 ; (case 3, 40 . 7f f ) , 15 4 n. 1 4 4 ;
3 5 8 .iff), 47 n. 2 0 5; (25, 3 5 8 .7 ), 4 4 n. 1 8 7 ; (25, 3 5 8 .1 0 ), 26 n. 8 8 ; (2 6
(case 3, 40 .8), 154 n. 14 6 ; (case 6 , 50 .9), 152 n. 1 3 7 ; (case 6 , 5 2 .8O , 153
358.1 if f ) , 4 7 n. 20 5; (27, 3 5 8 .i 3 f f ) , 4 7 n. 204; (2 8, 3 s 8 . i 6 f f ) , 16 n. 3 7
n. 1 4 1 ; (case 8, 5 6 .9), 152 n. 1 3 7 ; (case 9 , 58 . 7), 229 n. 8 ; (4 , 70 . 14- 7 6 .4 ),
(29f, 3 s 8 . i 9 f f ) , 1 9 n . 4 8 , 3 7 n . 1 3 6 ; (30 , s 6 o . 3 f f ) , 16 n . 3 7 ; (3 1, 36o .6ff)
155 n· 1 5 3 ; (9» 90. i f f ) , 155 n. 1 5 3 ; ( 2nd series, ca se 2, i i 2. i i f ) , 153 n. 1 4 1 ;
19 n. 48, 3 7 n. 1 3 6 ; (32, 3 6 o .g f f ) , 17 n. 4 1 ; (3 2 , 3 6 0 . 1 2 ) , 2 6 n . 8 8 ; (3 3
(case 3 , I i 6 . i 2f ) , 15 4 n. 1 4 9 ; (case 5 , 1 1 8 .8), 229 n. 8 ; (case 5 , 1 1 8 . 1 1 ),
3 6 0 .15), 26 n. 88 ; ( 3 3 ff , 36o .i3 ff), 47 n. 203; (3 4 , 360.16), 26 n . 88
152 n. 1 3 7 ; (ca se 10 , 132.4 O , 154 n. 1 4 9 ; (case 1 1 , i 3 4 -2f f ) , 153 n. 1 4 1 ;
(3 7, 3 62 .3 ), 26 n. 8 8 ; (3 9 , 3 6 2 . 6 ) , 4 4 n . 1 8 7 ; ( 3 9, 3 6 2 . 6 f f ) , 1 6 n . 3 7 ; (40
(case 12 , 13 6 . 13), 15 4 n. 1 4 9 ; (ca se 15 , i 4 2 .6f f ) , 153 n. 1 4 1 ; (case 15,
3 62.8 ff), 38 n. 14 5 ; (4 iff, s 6 2 .i o f f ) , 39 n. 149, 48 n. 2 0 9; (4 2 , 3 6 2 . 1 3 )
14 2. I l f ) , 152 n. 137
4 4 n. 1 8 7 ; (43, 3 6 2 .1 6 ) , 26 n. 88; (4 4, 3 6 2 . i 6 f f ) , 16 n. 3 7 ; (4 6 , 3 6 4 . 8 )
Epid. IV (6 , L V I 4 6 . i i f ) , 91 n. 1 7 2 ; ( 160.6 ), 91 n. 1 7 2 ; ( 162.5 ), 9^ « ·
4 4 n . 187
Epid. V (2 7, L V 226. 10) , 229 n. 8
ch. 2 (para, i , 3 6 4 .10 ), 26 n ; 8 7 ; (2, 3 6 4 . 1 i f ) , 1 6 n . 3 4, 2 6 n n . 8 7 a n d 88
Epid. VI (2, I , L V 2 7 6 .3f f ) , 229 n. 1 0 ; (5 , 7, 3 1 8 . 1- 4 ) , 90 n. 168
(3, 3 6 4 . i 2 f f ) , 2 2 n . 7 2 ; (6, 3 6 6 . 1 ) , 2 6 n . 8 7 ; ( 6 - 7 , 3 6 4 . 2 o f f ) , 2 5 n . 83
Flat, (ττερί φυσών) ( i , CMG i, i 9 i . 2f f ) , 92 n. 1 7 8 ; ( i , 9 1 . 15), 135 n. 4 8 ;
c h . 3 (p a r a , i , 3 6 6 .5 ) , 26 n. 8 8 ; ( i , 3 6 6 . 5 f f ) , 20 n. 4 9 ; ( i , 3 6 6 . 7 ) , 2 6 n . 88
( i , 9 i . i 6f f ) , 53 n. 2 2 5 ; ( i , 9 2 . 12) , 88 n. 1 5 1 ; (3 , 9 3 .5 ) , 134 n. 4 7 ; ( 3, 9 3-Qff)>
( 3 - 8 , 3 6 6 . i o f f ) , 2 4 n . 8 0 ; (4, 3 6 6 . i 2 f f ) , 2 2 n . 6 4 ; ( 5 - 7 , 3 6 6 , i 5 f f ) , 2 2 n . 6 6
171 n. 2 3 1 ; (5 , 9 4 .6f ) , 88 n. 1 5 1 , 149 n. 1 1 9 ; (6- 8, 9 4 .8f f ) , 149 n. 1 1 9 ;
(8, 3 6 6 . 2 3 f f ) , 2 2 n . 7 0
(6, 9 4 . 15 ) , 88 n. 1 5 3 ; ( 7 , 9 5 .6f f ) , 149 n. 1 1 9 ; ( 10, 9 7 . 10), 88 n. 1 5 3 ; ( 1 5 ,
c h . 4 ( p a r a . 2, s 6 8 . 5 f ) , 20 n . 5 2
ι ο ι . ι γ ί ΐ ) , 88 n. 151
ch . 5 (p a r a , i , s 6 8 . i o f ) , 20 n. 5 5 ; ( 1 - 9 , 3 6 8 . i o f f ) , 4 4 n . 191
Fract. (περί άγμών) ( i , L i i i 4 i 4 . i f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 2 ; ( i , 4 i 4 . 7f f ) , 90 n. 1 6 3 ; ( 2 ,
ch. 7 (para, i , 3 7 2 .4 ff ) , 20 n. 5 3 ; (3 , 3 7 2 . i o f f ) , 2 0 n . 5 4 ; (4, 3 7 2 . n f f ) , 2 1
4 i 8 . i f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 2 ; (2, 4 i 8 .8f f ) , 90 n. 1 6 2 ; ( 3, 4 22. i 2f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 2 ; ( 7 ,
n . 6 2 ; (7 , 3 7 2 . 2 2 f ) , 2 0 n . 5 4
440.2f f ) , 121 n. 3 2 6 ; ( 16 , 4 7 6 .8f f ) , 90 n. 1 6 1 ; ( 25 , 4 9 6 . i i f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 2 ,
c h . 8 (paras, if, 3 7 4 . 2 i f f ) , 21 n. 5 7
53 n . 2 2 5 ; ( 25 , 500. 10) , 53 n. 2 2 5 ; (30, 5 i 8 . i f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 2 ; ( 3 1 , 52 4 . i 7f f ) ,
c h . 9 ( p a r a , i , 3 7 6 . 1 7 f ) , 20 n . 5 6
39 n. 1 5 2 ; (3 5, 5 38 .6 ), 45 n. 1 9 5 ; (36, 540-9ff)» 4 ^ n. 209
ch. 10 ( p a r a , i , 3 7 8 . i o f ) , 21 n. 58; (2, 3 7 8 . i 2 f f ) , 2 1 n . 5 7 ; (4, 3 7 8 . 1 8 ) , 2 6
Hebd. (περί φ δομά δων) (4 5 , 66 R o s c h e r , L i x 46o . i 7f f ) , 43 n. 177
n . 8 8 ; ( 7 , 3 8 0 . 8 ) , 2 6 n . 88
Hum. (περί χυμών) (4 , L v 480. 17) , 43 n . 17 7
ch. II ( p a r a . 2, 3 8 2 . 2 f f ) , 2 3 n . 7 7 ; (2, 3 8 2 . 3 ) , 2 6 n . 8 7 ; ( 3 - 5 , 3 8 2 .6 ff), 23
Jusj. (δρκοζ) {CMG I, I 4 .2f f ) , 41 n. 1 6 2 ; (4-7ff)> 229 n. 9 ; (4 .g ff ) , 96 n. 199
n. 78, 1 5 7 n . 1 6 1 , 16 1 n. 18 5
U x (νόμος) ( i , CMG i, i 7 .5f f ) , 39 n. 1 5 1 ; (5 , 8 . i 5f f ) , 41 n. 16 3, 229 n. 9
c h . 1 3 ( p a r a , i , 3 8 4 .4 f F ) , 2 1 n . 5 9 ; (8, s 8 4 . 2 2 f f ) , 2 3 n . 7 4 ; (9, 3 8 6 . 4 ) , 2 6 n . 8 7 ;
Liqu. (ττερΙ ύγ ρών χρήσιος) ( i , CMG i, i 8 5 . 16) , 253 n. 119
(1 0 ), 26 n. 8 7
Loc. Horn, (περί τό π ω ν τ ω ν κοττά δνθρωπον) (2 , L ν ι 2 7 8 . i 4 f f ) j Ι 5 9 η. Ι775 (2 >
c h . 1 4 ( p a r a . 5 , 3 8 8 . 4 - 6 ) , 2 6 n . 8 7 ; (6, 3 8 8 . 7 ) , 2 6 n . 8 7
280.5Ο , 159 η· (3, a S o . i o f f ) , 159 η. 1 7 7 ; (4^» 3 4 2 - 4 f f ) , 39 " · 152
c h . 1 5 ( p a r a . 2, 3 8 8 . i 6 f ) , 2 6 n . 88
Medic, (περί ίητροΟ) ( 2, CMG ι, ι 2 i . i i f f ) , 90 η. ι 6 ι ; (4 , 2 i . 32f f ) , 90 η. 162
c h . 1 7 ( p a r a . 4 , 3 9 2 . 1 i f ) , 2 6 n . 8 7 ; (5 , 3 9 2 . 1 3 ) , 2 6 n . 8 8 ; (6, 3 9 2 . 1 7 ) 5 2 6 n . 8 8 ;
Morb. I (περί νούσων) ( i , L v i 140. i f f ) , 91 η. 1 7 5 ; (ι^ 140. 10- 19) , 92 η. ιηη\
(8, 3 9 4 . 2 ) , 2 6 n . 88
( ι , 1 4 2 . i f f ) , 92 η. 1 7 8 ; ( ι , I 4 2 . 2 f f ) , 94 « · 18 8 ; ( ι , 14 2 .7- 12 ), 92 η . 1 7 9 ;
ch. 18 (para, i, 394-9f), 16 n. 34, 26 n. 8 8 ; (1-2, 394-9ff), 26 n. 89; (iff,
( 7 , i 5 2 .9f f ) , 39 η. 1 5 2 ; (8 , 15 4 -5^ ) , 39 η . 1 5 2 ; ( ι 6, 168.23- 17 0 .8) , 155
394.9ff), 49 n. 2 1 0 ; (iff, 39 4.9 -39 6 .9), 21 n. 6 1 ; (2, 3 9 4 - 1 4 ) , 26 n. 8 7 ;
η. 1 5 3 ; ( ι 6 , i 70.2f f ) , 121 η. 326
(2, 394-14O , 22 n. 7 2 ; (3 , 394-150» 22 n. 7 1 ; (6, 3 g6.5ff), 22 n. 72,
Morb. II (4 7 , L νιι 6 6 . 4 f f ) , 91 1 7 2 ; (6 1 , 9 4 - i ^ 0 5 152 η. 1 3 9 ; (6 7 , i 0 2 . 4 f f ) ,
4 9 n . 2 1 0 ; (6, 3 g 6 . 8 ) , 4 4 n . 1 8 7
40 η. 1 5 3 ; (7 2 , i o 8 . 2 5 f f ) , 40 η· ΐ 5 3
Mul. I (γυνα ικ εία ) (2i, L viii 6 o .i5 ff), g i n. 1 7 2 ; (6 2 , i2 6 .i2 ff), g i n. 17 2 ,
Morb. Ill ( 16, L νπ i 5 2 .2 i f ) , 152 η. 139
2 6 3 n . i 5 g ; (6 2 , I 2 6 . i 4 f f ) , 5 4 n . 2 3 1
Morb. IV (39, L v ii 5 5 6 . i 7f f ) , 158 n. 1 7 1 ; (5 6, 606. 7f f ) , 2 16 n. 4 6 6 ; (5 6 ,
Nat. Horn, (περί φύσιος ά ν θ ρ ώ π ο υ ) (i, L v i 3 2 .1-3 4 .7), g3 n. i 8 o ; (r, 32 .3),
608. 14- 2 1 ) , 95 n. 1 9 2 ; ( 56, 6o 8. i 7f f ) , 2 16 n. 4 6 5 ; (5 6 , 608.20) , 95 n. 1 9 2 ;
g 4 n . 1 8 7 ; ( i , 3 2 . 3 f f ) , 1 4 0 n . 7 7 ; ( i , 3 2 . 1 3 ) , i 4 g n . 1 2 4 ; ( i , 3 4 -6 0 , 9 3 n . 1 8 3 ;
( 5 6 , 6o8.23f f ) , 2 16 n . 466
(2, 3 4 . 8 f f ) , g s n . 1 8 1 ; (2, 3 4 . i o f f ) , g 3 n . 1 8 2 ; (2, 3 4 - i 7 f f ) , g s n . 1 8 3 ; ( 2 , 3 6 . 1 ) ,
Morb. Sacr. (περί ίερής νούσου)
1 0 3 n . 2 4 4 ; (2, 3 6 . 6 ) , 1 0 3 n . 2 4 4 ; (2, 3 6 . 1 2 ) , 1 0 3 n. 2 4 4 ; (2, 3 6 . 1 5 ) , i 4 g n . 1 2 4 ;
ch . I (p a ra . 2 , L v i 3 5 2.2f ) , 26 n. 8 7 ; ( 2, 3 5 2 .4), 26 n. 8 8 ; (2f, 3 5 2 . i f f ) ,
