JAIME JOVEN and REYNALDO C. RASING vs. ATTYS.
Sevilla’s violation of Rule IV of the Rules
PABLO R. CRUZ and FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III
A.C. No. 7686 July 31, 2013
Facts: On July 16, 2007, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) rendered a decision. Joven's counsel,
Atty. Solon R. Garcia, received their copy of the decision
on August 14, 2007. As to respondents, they received a
copy of the decision on August 24, 2007 based on the
Registry Return Receipt 2 that was sent back to the NLRC.
Joven and Rasing filed a disbarment case against Attys.
Cruz and Magsalin III for deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and falsification of public documents as they
alleged that respondents made an alteration of the true
date of their actual receipt with the intention of extending
by ten days the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON respondents should be disbarred.
Ruling: No. The Court dismissed the disbarment case for
lack of merit. The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always
rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh
penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is
innocent of the charges made against him until the
contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an
officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P.
REVILLA, JR.
A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013
Facts: Atty. Quirino Revilla, Jr. notarized a complain-
affidavit signed by Heneraline Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas
Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister
of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Sevilla’s wife. Bernard
Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla is
disqualified to perform notarial acts per Section 3, Rule IV
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He also complains
that Atty. Revilla did not require the three affiants in the
complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
Atty. Revilla did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s
material allegations.
Issue: W/N the singe act of notarizing the complaint-
affidavit of relatives within the court civil degree of
affinity, and, at the same time, not requiring them to
present valid identification cards is a ground for
disbarment.
Ruling: No. Atty.
on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground for
disbarment. Given the clear provision of the
disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla to act
with prudence and refused notarizing the document.
Furthermore, if the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to show their valid
identification cards.
ROLANDO E. CAWALING, ET AL. vs. NAPOLEON M.
MENESE
A.C. No. 9698 November 13, 2013
Facts: Complainants were employees of Bacman
Geothermal, Inc. (Bacman), who were dismissed from their
employment. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Bacman Geothermal, Inc., Danilo G. Catigtig,
Ernesto Espinosa and Oscar. The Labor Arbiter declared
them to be illegally dismissed. Bacman appealed. The
appeal was raffled to the Second Division of the NLRC
where respondents were sitting as Commissioners. There
being a monetary award in the decision, Bacman posted a
supersede as bond issued by Intra Strata Assurance
Corporation (Intra Strata). Intra Strata stated that their
certification of accreditation and
authority from the Supreme Court had expired but their
application for renewal is pending before the Supreme
Court. Complainants assailed the regularity of the surety
bond alleging that Intra Strata no longer has the authority
to issue the surety bond. Complainants averred that the
acts of respondents in allowing the filing of appeal bond of
Bacman despite the expired accreditation of Intra Strata
constitute gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law and procedure. They pray that respondents be
disbarred or be imposed with the appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. Respondents denied the charges and
accusations against them. Respondents explained that
contrary to the claims of the complainants, the appeal
bond is existing and valid.
Issue: W/N the respondents should be disbarred.
Ruling: No. Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution, only for the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and member of the bar. 12 This
Court has consistently held that only a clear preponderant
evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh
penalty. It means that the record must disclose as free
from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court
of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly
demonstrated. 13 In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. 14 This complainants failed to do.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B.
QUINSAYAS
G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013
Facts: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the
principal accused in the Maguindanao Massacre. In
November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment
complaint against petitioner for misleading the
prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled
the issues and diverted the attention away from the main
subject matter of the case. Petitioner alleged that from
November 22 to
23 a number of media published information about the
disbarment case against him. Atty. Fortun filed an indirect
contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media group for
active dissemination of the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court on confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quinsayas violated the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting
a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.
Ruling: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant and
as a lawyer in the disbarment case against Atty. Fortun. As
a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is
familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment
complaint against Atty. Fortun to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the
Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act
to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946
up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade
lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades
shall be included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal
defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per
its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946
to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared
in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down
was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission
who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the
end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary
prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice
of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum
norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the
court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to
class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court
could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner.
The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission
to the practice of law.
CRISELDA F. JOSE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
DANILO OMEGA
G.R. No. 128646
March 14, 2003
Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City rendered a
decision declaring that the marriage of respondent Danilo
Omega and petitioner Criselda F. Jose as null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Criselda. During trial, her counsel on record, the Atty.
