PHIL 4444: AI, SCI FI, AND HUMAN VALUE

(EP4 VALUE SEMINAR)

SYLLABUS – SPRING 2017

Instructor: William Jaworski

Email addresses: jaworski@fordham.edu
Phone numbers: 212-636-6588
Office Location: LL 913E
Office Hours: MW 1100-1130a, W 230-400p, or by appointment

Required Texts
Dick, Philip K. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (New York: Ballantine Books, A Del Rey Book, 1968). ISBN: 0345404475
Jaworski, William. Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) ISBN-13: 9781444333688
Lem, Stanislav. Solaris, Joanna Kilmartin, trans. (Mariner, 2002). ISBN: 0156027607
Additional reading materials on Blackboard (http://fordham.blackboard.com/)

Recommended Texts
Williams, Joseph M. Style: Toward Clarity and Grace. (University of Chicago Press, 1995)

Course Objectives and Expectations

What is it that makes humans special? What sets us apart from other denizens of the cosmos? What in particular gives us moral
value or makes us targets of moral evaluation? What, if anything, grounds the sense that humans are special objects of care,
concern, or moral obligation? Is it something about our biology—that we have large brains, say? Or is it something about our
psychology—that we are intelligent, or rational, or can experience emotions or love? Or does nothing ground the sense that humans
are special? Are we in reality not special at all? Are we really no different from any other collections of physical particles? What,
moreover, is the nature of moral value? Is it something real that exists in the world independent of whether anyone appreciates it,
or is it a human creation, something we make or pretend to make? If the former, could an artificially-constructed machine be
capable of grasping moral value? If the latter, could an artificially-constructed machine be capable of creating it? What implications
do answers to these questions have for how we would treat sophisticated computer systems such as the HAL 9000, Commander
Data from Star Trek, or David from Prometheus? Conversely, what implications do they have for how we ought to treat humans
whose intellectual capacities have been impaired such as the mentally handicapped or people who have suffered severe neural
trauma?
Questions about human value have long been the subject of philosophical discussion. In the twentieth century they were given
new attention in light of artificial intelligence (AI). AI researchers look to construct systems that can simulate human intelligence in
particular domains, but many exponents of AI claim that if the research program were carried out in sufficient detail and generality,
the result would be a system that not merely simulated intelligence, but that actually was intelligent. If this is possible, what are its
implications for our understanding of human value? In trying to answer questions like this, science fiction is a valuable resource.
Science fiction explores human uniqueness by imagining circumstances in which the human condition has been altered through
technology. Science fiction authors are often able to depict the implications of various ideas more vividly than philosophers,
scientists, and others, and because of this, their work provides a rich source for philosophical reflection.
After a primer on logic and argumentation, the course begins with an introduction to AI and a survey of different views of what
we are (Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, Chapters 3 and 12). Some people claim that we are human animals, members of the primate
species Homo sapiens. Others claim instead that we are ghostly nonphysical beings that are merely connected to human animals, or
that we are the brains of human animals. Some even claim that we are nothing at all; that you and I do not really exist. These views
have crucial implications for our understanding of human moral value. For example, if we are ghostly nonphysical beings, then an act
such as killing a human could amount only to destroying someone’s body, something analogous to vandalism, and certainly much
less serious than murder. If, by contrast, we are human animals, then killing a human really is murder. Developing a clear
understanding of what we are is thus a prerequisite for any discussion of what value we have and what that value is grounded in.
The view implicitly assumed in a great deal of science fiction writing is a version of constitutionalism. Constitutionalists claim
that we are mental beings that are merely constituted by human animals. To say that you are constituted by a human animal implies
that you share all your parts with that animal, and yet despite sharing all those parts, you and the animal are different things. The
reason, say constitutionalists, is that you could survive having all your parts replaced by robotic parts but the animal that constitutes
you couldn’t. Unlike the animal, which is essentially a biological being, constitutionalists insist that you are essentially a mental
being. What makes you the same individual from one moment to the next is not biological continuity (your continued life), but
instead psychological continuity, the continuity of your mental states. When it comes to those mental states themselves, moreover,

