Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation: The Boon or Bane of Contemporary Psychology of

Religion?
Author(s): Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Ralph W. Hood, Jr.
Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 442-462
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
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Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious
Orientation: The Boon or Bane of
Contemporary Psychology of Religion?*
LEE A. KIRKPATRICKt
RALPH W. HOOD, JR.t

Although the Intrinsic-Extrinsic (I-E) frameworkhas provided the dominant conceptual and
measurementparadigmfor the psychology of religionover the last two decades,researchin this tradi-
tion suffers from a number of serious limitations. This paper details a variety of theoretical and
methodologicalcriticisms of contemporaryI-E research,many of which have been noted by previous
researchersbut have yet to be adequatelyaddressed.Theoreticalproblemsincludelack of conceptual
clarity in the definitions of I and E; confusion regarding what I and E are supposed to measure
(namely, intrinsic-extrinsicwhat?);the value-laden "good-religion-versus-bad-religion" distinction
underlyingthe framework;the problemsinherentin definingand studying religiousnessindependently
of beliefcontent; and the thornyissue of how I and E are conceptuallyinterrelated(namely,Allport's
originalbipolarcontinuumversus the moderntwo-factortheory). Criticismsof the measurementof
I and E concern the factorial structure, reliability, and construct validity of the I and E scales, as
well as the empiricalrelationshipbetween the scales. Although the I-E paradigm has clearly been
successful in terms of generatingresearchdata, it is our view that muchof this workis theoretically
impoverishedand has really taught us very little about the psychology of religion.Only a few years
after the Allport-RossI-E scales appearedon the scene, several researchersargued that it was time
to move beyonda simplistic I-E frameworkto more theoreticallyand psychometricallysophisticated
approaches.Nearly 20 years later, we believe this admonitionbears repeating.

INTRODUCTION

It might be said that GordonAliport'sconceptualizationof intrinsicand extrinsicreligion

currentlyrepresentsthe backboneof empiricalresearchin the psychology of religion.The
theoretical distinction goes back to at least 1950 in Allport's work contrasting mature
and immaturereligion(Allport1950, 1954).Empiricalmeasurementof the constructs can
be tracedto studies by Wilson(1960)and Feagin (1964).The now classic articleby Allport
and Ross (1967)on "personalreligiousorientationand prejudice,"in which extrinsic, but
not intrinsic, religious orientation was shown to be correlatedwith ethnic prejudice,is
probablythe most frequently cited referencein this line of research.A spate of articles
followedin the 1970s, reportingresearchin which the I-E scales were correlatedwith a
wide variety of individual-differencevariables (see Donahue 1985b for a review).
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion,
Salt Lake City, October, 1989.

tLee A. Kirkpatrick was until recently a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of South Carolina, Columbia, SC. He is now a post-doctoral research associate in the Department of
Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, where all correspondence should be directed
Ralph W. Hood, Jr. is a professor of psychology at the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, TN 37401.

? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1990, 29 (4): 442-462 442

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IIE ORIENTATION 443

Within four years of the publication of Allport's and Ross's (1967) work, however,
both the scales and the constructswereunderfire.Dittes (1971)and Hunt and King (1971)
suggested that the frameworkwas beginning to outlive its usefulness and called for con-
ceptually and psychometrically more sophisticated approaches to supersede it. Dittes
(1971:382)speculated, however, that the I-E typology showed "considerablepromise of
surviving [its] obituary."It now appearsthat he was right. Fourteenyears after Dittes's
remarks were published, Donahue (1985b:400)counted 70 published studies employing
Ailport's Religious OrientationScale and concludedthat "no approachto religiousness
has had greater impact on the empiricalpsychology of religion."
Manycriticismshave beenleveledagainst the I-E frameworkover the years by various
researchers;many of the important ones were pointed out long ago by Hunt and King
(1971)and by Hoge (1972).These old problems,it seems to us, have never been resolved
satisfactorily.In the meantime,new problemshave been identifiedthat also await resolu-
tion. We feel it is time to review these various criticisms, introduce some new ones, and
encourage researchers in the psychology of religion to pursue more promising
methodological and theoretical directions.
In his 1984AmericanPsychologist article,RichardGorsuchsuggested that measure-
ment has been both the boon and bane of the psychology of religion. This statement is
as trueof the I-E traditionin particularas it is of the measurement"paradigm"(as Gorsuch
described it) in general. There can be little doubt that this frameworkhas generated a
great deal of empiricalresearchin the psychologyof religionover the last coupleof decades,
and in this sense it has certainly been a boon to the field. However, we believe that in
many ways the I-E frameworkhas been a bane as well.
It is generally not a simple matter to disentangle conceptual, theoretical concerns
from empirical,psychometricones. For purposes of exposition, however,we will attempt
to do so to some extent, although the interconnectionswill become readily apparent(and
unavoidable)at various points.

DEFINING "RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION"

The first issue to be addressedin consideringintrinsic-extrinsicreligious orientation

is, simply put: What precisely does "religiousorientation"mean?As straightforwardas
this question may seem, a precise answer proves to be elusive.
Perusal of published and unpublished articles concernedwith Allport's distinction
reveals that writers fill in the blank after the words "intrinsic"and "extrinsic" with a
diverse array of terms: We variously refer to intrinsic-extrinsic"religiousorientation,"
intrinsic-extrinsic"religiousness,"intrinsic-extrinsic"religiosity,"and so forth. Sometimes
we avoid the issue entirely by simply referringto "intrinsicness"or "extrinsicness,"or
more commonly, by referringto research participants as "Intrinsics" or "Extrinsics."
Such terms are freely interchangedas if they were all synonymous;it is not unusual to
see several of these variants used within the same article. Although this may seem like
semanticnitpicking,we believethis casualuse of languagemay in fact betrayan underlying
confusion about what exactly is being studied.
A naturalplace to start in defining"religiousorientation"wouldof coursebe Allport's
own writings. It turns out, though, that Allport too used the term in several ways. After

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444 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