(2, 3 6.15Ο » 103 n. 2 4 4 ; (3 > 3 6 . 1 7 ) , 103 n. 2 4 4 ; (3, 3 8 .io f), 103 n. 2 4 4 ;
16 n, 3 4 ; (4 , 3 5 2 -7f f ) , 4 7 n . 2 0 5 ; (4 , 3 5 2 .8) , 44 n. 1 8 7 ; ( 7, 3 5 4 .5 ), 26 n . 8 8 ;
(4, 3 8 .i9 ff), g4 n. 18 4 ; (4, 4 0 . 6 ) , 103 n. 2 4 4 ; (4, 4 0 . 1 2 ) , 103 n. 2 4 4 ; (5,
( 10- 12 , 3 5 4 - i 2f f ) , 16 n. 3 5 ; ( 1 1 , 354. 15 ), 4 7 n. 20 4 ; ( 1 1 , 35 4. i 5f f ) , 17
4 0 . i 5 f f ) , g 4 n . 1 8 4 ; (5, 4 2 - 3 f f ) , 1 5 2 n . 1 3 7 ; (5, 4 2 . 6 ) , 1 0 3 n. 2 4 4 ; (5, 4 2 . 8 f f ) ,
n. 4 0 ; ( 12 , 3 5 4 -19 0 , 44 n. 1 8 7 ; ( 12, 3 5 4 -2o ) , 40 n. 1 5 4 ; ( 1 3 , 3 5 6 . 1) , 37
g 4 n. 186, 150 nn. 125 a n d i2g; (5, 4 2 . i o f f ) , 151 n. 1 3 3 ; (5, 4 2 . i 8 f f ) , 150
n . 13 8 ; ( i 3> 3 5 6 .2) , 40 n. 1 5 5 ; ( 14, 3 5 6 .3 0 , 40 n. 1 5 5 ; ( 1 5 , 35 6.4 ), 37
n. i 2 g ; (5, 4 4 . 2 ) , 1 0 3 n . 2 4 4 ; (6, 4 4 . 3 f f ) , g 4 n. 1 8 5 ; (6, 4 4 . 1 0 ) , i4 g n. 124;
n. 1 3 9 ; (i7> 3 5 6 - 6 f ) , 3 7 n. 140, 4 7 n. 2 0 3 ; ( 19 , 3 5 6.8f ) , 4 7 n. 2 0 3 ; ( 19,
320 Index o f passages Index o f passages 321
H I P P O C R A T IC CORPUS (continued) Viet. I (περί διαίτηζ) ( i , L v i 4 6 6 .i6 ff) , 95 n . 1 9 1 ; (2, 4 6 8 .6 ff), 149 n. 120;
(6, 44.1 iff) , 94 Π. 186, 150 n. 126; (6, 4 4 -i5 ff). 150 n. 126; (7, 46.9ff)> (2, 4 7 0 .i3 f f) , 121 n. 326 ; (3, 4 7 2 .i2 f f ) , 149 n . 1 2 1 ; (4, 4 74 -8 ff), 149 nn. 121
94 n. 184; (7, 4 6 .11), 149 n. 124; (7, 4 6 .iif f ) , 152 n. 137; (7, 4 6 .i7 ff), a n d 12 3 ; (5), 149 n. 12 3 ; (g f) , 158 ; (g, 4 8 2 .i3 ff) , 158 n. 170 ; (10 , 4 8 6 .3 ff),
94 η. i86, 150 η. 127; (7 ,4 8 -io ff),9 4 n . 186, 150 η. 127; (7, 50·3)> 103 η. 244; 158 n. 170 ; ( n , 4 8 6 .i2 f) , 134 n . 4 7 ; ( n , 4 8 6 .i4 f) , 41 n. 164; (12 -2 4 ,
(7· 50.9), 149 η. 124; (7, 50-9ff), 94 «· 186, 150 η. 128; (8, 50.19), 103 η. 244; 4 8 8 .1 -4 g 6 .1 g ) , 227 n . 3 ; (12 , 4 8 8 .2 ff), 227 n . 3
( ι ι ) , 157 η. ϊ6 7 ; ( ι ι , 6 o .iff), 21 η. 63 Viet. II (39ff, L VI 5 3 4 .i7 f f) , 149 n . 122
JVat. Mul. (περί γυναικείη$ φύσιος) ( ι, L νπ 3 12 .if f ) , 41 n· 164; ( ι , 312.9), Viet. Ill (67, L VI 5 g 2 .if f ) , 121 n . 326 ; (67, 5 g 4 . i f ) , 121 n . 326; (70, 6 o 6 .2 o ff),
41 η. 164; (ιο , 326 .3ff), 91 172; (96, 4 i 2 . i 9ff)> 223 η. 493 53 n · 226
JVat. Puer. (περί φύσιο$ παιδίου) (13, L ν ιι 488.22ff), 160 η. ι 8 ι ; (29, 530-ioff), Viet. IV (87, L VI 6 4 2 .6 ff), 42 n. 1 7 1 ; (8g, 652 . i 7f f ) , 42 n. 17 2 ; (go, 6 5 6 .2 2 -
158 η. 172 6 5 8 .1 ), 42 n. 17 2 ; (g3, 6 6 2 .8 f), 41 n . 164
Off. ( κατ’ Ιητρεΐον) ( ι, L ιιι 2 72 .1-5), Ι 35 «· 4 ^ Virg. (περί παρθενίων) ( L v iii 4 6 6 -4 7 0 ), 28 n . g s ; ( 4 6 8 .i7 ff) , 2g n. g6
Oss. ( π ε ρ ί όστέων φύσιο$) ( 8 , L ι χ ) , 1 5 7 η. 1 6 7 ; (g) Ι 5 7 ϊι· ^^7 H IP P O L Y T U S
Praec. ( π α ρ σ γ γ ε λ ί α ι ) ( ι , CMG ι, ι 3 0 - S f f ) , Ι 3 5 η. 4 8 ; ( ι , 3 0 .i8 ff), 3 9 Ι5 ΐ; Haer. i (6 .4 -5 ), 170 n. 225 ; ( 7 .1 ), n n, g ; (7 .3 ), 141 n . 7 g ; (7.4 ), 140 n. 72 ;
(2, 3 i - 6 f f ) , 9 1 η · 1 7 2 ; (5 , 3 i - 2 6 f f ) , 9 0 η . 1 6 3 ; (7 , 3 2 -2 2 ff ), 91 « · ΐ 7 4 ; (8> (8.g), 170 n. 230, 171 n . 2 3 1 ; ( 1 4 .5 - 6 ) , 143 »· 92
3 3 -5ff), 91 η· 1 7 4 ; ( ιο , 33*32ff), 8 9 η . 1 5 8 ; ( ΐ 2 , 3 4 - 5 ff)> 9 0 η . ι 6 6 HOMER
Prog, (π ρογνω σ τικ όν) ( ι, L i i i io .2 f f ) , 4 5 ΐ9 4 > 9 θ η . 1 6 9 ,15 1 1 3 4 ; ( ι , 1 1 2 .5 ^ )5 Iliad I (4 3 -5 2 ), 29 n. g 8 ; (70), 45 n. ig 4 ; ( io 6 f f ) , 17 n. 4 1 ; (15 3 ), 52 n. 222
41 η. 164; (ι, ii2 .6 ff), 90 η. i 6 g ; (ι, ii2 .io f), 48 η. 209; (2, Ii2 .i2 ff), IV (2 18 ), 44 n . 184
152 η. 135; (3 ff, ii8 .7 ff), 152 η. 136; (g , i3 2 .6 ff), 152 η. 13 7; ( n - i 4 , V (4 0 1), 44 n. 184; (864f), 50 n. 2 11
13 4.13 -14 6 -15), 152 η. 138; (ΐ2, I3 8 .i5 ff), 152 η. 140; (ΐ2 , I4 2 .i2 ff), 152 VIII ( i3 g f f ) , 50 n. 213
η . 1 4 0 ; (20, i 6 8 . i 6 f f ) , 1 2 1 η . 3 2 6 , 1 5 5 ΐ5 3 5 (25, ig o .6 f f ) , g o η. 164 IX (4 38 -4 3), 7g n. 98
Prorrh. 11 (π ρ ο ρ ρ η τικό ν ) (if, L i x 6 . i f f ) , 4 5 « · i g 5 , 8 g η. i 6 o ; ( i , 8 .2 ff), 4 5 n. i g 5 ; XII (2 3 i f f ) , 17 n. 41
(2, 8 . 1 1 ), 4 5 n. i g 5 ; (3, io.2 3 ff), 45 n. i g 5 ; (27, 6 o .if f ) , gi n. 1 7 2 ; (3 4, XIII (6 8 ff), 50 n. 2 1 3 ; (5 4 5 ff), 127 n. 8
66.8ff), g i n. 1 7 2 ; (41, 7 o .2 2 ff), g i n. 1 7 2 ; (4 2 , 7 4- 4 ff) > 9^ » · 1 7 2 XIV ( i6 f f ) , 50 n. 211
Steril. (ττερί ά φ ό ρ ω ν ) ( 2 1 3 , L v n i 4 i o . i 4 f ) , 91 n . 1 7 2 ; ( 2 i 4 , 4 i 4 . i 7 f f ) , 2 2 3 n . 4 g 3 ; XV (2 g o ff), 50 n. 2 1 3 ; (4 5 8 ff), 50 ; (4 6 9 ^ , 50 ; ( 6 i8 ff) , 50 n. 2 11
(215, 4 i6 .8 ff), 223 n. 4 g 3 ; (215, 4 i6 .i3 ff), 223 n. 4 g 3 ; (2 ig, 4 2 2 .2 3 ff), XVI ( n g f f ) , 50 n. 2 1 3 ; (50 3O , 127 n . 8
2 2 3 n . 4 g 3 ; (2 3 0 , 4 4 0 . 1 3 O , 9 1 n . 1 7 2 XVII (2 6 3 ff), 50 n. 2 11
Superf. ( π ε ρ ί έ π ι κ υ ή σ ι ο $ ) ( 2 5 , CMG i, 2, 2 8 o . 2 8 f f ) , 2 2 3 n . 4 g 3 XVIII (2 4 g ff), 7g n. g 8 ; (4g7~ 5o8), 241 n. 55
VM ( π ε ρ ί ά ρ χ α ί η ς Ιη τ ρ ι κ ή ξ ) ( i , CMG i, i 3 6 . 2 ) , g 5 n . i g 3 ; ( i , 3 6 . 2 f f ) , 1 3 5 n . 5 1 , XXIV (5 6 3 ff), 50 n. 2 13 , 66 n. 40
140 n. 73, 1 4 7 n. 10 9 ; ( i , 3 6 . i 5 f f ) , 13 5 n. 5 1 , 140 n. 73, 1 4 7 n. 10 6 ; ( i , 3 6 .1 6 ) , Odyssey i ( 2 i5 f) , 78 n . 93
147 n. 108; (i, 3 6 .18 -2 1), g5 n. i g 4 ; (2, 37-iff)> i35 n. 49 ; (2, 37-7ff)> II ( i7 8 f f) , 17 n .4 1
3 9 n· 1 5 2 ; (2, 3 7 - g f f ) , 9 5 " · i g 5 > 2 2 8 n . 7 , 2 6 0 n . I 4 g ; (2, 3 7 - i 7 f f ) , 3 9 n . 1 5 2 , m ( 3 7 i f ) , 68 n. 53
228 n. 7 ; (2, 3 7 - i 7 -ig)> 9 5 196; (3, 37 -2o ff), 135 « -4 9 ; (4 , 3 8 - 2 7 f f ) , IV (230), 44 n . 184
3 9 n. 1 5 2 ; (4, 3 9 - 2 f f ) , 3 9 «· 152; (5, 3 9 -2 i f f ) , 148 n. 1 1 4 ; (6, 3 g . 2 7 f f ) , 148 V {395^), 2g n . g8 ; (4 3 2 ff), 127 n. 7
n. 1 1 5 ; (8, 4 i . 8 f ) , 13 5 n. 4 g ; (g -12 ), 121 n. 326; (g, 4 i . 2 o f f ) , 121 n. 326, VI (273 f f ) , 66 n. 41
1 3 5 n · 5 2 ; (g , 4 i - 2 5 f f ) , 3 g n · 1 5 2 ; (g , 4 2 . 6 f f ) , 39 n . 1 5 2 ; ( 1 3 - 1 7 , 4 4 -8 f f ) , i 4 7 IX ( 4 1 1 ), 2g n. g8
n. 109; ( i 3 f f ) , 148 n. 1 1 4 ; (13 , 44.8), 1 4 7 n. 108; (13 , 4 4 .i 8 f f ) , 148 n. 1 1 5 ; X (3 0 2 ff), 31 n. 106; ( 3 g 4 ), 4 4 n. 184
(13, 44 .27f), 95 n. i g 7 ; (14, 4 5 .1 7 O , 41 n. 164 ; (14, 4 5 -i8 f f) , 248 n. g 7 ; XIV (38), 253 n. 1 1 7
(14, 4 5-2 6 ff), 147 n. n o ; (14 , 4 5 -2 8 ff), 1 4 7 n. i n ; (1 5 , 4 6 . i 8 f f ) , 5 4 n. 2 2 8 ; XVI ( ig 4 f f ) , 50 n . 2 13 , 66 n. 40
(15, 4 6 .2 o ff), 148 n. 1 1 5 ; (1 5 , 4 6 .2 2 ff) , 148 n. 1 1 4 ; (1 5 , 4 6 .2 6 ff) , g i n. 17 3 , XIX ( i6 4 ff ) , 65 n . 3 g ; (455 f f ) , 2g n . g8
g 5 n · i g 7 ; ( I 5 > 4 7 -5 f f ) . 1 4 8 n . 1 1 6 ; ( 1 5 , 4 7 . 6 ) , 1 4 8 n . 1 1 8 ; ( i 6 f f ) , 5 4 n . 2 2 8 ; XX (g 8 ff), 50 n. 213
( 1 6 , 4 8 . i o f ) , 5 4 n . 2 2 8 ; ( 1 7 , 4 8 . 2 1 ) , g s n. i g 8 ; ( 1 7 , 4 8 . 2 i f f ) , 5 4 n . 2 2 8 ; ( 1 7 , XXI ( 32 g ), 253 n. 1 1 7
49.2), 54 n. 228; (18, 4 9 .i o f ) , 152 n. 1 3 7 ; (18, 4 g .i6 ff), 54 n. 228; (ig,