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the view is committed to functionalism (Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 6). Functionalism claims that mental states are
postulates of abstract descriptions of systems in terms of inputs to them, outputs from them, and internal states that correlate the
two. According to functionalists, all it takes for a system to have mental states is for it to correlate inputs with outputs in the right
kinds of ways. It is this idea that forms the basis of the strong AI research program, the program that aims to create genuine
intelligence: so long as a system correlates inputs with outputs in roughly the way a normal human does, then that system counts as
an intelligent being in just the way a normal human does (Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’; Haugeland, selections
from Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea; Kurzweil, selections from How to Create a Mind).
Constitutionalism combined with functionalism and a psychological continuity account of personal identity is the basis of many
science fiction plot lines. It is, for instance, the basis of the idea that you could survive a Star Trek transporter despite being
shredded to bits by it (Jaworski, ‘Transporters and Human Extinction’). It is also the basis of the idea that it would be possible for you
to become an android or to have your conscious states stored within a computer. But there are serious objections to
constitutionalism, functionalism, and a psychological continuity account of personal identity. The arguments against functionalism in
particular purport to show that AI researchers could never construct genuinely intelligent systems; the most they could ever do is
construct systems that simulate intelligence (Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’; Dreyfus, selections from What Computers Still
Can’t Do). These arguments purport to show that there is something distinctive about human intelligence or human cognition
generally. Dreyfus, for instance, argues that the background of human valuing is what makes human intelligence possible, and
because artificially-constructed systems lack such a background, they could never be genuinely intelligent.
Some researchers argue, however, that what machines could in principle accomplish should still be counted as intelligence; it
would just be intelligence devoid of human modes of valuing (Koch, ‘Intelligence without Sentience’). The possibility of intelligence
divorced from human value raises an important challenge to a long-standing philosophical assumption, namely that intelligence is
the characteristic that makes humans morally special. If intelligence is not what makes humans morally special, or if there is
something about distinctively human intelligence that does, what exactly is it?
Some people suggest that what sets us apart is bound up with—or perhaps just is—the ability to love and be loved. That idea is
evident in Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, in Stanislaw Lem’s haunting novella Solaris, and in the recent film Ex
Machina. Jeffrey Blustein articulates a sophisticated account of love in Care and Commitment. On Blustein’s view, love is a form of
caring for a person that values him or her as unique and irreplaceable. One of the things that poses a conceptual challenge for the
characters in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is the sense that androids are replaceable, and that perhaps humans are too.
Another challenge derives from the sense that androids seem incapable of the same kind of empathy that humans are capable of.
Yet many humans behave in non-empathic ways, and both the androids and the humans in Dick’s novel behave in ways that express
care and commitment.
Lem’s novella places human value and empathy against the starker backdrop of a complex system that is incapable of these
things. Humans discover a planet, Solaris, which is covered by an ocean that is capable of forming itself in ways that mimic extremely
complex patterns – including the patterns in a human brain. When humans set up a space station around the planet, the station’s
inhabitants begin having strange experiences. The ocean responds to their presence by materializing what seem to be human
individuals who are associated with memories the inhabitants have. When the protagonist is visited by a replica of his wife, who died
by suicide years earlier, he cannot help feeling affection for her, yet she is not a genuine human individual; she is a replica based on
his memories of her, his memories of someone who is suicidal, and who has none of the behavioral flexibility that a real human
might have.
The ocean on Solaris creates complex patterns, some of them more complex than humans are capable of creating. In that sense
the ocean can be reckoned an intelligent being in the way Watson (the computer that beat Jeopardy champion Ken Jennings) or
Deep Blue (the computer that beat chess champion Gary Kasparov) can be. Yet the ocean’s intelligence is utterly alien insofar as the
patterns it creates hold no value for it. It can create the replica of a loved one who is specially valued by a human individual, but who
is not in any way valued by the ocean. Distinctively human intelligence takes an interest in what it knows; it values what it grasps,
and it grasps only because it values.
The foregoing reflections raise deeper questions about the nature of moral value in general. Is moral value something real that
exists in the world independent of whether anyone appreciates it, or is it a human creation, something we make or pretend to
make? Generally speaking, moral realists endorse the former position; moral antirealists endorse the latter. A review of the
arguments for and against these positions provides further resources for exploring the implications of AI for our understanding of
human value.

Capstone Statement
This course provides students with a robust set of conceptual tools for discussing human value and evaluating the ways it is
depicted in science fiction, philosophy, and appraisals of AI. It provides a capstone experience in several respects. First, it brings
together in a thematic way many diverse elements of Fordham’s core curriculum. Its discussion of moral realism and antirealism
introduces elements from theology. The moral realism of both Judaism and Christianity, for instance, is committed to the
fundamental goodness of creation—a goodness taken to derive from God’s creative act. Its discussion of AI and the arguments for