Margarito D. Yap, represented Criselda. However, notice of
appeal was filed by Criselda without the assistance of Atty.
Yap. For failure to pay the docket fee, however, the appeal
was dismissed and the decision of the trial court became
final and executory. The notice to pay docket fee and copy
of resolution and the entry of judgment were all sent to
Atty. Yap. Later, Criselda inquired from the appellate court
the status of her appeal and claimed that she had not
received any notice from the appellate court. Upon
knowing the notices and other incidents were sent to Atty.
Yap, Criselda, through counsel, reinstated her appeal
through a motion. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion
Ruling: No. It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.
Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
to represent any cause in which he appears. Under Section
22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de parse in
a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. VINE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 137785
September 4, 2000
Facts: On July 12, 1995, petitioner National Power
Corporation instituted a complaint for expropriation of
several parcels of land located at San Agustin, Dasmariñas,
Cavite owned by respondents Vine Development
Corporation and Romonafe Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite. After due
trial, the lower court granted the expropriation of those
parcels of land at a rate of P3,500.00 per square meter.
Petitioner directly appealed to the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the said decision was contrary to law,
jurisprudence and evidence on record. During the
pendency of the appeal, petitioner and Romonafe Corp.
entered into a Compromise Agreement. When the Court of
Appeals required the Office of the Solicitor General (OCG)
to comment on the Compromise Agreement, the (OCG)
commented that the said Compromise Agreement should
be disapproved and the appeal should be resolved on the
merits. During the December 10, 1998 hearing, the
Solicitor General personally appeared and argued that
subject Compromise Agreement suffered from two fatal
infirmities, namely: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the
government and (2) the deputized lawyers if the petitioner
have no legal authority to bind the Solicitor General to the
said Manifestation to the effect that the OCG deputized
counsel of the petitioners have authority to file notices of
appeal of the petitioners have authority to file notices of
appeal in cases being handled by them. However, such
authority does not extend to withdrawal of said appeal,
execution of compromise agreement and filing of
pleadings before the appellate courts without the review
and approval of the Solicitor General. On January 19, 1999,
the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on the
ground that the filing of the said appeal is in violation of
the Administrative Code (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV) which impliedly stated that the NAPOCOR
lawyers have no authority to appear before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. Hence, thus petition.
Ruling: The Court disagreed with the CA ruling that the
deputization of the NPC lawyers excluded the authority to
file appeals in the higher courts. Under Section 2 (a), Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court which pertains to ordinary
appeals, the notice of appeal is filed in the very same court
which rendered the assailed decision, which in this case is
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite. Since the
notice was filed before the RTC, the NPC lawyers acted
clearly within their authority. Indeed, their action insured
that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
Regardless of which mode of appeal is used, the appeal
itself is presumed beneficial to the government; hence, it
should be allowed. After all, the OCG may withdraw it, if it
believes that the appeal will not advance the government's
cause.
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181502
February 2, 2010
Facts: The petitioner filed an application for registration of
a vast tract of land in Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and
harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the
same continuously publicly and adversely for more than 26
years. OSG opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military
Reservation. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of
the public domain. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Subsequently, CA encouraged the parties to reach an
amicable settlement on the matter. The parties entered
into one. However, OSG backed out from the settlement
and informed the CA that the track of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military
reservation. CA ruled in favor of OSG. Petitioner then
wrote letters addressed to Justice Quisumbing and Justice
Puno alleging there was a miscarriage of Justice and that
the petitioner was tempted to go to media regarding the
situation.
Issue: W/N Diaz is guilty of contempt of court.

Ruling: Yes. Diaz has doggedly pursued her case in this
Court by filing three successive motions for
reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this
resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no
further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her
unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this
Court's orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure.
This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to
the media to gain public sympathy — although the tone of
petitioner's compliance with our show-cause resolution
was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters —
constitutes contempt of court.
[G.R. No. 169079. February 12, 2007.]

FRANCISCO RAYOS, petitioner, vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
1. Rayos was a client of Atty Hernandez in Rayos vs
NAPOCOR.
The story of the case:
On Oct 26-27, 1978, typhoon Kading hit Bulacan and
concurrently, NAPOCOR imprudently opened three
floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam which caused
flooding of Angat River. Consequently, 10 relatives of
Rayos died and his family’s properties were destroyed.