5 0 .2 ff), 1 4 7 n. 1 1 3 ; (19, 5o .7fF ), 5 4 η. 2 2 g, 1 4 7 n. 1 1 2 ; ( i g , s o . g f f ) , 5 4 η . 2 2 8 ; lAM BLICH U S

( ig , 50 .i4fF ), 1 4 7 n. 1 1 3 ; (2 0, 5 i . 6 f f ) , 14 7 n. 10 7 ; (20, 5 i . i o f ) , 3 4 n . n g ; In Nie. (6, I 2 i.i3 f f ) , 144 n. g5
(20, 5 i.ia f), gs n. i g 3 ; (2 0 , 5 i-i7ff), i35 n. 4 g ; (2 0, 51.24), 54 n. 2 2 g ; Protr. (21, 5), 37 n. I3g; (21, 17), 37 n. i3g
(20, 5 2 . 3 ) , 5 4 n. 229; (21, 5 2 . i 7 f f ) , 39 «· 152, 54 «· 2 2 7 ; (22, 5 3 - i f f ) . 158 VP (31), 228 n. 5; (6off), 37 n. 135; (64), 42 n. 173; (84), 37 n. 139; ( n o - n ) ,
n. 1 7 4 ; (22, 5 3 - i 2 f ) , 134 n - 4 7 ; (22, 5 3 - i 2 f f ) , 148 n. 1 1 7 , 158 n. 1 7 4 ; (2 4 , 42 n. 173; ( ii5 f f , 6 6 .i2 ff), 144 n. 95; (i3 4 ff), 37 n. 135; ( i 4 o ff), 37 η. 135;
5 5 ·# ·), 1 4 8 n . 1 1 7 ; (2 4 , 5 5 - 1 2 ) , 1 4 8 n . 1 1 8 (163), 46 n. 197; (164), 42 n. 173; (244), 46 n. 197
322 Index o f passages Index o f passages 323
ISOCRATES P H IL O

III ( I 4 f f ) , 244 n. 74 Bel. (5 0 .2 0 ff), 223 n. 4 9 4 ; (5 0 .3 7 ff) , 223 n. 4 9 4

P H IL OLA U S
IV (45)> 254 n. 125
VII (20), 245 n. 8 1 ; (2 o if), 244 n. 74 fr. (6), 1 1 9 n. 320

VIII (14 ), 257 n. 140 PHILOPON US

In Ph. (6 8 3 .i6 ff), 204 n. 385
X (iff)» 99 n· 2 1 4 ; ( 2 - 3 ) , 8 1 n . 1 1 2
P H IL O ST R A T U S
XI ( 2 i f ) , 238 n. 39; (2 2 f), 103 n. 248; (23), 230 n. 13 ; (28), 238 n. 40
7 5 1 (10 .3), 225 n. 129
XII (2 6 f), 103 n. 248; ( i 3 o ff), 244 n. 74
XIII, 99 n. 2 14 PIN DAR

XV ( i 5 f ) , 99 n. 2 14 ; ( 1 5 -3 8 ), 251 n. 10 7; (19 ), 256 n. 13 7 ; (42), 100 n. 2 16 ; 0. (l 35)5 52 n. 222

P. (ill 5 i f f ) , 2 9 n . 9 8
( i9 7 f f) , 100 n. 2 18 ; (2 5 9 ff), 99 n. 2 14 ; ( 2 6 iff) , 103 n . 248; (2 9 5 ^ , 251 n . 107
PLA TO
Ap. (i7 d iff), 251 n. 10 7 ; (i8 bc), 99 n. 2 1 2 ; (igb c), 99 n. 2 1 2 ; (23d), 99

n. 2 1 2 ; ( 3 i c - 3 2 a ) , 243 n. 6 6 ; ( 3 2 a - c ) , 243 n. 6 7
LEU CIP PU S
fr. (2), 3 2 -3
Chrm. ( i 5 5 e f f ) , 29 n . 98

L U C RE TIU S Cra. (4 0 5 a b ) , 4 4 n . 1 9 2

V (6 2 i f f ) , 174 n . 248 Criti. ( i o 8 d f f ) , 2 3 8 n . 4 0

LYSIAS Epin. ( 9 8 6 c f ) , 1 7 7 n . 2 6 6
Euthd. ( 2 7 5 d ) , l o i n . 2 2 9 ; ( 2 7 7 d ff), l o i nn. 2 2 7 a n d 2 2 9 ; (2896 f), 99 n. 209;
I (40 -2), 80 n . 104
( 2 9 5 b e), l o i n. 229
III (2 2 -3 ), 80 n. 104; (24), 80 n . 104; (40), 102 n. 242
Grg. ( 4 4 7 b ff), ICO n. 2 2 0 ; ( 4 4 8 d e ) , lo i n. 2 2 5 ; (44gbc), 10 0 n . 2 2 0 ; (452c),
IV (12 ), 102 n. 242
84 n. 134, 2 5 4 n. 1 2 7 ; (4 5 2 c ff), TOO n . 2 1 9 ; (4 5 3 ^), 1 00 n . 2 2 3 ; (454c),
VII (14 ), 80 n. 104; (24), 80 n. 104; (43), 102 n. 242
100 n . 22 3 , 101 n. 2 3 2 ; ( 4 5 4 c f f) , 8 4 n. 1 3 4 ; ( 4 5 6 b c ) , 2 5 4 n. 1 2 7 ; (457^ ),
XII (38), 80 n. 104; (56 ), 102 n . 242; (86), 100 n. 2 16
100 n. 2 2 4, Id n . 2 2 8 ; ( 4 5 7 c ) , 10 0 n . 2 2 3 , l o i n . 2 3 3 ; ( 4 5 8 a b ) , l o i n . 2 2 6 ;
XIII (49), 102 n. 242; (5 1 ), 102 n. 242; (62), 102 n. 242
(458de), ICO n . 2 2 0 ; ( 4 5 8 c f f ) , 100 n. 2 1 9 ; ( 4 5 9 3 - 0 ) , 84 n. 13 4 , 2 5 4 n. 1 2 7 ;
XV ( u ) , 102 n. 242
( 4 6 0 6 - 4 6 1 a ) , l o i n . 2 3 3 ; ( 4 6 1 c ) , 2 4 5 n . 80 , 2 5 7 n . 1 4 0 ; ( 4 6 2 a ) , l o i n . 2 2 6 ;
XVII ( i ) , 100 n. 216
(4 64bff), 1 00 n. 2 1 8 ; (465c), 100 n. 2 1 7 ; (466cd), lo i n. 2 3 0 ; (471c),
XXII ( i i f f ) , 80 n. 104
100 n. 2 2 2 ; (4 71 e f f ) , 10 0 n . 2 2 1 ; ( 4 7 2 b c ) , 10 0 n . 2 2 2 ; ( 4 7 3 b ) , 100 n. 2 2 3 ;
XXIV (26), 253 n. 121
(473de), lo i n. 228; (4 7 4 a ), 1 00 n . 2 2 2 ; ( 4 7 4 b ) , lo i n. 2 2 6 ; ( 4 7 5 0 - 4 7 6 3 ) ,

100 n. 2 2 2 ; (479bc), lo i n. 2 3 2 ; (480a), lo i n. 2 3 2 ; (48ode), lo i n. 2 3 2 ;

MACROBIUS
(482bc), lo i n. 23 3, 123 n. 3 3 1 ; (487b), lo i n. 2 3 3 ; (497b), lo i n. 232;
Somn. Scip. 11 ( i.8 ff, 583-28 ff), 144 n. 95
( 4 9 8 e - 4 9 9 b ) , l o i n . 2 3 2 ; ( 4 9 9 ^ ) , l o i n. 2 3 3 ; ( 5 0 0 b e ) , l o i n . 2 2 7 ; ( 5 0 2 d e ) ,
MELISSUS
100 n. 2 1 8 ; (50 3ed), lo i n. 2 3 2 ; (505c), 10 0 n . 2 2 4 ; (506c), lo i n. 2 2 6 ;
fr. ( i ) , 7 7 ; (2), 7 7 ; (3), 77, 78 n. 92; (4), 7 7 ; (5), 77 a n d n. 9 1 ; (6), 77 n. 9 1 ;
(509c), lo i n. 2 3 2 ; (5 i4 d ff), 254 n. 1 2 7 ; (520a), 10 0 n. 2 1 7 ; (522d),
(7). 7 7 -8 , 93 n. 18 3; (8), 7 6 -7 , 131 a n d nn. 21 a n d 25, 1 4 1 ; (9), 78 n. 92;
1 0 0 n . 2 2 2 ; ( 5 2 3 a ) , 1 0 2 n . 2 3 7 ; ( 5 2 4 a b ) , 10 2 n . 2 3 7
(10 ), 78 n . 92
Hp. M a . ( 2 8 2 d ) , 80 n . 1 0 6 ; ( 2 8 5 b f f ) , 8 7 n. 146