reviewing Allport's various writings on the topic, Hunt and King (1971:340)concluded
that Allport'sdefinitionof I-E showed"a clearprogressiontowardviewingthe phenomena
as types of motivation,"that is, "themotives associatedwith religiousbeliefand practice."
Hoge (1972:370)agreed with this assessment, noting that I-E "is clearly a measure of
motivationfor religiousbehaviorratherthan the behavioritself.... We call this dimension
'intrinsicreligious motivation'. . . [and]use the term 'extrinsic motivation' for the latter
end of the dimension."
In the same paper, Hunt and King also suggested that in the work of Allport and
Ross (1967), as well as related work by Allen and Spilka (1976) concerning consensual
versus committed religion, I-E "began to look more like a personality variable and less
like 'religion'," adding that I and E "may prove to be basic pervasive personality
variables"(Hunt and King 1971:353;emphasis in original).With respect to the Extrinsic
scale in particular,they noted that with minorrewordingthe items might easily be applied
to any area of institutional behavior or involvement. Thus, one might be extrinsically
oriented toward almost anything, with religion representing only a special case.
McFarland's (1989a) adaptation of the I-E dimensions to Communist beliefs and com-
mitment in the Soviet Union offers a recent illustration of this interpretation. Kahoe
(1974:817)also seemed persuaded by the idea that an "underlyingpersonality variable
links [intrinsicreligion]and internal motivations." Allport and Ross (1967) themselves
discussed their results, particularly with respect to the Indiscriminate Proreligious
category, in terms of cognitive styles.
Examination of the item content of the Religious OrientationScale (ROS)corres-
pondingly reflects this conceptual confusion. Gorsuch (1984)has pointed out that these
items represent a "hodgepodge"of attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors. (The "Age
Universal" version of the I-E scales developed by Gorsuch and Venable [1983]partially
solves the problemby eliminatingbehavioritems.) The fact that the Intrinsic items, for
example, display relatively high intercorrelationsand tend to "hang together" in factor
analyses does not in itself justify aggregationof the items into a meaningfulscale. Under
the traditional common-factormodel, such aggregation implies that a latent construct
("intrinsicreligiousorientation,"whateverthat is) representsthe commoncause underlying
the inter-item correlations.' However, as Gorsuch (1984) has argued, the relationships
among values, attitudes, behaviors, and so forth constitute interesting empirical ques-
tions that should be resolved by research, not by fiat.
So, what does religiousorientationmean?Is it aboutmotivation,personality,cognitive
style, or something else? Perhaps it is a little of each; but in any case, greater precision
in definition is clearly called for from a scientific perspective. Sloppy definitions make
it difficult to devise and test precise hypotheses in empirical research. One particular
manifestationof this is the difficultyof assessing the construct validity of the scales used
to measure the constructs: How can we determinewhether the I-E scales are valid if the
constructs themselves are poorly defined?The credibilityand conceptualutility of a con-
struct derive from the logic of a theoretical system in which it is embedded.Conceptual

1. Gorsuchalso arguesthat such measurementimpliesthat these items at differentlevels of analysisarethought

somehowto cause eachother;instead,it is probablymoreaccurateto say that this hodgepodgeimpliesa common-
factor model in which all items are "caused"by the latent construct "religiousorientation,"whatever that is.

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IIE ORIENTATION 445

clarity regarding what is being measured is at least as important as the psychometric

properties of the measures themselves.
Gorsuch(1984)wonderedwhetherhis concernabout the "hodgepodge"nature of the
I-E scales was widely shared by others in the field. We suspect that most researchers
would indeed share his concern as a general rule. However, we also suspect that with
respect to these particularscales, the problemhas been tolerated or convenientlyignored
primarilybecauseresearchershave not beenclearaboutexactly what is meant by "religious
orientation."If a precise definitionof religious orientationwere decidedupon - whether
in terms of a personality trait, cognitive style, or motivational system - we believe it
wouldquicklybecomeapparentthat better measurescouldand shouldbe utilizedto assess
the particular construct of interest.

DEFINING "INTRINSIC" AND "EXTRINSIC"

Putting aside for a moment the question of what religious orientationmeans, let us
consider the meaning of the more specific terms "intrinsic"and "extrinsic."Again, the
question of how I and E are definedor conceptualizedis somewhatdifferentfrom(though
not unrelatedto) the problemof how the psychometricinstrumentsused to measurethem
behave empirically.
In their comprehensivereviewof Allport'swritingson the topic, Hunt and King (1971)
called attention to a considerablelack of theoreticalclarity concerningAilport's multiple
usages of the terms "intrinsic"and "extrinsic."Specifically,they cited 11 distinct dimen-
sions or components used in Ailport's various writings to differentiate I and E. They
concludedthat the Intrinsic dimension is particularlyill-definedby this multiplicity of
diverse meanings, whereas the E dimension is more clearly defined as an "instrumen-
tal/selfish motivation"for religiousinvolvement and is adequatelymeasuredby Feagin's
(1964) six-item scale. Similarly, Dittes (1971:375)bemoanedthe "formaluntidiness" of
the I-E typology, which he characterizedas representing "multipledefining categories,
carelessly agglutinated, shifting from one discussion to another,not integratedwith each
other conceptually, and manifestly not correlated empirically."
This criticismof the I-E scale is relatedto the "hodgepodge"problemcited by Gorsuch
(1984)and is supportedby factor-analyticresults. Hunt and King (1971)cited their own
previouswork in which I and E items were factoranalyzedin the context of a wide variety
of other religion items. Although many of the E items loaded together on an extrinsic
motivation factor, the I items did not form a unitary factor but instead were scattered
across several different factors (King and Hunt 1969). This result suggests that the I
items are indeed tapping a diversity of dimensions of religiosity. We will have more to
say about these factor-analyticresults below.

Psychometric Properties of the I-E Scales

Kirkpatrick(1989b)has shownrecently in multiple samplesthat at least three factors

can be identifiedin both the Ailport-Rossand the Feagin scales. The first factorrepresents
the traditionalI dimensionand contains most of the nominallyIntrinsicitems. However,
two distinct (thoughmoderatelyintercorrelated)E factors emergedin these analyses:An

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446 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Extrinsic-Social (Es) factor involving the use of religion as a means toward social gain,
and an Extrinsic-Personal (Ep) factor involving the use of religion as a means toward
gaining comfort, security, and protection. A second, equally significant finding was that
several E items loaded on neither of the extrinsic factors, but instead evinced strong
negative loadings on the I factor. These "residual"E items appear,in effect, to represent
negatively worded or reversed I items. McFarland(1989b)scored these items as a third
separate extrinsic scale which he labeled (afterreverse scoring) "religiousseriousness."
We will say more about these items below.
Similarfactor-analyticresults had been reportedpreviouslyby other researchers,but
for understandable reasons these results had generally gone unnoticed: Hoge (1972)
reported his results in a footnote, and Amon and Yela (1968)published their data in a
Spanish-languagejournal.The three-factorsolutionhas also been replicatedmorerecently
by Radikeret al. (1988),using the Feagin scale, and by Gorsuch and McPherson (1989)
using the Age Universal scale.2 However, Kirkpatrick(1989b) went a step further by
demonstratingthat these dimensionsrelateddifferentiallyto a numberof other variables.
For example,Ep correlatesmore highly with prayer,while Es correlatesmore highly with
churchattendance.Althoughhe did not successfullyreplicateKirkpatrick'sfactoranalyses,
McFarland(1989b)found the Ep and Es scales to correlatedifferentiallywith discrimina-
tion against various groups.
These results have a number of important implications for the present discussion.
First, the I items (alongwith a few reverse-scoredE items) tended to forma unitary factor
in these analyses, seemingly in contrast to the King and Hunt (1969)results reported
above. However, from a factor-analyticperspective there is no inconsistency here. In the
context of the I-E items alone, the I items correlate with each other more highly than
with E items and so form a unitary factor. In the context of a broaderdiversity of religion
items, the I scale breaks up into its various components, since each item can now "find"
similaritems with which to cluster. Thus a unitary intrinsicfactor is observedonly within
the relatively impoverished context of the E items.
A secondimplicationof these factor-analyticresults is that the Extrinsic scale appears
to tap morethan one type of extrinsic"motivation"for religiousinvolvement.This perhaps
should come as no surprise. If E is intended to represent an orientation involving the
use of religion as a means toward other ends, this clearly invites the follow-upquestion:
a means toward what other ends? The items contained in the Allport scales seem to tap
two such motives or categories of motives, namely social gain and personal comfort/pro-
tection. Interestingly,previous attempts have been made to expand I-E theoreticallyinto
a three-dimensionalframeworknot unlike the I-Ep-Es factor solution (Echemendiaand
Pargament 1982; Fleck 1981).