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and against it introduce elements of computer science and neuroscience. It also explores the implications of AI for human value
through the medium of film and through literature in the works of Philip K. Dick and Stanislav Lem. In addition, it brings together and
develops further the ideas to which all Fordham students were initially exposed in their philosophy core courses. All Fordham
students cover moral theories in their Philosophical Ethics courses, and many discuss competing accounts of what we are in
Philosophy of Human Nature. Third, the course integrates the students’ own experiences with technology and its depiction in science
fiction. The oral and written assignments described on the syllabus are designed to challenge students to synthesize the
aforementioned elements of the core curriculum (the theological, the biological, the psychological, the literary, and the
philosophical) with an eye to deepening the ways they discuss, understand, and evaluate technology, the possibility of AI, and the
distinctive character of human value. Through those same assignments, moreover, the course achieves the core curriculum’s goal of
eloquentia perfecta: students who successfully complete the course will have greater facility understanding, formulating, and
evaluating arguments, and should be better able to discuss challenging ideas orally and in writing.
Students are expected (i) to familiarize themselves with the Arts and Sciences Policy on Academic Integrity and the severe
consequences of violating it (see Fordham University Student Handbook); (ii) to attend each class session (barring extenuating
circumstances which must be appropriately documented if a student wishes to complete missed work); (iii) to have read the
assigned material; (iv) to be active participants in class discussion; (v) to complete assignments on time; and (vi) to ask their
professor for help if they need it. The professor and TAs are expected (i) to familiarize themselves with the Arts and Sciences Policy
on Academic Integrity; (ii) to attend each class session (barring extenuating circumstances); (iii) to have read the assigned material;
(iv) to be an active participants in class discussion; (v) to grade assignments in a timely fashion; and (vi) to be available to students
who need help.

NOTE 1: NO ELECTRONIC DEVICES ARE PERMITTED IN CLASS!

 Sana, et al. 2013. ‘Laptop multitasking hinders classroom learning for both users and nearby peers.’ Computers & Education
62: 24-31.
 Wood, et al. 2011. ‘Examining the impact of off-task multi-tasking with technology on real-time classroom learning.’
Computers & Education 58: 364-374.

NOTE 2: Your Fordham email account is the source for all official communication regarding the course.

NOTE 3: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, all students, with or
without disabilities, are entitled to equal access to the programs and activities of Fordham University. If you believe that you have a
disability that may interfere with your ability to participate in the activities, coursework, or assessment of the object of this course,
you may be entitled to accommodations. Please schedule a meeting to speak with someone at the Office of Disability Services (Rose
Hill - O’Hare Hall, Lower Level, x0655 or at Lincoln Center – Room 207, x6282).

Grades and Assignments: Grades will be determined according to the following percentages:

Three Argument Rehearsals (10% each): Argument rehearsals are formal writing assignments (usually 3-5 pages each) that rehearse
arguments discussed in class or the readings. A rehearsal is not a summary of a theory or argument; it is not a description of a theory
or argument; it is not a comparison of what competing theories say; it is not a report of what someone said; it is rather the
presentation of an argument (of reasons for thinking something is true or false) written from the perspective of someone who
endorses those reasons. The purpose of rehearsals is fivefold: (1) to give students an opportunity to explore ethical debates in the
course; (2) to give students practice reciting well-formulated arguments, (3) to teach them how to understand, appreciate, and
respect different points of view, (4) to infuse their oral expression with the precision and clarity of the written word, and (5) to
infuse their written expression the fluidity and vibrancy of the spoken word. Rehearsals are typically due at the class session
immediately following the session at which the argument is covered in class. There will be three rehearsals:

1. The argument for a psychological continuity account of personal identity (oral & written- 2 drafts)
2. The fission problem for a psychological continuity account of personal identity (written- 2 drafts)
3. Searle’s Chinese Room argument (written- 2 drafts)

The first rehearsal must be performed orally for the professor in addition to being submitted in written form. Oral performance is
pass/fail. Students who fail an oral must schedule a follow-up appointment to re-rehearse the argument until they pass. Students
who do not pass the oral will receive an F for the entire assignment. Students are allowed to redraft papers after receiving
comments from their professor. Students must submit their redrafts within 5 calendar days of receiving feedback.

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 Audience: The target audience for all formal writing in the course (rehearsals, papers, and exams) is the ideal reader: a college
freshman who is intelligent and well-educated about all subject-matters except the subject-matter students are writing about.
Rehearsals and papers are graded in terms of a single criterion: how well students present and evaluate the arguments.

Style: The style of much academic writing is very bad. As students learn to write academic prose, many take on the bad stylistic
habits they see modeled in the academic prose they’re learning to read. Joseph M. Williams, author of a recommended book on
style, explains: “[A]s a novice in a field reads its professional prose, he will predictably try to imitate those features of style that
seem most prominently to bespeak membership, professional authority. And in complex professional prose, no feature of style
is more typical than clumps of Latinate abstraction… What we should find astonishing is not that so many young writers write
badly, but that any of them writes well” (Style, 13). Williams’ book on style is highly recommended for this course because it
diagnoses many of the stylistic maladies that afflict academic writing, and teaches students how to avoid them.