Rayos sued NAPOCOR. RTC dismissed the case for lacking
credible evidence. CA reversed the decision and awarded
damages in favor of Rayos, which was also affirmed by the
SC.
Final and executory on Aug 4, 1993. The awards were as
follows:
a. Actual damages - P520, 000
b. Moral damages – P500, 000
c. Litigation Expenses – P10,000.
2. The check issued by NAPOCOR was turned over to Atty
Hernandez as he was the counsel of Rayos. Rayos
demanded the check from Atty H but Atty H refused
3. Rayos filed a motion with the RTC to direct Atty
Hernandez to deliver to him the check. Despite the Court
Order, Atty H refused claiming that it was his means to
ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.
4. Atty Hernandez deposited the amount of P502, 838. 79
to the bank account of Rayos.
5. Rayos filed a disbarment case against Atty H for his
failure to return the remaining P557, 961. 21.
6. Atty H replied: Rayos allegedly agreed to a contingent
basis fee on a 40%-60% (client-lawyer) sharing:
40% - attorney’s fees
20% - litigation expenses
7. The Court referred the case to Commission on Bar
Discipline of IBP for investigation.
Investigating Commissioner recommended the DISMISSAL
of the case.
IBP adopted and approved the same.
MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement is binding
upon Rayos and Atty Hernandez.
DECISION:
YES, but with RESERVATIONS.
CONTINGENT FEE – the contingent fee is the amount
agreed upon by the parties subject to the stipulation that
counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation prospers.
YES: Contracts of this nature are permitted because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause
of action but no means to pay for legal services, unless he
agrees to a contract of contingent fee. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if
the suit fails.
RESERVATIONS: Contingent fee contracts should always be
subject to the supervision of a court as to its
reasonableness. When the courts find that the stipulated
amount is excessive or found to have been marred by
fraud, mistake, undue influence on the part of the
attorney, public policy demands that said contract be
disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable
exaction.
In the case at bar, Atty H collected 53% of the total
amount due to Rayos.
Rayos was unschooled and frustrated with the loss of his
loved ones and the destruction of his family’s properties.
Given these facts, Rayos would easily succumb to the
demands of Atty H regarding his attorney’s fees.
Taking note also of Atty H’s efforts in litigating Rayos’ case
for 15 years and the risk he took in representing Rayos on
a contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount
awarded to Rayos would be a fair compensation for Atty
H’s legal services.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish
the end desired. Thus, guided by previous rulings of the
Court, Atty Hernandez’s SUSPENSION FOR 6 MONTHS is
justified in the case at bar.
-----------------------------------------------------
NB:
Factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his
fees:
Rule 20.1 of CPR:
The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
 to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking
The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; 
 of the easement practically deprives the owners of its
The importance of the subject matter; 
 normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes
The skill demanded; 

The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
The contingency or certainty of compensation;
The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
The professional standing of the lawyer.
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60 G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation
FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the
Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate
electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the
water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages
of the property and a prayer for just compensation. They
alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land;
and that their land had also become an unsafe place for
habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just
compensation
RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
It has the objective to recover the value of property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on
respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period
and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents
are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the
sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It
is settled that the taking of private property for public use,
or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the
rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use
and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value.
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R.
No. 183952, September 9, 2013.
The case initially concerned the execution of a final
decision with the Court of Appeals in a labor litigation.
Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise
agreement with the respondents pending appeal without
informing her counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to
Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and
fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their
attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or
completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent
fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention
to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the
Intervenor’s right to his stipulated professional fees. The
Court did so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on
contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved
by the Court, the payment of the counsel’s adequate and
reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the
settlement of the litigation without the counsel’s
participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the
compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court
because its members are officers of the Court who are as
entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the
client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other
words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the
attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to
see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on
winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the
case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional
services rendered.
Elisa Venterez, Genero de Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez,
Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon De Vera,
Complainants, v. Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme , Respondent |
A.C. No. 7421, 10 October 2007
Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a
land title dispute. The court ruled against the
complainants. They wanted to file a motion of
reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so.
Because of this, the complainants were constrained to
contact another lawyer to prepare the motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the
complainants informed him that the complainants were
withdrawing the case from him because he (the son)
engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme
further explained that he even turned over the records of
the case to the son, ceased to be counsel of the
complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of the
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Held:
The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating
Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR for abandoning the
complainant’s case without a good cause. An attorney may
only retire from the case either by a written consent of his
client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that
the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.