2. We should point out that other investigators have failed to replicate the three-factorsolution (McFarland
1989b;Radikeret al. 1989).The fact that the three-factorsolution is not highly reliableis not surprisinggiven
the fact that, dependingon the specific pool of I-E items used, the Ep and ES factors are defined by only two
or three items each. Therefore,randomfluctuations (dueto samplingerror)in the values of a few criticalcorrela-
tion coefficients powerfully influence the likelihoodof finding distinct Ep and ES factors.

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I/E ORIENTATION 447

The Intrinsic Scale

If we grant that I does represent some sort of unitary dimension, what exactly is
this dimension?Batson (1976)and Batson and Ventis (1982)have claimedthat it essen-
tially measures a religiousorientationreminiscentof Hoffer's(1951)"truebeliever,"that
is, a "singlemindedness"or rigid adherenceto doctrinalorthodoxy. Batson proposedthe
dimensionof religionas quest to representan aspect of maturereligionwhich, in his view,
was an importantcomponentof Allport's conceptualizationof maturereligionnot tapped
by the Intrinsic scale.3While Donahue (1985b)has arguedthat the "workshopof doubt"
idea is less centralto Ailport'sconceptualizationof maturereligionthan Batson suggests,
Hood (1985)has maintainedthat overcomingdoubt is central to Ailport's conceptualiza-
tion of intrinsic religion. This debate is particularlyinteresting in the present context,
for it points once againto the diversity of theoreticalinterpretationsto whichthe Intrinsic
construct can be (and has been) subjected.
Anotherhint as to what the Intrinsicscale "really"measuresis providedby examina-
tion of the scale's empiricalcorrelates.Gorsuchand McFarland(1972)have demonstrated
that a single item ("Howimportant is your religion to you?")correlateswith the I scale
about as strongly as respective reliabilities will allow. Donahue (1985b)cites four addi-
tional studies in which a meta-analysis revealed a correlationof .76 between I and self-
rated importance of religion or religious commitment. These findings suggest that,
whatever its other psychometric and theoretical properties,the Intrinsic scale behaves
empirically as a measure of "religious commitment" (Donahue 1985b).
We interpret these data as pointing to a weakness of the I-E scales, not a strength.
There is no doubt that strength of religious commitment is an important variable to be
consideredin psychology of religionresearch,but it is a theoretically impoverishedone.
With this conceptualizationwe have wandereda long way from religious orientation as
a personality, cognitive, or motivational construct, and even further from Ailport's rich
theoretical descriptions of mature-immatureand intrinsic-extrinsicreligion. Moreover,
examinationof the scale'sitem content suggests that severalitems areprobablytangential
to the "commitment"interpretation,and that the scale should be modifiedsubstantially
if "religious commitment" is indeed what we intend for it to measure.

The Extrinsic Scale

What is measuredby the Extrinsic scale? Hunt and King (1971)concludedthat the
scale measuresa selfish/utilitarianmotivation for religiousinvolvement:Donahue(1985b:
416) concludedthat E "does a good job of measuringthe sort of religionthat gives religion
a bad name." As described above, Kirkpatrick's(1989b)analyses suggest the presence
of two distinct extrinsic factors, although these are perhaps sufficiently intercorrelated
to justify aggregating them into a single scale for some purposes. (However, as noted

3. A critique of Batson's work is beyond the scope of the present article. Although his three-dimensional
frameworkof InternalEnd,External/Means,and Quest historicallyemergedout of the Ailporttradition,a review
and criticalanalysisof this workwouldtake us far afieldfromthe particularargumentsandissues beingdiscussed
here.

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448 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

earlier,these analyses also show that several "residual"E items clearly do not belong
on the same scale with the Ep and Es items.)
It is important to note that the two extrinsic factors (Ep and Es) described by
Kirkpatrickwere decidedlynot theoreticallyderived.Two distinct E factorswerecertainly
not intended by Ailport (norwere any two factors, for that matter). The appearanceof
"extra"factors shouldproperlybe interpretedas a psychometricdeficiencyof the scales,
not as a substantive researchfinding. It thereforedoes not necessarily follow from these
results that researchersshouldnow begin to focus on, or developexpandedand "improved"
scales for measuring,extrinsic-personaland extrinsic-socialreligiousorientations.Gorsuch
(1988:212)has referredto the I/Ep/Es distinction as the "cutting edge in the utilization
of [the I-E] scales" and has called for improved measurement and additional research
on the Ep and Es dimensions (see also Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). In contrast, we
maintain that a serious approach to researching the topic of motivation for religious
involvement, if motivation is indeed the construct of interest, should begin with a rich
psychological theory of human motivation, not with a psychometric blunder.

Summary

In summary,the Intrinsic dimensionappearsto be poorly definedboth conceptually

and empirically,but in the end it seems to measure the important but theoretically im-
poverishedconstruct of (somethinglike) "religiouscommittment."The Extrinsic dimen-
sion, on the other hand, appears to be fairly well defined as a utilitarian, selfish motiva-
tion for religious involvement, or perhaps two such motives, but it immediatelyleads to
anotherquestion concerningthe specific motive(s)or goal(s)behind this orientation.We
find it very surprising,and ratherdisappointing,that after 20 years of I-E researchthere
has been so little effort to tackle this interesting and fundamentalpsychologicalquestion.
Just as this conceptualizationof E leads immediately to the question, "motivation
for what?,"the conceptualizationof I in terms of strength of commitmentleads (orshould
lead)naturallyto the question, "commitmentto what?"Assessment of a person's degree
of commitmentto a beliefsystem may be quite important,but it seems almost nonsensical
to do so without carefully taking into account the content and nature of the beliefs to
which the person is committed. Perhaps this is not a problem when a research sample
is homogeneouswith respect to beliefcontent, since beliefcontent is in effect "controlled"
in such a sample, but surely it raises questions in a religiouslymore diverse sample. For
example, from a psychologicalperspective, people genuinely (intrinsically)committed to
fundamentalistProtestant beliefs may be very differentfrompeople similarlycommitted
to less conservative beliefs.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN I AND E

A fundamentalstumbling block for the I-E frameworkfrom the very start has been
the question:Do I and E representopposite poles of a single continuum,or two indepen-
dent dimensions?Allport's theory clearly specified bipolaropposites, but the two-factor
theory has predominatedsince the early empiricalwork of Ailport and Ross (1967)and
Feagin (1964).Hoge (1972:370)clearly struck at the heart of the matter when he wrote:

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I/E ORIENTATION 449

"Theresearchertoday is faced with the question - is the weakness of the existing scales
due to Allport'stheoreticalimprecision,or is it due to poorscale constructionwhichallowed
'uninvited' factors to enter into the measurements?There is evidence supporting both
contentions." Hoge's remarksare no less applicabletoday than they were 18 years ago.
The problem has never really been solved.
Although we do not necessarily wish to be apologists for Ailport's earlierposition
regardingI and E as a single bipolardimension,we do believe that the one-factortheory
was abandonedmuch too easily and has never really received a fair empiricaltest. As
noted by Hoge (1972),the lack of fit between theory (onedimension)and data (two dimen-
sions)in Feagin's(1964)factor-analyticresults couldhave beenresolvedeitherby modifying
the theory to accommodatethe empiricalfactor structure, or by modifyingthe item pool
to produce a factor structure more congruent with the theory. Feagin concluded, and
Allport and Ross (1967) concurred,that the evidence proved I and E to be orthogonal
rather than bipolar. Of course, theories should be modified by data, but in this case it
seems that a long history of theoreticalworkwas abandonedon the basis of a single ques-
tionablefactor analysis and an exploratory,untested sample of questionnaireitems.4 As
one of us has argued elsewhere (Kirkpatrick1989b), this seems like an instance of the
tail wagging the dog. Given the rich theoretical work of Ailport, was it really sensible
to abandonthe bipolarconceptualizationso quickly?Few researchersseem to have con-
sideredthe alternative and at least equally plausible conclusionthat the initial I-E item
pool was simply inadequateto assess Allport's constructs. Only Hoge (1972)has taken
up the gauntlet and attempted to create a unidimensionalscale of "intrinsic religious
motivation," focusing on the distinction between ultimate (intrinsic)and instrumental
(extrinsic)religious motivation.
Conceptually,the notion of orthogonal I and E dimensions seems problematic.Of
course, this depends on the precise meanings assigned to I and E, a thorny issue which
has been discussed in some detail above. But if I and E are defined,for example, in terms
of the instrumental-ultimatedistinction used by Hoge (1972), they seem clearly to be
opposites. Can a person hold religion as a primaryvalue and master motive, and at the
same time merely be using religionas a means to other selfish ends? Again, a rich theory
of motivation is required to clarify the issue. For instance, ambivalence is central to
psychodynamicmotivational theories, thus allowing for "mixed" motivations.

Indiscriminate Proreligiousness

In any event, Allport and Ross (1967) discovered that a sizeable number of their
subjects persisted in endorsing both I and E items, and thus proposed a category of
IndiscriminateProreligiousness(IPR) to which these subjects were assigned - in con-
trast to pureIntrinsics(high I, low E) and pureExtrinsics (lowI, high E). Donahue(1985b)
found an overall I vs. E correlationof -.20 in his meta-analysisof existing I-E research.

4. We refer to Feagin's (1964) factor analysis as "questionable"because his methods and results are not
presentedin sufficientdetailto permita carefulcriticalevaluation.For example,the fact that his first two factors
accountedfor only 29% of the total variance suggests that extraction of additionalfactors might have been
warranted,althoughit is difficult to interpret"29%of the variance"without additionaldetails of his procedures.

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450 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

The small magnitude of this correlationimplies, as observed by Ailport and Ross, that
a substantial numberof subjects do endorse both I and E items, but what exactly does
this pattern of indiscriminateproreligiousnessmean?Several alternativeinterpretations
are possible, but each has important shortcomings.
First, the IPR category (which might be operationally defined in any number of
ways - see below) might be interpreted as simply a third type of religious orientation
towardreligion,in much the same way as androgynyhas been defined as a third psycho-
logical sex-roleorientationalong with masculinity and femininity(Spenceand Helmreich
1978). The problemwith this interpretationis that, as we have seen, this third orienta-
tion is not easily accommodatedtheoretically. In contrast, androgyny (scoring high on
both masculinity and femininity)is not self-contradictorybecause the two dimensions
were conceptualizedand deliberatelyoperationalizedas orthogonal rather than bipolar
constructs. Our conceptualizationof the meaning of I and E orientations would need to
be modifiedconsiderablyto make room for a third IPR category as a meaningful,alter-
native orientation toward religion.
Ailport himself opted for a second alternative.Rather than cast IPR as a third orien-
tation towardreligionper se, Allportand Ross (1967)interpretedthe IPR responsepattern
as a response set bias or cognitive style somewhat akin to Rokeach's (1960) construct
of dogmatism. Their reasoning seemed to suggest that the IPR category represents a
qualitatively differentkind of variablefrom that reflected in the I and E categories. Un-
fortunately,however,this makes for a ratheruntidy conceptual/psychometricframework.
Among people who are classified as Intrinsics or Extrinsics, we are measuring an orien-
tation toward religion;for people who are classified as IPR, however, we are measuring
"cognitive style." Logically this seems roughly analogous to classifying people into the
three categories of Introverts, Extroverts, and Auto Mechanics. The confounding of
cognitive style or response set with the I-E constructs themselves adds further concep-
tual confusion to an already clouded picture (see McCallister1988 for a treatment of I,
E, and IPR in cognitive terms).
Pargamentet al. (1987)have taken a relatedapproachin suggesting that indiscriminate
proreligiousnessis a usefulconstructin its own right and have proposeda scale formeasur-
ing it directlyratherthan as a by-productof the I-E scales. Theirscale appearsto measure,
in effect, a social desirabilityresponse set specific to religionand thereforeseems concep-
tually distinct fromthe Intrinsic-Extrinsicframework.Pargamentet al. (1987)recognized
this in noting, "It is surprising... that efforts to deal with this problemhave beenlargely
limited to work in the specific area of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation."We
agree that the assessment of response-set biases or artifacts in religion measures is an
importantproblem,and that the approachsuggested by Pargament et al. may prove to
be a useful one. However,their conceptualizationand operationalizationof indiscriminate
proreligiousnessseem sufficientlydistinct fromthe I-E frameworkper se that it probably
warrantsa distinct label.This is theoreticallya more elegant solutionthan Ailport's,since
it defines and measures the response-set or cognitive style variable independently of
religious orientation rather than confounding the two constructs. Nevertheless, this
solution does not solve the problemof what to do with those "muddleheads"who score
high on both I and E.