Preparation and Process: Students should read TIPS on Philosophical Reading & Writing and the Rehearsal Grading Rubric in
advance of writing their rehearsals, and they should use the checklist in the Rehearsal Preparation document to assess their
rehearsals before submitting them. When they receive comments back from their professor they should have a printed copy of
the Abbreviation Key for Comments ready to hand, and make use of Presenting Your Argument Clearly as needed. It will help
them to reread TIPS on Philosophical Reading & Writing several times throughout the semester.

Electronic Submission: Students must use the following guidelines for submitting their rehearsals electronically (if they do not,
they will receive an F for the assignment). Rehearsals must be submitted in Microsoft Word format. Both your document and
the subject line of your email must be titled in the following way: Last Name- Assignment Name- Draft Number.

Research paper (written only – 2 drafts) (25% paper): Research papers are formal writing assignments (usually 8-20 pages) that
require students to conduct independent research on a theory or argument relevant to the subject-matter of the course. Research
papers are like rehearsals in several respects: they are on topics pertaining to the main theme of the course; they must have clear
thesis statements, and they must have well-articulated arguments that support those statements—including arguments that defend
the thesis against opposing views. Here are some examples of clear thesis statements: “Hylomorphism is true”; “The multiple-
realizability argument proves that the identity theory is false”; “The conceivability argument fails to prove that substance dualism is
true”. Research papers nevertheless differ from rehearsals insofar as students choose the topic and conduct research on that topic
independent of what is covered in class or the regularly assigned readings. Students start by familiarizing themselves with the
discussion of their topic in the assigned readings for the course. They then go beyond those readings in a combination of ways
including (1) consulting standard philosophical reference works such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(plato.stanford.edu/), the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (www.iep.utm.edu/), and the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(www.library.fordham.edu/database/philosophy.html), and (2) consulting professional articles on the topic which are either cited in
the foregoing sources or cited in The Philosopher’s Index (www.library.fordham.edu/database/philosophy.html). Students must list
their sources, and should use an author-date system for their references and in-text citations. (For details they can consult The
th
Chicago Manual of Style, 15 Edition.) Students should consult with their professor about their paper topic well in advance of the
due date to make sure it is on target to satisfy to requirements of the assignment. Students will submit an initial draft to their
professor who will give them critical comments. Students will then redraft their papers submit the final draft of their papers by the
last day of class. Papers must be submitted in Microsoft Word format. Both your document and the subject line of your email must
be titled in the following way: Last Name- Research paper. Example: Smith- Research Paper.

Journal (15%): Journals are informal writing assignments in which students describe their encounters with the ethical topics covered
in the class – their thoughts, feelings, comments, and questions about the various ethical theories we are covering and the
arguments for and against them. Journal entries are not required to follow any specific format. They are graded in terms of both
quantity and quality, both how much effort students put into their reflections on the course material, and the quality of that effort.
Students should make twenty journal entries on material covered in the readings, lectures, or discussions (the length of an average
journal entry is approximately 1-2 pages). Among those entries there should be at least one devoted to each of the following topics:

 Animalism and the arguments for and against it

 Substance dualism and the arguments for and against it
 The brain view and the arguments for and against it
 Nihilism and the arguments for and against it
 Constitutionalism and the arguments for and against it
 The psychological continuity view of personal identity and the arguments for and against it
 Functionalism and the argument for it
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  The Chinese room argument, the liberalism objection, and the embodied mind objection to functionalism
 The functionalist argument in favor of AI
 Dreyfus’ arguments against the possibility of AI
 Dick’s vision of AI and its implications for human value in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
 Lem’s vision of human value in Solaris.
 The arguments for moral realism
 Moral antirealist positions and the arguments for and against them
 The idea that moral value is grounded in the goodness of creation

Students are encouraged to get feedback on their journal at mid-semester to check their progress, and ask for suggested
improvements.

In-Class Discussion (5%): Every class session students are assigned to small groups to discuss particular arguments or theses covered
in the lectures or readings. After discussing a particular argument or thesis, one member of the group is charged with the task of
describing for the entire class the results of his or her group’s deliberations. The role of group spokesperson rotates so that each
student in every group has ample opportunity to present material to the class as a whole and to receive feedback on his or her
presentation.

Final Exam (25%): There is a comprehensive final exam administered at a date set by the registrar’s office. It consists of several
essay-questions.