NICOMACHUS
Hp. M i. ( s 6 3 c d ) , 2 5 4 n . 1 2 5 ; ( 3 6 4 a ) , 2 5 4 n. 1 2 5 ; ( 3 6 8 c d ) , 2 5 4 n . 1 2 5

Harm. (6, 2 4 5 ,i9 ff) , 144 n. 95

Ion (5 4 0 b f f ) , 6 5 n . 3 7
Lg . ( 6 4 2 d e ) , 2 4 9 n . l o i ; ( 6 5 6 d f f ) , 2 5 9 n . 1 4 5 ; ( 6 7 7 d e ) , 2 4 9 n. l o i ; ( 7 2 0 b f f ) ,

228 n. 7 ; ( 7 3 7 c ff), 2 5 9 n. 1 4 4 ; (764a), 2 44 n. 7 0 ; (8 i9 d ff), 113 n. 2 8 9 ;

ORIBASIUS
(822a), 175 n. 2 5 4 ; (8570 ff), 228 n. 7 ; (872c f), 4 4 n. 1 9 2 ; (888eff), 36
XLV (30) { C M G VI, 2 , I 1 9 1 .i f f ) , 41 n. 161
n. 130 ; (889bc), 36 n. 1 3 2 ; (Sgede), 248 n. 9 4 ; (899b), 11 n. 9 ; (90 4a),

248 n. 9 4 ; ( 9 o g a b ) , 17 η. 41; ( g o g a - d ) , 29 n. g 8 ; ( g 3 3 a f f ) , 2 g n. g8
PARMENIDES
Men. ( 7 6 c f f ) , 8 7 n . 1 4 6 ; ( 8 2 b - 8 5 d ) , 1 0 5 n. 2 5 8 ; ( 8 4 3 1 ) , 1 0 5 n . 2 5 g ; ( 8 4 d f f ) ,
fr. ( i.2 8 ff ) , 78 n. 9 3 ; (1.3 0 ), 71 n. 68, 78 n. 9 3 ; ( i- s o f f ) , 84 n . 132 ; (2), 6 9 -70
10 7 n. 2 6 8 ; (8 4 0 4 f f) , 106 n. 2 6 1 ; (8 6 e ff) , 1 1 3
(2.4), 78 n. 93, 84 n. 133 ; (3), 69, 70 n. 60; (5), 7 0 1 1 .6 3 ; (6) 70 n. 60
(6 .4 ff), 7 0 η . 6 2 ; (7), 7 1 , 1 3 0 - 1 ; (8), 6 9 - 7 1 ; (8.30), 7 8 η . 9 3 ; (8.39), 8 4 η . 133
Mx. ( 2 3 g a f f ) , 2 4 6 n . 83
Phd. (6 4 c ff), 131 n. 2 4 ; (65b), 131 nn. 25 a n d 26; ( 6 5 b ff), 1 1 9 n. 3 1 7 , 132
(8 .5 o ff), 71 n. 68, 78 n. 93, 84 n. 13 2 ; (8.60), 78 n. 9 3 ; (8 .6 1), 71 n. 68
n. 3 3; (6 6 d -6 7b ), 131 n. 2 4 ; (7 9 a ff), 131 n. 2 3 ; (?g e), 131 n. 2 6 ; (81 b ) ,
(9), 248 n. 9 3 ; (10 ), 78 n. 9 3 ; ( io .6 f) , 33 n. 1 1 3 ; (14 ), 170 n. 228
324 Index o f passages Index o f passages 325
P L A T O {continued) (5 6 c f f ) , 142 n . 8 5 ; (6 0 b f f ) , 142 n . 8 5 ; (6 8 d ), 253 n. 1 1 9 ; (7 0 c), 2 16 n. 4 6 5 ;
131 n. 24 ; (8 3 a ), 131 n. 26; ( 9 1 a ) , 10 0 n. 2 19 ; (9 2 d ), 1 1 6 ; ( 9 7 b f f ) , 3 6 n . 1 3 1 ; ( 7 i a f f ) , 15 7 n. 16 5 ; ( 7 i e f f ) , 227 n . 4 ; ( 8 ie - 8 7 b ) , 9 7 n. 203
( 9 9 a b ) ,5 4 n . 230; (9 9 b ), 140 η . 72 ; ( i 0 2 d f ) , 132 n, 2 7 ; ( io 8 d e ) , 102 n. 2 37; S c h o lia in Phd. ( io 8 d ) , 145 n. 98
( 1 1 5 a ) , 44 n . 184 in R. (60 0 c), 257 n . 138
Phdr. (2 4 4 a f f ) , 227 n. 4 ; (2 4 4 d - 2 4 5 a ) , 29 n. 98; (2 4 5 c ), 102 n . 2 3 7 ; (2 4 6 a f f ) , P L IN Y
102 n. 2 3 7 ; (2 5 9 ε f f ) , 100 n. 2 19 ; (2 6 3 d ), l o i n . 225; (2 6 5 d e ), 102 n . 240; N at. Π (24.95 ), 180 n. 2 9 2 ; (4 1 . 1 10), 183 n. 305
(266d f f ) , 81 n . 109; ( 2 6 6 e -2 6 7 a ), 81 n. 1 10; (2 70 c f f ) , l o i n. 225 ; (2 7 2 d f f ) , XIX (26.86), 24 n. 79
100 n. 2 19 ; ( 2 7 3 a ), 81 n. n o ; (2 7 4 c d ), 230 n. 13 ; (2 7 4 c ), 44 n. 18 5; XXIII ( 7 i . i 3 7 f f ) , 13 n . 20
( 2 7 7 b 6 ) , l o i n. 225 XXIV ( i . 4 f ) , 13 n. 20
Phlb. (2 8 c ), 248 n. 9 4 ; (3 3 c f f ) , 131 n. 23; (5 8 a f f ) , 84 n . 134, 100 n. 2 19 ; XXVI ( 9 .i8 ff) , 13 n. 20; (6 2 .9 5 ff), 13 n. 20
( 5 8 a - c ) , 102 n . 2 4 1 ; (5 9 a ), 1 19 n. 3 1 7 ; ( s g a - c ) , 102 n. 241 XXVII (43.66), 13 n. 20
P it. (2 8 o e), 29 n. 98 ; (2 8 5 a b ), 102 n. 240; (2 9 6 b c), 259 n . 14 5 ; (2 9 7 c ff)> x x v n i (2 3 .7 7 0 , 13 n . 20; (2 3 .8 s f), 13 n. 20
254 n. 12 7 ; (29802 f ) , 254 n. 12 7 ; (2 9 9 a ), 253 n. 120; (3 0 3 c), 99 n. 209 XXIX (3 2 .9 8 ff), 13 n. 20
Prm. ( i2 7 a b ) , 262 n . 15 6 ; ( i2 8 c d ) , 7 2 ; ( i 2 8 d 5 f ) , i n n . 284; ( i 3 6 a 4 f ) , i i i XXX, 13 n. 20

n. 284; ( 1 3 7 c ) , 105 n . 255 PLO TINUS

Prt- ( 3 1 5 c ) , 87 n. 14 6 ; ( 3 i 8 d f f ) , 87 n . 146; ( 3 1 9 b f ) , 254 n . 12 7 ; (320 c f f ) , H (9-i4)> 29 n. 98

244 n. 73 ; ( 3 2 8 d f f ) , 100 n . 220; (3 2 9 b ), 100 n. 220; (3 3 3 » ), l o i n. 233; P LU T A R C H

(3 3 4 e -3 3 5 d ), 100 n. 220; (3 3 8 d e), l o i n. 226; (3 3 9 b - d ) , l o i n. 2 33 ; (3 4 3 a ), Moralia