For failing to protect the interests of the complainants, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
The Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for a period of three months.
Angelita Orcino vs Atty. Josue Gaspar
FACTS
Orcino’s husband was murdered and she was zealous in
prosecuting the suspects. She hired Atty. Gaspar as her
counsel and they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorney’s fee
which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his duty religiously
from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the
preliminary investigation. But on the day bail is to be
heard, Atty. Gaspar failed to appear. Bail was granted in
favor of the suspects and this enraged Orcino. She then
went to Gaspar’s residence where Gaspar reasoned out
that he did not receive a notice of hearing hence his
absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino
demanded the records of the case and advised Gaspar that
she’ll be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied and
thereafter he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The
court did not grant his motion because the same was
without Orcino’s written consent. Perhaps changing her
mind, Orcino refused to give her consent. Gaspar,
however, did not attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino
then filed an administrative complaint against Gaspar for
abandoning the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to
his client.
HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is
understandable and is attributed to her over zealousness
to bring justice to the death of her husband. When she
uttered that she’s terminating Gaspar’s services, she did so
in a burst of passion. She did not really mean to terminate
Gaspar at all as evidenced by her refusal to give consent to
Gaspar’s motion.
At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal
services to his client. Unlike the other way around where a
client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relationship with or without just cause. Atty. Gaspar
has no reason to presume that his motion shall be granted
by the court. He should have not left Orcino in the cold
and should have continued appearing for her until there is
a withdrawal of record and a successor placed in his stead.
Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed
to return half of what was paid him.
LUISITO BALATBAT, A.C. No. 1666
Complainant,- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and ATTY. EDGARDO ARIAS
Y SANCHEZ, Respondent. April 13, 2007
FACTS:
In the Complaint[1] dated September 8, 1976,
Luisito Balatbat alleged that he engaged the services of
respondent to undertake his defense in the said civil
case.According to complainant, he did not attend the
scheduled hearings because respondent told him that
there was no need to be
present. But when he verified the status of the case from
the then City Court of Manila, he was surprised to learn
that a Decision[2] dated June 21, 1976 had already been
rendered. Complainant alleged that the enforcement of
the decision caused him and his family untold miseries,
embarrassment and public ridicule.[3]
ISSUE
Won respondent is liable
HELD
YES. Based on respondents own admissions, he
did not properly withdraw as counsel for complainant. The
settled rule is that the attorney-client relation continues
until the client gives a notice of discharge, or manifests to
the court or tribunal where the case is pending that
counsel is being discharged, with a copy served upon the
adverse party.[19] Thus, the only way to be relieved as
counsel is to have either the written conformity of his
client or an order from the court relieving him of the
duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138, Section
26 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 167620 April 4, 2007
CAROLINA B. VILLENA, Petitioner, vs.
ROMEO Z. RUPISAN and RODOLFO Z.
RUPISAN, Respondents.
FACTS
The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to
Felicidad Zamora. Their union bore five children namely:
Consuelo, Erlinda, Alejandro, Rodolfo, and Romeo. Rodolfo
and Romeo are the respondents in this petition. Upon the
death of Felicidad in 1949,3 Nicomedes married Maria
Rosario de Castro (Maria Rosario) on 14 October 1964. The
couple did not have any children. During the marriage of
Nicomedes and Maria Rosario, they acquired certain
properties
ISSUE
WON respondent is liable
HELD
In the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the
payment of docket fees for six (6) days only. The reason
advanced by them was because of poverty. Evidently, in
the cases where the Supreme Court disallowed the late
payment of docket fees, the tardiness was for a significant
period of time.49 Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential
pronouncements, it will be extremely harsh for the Court
to take a lackadaisical attitude towards the cause of the
respondents. We are convinced of the fastidiousness of
the Court of Appeals’ decision.
G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812 February 2, 2007
VICENTE DELOS SANTOS, ET AL,
Petitioners, vs. FRED ELIZALDE, et al,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the
Kalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots
for a total land area of 14,771 sqm, located in
Boracay Island,Malay, Aklan. The Trial Court declared
intervenors Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-
Flores as lawful ownersof two-thirds (2/3) of the disputed
land, and Fred and Joan Elizalde as owners of the
remaining one-third (1/3) of theland. Thus, petitioners and
respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate Notices of
Appeal dated June 6, 1996 and May16, 1996, respectively.