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I/E ORIENTATION 451

The Fourfold Typology

This problemof what to do with subjects who endorse both I and E items has never
been solved satisfactorily.The most popularsolutioninvolves dichotomizingthe two scales
into "low" and "high" categories and then creating the well-knownfourfold typology.
However,this solutionsuffersfroma numberof interrelatedconceptualand methodological
problems.
First among these concerns is the fundamentalissue of "types" or class variables
versus continuous dimensions or dimensional variables. In most areas of contemporary
psychology,and particularlypersonalityresearch,individualdifferencesare conceptualized
almost exclusively in terms of dimensions rather than types. Discrete categories (for
example, introverts and extroverts) are sometimes employed as a matter of convenience
to illustrateopposingpoles of a continuum,but ultimatelythe underlying(latent)variables
are typically conceived as continuous dimensions. This perspective fits naturally with
most commonsensenotions of individualdifferences:We think of peopleas "moreor less"
(that is, as a matter of degree) fastidious, intelligent, warm, and so forth. Although we
might describe someone as a shy person, as if to imply that people are either shy or not
shy, what we usually mean is that the person falls toward the shy pole of a continuum.
With some reflectionwe couldprobablythink of other individualswho are somewhatmore
shy, or slightly less shy, than this person. In psychologicalresearch,this conceptualiza-
tion is reflectedin the 5-, 7-, or n-point responsescales whichcomprisemost psychometric
instruments.
Under certain conditions,however,reasonableargumentscan be made that a (latent)
variable is "truly" discrete. Defending such a position empiricallyis rather a difficult
and complexmatter rarelyattemptedin personalityresearch.(See Gangestad and Snyder
1985 for an exceptionand a detailedanalysis of these issues.)A seriousdefenseof religious
orientation as a "true" class variable, however, has yet to be undertaken.There is no
obvious empiricalevidence to support I and E as types: For example, the Intrinsic and
Extrinsic scales do not tend to producethe kind of bimodalfrequencydistributions one
would expect if there really were two types being imperfectly measured by continuous
scales. Again, this reflects our commonsensenotion that people vary along a continuum
with respect to their level or degree of personal commitment to religion, or the extent
to which they rely on religion for personal or social rewards.
We suspect instead that most I-E researchers,like other personality researchers,
generally utilize types merely as a matter of convenience, usually in order to employ
analysis of variance (ANOVA)for assessing possible statistical interactions between I
and E. However, this approachsuffers from two important drawbacks.First, collapsing
a continuous variable into a dichotomy discards a tremendous amount of information.
Arbitrary dichotomization of a continuous variable results in a considerable loss of
statistical power (Cohen1983 as cited in Pargament et al. 1987). Second, dichotomizing
the I and E scales precludesthe possibility of assessing curvilinearrelationshipsbetween
I and E and other variables (Pargament et al. 1987).
Another majorproblem,which is simultaneously theoretical and methodological,is
that there is no obvious basis for choosing cutpoints. The commonly used median-split
approachis problematicfrom a methodologicalstandpoint because the variation in cut-

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452 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

points across populationsattenuates the comparabilityof results across studies. A more

theoreticalproblemis that this procedureforces approximatelyhalf of any sample to be
classified as "high intrinsic," whether it consists of secular university students, funda-
mentalist ministers,or participantsat an AmericanAtheists convention.Donahue(1985b)
has recommendedusing the theoreticalmidpoints of the scales rather than the medians,
but this approachmay produce empty cells or, in the extreme, no variance at all. For
example, all subjects in a highly religious sample might be classified as Intrinsic. (It is
interestingto note in this regardthat Ailporthimselfexpectedno morethan 10%of people
to be true Intrinsics).Watson et al. (1989)have recommendeda variation of the median-
split approachutilizing"localnorms"- that is, mediansbased on a wide range of regional
samples rather than on the medians of individualsamples. However, this solution bears
the same shortcomingsof the median-splitapproachand similarlylacks a cleartheoretical
foundation.
In general, then, the convenienceof workingwith types comes at the cost of a host
of methodologicaland theoreticalproblems.Moreover,it is not clearwhat is actuallygained
from the typology. If researchersare interested in testing for I-E statistical interactions,
this can be accomplishedwith a crossproductterm in multipleregressionanalysis rather
than with a 2 X 2 ANOVA. Whether or not such interactions are important from a
statistical standpoint (that is, whether they account for a significant and/or substantial
amountof variancein other measures)is an empiricalquestion.Whethersuch interactions
shouldbe expected,and how they areto be interpreted,is quite anothermatter,one leading
directly back to the various theoretical concerns discussed above.
All this is not to say that a case for types in I-E researchcannot be made but only
that it has yet to be done. In light of the statistical drawbacksinvolved in arbitrarily
dichotomizingcontinuousvariables,the long history of measuringI and E as continuous
measureswith multi-itemscales, and the prevailingpro-dimensional(anti-type)sentiment
in contemporaryresearchpsychology,we believethe burdenis on those who wish to utilize
types to demonstrate their greater utility over continuous scales.

EP, Es, and ER

Kirkpatrick's(1989b)analyses of the I-E scales shed some new light on the I-E inter-
correlationand the issue of indiscriminateproreligiousness.These results revealed that
(1) the Extrinsic-Personaland Extrinsic-Socialitems/scales are uncorrelatedwith I, but
(2) several of the "residual"items correlatestrongly and negatively with I and load with
I items in factoranalyses.It is these latter items whose contentindeedappearsto represent
the negationof I items. Examplesof such items include"AlthoughI am a religiousperson,
I refuse to let religious considerationsinfluencemy everyday affairs" and "Although I
believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life." These
data demonstrate that the negative correlationbetween I and E is due entirely to the
misplacementof these reversedI items on the E scale - that is, a psychometricdeficiency.
If these items were moved from the E scale to the I scale and reverse-scored,I and E
would be orthogonal rather than negatively correlated.
These residual E items were undoubtedly the ones Ailport had in mind when he
referredto the indiscriminatelyproreligiousas "muddleheads":People endorsing these

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I/E ORIENTATION 453

items as well as I items would indeed seem to be logically contradicting themselves.

However,given the strong inverse correlationbetween these items and I, it appearsthat
few subjects endorsed both these reversed I items and the nominal I items, a finding
anticipated by Donahue (1985a). Instead, the fact that Ep and Es were essentially
orthogonalto I suggests that most subjects who would be classified as indiscriminately
proreligious(basedon median splits of I and E) are probablythose who endorseEp and/or
Es items in addition to I. It is these Ep and Es items to which Pargament et al. (1987)
referredin arguing that there are many instances of I and E items for which endorse-
ment of both would not be logically inconsistent. Perhaps there is nothing inconsistent
about simultaneouslysaying that you are genuinelycommittedto your religion,and that
you also derive comfort and/orsocial relationshipsfrom religious belief and involvement.
Along the same lines, Echemendia and Pargament (1982) have argued that individuals
who score high on the two scales may both "live" and "use" their religion.
Anotherintriguingtwist has been providedrecently by Kennedyand Gorsuch(1989),
who reported results from a Gallup survey in which single-item measures of I, Ep, and
Es were included in a national probability sample of more than 1,000 respondents. In
these data, Ep and Es were mutually orthogonal (r = .01), whereas I and Ep were
positively correlated(r = .40). We have also found this pattern in some of our own un-
published data. These findings are extremely problematic both for the prevailing two-
factor theory (accordingto which Ep and Es should be highly intercorrelated,as they
together comprise a unitary factor) and for Ailport's original bipolar conceptualization
(accordingto which I and Ep should be negatively correlated).
In summary, it appears that the inverse correlationbetween the existing I and E
scales is due primarilyto a subset of misplaceditems on the Extrinsic scale.The remaining
E items, those focusingon personaland socialfactors, are orthogonalto (oreven positively
correlatedwith) I. Examination of item content suggests that there is no logical incon-
sistency implied by the endorsement of these Ep or Es items along with I items. There-
fore, to the extent that the IPR category is composed of individualswho simultaneously
endorse I and Ep/Es items, indiscriminateproreligiousnessdoes not requirean explana-
tion in terms of responseset, cognitive style, or the like. (It is possiblethat a smallnumber
of "muddleheads"do endorse both I and reversed I items, however, and for these
respondents an explanation in terms of cognitive style or response bias may be appro-
priate.) Instead, the scales simply appearto measure quite independentdimensions, and
they are not the dimensions Allport proposed.This again leads back to the question:two
dimensions of what?