249 n . 99; (3 4 8 a ), lo i n . 226; (3 4 9 a ), 80 n . 106; ( 3 6 13 -0 ), lo i De Superstitione ( 1 6 8 b e ), 29 n. 98
n . 233 De Is. et Osir. (3 5 3 c ), 178 «· 2 7 1 ; (3 5 4 d e ), 178 n. 271
R. (3 3 6 c ), 100 n . 224; (3 3 6 ε ), ΙΟΙ η . 227; ( 3 3 ? a b ) , l o i n . 2 3 1 ; (3 4 3 a ff), Quaest. Conv. v ii ( i , 698a ff), 2 16 n. 465
101 n . 228; (3 5 0 c -e ), l o i n. 226; (3 5 8 b ), 99 n . 209; (3 6 4 b f f ) , 29 n. 98, VIII (8.4, 73 oe f ) , 143 n. 94 (10 .2 , 734 ff)> ^4 n. 28
227 n . 4 ; (3 6 4 c f ) , 44 n. 18 9; (4 2 6 b ), 29 n. 98 ; ( 4 3 6 b 8 f f ) , 124 n. 3 3 1 ; De prim. frig. (7, 9 4 7 f) , 143 n . 90
(4 7 6 d ff), 119 n. 3 1 7 ; (s io c ff) , 1 13 -14 ; (5 11b ), 1 1 4 n. 292 ; (521 c d ), De Musica ( 1 1 4 6 b e ), 42 n. 173
132 n . 3 1 ; (5 2 3 a b ), 132 n. 3 1 ; (5 2 3 b ), 1 1 9 n . 3 1 7 , 131 n. 26, 132 n . 33; Vitae
(5 2 3 c), 132 n . 3 1 ; ( 5 2 4 d f f ) , 103 n. 248; ( 5 2 5 b - e ) , 132 n. 3 1 ; (5 2 5 d e ), Dem. (14 ), 29 n. 98
1 1 7 η . 3 o 6 ; ( 5 2 6 a b ), 132 n. 3 1 ; ( 5 2 9 b 7 - c i ) , 132 n. 3 3 ; (52 9 0 4 f f ) , 132 n . 32; Per. (6), 24 n. 79, 161 n. 18 5; (32), 255 n. 129
(5 2 9 c d ), 1 3 1 ; ( 5 2 9 d 7 f f ) , 133 n . 3 5 ; (52 9 6 3 f f ) , 132 n. 28; ( 5 3 o a 7 - b 4 ) , Sol. (12 ), 249 n. l o i
132 n . 34; (53 0 b 1 - 4 ) , 132 n. 28; ( 5 3 o b 6 f f ) , 132 n . 29 ; ( 5 3 o b 8 f ) , 132 n . 3 1 ; Strom. (2), 32 n . n o
(5 3 0 C 2 f ) , 132 n. 32; (5 3 o d ), 14 5 ; (5 3 o d f f ) , 119 n . 320, 133 n . 3 6 ; ( 5 3 o d - POLLUX
5 3 1c), 145 n . 100; (531 a 1 - 3 ) , 133 n. 3 6 ; (531 b 7 ) , 145 n. l o i ; (5 3 1c), IX (83), 236 n . 31
133 n - 3 6 ; (531 c d ), 102 n. 239; (531 e), 102 n . 238; ( 5 3 2 d f f ) , 102 n. 239; P O L Y B IU S
(5 3 3 c ), 102 n. 238; (5 3 4 a b ), 102 n . 239; (5 3 4 b ), 102 n. 238; (5 3 4 d ), 102 XII ( 2 5 d - e ) , 90 n. 167
"•2 3 8 ; (5 3 7 c d ), 102 n . 239 ; (5 39 b -d ), lo i n. 2 2 7 ; ( 5 5 ? b ) , 245 n . 8 1 ; PORPHYRY
(561 d e ), 245 n. 8 1 ; ( 5 6 2 b - 5 6 3 b ), 245 n . 8 1 ; ( 6 o 6 e f ) , 65 n. 3 7 ; ( 6 i6 d e ) , Aist. II (40), 29 n . 98
1 7 4 1 1 .2 5 1 ; ( 6 1 7 a ) , 174 η. 249; ( 6 i7 a b ) , 174 η . 250 In Harm. ( 56 . 5f f ) , I 44 n. 98; ( 57 -2f f ) , i 44 n. 98; ( S 7 .i4 f f) , 144 n . 98
Smp. ( i8 6 d f f ) , 248 n . 9 7 ; (2 0 2 6 -2 0 3 3 ), 29 n. 98 VP (2 3 ff), 37 n. 135 ; (2 7 ff), 37 n . 13 5 ; (33), 42 n. 17 3 ; (45), 37 n. 139
Sph. (2 2 6 d f f ) , 44 n. 190; (2 3 4 c f ) , 99 n . 209; (2 4 8 a f f ) , 131 n. 23; (2 5 3 b - e ) , PROCL US
102 n. 240; (261 d f f ) , 124 n . 332 Hyp. (P ro em , 2 .i f f ) , 133 n. 3 7 ; (3, 4 2 .5 -5 4 .1 2 ), 182 n. 3 0 1; (3, 7 2 .2 o ff), 182
Tht. ( i 4 7 d ) , 106 n n . 260 a n d 265; ( i 4 7 d f f ) , i n n . 283; ( i4 9 c d ) , 29 n . 98 ; n. 3 0 1; (4, I io .3 f f ) , 182 n. 3 0 1; (4, I 2 0 . i 5 f f ) , 182 n. 3 0 1; (4, 12 8 .6 -13 0 .2 6 ),
( 1 5 1 c ) , 135 n . 5 4 ; ( 1 5 2 a ) , 135 n .5 4 ; ( i6 2 e ) , 1 1 6 ; ( 1 6 4 c ), 1 1 6 n .2 9 9 ; 182 n. 3 0 1; (6, 1 9 8 .1 5 -2 1 2 .6 ), 182 n. 301
( i 6 6 a f f ) , 1 3 5 n. 5 4 ; ( i6 6 d ) , 1 3 5 n. 5 4 ; ( 1 6 7 c ), l o i n . 2 2 7 ; ( i6 8 e ) , i i 6 n . 299; In Euc. (6 6 .7 ff), 108 n. 269; ( 6 6 .i4 ff) , 11 5 n. 296; (6 6 .2 o ff), 11 5 n . 296;
(1 8 4 b e ), 131 n . 2 3 ; (201 e ff) , 108 n . 270 (6 7 .2 ff), 11 5 n n. 295 a n d 296; (6 7 .8 ff), 11 5 n. 296; ( 6 7 .i2 f f) , 11 5 n. 296;
T i. (2 o d f f ) , 238 n. 40; (21 e f f ) , 238 n. 39; (2 4 c), 227 n. 4 ; (2 7 d f f ) , 201 n. 3 7 7 ; (7 2 .2 3 ff), 115 n. 296; (95-2if)> n. 288; ( 1 5 7 .1 0 0 , 104 n. 254; ( 3 5 2 .i4 ff),
(2 9 b c ), 102 n . 237, 201 n. 3 7 7 ; (3 6 b f f ) , 174 n. 249; ( 3 6 b - d ) , 174 n. 2 5 1 ; 104 n. 254
(3 6 0 7 ), 174 n . 249; (3 6 d ), 174 n . 250; (3 8 d e), 174 n n. 250 a n d 25 2; ( 3 8 c - In Ti. I (2 2 6 .2 6 ff), 120 n. 324; (228.27), 120 n. 324; ( 2 3 6 .i5 ff), 120 n. 324;
3 9 b ), 174 n . 250; (3 9 c d ), 1 7 4 - 5 ; (4 0 c), 175 n. 254; (4 0 cd ), 174 n. 252, (2 5 8 .i2 ff) , 120 n. 324 ; ( 3 4 6 .3 iff) , 120 n. 324
181 n. 293; ( 4 ? a b ), 133 n . 3 5 ; (4 7 c f ) , 248 n. 9 4 ; ( s i d f f ) , 119 n. 3 1 7 ;
326 Index o f passages Index o f passages 327
PRODICUS SAPPHO
fr. (5), 15 n. 29 P o e m (31.7!?), 127 n . 9
P RO TAGORA S SE XTU S E M PIRIC US
fr. (4), 85 n . 13 6 ; (7), 87 n. 14 7, 1 1 6 n . 299 M . v n (60?), 135 n. 5 5 ; (65), 82 n. 1 1 5 ; (65!?), 81 n . 1 1 3 ; (66), 82 n . 1 1 6 ;
P TO LEM Y (68), 82 n n . 1 1 7 a n d 1 1 9 ; ( 7 1 ), 82 n. 1 1 8 ; (140 ), 134 n . 44
Harm, (i 13, 30.9if), 119 n. 320 VIII (225), 25 n. 8 5 ; (227), 25 n. 85
Optics V (6ff), 197; (23ff), 182 n. 302 IX (13!?), 14 n. 25; (18), 15 n. 29; (24), 14 n . 27, 36 n. 128; (52), 15 n. 29
Phaseis (n 67-2ff), 172 n. 236 P. I (2 i!?), 138 n. 65; (216!?), 135 n. 55
Plan. Hyp. (11 6, 11 117.17 !?), 199; (n 7), 199 SIMPLICIUS
Planisphaerium (14, n 249.19!?), 182 n. 300 In Gael. (117 .2 4 !? ), 176 n. 262 ; (4 8 1.12 !?), 176 n. 262; (4 9 5 .2 6 -9 ), 175
Syntaxis n. 2 56 ; (4 9 5 .2 8 -9 ), 178 n. 2 7 5 ; (4 9 6 .6 -9 ), 175 n. 256; (50 4 .17 !?), 179
I ( i , li 6 . i i f f ) , 120 n. 323; (3, i i . 2 o f f ) , 183 n . 30 2; (3, i3 *3 ff)j 183 n. 302; n. 2 8 1; (506.8!?), 176 n. 262; (50 6.10!?), 178 n. 2 7 6 ; (662.10 !?), 119
(5, i6 .2 o ff), 199 n . 3 7 2 ; (7, 2 i.9 f f ) , 199 n . 3 7 2 ; (12 , 6 4 .12 !?), 181 n . 2 9 7 ; n. 315
(12 , 6 6 .5 ff), 181 n . 297 In Ph. (2 4 .16 !?), 67 n, 4 7 ; (24.29!?), 141 n. 78 ; (60 .2 2-69 .3 4), 109 n. 2 7 1 ;
III ( i, li i9 4 .i2 ff), 186 n . 322; ( i, 194.23!?), 181 n. 295; ( i , i 95 .iflF), 186 (6 1.5 !?), 109 n. 2 7 2 ; (6 1.12 !? ), 109 n. 2 7 6 ; (6 3 .19 !?), 109 n. 2 7 4 ; (6 4 .17!?),
n. 322; ( i, 196.8!?), 181 n. 295; ( i , 197-iff)» ^86 n. 322; ( i, 1974^ )» 181 109 n . 2 7 5 ; ( i i o . 6 f f ) , 77 n. 9 1 ; (1 3 9 .1 1 !? ), 73 n . 7 5 ; (13 9 .18 ), 72 n . 72 ;
n. 295; ( i, 202.14!?), 186 n. 322; ( i , 204.1!?), 186 n. 322; ( i , 205.15!?), (139.19)5 73 n· 73; ( I 4 I - 0 ) 72 n. 72 ; ( 1 4 1 . i? ), 73 n . 7 5 ; (14 1.2 !? ), 73 n. 76 ;
171 n. 233, 172 n. 237; ( i, 205.21!?), 186 n. 322; ( i , 208.13?), 186 n. 322, (14 1.6 !? ), 73 n. 7 7 ; ( 14 1.8 ), 73 n . 78; (15 5 .2 3 !? ), 141 n. 82; (15 7 -2 7 ), 34
199 n· 374; (7» 254. 11!?), 185 n. 315 n. 1 1 9 ; (300.20), 34 n . 1 1 9 ; (3 8 1.2 9 ), 34 n. 1 1 9 ; (460 .13?), 141 n .8 3 ;
IV (2, li 270,19!?), 180 n. 291; (9, 332.14!?), 180 n . 291 (479.33)» 67 n. 4 6 ; (480 .1), 6 7 n. 4 6 ; (9 16 .10 !?), 202 n . 3 8 1; (9 16 .14 !? ),
V ( i , li 351.5!?), 182 n. 299; (12,403.9!?), 182 n. 298; ( 1 4 ,4 1 7 .i!?), 181 n. 296 202 n . 3 8 1; (9 16 .2 1!? ), 202 n . 3 8 1; (10 16 .9 !? ), 74 n . 82
v n ( i , lii 3.1!?), 185 n. 3 17 ; ( i, 3.8!?), 185 n. 3 17 ; (2-3), 194 -6; (s, 18.14!?), SOLON
185 n. 3 17 ; (3, 23.23), 195 n. 353; (3, 24.12?), 195 n. 354; ( 3 , 24.13), ?r. ( 1 .1 7 !? ) , 247 n. 90; (1.5 3 !? ), 227 n. 2; (3), 243 n. 64, 262 n. 15 8 ; (3 .1 ),
195 n. 353; (3, 25.10), 195 n. 353; (3, 25.13!?), 196 n. 356; (3, 30.15!?), 247 n. 90; (3.5!?), 248 n. 9 1 ; (5), 243 n. 63, 262 n. 15 8 ; (8) 248 n . 9 1 ,
196 n. 358; (4, 35-1 iflf), 182 n. 299, 184 n. 312 262 n. 158 ; (9), 262 n. 158 ; (10 ), 262 n. 15 8 ; (23), 262 n. 15 8 ; (2 3 .18 ), 247
IX (2, 111208. 12! ? ) , 176 η. 2 6 2 ; (2, 209.5! ? ) , 185 η. 3 1 7 ; (2, 209. 16), 183 η. 3 0 2 ; n. 90; (24), 243 n . 63, 247 n. 90, 262 n. 158 ; (28), 247 n. 90
(2, 209. 17 ! ? ) , 185 η. 3 1 7 ; (2» 2 10 .5! ? ) , 183 3 0 2 ; (2 , 2 X0 .8!? ) , 185 ηη. 3 14 SOPHOCLES
a n d 3 1 7 ; (2 , 2 1 1 .24! ? ) , 187 η. 3 2 6 ; (3, 2 1 3 . 16! ? ) , 185 η. 3 1 4 » 1 8 7 ; (3, Ai- (58 1?), 29 n. 98
2 1 4 .2! ? ) , ι 8 7 η. 3 2 5 ; (3» 2 i 5 . 5 f f ) > ^9^ η. 34 0 ; (5, 250 . 15 ^?), 187 η. 3 2 9 ; OT (99), 44 n. 18 9; (387!?), 13 n . 20, 17 n. 4 1 ; (12 2 8 ), 44 n. 189
(5 , 2 5 2 .2! ? ) , ι 87 η. 3 3 0 ; (5 , 2 5 2. 7! ? ) , ι 88 η. 3 3 1 ; (5» 2 5 2 . ι ι ! ? ) , 187 η. 3 3 0 ; Tr. (12 3 5 ?), 29 n . 98
(5 , 2 5 2 . 17? ), 199 η. 3 7 4 ; (5 » 252. 18! ? ) , ι 88 η. 3 3 1 ; (6 , 254-3ff)> 187 η. 326 SORANUS
X (1-6 , ιϋ 296.3!?), ι 88- 94 ; ( ι , 298.11!?), ΐ 93 ; ( ι . 299.2), ΐ 93 η. 344 ; Gyn. I (7.30!?, CMG i v 20.2!?), 91 n. 174 ; (9.35, 24.20!?), 223 n. 4 93 ; (11.4 2 ,
(2, 300.19!?), 189 η. 335 ; (2 , 302 . i 7)j ^93 ; (3 > 305 -^7)j ^9 3 ; (4 > 3 Η .ΐ5 ^ )5 29.17^ )» 91 n. 174 ; (19 .6 3 , 4 7 .16 !? ), 42 n . 167
191 η. 340 III (Pre?. 3, 95.8?), 263 n. 15 9 ; (10 .42, 12 1.2 6 !? ), 42 n . 16 7 ; (1 7 , 10 5.2!?),
XIII (2 , ιϋ 532 . 12!?), 199; ( 2, 532 · ι 6 !?), ΐ 99 « · 373 ; (2 . 533 -3ff)> ^99 η. 373 ; 97 n . 202

(2, 533 - i 5ff)> 199 η. 373 STRABO

Tetr. I ( 1 - 2 ) , 181 η . 292 I ( 3 -4 ), 143 n· 92
II (5 .1 4 ), 179 n. 280
q U IN T IL IA N XIV ( i , 27.6 4 2), 60 n. 6
Inst. X (1.46!?), 65 η. 38 XVII (1.2 9 -3 0 ), 178 n. 2 7 1 ; (1.3 0 ), 179 n . 280
XII (10.64), 65 η. 38
THEMIS TIU S
RUFUS XXX (S 4 9 a b ), 15 n. 29
Anat. (170 .9 !?), 166 η . 2 ΐ ο ; (18 4 .15 -18 5 .7 )» 165 η . 205 THEOONIS
Οηοτη. (ΐ34·*ιο!?), 167 η . 2 ΐ 6 ; ( i 54 *iff)> 166 «· 2 10 ; ( i 58 .5 f f ) , ^57 η. 165 ( 4 1 7 ) , 253 n . 119