Grading Criteria for Rehearsals

Organization The thesis is clearly stated The argument is stated premise Every premise is Every premise
at the opening of the by premise. defended with is clearly
rehearsal. an argument. explained for
the reader.
Terminology Important terms are The speaker uses technical
defined as soon as they philosophical or logical terms
are introduced and correctly (e.g. ‘valid’, ‘sound’)
illustrated with examples if
necessary.
Mechanics The rehearsal is cohesive The speaker is economical and The speaker
and moves smoothly and direct, and avoids unnecessary uses correct
naturally from one point jargon. grammar and
to the next. The reader diction.
never feels lost.
Performance The speaker’s tone is clear The rehearsal does not sound like
(pertains to and confident. a memorized recitation; the
orals only) speaker instead makes listeners
feel as though they are being
spoken to directly.

Schedule
Week Topics Reading Assignments Class Discussions Writing
Assignments
Introduction to the ‘Presenting Your Argument Clearly’ :
1 course’s themes. Introductory section on logic and §§1,2,6 Lecture
Primer on Copi: ‘What Is Logic?’, ‘Basic Logical
argumentation: sound, Concepts’, ‘Validity, Truth, and Fallacies’
inductive, and
fallacious arguments

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2 What are we? Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 12 Are we human animals or
something else?

3 What are we? (cont) Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, Chapters 1, 3 Is a psychological continuity
account of personal identity true?
4 What are we? (cont) Jaworski, ‘Transporters and Human Could we survive a Star Trek Rehearsal 1
Extinction’ transporter?

5 Moral Realism vs. Miller: Selections from Contemporary

Moral Antirealism Metaethics: An Introduction Is human value discovered or
Bible, Genesis I created?
The Catechism of the Catholic Church
(selections)
6 Human being & human Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind, Sections 4.1- What are the implications of
value 4.4, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7-5.8 various accounts of what we are
for human value?
7 The basic assumptions Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind, Sections 6.1- Rehearsal 2
of cognitive science 6.6, 7.3-7.4 Are there good reasons to favor
Dellarosa Cummins: ‘A History of Thinking’ connectionism or
Haugeland: ‘Turing Machines and computationalism over the
Universality’ other?
Churchland: ‘Cognitive Activity in Artificial
Neural Networks’
Newell and Simon: ‘Computer Simulation of
Human Thinking’
8 Artificial Intelligence Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very
and its popular Idea (selections) Assuming that the assumptions of
depictions Kurzweil, How to Create a Mind (selections) standard cognitive science are
Video: Meet David: true, is it possible to construct an
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJ7E7Q artificial system that is genuinely
p-s-8 intelligent?
Video: Are We Approaching Robotic
Consciousness?:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTOMN In what respects are popular
kZJRao depictions of AI accurate or
Film: Blade Runner inaccurate?
Film: 2001: A Space Odyssey
Film: Star Trek: The Next Generation: The
Measure of a Man
9 Challenges to standard Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind, Sections 4.7- Do qualia-based objections give
cognitive science and 4.8, 6.6-6.10 us good reason to reject the
Strong AI Chalmers: ‘Consciousness and Its Place in assumptions of standard
Nature’ cognitive science?
(http://consc.net/papers/nature.html)
10 Challenges to standard Searle: ‘Minds, Brains & Programs’ Does Searle’s argument give us Rehearsal 3
cognitive science and Kim: ‘Multiple-Realizability and the good reasons to reject Strong AI?
Strong AI (cont) Metaphysics of Reduction’
Does Kim’s argument give us
good reason to reject the
realization physicalist
framework?
11 Embodiment Dennett: ‘Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Do Dennett’s or Dreyfus’
Problem of AI’ arguments give us good reason
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVAKG for rejecting the possibility of
6Y2uIg) Strong AI?

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 Dreyfus: selections from What Computers
Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Intelligence
Shapiro: Embodied Cognition, Chapter 2
Noe & O’Regan: ‘On the Brain-Basis of Visual
Consciousness: A Sensorimotor Account’
Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 10-11
To what extent does work on
embodied cognition provide a
different picture of human
nature? What are the
implications of this picture for
human value?

12 AI & Human Value Koch, ‘Intelligence without Sentience’ Could a system be intelligence
Lem, Solaris without being conscious?
If so, what are the implications of
this for human value?
13 AI & Human Value Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sleep? What role (if any) does human
(cont) uniqueness play in human love?

14 AI & Human Value Blustein, Care and Commitment (selections) Research

(cont) Film: Ex Machina What role (if any) does love play paper,
in human value? journals,
final exam