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN I-E AND OTHER VARIABLES

It might be argued that in spite of the theoretical and psychometric shortcomings

of I-E discussed above, the frameworkhas still been more of a boon than a bane to the
psychology of religion,based on the sheer volume of researchit has produced.However,
it seems to us that the large numberof publishedand unpublishedstudies in which these
scales have been used have not really advanced the state of knowledge in the field very
much at all. What have we learned from this research?

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454 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

According to Donahue (1985b:415),I seems to correlate well with other religion

variables (e.g., orthodoxy, church attendance),but "by itself it seems to correlate with
little besides other measures of religiousness."The reason for this, we suggest, may lie
in the "hodgepodge"nature of the scale as describedby Gorsuch(1984):Because the scale
taps various religious behaviors,values, and attitudes, it would be expected to correlate
with external measuresof these same components.This interpretationis consistent with
the factor-analyticresults reportedby King and Hunt (1969)indicatingthat in the context
of a large pool of religion-relateditems, the I items scatter themselves across a variety
of other factors rather than forming a unitary dimension of their own. Alternatively, it
might be argued that the I scale simply measures religious commitment, and religious
commitment (not surprisingly)correlates with other indicators of religious involvement
and belief.
In either case, though, the consistent finding of positive correlationsbetween I and
other measures of religiousness represents at best a measure of concurrentvalidity, not
a substantive scientific finding. On the other hand, it might be argued that the many
negative results that have been reported,accordingto which I fails to correlatewith other
psychologicalvariables,themselves representan importantfinding:Perhapsthis indicates
that religion (orwhatever the I scale measures)is in fact independentof other behavioral
and attitudinalvariablesin whichpsychologists are interested.This seems to us unlikely,
however; these negative results are probably traceable instead to psychometric and
conceptual weaknesses.
In contrast, the E scale tends to be essentially uncorrelatedwith other measures of
religiousness and instead is empirically related to a variety of "socially undesirable"
individual-differencevariables such as prejudice,dogmatism, and trait anxiety (Donahue
1985b).These are indeedthe kinds of variablesin whichmany psychologists are interested.
However, this pattern of results raises the question of whether the E scale is really
measuringreligionat all. Instead, the scale may simply be tapping, ratherinadvertently,
individual differences in more pervasive personality or cognitive characteristics, with
religionmerely providingthe vehicle or manifestationof this trait (whateverit might be).
Moreover, these empirical correlations, particularly between I-E and personality
measures,tend to be rather small, in the .20-.30 range. Although it might be arguedthat
such values are typical for much social science research, we should expect to do better
after 20 years of research with the scale. Studies employing measures of religion other
than I-E frequently show that other measures do better than I-E in predicting other
variables.For example,fundamentalism/orthodoxyis a better predictorof prejudicethan
is either I or E (McFarland1989b).This suggests that either (1) we should be focusing
more on these other variables and less on I-E, or at least (2) I and E are not very useful
unless these other variables are also taken into account. Again, this suggests the need
to consider belief content as well as religious "orientation."
Given the long history of the theory and the scales, we believe researchersshould
be disappointed that little else of theoretical interest has been uncovered in research
utilizing I-E.

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I/E ORIENTATION 455

POPULATIONS AND SAMPLING

The selection of populations(and samples thereof)to be studied is of course a central

concernin any empiricalresearch,including researchin the psychology of religion.This
issue is particularlyproblematicwith respect to the religious orientationscales, because
many items are written in such a way as to be essentially meaningless or not applicable
to nonreligiousrespondents.For example,questions beginningwith phrases such as "The
prayers I say when I am alone .. ." or "Onereason for my being a church member . . ."
presupposethat the respondentprays or belongs to a church.This concernled Donahue
(1985b)to suggest the need for a version of the I-E scales that would be appropriatefor
administrationto nonreligioussubjects. From a methodologicalstandpoint,this problem
is commonlyresolvedby discarding(ornot collectingin the first place)data from subjects
who are somehow classified as nonreligious.Presumably we would want to define such
a criterionindependentlyof I and E. Recall, however, that the I scale tends to correlate
with most other measures of religiousness. As a result, nearly any criterion for subject
selectionwill be approximatelyequivalentto restrictingthe sampleto moderate-and high-
scorers on the I scale.
This would perhaps be only a minor methodologicalnuisance were it not for some
deeperconceptualproblems.The first issue is the questionof whetherintrinsicand extrinsic
orientationsare meaningfulconstructs at all for nonreligiousindividuals.The secondissue
concernsdifferencesin the meanings of the "indiscriminate"categories in samples which
are or are not restricted to religious subjects.
One way to conceptualize religious orientation is to restrict it, by definition, to
"religious"individuals.The problemof defining"religious"independentlyof I and E not-
withstanding, this approachbegins with the premise that one cannot be orientedintrin-
sically or extrinsically toward religion unless one is "religious"in the first place. Given
that one is religious, is one genuinely (intrinsically)committed to those beliefs, or is one
using those beliefs as a means to other (secular)ends? Ailport's originalbipolar scheme
appearedto be defined in this way: In effect it divided religious people into two types
or two ends of a continuum.Although Allport and Ross (1967)foundtheir tidy framework
to be threatened by the near-orthogonalityof the I and E scales, they never abandoned
the fundamental assumption that the scheme is applicable only within religious (e.g.,
churchgoing)populations.
An alternative conceptualizationof I-E is one in which each dimensionis defined as
a continuumfrom "not at all" to "very,"where "not at all" on each dimensionrepresents
nonreligiousindividuals. From this perspective it would be entirely appropriateto use
heterogeneoussamples includingboth religiousand nonreligiousindividuals;in fact, such
sampling would typically be desirable in order to examine the entire range of each
dimension. It is only in light of this conceptualizationthat revised scales would be re-
quired for use with nonreligiousrespondents, as recommendedby Donahue (1985b).If
this stance is adopted, it makes little sense to restrict samples to religious respondents;
this serves only to attenuate the magnitudeof correlationsbetween I and other variables.
Apart from methodologicaland statistical issues, the differencebetween these alter-
native perspectives is critical because in researchapplications(i.e.,the calculationof cor-
relations, regression coefficients, and differencesbetween means) the meaning of "high"