(^aestiones Medicinales (CMG S u p p l. iv , 3 4 .13 !?), 43 n . 179 THEON OF SMYRNA

?r. (90), 42 (56 .9 !?), 144 n. 9 5 ; (5 7 .7 ), 145 n. 98 ; (19 8 .1 9 -1 9 9 .2 ), 170 n. 228
328 Index o f passages
T H EO P H RA S TU S
H P IX (1 9 .2 -3 ) , 42 n . 16 6 ; (19 4 )» 53 « · 225
Isn. (1 3 .7 3 ), 8 7 n . 146
Lap. (4 8 ff), 2 11 n . 421 GENERAL INDEX
( i f f ) , 162 n . 188; (2 5 f), 156 n . 160, 161 n . 18 7 ; (26), 162 n . 18 9; (4 9 ff),
159 n . 176
T H U CY D ID ES
A cadem y, 86 n. 139, 98, 115, 201
I ( i ) , 135 n .4 8 ; (20), 135 n .4 8 ; (2 1), 253 n. 1 1 8 ; (22), 135 n. 48 ; (23), 53
accountability, 252-3, 256, 258
n. 223 ; (69), 246 n . 8 3 ; (7 7 ), 245 n. 80, 2 5 1 - 2 ; ( 7 9 ff), 245, 2 6 1 ; (87), 245 acoustics, 119, 133 n. 36, 144-6.
n . 82 ‘ a cto r’ versus ‘ observer’ categories, 2
II (8), 246 n. 83 ; ( 1 7 ), 53 n. 223; (40), 2 5 1 ; (47), 42 n. 170 ; (48), 4 4 n. 184, adjustment o f data, 192-8, 200
9 7 n. 201 Aeschines, 79
III (3 6 ff), 256 n . 136 ; ( 37 f f ) , 251 n. 108; (3 7.2 ), 252 n , n o ; (38), 253 n . 120, Aeschylus, 238 n. 41
a fortiori arguments, 80 nn. 104 and 105
254; (38-4)>25i n. 108; (38 .7), 251 n. 108; (42), 252 n. 1 1 1 ; (43), 256 n . 13 4 ;
Agassi, J ., 7
(59), 246 n. 83 ; (62), 246 n . 8 2; (82), 242 n. 60, 245 n. 79 agon, 90 n. 161, 9 i n . 174, 97, 99, 253, 267
IV (78), 245 n. 79 ; (8 5 -6 ), 246 n. 83 A gripp a o f Bithynia, 196
V (9), 246 n. 83 ; (20), 172 n . 240 alchem y, 6, 227
Alcm aeon, 78 n. 93, 126, 133, 156, 162
VI (3 8 -9 ), 245 n. 79
nn. 189 and 91, 163 n. 193, 171 n. 230,
VII (50), 50 n. 2 14 , 171 248 n. 97
Alem an, 10
V ITR U V IU S Alexander, 178, 237, 260
Alexandria, 181 n. 295, 185, 202, 223
IX (8 i ) , 179 n . 280
n. 494, 225
alphabet, 240
XE NO PH A NE S am biguity, 64 n. 28, 101, 208, 228
fr. (4), 236 n. 3 1 ; (7 ), I I n. 12 ; (8), 143 n . 9 3 ; ( 1 1 ) , 1 1 ; (12 ), 1 1 ; (14 ), 1 1 , amulets, 13 n. 20, 42, 45
68 n. 5 2 ; ( 1 5 ), 1 2 ,6 8 n . 5 2 ; (16 ), i i - i 2 , 6 8 n . 5 2 ; (18 ), 133 n. 39, 259 n . 1 4 7 ; analogy, 12, 66, 68, 123, 139, 145 n. 99,
148, 158 n. 171, 235, 247-8
(23), 12 ; (2 4 -6 ), 12 ; (34), 71 n . 6 7, 78 n . 93, 84 n. 13 2 , 85 n . 136, 133 n . 39 ;
analysis, 113 n. 290, 120 n. 325, I22
(35), 78 n. 93, 84 n . 132, 133 n . 3 9 ; (38), 69 n . 54 anatom ical theories, 2 1-4 , 56, 157-69,
X E NO PHON 2 13 -17 , 220, 231 n. 18
Ath. ( 2 .i8 f) , 255 n . 130 Anaxagoras, 23 n. 76, 24 n. 79, 36 n. 131,
87 n. 145, 97 n. 202, 134, 141, 143» 170
Cyn. (13 .4 ), 99 n . 2 1 3 ; (13 .8 ), 99 n. 2 13
nn. 227-8 and 230, 171 n. 231, 228, 248
HG I (7-4 ff), 256 n. 13 6 ; (7-9 ff), 256 n . 136 ; ( 7 - i 5 )> 243 n. 67 n. 94, 255 n. 129, 257, 260, 261 n. 156
Mem. I (2 .3 1), 255 n . 130 A naxim ander, 11 n. g, 32-3, 67-8, 126
II (9 .1 ), 251 n. 106 n. 2, 143 n. 94, 169-70, 177 n. 265, 248
n. 93, 262
IV (2 .5 ), 254 n. 1 2 7 ; ( 7 .2 -5 ) , 103 n . 248
Anaxim enes, 11 n. 9, 20 n. 5 1, 32, 139-41,
Oec. ( i 1 .2 3 - 5 ), 99 n. 2 1 3 ; (19 -16 ), 253 n . 120 143, 170
Andocides, 79
ZENO OF E LE A anthropom orphism , 11-12 , 68
fr. ( i ) , 7 2 - 6 , 7 9 n . 9 5 ; ( 2 ) , 7 2 - 6 , 7 9 n . 9 5 ; ( 3 ) , 7 2 n . 7 1 ; ( 4 ), 7 2 n . 7 1 anthyphairesis, 106 n. 266, i i i , 123
antinom y, 73 n. 78, 74, 76, 123
A ntiphon the O rator, 79-80, 85, 99
Antiphon the Sophist, 85 n. 138, 87 nn.
146-7, 119 n. 316, 171 n. 230
Apollonius, 120 -1, 180 n. 290, 187 n. 327
approxim ation procedures, 193-7, 200
Archilochus, 50 n. 214
Archim edes, 115 n. 295, 120-2, 181
nn. 293 and 296
Archytas, 104, 108, 115 η. 296, i i g n. 320,
144-5
Aristarchus, 120 -1, 198
Aristeas o f Proconnesus, 249-50
Aristides, Aelius, 40 n. 158, 41, 45 n. 193,
46 n. 197, 48 n. 208
Aristophanes, 17 n. 41, 99, 172, 250-1,
255 n. 130, 257, 263
Aristotle: analysis o f modes o f reasoning,
25 n. 84, 62-5, 115, o f demonstration,
62-3, I I I , 115 -16 , 118, 136; anatom ­
ical theories, 21 n. 63, 161, 2 13 -17 ;
astronomy, 163, 177, 179-80; causes,
doctrine of, 163, 2 13 -14 ; dialectic in,
62-4, I I 6-18 , 203-4, 217; dissection,
use of, 157, 160, 163-5, 167, 2 11, 217;
on earth’s position, 205-6, and shape,
206; element theory, 142 nn. 86 and 87,
207-10; em bryology, 158 η. 1 7 2 ,2 1 5 -1 7 ;
knowledge, theory of, 136-8; on mathe­
matics, 107-8, 11 6 -1 7 , **9> 230 n. 13;
on medicine, 96-7, 259 n. 145; on
nature, 36 n. 129, 50 n. 212, 52 n. 220,
119; observation in, 203-20; on φαινόμενα,
130, 137, 202-3, 207, 212; on place, 203;
political theories, 238 n. 44, 244 n. 70,
245, 256 n. 134, 261; on reproduction,
213, 2 17 -19 ; research, program m e of,
98, 201-2, 220, 225; on rhetoric, 63-5;
zoology, 137, 163-4, 201, 2 11-2 0
Aristoxenus, 119 η. 320, 145 n. 98
Artelt, W ., 43
Arts (rhetorical treatises), 62, 81
Artem idorus, 43 n. 178
Asclepius, 29 n. 98, 40 -1, 46, 250
assemblies, 63, 79, 84, 86, 241 n. 55, 243-5,
250, 252, 254-7, 259
astrology, 5-6, 178, 180, 221, 227
astronomical instruments, 177 n. 265,
181-3
astronomy, 87 n. 146, 1 19-21, 131-3, i45>
169-200, 229-30, 232
atheists, 36, 255 n. 129, 257 n. 138
Athens, 242-5, 247-8, 250-2, 254-7, 260-3
atomists, 36 n. 129, 76 n. 89, 140 n. 74,
162 n. 190, 207, 210 n. 421; see also
Democritus, Leucippus
audience, role of, in debate, 61, 63-4, 93,
95, 97-8, 249-50, 254-5, 259, 262-4, 266
axiom atic system, development of, 63, 105,
1 1 1 - 15, 117 -18 , 123-4, 265,26 7
A zande, 2, 17-18 , 26, 48 n. 207, 222
330 General index
Babylonians, io6 n. 264, n o , 128, 169 debate, 60 -1, 90-8, 123, 248, 253-5, 258,
n. 220, 171 n. 234, 176-80, 185, 187, 263, 266-7
226, 229-33, 236-7, 240-1 deceit, 35, 71, 90 n, 168, 228
Bacon, F., 54 n. 232 deductive argum ent, developm ent of, 62-3,
Barotse, 59-60 6 9 - 7 9 ,i i o - i i , 123
black, symbolic associations of, 37, 47 definition, 63-4, in -1 4 , 116, 118,
blood-shedding, 12, 38, 44 123
blood-vascular system, theories of, 157-9, Delam bre, J. B. J., 185, 196 n. 360
162-3, veins dem ocracy, 79, 244-6, 252, 256-7,
Boll, F., 183 n. 305 260-1
botany, 201 Democritus, 14 n. 28, 36 n. 128, 42 nn. 170
brain, 20-4, 156-7, 159, 162, 165-6, 214, and 173, 97 n. 202, 106 n. 263, 119, 134,
215 n. 461 159 n. 176, 170 n. 227, 172 n. 239, 174
Burnet, J ., 126 n. 248, 228; see also atomists
demonstration, 62-3, 6 9 -71, 78, 102-22,
calendar, 172-3, 180 136, 230, 232
Callippus, 173, 176 Demosthenes, 79, 245
C arthage, 239, 240 n. 54 Detienne, M ., 248 n. 98
case-histories, m edical, 153-5, 232 Diagoras, 255 n. 129, 260
causation, 26, 28, 31, 36, 49-56, 163, dialectic: contrasted with competitive
213 -14 , 231 n. 18, 265 disputes, 64, with philosophy, 63 n. 19,
chance, 36, 39 n. 152 with sophistic, 62 n. 17; interactions
charms, 34, 40, 47, 231; see also incanta­ with demonstration, n 5 ~ 2 3; nature of,
tions, spells 61 and n. 14, 123, Aristotle on, 62-4,
Childe, V . Gordon, 236 1 16-18, Plato on, 100-2, 118; Zeno as
C hina, 8 n. 28, 18 n. 46, 183, 264 founder of, 62 n. 16, 79
city-state, 79, 99, 240-64, 266 dicasteries, 243-4, 250-1; see also ju r y
Cleisthenes, 249, 261-2 service
Clem ent o f Alexandria, 12 n. 18, 237 n. 39 Dicks, D . R ., 182 n. 298, 183 n. 304
Cleon, 251, 254, 255 n. 130, 257 dilemm a, 74-6, 80 nn. 104-5, 82-3, 123,
Cnidus, 39, 98 204, 217
coinage, 236 Diogenes o f Apollonia, 20 n. 51, 21 n. 63,
colonisation, 237 n. 35, 239 36 n. 131, 87 n. 145, 140 n. 74, 157-8,
comedy, ban on, 255 n. 130 248 n. 94
common opinions, in Euclid, 105, i n , Dionysius o f Aegae, 91 n. 174
117 -18 Diopeithes, 255 n. 129
competitiveness, 234, 250, 259, 266; dissection, 23-4, 156-69, 2 11, 217
between healers, 45, 57, 89, 92, 96-8, divination, 29, 45, 157 n. 165, 227
250, 264; in philosophy, 100; in rhetoric, Dodds, E. R ., 4-5
64; between wise men, 60-1, 250, dogmatism, 54, 97, 121, 126, 148-9, 221,
266 234, 267
consistency, 60, 80 nn. 104-5, l o i , 123, 142 Dogmatists, 138 n. 65
constitutions, political, debate on, 242, double determ ination, 32, 51, 57
244-5, 248, 255, 258-9, 261 Douglas, M ., 3, 44
contradiction, l o i , 112, n 8 n. 310, 123 dreams; diagnosis through, 43, 45; in
coordinates, celestial, 180, 184 n. 310, temple medicine, 38 n. 149, 43
195 n. 352 Dreyer, J. L . E ., 196 n. 360
Copernicus, 182 n. 298, 192, 199 n. 375 drugs, 31 n. 106, 34, 40-1, 42 n. 165, 44-5,
Corax, 81 150
Cornford, F. M ., 33 n. 113, 126, 143 n. 88 dynamics, 199, 202, 204 n. 385
