LEGAL RESEARCH

Submitted to
Atty. Marforth Fua

Submitted by Maria Jean Pearl Manikis

I-O
G.R. No. 167622

Gregorio V. Tongko,vs.The Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co.

(PHILS.), INC. and Renato Vergel de Dios

Ponente: Velasco, Jr.

The Supreme Court found the petition of Tongko meritorious. In

the court’s ruling, basically, it tackles the resolution of the Supreme
Court on the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Significantly, it was found out that there is no such relationship exists.
If no employer-employee relationship existed between the two parties,
then jurisdiction over the case properly lies with the Regional Trial
Court.

As cited in the court ruling in the case of Tongko in determining

of whether an employer-employee relationship exists between two
parties, this Court applies the four-fold test to determine the existence
of the elements of such relationship.

In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld, the

Court set out the elements of an employer-employee relationship,
thus:

“Jurisprudence is firmly settled that whenever the

existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four
elements constitute the reliable yardstick:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
(d) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which constitutes
the most important index of the existence of the employer-
employee relationship that is, whether the employer controls or
has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to
the result of the work to be done but also as to the means
and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
Stated otherwise, an employer-employee relationship
exists where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end
to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching
such end. ”

The NLRC, for its part, applied the four-fold test and found the
existence of all the elements and declared Tongko an employee of
Manulife. The CA, on the other hand, found that the element of control
as an indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship
was lacking in this case. The NLRC and the CA based their rulings on
the same findings of fact but differed in their interpretations.

Thus, The Supreme Court held that when there are particular
rules and regulations to be implemented and followed by the agents or
employees that would directly affect the performance of such agents
to achieve their objectives then such are employees of the company.
Applying this, the Court held that truly Tongko was an employee of
Manulife since the company has the power over him. That being so, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tongko which encourages him file
against Manulife a Motion for Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, regarding the disposition of the Motion for

Reconsideration, it was averred that the original Agreement of Tongko
with the company indicates that he is an insurance agent. There are no
other archived evidence was found to support subsequent stipulations
that would prove that he is not connected with the company.

Consequently, it was found out by the Court that Tongko has

declared himself as business or a self-employed person in his income
tax return, which is contrary to the content of the Agreement
mentioned above that he was an insurance agent in the context of the
Insurance Code and the Civil Code. To the Court, this aspect of the
evidence was not considered in its original decision, which had they
been given importance, would have changed the decision as it is an
admission against interest on the part of Tongko. In addition to that,
there is an issue regarding the principle of estoppel. Concerning the
previous admission of tax returns of Tongko as an independet agent,
which is absurd to be simple disregarded.

Hence, the Court further held that a commitment to abide by the

rules and regulations of an insurance company does not ipso facto
make the insurance agent an employee. Neither the guidelines can
indicate “control” on the agent’s conduct as this term is defined in
jurisprudence.Thus, as will be shown more fully , Manulife’s codes of
conduct, all of which do not intrude into the insurance agents’ means
and manner of conducting their sales and only control them as to the
desired results and Insurance Code norms, cannot be used as basis for
a finding that the labor law concept of control existed between
Manulife and Tongko. Thus, the Court did not see the existence of such
relationship and reversed its earlier ruling which granted Tongko
backwages worth millions.
G.R. No. 176951
G.R. No. 177499
G.R. No. 178056

League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

Ponente: Carpio, J

The Case

On December 2006, there are sixteen (16) Municipalities filed

their cityhood bills in the 13th Congress. The Cityhood Bills contained a
provision exempting the municipalities from the income requirement
imposed by Republic Act No. 9009. Such exemption from the income
requirement was due to the fact that none of the them met the
minimum requirement of at least one hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) locally generated income for the last two (2)
consecutive years. The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) has
questioned the constitutionality of the laws declaring the 16
municipalities into cities. These 16 towns are Mati, Davao Oriental;
Naga, Cebu; Bogo, Cebu; Carcar, Cebu; Baybay, Leyte; Catbalogan,
Samar; Tandag, Surigao del Sur; Lamitan, Basilan; Borongan, Samar;
Tayabas, Quezon; Tabuk, Kalinga; Bayugan, Agusan del Sur; Batac,
Ilocos Norte; Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte; and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.

Summary of the Legal Proceedings

November 2008 Ruling

On November 18, 2008, the Supreme Court, by a 6-5 vote,
nullified the 16 cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution,
specifically its sec. 10, Art. X and the equal protection clause. On
March 31, 2009, a divided High Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.

April 2008 Ruling

On April 28, 2009, the Court, by a 6-6 vote, denied a second
motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
Subsequently, the LGUs filed a motion on May 14, 2009 to amend the
April 28, 2009 resolution.
The Court, per its June 2, 2009 resolution, declared the May 14, 2009
motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made
on May 21, 2009. The LGUs subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 resolution.

December 2009 Ruling

Then on December 21,2009,, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-
4, has reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as
constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts converting 16
municipalities into cities.
The SC then stated that all 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood
from PhP20 million to PhP100 million in sec. 450 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), explicitly exempt respondent municipalities
from the said increased income requirement.
The Court issued an entry of judgment, dated May 21, 2009, in the
consolidated cases of the“League of Cities vs. COMELEC, et al (G.R.
Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056)”. It stated that the decision of the High
Court dated November 18, 2008 has become final and executory.

August 2010 Ruling

The Supreme Court, with votes of 7-6, granted the motions for
reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al.
and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring
unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting
16 municipalities into cities.
It was stated that “Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior
majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior
majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration.
The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same
as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision,” the
Court said.

In the recent resolution of the Court, the ruling was reiterated

from November 2008 that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Art. X
of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no city…shall be
created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code.” It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation
of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code,
the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased
income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the
Local Government Unit.
 Issues in the case of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez: the
Separation of Powers and Temporary Restraining Order issued
by the Court

It is deemed to the public sensation the rise of a constitutional

issue regarding the impeachment of the Ombudsman Merceditas
Gutierrez. Relevant matters uncover, particularly the Separation of
Powers under the Philippine Constitution between the Legislative and
the Judicial Department of the Government; and the request of
temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court to stop the House
committee on justice from hearing the two impeachment complaints
filed against her by former Akbayan Rep. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel and
the militant group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan).

In my view, it is rightful that the impeachment proceedings of

Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez must be deemed to stop. In the very
first place, there were two impeachment complaints against the
aforementioned Ombudsman filed on different dates and with different
petitioners. This means that the complaints cannot be counted as one
because according to the law, there must be only one member of the
House of Representatives who can initiate the impeachment. This
filing of complaint can lead to a violation of the law under the
Constitution, which thus explicitly states that, "No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official [in this case,
the Ombudsman] more than once within a period of one year."—as
cited in Section 3(5), Article XI of the Philippine Constitution.

Regarding the Doctrine of Separation of Powers between the

Legislative and Judiciary, I think that Supreme Court is exercising their
duty well that they see the issue objectively. It is very obvious that the
Legislative Department is performing a grave abuse of discretion even
if they found that in impeachment complaints are in form and
substance because instead of complying with the law written in the
Constitution, the legislatures’ ineptitude is procuring. The Legislative
Department must also realize that there is a concept of Check and
Balances, where even if it is them manages the impeachment trial,
still, the court has its power to check if they are exercising their duty
properly.

Hence, I am thoroughly convinced that if it is in the letters of the

law that there should be "No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official [in this case, the Ombudsman] more
than once within a period of one year.", then the Constitution must
always prevail.