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456 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

and "low"scores on I and E is definedrelative to the sample at hand. A particularscore

on the I scale, for example, may be very low in a highly religious sample but very high
in a more heterogeneoussample. The meaning of correlationsand regression weights is
similarly dependent on the mean and variance of scores within the given sample. The
correlationbetween I and another variable within a churchgoing sample represents, in
effect, the differencebetween highly religious and moderatelyreligious individuals;in a
more heterogeneous sample, the same correlationrepresents a comparisonof religious
versus nonreligioussubjects. These two correlations,if similarin value, would have rather
different theoretical implications.
The issue becomes particularlysalient when one considers classification of subjects
into the fourfoldtypology, particularlywith respect to the indiscriminatelyantireligious
(ornonreligious)category. If the construct of religiousorientationis restrictedto religious
populations, what does it mean for a "religious"person (as defined by some external
criterion)to be neither intrinsicallynor extrinsically oriented?This seems to us a rather
unsettling question that has been almost completely overlooked in the confusion
surroundingindiscriminateproreligiousness.Ailport and Ross (1967)solved the problem
by not using this category at all: They simply noted that in their sample, which was
restrictedto churchgoers,"suchcases are not found."Had a median-splitprocedurebeen
used to generate a fourfoldtypology, however,such cases would indeedhave been found,
but how would they have been interpreted?Few subsequent researchershave utilized
this particular solution to the problem, but conceptually (if not methodologically)it is
at least supportedby a clear rationale(see Hood 1978). In a more heterogeneouspopula-
tion or sample, in contrast, the IndiscriminatelyAntireligious category is clearly inter-
pretable as including nonreligious individuals.
Most researchin the field today (includingour own)tends to employ a samplingpro-
cedure that is implicitly or explicitly groundedin the formerof these two conceptualiza-
tions; that is, it is assumed that studying religious orientationis meaningfulonly in the
context of a popuiationof religiousindividuals.As long as I and E areorthogonal,however,
it is necessary to confront these conceptual issues more directly. The complete fourfold
typology may be of limited utility in highly religious populations, or at least in need of
careful reinterpretation. Any attempts to improve the scales - in order to restore
bipolarity, to make the scales appropriatefor nonreligiousindividuals, or for any other
reason - need to begin by considering these general theoretical problems.

META-THEORETICALISSUES

Value-ladennessof the Constructs

Another problemwith I-E, in our view, is that it is part of a long tradition of distinc-
tions between "good religion"and "bad religion."In the words of Dittes (1971:375),the
I-E distinction carries "a heavy contrabandload of value judgment that simply will not
be sloughed off." Dittes addedthat this weakness of the I-E typology (as well as the lack
of theoreticalclaritymentionedabove)exists becauseits developershave been "principally
concernedabout the purity of religion, not about the purity of concept" (375). He refers
to Ailport's approachas "prophetic,"by which he means "being animated principally

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I/E ORIENTATION 457

by passionfor socialvalues andreligiousintegrityand ... confoundingthese value concerns

with conceptual analysis" (378).
AlthoughDonahue's(1985b:401)objectionto Dittes's scathingreviewof I-E as "based
on purist, logical positivist views of science and ad hominems against Ailport" is duly
noted, Dittes did in fact identify an importantproblem.The I-E distinctionhas the effect
of differentiatinggood (pure)religion from bad religion (contaminatedby base motives)
in a mannerthat appearsboundto cause difficulties for a scientific approachto religious
belief and behavior.Researchersin most areas of psychologicalresearchhave to grapple
with their own personal beliefs and biases and the effects these biases potentially exert
on their theories,data interpretation,and so forth. This problemis perhapsnowheremore
obvious and more challenging than in the psychology of religion, wherepersonal beliefs
and agendas may be especially strong and deeply felt. Underthese circumstances,value-
laden theoretical frameworksseem particularlydangerous and potentially threatening
to the integrity of scientific activity. Although the currentZeitgeist recognizesthat true
objectivity in science is unattainable(andperhapsnot even desirable),highly value-laden
models seem likely to complicate matters unnecessarily, particularly if they are not
recognizedas such (see Watson et al. 1990).
This potential problem does not in itself make the typology wrong, of course, but
it does represent a serious concernin the realm of scientific discourse and may inhibit
scientific progress in insidious ways. For instance, it might be tempting, once religion
is vindicatedwith respect to the chargeof fosteringracialprejudice(i.e.,"good"[intrinsic]
religionis not correlatedwith prejudice,but "bad"[extrinsic]religionis), to look no further.
In fact, it is only quite recently that the possibility of a positive correlationbetween
intrinsic religious orientation and certain kinds of prejudiceor discriminationhas been
recognized(Herek1987;McFarland1989b).We suspect that one reasonfor the belatedness
of this discovery is that researchersmay not have been eager to smudge the otherwise
favorablerecord of intrinsic religion. Similarly, the good-baddistinction makes it easy
simply to pile up researchresults documentingthe fact that E correlateswith "badstuff"
and I correlateswith "good stuff" (orat least is uncorrelatedwith the "badstuff"),rather
than devoting attentionto moredynamicand potentiallymorefruitfultheoreticalavenues.
In his 1989 William James Award address, Peter Benson noted this long tradition
of good-badreligious typologies, including I-E (or more obviously, "mature-immature")
as well as James's (1902)religionof the sick-souledand of the healthy-minded.Unsatisfied
with this value-laden approach, Benson argued for an alternative conceptualization
describedvariously as individual-preservingversus community-building,agentic versus
communal,and horizontalversus vertical. This framework,and many others like it that
could be (or alreadyhave been) developed, seem to us to show much greater promise for
getting beyond"good-bad"religionto a richer,moredynamic,and heuristicallymoreuseful
approachto individual differences in religious belief and behavior.

Limitations of the Content-FreeApproach to Religion

Whetherone dimensionor two (orthree),I-E has always been intendedas a "content-

free" measure of religious orientation - that is, a frameworkof religious involvement
independentof specificbelief content. Gorsuch(1984)referredto this as the "functional,"

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458 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

and Benson (1989)as the "process"approachto definingreligion.This orientationcertainly