corroborative role o f evidence, 142, 151,
210, 221-2, 224 earth ; position of, 67-8, 139-40, 173 n. 244,
Cos, 39, 98 199, 205-6; shape of, 206
Crete, 245 n. 82 earthquakes, 30 n. 102, 32, 52, 139
Critias, 15, 255 n. 130, 257 n. 138 eclipses, 14 n. 27, 19, 32, 50 n. 214, 170 -1,
cross-examination o f witnesses, 59, 64, 86, 185, 198 n. 366, 206
91, 145, 252-3 economic factors in the development of
Ctesias, 2 1 1-12 science, 236, 258-9, 266
Ctesibius, 183 Edelstein, L ., 41 n. 160
General index
Egyptians, 6 n. 20, 14, 24 n. 79, 30 n. l o i ,
68 n. 53, n o , 128, 153, 172, 177, 226,
229-33, 236-41, 256, 259 n. 145
Eleatics, 103, n o - 12, n 7 ; jee also Melissus,
Parmenides, Zeno
element theories, 34, 67, 92-4, 140-3,
146-7, 149-51, 207-10
elements o f geom etry, 108-10, 112, 114 -15 ,
117
elenchus, 86, 100-2, 253
em bryology, 94, 158, 163 nn. 193-4,
2 15 -17
Empedocles, 33-8, 44, 51, 62 n. 16, 68
n. 49, 87 n. 145, 134, 140 n. 75, 142
n. 87, 143 n. 91, 147 n. 107, 159 n. 176,
162 n. 190, 170 nn. 228 and 230, 207,
228, 248 n. 93, 254 n. 125, 261
Empiricists, 138 n. 65, 166
Epicureans, 138 n. 65, 210 n. 421
epideictic oratory, 63, 80
ίττίδειξις, 88, 96, 98, lOO n. 2 2 0
Epimenides, 10, 249-50
equant, 187, 192-3, 198
Erasistratus, 165-8, 223 n. 495
Eratosthenes, 121, 206
eristic argum ent, 62, 64, lo o - i
Eskimo, 59
Eubulides, 62 n. 16
Euclid, 103, 105, 109, n i , n 4 , n7~ 22
Euclides o f M egara, 62 n. 16
Euctem on, 171-3 , 179 n. 281
Eudemus, 77 n. 91, 104 n. 254, 109, 201
Eudoxus, 106 n. 263, n 4 - i 5 , n 9 , 169,
173. 175-9, 180 n. 292
Euripides, 14 n. 26, 134 n. 42
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 2-4, 17-18 , 26,
48 n. 207, 222
evidence, terms for, 129, 149 n. 124, 252-3
exactness in science, 98, 120-1, 225
exhaustion, method of, 115 n. 295, 119
n . 316, 122-3
experim ent, 167, 197, 204 n. 385, 210
n. 421, 216 n. 465, 222-4, 267
exploration, 237-9
eye, investigations of, 156, 159, 16 1-2, 164,
166
fallacy, 64-5, lo i n. 229, 124
Farrington, B., 235
Feyerabend, P. Κ ., 3
Finley, M . I, 242 n. 59
foetus, 160, 163 n. 194
fossils, 143
Frankel, H ., 73 n. 78
Frankfort, H ., 128
Furley, D . J ., 73 n. 78, 75 n. 84
Galen, 42-3, 46 n. 201, 91 n. 174, 120,
138 n. 65, 165-7
331
Gellner, E., 7 n, 23
geography, 121, 169, 207 n. 403
Gernet, L ., 248 n. 98
Gluckm an, M ., 59-60
gnomon, 177 n. 265, 181
gods, 10, 35-6, 42, 47, 50, 247, 255, 257
n. 139; as healers, 38, 4 0 -1,4 5 -6 , 48, 55;
rationalist accounts of, 14-15
Goody, J ., 4, 239, 258 n. 141
Gorgias, 8 1-5 , 87 n. 146, 99, 254
H am m urabi, 241, 247 n. 88
haruspicy, 157 n. 165
H arvey, W ., 166
heart, 159 n. 175, 161-2, 164-5, 216
Heath, T . E., 105 n. 256, 170 n. 226
Hecataeus, 130, 169, 238 n. 41
Heraclitus, 1 1-13 , 33 n. n 3 , 68-9, 71 n. 67,
*33> 141 n. 80, 171 n. 230, 248
n. 94, 265
Hero o f A lexandria, 104, 121, 202 n. 381,
2 n n. 421, 223 n. 494
Herodotus, 13, 14 nn. 23 and 26, 24 n. 79,
29-32, 50 n. 214, 53, 169, 2 n - i 2 , 230
n. 13, 238-9, 244-5, 252, 256, 259
heroes, healing, 29 n. 98, 38
Herophilus, 43, 138 n. 65, 156, 165-6,
223 n. 495
Herzog, R ., 48 n. 209
Hesiod, l o - n , 130, 171
Hesse, M ., 128
heuristic methods, in mathematics, 106,
122
H ipparchus, 5 n. 16, 121, 169, 178, 179
n. 279, 180-7, 194) ^965 198» 200, 221
Hippasus, 145 n. 98
Hippias, 87 nn. 146-7, 88
Hippocrates o f Chios, 104, 108-10, n 2 ,
1130.289
H ippocratic m edicine: anatom ical theories,
2 1-4 , 56, 15 7-6 1, 165; attack on magic,
15-29, 37-8, 231-2, 235, 263; criticisms
o f incorrect medical practices, 89-91;
dialectic and rhetoric in, 87-98; dis­
section in, 23-4, 156-61, 165; dogmatism
in, 54, 97, 148-9, 221; epistemological
theories, 95, 121 n. 326, 134-5, 168;
notions o f nature and cause in, 26-7,
5 2 -7; observation and research in, 146-
61, 168-9; physiological theories, 92-4,
96, 146-51, 158, 168, 248; pluralism of,
37-49, 228-9
H ippon, 97 n. 202, 140 n. 74, 257 n. 138
historians, 53, 103 n. 243, 135 n. 48, 169,
225, 233 n. 24, 259
H oebel, E. A ., 59 n, 3
Homer, l o - n , 17 n. 41, 50, 65-6, 78 n. 93,
79, 127, 2 n , 236-7, 241
H orton, R ., 48 n. 207
332 General index General index 333
H uan T ’an, i8 n. 46 Lyceum , 98, 164, 201-2, 211 m ystery religions, 12 -13 , 14 η. 22, 41, 76, 78, 84, 102, n o , 130-1, 133, 135,
H um e, R . E ., 60 n. 8 Lysias, 79-80 229 140 n. 75, 149 n. 123, 170 nn. 228-9,
hum oral theories, 20 -1, 23, 93-4, 147-50, m ythology, 10, 32, 52, 66, 212, 233-4 248 n. 93, 261 n. 156, 265
i 5 4 >158 m agic: anthropological debate on nature participation in political life, 242-4,
hydrostatics, 121-2 of, 2-3, 47-8; attacks on, 15-29, 231-2, naturalistic accounts; o f cures, 4 2-3; o f 250-64
hypothesis, 123; in Aristarchus, 121, 198; 235, 263; com pared with rhetoric, 84, diseases, 16, 21, 26-8, 33; o f phenomena, Pedersen, O ., 192 n. 342
in Aristotle, 63, 1 11, 1 14; in H ippocratic 99; survival of, 4-5, 227, 261, 263; and II, 32-3, 52-3, 139 perception: terms for, 129; debate on
writers, 88 nn. 151 and 154, 95, 135, technology, 48, 56, 235 nature: developm ent o f idea of, 26-8, 30-1, validity of, 34, 71, 77-8, 119, 123,
147-9; in Plato, 11 3 -1 5 ; in Ptolem y, μάγοι, 13 and n. 20, 16, 17 n. 41, 21, 30 33, 36, 49-56, 265; divinity of, 11, 26, 129-38, 141, 221
199; in Zeno, 72 n. l o i , 56 28, 43 n. 177, 49 n. 209; inquiry con­ Pericles, 251, 255 n. 129, 257
M alinowski, B., 48 n. 207 cerning, 30, 32-6, 5 1-3 , 84, 87, 93, 97, periodicities, in diseases, 154-5
Ilberg, J., 41 n. 161 maps, 169 139-47, 169, 201-3, 233; opposed to Persians, 239, 244, 246 n. 83
im piety: accusations of, 16, 19, 37; trials M arshall, L ., 3 n. 7 convention, 86 n. 140, 150 n. 129, 238, persuasion, 63, 65-6, 78-85, 8 7-91, 94-5,
for, 255, 257 marvels, 32-3, 5 1-2 247, 262 97, 100-2, 116, 123, 228, 249-50, 251
impotence, explanations of, 28, 31 mathematics, 87, 103-24, 135 n. 50, 201, necessary condition, 54 n. 109, 254-5, 259, 262-4
incantations, 16, 42, 83-4; see also charms, 228-32, 262, 265; axiomatisation of, necessity, 32, 33 n. 113, 36 n. 129, 78 n. 93, φαινόμενα - the ‘ appearances ’, 129-30,134,
spells 1 1 1 - 1 5 , " 7 - ϊ 8, 124, 265; dialectic in, 103; contrasted with probability, 78, 135 n. 55, 137-8, 138 n. 65, 173, 202-3,
incommensurability o f belief-systems, 1-2 116 -18 ; G reek contrasted with B aby­ 116, 123 206-7, 212, 219; saving the, 120, 198
incommensurability o f side and diagonal, lonian and Egyptian, 106 n. 264, 110, Needham , J ., 18 n. 46 n . 370,199-200
105-8, n o , 113 n. 289 229-32; heterogeneity o f Greek, 103-4; nerves, discovery and investigations of, Pherecydes, 10
incubation, 43, 45 interaction with philosophy, 110 -15 ; 165-7 Philistion, 140 n. 75, 208 n. 4 11, 216 n. 465
India, 60-1 origins of, G reek ideas on, 103 n. 248, Neugebauer, O ., 176 n. 264, 184 n. 310, Philo, 223 n. 494
indirect p roof or reductio, 66 n. 40, 71-8, 230 n. 13; contrasted with physics, 119, 186 n. 323, 192 n. 341 Philolaus, 97 n. 202, 119 η. 320, 170 n. 227,
80 n. 104, 87 n. 145, 93 n. 183, 107-8, 198-200 N ewton, L , 120 n. 322 173-4
n o , 122-3 m athematisation of physics, 118-22, 132, Newton, R . R ., 185, 194-6 Philoponus, 182 n. 300, 204 n. 385
indivisibles, 74, 113 n. 288, 117, 207, 210 133 n· 36 νόμο$, 14 n. 26, 86 n. 140, 134 n. 45, 150 Phoenicians, 239, 240 n. 54
Ισηγορία, 244-5 M aula, E ., 179 n. 280 n. 129, 238, 247, 262 physiology, 92-4, 96, 120, 146-51, 158,
Isocrates, 79, 99, 244, 251 n. 107 mechanics, 120-1, 202 num ber-theory, 103-4, ” 3 n. 288, 145-6, 166-8, 231 n. 18, 248
medicine, 15-29, 34, 37“ 49> 52-7» 87-98. 154 n. 149, 221, 228 physicians, public, 39 n. 150, 254-5
Jarvie, I. C ., 7 103, 120, 146-69, 221, 228, 230-2, 248, planetary theory, 170, 173-6, 179, 186-93,
Jones, W . H . S., 88 n. 149 250, 254, 256, 259-60, 263; com petitive­ obscurity, deliberate, 229 197-200
jury-service, 243-4, 252-3; see also di- ness in, 45, 57, 89, 92, 96-8, 250, 264; observation: in Aristotle, 163-4, i7 9 ^ o , Plato: on acoustics, 133 n. 36, 145-6;
casteries G reek com pared with E gyptian and 200-20; in astronomy, 17 1-3 , 178-200, astronomy, 131-3, 174-5, 191, 198;
Babylonian, 153, 230-2, 256, 259 n. 145; 225, 230, 232; in H ippocratic medicine, attack on atheists, 36, on sophists, 100-1;
