Dabalos vs.

Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City (Pampanga)

FACTS:

• Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders of the (RTC) of
Angeles City, Branch 59 which denied petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.

• Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information: x x x the above- named accused, being then the boyfriend of the
complainant, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence [on]
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4ςrνl1

• RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest. The latter posted a cash
bond and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with
Motion to Quash the Information.

• Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a
dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.

• In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner
but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading
rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the
latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied petitioner's
motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties' dating relationship had ceased prior to
the incident.

ISSUES:

W/n the act of petitioner which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed
was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he
has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in
or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.6ςrνl1

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of
such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for
as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court
cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence
should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity7 because there is no
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under
RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for
prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more
severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had
a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a
dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the
petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsen

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu
where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint
since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being
an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that
Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the
foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.
Go-Tan vs. Tan

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of conspiracy under the RPC is applicable to RA 9262. Therefore, offenders
under such law are not limited to those related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; but also include those acting in conspiracy with them.

QUICK FACTS: Wife prays for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against her husband and
parents-in-law. Respondents herein are only the parents-in-law as they are contending that they cannot
be instituted as respondents in this case as they are not covered by RA 9262.

FACTS:

Contested Law: RA 9262

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Out of this union,
two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner Go-Tan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light
of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC
can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
Respondent’s Contention: Spouses Tan’s were contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. They submit
that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender
should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this
Court in a petition for review.

TC - Granted respondent spouses Motion To Dismiss and issued a resolution dismissing the
case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius."

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW

OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".

HELD: YES.

RATIO: The ratio of the SC is anchored on the 4 points below:

(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as

"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable
laws, shall have suppletory application.

(2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another.

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
 (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x

(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally

or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x

(4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and their children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here.

Ang vs. Court of Appeals

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRSH SAGUD, Respondents,

Facts:

Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when the latter learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Prior to the marriage of Rustan, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him. Irish
rejected the proposal and changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it
and sent her text messages, using the following numbers: 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied
to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish
received through multimedia message (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with
Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was
0921-8084768, one of the numbers Rustan used. Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures and threatened to spread the picture through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish was: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa
lahat ng chatter.” Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
the police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the
picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan if he could meet her at Lorentess Resort. Rustan came
with a motorcycle and was arrested by the police upon walking towards Irish. The police searched him
and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC found Irish’s testimony
completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. Thus the RTC found Rustan guilty of
the said crime. Rustan appealed but denied, then raised the case to the higher court.

Issues:

Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture pasted with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in
violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

1) Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in
RA 9262
2) Whether or not a single act of harassment, like sending the nude picture in this case, constitutes
a violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262
3) Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4) Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case

Held:

1) Yes. Dating relationship as defined in Section 3 “refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

2) Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence
against women.This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would
be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that
is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

3) No. Prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of the arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to
prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during pre-trial
conference. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text message to Irish.

4) The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

The court AFFIRMED the decision of RTC

Dinamling vs. People

Facts:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal information for violation of R.A. No. 9262. It is
alleged in the information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence upon a woman with whom he
has two children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public humiliation by repeated verbal and
emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterance directed against the victim. Dinamling
pleaded not guilty to both charges.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262.

Ruling:
The elements of the crime are;

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child.
As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode.
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or
similar acts or omissions.

In this case, the elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that thevictim is a
woman who has then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had two common children.
The woman is often in fear of petitioner due to latter’s physical and verbal abuse.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (RA No. 9262) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. It is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as the element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of
the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is
necessary to present a testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA
9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done, petitioner Dinamling's
acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of
physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they
resulted in the victim’s public ridicule. Accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional
suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical
violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual
bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the
victim's mental or emotional well-being.