offers some advantages,since it permitsthe investigationof psychologicaland sociological
similaritiesin process and function across a variety of domains of specific belief content.
Functionaldefinitionsof funidamentalismindependentof specific beliefcontent (e.g.,Pro-
testant Christian)arewidelyused for this reason(Kirkpatricket al., in press;Lechner1989).
However,equallyimportantshortcomingsof such an approachneedalso be considered.
By focusing on how people believe, we can easily overlookthe importanceof what they
believe, and trying to understand "how" without considering "what" may be uninfor-
mative or even misleading. In the case of fundamentalism,for example, we have argued
elsewhere(Hood 1983:173)that although the "kind of" approachmay have some scien-
tific utility, "this approachremainsonly a proximate solution, since ultimately both the
content and the source of beliefs must at some point be confronted."We would argue
that this is equally true of other approachesto definingreligionindependentlyof specific
belief content, including I-E.
For example, much research has shown the Intrinsic dimension to be essentially
uncorrelatedwith racial prejudice (Donahue 1985b). Yet as noted above, more recent
research has shown I to be positively correlatedwith certain other kinds of prejudice,
such as discriminationagainst homosexuals (Herek 1987; McFarland 1989b) and Com-
munists (McFarland1989b).Similarly,Griffinet al. (1987)found I to be significantly cor-
relatedwith prejudiceagainst Rastafariansamong Seventh-DayAdventists on the island
of St. Croix. As suggested by Herek, these findings underscorethe need to take into
account the content of the belief system to which a person is intrinsically committed.
McFarland(1989b)showed that the positive correlationsbetween I and discrimination
against homosexuals and Communists vanished when fundamentalism/orthodoxywas
statistically controlled.
Batson and Ventis (1982) claimed, as noted previously, that the Intrinsic scale
measures to a large extent a "true believer" orientation to religion. If we put aside
psychometricissues for the moment,it may be that a truly intrinsic orientation(commit-
ment) to an orthodox or fundamentalistbelief system is representedby Hoffer's (1951)
"true believer,"but that an intrinsic orientation (commitment)to a less dogmatic belief
system is not. In other words, the degree to which the intrinsic dimensionrepresents a
"true believer" stance may be a matter of belief content rather than an independent,
content-freedimension. (See Kirkpatricket al., in press, for a related discussion.)
Recent researchhas taken some useful steps in this direction.For example, Watson
et al. (1989)examinedthe relationshipof depressionboth to I-E and to beliefs about grace
and guilt. This approachtakes a step toward bringing together issues of belief content
and content-independent dimensionsof religiousness.It is interestingto note in the present
context that while the results showedthe Intrinsicscale to be (inversely)relatedto depres-
sion, beliefs about grace were consistently a stronger predictorof depressionthan were
religious orientation variables.

I-E AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PSYCHOLOGYOF RELIGION

In one sense, the I-E frameworkand measurementscales have certainlybeen a boon

to the field in generating research.Gorsuch(1988:210)referredto I and E as "the most

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I/E ORIENTATION 459

empiricallyuseful definitionsof religion";Donahue(1985b:400)concludedthat the nearly

70 published studies using the ROS make it "one of the most frequentlyused measures
of religiousness."We feel, however,that much of this researchhas been theoreticallyim-
poverishedand only of marginalvalue in increasingour understandingof the psychology
of religion. We invite the readerto think about all the I-E researchhe or she has heard
or read about in recentyears, and imagineexplainingwhat has been learnedto a colleague
in another field. Would you be surprised if the colleague replied, "Is that all?"
In ourview, the psychologyof religionhas madelittle progressin the last two decades,
and in some ways the I-E "paradigm"has been part of the problemrather than part of
the solution. Specifically,we believe that the existence of an I-E paradigmmay have had
the effect of lullingmany researchersinto a false sense of securityregardingthe theoretical
significance of some of their research efforts. Dittes (1971),Hunt and King (1971),and
Hoge (1972)all recommendednearly 20 years ago that it was time to go beyond the I-E
scales and develop richer theoretical and methodologicalapproachesto the psychology
of religion;but few have taken their advice to heart.
We believe that if researchers carefully considered the issue of what I and E are
intended to measure (e.g., motivation, personality, etc.), and decided which aspect they
were interested in studying, they would almost surely not use the I-E frameworkto con-
ceptualizeit or the I-E scales to measure it. For example, if we are interested in motiva-
tional questions ("Whyare people religious?"),we should begin with a rich psychological
theory concerning motivation, and then explore the ways in which various aspects of
religious belief and involvement may relate to these. Pargament (1990)has argued for
the utility of a functionalapproachinvolving a typology of provisions religion may offer
to individualsin different contexts. If we are interested in personality issues, we should
begin with a rich personality theory and begin to develop some of the implications of
the theory for religious belief and behavior. Ironically,Allport's own writings might be
one good place to start.
We do not believe that the solution to these problemsis simply a matter of further
refinementof the existing I-E scales. Just because Kirkpatrick's(1989b)analyses point
to the existence of distinct extrinsic-personaland extrinsic-socialfactors, for example,
doesn't necessarilymean that revising our scales to measurethese dimensionsbetter will
prove fruitful. These particularfactors just happened to emerge from the specific item
pool developedby Allport and his colleagues;their emergenceas distinct factors was very
much an accident.To pursue this avenue based on nothing more than the factor-analytic
results would, in our estimation, be an example of the tail continuing to wag the dog.
If a suitable theoretical motivation can be constructed to support such an undertaking,
that would be anothermatter. However, it seems to us that there is far greater potential
in stepping back for a moment and consideringthe variety of avenues open to us before
racing headlong down this path.
As arguedby Kirkpatrick(1989b),the latest psychometricfindingsleave threepossible
avenues open to I-E researchers.The first of these would be to bring I-E theory into line
with the three-dimensionalfactor-analyticsolution and to develop improvedinstruments
for measuring Ep and Es as distinct dimensions. However, we believe that this would
repeat the error made by Allport and others 20 years ago, namely, to abandon theory
on the basis of the performanceof a poorly constructed scale. Unless strong theoretical

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460 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

argumentscan be made for retaining a three-factorI/Ep/Es scale, Kirkpatrick's(1989b)

results should be interpreted as pointing to a psychometric deficiency rather than as a
substantive scientific advance. Although Kirkpatrick(1989b)regardedthis as the least
preferable alternative, it is this path that researchers are already beginning to follow
(Gorsuchand McPherson 1989; Kennedy and Gorsuch 1989; McFarland 1989b).
Instead, we recommendthat future researchbe orientedtoward one of the other two
alternativesoutlinedin Kirkpatrick(1989b).If researcherswish to take seriouslyAliport's
theorizing about intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, the current scales should
be abandonedin favor of a new pool of items. New scales should be carefullyconstructed
in orderto conformto a clearly definedtheoreticalframework,whetherthis involves one,
two, or ten factors. Allport's own items have proved to be poor measures of the I-E
constructs as he defined them theoretically.Recent analyses demonstratethat the items
are also inadequate for measuring the revised two-factor framework.
The final alternative,and the one we recommend,involvesreconceptualizingthe entire
theoreticalapproachand consideringalternativeframeworksfor studyingreligiousmotiva-
tion, belief, and behavior.Social psychology and personality psychology offer a plethora
of rich theoretical traditions (but also many impoverishedones), which psychologists of
religion have yet to tap. In our own work, for example, we have just begun to explore
the treasuretroves of attachmenttheory (Kirkpatrick1989a;Kirkpatrickand Shaver1990)
and Rokeach'stheoryof the openandclosedmind(Hoodand Kirkpatrick1989;Kirkpatrick
et al., in press) as potentially fruitful theoretical frameworksfor investigating religion.
Otherpowerfultheories that appearuseful to the psychology of religionhave barely had
their surfaces scratched,such as the well-known"just world"hypothesis (Pargamentand
Hahn 1986),theories of stress and coping (Pargament1988, 1990),and attributiontheory
(Spilka et al. 1985).
In short, we need strong theory to motivate and guide our researchin the psychology
of religion.Simplydocumentingcorrelationcoefficientsbetweenour favoritereligionscales
and miscellaneousindividualdifferencevariablesdoes not good researchmake. To begin
to tap the vast array of available theoretical resources would, in our estimation, make
the psychology of religion a much more interesting and dynamic field, as well as bring
it closer to other areas of research psychology from which it is currently estranged.

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