K eith , A . B., 60 n. 8 heterogeneity o f Greek, 37-49, 56^7» 23-4, 146-61, 168-9, 232; in Presocratic causation, 54; cosmology, 36 n. 133, 201,
K irk , G. S., 126 96-7, 228-9; qualifications in, lack of natural philosophy, 126, 139-46; distin­ 248 n. 94; dialectic in, 100-2, 118, 123;
K n orr, W . R ., 107 n. 266 legally recognised, 38-9; training in, 39, guished from research, 127; relation to element theory, 142, 207; epistemology,
knowledge: about gods, 14 n. 23, 85 n. 136, 96, 98; see also H ippocratic medicine, theory, 128-9, 137, 154, 161, 167-8, 131-3, 135-6; Forms, theory of, 102,
259; o f other societies, 169, 236-9, 258; temple medicine 185-6, 192-3, 197, 199, 210, 212, 2 14 -15 , 131, 136; hypothesis in, 11 3 -1 5 ; mathe­
limitations o f hum an, 13 n. 21, 133 M egarians, 62 n. 16 221 matics in, 105-6, 1 11, 113 -16 , 201; on
nn. 39 and 40; theory of, 71, 78, 119, Melissus, 76-9, 93, 130-1, 135, 141, 261 O gle, W ., 216 medicine, 228 n. 7; pathology, 97;
129-38 n. 156 oligarchy, 244, 256, 261 political viev^rs, 245 and n. 77, 254 n. 127,
K udlien, F ,, 40 n. 153 M enaechm us, 115 n. 296 opposites: analysis of, 72 n. 69, 76; cure by, 261; on rhetoric, 81, 84 n. 134, lo o - i ,
K u h n , T . S ., 3-4 M enelaus, 184 n. 308, 196 22 263
M en o’s history o f medicine, 97 n. 203, 201 optics, 119 -2 1, 182, 197 Pliny, 13 n. 20, 24 n. 79, 210 n. 421, 223
Lakatos, I., 3 meteorology, 84, 135, 172, 178, 254 oracles, 34, 42 n. 170, 53 n. 223, 222 n. 492 politics, and the developm ent o f Greek
law : codes of, 241, 247; metaphors from, in M ethodists, 138 n. 65 ordeals, 222 science, 79, 240-64
cosmology, 33, 247-8 M eton, 17 1-3 , 179 n. 281 Orphism , 1 1 pollution, 12, 44
law-courts: arguments in, 59, 63, 79-80, Milesians, 11, 35; see also Anaxim ander, orreries, 174 η. 252, i8 i Polybus, 21 n. 63, 157-8
84-6, 99-100; experience of, 244, 250-2, Anaximenes, Thales Osier, W ., 20 n. 53, 22 n. 73 Popper, K . R ., 3, 126
259, 262-3 M ill, J. S., 54 n. 232 ostracism, 246, 256, 260-1 Posidonius, 169, 181 n. 293
lectures, public, 90, 92-5, 254, 262 M odus Tollens, 25, 28, 66 n. 40, 71, 73, O w en , G . E. L ., 1 19 n. 319, 130, 203 n. 382, postulates: in Archim edes, 121 n. 327; in
Leucippus, 32-3, 37 76-7, 123, 205 204 n. 386, 205 n. 390 Euclid, 1 11, 114, 117 -18 ; in On Ancient
Lewis, G ., 231 n. 19 M om igliano, A ., 237 Medicine, 135, 147-9
lightning, 14 n. 27, 15, 32, 139 monsters, 50 n. 214, 52 Page, D . L ., 127 n. 9 Praxagoras, 152 n. 139
literacy, 98, 239-40, 258, 266 Morrison, J. S., 85 n. 138 pangenesis, 2 17 -19 prayers, healing by, 42, 45
lot, appointment by, 243, 250, 252 M oulinier, L ., 44 paradox, 62 n. 16, 68, 124 n. 331, 228 precession, Ptolem y’s determination of,
n. 114 M useum, Alexandrian, 202, 225 parapegm ata, 172, 178-9 194-7
L ozi, 59-60 music, 104, 144-6; in healing, 42-3 Parmenides, 33 nn. 113 and 1 18, 34, 69-72, Price, D . J . de S., 181 n. 293, 182 n. 298
334 General index
probability, 64 n. 29, 66, 78-9, 80 nn. 104-
5, 81, l o o - i , 115 -16 , 123
Proclus, 117 n. 308, 120, 182 n. 301
Prodicus, 14 -15, 87 n. 146, 257 n. 138
professionalism, in art o f speaking, 80-1,
85, 122, 263
prognosis, 45, 90, 97 n. 202, 15 1-2 ; com­
pared with divination, 45
proof, informal notions of, 60, 81, 93,
102-6 see also demonstration
prophets, 17 n. 41, 45
proportion theory, 109 n, 276, 115 n. 295,
118 n. 314
Protagoras, 8 0 ,8 5-6 ,8 7 n. 147,88, 99, 116,
119, 135-6» 244, 245 n. 77, 255 n. 129
psychological effects in medicine, 42, 46,
49, 153 n. 141
Ptolem y, 5 n. 16, 117 n. 308, 120-1, 169,
172, 176 n. 262, 178, 180-200
pulse, 152 n. 139
purifications, 12, 16, 19, 21, 29, 38, 40,
4 4 “ 5 j 5 5 j 249 n. l o i ; Em pedocles’
Purifications, 34, 44, 254 n. 125
purifiers, 16, 19 ,2 5, 39 n. 14 9 ,4 6 -7,4 9 , 52,
5 5 , 5 7 , 9 9 , 264
Pythagoras, 11, 37 n. 135, 130, 144, 145
n. 98, 170 n. 229, 228, 238 n. 40, 260'
n. 152
Pythagoreans, 33 n. 118, 37-8, 42 n. 173,
46 n. 197, 98, 104, 107 n. 266, 112
n. 288, 113 n. 289, 137, 144-6, 154
n. 149, 170 n. 230, 173-4, 201, 205
n. 393, 221, 228
question and answer, 60, 62 n. 16, 64,
91-2, 94-6, 100-2, 105
Rawlings, H . R ., 54 n. 231
reductio, see indirect proof
refraction, 182 n. 302, 197
refutation, 25, 27, 63-4, 72, 204, 207, 253;
see also elenchus
regimen, 21, 4 0 -1, 49
religion: criticisms o f traditional religious
notions, 1 1 - 1 3 ; pluralism o f Greek
religious belief, 10 -15, 259; rationalistic
accounts o f origin of, 14-15
reproduction, 213, 2 17 -19
research, 23-4, 27, ch. 3, 227,238; develop­
ment o f programmes of, 201-2, 232, 265
responsibility, idea of, 52
rhetoric, 62, 65, 79-102, 122, 228, 239,
251 n. 107, 254, 263; Aristotle on, 63-5;
criticism of, 98-102, 263; development
of, 79-86, 122; and natural science,
86-98; Plato on, 100-1, 263
riddles, 60 n. 6, 124 n. 321
Robinson, R ., lo i n. 236, 123 n. 331
R uben, W ., 60
General index 335
Rufus, 42, 91 n. 172, 157 n. 165, 166-7 testing, 24, 54, 144 n. 95, 150 -1, 168, 209, Upanisads, 60 -1
R yle, G ., 62 n. 16, 64 nn. 28 and 33 220, 222-4, 253; contrasted with experi­
ment, 223; legal, 252-3; see also experi­ veins, 20-2, 24, 28, 157-9; blood-
sacred disease, 15-28, 40, 47, 48 n. 209, ment vascular system
4 9 , 56-7, 235 Thales, i i n. 9, 32, 67-8, 104-5, »39-40, venesection, 45, 158, 162-3
Sappho, 127 1 70 nn. 224 and 228, 249, 262 verification, 135, 140, 148, 168, 212, 220
scepticism about traditional beliefs, 18 -19, Theaetetus, 108, i n , 115 n. 296 Vernant, J . P., 242 n. 60, 248 n. 98
234, 239, 265 theatre, 253-4, 257 V idal-N aquet, P., 242 n. 60, 248 n. 98
Sceptics, 138 n. 65 Theodorus (geometer), 106, 116 vivisection, 156, 165-7
Schiaparelli, G . V ., 175 Theodorus (writer on rhetoric), 81 Vlastos, G ., 36 n. 133, 207 n. 404
Schjellerup, H . C . F. C ., 183 n. 304 theology, 10, 120, 233 n. 23; jee also religion void, 140 n. 74, 211 n. 421
Scot, R ., 18 n. 46 Theon of Alexandria, 182 nn. 300-1
secondary elaborations, 17-18 , 57 Theon o f Sm yrna, 185 n. 318 W an g Chhung, 19 n. 46
secretiveness, 41, 113 n. 289, 228 and n. 5, Theophrastus, 42 nn. 166 and 173, 201-2, waterclock, 183
234 2 n n. 421 W est, M . L ., II n. 6, 237 n. 36
seers, 60 n. 6, 249 Thom as, Κ ., 16-19 w ind: control of, 30 n. l o i , 34, 37; effect
sensation; debate on seat of, 156 n. 160, thought experiment, 24, 68-9, 158 n. 169 on diseases, 21, 23
162, 216; transmission of, 20, 165; see Thucydides, 42 n. 170, 53, 97 n. 201, 171, wise men, 12 n. 13, 35, 60, 249-50, 259
also perception 172 n. 240, 245, 251-4, 256, 260 n. 149, wonder-working, 33-5, 37 n. 135, 51, 228,
slavery, 228 n. 7, 236, 242-3, 253 n. 119, 261 249
259 thunder, 14 n. 27, 15, 32, 139 w ord: o f healing, 34; power of, 81, 83-4
Socrates, 62 n. 16, 86, 99, 112, 243, 251, Tim ocharis, 194, 196
255, 257, 260 Tisias, 81 Xenophanes, 1 1 -1 2 , 68, 71 n. 67, 78 n. 93,
Solon, 243, 247, 249, 262 torture, 145, 253 n. 119 84, 85 n. 136, 126 n. 2, 130, 133, 143,
sophistic: in Aristotle, 62 n. 17, 64 n. 28; trade, 236-7, 239, 258 170 n. 228, 236 n. 31, 259, 260 n. 152
in Plato, 100 training, importance of: in dialectic, X enophon, 99, 251
sophists, 14 -15 , 80-1, 85-8, 95-6, 98-9, 65 n. 36, 86 n. 140; in medicine, 39, 96,
250 n. 103, 251, 254, 260-2 98 Zeno o f Elea, 62 n. 16, 72-6, 78-9, 82,
Soranus, 42, 91 n, 174, 223 n. 493, 263 travel, 134 n. 44, 143 n. 93, 178, 236-9, 113 η. 289, 117 η. 3o6
n. 159 260 n. 152, 261 n. 156 zoology, 137-8, 163-4, 211-20
Sparta, 245, 261 n. 153 tyranny, 242, 249 n. 100, 252, 256 n. 134
spells, 29 n. 98, 34, 42, 231; see also charms,
incantations
spontaneous, idea of, 33, 36 n. 129
star-catalogues, 183-4
statics, 121-2, 202
Stoics, 25, 138 n. 65, 210 n. 421
Strabo, 169
Strato, 202, 211 n. 421, 223 n. 495
sufficient reason, principle of, 68, 70-1
supernatural, 26-7, 29-30, 35, 36 nn. 129
and 133, 51, 56, 65
surgery, 158; miraculous, 40
Syennesis o f Cyprus, 157
syllogism, theory of, 62-3, u 6 , 118
symmetry, bilateral, 22, 158
Szab0, A . , n o n. 279
Tam biah, S. J ., 2-3, 7, 48 n. 207
Tannery, P., 74
teaching, 80, 85, 86 n. 142, 87 n. 146, 96,
99, 250 n. 103
technology, 183, 202 n. 381, 209; and
developm ent o f science, 235-6, 266;
and m agic, 48, 56, 235
teleology, 36 n. 129, 2 13 -14
Tem kin, O ., 15 n. 33
temple medicine, 6, 38, 40-1, 43, 45-8, 57,
228, 264