The cases were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for
respondent Elizalde and CA-G.R. CV No.54136 for
petitioners. Subsequently, the CA issued the June
2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners
and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days
from receipt of said notice.
On July 27, 1998, petitioners filed by registered
mail a July 27, 1998 Motion for Extension of Time
to File Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants. In their motion,
petitioners admitted having received a copy of the Notice
to File Brief on June 15,1998; thus, they had until July
30, 1998 to file their brief, and prayed for an
extension of forty-five (45) days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal,
considering it withdrawn as prayed for by counsel,
Atty.Victoriano and for not considering the fact
that said cpounsel was clearly at fault and/or
grossly negligent in theperformance of his duties to his
clients.
RULING:
petitioners claim that the Undertaking or Agreement
allegedly entered into by them and respondents
delos Santos is invalid considering that their purported
signatures in it were forged. They argue that the motion to
withdraw is likewise invalid; therefore, there is no basis for
the withdrawal of the appeal. In other words, petitioners
question the authenticity of said documents, raising a
question of fact.
No meritorious cause.
With the loss of their right of appeal to the CA, we see no respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members
need to resolve the issue of ownership. Such issue should is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw
have been first resolved by the CA, but it was not able to
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty.
do so because of the dismissal of the appeal. Thus, the Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
claim of ownership is a non-issue before this Court. assuming the name, identity, and academic records of
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a
law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly,
PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a.
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or
“ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN”
criminal cases,
A.C. No. 11316, 12 July 2016, (Sereno, CJ)
Conrado N. Que v. Atty Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
FACTS:
A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014
On 2013, a complaint was filed by the real Patrick A.
Caronan against his brother Richard A. Caronan a.k.a.
Facts:
“Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” before the Integrated Bar of the
Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final
Philippines. In his complaint, he stated that he and his
judgment of the lower court against his client. Respondent
older brother both completed secondary education at the
successfully filed a petition of certiorari before the Court
Makati High School and that he finished his college
of Appeals, two petitions of annulment of title and a
education at the University of Makati. Thereafter, he
petition for annulment of judgment before the Regional
applied and got a job at a 7-11 convenience store in
Trial Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of the
Muntinlupa City, working his way up until he was
lower court’s decision against his client.
promoted as
its store manager.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated various canons
On the other hand, his brother enrolled at the Pamantasan
and provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
ng Lungsod ng Maynila and later managed to enter the
(CPR).
Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City but was
discharged. in 1993. The respondent Richard then moved
Held:
to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and three children.
Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple
Patrick said he learned from Richard that he had enrolled
actions praying for the same cause delayed the execution
at St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in Bayombong,
of the final judgment of the court. The respondent’s willful
Nueva Vizcaya using Patrick’s name and college records
and revolting falsehood is also alleged by the complainant
from the UM and that he passed the Bar exams in 2004.
that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and
reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the
ISSUE: WON respondent shall be liable
previous counsel of the respondent’s clients. The
respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond legitimate
HELD
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack
the interests of his clients. The respondent violated his
of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
duty as an attorney “never to mislead the judge or any
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
law.”
eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign
from PSC where he had been working for years. Good
Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR,
moral character is essential in those who would be
and is found liable for professional misconduct for
lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a
violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and
lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his
10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 10; Rules
client, as well as between him and the
12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
court.62chanrobleslaw
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20
(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession
Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from the
by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
practice of law.
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his
alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing
Pollo v. Constantino-David
of several criminal cases against him. Certainly,
G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking
place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent
then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team
“to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from
the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned
over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA).
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the
Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone
on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-
affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against
him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition”
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in
his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an
Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or
to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond
the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining
solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the
motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of
the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have
waived his right to the formal investigation which then
proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a
petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the
ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of
the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a
violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate
his constitutional right.
In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana
of Cebu City
A.C. No. 270, March 29, 1974
FACTS
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty.
Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar
on January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a
notary public and "has exhibited such a frame of mind and
observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a
member of the legal profession," ordered his disbarment.
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court
petitions for re-admission, supported by resolutions from
members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper
editors and reporters, members of professional and civic
organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to
respondent's good conduct and moral character since his
disbarment, and petitioning for his reinstatement to the
legal profession.
The sole object of the Court upon an application for
reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is
to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied
and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the
effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his
character has been successful, and, therefore, he is
entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is
intrinsically an office of trust.
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On
June 13, 1972, he filed a verified petition for
reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and
integrity and other indications of his good moral character
(clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials on
his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City Courts and
of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions
Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of
Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League,
Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for
reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a
resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:
"x x x [A] cling on the respondent's prayer for
reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar, and
considering (a) that respondent movant had been
disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the said
respondent may be considered as having undergone
adequate punishment; (c) that he has observed exemplary
conduct since then, according to credible certifications
attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by
him thirteen (13) years ago, and may be reasonably
expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal
Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous
changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should
offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate
service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that
respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby
required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review
classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his filing
with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the
individual professors of the review classes attesting to his
having regularly attended and passed their subjects, under
the same conditions as ordinary students said movant
Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of
this Supreme Court."
ISSUE
WON Rusiana is allowed to be reinstated to the Bar
HELD
Yes. Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the
lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to
this Court the requisite fees.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements
contained in the Court's resolution, as evidenced by the
sworn certificates by the individual professors of the
review classes attended by him attesting to his having
regularly attended and passed their subjects under the
same conditions as ordinary students, and the separate
letters, both dated February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and
the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of the University of the
Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy
Clerk of Court and Acting Bar Confidant, confirming the
truth of the professors' statements.
JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI and ROMULO CUI
G.R. No. L-1872, August 31, 1964
FACTS
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable
institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge,
of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation
(Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.
(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui.
In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio,
resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio”
entered into between them that was embodied on a
notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice
of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of
the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter
to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be
turned over to him. When the demand was not complied,
Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not
a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all
theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is
not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was
reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession
of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of
certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder
to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree
merely serves as evidence of compliance with the
requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of
all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license
to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as
against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio
was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional
conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated
before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation,
upon proof no less than that required for his admission to
the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.
Florence Teves Macarrubo vs. Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo
424 SCRA 42
FACTS
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In
1986, he began his career as a lawyer. However in 1991,
Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with
Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a
complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves
alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage
with Esparza was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as
her husband but later on left her and then Macarrubo
subsequently married another woman named Josephine
Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves
presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbo’s
marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family.
Macarrubo was initially declared in default for failing to
appear multiple times but was subsequently given the
opportunity to defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo
avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to
save her face because at that time she was already
pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick
Macarrubo up wherever he goes.
He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for being
a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case
serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because
Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He also
avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently
being annulled due to similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that
Macarrubo was never remiss in supporting Teves and the
two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with
her is void, recommended a penalty of three months
suspension from the practice of law for grave misconduct.
ISSUE
Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a
lawyer while his first one is subsisting shall be a ground for
disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD
Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second
marriage is declared void, it is still undeniable that he
contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since
the second marriage is void, he is then liable for
concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give
credit to his defense that both second and third marriages
are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be
coerced. One incident of a “shotgun marriage” is
believable, but two such in succession would tax one’s
credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to
the institution of marriage and family. His acts import
moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic
social institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be perceived to be of
good moral character and must lead a life in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that
disbarment cases are sui generis cases. A disbarment case
is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if
an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course. In this case, the annulment of
Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove
such second marriage as a ground for disbarment.
Constancia I. Valencia v. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw
A.C. No. 1302, A.C. No. 1391, A.C. No. 1543, 30 June 2008
Facts
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the
respondent who was disbarred on 26 April 1991 for
falsifying a deed of sale and introduction the same as
evidence for his client. From 1993 to 2002, the respondent
filed several motions and appeals for reinstatement to the
bar. His motions and appeals were accompanied by
endorsements of his good moral character by various
organizations such as IBP-Pangasinan Chapter; Executive
Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Lingayen and
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Provincial Prosecutors’ Association
of Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club
of Urdaneta; and past National President of the IBP.

Issue
Whether or not the respondent should be readmitted to
the practice of law.

Held
Records show that the long period of respondent’s
disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his
misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to
demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once
again of conduct demanded of every member of the bar. It
is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary
proceedings is restorative justice, not retribution. Guided
by their doctrine and considering the evidence submitted
by respondent satisfactorily showing his contribution and
his being again worthy of membership in the legal
profession, the Supreme Court find that it is now time to
lift respondent’s disbarment.